



BILATERALISM: NEW DIRECTIONS

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As a concept the guiding principle of Pakistan's foreign policy which we call Bilateralism suffers from no confusion or complexity. The idea of conducting and developing our relations with each of the great powers on a bilateral basis, identifying areas of cooperation with one without repudiating an alliance with another and thus evolving an internally consistent and integrated policy requires no justification and implies no moral pretence. The normal mode of maintaining relations between any two countries great or small, is to base them on their joint perception of their mutual interest. Abstracted from the realities and pressures of our turbulent age, Bilateralism is not a newfangled notion. The experience, however of injecting this principle into the body of a country's external relations reveals a certain organic growth. It unfolds important implications and corollaries of the idea which are not always clearly perceived. Having been associated with this experience in government from 1958, I feel that these implications are of more than ephemeral interest. When an idea is sloganized, its original rationale or its concomitants tend to become nebulous. Its edges are blurred, its nuances eclipsed. To put the concept of Bilateralism in perspective, therefore it is necessary that we recall the changes in the global environment of Pakistan's nascency, early development and maturity, and review the adjustments that Pakistan and other Third World countries made to them.

II

This review has to be preceded by the statement of an obvious fact. Even a silhouette of Bilateralism will remain indistinct if it is thought to cover the entire spectrum of a country's external relations. The formation of collective loyalties by sovereign states and their willing acceptance, in whatever degree, of consequent obligations is one of the characteristics of the contemporary world order. A state's membership of the United Nations and its declared adherence to the United Nations Charter, which is now a mark of national independence, engages it constructively in a multilateral relationship. Likewise, on a lower juridical plane and with a relatively limited scope, there exist other associations of states which are formed without any duress or *diktat*. These are generally based on historical background, spiritual or cultural affiliation, geographical contiguity or community of economic interest. For Pakistan, its membership of the Islamic Conference, its bonds with Iran and Turkey and its links with Saudi Arabia as the

¹ Signed article of the Prime Minister Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, released to the press in Pakistan on 30 October 1976, in view of the importance of the article. It is reproduced from Dawn. Karachi, 31 October 1976 — Editor.

cradle of Islam govern a considerable segment of its external relations. Then, there are causes of the emancipation of states from alien subjugation, the ending of usurpation or dominance and hegemony to which Pakistan cannot ideologically forswear its allegiance. The cause of the Arab World, Africa's struggle against racism or residual colonialism and the general interest of the Third World in the establishment of an equitable economic order cannot but decisively influence our attitudes towards international issues and, to that extent, mould our external relationships.

Honoring these obligations is axiomatic and outside the scope of Bilateralism. Indeed, insofar as all these orientations derive from objectively commendable principles, there is nothing in the concept of Bilateralism which postulates a chance in them. Bilateralism would degenerate into sheer opportunism if it meant a deviation from principles, not to speak of their renunciation. What I envision as a correct stance for states with a quantum of power similar to ours is a dignified posture. Not a vestige of dignity can be retained if a state were to lose its foothold on principle and let itself be buffeted by changing expediencies. I have enjoined it as an element of policy on the practitioners of our diplomacy that a developing nation's bulwark against the pressures of the great powers is its unwavering adherence to principles and its capacity to articulate them in a given contingency. The notion is demonstrably false that a great power, *qua* a great power, remains beyond conversion to a principle which it might not itself have espoused. In the contemporary age, when international issues arise that bear upon human destiny, the policy untenable, for a nation is one of alienation from principles.

III

Political commentators have written volumes on the unique historical situation that crystallized after the Second World War and for us, coincided with our attainment of independence. The fundamental difference between the new world order and all its predecessors in history were the emergence of two global powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and their respective identification with two opposite ideologies, each asserting its universal scope, each attempting to propagate itself not only doctrinally but institutionally in other states and each thus seeking to construct a world system of its own choice.

Humanity, of course, had known ecumenical empires before. In the age of empires, however, a great power's dominance was regional end, even with religious sanction, could not cross the limits of the interests of another great power. This was true even of that most expansive of empires, the British Empire, which had to contend with the imperial ambitions of France, Spain and Portugal and, subsequently, of Czarist Russia, Germany and Japan. As a consequence, at certain crucial stages in its career. the British Empire imposed geographical limits itself, not out of any constants on its physical

capacity to expand but through acquiescence in the maneuvers of other imperialist powers.

But, in the era after the second World War, the two super powers tried to girdle the earth and, in so doing, confronted each other virtually in every part of the globe, on the plane of ideology, commerce, diplomacy or wars by proxy. Each of the two protagonists commanded assets unpossessed by previous great powers; each inhabited territory of a near-continental size; each disposed of unprecedented material resources; each aimed at technological excellence and each professed an assertive Ideology. Since neither power ostensibly approved of orthodox imperialism—that is, jurisdiction over other nations' territories through either direct and permanent military occupation or the forced submission of their rulers—their conflict was conducted on a different plane. Their aim was not to subjugate the world in the conventional sense but to control the destinies of nations through a multitude of powerful devices, some open, others invisible, aided by the operation of class interests in other societies and the pervasive influence of the mass media of communication. The contest for global supremacy that took the shape of the Cold War, was something to which history offered no parallel.

IV

If the bi-polarity which was the most striking feature of this situation had been unqualified, the choice before most developing nations and even quasi-great powers in their external relations would have been narrowed to stark either-or terms. Their options would have been reduced to two; side with one super power or the other; be a satellite or an adversary; genuflect or defy; surrender or offer battle. They would have had little latitude for their contacts and less chance of retaining their independence in its plenitude.

In the mysterious ways of Providence, of which history is but a demonstration, the very process which led to the emergence of the two global powers also generated forces that reduced and even precluded these powers' mastery of the globe. Three developments occurred, not casually related to one another, which had the convergent effect of ridding humanity of the asphyxiation that it might have suffered otherwise. In rough chronological order, these were the formation of the United Nations, the emancipation of China and the liquidation of Western colonialism, But for these, the semi-theological categories of the Cold War would have imposed a dreadful simplification on the world and human diversity in the working of international affairs would have been denied.

It was, however, many years before all the ramifications of these three phenomena were clearly seen. As the Cold War persisted in its venom and vehemence, the urgent question before the states which were neither incorporated in the Leninist-socialist

system not belonged to the Western Christian civilization was how to conduct their affairs in such a manner as to protect their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. In more concrete terms, how would they regain their options? How would they preserve some freedom in shaping their relations with the super powers as well as with others? They could take little comfort in the normative principle, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, of the sovereign equality of states. The relationship between a global power and a smaller state could not, in actual fact, be a relationship between equals; the one could extract multiple advantages from the other without responding in sufficient measure, especially when it was engaged in global contest. Was there no other relationship possible between a super power and a smaller state than that of principal and client?

The bulk of the nations of Asia and Africa, especially the newly-independent states, made an instinctive and honorable response to this situation by choosing the path called non-alignment. For the vast majority of them, It was the only possible way in which they could assert their nationalism, preserve their identity, maintain a flexibility of action in their relationship with all powers, great or small, escape an identification with the total strategic interests of one super power at the expense of the other's interests and thus collectively restore some equilibrium to an otherwise unbalanced world.

On the whole, nonalignment has been a balancing force. As practiced by the majority of Asian-African states it has gained the recognition, which it had merited from the beginning of being morally the only valid and practically the only effective policy available to them in face of the rivalry of the great powers. But there has been a canker in the rose. This has been generated by the assumed or professed leadership of the group of non-aligned states by one or more powers that have sought to use nonalignment as a lever for their own diplomacy in pursuance of their own chauvinistic ends. When championed by such powers, nonalignment suffers a distortion and does not reflect the strength which the very number and sincerity of most of its adherents would have imparted to it. Divested of its original meaning and purpose, it can become an instrument of national aggrandizement, a subtle weapon for the promotion of a political hegemony by certain powers and the elimination of rivals within their sphere. In such a case, non-alignment would be vulnerable to the criticism that it carries a patent contradiction within itself. The moment non-aligned countries concert their policies under the leadership of one or more countries aspiring to a great power or quasi-great power status, an alignment crystallizes and they cease to be nonaligned in the sense of not aggravating confusion or disequilibrium in international relations. Happily, this realization has begun to influence the non-aligned movement.

Jawaharlal Nehru made an historic contribution to the evolution of world affairs by articulating the principle of non-alignment By virtue of India's size, importance and

intellect, this contribution would have been an enduring service to peace if he had not also sought to graft on the movement the tendency to hammer away at other Third World countries that had chosen, for compelling reasons, to be aligned with one or the other of the great powers. This tendency stemmed from the lamentable fact that India engaged itself in a major international dispute with its neighbor, Pakistan, in which it actively sought, and depended upon, the support of a super power in defying the solutions of the United Nations. To seek the help of a super power in promoting the purpose or enforcing the decisions, of the United Nations does not vitiate non-alignment; to seek it for frustrating them most certainly does. I mention only in passing here the two facts that India initiated an armed conflict with China and, some years later, entered into a treaty of a military character with the Soviet Union. Little wonder that, in such hands, the concept of non-alignment is translated from the amorphous to the incomprehensible.

A state's tendency to browbeat and morally bully its rival is corrosive to international relationships. In the case of nonalignment, the tendency, whether evinced by India's attempts to ostracize Pakistan or by the hostility of Nasserist Egypt to certain other Arab regimes which was visible at the Bandung, Conference in 1955, warps the content of the idea and prevents this body of Asian-African-Latin American states from providing a new focal point of their collective strength. A closely related factor which diminished the cohesion of the non-aligned movement during a historical phase was the tendency, again on the part not of the non-aligned status as such but one country, to play off one super power against another in the hope of elevating itself to the position of being the indispensable broker between the two and thus playing a great-power role. This was based on the assumption that without its intercession, there could not be a dialogue or detente between the super powers. It is significant that as early as 1963, in his speech to the United Nations' General Assembly, President Tito referred to the changed international situation and said that, in view of it, "the term non-alignment" had "been rendered somewhat obsolete by new positive trends in international relations".

I believe that the still valid concept of non-alignment can be saved from both obsolescence and negativity if the group of non-aligned states remains consistent in forswearing the promotion of expansionist national objectives and also provides a fair and logical answer to certain questions about its composition. By doing so, it will recapture its original terms of reference which forbid an interventionist role that would divide the countries of the Third World and dissipate their total limited strength.

First, what is the principle of inclusion in the ranks of the non-aligned? Does non-alignment mean that there can be material military alignments with Eastern States but there cannot be any alliances of Asian or African countries with the West? The criterion

which is based on the distinction between multilateral alliances and bilateral treaties is illusive because both such engagements are either equally innocuous or equally part of the pattern of great power rivalries. Then again, it is apparent that, despite a diversity in ideological moorings, political systems and economic conditions, the non-aligned movement derives its force from the experience of colonial domination common to all its members. How can, therefore, those states be excluded which have suffered from the same experience and are equally engaged in the struggle to end the iniquities in the international economy? Secondly, the original terms of reference of the nonaligned movement implied an equidistant position from both the super powers and a scrupulous avoidance of using nonalignment as a pressure grouping against neighbors. But when a country, enters into close relations with one great power and still professes to be non-aligned in order to be better able to establish its political domination over a neighboring country then what we witness is alignment masquerading as non-alignment. Such an arrangement is *ultra vires* of the concept of non-alignment.

