Pakistan and Alliances

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CHAPTER 1

The Proposed Alliance

President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to vacate the political scene with the reputation of a statesman who brought peace to Vietnam and gave Asia a new place in world affairs. Whatever happens in Vietnam, whatever happens to Asia, history will not bestow this honour on President Johnson. His many mistakes, his legion of faults, cannot be washed away by retirement on the ranch. His errors of judgement caused much anguish in the world.

The former President of the United States tried to use the great powers of his office to dictate onerous political terms on my country. I happened to incur his displeasure on account of Pakistan’s growing relations with the People’s Republic of China. He was also angered by the position I took on Vietnam. The reason for which President Johnson was determined to “punish” me in 1965 was the same reason that obliged him to withdraw altogether from public life in 1968.

The former President of Pakistan, who submitted to external pressures, had to suffer the same fate. Aroused by the spirit of the times and disgusted by corrupt dictatorship, the people of Pakistan rose in a mighty movement to oust Ayub Khan. Now it is for the people to unite in the colossal task of national reconstruction.

Ayub Khan’s external policies were as disastrous as his internal policies. The fallen dictator entrapped Pakistan in the tread-mill of his making. After assuming power in 1958 he left no doubt about his attachments. Ayub Khan maintained a one-sided foreign policy until the events of 1962 forced him to relent. Earlier in 1960, unnerved by the fiasco of the U-2 incident, Ayub Khan acquiesced to an oil agreement with the Soviet Union. Still more disturbing was the boundary conflict that erupted between China and India in 1959. It led to the quest for a settlement of the frontiers with China. These limited overtures notwithstanding, the policy of alignment implacably remained. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, breaking into the bastion of the conventional foreign policy, became the true point of departure. Whether Ayub Khan was or was not the author of the policy of alignment, its pieces certainly fell in front of him. Being by temperament, incapable of grappling with revolutionary situations, he hoped that somehow the events would pass like a bad dream. But events pressed forward.

One initiative led to another, and within three years Pakistan managed to break her isolation to become a leading nation of the Third World. As a consequence the country’s relations improved with all her neighbours except India. In Western Europe a new understanding developed with France. Relations with the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe, especially
Romania, entered a phase of constructive association. Indonesia, which in the past had stood disapprovingly aloof, moved away from India. RCD filled the partial vacuum caused by the weakening of CENTO. A noticeable change came in the attitude of the Arab countries. The inert policy towards Latin America was abandoned. A satisfactory understanding was reached with China. On the whole, it was a remarkable transformation in foreign policy, attained in an atmosphere of relative calm. For the first time since independence, India was put on the defensive. The initiative, held menaciously by Prime Minister Nehru from 1947 to 1962, was at last snatched from his skillful fingers.

President Ayub Khan witnessed the changes with considerable disquiet. He felt unable to stem the tide. But the clamour of public opinion for change could not be ignored. The powerful pockets of resistance, unhappy over the new trend, retreated not in defeat but to gather strength. In the beginning, they dared not speak against the changes. But when the momentum began to settle, the initial opposition was expressed in guarded criticisms against the exchange of tutelage of one Great Power for that of another. The same people who had earlier rejected non-alignment became the advocates of non-alignment. When it came to alignment with the United States, the virtues of fidelity were extolled to the point of shocking subservience. The merits of neutrality became apparent only when the foreign policy began to turn away from total commitment. The movements towards a position of equi-distance was interpreted as going from one extreme to the other. There was consternation over the slight shift away from the United States in the direction of China and Soviet Union. What was being defended was not the need for balance. In reality, it was the expression of fear over attaining balance at the cost of alignment with the United States. After Pakistan’s having been kept a client-state for over a decade, suddenly a discovery was made about the benefits of neutrality only to prevent the development of cordial relations with China.

When it came to developing relations with the United States, the former President was prepared to go to any length. He claimed to be the author of the policy of alignment and conceded extra-territorial rights to the United States in Peshawar. In 1961 he confidently assured the Congress that Pakistan was the only country in Asia where the presence of the United States Forces would be welcome. To satisfy the global interests of the United States, the former President was prepared to compromise the sovereignty of Pakistan for joint defense with India. When however it came to cultivating relations with other Great Powers, he was harrowed by the fear of being overwhelmed. In an address to the Nation on October 27, 1968, he pointed out the limitations imposed on Pakistan in the determining of her relations with a Great Power. In saying this he had China in mind. He never bothered to think of limitations when he bartered away the country’s sovereignty. When it came to alignment, Pakistan was the most aligned ally of the United States. When it came to developing relations with China, Ayub Khan thought it necessary to warn his people of the limits to their expectations.
As a popular policy, serving national interest could not be openly defied, the resistance took surreptitious forms. When however the preliminaries were completed, a massive offensive was launched against the independent trends. The retaliation might have come earlier, had it not been for the total involvement of the United States in Vietnam and the belief that President Ayub Khan, a reliable friend of the West, would turn the tide the moment public opinion was appeased.

Three crucial years were allowed to pass. The counter-offensive came in two stages. In the beginning it was considered politically expedient to avoid ultimatums. Mr. George Ball, the Under Secretary of State, was sent to Rawalpindi in September 1963 to discuss the differences in a conciliatory spirit. The second phase was more aggressive. It began in June 1965 when Mr. George Woods, the President of the World Bank, met President Ayub Khan in London to discuss the Tarbela Dam and other economic matters. Before meeting the former President, Mr. George Woods informed Mr. Saeed Hassan, the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, that the United States would not consider any further economic assistance to Pakistan so long as the Foreign Minister remained in office. Emboldened by the failure to hold the second Afro-Asian Conference in June 1965, Mr. George Woods issued his blunt warning. Following quickly on the heels of Mr. Woods’ threat, the United States Government decided to postpone the Consortium meeting from July to September 1965 and demanded a discussion on political differences in the intervening period.

Disturbed by the sharp reaction of the people of Pakistan to such brazen interference in the internal affairs of the country, the United States Administration beat a tactical retreat by offering other reasons for the postponement of the Consortium meeting. This crisis was overtaken by the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. The chapter on that epochal event has still to be written. Rarely before in our sub-continent have people mobilized themselves so splendidly for self-defense. Pakistan’s Armed Forces held up the enemy, penetrated deep into Rajasthan and advanced to the outskirts of Akhnoor in disputed Kashmir. This magnificent demonstration of national unity, and China’s ultimatum along with it, were bringing matters to a head. But the war was brought to an abrupt end without achieving the national objective. The nation was dismayed by the cease-fire. After three years of bewilderment over the cease-fire, General Musa, the Governor of West Pakistan, volunteered an explanation at Hyderabad on October 10, 1968. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army during the war informed the nation that Pakistan agreed to the cease-fire to oblige international opinion. This explanation is unacceptable. Besides being contrary to facts, no nation forsakes its national interest to accommodate what is euphemistically called “world opinion”. Asia and Africa would still be under colonial rule if “world opinion” were to be dictated by the Great Powers. The decision to accept the cease-fire came not in Pakistan’s interest but to meet the demand of the Great Powers in the Security Council, and not to oblige world opinion.
represented in the General Assembly. For the second time in the history of
the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan submitted to the orders of the Security Council
without a settlement of the dispute. Soon after the cease-fire, President Ayub
Khan made his fateful journey to Washington. In London he stopped for
consultations with Prime Minister Wilson, who paved the way for President
Johnson to dictate the terms for a rapprochement.

It appears that at Washington, an understanding was reached between
President Johnson and President Ayub Khan. The official communiqué
recognized the mutual differences, but sought to narrow them. Animated by
the spirit of accommodation, the United States condescended to accept
Pakistan’s relations with China provided Pakistan, while developing such
relations, remained conscious of the United States vital interests. On the
positive side, President Johnson insisted on a renewed effort to improve
Indo-Pakistan relations without pre-conditions. President Johnson made it
known that the United States did not possess the influence to make India
“disgorge” Kashmir. The demand for better relations with India, without a
settlement on Kashmir, was aimed at affecting Pakistan’s relations with
China. Instead of making an affirmative demand for a change of policy
towards China, a roundabout approach was adopted to attain the same
result. This was done by insisting on the improvement of Indo-Pakistan
relations at Pakistan’s cost and to China’s serious disadvantage. A settlement
in favour of Pakistan or one reached in the mutual interest of India and
Pakistan would not cause misgivings to another country. But if the relations
were to improve, to benefit India at the cost of Pakistan and to meet the
United States global policy against China, there would certainly be cause for
China to feel aroused.

As a sequel to the Washington commitment, President Ayub Khan met
Prime Minister Shastri at Tashkent under the auspices of the Soviet Union to
clear away the debris of the 17-Day War and to promote Indo-Pakistan
amity. Pakistan went to Tashkent in a stronger position than India. We
certainly did not go as suppliants as would appear from the outcome.
Pakistan had brought India’s aggression to a halt outside Lahore, and her
Armed Forces had penetrated into Indian territory and in Kashmir. India
stood isolated and was deeply disturbed by China’s ultimatum. Her food
position was desperate, with famine threatening a number of her provinces.
India’s economic condition was equally precarious. The Nagas and the Mizos
were taking full advantage of the situation. These were some facts of the
manifest situation that forced India to plead for a cease-fire and obliged her
Prime Minister to accept the good offices of a Great Power which had, until
the war, consistently upheld the view that Kashmir was part of India. In
contrast, Pakistan went to Tashkent in defence of a just cause, backed by the
ultimatum of China and supported by world opinion. The country’s economic
position was sound. There is no doubt that Pakistan was in a better
negotiating position. But at Tashkent, whilst India lost her Prime Minister,
Pakistan lost much more.
If the sacrifices were made only to restore special relations with the United States, many more disappointments were to follow. The United States attitude to military alliances had changed. Many notions of the cold war were forsaken. Non-alignment had come to acquire respectability. Advances in the art of war and technology were giving a different meaning to global strategy. Vietnam had become to central issue, and that conflict necessitated the reappraisal of military and economic assistance to Asian nations.

World conditions ruled out a return to the past. The United States was conscious of the limitations and recognized that Sino-Pakistan relations could not be suddenly revered. The idea was to induce Pakistan gradually to turn in the opposite direction by insisting on Indo-Pakistan co-operation instead of a rupture of Pakistan’s relations with China.

Because such was the aim in view the indicative straws in the wind appeared, when on the conclusion of a visit to Washington in April 1966. Mr. Mohammad Shoaib, the Finance Minister, returned with certain concrete proposals on India-Pakistan co-operation. It became clear that after June 1966, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy was put on the defensive. For some time, and particularly during the tenure of Ambassador Locke, the American Government pressed its proposals with vigour and with partial success. Contacts with China were noticeably reduced. On a brief visit to Pakistan in the Spring of 1967, the President of the World Bank, Mr. George Woods, expressed his indignation over the lack of progress on joint co-operation with India on the Ganges river. In a speech at Rawalpindi, President Ayub Khan blamed his former Foreign Minister for the deterioration in Pakistan’s relations with the United States, and took credit for restoring good relations. In another speech during the inauguration of the Mangla Dam, for the benefit of the representatives of Western Powers attending the ceremony, President Ayub Khan suggested that if nations were unable to resolve their disputes, it should be possible for them to put aside their unresolved disputes and co-operate in other fields. Later the former President proposed arbitration on the Kashmir dispute and agreed to conclude a conditional No-War Pact with India.