These questions relate organically to both the concept and the practical expression of non-alignment. If non-alignment is to become a movement of great value once again, it has to restore its pristine image, redefine its objectives and redetermine its priorities. International affairs have now reached a stage when non-alignment cannot afford to limit its votaries to certain high priests and those they regard as their disciples, if other Third World countries are kept beyond the pale, the transcendental issue, of world affairs today would be eclipsed. This is the issue of the division between the exploiters and the exploited, regardless of geographical location, power alignment, race, religion or ideology. In itself not a political contrivance, the division cannot be manipulated for the promotion of any country's specific national policy. The issue demands a mobilization of the energies of the Third World, hitherto unfocussed, not for a conflict with the richer countries but for the dismantling of iniquities, not for the destruction of a particular system but the building of a new economic order through rectification of existing imbalances. Any movement, any grouping, any maneuver that retards the unification of the Third World for achieving this pre-eminently just end will invoke the censure of being little-minded, of ignoring the historical situation and of blocking a radical but constructive response to the challenge of the times.

It is with this consideration that I have recently issued an appeal for convening a conference of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America at the summit level. I am convinced that the idea of an inclusive forum of the Third World will be perceived as an enlargement and evolution, and not, as a negation of the concept of non-alignment,

V

I have not felt the need to be apologetic about the agreements or understandings of mutual defense and cooperation that have existed between Pakistan and the United States. Insofar as they are intrinsically consistent with Pakistan's self-interest, untainted with any dishonorable motive, directed against no other power's legitimate interest and as they do not fetter Pakistan's standpoints nor hamper its loyalty to the causes of Asia and Africa, Pakistan is under no necessity of repudiating these agreements merely to establish its credentials as a member of the Third World and a promoter of its supreme aims. These credentials are the vital tissue of the organism of a state that was born in a glorious struggle which carried the force of a thousand years of history of a nation inhabiting the heart of Asia, of a people authentically Asian in their personality, of a country situated in the immediate proximity of China and the Soviet, Union and of a society sharing the culture and civilization of the Middle East.

What for a certain time obscured these realities was not any agreement with the West but the way it was interpreted by one side or understood by the other. The result was that, for a time, Pakistan found itself maladjusted to its world environment and the Asian-African situation, The impression was created that Pakistan wished to escape its geography, falsify its identity, ignore its long-term interests and barter away the freedom of choice without which independence is but a myth. If I have sought to do anything in our external affairs, it has been not only to dispel this impression but also to lend an authenticity to our foreign policy. A foreign policy is inauthentic if it does not articulate a nation's psychic urges nor reflect an awareness of the historical process. The struggle to add this dimension of depth to the totality of our external relationships has not been an easy one.

Intrinsically, there is nothing repugnant to the values and objectives of the common cause of the Third World if an Asian, African or Latin American country enters into an alliance with either the East or the West. An element of repugnance is introduced by discrimination and non-reciprocity.

I shall not analyze here the causes of Pakistan's entanglement during the 1950s in situations which were as anomalous as they were inimical to its national interest. To be fair to all those who managed the nation's affairs at that time, the motive force was a quest for security. Alone among the newly-independent major states, Pakistan was born embattled. As early as two months after its establishment, the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who was not given to exaggeration, felt constrained to talk of "a well-organized and well-directed" plot to force Pakistan "to come into the (Indian) Union as a penitent, repentant, erring son" and, to that end, "to

paralyze the newborn state". This he said on 24 October 1947, three days before India sent her troops to Kashmir, to prevent that state's rightful accession to Pakistan. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that Pakistan's overriding concern in the early years was the security of the country. This was at a time when the United States was nonpareil and promised not only a firmer military underpinning than could be obtained from any other quarter but a large and generous economic assistance. With the added, and enduring, factor of a facility of dialogue with the United States, the consequent alliance could not be deemed unnatural.

While these factors cannot be ignored, it would be a falsification of history to dismiss on this account the contradictions in which Pakistan continually involved itself, in conducting its external affairs. Some examples are most pertinent.

Pakistan was among the states which recognized the People's Republic of China soon after its establishment. Yet, some years later, while still maintaining the recognition, it persistently voted in the United Nations against the immediate representation of China by its legitimate and recognized government (*See Annex 1*). In 1956 despite the first journey of a Prime Minister of Pakistan to China and on the eve of Prime Minister Chou En-lai's return visit, Pakistan still supported action to exclude the representatives of the People's Republic of China from the United Nations. When in September-October 1958 a clash over Taiwan seemed possible, Pakistan went so far as to disregard the implications of its own recognition, of the People's Republic of China and conveyed the message to the Chinese that "the juridical position of sovereignty over Formosa" was not clear (*See Annex 2*).

On 2 June 1949, the USSR conveyed an invitation to the Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit Moscow. The invitation was accepted and announced but, when the Soviet Union suggested the exchange of Ambassadors between the two countries prior to the Prime Minister's visit, it was officially stated in Pakistan that the exchange could not be achieved immediately due to "a shortage of personnel" in Karachi (*See Annex 3*). While Moscow's invitation was thus virtually spurned, a later invitation from Washington, which had the appearance of an afterthought, was promptly accepted. In April 1950, the visit to the Soviet Union was shelved, only to materialize fifteen years later after many changes of governments in Pakistan and a considerable transformation of the international scene.

These contradictions surfaced not only in Pakistan's relations with the great powers. What was its attitude towards the Islamic world? On the one side the national leadership at the time made the claim that Pakistan was "the fortress of Islam". On the other, a former Prime Minister, referring to the Muslim countries, delivered the celebrated verdict that "zero plus zero plus zero still equals zero" (*See Annex 4*). On the

one side, with Pakistan's leadership of the campaign against the dismemberment of Palestine in 1947, there were protestations at undying support to the Arab cause. On the other, Pakistan adopted a policy of dither and equivocation over the historic Suez Canal issue in 1956.

These are but a few outstanding examples of the kind of thinking which governed Pakistan's foreign policy and which I had encountered in the first meeting on the subject held under Ayub Khan's president ship, (*See Annex 6*). None could be ascribed to an objective concern with security. Other elements played their part. There was the fact of Pakistan's inexperience in international affairs. Who but a novice would expect that by providing the Bada Bar surveillance base to the United States. India would be made to "disgorge" Kashmir? It was this base which figured in the famous U-2 incident in 1960 and provoked the public threat from the late Mr. Khrushchev that the Soviet forces would wipe out Peshawar (*See Annex 6*). A U.S. Senator visited this base, asked a Pakistani official what compensation Pakistan had received for it and, on hearing the reply, remarked. "You Pakistanis are suckers. For less important bases, hundreds of millions are given". In addition to the element of naiveté, there was a lack of integrity in a national leadership which was tied to the interests of a limited class of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats and, therefore, removed from the people's urges and aspirations. The offer of Pakistani troops to fight in Laos in 1961, reminiscent of an earlier half-suppressed thought relating to Korea in 1951, was a proof that the country's rulers regarded its soldiers as no more than cannon-fodder. Such a ruling class, itself incapable of understanding the historical situation, is prone to psychological projection and apt to imagine that the other side is equally unsophisticated. Only this explains Ayub Khan's resounding promise, in his address to the U.S. Congress in 1961. that Pakistan would one day be the only country in Asia to stand by America (*See Annex 7*). Not realizing what this implied, Pakistan's ruling class was wont to express surprise that in the Asian-African environment, the country had been relegated to a political quarantine.

VI

The crowning absurdity of this state of affairs was revealed in October-November 1959. At that time, reports were already available of a dispute between China and India about an area in Ladakh, in the territory of the Jammu and Kashmir State. On 23 October 1959, however, President Ayub Khan addressed a press conference at which he dwelt on "the serious threat from the north", said that events on the Tibet border would make the Subcontinent militarily vulnerable", and emphasized the necessity of India and Pakistan coming together to meet the danger (*See Annex 8*). He followed this by a statement made in an airport interview on 3 November about "the latest Chinese incursion in Ladakh", saying that It was "India's problem" (*See Annex 9*). On 8 November, he was

again reported to have said that "Chinese occupation of Tibet" was posing "a serious threat from the north". It must be remembered in this context that China had notably resisted all Indian blandishments in the heyday of Sino-Indian friendship and refused to support India's claim to Jammu and Kashmir.

I was not in charge of the country's foreign affairs at the time, in New York, leading the Pakistan delegation to the General Assembly. I was filled with a sense of foreboding at these reports. It was not only that the head of Pakistan's Government was making an offer of joint defense to India which only those unlettered in international affairs would hope to be accepted or reciprocated. That was humiliating enough. What was dangerous was that, in the process, he was serving notice to China of Pakistan's hostility and, in addition, lending sanction to India's claim to Kashmir, the very claim which Pakistan had challenged through all the years and the United Nations had refused to recognize. This was how Pakistan's interpretation of the alliance with the United States was damaging Its enduring national interest.

Realizing how hard it would be to unlock the government from this self-stultifying, indeed suicidal position, how a frontal attack on the then prevailing philosophy would be parried and how much tact would be necessary to wean the country away from the stance it had adopted, I addressed a letter to Ayub Khan immediately after reading these press reports (*See Annex 10*). In the letter dated 11 November 1959, I reminded him that, by "the statements we have made" and "the entire attitude" we had evinced, we could be taken to have tacitly recognized India's authority over the part of Kashmir under its occupation and to justify any augmentation of Indian forces in Kashmir, contrary to the United Nations resolutions. I then suggested an authoritative pronouncement, possibly in the form of a letter to the Security Council, safeguarding Pakistan against these dangers. China may not, I added, "react adversely to a statement from Pakistan questioning the very basis of the stand taken by India regarding Ladakh". I also sent a copy of this letter to Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir and suggested to him that we "examine, the whole question in depth and not let the India-China situation regarding Kashmir drift and develop to our detriment" (*See Annex 10*).

President Ayub Khan realized how he would be denounced by the people if he appeared to have weakened Pakistan's position on Jammu and Kashmir. Changing his tune upon the receipt of my letter, he stated on 23 November that Pakistan would not recognize any arrangement between India and China in Ladakh as the area was a disputed territory between Pakistan and India (*See Annex 11*). As suggested by me, he also authorized our Permanent Representative at the United Nations to address a letter to the President of the Security Council which reserved Pakistan's position and declared that "pending a determination of the future of Kashmir through the will of the people impartially ascertained, no positions taken or adjustments made by either of the parties

to the present controversy between India and China or, any similar controversy in the future, shall affect the status of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir or the imperatives of the demilitarization and self-determination of the State". The letter added that it would be "for the sovereign authority freely evolved by the people of Jammu and Kashmir to effect, or refuse to effect, any adjustment of its frontiers with any foreign power" (*See Annex 12*)

While seemingly centered on the restricted question of Jammu and Kashmir, this was the first demonstration by Pakistan of its capacity to maintain its national position in a contingency even when such maintenance ran counter to the tactical considerations weighing with the great power with which it had allied itself. As I envisioned it, such a course of action would not connote any weakening, far less a termination of the alliance. All that it would indicate was that the smaller party in the alliance would not suffer its national interests to be overlaid. In this way, the alliance would gain strength by an infusion of realism and equity. An alliance is but a tissue of strains and frictions, of no benefit to either side, if it submerges the interest of the smaller partner, it acquires solidity when it reassures the one that needs such reassurance that his interests will be duly protected and advanced.

A year later, on 14 October 1960, I wrote to Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir about Pakistan's vote on the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations (*See Annex 15*). This vote was becoming preposterous and earning no respect for Pakistan from nations not wedded to the Cold War. I wrote that I could not see why Pakistan should not be considered a staunch ally, any less than certain countries (Norway and Denmark) which had voted against the U.S., if it took "a stand on the merits of the question and a recognition of realities". This led to a Cabinet discussion in November 1960 at which it was decided to support China's legitimate representation at the United Nations (*See Annex 14*). It is a matter of history how these small beginnings led to bigger results in the form of establishing contacts with China, negotiating and concluding a boundary agreement with her, and opening the era of cordiality and close friendship between Pakistan and her great neighbor.

Along with establishing contacts with China. I was also feeling the necessity of initiating a dialogue with the Soviet Union. Immediately after my return from the United Nations in October 1960, as Minister for Fuel and Natural Resources. I announced my intention to go to Moscow to discuss the possibility of Soviet assistance to Pakistan in the exploitation of our oil and mineral resources (*See Annex 16*). The terrain was roughened for me by my own government. Some influential members of Ayub Khan's cabinet counseled that the visit would be "inadvisable". When persistent arguments broke this resistance, the key man in my delegation who had gone to Delhi, claimed to be sick. Another of my principal advisers was instructed not to stay with me

in Moscow for more than a few days. I was directed to return home a day before the agreement which had been evolved was to be signed. It was finally signed by me and the Soviet Ambassador in Karachi. But for this purblind attitude of Pakistan's erstwhile rulers towards the Soviet Union on the one side and the regrettable trend in Soviet policy of closely associating Soviet interests with India's in our region, on the other, the beginning I had attempted in 1960 could have paved The way for an uninterrupted course of friendly and fruitful relations between the two countries.

VII

I need hardly narrate here the whole story of international developments directly involving Pakistan between 1960 and 1966. For a time especially In 1963-1964 and up to the war of September 1965, Pakistan sought to regain its capacity to respond to the dynamics of the world situation and remove itself from a narrow, one-dimensional, all-or-nothing basis of relationship with great powers. On a visit to the Subcontinent in 1962. Dr. Kissinger had observed that America had been suffering from "pactitis". The observation, based on a keen perception of an evolving world situation, could no longer be ignored. A national personality programmed to react to signals from one source alone could be an asset neither to itself nor to its allies. For its own benefit and in the larger interests of restoring a balance to our region, Pakistan decided to activate its diplomatic arteries with both China and the Soviet Union. These channels had remained open although few cordial communications had earlier flowed through them. During the India-China conflict in 1962 there were representatives of certain vested interests in Pakistan who wanted to allow American military equipment to be moved to India through Pakistan. The time had arrived to thwart the designs of such interests.

This progress was, however, arrested by two sets of developments. One was the considerable pressure put on Pakistan by the obsessive hostility of the Lyndon Johnson administration in the US towards China and by the pressures it exerted to force a change in Pakistan's policy. Such was the extent of the suspicion with which that administration viewed every move regarding China that, in August it suspended a \$ 4.3 million loan for the Dacca airport because Pakistan had signed a civil aviation agreement with China. The cancellation in April 1965 of an invitation to Ayub Khan to visit the United States, the postponement in July 1965 of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium meeting, the imposition of an arms embargo during the India-Pakistan war of 1965 which operated to the direct detriment of Pakistan and not of India, the warning to China on 16 September 1965 against helping Pakistan – all these were actions against the policy of dialogue and friendship with China.

The other set of developments, paralleling the first but traceable to a similar source, was the Soviet attitude in the Pakistan-India war of September 1965 and the issuance of the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966.

Neither of these chains of events would have confused Pakistan's foreign policy if the country had a leadership which understood the complexity of international relations and could maintain a serenity and a steadiness despite temporary setbacks. It is ironical that the correctness of Pakistan's policy towards China was vindicated for the United States by subsequent developments in the world situation—but, thanks to the ineptitude of a junta in Pakistan, at Pakistan's colossal expense. As far back as 1965-66. I had conveyed to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk that Pakistan could serve as a bridge between China and the United States. When, in a conversation I had with Dean Rusk in Ankara, this possibility was explored, Ayub Khan took alarm and said that we should not "burn our fingers" (*See Annex 16*). More than fingers were burnt when, in 1971—five crucial, destructive years after I had first put forth the proposition—Yahya Khan's regime made arrangements for Dr. Kissinger to fly through Pakistan on his secret mission to Peking. The event itself, the inception of a direct dialogue between China and the United States, could not have been more felicitous for Pakistan, "Do not forget the bridge which you crossed in coming here", Premier Chou En-lai said to Dr. Kissinger in Peking. But, from Pakistan's side the development fell into a context—the civil war in East Pakistan and tensions on the border with India—which provoked the kind of speculation that could easily have been avoided if parallel approaches had been made to reassure the Soviet Union. In the actual setting, the immediate sequel to Dr. Kissinger's journey through Rawalpindi to Peking was the *coup de grace* dealt by the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971, the draft of which had remained under consideration for three years. Nothing but this treaty enabled India to launch its armed invasion of East Pakistan in November 1971.

The relationship between Pakistan and China has withstood the stress of that and other lesser developments. Its strength lies in its sincerity on both sides. But the essence of Bilateralism is that a sincere relationship need not be converted into an *affaire de coeur* which disregards circumspection and imposes a strain on both sides.

Some years earlier, after the Tashkent Declaration in 1966, Ayub Khan made some rather disingenuous attempts to laud the Soviet Union for its intervention. This showed that, though he was persuaded of the necessity of establishing friendly relations with China and the Soviet Union, he did not grasp the basic principle that Bilateralism flows from the sum of relations between two countries and does not hinge on a single development. My standpoint, which I stated in official memoranda, was that good relations with the great powers should not be made dependent on each and every initiative either in favor or otherwise, for then there would be no continuity or certainty

in state relations (*See Annex 17*). But in a setting where the approach to international issues is temperamental, pleadings at this kind remain unheeded. I may mention here the personal fact that, witnessing a drift in Pakistan's policy and finding fruitless my expositions of Bilateralism. I resigned as Foreign Minister in 1966.

VIII

During the years that have elapsed since, there have occurred some global developments which in a historical perspective, are almost of the same magnitude as the three (i.e., the establishment of the United Nations, the liquidation of colonialism and the emergence of China) which I mentioned earlier. Briefly, these are first, the reassertion of nationalism not only in the Third World but also in the Western and Socialist Worlds; second, the achievement, despite current difficulties, of economic prosperity in Europe, Japan, the Socialist world and the oil-producing countries, which has led to a dispersion of centers of power and, third, the policy of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union following the attainment of nuclear parity by them. All these have created an objective world situation in which the terrain for the exercise of Bilateralism is not only smoother but which has made Bilateralism essentially the ground on which a developing nation can base its contacts with great powers. For Pakistan, there has been the phenomenon of its resurgence after the shattering events of 1971. Were it not for this revival, I would not be expounding the constituent principles of what I regard as a viable foreign policy.

A pre-requisite of clean and consistent bilateral relations is the substance of non-alignment in the sense that the relations are confined to the limits of the common national interest of the two powers concerned and do not exceed these limits inimically to the interest of a third country. This provokes the question how bilateral relations can be maintained by a smaller state with a global power when the latter's tactical or strategic interests are opposed to the former's national interest in a certain situation. The answer is that this point of conflict can be insulated in direct dealings with the great power concerned and a workable equilibrium should be sought independent of this point, provided, of course, the segregation of the conflicting interest is scrupulously mutual and reciprocal. By removing, as far as it can, the point of conflict from the channel of a direct and barren encounter, the smaller state retains the freedom to vindicate its stand. This it can do by mobilizing the moral support of world opinion which may persuade the great power concerned to alter its position in its own independent interest (*See Annex 17*).

This implies a gradation of relationships but with the minimum of strain or tension. The gradation is determined by the degree of recognition a state receives of its position of principles an major international problems in which it is directly involved. If a state

were to ignore the help and support which it has received from one power and try to maintain as much cordiality or correctness with it as with another power that has withheld such assistance, then it would cease to command respect and would forfeit its credit. When a state does not impose support on contentious issues as a pre-condition on the exploration of other avenues of mutual cooperation, it does not thereby declare that such support has no relevance to the level, degree of warmth or intimacy of state relations.

Reciprocity is thus the obverse of the coin. When a smaller state seeks its relations with the great powers to be consistent, when it does not let relations with one cut across the ambit and scope of relations with another, when it refrains from pro-determined partiality in a great power conflict, it expects a basic reciprocity from the other side. A commitment of policy in state relations cannot be one-sided. It is not equitable that a smaller state should impose a self-denying ordinance on itself without a similar response from the other side in the bilateral relationship. Such relationships must reflect agreement on certain fundamental principles between the two states. Otherwise, the smaller state can be reduced to a pitiable satellite and Bilateralism will degenerate into a baneful alignment.

The irreducible minimum of reciprocity is mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. This needs hardly to be elaborated. There are few countries in the world that have not subscribed to these principles which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on World Peace and Cooperation issued by the Bandung Conference in 1955 and numerous other texts of international law. It is difficult to see how two states can have any kind of relations unless they are prepared to accept the geographical boundaries of each other's national territory, acknowledge each other's sovereignty and undertake not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. But, in the very nature of things, this obligation rests more heavily on the great power than on the smaller one in a bilateral relationship for it is not the smaller power which can question the great power's state frontiers or try to interfere in its internal affairs. The great power itself may not do so but it may acquiesce in, or encourage situations in which doubt is cast on the smaller power's territorial integrity or its right to determine its own affairs. It is one thing for the smaller state to segregate from mutual relations those questions on which the perceptions of the two countries differ and to try to prevent the difference from spilling over into the broader areas where agreement exists. It is altogether another to suffer a compromise, or turn the other cheek, when matters as fundamental as territorial integrity or political independence are involved. No one can take pride in bilateral relations with adversaries whose policies run counter to his basic interests. Moreover, there cannot be an equivalence in what is called *quid pro quo* in bilateral relations between states of unequal international stature. To the degree that the one commands

wider international influence and disposes of a larger quantum of power, its return for the other's friendly cooperation has to be greater. Every act which denotes a withholding of this return will call for a corresponding and measured response. The relationship may not be served but the necessary conclusion will be drawn and a different pattern will be evolved.