In November 1968, taking advantage of the reversal of policy, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, while on a visit to Pakistan, bluntly repudiated the United Nations commitment to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. A month later on 17th December, the American Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Benjamin H. Oehlert, stated his Government’s position on Kashmir by saying:

"The United States role in seeking a solution to the Kashmir issue could not be that of an initiator. To fulfil such a role, the United States would be obliged to exercise pressures that would be unacceptable politically and morally both to ourselves and to one another or both the parties.”
From the time the United States discarded isolationism, her foreign policy has been built on the faith that pressure and interference are a means of attaining national goals. President Johnson, who appointed Mr. Oehlert as Ambassador to Pakistan, was notorious for his interference in the internal affairs of other countries. He did it unabashedly in the Dominican Republic. His interference in Vietnam led to the presence of over half a million Americans in the battle-field of that war-torn country. Who does not know that America’s policy in the sub-continent has been distinguished by pressure and interference? The Johnson Administration exercised the most unpleasant sorts of pressure on the Government of Pakistan. It was therefore both strange and ironical for an ambassador of a country that has taken pride in interfering in the affairs of other countries to come out with a statement deprecating pressure. This departure from established policy was made to oblige India. It only means that the United States will do nothing to interfere with India’s illegal occupation of Kashmir.

This is how the United States views India-Pakistan problems. The well-known position of the Soviet Union remains unchanged. As far as China is concerned, Sino-Pakistan relations may still be good but are not as cordial as they were in 1965. On balance, India’s relations with the Arab states are as good as those of Pakistan. The attitude of Western Europe would be determined largely by the position of the United States. Under President de Gaulle, France was different but de Gaulle does not govern France any longer. The attitude of the Eastern European countries would, in a large measure, be determined by the position of the Soviet Union. In the past, Romania took an independent position but now, after the events in Czechoslovakia, it might be more difficult for Romania to strike an entirely separate note. Yugoslavia, the only country in Europe that supported India in the 1965 conflict, will continue to maintain that position. Africa and Latin America are far away but, despite the distance, India has been more active in Africa and in Latin America. She has pursued an energetic economic policy in many African countries. In the winter of 1968, the Prime Minister of India went on a goodwill mission to a number of Latin American countries. As a follow-up of that visit, India intends to expand her missions in Latin America. In Asia, India’s relations with Japan have been growing rapidly and so also with the new regime in Indonesia. In June 1969, the Indian Prime Minister visited both countries to extend the areas of co-operation with them. The influence of the United States on SEATO countries, particularly on Australia and New Zealand, must be taken into account. Malaysia was the only country in Asia to support India during the 1965 conflict. That country will continue to lean towards India. Burma remains neutral but recently relations between Burma and India have improved considerably. Turkey and Iran maintain fraternal relations with Pakistan. But the recent improvement in India’s relations with Iran cannot be overlooked. Within a week of the RCD Summit Conference in Karachi on 25th December, 1968, it was announced on December 31st that ships of the Royal Iranian Navy had arrived on a goodwill visit to India and that under an agreement, concluded on the same day, India would train 500 Iranian technicians to run Iran’s first steel mill. This
announcement was crowned with the information that the Shah of Iran would visit India on the 2nd of January 1969. On his arrival in New Delhi the Shah said to the Indian President:

“We trust confidently that this mutual rediscovery of Iran and India will revitalize our ancient ties, stimulate co-operation between our countries and contribute to stability and progress in Asia and the world.”

India and Iran have established ministerial machinery to promote relations between the two countries. On the pattern of the RCD, ministers of the two countries will meet every six months. On 22nd June 1969, Indian Foreign Minister concluded the first of these meetings in Tehran with a joint communiqué promising expanded economic co-operation between Iran and India.

Neither was it fortuitous for the Foreign Minister of Turkey to visit India on a goodwill mission in 1967. On his return to Turkey, when asked by correspondents if his visit would affect Turkey’s relations with Pakistan, instead of denying it, as would have been expected from an ordinary visit, the Foreign Minister refused comment. It would be wrong to jump to hasty conclusions, but there is no doubt that a goodwill visit to Greece by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan would arouse considerable interest in Turkey.

After great difficulty, during the period of Pakistan’s struggle for an independent foreign policy, relations with Afghanistan had taken a turn for the better. But once again, during the later part of Ayub Khan’s regime, setbacks were registered. Addressing a press conference in Rawalpindi on 20th December 1968, the Foreign Secretary admitted that relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had suddenly deteriorated since 1966. Sudden deterioration does not take place between neighboring countries sharing common interests. None of the problems between the two countries are of recent origin for relations to deteriorate suddenly.

The moment the Government of Pakistan put its foreign policy on the defensive, it was natural for others to take advantage. When a fundamental change takes place, it affects not only adversaries but also friends. Both have a stake in the change. Both try to draw advantages out of it. The unconcerned States remain unconcerned. The concerned States, which are friends and adversaries, seek to make adjustments favorable to themselves.

The half measures of President Ayub Khan led to intractable problems. The great opportunity that came in 1962 was frittered away. Ayub Khan made a hesitant encounter with history. By changing a little and by retreating again, he further jeopardized national interest. He was unable to resist public pressure for change, and, at the same time, equally unable to resist external pressure against the change.
The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 was seen by Ayub Khan not as an opportunity for a bold departure from established policy but as a reason for strengthening it by arriving at a settlement with India. Why else would he have entered into puerile negotiations with India at the height of the Sino-Indian conflict? That was the initial blunder. He obliged the Western powers by permitting India to give her undivided attention to China. The negotiations were undertaken not to settle Kashmir but to give relief to India. If Ayub Khan did not choose to drive a wedge whilst India was militarily harassed by China, the least he could have done was to have kept out of the picture instead of assisting India by concealed and deceptive measures. By taking a wrong at the start, Pakistan lost a great opportunity. So if Kashmir is further away from solution, it is not due to the change in foreign policy but because foreign policy was not changed at the right time. The change, when it came, was more of style than a substance. Even this was done with reservations. But whatever the change and howsoever it took place, it was in Pakistan’s interest as long as it lasted. It prevented more sinister pressures leading to an Indo-Pakistan axis against China. In making the limited change, Pakistan might have lost military assistance but she managed to retain her sovereignty. She might not have come closer to a settlement of Kashmir, but the country was secured from extinction.

Military assistance is sought for the defense of territorial frontiers and not for the liquidation of those frontiers. The 17-Day War with India manifested the dangers of military assistance rendered for purposes other than the country’s own objectives. If the assistance was not to be employed against Indian aggression, it was definitely not sufficient to meet the threat from China or the Soviet Union, if such a threat existed. In such a contingency, it was to be assumed that the United States would step into the conflict, if need be, with ultimate weapons. To what extent ultimate weapons would be used has still to be seen. However, it would be a poor consolation to the people of Pakistan if their country were to be defended by atomic annihilation. The pith and substance of military assistance lay not in meeting Indian aggression, but in defense against the Soviet Union and China. In one event the assistance was not to be employed, and in the other, it was not sufficient to prevent the complete destruction of the country.

For over ten years, the United States granted liberal economic assistance to Pakistan. In the beginning, there were outright grants. Gradually, however, loans replaced grants and today economic assistance comes only in the form of credits with interest. Pakistan is heavily burdened by a foreign debt that has shot up to the alarming figure of three thousand million dollars. About one-third of the country’s foreign exchange is spent on servicing foreign debts. The fact remains that, notwithstanding the loans and grants, Pakistan continues to be one of the poorest countries of the world. The country has not yet obtained an industrial infra-structure. Pakistan dies need economic assistance, but more than that she needs to have an economic system attuned to the requirements of under-developed countries. With out such a change, economic assistance will be a palliative, giving temporary
relief. The heavy dependence on foreign assistance needs to be reduced. As long as Pakistan took substantial assistance under PL-480, she remained heavily deficit in her food requirements. The assistance depressed national growth in agriculture. Once however PL-480 assistance was reduced, national incentives brought the country to the point of self-reliance in her food requirements. But even without any change in foreign policy, due to independent considerations, economic assistance would have diminished in the future. The global requirements of the United States and the weariness of her people at the indefinite continuance of economic assistance were beginning to affect the policy of economic assistance to the outside world. Other influences were also at work. The internal situation required the Government to turn inwards. The deficit in the balance of payments was widening. The heavy toll of the Vietnam War, the diminishing importance of alliances, the emergence of new states in Africa and the need to concentrate on Latin America were considerations of equal importance in the United States outlook on foreign assistance to countries like Pakistan. The policies of the Eisenhower era were being discarded. The only difference is that what was to come a few years later, came a few years earlier but in that process Pakistan saved her sovereignty, and came closer to self-reliance.

President Ayub Khan was not able to comprehend the significance of the irreversible changes taking place in the foreign policy of the United States. Equally, Ayub Khan failed to understand the rationale of Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union. In determining that raison d’etre it must be remembered that Pakistan is a large country of strategic importance both to the Middle East and to South East Asia, having a population of over a hundred million people. As a northern neighbor, the Soviet Union always recognized the value of good relations with Pakistan. The relations were strained not for inherent reasons but because of Pakistan’s alignments. For over a decade, Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union remained strained on that account. The single most important factor in enlivening Soviet Union’s interest in Pakistan is the development of Sino-Pakistan relations. The Soviet Union, like the United States, has high stakes in the sub-continent. Sino-Soviet differences have widened and led to border conflicts. The completion of strategic roads in our region and the importance of Sinkiang, bordering on Kashmir, cannot be ignored by the Soviet Union. A change in the Soviet Union’s attitude towards Pakistan is understandable for these and other good reasons. The question is to understand the change in terms of Indo-Pakistan relations. Put to the acid test, the change is not yet substantial. The Soviet position on Kashmir remains basically the same. Now that India is less non-aligned in relation to China, and Pakistan less aligned in relation to the United States, the Soviet Union might act more circumspectively. But still, whenever possible, she will try to harness her growing influence in Pakistan to promote an unconditional Indo-Pakistan settlement. Ayub Khan tried to make capital out of Soviet Union’s decision to extend military assistance to Pakistan. In the wider spectrum, it will be found that, over a period of time, this decision has been taken in the interest of Indo-Pakistan amity. If Pakistan is to be armed, it is in India’s interest that
the country be equipped with Soviet weapons in preference to Chinese. If both countries provide military assistance to Pakistan, it is again in India’s interest for the Soviet Union to keep a hand on the lever of control. In the ultimate analysis, it is in India’s interest for Pakistan to depend more on Soviet weapons than on Chinese equipment. Moreover, when compared to the military assistance that the Soviet Union provides to India, the assistance to Pakistan would remain inconsequential. For the same reasons, the United States might, in the future, supply military weapons to India and Pakistan. When the war ends in Vietnam, plenty of military equipment will become available. This equipment will not be taken back to the United States. The economy of the United States does not allow for surpluses to be dumped back into the country. The equipment will be made available to the countries of Asia and Africa. Pakistan and India are among the principal states to qualify for the surplus equipment.