An intermediate question arises here: Can an alliance between a great power and a developing nation remain intact in a bilateralist scheme of foreign policy? The answer is in the all affirmative but the question could be nagging only if one were to ignore the entire thrust of decades of effort by the great powers backed by the counsel and importunities of world opinion. Since the whole objective of this effort has been to establish a *modus vivendi* between the super powers and since also the contingency of a war between them, which would mean total annihilation, recedes farther from reality, the first duty of a party to a defense alliance with a great power relating to the eventuality of an all-out war involving that great power does not have the imminence and the urgency to pervade all diplomatic approaches and understandings towards peace. This is so regardless of a country adopting a bilateralist stance or otherwise.

There have also been other developments in the international situation which govern the interpretation of alliances equally on both sides. The invention of inter-continental ballistic missiles a decade and a half ago brought about changes in military strategy as a result of which the original concept of peripheral defense was modified and the importance of military pacts, insofar as they were based on that concept, was altered. In a changed environment, the original scenario of pacts creating power amalgams or consolidating various nations into units of total power inevitably underwent a drastic revision. Again, Bilateralism was not the agent but the product of this change.

Moreover, the proposition that Bilateralism, is not incompatible with alliances is backed by the visible phenomenon that alliances do not constitute all-embracing, categorical imperatives for either side. They do not chart a straight and narrow path of compliance from which the smaller state is not permitted to deviate; if they did, diplomacy would be denuded of its moral content and purpose. Thus, there is a large room for the exercise of their own diplomacy by states in accordance with what they perceive as their national interest. In order to endure and to escape anomalies and irritations, an alliance has to accommodate the interests of both sides. Here again however, the accommodation cannot be equal. The vital interests of a great power are secured by its very greatness while those of a smaller state associated with an alliance may be in jeopardy without that affiance. Were the associated state to acquiesce in the shelving of its deep concerns and accept a position of diktat, what insurance could it have that, in the dynamics of international affairs, the dominant state would not at some stage consider the alliance obsolete?

This leads to a two-fold conclusion first, Bilateralism does not *per se* repudiate alliances with the great powers; second, the combination of a bilateralist stance and an adherence to an alliance does create difficulties in the actual conduct of international affairs. The difficulties and the strain are accentuated in situations where a particular alliance system or organization, divorced from the bilateral agreements or understandings between its members has lost the cohesion and strength envisaged for it in a different historical situation. What Bilateralism seeks to do is, firstly, to fasten on those elements in an alliance which remain relevant through all the changes in the global environment and, depending on reciprocity, carry out the obligations flowing from them and, secondly, to demarcate the area which is not covered by these elements and exercise the states options in it. What determines this exercise?

IX

It goes without saying that a country is primarily actuated by its national interest. But where the impingement of an international issue on this interest may be uncertain or doubtful and where the interest itself may be open to question, the only yardstick for judging an issue is its merits. I know that every party to a dispute holds that the merits of the case are on its side. But I assert that this is no reason why merits should be cynically disregarded. There are objective criteria for determining them. These are furnished by (i) the established principles of international law; (ii) the resolutions of the United Nations; (iii) treaty, obligations; (iv) the accordant or variance of a party's standpoint on the dispute with both its own previous statements or declarations and the settled position of other governments on similar issues in other contexts; (v) the readiness or unwillingness of a party to a dispute to have recourse to the methods of peaceful settlement outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, and (vi) the recommendations of a regional machinery for the settlement of a dispute which may be established when other criteria do not yield a definite judgment.

There is no need for me to elaborate these criteria as they are exhaustively discussed in the jurisprudence of the United Nations. Much though the world organization presents a spectacle of futility, acute though is the world's loss of faith in its efficiency, the powerlessness of the United Nations is not an argument for an international issue to be judged other than on its merits. If it is not the recommendations, or decisions of the United Nations that serve to bring an international situation into alignment with the rightness of a cause, then the task is accomplished, at much greater cost, by the movements of peoples and the operation of historical forces. An active United Nations or not, the future in international affairs can be organized only along the lines of merit, power politics may distort a right or delay the evolution. But even the contemporary

age, with the discouraging examples of Kashmir and Palestine, has not conclusively proved that the fabrications of power politics will not prove flimsy in the long run.

Two disparate examples from Pakistan's current concerns may, be pertinent here. One is our dispute with India regarding the disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We have taken, and we will take, no position on this dispute which does not satisfy objective criteria of merit. The second is the far less vexatious and stubborn question of Pakistan acquiring a reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which I regret, has been wholly, misunderstood by certain elements in the United States.

These elements are, I concede, motivated by a concern about the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the circles of the five nuclear powers. Pakistan shares that concern. If anything, it has more cause for apprehension about proliferation of nuclear weapons than even the most humane opinion elsewhere. We have repeatedly and voluntarily given categorical assurances about the peaceful Intent of our nuclear programme. Lest it be thought that these are just-verbal pledges, we have accepted Iron-clad IAEA safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities. We have gone even further and accepted the most stringent conditions from France, the supplier of the reprocessing plant, which fully conform to the guidelines adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries. The agreement for the supply of this plant was accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral safeguards agreement with IAEA approved by its Board of Governors by consensus. Moreover, we have worked out fail-safe expedients with Canada and the Federal Democratic Republic of Germany regarding an atomic reactor and a small heavy water plant respectively. There could not possibly be a more convincing earnest of our commitment to use our nuclear facilities for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Thus, Pakistan's going ahead with its peaceful nuclear programme is a non-event as far as nuclear proliferation is concerned. That this should be turned into an event while the unrestrained nuclear programmes of Israel, South Africa and India are considered non-events is a dismal commentary on the regard for merits shown by those who ostensibly would not like to ignore them. India is reported to have plans to carry out a series of nuclear explosions, having already conducted one on our doorstep. Her nuclear capability was built on the materials and technology she derived from an unsafeguarded reactor and heavy water supplied by Canada and the United States respectively. Can it be claimed that there is not some discrimination involved here? Does it prove that the nuclear monopoly of the great powers is being judiciously used in the interests of peace and equilibrium? Not only Pakistan but a large number of nonnuclear-weapon states would be gladdened by a convincing assurance on this score.

If a developing nation scrupulously forswears any interest in the continuance or exacerbation of a conflict between the great powers, it correspondingly devolves on the great powers not to tacitly approve or aggravate regional imbalances. Only thus can bilateral relations between the great and the developing nations be free from strain. Only thus can that framework of principles be strengthened within which a state can pursue its objectives in external affairs without becoming a liability on a great power, without eroding its associations or repudiating its undertakings. Unpretentiously. Bilateralism provides such a framework.

In matters of men and state, it is not possible to achieve a formulation which takes into account all variables and unforeseen contingencies. Some element of simplification is unavoidable in the quest for the bases of dealing with complicated situations. "By their fruits, we shall know them". Prior to the adoption of Bilateralism, Pakistan's foreign policy was, at worst, capricious and at best, one of pragmatism planted on a half-forgotten ideology. With the adoption of this principle, Pakistan has steered itself through the treacherous shoals and currents that menace the passage of strategically placed states in the complex, contemporary age. Bilateralism has provided a safe chart for this kind of navigation. More importantly, it has helped Pakistan to fulfill, as well as it can, the Islamic injunction of integrity in international dealings. The injunction is immutable.

Sd/-
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
30th October 1976.

Annexes

(Documentation Supplied by the Cabinet Division and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and information) See authorization.

1. Question of China's Representation at the United Nations Pakistan's Early Record,
2. Juridical Position of Taiwan: Pakistan's standpoint in 1958.
3. Invitation from the Soviet Union and Pakistan's Response in 1949.
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8. President Ayub Khan's Statement on 'Danger from the North' and Joint Defence with India,
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10. Letters addressed by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Leader of Pakistan Delegation to the UN. to President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir on the situation in Ladakh.
11. President Ayub Khan's Retraction of Earlier Statement Regarding Ladakh.
12. Excerpts from letter Dated 3 December 1959 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council.
13. Chinese Representation at the UN Change in Pakistan's Policy.
14. Resume of Cabinet Discussions on Foreign Policy in November 1960.
15. Mr. Z.A. Bhutto's Announcement of Proposed Visit to Moscow for Aid in Oil Exploration.

16. Excerpts from Memorandum addressed by Mr. Z.A. Bhutto Foreign Minister, on 11 May 1966 from Dacca to President Ayub Khan through Foreign Secretary.
17. Excerpts from official Memoranda by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Foreign Minister-1966.

Annex I

Question of China's Representation at the United Nations Pakistan's Early Record.

The Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed in Peking on 1 October 1949, after the final defeat of the Chiang Kai-Shek forces by Chinese Communists. Pakistan was among the first to extend recognition (on 4 January 1950) to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Accordingly, when the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations was raised at the Session of the General Assembly held that year with India moving a draft resolution that the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic represent China. In the United Nations, Pakistan voted in favor of this resolution.

Between 1951 and 1960, the proposition did not come before the General Assembly in this direct form, however, the issue never ceased to command attention. At every annual session, the United States proposed that consideration of the question be deferred.

Consequent on the Korean War, the United States sponsored a draft resolution in 1951 seeking to brand China an aggressor in Korea. Pakistan abstained from voting on it. Likewise in 1952, when the United States sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly calling for postponement of the consideration of the question of China's representation, Pakistan again abstained. But in 1953 the Pakistan delegation to the General Assembly voted for the postponement of this question's consideration even though the brief had provided for abstention, in 1954 Pakistan joined SEATO and from then on its attitude on the question of China's representation showed scant regard to the real position in China, to its own recognition of the Chinese Government and to the sentiment of the Asian-African member.-ship. This position continued at successive sessions.

In 1957. Pakistan had at first abstained from voting on the resolution due to certain procedural considerations arising from a slight change in the U.S. resolution. However, following an immediate American *demarche* to the Pakistan delegation, led by the Foreign Minister and including the Foreign Secretary, the delegation changed its vote the next day in favor of the resolution blocking China's representation by its legitimate government. It informed the UN Secretary-General that the previous vote had been incorrectly recorded. A reversal of a vote exercised during the Assembly's proceedings and so recorded is a most unusual, indeed a humiliating, act for any delegation. Pakistan did not flinch from such self-abasement on this issue during this phase of its attitude toward the great powers.

Annex 2

Juridical Position of Taiwan: Pakistan's Standpoint in 1958.