India refuses to change her attitude to Pakistan. She is fast expanding her Armed Forces and resurrecting old theories on the use of force as a method of dealing with neighbors. She is building a formidable armada to police the oceans. The latest position of the Indian Government on Kashmir is that the only question to be determined is for Pakistan to surrender Azad Kashmir to India. This is how India fulfills her international commitments. Pakistan is not in a position to compete with the formidable war machine that India is building. Pakistan has to supplement her own preparations with diplomatic and political support from a country having a common interest with Pakistan. It so happens that China is that country, a neighbor of Pakistan, having a common interest with Pakistan to prevent Indian expansionism in our region. This is our effective deterrent and we must not allow either pressures or passing exigencies to obfuscate this basic truth.

The need for maintaining good relations with China is so compelling that Ayub Khan could not dare do anything openly to root them out. For one thing, Sino-Pakistan relations have crystallized sufficiently. The United States is not in a position to restore the old association in which a sufficient quid pro quo simply does not exist. Neither does the obdurate attitude of India help in attaining Indo-Pakistan amity. Towards the last days of his regime, President Ayub Khan was beginning to realise the mistake of trying to wriggle out of a perfectly feasible foreign policy. He, at last, discovered that an alternative was not available to the foreign policy evolved between 1963 and 1965. After knocking at many doors, like a prodigal son, Ayub Khan returned to China.

Old notions must give way to new ideas. The changes taking place in Asia will affect the United States relations with China, bringing forward new orientations. After the Vietnam war, United States will be more inclined to rely on her sea power in Asia, strengthen her bonds with Japan and Australia and to refrain from a policy that would commit her manpower to the land mass of Asia. In the changed circumstances, the United States may not look askance at Pakistan’s relations with China. If the United States keeps her options open, the Nixon Administration may be in a better position to
appreciate Sino-Pakistan relations. If President Ayub Khan had pursued correct bilateral relations with the United States and with China, it is not inconceivable that the peace negotiations on Vietnam, now being held on European territory in Paris, might have taken place on Asian soil in Pakistan.

The time is come for Pakistan to look ahead and to look in depth. A new era has dawned, at once full, both of promise and of fear. It needs to be understood by the men who control the destinies of nations. To comprehend the present changes is to grasp the infinite possibilities of the future. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who denounced pacts six years ago in Calcutta as a disease called “Pactitis” and is now President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, said in December 1968:

“The shape of the future will depend ultimately on convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power. In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical.”

We do not know whether in the years ahead the United States will become more philosophical, but we do know that she will have to re-shape her policy towards Asia. Acting against wiser counsel, President Johnson committed American manpower to the land mass of Asia. No future American President is going to make such a commitment again in haste.

There was a time when it was thought that the United States would rather risk another global war than come to an accommodation with the Soviet Union. For over a decade the confrontation was chilling. Now the two powers are engaged in widening their co-operation. If a change can come about in Europe there is no reason why it cannot happen in Asia. Once the Vietnam war comes to an end and China perfects her long range missiles pointing to the Western coast of the United States and draws nearer to military parity, the United States will have to take another hard look at her policy towards China. The United States cannot ignore the reality of China. The same Ocean washes the shores of both countries. Nor can the United States ignore the increasing Sino-Soviet differences over ideology and territory, the most potent causes of war.

Europe takes first place in the global outlook of the United States. In Europe, the interests of the United States have to be reconciled not with China but with the Soviet Union. The case of Czechoslovakia shows that little or no room is left for mutual adjustments in Europe. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is in a position to make concessions to each other in that region. It would thus appear that co-existence has reached its limits in Europe. Little wonder then that after completing his tour of South East Asia, beginning on 24th July 1969. Mr. Nixon will be the first American President to visit a communist capital when he flies westward to Bucharest for discussions with President Nicolas Ceasescu of Romania. It is reported that Chairman Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin also intend visiting Romania a day or two before President Nixon.
Having taken a different position from that of the Soviet Union on a number of important international questions, particularly on the Middle East and on Sino-Soviet relations, it is not without significance that the top leadership of both the United States and the Soviet Union should be concerned about Romania. It is to be seen if the visit of President Nixon to a country within the Soviet hegemony will strengthen co-existence or lead to renewed rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe with wider implications for the rest of the world.

The strategic Middle East, with its vast oil resources, comes next in the order of importance. Here again, Soviet interests stand face to face with those of the United States. The Soviet Fleet has entered the Mediterranean and is skirting American Naval power on the seas of Southern Europe. The Middle East is in a state of flux. At any moment, another crisis might involve the United States and the Soviet Union. Both in Europe and in the Middle East, it is not China but the United States and Soviet Union that engage each other.

There is no doubt that the material for a holocaust is to be found more abundantly in the Middle East than in Asia and Europe. The Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia came not to upset the status quo in Europe but to uphold it. In Asia, the Vietnam war came to the verge of involving China, but the fact that although that deplorable war has lasted for over ten years and continues to this day, has not led to an enlarged conflict. On the other hand, the Middle East war lasted for six days only but it brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the point of physical confrontation. The fear of war carries with it the conditions for a compromise. The Middle East provides the scope both for another terrible confrontation and for a spectacular concession. Here the limits of co-existence have not reached a saturation point as in Europe. The elements of mutual accommodations between the Soviet Union and the United States are available in the Middle East. When a compromise is thrashed out between the two Great Powers at the expense of other nations, in the modern diplomatic parlance the arrangement is called “a package deal”. The Middle East presents the most favourable conditions for such a package deal. The United States might be interested in an adjustment favourable to the Soviet Union in Western Asia in return for the furtherance of her interests in the Middle East. If the Soviet Union made concessions to the United States at the cost of the Arab States, the United States might reciprocate by strengthening the détente to combat jointly the rising power of China. Since there is room for “give and take” in this region, the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States may lead to a formula. Its enforcement, however, will give rise to new tensions, but that is a separate matter.

When the war ends in Vietnam and if the Middle East is not stabilized, the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union may run into trouble. Correspondingly, the situation might brighten the prospects of a
productive dialogue between the United States and China. Fatigued by the war in Vietnam, public opinion in the United States is turning towards a more realistic approach to China. Important leaders, who were previously opposed to China, are demanding her recognition. Senator Fulbright has again taken the lead and called for a change in the United States policy on Taiwan.

In the fast changing kaleidoscope of international affairs concepts remain neither fixed nor immutable. The Great Powers keep tapping alternatives to promote their individual and global interests. The Sino-Soviet differences are getting more serious. The 4,500 miles common border has become the scene of recurring conflicts. In June 1969, the Soviet Union convened an international conference of Communist Parties in Moscow for asserting her leadership over the Communist world. Behind the congeniality of communiques, the Sino-Soviet strains were visible enough. At this rate it appears doubtful if a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union is possible. On the contrary, it would appear that the differences might widen. This means that the Soviet Union would be prone, nay anxious, to strengthen the détente with the United States. This can be done but it must not be forgotten that there is a point beyond which the détente cannot proceed without affecting the social systems of the two Great Powers with different ideologies and conflicting national interests.

Two options are open to the United States. She can further strengthen her relations with the Soviet Union to collectively harass China or she can define the limits of the détente, step aside a little from the Sino-Soviet conflicts, and take advantage of those differences.

The People’s of Republic of China is similarly situated. She can repair her relations with the Soviet Union, which seems doubtful, or she can consider an accommodation with the United States to enable her to give greater attention to her differences with the Soviet Union. China has another option open to her. As in the past, she might choose to continue the confrontation both with the Soviet Union and the United States in the belief that the inherent contradictions between the Soviet Union and the United States will not permit their collaboration to endanger the interests of China.

Over a century ago, in 1823, the United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine in order to limit the influence of European powers in the Americas. The Doctrine grew in vigour with the expanding power of the United States, until it came to reflect the ascendancy of the United States in the Americas and in Western Europe. After her intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Soviet Union proclaimed her own doctrine on the hegemony of Eastern Europe. This has come to be called the Brezhnev doctrine. By virtue of this doctrine, the Soviet Union has undertaken to protect the social systems of Eastern European nations, if need be by force. Both the Great Powers have a doctrine of their own for controlling the status quo in Europe and in the Americas. Africa, the most ravaged continent, has not yet reached the stage for being divided into spheres of influence controlled by the Great
The conditions in Africa are not yet ripe for a ‘doctrine’. The Middle East is in the process of transformation and a doctrine for that region cannot emerge before a settlement is reached. Asia is approaching the point where the notion of a doctrine is becoming relevant. If there is to be a doctrine for Asia before one is found for the Middle East, which country will proclaim it? China and Japan are the two countries that have the power and the potential to pronounce an Asian doctrine. India cannot do it. She does not possess the qualities of a Great Power. That country will keep rising and tumbling, but tumbling more than rising to be able to voice a doctrine for Asia. Japan has the wherewithal but that great industrial power in Asia is the victim of her own past. Japan has subordinated her political ambitions to her economic interests. The United States gives her the overall cover of defence by virtue of the Mutual Assistance Treaty. Japan has been the dominant power of Asia and still possesses the qualities to play a significant role in the continent’s future. But as long as she chooses to remain under the protection of the United States and as a matter of policy denies herself the position that her power merits, she will not set the terms for a modus vivendi in Asia.

Considering the objective conditions of Asia. It seems that China alone is in a position to dictate a doctrine for Asia, if one needs to be dictated. If there can be a Monroe Doctrine for the Americans and Western Europe, and if there is to be a Brezhnev Doctrine for Eastern Europe, it is not inconceivable that in the future there might be a Mao-Tse-tung Doctrine for Asia. Such a compromise can come if the three Great Powers tacitly accept each other’s sphere of influence. The Potsdam Conference shows that such agreements are not publicly admitted. In the first instance, they involve mental reconciliation. After a period of intense struggle and confrontation, war and recrimination, a time comes for submission to realities. When it becomes apparent that more cannot be done to further national interest, without complete disaster, that is the stage for tacit readjustments. This is what happened in the great confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, and, centuries before that, between Islam and Christianity. Forecious rivalries between the equals seldom come to a head. They fade away, are relegated to obscurity or replaced by new rivalries. New challenges are met with new responses. This does not mean that the people of the world will have to accept a permanent status quo dictated by the Great Powers. In the modern meaning of the term, a sphere of influences does not mean the creation of an empire or a dominion, nor does it mean the control of one Great Power to the exclusion of others. Even within a de-limited sphere, there is room for co-operation, but not for a conflict. It means that a hostile bridge-head cannot be permitted existence against a Great Power in the areas of its geographical propinquity. This means that nothing detrimental shall be done to endanger the interest of the Great Power within its area and that the rules of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of all countries, large and small, shall be strictly enforced. For certain inherent reasons, or as a result of common agreement, certain nations have remained outside and can still continue to remain outside a given sphere of influence. For instance, in Asia, the Sub-Continent is too
large and too important to come within the purview of a distinct sphere of influence. Nor does the sphere of influence mean an end of the struggle against an unjust status quo built on tyranny and exploitation. The sacrifices for freedom will continue until all forms of domination are extinguished.