On 22 September 1958, at a time of tension between China and the United States over Taiwan the Chinese Foreign Office addressed a note to the Pakistan Government which, in substance, stated that on most international issues, Pakistan had sided with America and, while China did not expect a great change in Pakistan's foreign policy, she would like to know the attitude of Pakistan as an Asian nation in the dispute over the status of Taiwan. Instead of giving a forthright answer in accordance with China's rightful claim that Taiwan was an integral part of her territory and on the consideration that not even the Chiang Kai-Shek clique upheld the two-Chinas theory or sought separate recognition as the Government of Taiwan, Pakistan sent a reply on 1 October 1958 asserting that she had given neither *de facto* nor *do jure* recognition to the government in Taiwan and urging that no party should take action that would threaten world as well as regional peace.

The following passage from the reply was particularly disingenuous and meant to cause an offence to China: "The juridical position of sovereignty over Formosa is not clear. The problem should therefore be settled by peaceful negotiations. The wishes of the local inhabitants should be given due consideration".

Annex 3

Invitation from the Soviet Union and Pakistan's Response in 1949.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan and Begum Liaquat Ali Khan have been invited by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to visit Moscow. The invitation has been accepted. It is understood that the invitation was conveyed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan by the Russian Ambassador in Iran through the Pakistan Ambassador, Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, during the Prime Minister's recent visit to Teheran.

The official announcement of the invitation and its acceptance was made by Pakistan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chaudhri Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, at a Press conference in Karachi on Wednesday evening.

Asked if the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow would lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Pakistan, the Foreign Minister pointed out that the two countries had already agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives, but the exchange had not been possible so far on account of "shortage of personnel" in Pakistan.

Dawn, Karachi, 9th June 1949.

Annex 4

An evaluation of Muslim Countries in 1956-1957.

"The question is asked: Why don't we (the Muslim countries) get together rather than be tied to a big power like the UK or America? My answer to that is that zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero. We have, therefore, to go farther afield rather than get all the zeros together because they will never be able to produce anything which is substantial".

*Excerpt from H. S. Suhrawardy's speech at Salimullah Hall, Dacca.
DAWN. Karachi, 12 December 1956.*

At the time of the historic Suez crisis of 1956, Prime Minister Suhrawardy addressed the National Assembly and, in the course of his statement, said:

"Today we see no reason why the United Kingdom, having obeyed the mandate of the United Nations, should not sit with us in order to promote the security of the Middle East and also to strengthen ourselves. We, know perfectly well that unfortunately the strength which the Middle East countries possess is not sufficient to guard them either against aggression from any sources or from internecine warfare and as I said elsewhere any number of zeros cannot make more than zero, whereas if you add one to it, the larger the number of possible zeros the greater will be the ultimate result, whether they are put in front or put in the rear, they are more than zero",

National Assembly Debate
Vol. 1 1957: PP 917&918

Annex 5

Resume of Cabinet Discussions on 22 and 24 December 1958 on Foreign Policy.

A summary containing some directive principles was submitted to the Cabinet by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Manur Qadir. The commerce Minister, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, stated that "the summary created an impression that our foreign policy had been determined by our acceptance of the US aid and the course had already been set. The two vital problems for us were the problems of Kashmir and Canal Waters. We had to determine how far our foreign policy had helped us to achieve the solution of these problems. It seemed quite certain that in case of war with India, USA was not going to help us", We should not, he added, unnecessarily extend the principle of attachment to the United States" The Foreign Minister rejoined that the summary was based "on an objective appreciation of the circumstances that limited our maneuverability in the field of foreign affairs". The President, Mr. Ayub Khan, analyzing the country's situation, concluded that "there was not much room for flexibility in our foreign policy". He added that "it was a fact that we needed aid and, therefore, we should not behave in a manner which would annoy those who give us aid for the development and security of our country. The aid given to us by the USA was aimed at helping us maintain our independence in an area which was threatened by communism".

When the point was raised that "we should show some flexibility in our attitude towards China and work for its acceptance as a member of the United Nations", the response was that "any such attempt on our part at the moment would undoubtedly upset the United States Government". In regard to the Third World, the opinion was expressed that "it was not really a bloc but a group of countries which were oscillating between the two blocs".

Another point that was made at the meeting was that "we should try to develop good relations with India because that would further improve our relations with America".

At the next meeting on 24 December, the Kashmir issue was considered.

Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Minister for Commerce emphasized that "we had to continue to press the Kashmir case" and suggested the alternative of approaching the General Assembly under Article 10 of the Charter because of the Soviet veto in the Security Council. The Secretary-General developed the argument that a reference to the General Assembly would exhaust all avenues of agitating our case before the United Nations". It seemed advisable therefore, "to follow the same policy as had been followed in the past".

The President (Mr. Ayub Khan) said that "it was true that the Baghdad Pact had rendered the solution of Kashmir more difficult but it had underwritten the integrity and security of Pakistan. In a situation of stalemate, the most important thing was to have enormous patience and capacity to wait".

Among the points made by other participants without attribution) at the meeting were

- (a) We should not undertake the experiment of leaning towards China.
- (b) We should avoid technical aid or cultural cooperation with the Soviet Union and "be cautious about developing trade relations with Communist countries because the US Government might not approve of the idea".
- (c) When it was urged (presumably by the Minister of Commerce) that trade relations with Socialist countries were important for our cotton, the President stated that "we should offer our surplus cotton to America for sale and explain to them our predicament. If they were unable to purchase it we should negotiate with the communist countries".

However, it was decided that "the Ministry of Commerce should review the existing trade arrangements with Communist countries with a view to maximizing the export of cotton and other commodities".

Annex 6

Chairman Nikita Khrushchev's Threat to Attack Pakistan.

MOSCOW, May 10: Unsmiling and grim, Premier Khrushchev last night threatened diplomats from Pakistan and Norway that Russia would attack the bases used by foreign planes which violate Soviet frontiers.

The Soviet leader made his threat in a man-to-man talk with diplomats of the two countries at a party held in the Czech Embassy in Moscow.

Premier Khrushchev called Norway's Ambassador Oakar Gunderson and Mr. Salman Ahmad Ali, Counsellor in the Pakistan Embassy, who was deputizing for Pakistan's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to step before him.

He told them; "If you continue to let the Americans fly from your air bases into Russia, then we will not only shoot down the US planes but will have to aim our rockets at your bases as well".

The Premier was quoted as saying that Peshawar had now been marked on a map and a ring made round it by Soviet defense forces.

Dispatch by Ross Mark
Dawn, Karachi, 11 May 1960.

Annex 7

*Excerpt from President Ayub Khan's address to the United States Congress on 12 July
1961*

"Let me assure you that we have the deepest interest in your affairs and we hope you will have the same interest in our affairs because, let me tell you that if there is real trouble there is no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan. (Applause)".

From "Congressional Record – House"
of 12 July p1981 PP. 12398.

Annex 8

President Ayub Khan's Statement on "Danger from the North".

In 1958 Pakistan's relations with China were under great strain. They deteriorated further in the following year. President Ayub Khan who later claimed to be the architect of friendship with China, had no qualms in criticizing both China and the Soviet Union and dwelling again and again on "the danger from the North". In 1959, he formulated a scheme for joint defense with India Obviously against China and the Soviet Union. On 19 January 1960, he declared: "I foresee China moving south through Burma and Russia through Afghanistan and Iran, if there is no clash between the two of them These moves need not necessarily be military ideological penetration with communist backed regimes would do". He conveyed to the Indian Prime Minister Nehru that an agreement on joint defense could be achieved through goodwill and understanding on both sides; a format pact would not be needed. His thesis was that Indian and Pakistani forces which were facing each other should be released to defend against "aggression from a third party" (meaning China and the Soviet Union). The strategy he had conceived was that of friendship with India to the point of military collaboration and hostility against both China and the Soviet Union on the assumption that, in this way, Pakistan would secure Kashmir and an inflow of increased American assistance, Mr. Nehru's response was an opposite commentary on this kind of thinking.

The following are a few of the relevant Press Reports on this subject:

Pakistan would like to Defend Bharat

The President, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, yesterday warned that in five years the Pakistan-Bharat Subcontinent would become militarily vulnerable to major invasions from the north.

General Ayub Khan said that the invasions would most probably be directed against the bigger segment of the Subcontinent, Bharat, but Pakistan was also in the way. The President was last evening giving *his impressions as a military man* of the recent developments in Tibet and Afghanistan, flanking the Subcontinent.

He told a news conference at the President's House that the position could be defended if both Pakistan and Bharat dissolved their differences and ceased to face each other with loaded rifles. *Pakistan, he said, would very much like to defend Bharat in such an event.*

Morning News, Karachi, 24 October, 1959.

The substance of this statement was reported not only in the Pakistan Press but also abroad. *The Times of India* of 24 October 1959, for example, gave it the headlines "Threat to India and Pakistan. General Ayub calls for unity".

Mutual Defense of the Subcontinent

Teheran, Nov. 9 (Reuter) President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan was today reported to have said in an interview that Chinese occupation of Tibet and road-building activities in Afghanistan posed a serious threat from the north.

The Teheran newspaper, *Keyhan International*, said that in Karachi interview the Pakistan President said to its correspondent:

"The Subcontinent will be vulnerable to attack within five years. Chinese occupation of Tibet and road construction activities in Afghanistan pose a serious threat from the north. It is a threat that cannot be overlooked by wishful thinking".

Referring to Indo-Pakistan differences. President Ayub Khan was reported as saying that the Canal Waters dispute was on its way to being solved.

The Pakistan President also termed the Kashmir settlement as "a final phase in the overall settlement with India", He said, "Should this be accomplished, then the question of mutual defense of the Indian Subcontinent could be earnestly entered into".

Annex 9

Sino-Indian Clash in Ladakh President Ayub Khan's Original Reaction.

Asked to comment on the latest Chinese incursion in Ladakh he said that *it was India's problem* and he was not in a position to say anything as there were not enough details available.

Dawn, Karachi,
4 November, 1959.

President Ayub said he would be glad to invite Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru if any opportunity arose. Of Ladakh, he said that *it was India's concern*.

Morning News, Karachi
4 November 1959.

Annex 10

Letters addressed by Mr. Z.A. Bhutto. Leader of Pakistan delegation to the UN to President Ayub Khan and foreign Minister Manzur Qadir on the situation in Ladakh.

11 November 1959

Dear Mr. President.

For the past several weeks, I have been anxiously concerned with the India-China situation in Ladakh and the impact it can have on our position regarding Kashmir. I noticed in the press: that during an airport interview, you were asked a question regarding this situation and you replied to the effect that it was India's problem. I do not know what exactly was the wording of your statement and whether it was accurately reported in the press.

However, even raking it as reported, your statement was, of course, correct, both factually and from military point of view and I have no doubt that our friends will read it in that light. At the same time, however, it is possible that, on another occasion. India and its friends will construe and probably use, a statement of this kind in an altogether different sense.

I would go even further and say that, in fact, it is a question not only of the statement we have made but of the entire attitude we are going to evince in the matter. The dangers that lie in our attitude so far shown can be spelled out as follows:

- (a) We can be taken to have tacitly recognized India's authority over that part of Kashmir which she controls at present. After all, it is by virtue of the present partition of Kashmir that India controls Ladakh and is in a position to declare that China's encroachment on Ladakh is an encroachment on India itself.
- (b) The present situation can be cited by India as justifying any augmentation of forces that she might effect in Jammu and Kashmir, the contrary provisions of the UNCIP resolution notwithstanding. This augmentation of forces will include any tightening of control over Kashmir, any building of roads and airports and, in fact, any other measures that she might undertake.
- (c) We can be deemed to be estopped from saying in future that the responsibility for the preservation of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir is not that of India but of the Security Council, We have so far always

taken the stand that Jammu and Kashmir is not Indian territory and, therefore, the question of its external defense is a matter for the Security Council and the Council alone, to con sider. We can now be taken to have virtually abandoned that stand.

In my humble but emphatic opinion, it seems to me that we must make some kind of an authoritative pronouncement which would effectively safeguard us against these dangers. A draft letter to the Security Council, if that is going to be the means of making this pronouncement is under preparation in the Mission here and will be soon submitted to you.

I can assure you that, in making this suggestion, I am not at all unmindful of the complexity of the present situation and the delicacy of our relationship with China. With as much anxious and careful thought as I am able to give to the matter, I feel that a statement, which clearly declares our stake in Kashmir, will not necessarily embroil us with China. On the contrary, it may even be that China will not react adversely to a statement from Pakistan questioning the very basis of the stand taken by India regarding Ladakh.

As far as the effect of a statement of this kind on India is concerned, we cannot ignore the fact that in spite of all trends and efforts to the contrary, the Indian Government persists in writing letters to the Security Council about Kashmir which consist of the same pseudo arguments and fulminations that Krishna Memon has been spouting during the last several years. Regarding the effect on the Canal Waters negotiations, we have of course, carefully to consider the matter but we cannot let India damage our entire position on Kashmir during the time these negotiations remain pending. The solution seems to be to make a statement, unhostile in tone and confined only to a principle. Such a statement, after all, will not be the first or the only example that we have not achieved that final and definitive settlement of all our disputes with India which the outside world seems to imagine.

I am taking the liberty of making this suggestion to you because, in my consultations here. I have found a great anxiety lest the present India-China situation allows the impression to settle that Pakistan no longer feels itself concerned with Jammu and Kashmir. This, of course, is only one aspect of the matter and it is for you to view it in the larger perspective which will take into account the attitude of the United States. At the present moment, however, this aspect seems to be quite important in itself. I do hope that you will not mind my taking an opportunity to make this suggestion to you.

Your respectfully,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Field Marshal Mohammad
Ayub Khan H. J., H.Pk.,
President of Pakistan,
Rawalpindi.

11 November, 1959.

I enclose copy of a letter which I have addressed to the President. I have no doubt that you are aware of all the implications of the question touched upon in the letter and of all the possibilities, both good and evil, which are latent in the present situation.

It is my feeling that we shall have to examine the whole, question in depth and not let the India-China situation regarding Kashmir drift and develop to our detriment.

Sincerely yours,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Manzur Qadir, Esquire,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Government of Pakistan.
Karachi.

Annex 11

President Ayub Khan's Retraction of Earlier Statement Regarding Ladakh.

RAWALPINDI, Nov. 23 Pakistan would not recognize the creation of a no man's land in Ladakh as suggested by the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Nehru to the Chinese Premier said Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan while replying to questions on his attitude to Mr. Nehru's latest proposals to China on Ladakh when he arrived here tonight after a tour of Iran and Turkey.

The President said that *Ladakh was a disputed area* and arrangements suggested by Mr. Nehru would not be recognized by Pakistan.

Asked whether he had communicated to the Indian Prime Minister that Pakistan would not recognize any such arrangement the President replied, "Let such an arrangement come". Asked if Pakistan would approach United Nations on the subject, he said. "Let time come"

Dawn, Karachi,
24 November 1959.

RAWALPINDI, Nov 23 (APP): The President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, said here today that Pakistan would not recognize any arrangement between India and China in Ladakh *as the area was a disputed territory between Pakistan and India.*

The President was replying to questions by newsmen at Chakiala aerodrome immediately after his arrival this evening from Karachi by way of Lahore.

He was asked to comment on the Indian Prime Minister's proposal to China for creating a no man's land in Ladakh. Asked if he would communicate to the Indian Prime Minister on the subject, he said Pakistan would see what happens in this connection. Let such an arrangement come, then we can talk, he added.

Mr. Nehru has proposed to the Chinese Premier in a communication that the area in dispute in Ladakh between India and China, some 8,000 miles be made a no man's land as an interim measure pending a final settlement of the frontier between the two countries in that sector.

Morning News, Karachi
24 November 1959.

Annex 12

Excerpt from Letter Dated 3 December 1959 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan Addressed to the President of the Security Council.

"Under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to draw the attention of the Security Council to reports, widely published in the international press, of recent events in the eastern part of the province of Ladakh of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

"For reasons which are evident and need no explanation, my Government is not in a position to ascertain the veracity of these reports or to determine the actual extent of the encroachment, if any, by a foreign power into the area in question which is an integral part of the Jammu and Kashmir State. It follows that my Government is not able to endorse, or comment upon, the reasons for action and for counteraction taken by either side in the controversy between India and China and in the confusion which has been attendant upon the events in Ladakh....."

"My Government is bound by its duty to declare before the Security Council that, pending a determination of the future of Kashmir through the will of the people impartially ascertained, the positions taken or adjustments made by either of the parties to the present controversy between India and China, or any similar controversy in the future shall not be valid or affect the status of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir or the imperatives of the demilitarization and self-determination of the State laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations."

"My Government regards it as a matter of self-evident principle that it is for the sovereign authority freely evolved by, and acceptable to, the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and for that authority, alone, to effect, or refuse to affect, any adjustment of its frontiers with any foreign power and that the emergence of such an authority shall not be allowed to be impeded by any necessity, supposed or real, of military defense felt at present by any party within the territory of Jammu and Kashmir".

Sd/.
Aly Khan

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations.

Annex 13

Chinese Representation at the UN: Change in Pakistan's Policy.

By 1959, the policy of supporting the United States on the issue of denying the People's Republic of China its right immediately to represent the country at the United Nations had acquired the stamp of a tradition. The first move towards a change came in 1960 when the Pakistan delegation was led by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources and it exercised the option to abstain instead of voting for postponement. In accordance with the brief, the Pakistan delegate in the Credentials Committee was authorized, for the first time since 1952, to abstain on the US-sponsored postponement resolution. But the reaction of the United States was again a *demarche*. As a result, within two days of the vote in the United Nations, the discretion originally given to the leader of the Pakistan delegation was countermanded and he was given new instructions. He emphatically disagreed with them.

When next year the same position was sought to be maintained the leader of the Pakistan delegation, Mr. Bhutto, addressed a telegram to the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Manzur Qadir, expressing his disappointment at the Pakistan Government's decision. He followed it with a letter on 14 October to Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir advocating support for the restoration of China's right in the United Nations and hoping that next year Pakistan's voting would be different. The following is the text of the letter:

Pakistan Mission to the United Nation
Pakistan House,
12 East 65th Street,
New York, 21. N.Y.
14 October, 1960.

My dear Foreign Minister,

The General Assembly decided on 8 October 1960, to reject the Soviet request for inclusion in the agenda of the item entitled "Representation of China in the United Nations", and also ruled out any consideration of the question of seating the representatives of the People's Republic of China during the present session.

The vote in favor of rejection was 42:34 against and 22 abstentions. Pakistan, voted in favor of rejection of the motion to include the item on the agenda, in conformity with your instructions.

When the Assembly first considered the question of Chinese representation in 1950, Pakistan had voted for Peking's admission to the United Nations in consequence of the fact that we had extended recognition to it and also because the existence and consolidation of the Communist regime had by then become a fact of international life. Subsequently, however, we changed our position. Since 1956, we have voted against the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

Over the years, the strength of the United States' position in the Assembly on this item has eroded. Last year, 44 countries were ranged behind the United States, 29 were against and 9 had abstained. This year the US majority was whittled down to 42 with 34 against and 22 abstentions. The two votes lost were Laos and Malaya, which last year supported the United States. This year, both abstained. Furthermore, Cuba and Ethiopia which abstained last year, voted against the United States at the present session. Of the 17 newly-admitted states (16 African and Cyprus), Mali, Senegal and Nigeria voted against the United States. Not one supported the move for rejecting consideration of the question at the present session. All the others except Congo (Leopoldville) which was not represented, abstained.

After the Soviet Union succeeded in having the item inscribed on the agenda (the required number of votes may well come from the 22 abstentions this year), a resolution may be introduced to the effect that the General Assembly decides to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China. It will be argued that this resolution requires a two-thirds majority vote, which the Asian, African and Eastern bloc countries cannot muster. They may, therefore, argue that only simple majority is required, which they possess. This point will have to be decided by the Assembly. Under the rules of procedure a decision as to whether a resolution requires two-thirds majority vote or not is itself taken by simple majority. Thus Asian, African, and East European countries should be able to get a decision that the vote on the resolution will be by simple majority. As they will possess the required number of votes, the motion to seat the Communist Chinese representatives will be carried.

The above is speculative in nature. It is difficult to forecast with accuracy as to whether the procedural fight will take precisely this form.

You will also notice from the voting record which I attach, that the division in the Assembly did not take place on an East-West basis. Two NATO allies, namely Norway and Denmark, voted against the United States. A third, Portugal, abstained. I do not, therefore, see why Pakistan should not be considered a staunch ally, any less than these countries if we take a stand on the merits of the question and a recognition of realities.

My initial instructions to the delegation to abstain had been given with these considerations in mind. It is too late to do anything in the matter this year. I can only hope that it will not be too late next year.

Yours sincerely,
(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)

Manzur Qadir, Esquire,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Government of Pakistan.
Rawalpindi,

After this, Pakistan recovered its capacity to approach the issue on merit. In 1961, Pakistan voted in favor of the draft resolution to seat the representatives of the People's Republic at the United Nations.

When a decade later, the representatives of the discredited Chiang Kai-Shek regime were ousted from the world organization the procedural course adopted by the General Assembly did not vary much from the one anticipated in this letter.

Annex 14

Resume of Cabinet Discussions on a Review of Pakistan's Foreign Policy in October-November 1960.

Following the dispatches received from Mr. Z. A Bhutto, Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, who led the Pakistan delegation at the UN General Assembly in 1960. a Summary to the Cabinet was submitted by the Foreign Secretary on 26 October 1960. The following views of Mr. Bhutto were quoted in the Summary:

- (a) Chinese Representation at the UN: "I feel that the time has come for Pakistan to adopt an attitude in the United Nations more consistent with its recognition of the Peking regime that has been the case since 1954".
- (b) Our attitude to Afro-Asian Issues: "It is imperative that in so far as our vital interests are not adversely affected, we should try to strengthen our position among the Asian-African An important and obvious way of doing so would be to alter our Stand on the issue of Chinese representation and Portuguese colonies in Africa".
- (c) "Neutralism is bound to emerge as a political philosophy with a wide appeal and possibly as a third force".