The conditions in the Soviet Union are different from those of the past. A return to that past cannot be made, either in the Soviet Union or in the countries of Eastern Europe. The liberal trends of Czechoslovakia will not wane. People will continue to hanker for a change in Western Europe. Convulsions will not abate without reform. Military regimes besride the lands of Latin America, and Che Guevara lies buried in an unknown grave somewhere in Bolivia. Yet a Batista or a Trujillo will not return to Latin America. In the Middle East, Nasser may not have succeeded in all that was expected of him, but the disgraceful social systems of the past has ended in his country forever.

The local situation anywhere on the globe keeps changing all the while. Such changes need not necessarily affect the overall equilibrium reached between the spheres of influence of the two Great Powers, which these are interested to preserve because only some sort of status quo in that respect appears to avert a clash between them that might spell the extinction on life on earth. The equilibrium will always be uneasy; but since neither camp desires a global war, it is in the interest of both to allow for internal changes and reform within each sphere. The struggle for a better social order will go on in spite of hegemonies, and the elementary urge for freedom will constantly upset the established order whereas people feel themselves oppressed.

A détente does not mean an end to the struggle for justice. This is one way of interpreting the consequences of the détente. On the other hand, it can be argued that regional conflicts are taking place in Asia, in Africa and in the Middle East but not in Europe because the détente covers Europe more completely, and because it excludes China. Perhaps for this reasons the longest and the bitterest conflict is being waged in Asia, and on her periphery. The status quo in Europe notwithstanding, it can always be disturbed if there is world conflict and the fear of such a conflict will exist as long as China is denied her rightful place.

Looking at the foreseeable future, it does not seem that an agreement between the three Great Powers on the national division of the world into spheres of influence is coming in the next decade. Nor does it seem possible that the widening Sino-Soviet differences will suddenly be replaced by co-operation between the two countries. What appears more possible in the years immediately ahead is for the United States and the Soviet Union to consolidate their co-operation. This is the likeliest alternative, but it would not be prudent to rule out an improvement in relations between China and the United States and a corresponding adjustment in the United States relations with the Soviet Union so as to give the United States greater
leverage in dealing with the two communist Great Powers in conflict with each other.

How will Pakistan fit into either of these pictures? The answer rests partly on India’s attitude to Pakistan but more on Pakistan’s ability to overcome her internal problems and to make a correct evaluation of her future policies. Conceding that the chances of a Soviet-United States common policy against China are greater than the United States taking a central position between China and the Soviet Union, it should nevertheless be remembered that Pakistan’s interests lie in maintaining good relations with the People’s Republic of China. It cannot be disputed that the consolidation of a détente between the United States and the Soviet Union will work in India’s advantage and cause severe strain for Pakistan. It is therefore inadvisable for Pakistan to get involved in an international or regional agreement directed against China. Such an agreement might have the support of the two Great Powers, it might contain many inducement, but it would be fatal for Pakistan to get entangled in a position hostile to China.

It must not be forgotten that there are inner contradictions in the détente and that co-existence has a point beyond which it cannot proceed. It must also be understood that China is not going to remain menaced forever. If not in the next five years, certainly by the end of the next decade, China will attain military parity and occupy a position of preponderance in Asia. India is hostile to Pakistan and will be interested in containing China in collaboration with other countries. It would be disastrous for Pakistan to come to an unnatural understanding with India at the cost of China merely because it has the support of two Great Powers and some friendly countries. What appears to be a position of disadvantage and isolation in the present circumstances is likely to turn to Pakistan’s advantage in the coming years.

Within this appreciation of the world situation and in this meaning of the future of Asia, Pakistan must consider how she will respond to the efforts to involve her in a confrontation with China. More specifically, in June 1969, the Soviet Union proposed a collective Security Alliance for Asian States. As a first step towards the realization of this objective, the Soviet Union is promoting the idea of regional co-operation between Iran, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. The term “regional co-operation” has come to acquire a special significance. It is becoming apparent that in reality it is a cloak for the attainment of global aims of the Great Powers. This latest endeavour to attain regional co-operation between the western states of Asia might be the severest test for Pakistan. A formidable alliance, actively sponsored by the Soviet Union and supported by the power of the United States, cannot be taken lightly. A multitude of levers will be brought into operation to compel Pakistan to join the alliance and to agree to unconditional regional co-operation.

The series of successive visits of foreign dignitaries in the sweltering heat of the summer must be seen in this context. Within barely two months, the
leaders of Iran have come twice to Pakistan. On his last visit to Islamabad, the Foreign Minister of Iran came out strongly in support of the proposed regional co-operation. When asked whether such co-operation was possible without the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes, the Foreign Minister said that not only was it possible, but that it would most probably assist in the resolution of disputes. Being more familiar with the history of our disputes, we in Pakistan know for bitter experience that our disputes cannot be resolved by putting them aside in the interest of regional co-operation. This is exactly what India has wanted from the beginning. Pandit Nehru took this position at the inception of the Kashmir disputes. The Quaid rejected it as a fraud and a ruse.

If Pakistan is expected to appreciate the difficulties of her allies, the least we should expect is some understanding of those difficulties that strike at the respect of our nationhood.

Within these two months, we were also honoured by the visit of the Foreign Minister of Turkey, who too supported regional co-operation, but more guardedly. The Secretary of State for United States visited Pakistan in June. The Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin, followed him within a matter of weeks. In the last days of June, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan sneaked out of Islamabad to Kabul for consultation with the Government of Afghanistan. To give these visits an air of normality, the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, a country close to the United States and hostile to China, came during the time when the Foreign Minister of Turkey and Iran were present in Pakistan. Quick to follow was Mr. Kewal Singh, Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, who, on arrival in Islamabad on 2nd July 1969, enthusiastically endorsed the idea of the Five Nation Conference in Kabul for economic collaboration by saying that:

"We would be most happy to join such a Conference when and wherever it takes place."

On India-Pakistan disputes, Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs repeated the well-known position of his country by saying that it was necessary first to create goodwill between India and Pakistan before tackling the differences. Earlier on June 14, 1969, his Foreign Minister welcomed the Soviet proposal for regional co-operation by saying that “the proposal was not exactly new”. He revealed that India had earlier suggested it to Pakistan, but he expressed his satisfaction over the Soviet Union’s added “weight to the proposal”. We are told that the President of the United States is to come to Pakistan in the end of July. Now it can be seen why these visits are being made rapid succession. Each visit of a foreign leader is with a purpose and that purpose is getting more apparent.

The President of the United States is making his Asian tour to consider the United States’ policy in Asia in the post-Vietnam period. If American troops are to withdraw from Vietnam and if no further commitment of American
Forces is to be made in Asia, it becomes all the more pertinent for the United States to take a keen interest in the Soviet proposal for an Asian Security Alliance. The correspondent of the ‘Observer’ in Washington D.C., Nora Beloff, reported that President Nixon’s advisers thought that there was no need to visit New Delhi but that a visit to Pakistan was politically more useful. India, according to this correspondent, was included in the itinerary to avoid diplomatic complications. This does not mean that India has lost her importance, or that Pakistan has suddenly become more important than India. It only means that Pakistan’s agreement on an Asian Security Alliance is more difficult to obtain than India’s consent. For the purpose of fulfilling this mission it is more important for the President of the United States to visit Pakistan than India.

There will be a multitude of pressures. There will be economic and military inducements and there will be threats. Friendly countries will be put in the forefront to propagate the idea. There will be an amalgam of pressure and temptations from all directions. Whatever the weight of pressure, no matter from where it comes, it is imperative for Pakistan to resist resolutely any initiative against China. The difficulties will pass, but if Pakistan succumbs to collective pressures, national interest will be injured permanently and perhaps threaten the very existence of Pakistan.

The proposed Security Alliance will be a multilateral military combination carrying all the dangers associated with such alliances, all the hazards so well known to Pakistan. The system of collective security alliances has led to tensions. Even if the system had any utility in the past, it does not carry any advantage for the future. When SEATO and CENTO have failed in the past, another alliance cannot succeed in the future. The grouping will cause reactions. It will strain our internal structure and invite the most sinister forms of external interference. It is against the spirit of the times, against the pledges of Bandung.

Strange that the Soviet Union should sponsor an alliance repugnant to Marxist-Leninist philosophy and against Soviet state policy. In the past, the Soviet Union always opposed multilateral military alliances. Afghanistan was lavishly praised by the Soviet Union for rejecting such alliances. Now the Soviet Union wants Afghanistan to be the venue for the promotion of a similar alliance. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has steadfastly opposed the western systems of collective security alliances. In a memorandum of March 31, 1949, addressed to the nations of the Atlantic Alliance, the Soviet Union expressed severe criticism against multilateral military alliances. The memorandum rejected in advance the Western criticism of the Soviet system by stating:

“All the Soviet Union’s treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the countries of people’s democracy have a bilateral character.”
On March 31, 1949, when the Soviet Union presented the memorandum to the Western Powers, all the treaties of the Soviet Union with Eastern European nations were of a bilateral character and directed against Germany. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, 1950 was also bilateral and it was directed against Japan. The treaties were not only bilateral treaties but they were restricted to the aggressors of the Second World War. This right was contained in Article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations which states:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action.”

Apart from the right given by the Charter, there was sufficient justification for the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries to make bilateral agreements against the threat of future German aggression and there was equally sufficient reason for China and the Soviet Union to take the same precautions against Japan. Both Germany and Japan had committed aggression that led to the devastation of Europe and Asia. There was need for protection against the recurrence of such brutalities.

In a speech, delivered on 23rd September, 1949, at the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Vyshinski repeated the arguments contained in the Soviet memorandum of March 31, 1949 and went on to accuse the Western Powers of violating the Charter of the United Nations and other international agreements by the instrumentality of the Atlantic Alliance.

In being directed against any third power except Germany and Japan, the Soviet memorandum saw another proof of the aggressiveness of the system of collective security as embodied in the Atlantic Alliance. It contrasted these features of the Atlantic Pact with the Soviet Agreement which “are aimed only against the possibility of a repetition of German aggression.”

The Soviet Union went so far in its criticism of collective security alliance as to deny to members of the United Nations the right to conclude in advance arrangements for collective self-defence. The Soviet memorandum stated this in the following terms:

“Nor can the establishment of the northern Atlantic group of States be justified by the right of every member of the United Nations, to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. Suffice it to say that such a right in accordance with United Nations’ Charter can only arise in the event of an armed attack on a member of the organization, while, as is universally known, neither the United States nor Great Britain nor France nor the other participants in the Pact are threatened with any armed aggression.”
The Soviet memorandum went further to claim that the Atlantic Pact was not a regional arrangement which could be concluded in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter:

"There can be no question of any regional nature of this Treaty, since the alliance envisaged by it embraces States in both hemispheres of the World and it is not for the purpose of settling any regional questions. This is also confirmed by the fact that as has already been announced, States which are not members of the United Nations - Italy and Portugal, are being drawn into participation in a North Atlantic Treaty, although Article 52 of the U.N. Charter envisages only the conclusion of regional agreements among members of the United Nations."