The then Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the UN had made the following points at variance with Mr. Bhutto's views:

- (a) "We cannot re-build our position among Afro-Asians so we should work for splitting that group The Africans voted for Nehru's Resolution blindly, innocently, emotionally".
- (b) "We should not get closer to the USSR. This is the wrong time to leave our friends". (Mr. Bhutto had made no suggestion that we "leave our friends").

The then Foreign Secretary's conclusions which carried the implicit approval of the then Foreign Minister (who himself gave no views) *inter-alia*.

- (a) "At the present juncture we have no alternative but to remain friendly with the West. Having fortuitously become the strongest non-European power allied to the West, we should take advantage of the situation by not

only showing but giving positive proof of our steadfastness and dependability".

- (b) "We would have been faced with a very difficult choice: annoyance of China or annoyance of US We have had to choose between the two and the force of circumstances demanded that we backed the US". (The Foreign Secretary referred to the possibility of the US quitting the UN in the event of Peking's admission).
- (c) "It is fashionable to criticize imperialism I fear they (African countries under Portuguese colonialism) would have to face the problems of government and administration and I trust they, like Congo, would not become a UN responsibility involving all of us in a tremendous amount of expense But we are now asked to vote against Portugal because the Afro-Asian opinion desires it. Is making of our vote available for every Afro-Asian enterprise in the UN the only method to win the support of the new nations? There are other methods also of cultivating public opinion which we are not using".
- (d) To extend our contacts and win influence at the United Nations "would require a vision, a large heart and a larger purse. Since we have not got any of these (if I may say so respectfully though cynically) we should 'lump' certain situations".

Those views were in accord with the prevailing thinking at the time. However, when Mr. Z A. Bhutto's views as well as the contrary opinions were considered at a special Cabinet Meeting on 18 November 1960, some of the decisions were reached as follows:

- (a) "It is true that they(the USA) have not found it possible for their own reasons to give us political support in our dispute with India. We understand their difficulty but then, because of that very reason, we have to fend for ourselves in this field This in turn, means that we should not adopt rigid postures towards Russia or China."
- (b) "We should explain with conviction (to the United States) that in the present situation we have come to the conclusion that we should vote for the admission of the People's Republic of China at the next session"
- (c) "The Government could not isolate itself by disregarding the public feeling as well as the feelings of all the Afro-Asian countries".

Annex 15

Mr. Bhutto's Announcement of Proposed Visit to Moscow for Aid in Oil Exploration.

Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, is likely to visit Moscow by the end of this month or early next month to finalize a credit agreement with the Soviet Union providing for technical assistance for oil exploration in Pakistan.

The Minister told this to Pressmen on his arrival in Karachi from Lahore by PIA.

The Minister stated that the draft agreement, which is expected to arrive from the Soviet Union soon, will first be discussed by the Cabinet before he leaves for Moscow.

He further added the amount of credit Pakistan accepts from Russia will depend on the terms and condition on which they are offered.

Mr. Bhutto said he would conduct further negotiations in Moscow on the basis of the draft agreement submitted by Russians.

Mr. Bhutto told a questioner that the supply of Sui Gas to India will depend on what terms the Indians will be willing to offer. He said gas was a very valuable item and only if attractive offers were made, would Pakistan supply it to India.

Moreover, he said no concrete proposal was made by the Indians after the talks on the subject between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan during the former's visit to Pakistan.

Mr. Bhutto will fly to Rawalpindi this evening and return to Karachi on 9 November – APP.

Dawn, 8 November 1960

Annex 16

Excerpts from Memorandum Address by Mr. Z. A Bhutto, Foreign Minister, on 11 May 1966 from Dacca to President Ayub Khan through Foreign Secretary.

Pakistan has its established links with the West. It is on terms of friendship and trust with China. Pakistan does not have a resident mission in Hanoi, but there have been sufficient contacts between Rawalpindi and Hanoi for it to be said that the relations between the two countries are friendly. Pakistan is in the most advantageous position to be approached on the search for a constructive initiative. Until recently, the United States completely ignored the most obvious country in its many efforts throughout the world to find an initiator for its high purpose. Apparently, the United States believed that if it approached Pakistan, it would be interpreted by that country as a glorious vindication of its China policy and thus encourage it to get even closer to China. However, basically the fear of this possibility is much less dangerous to the United States' interests than its future in Vietnam. It was, therefore, inevitable that sooner or later, the United States would approach Pakistan. This was done on the 20th of April, 1966, at Ankara when Secretary of State, Husk, almost pathetically appealed to me to do something about Vietnam. On two separate occasions in the same evening he said, "Can you not arrange a meeting between me and Chen Yi in Geneva or Monaco or anywhere he wants? There should be no difficulty for you to visit Hanoi or Peking for this purpose". I said to him that so far the United States had not taken Pakistan into confidence. Many preliminaries were involved and we were not prepared for such a mission. I informed him that I would get in touch with my Government and contact him on the following day. I immediately sent a telegram to the President in which I conveyed Mr. Rusk's request and sought his instructions. On the 21st afternoon Additional Foreign Secretary contacted Pakistan's Ambassador in Peking on the telephone and said that as the positions of the two parties were far apart, no reconciliation seemed possible Pakistan would not like to meddle in the affair and burn its fingers. He went on to say that the President was, however, agreeable to sound the Chinese through their Ambassador in Pakistan on Husk's request for a meeting with Chen Yi. Additional Foreign Secretary also informed Pakistan's Ambassador that in the President's view we should not give an impression to the Americans that we had influence on the Chinese. These telephonic instructions were confirmed by a subsequent telegram from Additional Foreign Secretary in which he repeated the gist of his conversation with Pakistan's Ambassador in Peking. When I met Mr. Husk on the evening of 21st, the Secretary of State said that he would like to keep in close touch with me on this question, but he resiled from his specific request and did not manifest the anxiety of the previous evening. It is possible that he changed his mind because the messages between Ankara and Rawalpindi were intercepted or for some other

important reason. As the response from Rawalpindi was negative, I did not consider it advisable to probe him any further. The instructions that came from Rawalpindi were unhappily couched.

Before leaving Ankara for Washington, Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk said on April 22nd that he had "a two-hour talk on Southeast Asia with Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto", and that, they had exchanged views on the matter of contacts with China". It is repeated that essentially Pakistan is the most appropriately placed to seek ways of tackling the Vietnam question. Pakistan is in the best position to open communications between China and the United States and Hanoi through China. Pakistan is an Asian country and a neighbor of China. It has developed special relationship with China without breaking its links with the West. It has forged friendly contacts with Hanoi. Even if its efforts failed it would not injure the interests of Pakistan. On the contrary, it would enhance Pakistan's prestige and show to the world that Pakistan alone is able to move substantially and more progressively in the right direction. It would show that Pakistan has constructive channels of communications with the United States and with China and has been able to maintain the confidence of both antagonists at war.

As the question is so important to peace in Asia and to the world at large, now is the time for Pakistan to play its part. We should not hesitate only because there is a risk of failure. even if the efforts do fail they may bring the situation closer to the cherished realization.

There are many indications to demonstrate that the situation is ripe for a meaningful initiative by an Asian state having good relations both with Peking and Hanoi and with Washington. In the present vortex of international affairs, it seems that it is Pakistan that happens to be that state. The gauntlet should be thrown. It may not succeed, but it will do no harm. It would establish our bonafides with both sides.

(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
Camp Dacca
11-5-1966

Annex 17

Excerpts from Official Memoranda by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto Foreign Minister--1966.

(1)

Pakistan has so far chosen to ignore the powerful reality called the Soviet Union protruding on to its head. Indeed, it pursued a policy of belligerence towards that colossal power It refused to have contact with the Soviet Union, and, on occasions, provided dangerous provocations to that country as, for instance, by allowing U-2 to take off from its territory to conduct espionage into the Soviet Union. Pakistan allowed the United States permanent facilities to pry on the Soviet Union. In the further pursuance of this one-dimensional foreign policy. Pakistan did not even feel the necessity of having any substantial cultural and commercial contacts with the Soviet Union. Soviet literature, even of a technical nature was prevented from being disseminated. Whilst the world had gradually changed and the Soviet Union and the United States made their respective adjustments to the changes, Pakistan stood firm and refused to recognize the evolution of the times. It was not the responsibility of the United States to educate Pakistan on the changes that had taken place, it did no injury to United States interests to allow Pakistan to remain as firmly entrenched to USA as it was before the changes. Also during the 1965 India Pakistan war, when Western countries imposed an embargo on the shipment of military equipment both to India and Pakistan, the Indian leaders paid rich tributes to the Soviet Union for not having imposed a similar embargo on India and for continuing to supply India with military equipment, according to the agreements reached between the Soviet Union and India before the hostilities began. During the war, with a smiling Mr. Dean Rusk standing by his side the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko said in New York, "the Soviet Union was India's staunchest friend". At the time of the critical Security Council debates leading to the September 20th Resolution, in each and every step, the Soviet Union supported India.

We seek to have good relations with the United States because it is a great power and an influential country – a country with whom it is necessary to have good relations. Our relations with the United States are not based on any particular initiative taken by the United States be they bilateral or multilateral. It is on the basis of the strength and position of the United States as a great power. So also, we have good relations with China not because China gave an ultimatum to India during the September War. Our good relations with China preceded the ultimatum. Our relations with China have developed not on account of any particular initiative taken by China, but on account of the hard realities of geography, history and politics. if good relations with the great

powers depend on each and every initiative either in favor or otherwise then there would be no continuity or certainty in state relations and no logical rules determining the course of relationship between the states. Therefore, it is essential for us to improve our relations with the Soviet Union independent of any particular initiative This will give our relations a broader scope and much greater maneuverability.

It is necessary and vital for us to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. This should be done independent of any important initiative taken by the Soviet Union rather than in the confined context of any particular initiative.

(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
11 April 1966.

(2)

The President is aware that for some time past, I have argued the merits of developing bilateral relations with foreign countries as against multilateral obligations so as to provide our foreign policy with latitude and logic.

For over twenty years the international situation was dominated by multilateral commitments. Now the situation is changing again. New factors have arisen and the prevailing conditions call for a return to an increasing emphasis on bilateral diplomacy.

Apart from the danger of multilateral conflicts, a state committed to a multilateral defense arrangement which does not strictly coincide with its own national interests suffers from a multitude of handicaps. Among the many vices of such multilateral arrangements is that the train is so composed as to move at the pace of the slowest and the result is conflict of interest and ineffectiveness in the face of specific exigencies. Simultaneously, inherent in this situation is the contradiction of the other extreme in which a state may want to proceed so fast as to cause derailment of an the wagons in the train. In other words, it is difficult to move perennially on the basis of a rhythm which is in accord with the aspirations of each and every state within a multilateral undertaking.

Even bilateral relations can assume the character of a multilateral obligation if the terms of the bilateral relationship in essence assume multilateral commitments under a connected arrangement. For example, if a state were to give a commitment to one of the great powers to go to war if that great power were to be involved in war, it would in fact assume a multilateral obligation. This would be so because the great power concerned may have similar bilateral and multilateral obligations with other states. Thus, a chain reaction would ensue and bilateral commitments would be transformed

into a multilateral obligation. Even a purely bilateral agreement could restrict the freedom of action of the participants if the nature of the agreement is such that it militates against the security of another state. For example, in such circumstances it would place the participants in a position from which they would find themselves severely restricted in the development of their bilateral relations with the third country against whose vital interests they have already concluded a bilateral agreement.

An essential pro-requisite of consistent and clean bilateral relations is the substance of non-alignment. The relations should be confined to the limits, of common national interest of the two powers concerned and not commit themselves beyond the respective interests of the two powers which would be inimical to the interest of a third country.

(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
30-5-1966

(3)

Since the end of the Second World War a new political situation has arisen in the world which, perhaps because it is so obvious, is sometimes not seen in its correct perspective and its implications on the conduct of human affairs are not sufficiently understood.

The traditional method of conducting foreign affairs of a country in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century was to have regional alliance to maintain a balance of power among the grouping of the great powers with the assistance of the smaller nations. It was by maintaining a very delicate balance of power that peace was maintained, in fact, peace was disturbed only when the balance of power at any given time tilted in favor of one or the other group in those days, smaller nations could influence the policy and the alignment of the great powers by indulging in various political permutations and combinations.

All this has changed today with the emergence of global powers which, in addition to having all the attributes of great powers in the classical sense, are at the same time bigger, much more powerful and play a much larger role in determining the destinies of the people all over the world. The emergence of these powers has radically changed the whole concept of conducting human affairs and affairs of the state in the last twenty years. The task of the smaller nations, in which category all the developing nations fall, in determining their relationship with the great powers and in the furtherance of their national interests has been more complex and more difficult. The small nation which does not understand the now rules is deemed to frustration, a sense of helplessness, isolation and, perhaps, eventual extinction, We must fully understand how in this now situation we should conduct our own affairs.

The question before the smaller nations today is how to conduct their affairs in such a manner that their basic interests are safeguarded, they retain their territorial integrity and continue to have independence in their relationship with the great powers as well as with the smaller nations. It is obvious that it is not possible to attain equality among unequal forces in such a situation the most one can expect is a relationship of tolerance, perhaps understanding, but never genuine equality. The relationship between the great powers and the smaller countries are *ipso facto* unequal in which the great powers can wrench out a multitude of advantages without responding in sufficient, leave alone equal, measure. It is not conceivable for a weaker nation to convert or reduce a great power to its point of view or to bring it under its influence on the noble plea of justice or the righteousness of its cause. In the ultimate analysis, it is not the virtue of the cause that becomes the determining factor but the cold global interests of great powers which determine their policy. These interests are bound to prevail in any open and endless confrontation among such unequal forces.

Does this mean that the smaller nations should obediently follow the dictates of great powers and exchange their independence for material gains and promise of economic prosperity? The answer is a resounding 'No'. It is possible with adroit handling of their affairs for the smaller nations to maintain their independence and have a flexibility of action in their relationship with great powers as well as smaller nations. It would be inexpedient and perhaps dangerous for a smaller nation to completely identify itself with the total interests of one great power to the exclusion of the others. Sometimes it might be necessary for a smaller nation to be more closely associated with one global power but, even so it is not impossible for it to maintain normal relations with the others on the basis of honorable bilateral relations. It would be the quintessence of folly for a small state to pursue a policy of provocation towards any global power on the strength of support from another great power, or for any other pressing reason.

It would be idealistic to expect a great power to change its global objectives on the demand of a smaller state. It would be unrealistic for a weaker state to expect to convert a great power to its point of view before agreeing to have normal relations with it. As the relationship is unequal, it would be sagacious for a smaller state to isolate and set aside the point of conflict on the clear and categorical understanding that neither party will influence the other on that special issue. On such a tacit understanding, a normal and logical association can be built. Such an understanding certainly does not mean that it should not have better relations with those great powers which support its point of view. Such an understanding brings about a gradation of relationships which are explicable, consistent and logical and free from misinterpretations, it does not mean that there is any loss of prestige or loss of face. On the contrary, it means that the smaller power is not willing to compromise its prestige, interests and position. It only means

that there is an agreement on the part of both not to interfere or influence each other's position on a point on which there is a basic difference, it means that a *quid pro quo* is not being extracted for the establishment of normal relations. It only divorces a particular issue from direct dealings. It only avoids an unequal confrontation on condition that neither will influence each other on the vital point of disagreement. Such an understanding does not stop the state concerned from pursuing its struggle. Nor does it prevent a lively dialogue on the differences whenever suitable opportunities arise.

The simple fact of the matter is that in the long run, a great power cannot be outwitted or out-smarted, it would thus be better to take a realistic and balanced attitude and evolve a policy on scientific rather than on subjective lines.

The objectives of the state concerned would stand better chances of being realized by other means—by the application of indirect pressures exerted by the collective voice and solidarity of the smaller nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, whom we now call the Third World together with diplomatic pressure from the great powers and the marginal great powers with whom its interest coincide. The primordial tactic should be to dodge a direct confrontation with the great powers with Whom basic interests are at variance.

It is, therefore, necessary for smaller states to maintain a dialogue on their conflicting interests with all great powers irrespective of their positions, to do all within their resources to influence them indirectly without getting entangled on a narrow one-dimension basis of all or nothing.

With the point of conflict set aside, there can be normal and friendly dealings with all great powers in question on all matters except on the issue of conflict. This would enable the state in question to have the latitude for more cordial relations with these great powers with whom its interests coincide in such an event, the great power whose interests clash, cannot take exception to That state's more cordial relation with the great powers with whom its interests coincide.

Solidarity of the Third World is so important to the less powerful nations that the great powers do not derive any special comfort from the emergence of this phenomenon. At present, this solidarity is not strong enough to be asserted as an effective level against the great powers.

It would be clearly understood that the whole basis of our foreign policy is to consolidate relations with those who support us and insulate the points of conflict with those that are either neutral or opposed to us.

Therefore, it is in the fitness, of the dynamics and dignity of the world situation that smaller powers should seek to isolate the areas of conflict in the pursuit of their national objectives and not come to a head on collision with the great powers with the vagaries and vicissitudes of their changing objectives.

The theory of causation is as much applicable to foreign affairs as it is to the law of tort. There is on active inter-relationship and mutual influence in the conduct of state relations. A clean, and praiseworthy foreign policy influences other states. correspondingly, an expedient or unscrupulous policy adversely affects the image of a state in its relations with other countries. If Pakistan's policies remain consistent and moral and are of a lofty tone and character, other states are bound to be influenced by such an attitude and behavior.

It is thus feasible and indeed desirable for Pakistan to maintain bilateral relations with both the great and the quasi great powers on a perfectly understandable gradation, but without any strain and tension. Bilateral relations, in order to be productive need to be consistent and not at the cost of relations with other countries The terms of bilateral relations should not in any way be inconsistent or cut across the ambit and scope of the bilateral relations with the other great states.

(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
15 April 1988

Authorization for publication of official documents.

The following is the text of the correspondence regarding the authorization for the publication of excerpts from official documents and resume of the Cabinet meetings:

From Special Assistant to the Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

No. 2356 SAPM/76

Dated 14 October 1976.

My dear Foreign Secretary,

As you are no doubt aware, the Prime Minister has prepared an exposition of the development of our foreign policy based on the adoption and implementation of the principle of Bilateralism. There are references in the exposition which would be further clarified by the relevant documentary evidence. These documents have been supplied to me by the Foreign Office from its archives. Even though, as chief Executive of the Government, the Prime Minister has the prerogative to determine whether or not the contents of a document, classified or otherwise, should be made public knowledge in the interest of the state, he has, in the present case, chosen not to exercise the right himself. Instead, he has asked me to obtain the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for their publication as annexes to the Prime Ministers own signed article. The list of the documents is appended herewith.

In requesting this permission, I am actuated by the consideration that the publishing of these documents will serve the public interest of creating a better understanding of the orientation of our external policy. At the same time it will by no means impinge on our current relations with any foreign power. Please convey to me your concurrence or otherwise with this evaluation.

In the event of the permission being accorded, I shall communicate to the Ministry of Information that the publication of these documents is authorized.

Yours sincerely,
M. YUSUF BUCH.

Mr. Agha Shahi,
Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Islamabad,

From Foreign Secretary to Special Assistant to the Prime Minister.

No. 7774/ FS/76
23 October 1976.

Dear Special Assistant,

Please refer to your letter No. 2356/SAPM/76, dated 14 October 1978 regarding certain documents to be published as annexes to. the Prime Minister's exposition of the principles of bilateralism. We concur with your evaluation and agree to the publication of the documents mentioned in the list enclosed with your letter.

Yours sincerely,
AGHA SHAHI.

Mr. M. Yusuf Buch,
Special Assistant to the Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Secretariat,
Islamabad.

From Special Assistant to the Prime Minister to Cabinet Secretary.

21 October 1976
No. 2366-SAPM/76

My dear Cabinet Secretary,

The Prime Minister has prepared an exposition of the development of our foreign policy over the years. This will be printed shortly. For purpose of clarification., some documents need to be annexed to the publication. In addition to those which have been obtained from the archives of the Foreign Office, the Annexes will also include resumes of Cabinet discussions on Foreign Policy In December 1958 and November 1960, These resumes are prepared on the basis of the summaries submitted to the Cabinet, the points made and the decisions reached at the meetings.

Considering that the publication of the Prime Minister's article, supported with the necessary documentation, will serve the interest of the state in creating better understanding of our external policy, I would ask The permission of the Cabinet Division for the two resumes mentioned above being published. The documents have

been suitably excerpted to ensure that they do not impinge on our current relations with any foreign power.

As Chief Executive of the Government, the Prime Minister has the prerogative to grant or to withhold such permission. However, in the present instance, he has chosen not to exercise the right himself.

I would appreciate an early response. If the permission is accorded, I shall communicate to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting that the publication of the resumes of the Cabinet discussions is authorized.

Yours sincerely,
M. YUSUF BUCH

Mr. Vaqar Ahmad,
Secretary,
Cabinet Division,
Government of Pakistan.
Rawalpindi.

From cabinet Secretary to Special Assistant to the Prime Minister.

D.O. No. D3567-PS-CS-76

26 October 1976.

My dear Special Assistant,
Please refer to your d.o. letter No.. 2366-SAPM/76, dated 21st October 1976. We agree with your views that the publication of the documents referred to in your letter as annexure to the Prime Minister's Article will be in the interest of the state. You may communicate this authorization to the Ministry of Information.

Yours sincerely,
VAQAR AHMAD

Mr. M. Yusuf Buch,
Special Assistant to the Prime Minister,
Prime Ministers Secretariat,
Islamabad.