The Soviet’s objection to the collective security system, embodied in the memorandum of March 31, 1949, which, in addition to those stated here raised additional objections, clearly demonstrate the state policy of the Soviet Union to multilateral regional and military alliances. Mutual assistance of a bilateral character pointed against Germany and Japan, the enemy states of the last war, has been the core of the whole system of Soviet treaties. The Warsaw Pact was in essence a consolidation of bilateral agreements directed against the threat of German Revanchism supported by NATO powers. For this reason the Soviet Union did not seem to regard the Warsaw Pact to be an exception to its concept of treaties. By broadening her concept of treaties, to conclude multilateral military alliances not specifically directed against a threat recognized by the Charter, the Soviet Union seems prepared to follow a system of collective security that she has vigorously denounced for over two decades.

The proposed alliance will not serve the cause of peace. On the contrary it will exacerbate international tensions. The need for such an alliance does not exist and, if it does, against whom is it directed? No matter how eloquently it is denied, there is no doubt that China will consider the alliance to be directed against her. On the 28th June 1969, China sharply attacked the Soviet-proposed system of collective security in Asia as “actually an anti-China military alliance picked up from the garbage heap of history”. The system was compared with SEATO to contain China. It was reported that:

"this and other similar treaties had either disappeared into thin air or fallen to pieces”.

The criticism ended by stating that:

“No matter what intrigues and schemes United States and Soviet revisionism may hatch and no matter what anti-China military alliances they may set up, they will attempt to contain China.”

The Sino-Soviet armed clashes on the south-eastern frontier of the Soviet Union are getting more frequent. Last March, there were clashes on the
island Chen Pao in Ussuri river and later there were conflicts on the Sinkiang border. India too has had boundary clashes with China on the Sinkiang frontiers, and in NEFA. It might thus serve India’s interests to welcome the proposed collective security alliance as a matter of common concern with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan and Pakistan do not have any territorial differences with China. Both countries have settled their common frontiers with the People’s Republic of China. As the proposed alliance serves only India’s interests as opposed to those of China, it would not be proper for Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, countries having no boundary clashes with China, to get drawn into it. This means that if Pakistan acquiesced, she would be entering into an anti-China alliance. It is quite clear that Pakistan cannot afford to enter into an alliance with India against China. India has unresolved territorial disputes with China and with Pakistan. China preferred to abandon her friendship with India in 1962 than to forsake her interests in this region. No matter how powerful a combination is set into motion, China is not going to abandon her vital interests in her sphere of influence. Pakistan will have to resist the pressures and wait for a change in the international situation. That change is definitely coming, and not in the distant future either. Whatever the immediate problems, the future course in Asia cannot be settled without China’s participation and to China’s detriment. Whether China proclaims a Doctrine or not, a modus vivendi in Asia is the logic of the next decade. Failing that, there might be unprecedented bloodshed and turmoil. Pakistan would be well-advised to consider the future carefully. Those who have taken control of Pakistan’s destiny today, must remember that the present difficulties will pass. We must stand firm even if we have to stand alone. The future augurs well, but we must not destroy its opportunities by falling victims to pressures. Pakistan has been suffering from a prolonged agony. This agony must end. Wisdom lies in strengthening the fibre of independence, in not getting entangled in alliances which in essence are the same that Mr. John Foster Dulles promoted.

Regional co-operation is only the curtain-raiser to the collective security alliance. It is the first sentence in a document of capitulation. If the regional co-operation is outside the scope of a collective military alliance, it can be considered only on the basis of equality, but that equality cannot come until the well-known disputes between India and Pakistan are resolved to our satisfaction. These days much emphasis is being placed on regional co-operation. It is another term for economic domination and the extension of the sphere of influence of the Great Powers. Experience show that regional co-operation does not always bring economic progress to the states engaged in such a venture. Its success depends on a multitude of factors. It depends on the resources possessed by the states in the region, the level of industrial development, the technological standards and a host of other factors. Indeed sometimes premature and unrealistic regional co-operation creates difficulties. The industrial development of Pakistan, the rise of her textile mills and jute factories, came into being only after India had terminated economic co-operation. If India had not imposed an economic boycott soon after independence, Pakistan’s economy might have still remained at the
sufferance of India. What does regional co-operation entail? If it means collaboration beyond normal trade and commercial intercourse, involving integration of economics and the elimination of tariff barriers, it would give rise to many difficulties. Here in our under-developed region – with erratic market conditions, parallel economics, high level of unemployment, weak currencies, and low wages – the problems of coordination will cause serious problems. If the growth of regional co-operation beyond normal economic activity is to be gradual, in so far as India is concerned, it can await the outcome of the settlement of our disputes. Pakistan is already engaged in regional co-operation with Iran and Turkey. Pakistan should be quite prepared to undertake similar co-operation with Afghanistan. Thus, if regional co-operation is to be independent of a collective security alliance, and not as its harbinger, it can be considered by Pakistan with all the countries in the region except India. The collaboration with India can follow the settlement of the disputes provided it is not a pre-condition to a military collaboration poised against China. If it is to be a stage in the development of a military collaboration, it cannot be accepted, even if economic bounties flow out of it or even if it comes after the settlement of India-Pakistan disputes. Being directed against China it will spell disaster.

A foreign policy cast in the vision of the future will overcome all obstacles and give the people of Pakistan the peace they have sought but which has been denied them since their independence.

This is one of the moments that history provides for a decision.

After Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler at Munich in 1938, Churchill said:

“The Government had to choose between shame and war. They choose shame and they will get war.”

Pakistan has a wider choice. In rejecting the collective security alliance and unconditional regional co-operation, Pakistan might face momentary difficulties but she would have served her long term interests and strengthened the case of peace in Asia. If Pakistan succumbs, the people will face a terrible tragedy, escaping neither shame nor war.
CHAPTER II

The Past Alliances

During the last years of President Ayub Khan’s regime, an exaggerated claim was made about the success of the bilateral nature of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. In a speech delivered in Islamabad on November 19th, 1968, Mr. Arshad Hussain, the former Foreign Minister, expressed satisfaction over the transition from a policy of commitment to that of bilateral relations outside the ambit of the Cold War. Ayub Khan insisted that the country’s external relations were so placed as not to cause offence to any Great Power. This objective is said to have been achieved by eschewing relations with one Great Power at the cost of the others. The policy entailed friendly relations with all of them without getting inveigled into global entanglement.

From the files of the Foreign Office, it will be seen who actually set the direction for bilateral relations. Knowing that a frontal attack on establishment policy supported by powerful interests in the country would come to grief, I approached this difficult problem with the utmost caution. Pakistan’s political and military commitments were the fulcrum of its foreign policy, too deeply entrenched to allow for a sudden change. The economic Consortium, being the weakest link in the chain of multilateral commitments, was more vulnerable. I chose it as the starting point.

The opportunity to prick at the Consortium came unexpectedly during President Ayub Khan’s visit to Europe and to the United States in December 1965. At a dinner in the Embassy in Washington, Mr. George Woods, who had replaced Mr. Eugene Black as President of the World Bank, engaged me in a discussion on the Consortium and wondered if it had not outlived its purpose. I expressed appreciation to Mr. Woods for the frank expression of his views and concluded the discussion by telling him that, generally speaking, bilateral agreements offered greater latitude and were, on the whole, less complicated than multilateral commitments.

President Ayub Khan was too affected by the chastisement administered to him by President Johnson to be in a condition to be approached while in Washington on other subjects. On our return, we stopped in Bonn for two days. A number of Pakistan’s envoys had collected in the German Capital to shower compliments on President Ayub Khan’s leadership during the war with India. In the congenial company of his Ambassadors, among whom was his brother-in-law, the envoy to Bonn, President Ayub Khan’s confidence began to return. The night before our departure from Bonn, Mr. Ghulam Faruque, the Commerce Minister, and I were summoned by the former President for a discussion on the country’s problems. Mr. Faruque lashed out at the economic policies of Mr. Mohammad Shoaib, the Finance Minister. Oddly
enough, for abandoned time, the President appeared receptive to the sharp criticism of his Finance Minister.

After Mr. Faruque had finished, I reminded the President that from the beginning I had not concealed my misgivings about Mr. Shoaib’s policies. Mr. Shoaib considered the Consortium to be the pride of his achievements. I went for this pride of his. I told President Ayub Khan that the time had come for a reappraisal of the Consortium, that this was so necessary that even the President of the World Bank was beginning to question the utility of the arrangement. I informed him candidly that I was disturbed over the growing nature of Pakistan’s multilateral commitments.

Another opportunity to discuss the subject arose a month later and again on foreign soil. On our way to Tashkent in January 1968, we stopped in Kabul. During our internal discussions, the former President praised Afghanistan for its ability to preserve its independence. To bring the conversation to a head, I told him that as a land-locked country, caught in the nutcracker of British and Czarist ambitions, Afghanistan was, perforce, foreign policy oriented. By trial and error, the Afghans had learnt to protect their independence by following a bilateral foreign policy.

On my return to Pakistan I took the precaution of recording a note on bilateral and multilateral relations, in the hope that the seeds sown in Bonn and Kabul would one day germinate. In this note I suggested that Government should examine the possibilities of gradually converting the country’s multilateral obligations to bilateral commitments. As a positive recommendation, I commended the need for replacing the Consortium by a series of bilateral agreements.

Not until my return from a conference in Teheran in April 1966, did I learn that my efforts had not been unrewarding. On my arrival in Karachi, I found the city buzzing with gossip over the defeat of the former President’s nominee in a bye-election from Karachi to the National Assembly. I summoned the Deputy Inspector General of Police to acquaint myself with the situation. After he had apprised me of the events, he requested me to explain to him the new trend in Pakistan’s foreign policy based on bilateral relations. Before I could ask him why he made this query, the official quickly added that during the former President’s last visit to Karachi, he had told him that Pakistan’s foreign policy would now rest on bilateral relations. As this officer was due to leave for London to take up an assignment in the High Commission, he was anxious to learn from his Foreign Minister more about this development in our external relations.

Foreign policy is judged by its substance, that is, by the principles on which it is built and which it follows. The pursuit of principles to more important than the external shape of a policy. If the terms of a bilateral agreement violate recognized principles of states region, the presumption in favour of bilateral agreements gets rebutted. So also apprehensions about
multilateral relations can be removed if their conditions serve the interests of a foreign policy based on accepted norms. For instance, a multilateral agreement like the Treaty of Rome that established the European Common Market is preferable to a bilateral agreement that violates state sovereignty. Although the merits of foreign policy are determined by its contents, it is nevertheless true that, generally speaking, for a variety of reasons, bilateral relations promote national and international relations more readily than multilateral relations.

Common sense will show that an arrangement involving a plurality of nations is more difficult to manage than an association between two states. But the problem is more complex. Before modern conditions complicate inter-state relations, when states were few and rarely in contact with one another, when communications had not devoured distances, bilateral relations faithfully reflected the given conditions. The theory of the balance of power between two or more states confronting each other was known in antiquity but was brought to maturity in the modern age. Hannibal notwithstanding, the Roman Empire did not need to balance its power with a matching rival. The Persian and the Byzantine Empires did seek a notional balance of power but more often combated each other with methods more familiar to ancient times. The great empire of the Arabs rose when the Byzantine and the Persians powers were ebbing. This coincidence delayed the flowering of multilateral diplomacy.

This does not mean that multilateral relations did not exist in ancient or medieval times. The Greek city-states, the pioneers of civilized international relations, functioned on a pattern of multilateral relations. Balance of power is a reflex of nations seeking aggrandizement. In its competition with the nations of Europe for colonies and commerce, Britain built and preserved its strength on balance of power. But as a vehicle of collective security, the concept developed much later. In their developed sense, both contemporary balance of power, called by Churchill “the balance of terror” and multilateral relations are corollaries of the Nations-State system. Rapid progress in communications narrowed the gap between a multitude of states; national ambitions, rooted in antagonisms and affinities, created propitious conditions for multilateral relations. As in the past, this evolution in diplomacy also corresponded to the changes in international society. The inter-locking and sometimes conflicting alliances built by Bismarck to protect Germany’s territorial accretions became a model for state relations in Europe. This form of diplomacy hastened the First World War. Aware of the frightful dangers of secret multilateral treaties, President Woodrow Wilson sought to reduce their mischief by calling for “open covenants openly arrived at”. The concept of collective security resting on groupings superseded more viable arrangements designed to maintain world peace. As a consequence, within a generation, the continuing instability, caused chiefly by multilateral treaties, led not to peace but to two World Wars and to the Cold War. The system had however become so entrenched that the Charter of the United Nations
recognized collective security as supplementing its own pretensions to the maintenance of international peace.

To give practical shape to this notion of peace, the United States initiated a series of inter-connected multilateral and bilateral alliances directed against the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. NATO, the most important of these alliances, was formed to protect Western Europe. Pakistan entered CENTO and SEATO, the imitations of NATO in the Middle-East and in South-East Asia. Pakistan concluded separately a bilateral Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States to compliment the multilateral undertakings. Thus, by virtue of both bilateral and multilateral treaties, Pakistan stepped into the Cold War on the side of the United States and its allies as an antagonist of the Soviet Union, China and their allies.

Without exception, every nation that entered into multilateral treaties assumed military commitments in exchange for massive military and economic assistance. The dominant purpose of all the agreements was to prepare the aligned nations for military responsibilities. These tiers of military commitments embracing the globe were described as collective defence treaties ensuring collective and individual security against Communist aggression. The Soviet Union and China, on the other hand, insisted that the Western military alliances were instruments of aggression designed to encircle Communist nations. In collaboration with the Communist states of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union set up the Warsaw Pact Organization in response to the military threat posed by NATO. In this spiral of the Cold War, multilateral treaties, as tools of the system of collective security, became increasingly associated with international tension.

In the course of more than a hundred years, organized military groupings have sparked off one war after another and brought the world to the edge of the final catastrophe. Multilateral treaties have neither reduced tensions nor prevented wars. The final holocaust is prevented not by the network of multilateral military treaties but by the bilateral military balance that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. A new situation, fraught with unimaginable consequences, is likely to arise when, in a few years, China attains military parity with the other two Great Powers. Whatever else multilateral military treaties might have achieved, as deterrents to war, they lead to an impasse.

Multilateral treaties are generally a disguise for collective military preparations under the control of a Great Power. There is always a shepherd with a big stick keeping the flock together. This is not always a simple task. Duress and cajolment are invariably applied to check waywardness. It is a tapestry of high-powered diplomacy woven with the threads of intrigue and pressure. The dominant objective of the Great Power over-shadows the vital interests of the others. Whenever a discordant note is heard, the full weight of the Great Power, together with that of the others, is brought to bear on the recalcitrant. The aligned nations are called “Client States”. Their
individual interests are subordinated to the objectives of the Great Power. The alliances move either too slowly for the Great Power or too fast for the others. Situations not envisaged at the time of entering the alliance keep arising and cause new complications. These developments either necessitate a reconciliation of conflicting interests or a crude interference in the internal affairs of one state or other in the alliance. The levers of power are put in action from all sides to preserve the arrangement. Differences over a crisis or over the interpretation of collective responsibilities cause misunderstandings. Whenever the gravitational influence of the Great Power supervenes, the internal problems of the lesser powers of the alliance are exacerbated to increase their external dependence. Lacking a balance of equity and heterogeneous in composition, the alliances falter whenever the common threats subsides or no longer remains common. When that happens, naked power is used to maintain the integrity of the association. Two threats perpetually hang over multilateral treaties – an external one relating to the hostile states and an internal one requiring permanent co-operation. Over a period of time, such alliances run into trouble and are kept alive by either force or inducement or both.

For these reasons, multilateral alliances function with greater difficulty than bilateral ones; and the most exacting among them are the military alliances embracing countries from different geographical regions. They operate satisfactorily only when a genuine common threat exists. Once the common threat diminishes or disappears, or seems to diminish or disappear, the arrangement begins to flounder. Collective treaties of a political and economic nature also create complications if they are prompted by extraneous motivations. A multilateral agreement works well only when it is genuinely inspired by a desire for internal progress without being a cloak for external ambitions. Such agreements, based on the principle of equality, and not on the greed for exploitation, promote regional co-operation. Agreements of this character are qualitatively different from collective military agreements or multilateral political and economic treaties externally directed against a state or a collection of states.

There is a third category of agreements which needs to be distinguished from bilateral and multilateral agreements. This class is comprised of agreements entered into with all states, or open to all states like the Charter of the United Nations. Such multilateral treaties cover a host of common problems ranging from riparian rights to the control of narcotics, from the international monetary system to disarmament. The scope of such treaties is as wide as the progress made inevitable by the conditions of existing society.

Under which moral criterion did Ayub Khan’s Government claim that its foreign policy was so bilaterally poised as to escape from global entanglements? The people of Pakistan are more concerned over the fact that their rights are compromised than over the modality by which it was done. Under the former regime, Pakistan has achieved the rare distinction of compromising its sovereignty both bilaterally and multilaterally.
The global nature of the United States’ foreign policy is such as to cause a chain reaction which simultaneously activates the bilateral and multilateral alliances that girdle the world. An example of this is to be found in the United States’ bilateral Mutual Security Treaty with Japan, a country not in SEATO or in any other multilateral military alliance. In the event of the activation of this bilateral treaty, the system of inter-connected alliances would come much more energetically into play than a SEATO responsibility.

Bilateral agreements are not by themselves the epitome of virtue. Whether such agreements are good or bad depends strictly on the terms of the covenant. However, apart from this, even the claim of Ayub Khan that Pakistan’s external policy was bilateral in character is false. Pakistan is a member of SEATO, and CENTO, associated in the Commonwealth, involved in the Colombo Plan and beholden to a Consortium for loans. Such a web of multilateral commitments can scarcely be described as a model of bilateral relations.

The people of Pakistan had become so inured to the Ayub regime’s contradictions that they were simply not impressed by its florid propaganda. The tragedy lay not so much in Ayub Khan’s false boasts as in his refusal to recognize the dangerous implications of the foreign policy he followed. By controlling the national press, the former regime sought to conceal its external compromises and its many blunders.

Without understanding the connotations of the phrase, it wanted a ‘bipartisan’ foreign policy. The United States involved its bipartisan foreign policy on the basis of the common objective which the two political parties of the country – the Republicans and the Democrats wanted to pursue jointly under a democratic system. In Pakistan neither did the Opposition function under a democracy and neither was a common objective shared by the people and the Government. Until the Ayub Government weakened its position on Kashmir, a common stand could have been taken on that issue of significance. As stated in the United Nations’ General Assembly on October 11th 1968, by Mr. Arshad Hussain, the Ayub Government wanted a solution of the dispute – any solution that would resolve the dispute. Otherwise, Mr. Arshad Hussain would not have said:

"On behalf of my Government, I reaffirm the readiness of Pakistan to take up all outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, either as a package deal or according to a step by step procedure, provided India clearly affirms its agreement that at an appropriate and specified stage, it will negotiate on Kashmir in sincerity and with a view to finding a solution of the dispute.”

In contrast, the people of Pakistan are not willing to settle for anything short of self-determination. Our people want to withdraw from CENTO and SEATO, but Ayub Khan’s Government remained devotedly attached to them without qualms of conscience. The people want to keep away from the Cold War, but
Ayub Khan kept Pakistan bound to the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, despite the cessation of all military assistance by that country. The divergence between the peoples’ thinking on foreign affairs and the Government’s conduct of foreign policy was unbridgeable.

Each of Pakistan’s multilateral and bilateral military commitments became useless the moment the United States unilaterally terminated military assistance to Pakistan. With the removal of reciprocity, the agreements became void ipso facto. Notwithstanding this incontestable position, the Government of Ayub Khan, committing dereliction of its elementary duty to the people of Pakistan, refused to renounce the agreements. It chose to endanger the security of Pakistan without an iota of corresponding protection. It cannot be forgotten that Pakistan assumed the liabilities of the Cold War in return for military assistance and political support on Kashmir. The military assistance ended three years ago and the political support went earlier. The United States’ position on Kashmir began to shift imperceptibly since the first Sino-Indian conflict of October 1959. This was established beyond doubt when Pakistan took the dispute to the Security Council in 1964.

The United States imposed an embargo on the delivery of military equipment to Pakistan when the country was struggling for its survivals against an aggressor, five times its size. For three years a complete ban was placed on the sale of weapons and spare parts to Pakistan. The government of a country in three military alliances had to run from pillar to post in search of armaments and spare parts, from black market centers and notorious arms peddlers. Throughout this difficult period, Ayub Khan refused to free the country from the burden of these obsolete alliances. On the contrary, he permitted the United States’ base in Peshawar to operate until the expiry of its lease in July 1969. Not even those countries which are the pillars of NATO would find it possible to assume such onerous one-sided military obligations on behalf of the United States or any other country.

In an extra-ordinary explanation of the United States’ position, given officially for the first time in December 1968, the United States’ Ambassador to Pakistan, in reply to a question from an Urdu newspaper, denied that the United States had abrogated the letter and spirit of CENTO and SEATO pacts. The Ambassador observed that under the SEATO agreements, the member countries had pledged to come to the assistance of South Viet-Nam in the event of an attack on that country. With reference to CENTO, the Ambassador said that the joint resolution of the United States’ Congress authorized the United States’ Government to conclude bilateral agreements with the regional CENTO member-countries exclusively to deal with “armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism.” The Ambassador concluded by asserting that the agreements made clear that the United States had in no way abrogated them either in letter or in spirit.
This explanation does not conform to the factual position. By no stretch of imagination can an analogy be drawn between the conflict in Viet-Nam and India’s aggression on Pakistan. South Viet-Nam is not a member of SEATO. Without taking part in the Manila Conference, Viet-Nam was unilaterally brought under the purview of SEATO as one of the “protocol states”. Under the Geneva Agreement of 1954, both North and South Viet-Nam were to be neutralized and freed of foreign troops. A civil war was internationalized in contravention of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and 1962. This civil war arose because South Viet-Nam made it plain that it would not consider itself bound by the Geneva Agreements. A country, not a member of SEATO, which had unleashed a civil war after breaking its own agreements, is not entitled to assistance. There is thus no parallel between SEATO’s obligations to Pakistan and its illegal interference in Viet-Nam.

Nor did the United States’ Ambassador give a correct interpretation of the treaty obligations. He should have considered them in the light of the totality of the United States’ pledges to Pakistan. He overlooked the unequivocal assurance given by the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to Foreign Minister Feroz Khan Noon, in an official communiqué in 1957. Equally, he ignored the pledge given by President Kennedy to President Ayub Khan on 13th July 1961 when at the conclusion of President Ayub Khan’s visit to the United States, a joint Communiqué was issued stating:

“The two Presidents re-affirmed the solemn purpose of the bilateral agreements signed by two Governments on March 5th, 1959, which declared among other things that ‘the Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan.’”

Relying on the successive commitments made by the United States’ Government of Pakistan, Ambassador’s predecessor, Mr. Walter P. McConnaughy, stated in Hyderabad on 31st December, 1962 that the United States would take every precaution that the assistance provided to India to help her fight the Chinese would not be used against Pakistan. In November 1962, the United States gave another assurance that she would come to the assistance of Pakistan in the case of aggression from outside, including India. Ambassador McConnaughy again stated in a press conference in Karachi on 9th November, 1962 that:

“The United States in turn has assured the Pakistan Government officially that if this assistance to India should be misused and misdirected against any other country in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression by India.”

Speaking on the same subject, on 20th November, 1962, President Kennedy told a press conference:
“Our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitments to Pakistan and we have made this clear to both Governments as well.”

If all the commitments of the United States are read together, not a shadow of doubt remains that the United States was under a positive obligation to assist Pakistan against Indian aggression. But the United States did just the opposite. Instead of fulfilling her obligations, the United States went to the other extreme by imposing an embargo which benefitted India and harmed Pakistan. The mountain divisions of India, equipped by the United States after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, were used to great advantage by India in the Kashmir sector. If CENTO and SEATO, along with the commitments, were not to be activated in the service of Pakistan, at least punitive action should not have been taken against an aligned country in the middle of the war.

The United States’ relations with Pakistan would not receive a fillip by the re-opening of this sensitive question. How much such an embargo hurts is evident from the protests Israel continues to make against General de Gaulle’s embargo on the sale of French weapons to Israel. The position of Pakistan was much serious. Israel is not dependent solely on French weapons as was Pakistan on American at that time. The embargo on Israel was placed by France a year after the ceasefire in the Middle East, as a sanction against an act of delinquency by Israel. The embargo on Pakistan came during the war, at a time when Pakistan was a victim of aggression by a country five times its size and possessing superior resources. Yet Israel reacted violently, almost hysterically to the French decision.

Quite independent of the mistake of entering the Cold War, quite apart from the merits of reciprocal benefits occurring from military alliances, the relevant question is to inquire why Ayub Khan did not renounce invalid treaties. Whether the alliances are beneficial or not can be determined by the mutuality of the benefit, by putting the reciprocal advantages and disadvantages in the scales of national interest. In the absence of a single trace of mutuality of interest or reciprocity, that is, in the total absence of any advantage, the question of remaining attached to invalid treaties simply does not arise. Even when tangible advantages flowed from the military alliances in the shape of generous military aid, public opinion in Pakistan was hostile to the alliances. When it became evident that SEATO and CENTO did not provide genuine security to Pakistan, despite the military assistance, it was considered that the disadvantages of alignment outweighed the advantages. Once however the military assistance came to a stop, even the most tenuous justification for remaining in the alliances disappeared. From that moment on, not a single argument was left open or available to the Government of Ayub Khan to remain in SEATO and CENTO.
Unlike other aligned nations that received military assistance, Pakistan was penalized by the termination of military assistance. For this reason, unlike other committed nations drawing advantages from the alliances, Pakistan for one can no longer take the position that it would be inexpedient to assume the onus of leaving alliances that are in the process of self erosion. In the first place, SEATO, which has always remained on the brink of involvement in Vietnam, has not become passive. It does not cover the détente. It is directed against China, a country friendly to Pakistan but which, at present, is regarded by the United States as its own principal adversary. There are reports that at the recent SEATO ministerial meeting in Bangkok on May 20th and 21st, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, made certain suggestions to strengthen SEATO. Secondly, because of its importance, it is repeated that if this assumption is valid at all, it is available only to those states that continue to receive military assistance and other benefits from the treaties but not to Pakistan, which is no longer a beneficiary of the alliances. Only those states that continue to derive benefits can continue to tolerate the burden of the alliances. Only they can argue that it would be inexpedient to assume the onus of withdrawing from treaties which are on the decline but which nevertheless provide them with valuable military assistance. Bearing only the disadvantages, Pakistan cannot defend its one-sided military commitments. The Government cannot explain away its conduct either as an active or a passive member of the alliances that ceased to exist for Pakistan three years ago. The hazards of these alliances cannot be reduced by down-grading the level of participation in the conferences from a Minister to an Ambassador or Observer. Nor can inherent dangers of alignment be eliminated by such means. In reality, President Ayub Khan had become less enthusiastic to the pacts not because of the damage the alliances did to Pakistan but because the United States has become less enthusiastic about them. Ayub Khan was waiting for the United States to dissolve the alliances. Pakistan’s participation became less consequential because the United States global policy made the alliances less important. This does not mean that the interest of the United States might not change to warrant the activation of the alliances, as in the case of NATO by the events in Czechoslovakia. The fluidity of the situation in South-East Asia and in the Middle-East might cause the United States to revitalize SEATO and CENTO. If this happens, Pakistan will be put on the horns of an awkward dilemma.

The truth is that, for his own reasons, Ayub Khan kept Pakistan attached to the alliances even when the quid pro quo vanished. To stake national security for individual safety is not unusual to a personal regime. Having seen how the hidden hand of CIA had toppled regime after regime in Asia and Africa, Ayub Khan wanted to maintain the goodwill of the United States by not doing anything to exasperate the Administration of that powerful country. Erroneously, he believed that he was strong enough to pursue policies against the interest of his country without understanding his position. He believed that he was capable of suppressing the people’s sentiments but was unable to cope with the dissatisfaction of a Great Power. Subsequent
events showed the folly of alienating one’s own people only to satisfy the requirements of a foreign power.

Time has shown that the alliances were harmful to Pakistan, even when they carried the advantages of military assistance. When Pakistan became a member of CENTO on the pretext that the Cold War had entered the sub-continent, Jawahar Lal Nehru repudiated his country’s pledge on Kashmir. Taking CENTO to be an affront to its security, the Soviet Union punished Pakistan with its veto in the Security Council. The Soviet position became so partisan that during his visit to India, Premier Khrushev made it a point to visit Srinager, the Capital of the disputed State, and from there he announced to the world that the Soviet Union regarded Jammu and Kashmir to be an integral part of India. To further punish Pakistan, the Soviet Union extended its support to Afghanistan on its irredentist claim on Pakistan’s territory. Taking advantage of the Soviet Union’s hostility of the Western alliances, Jawahar Lal Nehru cultivated with that Great Power a relationship of enormous benefit to India and incalculably detrimental to Pakistan. Close co-operation developed between the two countries in the United Nations and in international affairs, generally to elevate India to the leadership of the non-aligned Third World. This co-operation was not confined to the most important subject of political support but it extended to economic and military matters as well. Soviet support to India rose sharply with the passage of each year. The Soviet Union ignored Pakistan, its more proximate neighbour, and unequivocally stood by India. This identification became evident only after Pakistan became a member of CENTO. Before that, shortly after independence, the Soviet Union took the initiative to befriend Pakistan by inviting its first Prime Minister to Moscow much before a similar invitation was extended to the Prime Minister of India.

Apart from antagonizing the neighbouring Communist powers, the alliances caused resentment to every non-aligned neighbour of Pakistan. Burma, exacerbated over the ownership of some bordering islands and anxious to retain its neutrality, felt disturbed over Pakistan’s association in SEATO. Afghanistan capitalized on Pakistan’s commitment in the Cold War to further its interests both with the Communist states and with non-aligned countries. Indonesia, which pursued a dynamic non-aligned policy, demonstrated its disapproval by fraternizing with India. Led by Gamal Nasser, the Arab states of the Middle East took Pakistan’s membership of CENTO to be a threat to the security of the Arab countries. At that time, India claimed to exercise feudatory control over Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Chiefly for that reason, Pakistan could not count on them to be friendly neighbours. The remaining neighbours were Iran and China. SEATO being primarily directed against China, made it difficult for Pakistan, a SEATO state, to cultivate friendly relations with a country menaced by that alliance. This meant that with the solitary exception of Iran, the relations of Pakistan with all its neighbours were unsatisfactory, mainly on account of the country’s association in SEATO and CENTO.
Not that CENTO did not cause damage enough to Pakistan’s interests but had it not been for the Sino-Indian dispute, perhaps SEATO might have brought on greater calamity. Anticipating future events, particularly the possibility of a dispute on the question of Himalayan boundaries, from the beginning, the Government of the People’s Republic of China tried to have good relations with Pakistan. Pakistan did recognize China in 1950, but this was done more as a follow-up action to that of Britain, Pakistan’s mentor at the time, than as a sign of independent action based on the merits of the case. Once again, following the lead of Britain, at first Pakistan supported China’s admission to the United Nations but later, under the influence of its new protector, the United States, Pakistan changed its position on this issue. During the alcyon days of the alliances, China was subjected to a number of unnecessary irritants, if not provocations. A prominent member of Pakistan’s delegation to the United Nations’ General Assembly session of 1957 visited Taiwan in a semi-official capacity. Had it not been for the opposition of the first Constituent Assembly comprising democratically elected representatives, the Government was inclined to send a contingent of its armed forces to Korea. As a compromise, Pakistan became a member of the Korean Commission. In developing India’s relations with China, Prime Minister Nehru exploited SEATO to the detriment of Pakistan in much the same manner as he had succeeded in exploiting CENTO to India’s advantage. Nehru tried very hard to persuade Premier Chou En Lai to Visit Srinager, the Capital of disputed Kashmir, but, unlike Premier Khrushev, the Prime Minister of China refused to do so. Despite the good relations that existed between China and India and the unsatisfactory state of relations between Pakistan and China, India was unable to succeed in making China a tool of her interests.

A great deal has been made out of the rapport reached between China and Pakistan during the Bandung Conference in 1954. There is another background to that unavoidable meeting between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and China attending the same conference than is disclosed by official claims. The truth is that like some other aligned nations, Pakistan attended the Bandung Conference more with the object of guarding Western interests than for promoting Afro-Asian solidarity. Much has also been made of Prime Minister Suhrawardy’s visit to China in 1956. Neither the contact at the Bandung Conference nor the visit of Prime Minister Suhrawardy to China brought the two countries to a satisfactory understanding. In modern times, an exchange of visits or normal trade relations are not by themselves attributes of close relations. Chancellor Adenauer visited Moscow and there is trade between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, but this does not mean that relations between the two countries are not strained. Soon after his visit to China, Mr. Suhrawardy went to the United States and made some statements which were taken amiss by China. When China’s admission was considered in the Credentials Committee of the General Assembly of 1960, Pakistan reverted to its original position by supporting China’s admission but, under pressure from the United States, changed it again when the matter was raised in the Plenary Session. During the trouble in Laos in 1960, President Ayub Khan nonchalantly announced that if the
United States envisioned a role for SEATO in the conflict, Pakistan would send a military contingent. When, as one of the alternatives, the United States was informally considering a request for a battalion Ayub Khan was prepared to send a brigade instead.

Whatever marginal improvements came in the wake of obvious compulsions, a more eloquent testimony of Ayub Khan’s antipathy towards China cannot be found than the Joint Defence offered by him to India against “the threat from the North”. The prejudice of Ayub Khan’s Government towards Communist China was so intense that without a genuine fear of aggression, indeed without any rhyme or reason, it offered Joint Defence to India, a traditional adversary that had usurped Pakistan’s territorial and other rights and sought its annulment, against a powerful neighboring country that had no dispute with Pakistan. This notwithstanding, President Ayub Khan was prepared to endanger Pakistan’s sovereignty by co-operating with hostile India against China, a country having a common interest with Pakistan against India.

Pakistan’s attitude towards China remained negative until the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. If the significance of that conflict had been properly understood, and if President Ayub Khan had acted decisively, Pakistan might have avoided many subsequent catastrophes and, perhaps even vindicated its legitimate interests. The Government stopped into the void haltingly and with fear, primarily to bargain with the United States.

Not a single country that has attained independence in the last decade has chosen alignment in exchange for military assistance. This is certainly not a coincidence; yet Pakistan, stripped of all its military assistance and denied every privilege of alignment, continues to take an apologetic attitude about CENTO and SEATO. These pacts have failed so miserably that the United States, the founder of the alliances, is getting disenchanted with them. The United States has developed a new attitude towards non-alignment. After Viet-Nam her policies in Asia will undergo a reappraisal. What is more, the attention of the United States is again shifting to Europe and to the Middle East. Unmindful of the implications of these developments, instead of dismantling the fetters of alignment, the Ayub regime persisted in giving puerile excuses for its inaction. More than ten years of bitter experience have shown how much Pakistan has suffered from alignment. The United States brought Pakistan into the pacts as a part of its global encirclement of China and of the Soviet Union. Pakistan joined the alliances to secure military assistance from the United States as a measure of protection against the Indian threat and not as an act of hostility towards the Soviet Union or China. On account of this fundamental anomaly, Pakistan’s has reaped a harvest more bitter than any other aligned country. The poignancy of this contradiction was experienced by Pakistan during India’s aggression in 1965. Even with the benefit of military assistance, the people of Pakistan paid a very heavy price for their alignment. If the people of Pakistan were asked to choose between alignment carrying the advantage of military assistance and
an independent foreign policy bereft of military assistance, there is no doubt that they would decide in favour of an independent foreign policy. But the tragedy is this that the Government of Ayub Khan refused to leave SEATO and CENTO, even after the military assistance terminated three years ago. It held fast to obligations rendered null and void by the cessation of military assistance. In a policy statement made in the National Assembly of Pakistan in Rawalpindi on June 28th, 1968, the last Foreign Minister of Ayub Khan, Mr. Arshad Hussain, admitted the failure of the alliances by saying that:

"With a change in the world situation these pacts had lost a good deal of their importance. Pakistan’s disenchantment with them was completed by the failure of some of our allies to assist Pakistan against Indian aggression in 1965."

Despite this admission, the former Foreign Minister said that:

"Some members wanted formal denunciation of the pacts but I would rather let them wither on the vine."

Mr. Arshad Hussain is also reported to have said that there was no need to pronounce a formal talaq, that is, divorce.

This is how the Government of our Islamic Republic visualized the fundamental problem of alignment and independence; of war and peace, of slavery and freedom. It drew fatuous parallels between sovereignty and servitude. If Mr. Arshad Hussain had to indulge in metaphors to reduce grave national problems to false values, he should have known that the United States pronounced the divorce three years ago on the plea of incompatibility. Instead of filing a suit for dissolution of marriage and damages, the Government of Ayub Khan preferred to cohabit in sin with a Great Power.

Another delusion of our multilateral relations is the Commonwealth. This institution has become vestigial. A stronger Pakistan might have emerged if this sapping commitment did not dissipate our vitality. At the time of independence, the Empire was being replaced by the Commonwealth as Britain’s residuary power in world affairs. In pursuance of this transition and in Mountbatten’s words, Pakistan had to be put up like “a tent” and the Muslims “banished once and for all to their own very small and unworkable country”. To put up “a tent” enormous territories, not only of Ferozepur and Amritsar but also of Gurdaspur, had to go to India in violation of the principle of partition. In denying Gurdaspur to Pakistan, India was provided by Britain with a link to Kashmir, Lord Radcliff, the Chairman of the Boundary Commission for partition, conceded large Muslim majority area to India without even troubling to give his reasons for doing so. All that he said in his award was:

"I have hesitated long over these inconsiderable areas east of Sutlej River and in the angle of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers in which Muslim majorities are found. But on the whole I have come to the conclusion
that it would be in the true interest of neither state to extend the territories of the West Punjab to a strip on the far side of the Sutlej and that there are factors such as the disruption of railway communications and water systems that ought in this instance to displace the primary claims of contiguous majorities.”

Railway lines, if disrupted, can always be realigned; but the Radcliff Award, far from saving the water system from disruption added new problems to the existing ones. With Pathankot, India was given not only a Muslim majority region but also the headworks situated in it of the Upper Bari Doab Canal which served West Pakistan. Again without giving any reason, Radcliff assigned to India the Ferozepur Muslim majority area in which are located the head works of the Dipalpur Canal which irrigate even more extensive areas in West Pakistan. When India stopped the flow of waters in these Canals in 1948, 1952 and 1958, considerable damage was caused to Pakistan.

The Kashmir dispute also stems from the Radcliff Award. In his book, TWO NATIONS AND KASHMIR, Lord Birdwood has pointed out that India would not have been able to send troops into Kashmir or maintain them but for Radcliff’s decision that the Muslim majority area of Gurdaspur district be awarded to India.

The British advanced the transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1948 to accommodate Indian leadership. The Congress calculated that by an earlier, unplanned act of vivisection, Pakistan would succumb to the operation, Indian leadership agreed to accept dominion status and membership of the Commonwealth as a concession only when the date of partition was advanced. Complimenting Mr. V.P. Menon for this suggestion, Lord Mountbatten wrote to him saying:

“You were the first person I met who entirely agreed with the idea of dominion status and you found the solution which I had not thought of, of making it acceptable by a very early transfer of power”.

In the interest of the Commonwealth Pakistan had to be made into “a tent”. This notwithstanding, from the beginning, Pakistan has shown greater enthusiasm for the Commonwealth than India. Today the Commonwealth is in the process of decay otherwise Britain’s Ministry of Commonwealth Relations would not have been merged with the Foreign Office. Britain is striving to find a place in Europe. Circumstances have made her abandon her policy of “East of Suez”. This process will inexorably extend to the Commonwealth. Once the lingering legacies of the Empire have been dissolved and the moment Britain finds a satisfactory basis of relations with Continental Europe, the Commonwealth will become obsolete. The sentiment in Britain is turning dangerously against colored immigrants from the Commonwealth. Britain will find its place in Europe, but the Government of Ayub Khan did not find its place in Asia. Britain is revising her commitments according to her capabilities. The British Government admits that the United
Kingdom is now unable to stretch out into distant lands, but the Government of Ayub Khan believed in overstretching Pakistan by multilateral commitments and alliances.

The Farraka Barrage dispute could not be taken to the International Court of Justice because of the Commonwealth. As a lower riparian, Pakistan is entitled to its rights under International Law. The Ganges and the Indus are not the only two rivers in the world. Wherever there are international rivers, there the question of lower's riparian rights has been resolved by proper procedures. For years it prevaricated, until India was on the verge of completing the barrage. There will be starvation and death for millions if the waters of the Ganges are denied to Pakistan. Neither has the Commonwealth been of assistance in resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Although Commonwealth rules do not permit it, the Commonwealth condescended to discuss the dispute twice as an empty concession to Pakistan, once in 1951 and the second time in 1964. There was a great deal of jubilation merely because the dispute found a place in the final communiqué on both occasions. I was the Foreign Minister in 1964 but I did not sense any feeling of accomplishment. It only made me more conscious of the futility of the Commonwealth, where much ado is made over nothing.

The leader of Britain call for the expulsion of our nationals from their country but Ayub Khan attached so much importance to the Commonwealth that only when the crisis in Pakistan got out of hand, did he cancel his visit to the Commonwealth conference in London in January 1969. While the trouble in Pakistan was taking on serious dimensions, he assured Mr. Michael Stuart, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, that he would participate in the conference. Little did he realize that he was on the point of being thrown out by his people and that he would not be permitted to go to London to be exploited by Britain on its questionable policy on Southern Rhodesia. What is worse, the former President agreed to attend the London conference only a couple of days after the British Foreign Secretary had officially and publicly repudiated for the first time, in a statement at Rawalpindi on 28th, November 1968 the United Nations’ resolution on Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan will keep groping in the dark until she finds her equilibrium. Essentially this equilibrium leads to an Asia oriented foreign policy. Geography has made us a part of Asia, and this is a permanent constant. We will not be able to find our proper place in Asia if we continue to stretch ourselves over the horizons in overlapping commitments beyond our resources, in engagements with distant lands of different interests.

Relations between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey have remained cordial since independence, but the RCD did not come into being until 1964. It came into existence only when CENTO weakened. Had CENTO remained active, its shadow would have prevented the growth of a natural development like the RCD. Once the large shadow of CENTO was removed, a more harmonious arrangement was found between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.
Commitments with far away countries and for different purposes stunt the growth of Pakistan into a genuine personality. For this reason also it is necessary to shed not only multilateral commitments and evolve natural relations on terms that do not violate the proper norms of international conduct.

If the regime of Ayub Khan was frightened of severing its ties with alliances that had become void, it should have, as a token of remorse, moved in the direction of bilateral relations by disengaging from the Consortium.

The Consortium provides credits on terms dictated by a cartel of powerful nations. Mutual accommodations are prearranged amongst the creditors. An element of coercion exists in the unequal negotiations between the collective creditor nations and the single recipient under-developed nation. Tacitly the Consortium retains the power to distribute projects according to the choice of its member and is free to rip up the Five Year Plans to meet its collective convenience. The Consortium is in reality another form of economic domination and an instrument of foreign interference.

The regime of Ayub Khan played dangerously with the security of Pakistan by remaining committed to multilateral and bilateral military alliances that had been shorn of military assistance, the rational of their validity. Precious time has been lost. Pakistan cannot continue to jeopardize its fundamental interests. We must begin to disengage the country from redundant commitments. A beginning can be made by converting the Consortium into a series of bilateral economic agreements and taking the stand that the Commonwealth should be voluntarily liquidated. Together with these steps, the United States should be informed either to immediately restore military assistance to Pakistan with retrospective effect and reimburse the assistance denied since 1965, according to mutually agreed bilateral and military treaties, or, in the alternative, to consider them to be void.

In my opinion Pakistan’s true interest would be better served by renouncing invalid agreements and thereby liberating the country from fearful one-sided military responsibilities. Once this is done, Pakistan’s security and independence will be assured.