Z. A. Bhutto

Notes from Death Cell

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By: Sani H. Panhwar
Member Sindh Council
"If I die, longing for my native land,
Free my body from these chains,
Keep no more this stranger away from her love,
Over my dead body, spread Malir's cool earth,
When I die, send my body to Malir, my native land."
....... Shah Bhitai

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By: Sani H. Panhwar
Member Sindh Council, PPP. October 2008
Zia’s Islamic Law

Among the last notes that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto jotted down in his diary, while he awaited his fate in Rawalpindi Jail, were some remarks on Zia-ul-Haq- the man who sent him to the gallows:

The knock sounded twice before the ‘factotum’ pulled himself out of his reverie, quickly hid the bottle of whisky in the bottom drawer, then heaved himself up from behind the desk and opened the glass door. I stood in the doorway. I had sprung a surprise on the ‘factotum’, for I had not informed him earlier about my intention to call. I had every reason to file in as much as he regarded me as his ‘master’ and ‘mentor’ too, and experienced no difficulty in behaving as a ‘factotum’, after some army officers were dislodged to enable him to succeed General Tikka Khan as army Chief on March 1, 1976, superseding several senior officers.

Zia-ul-Haq was then widely known as my ‘factotum’. Frankly I never entertained indeed I never liked all those who had branded him as my ‘factotum’ in spite of his attractive physical features. He was Pakistan’s army chief; I was the Prime Minister. He invited me into his room. Zia lighted a cigarette. He was flabbergasted when I told him that he looked disturbed. “How do you know that, Sir,” he asked. Zia had not finished the cigarette when he lit a cigar. Here he was caught. And, unmistakably, he admitted he was disturbed.

The house was quiet. Even the phone was silent. Zia pulled out the whisky bottle from the bottom drawer and smoked the cigar, and stared at the small round hole in the cracked plaster ceiling. The weather outside was stormy, with lashing rain. And as the wind rattled the window, Zia looked like a frightened soldier. He looked at me and began talking of General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan who had resigned from their posts. He wanted ‘immediate’ action against them. I observed, “Sword for the soldier, pen for the poet, pragmatism for the politician.” General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim, he asserted, had failed to abide by the teachings of Prophet Mohammad. He had hardly completed his pronouncement when I intervened: “Has the Prophet recommended the luxury you are enjoying tonight soda added to?” Smart as he is, Zia eluded the affluent pleasure-loving people of Saudi Arabia and tried to educate me on the merits of Islamic law.

History and geography are two important fields with wide ramifications. On more than one occasion, I had tried to explain to Zia-ul-Haq that although Saudi Arabia was of tremendous importance for those professing Islam, the Muslim country of Pakistan with its peculiar political, historical, geographical and economic factors should not be forced to undergo a big change such as the introduction of ‘Islamic’ law.
Interestingly, Zia forgot, or ignored, the ‘glory’ of ‘Islamic’ law one night a few days before the country went to the polls in March 1977, when he made a desperate attempt to seduce Asifa, a well-known film actress, at a function in Lahore. Asifa, who is married to producer-director Agha Hassan Imtisal, had no evil intentions as she approached Zia to felicitate him on his elevation as army chief. After the function was over, I sent for him and threatened to inform his wife all about what had happened at the variety show. Zia became confused and could not coherently answer my question about his contradictory attitude towards the ‘glory’ of ‘Islamic’ law. As his plight was more real than apparent, I laughed and changed the subject to discuss a matter of topical interest elections.

Nor is that all. Bhutto promised (while explaining past events in his diary) to give an account of what happened before and after the elections. Here and now I wish to discuss, in depth, Zia’s unsystematic methods and his undue emphasis on the need to revolutionize Pakistan by promulgating Islamic law, Bhutto wrote, giving priority to matters of topical interest. ‘Islamic’ law, according to Bhutto, should not have been forced on a crisis-ridden Pakistan; an atmosphere conducive to its introduction should have been created before the presidential ordinance was issued. A federation of four provinces, Pakistan cried out for civil liberties; the will of the people living in the provinces was never ascertained by the authorities on the question of introducing Islamic law in the country. The fruits of these laws, Bhutto argued, could be realized only when the political situation and socio-economic system are visibly sound and stabilized. In the absence of stabilizing factors, Pakistan would find it difficult to embrace ‘Islamic’ law; a forced alliance between the two would look like the unhappy association between an angry bull and a frightened cow.

Zia’s announcement in the middle of February 1978 that foreigners could be sentenced to 30 lashes and three years’ imprisonment if they drank alcohol in public, astonished Bhutto and prompted him to raise quite a few questions: does Zia want foreigners to quit Pakistan? Does he want them to drink alcohol in public? Does he want them to drink alcohol only behind closed doors? Does he aim at placing police guards in every hearth and home to prevent people from consuming alcohol? Is he planning to place army personnel inside foreign missions in Pakistan? How will he convince his soldiers, especially those deployed on the borders, of the need for total prohibition in the country?

The presidential ordinance was based on the strict ‘Islamic’ injunction against drinking, fornication, adultery, theft and slander. The strict requirements of proof laid down under ‘Islamic’ law are almost impossible to satisfy and punishments set out in detail in the presidential ordinance included public stoning to death of Muslims convicted of adultery and fornication, but the offender could be spared the full stoning process and shot to death instead.
A convicted non-Muslim would face a possible 100 lashes in public, or death. Convicted thieves would have a hand amputated or a foot cut off, if caught twice. Muslims caught drinking could be sentenced to 90 lashes.

While asserting that grandiose plans and talks of a revolutionary approach only produce cynicism when little is accomplished in the end, Bhutto objected to the manner in which the military lord (Zia) has been acting as the only surviving authority on Islam and trying to make his presence felt among the innocent people by his rough and tough mood and method. Zia may have studied the Quran, judging from Bhutto’s contentions as revealed through Prophet Muhammad. The Quran, as explained by Bhutto, opens with the verse: In the name of God, the Beneficent, and the merciful. This indicates the unbounded love and mercy of God for all creatures, and also the fact that God is fundamentally merciful if men only obey Him and follow His injunctions revealed through His Prophet. These injunctions, as argued by Bhutto, never advocated imposition of rules and regulations on an unwilling people. In this connection, he referred to a series of measures seeking to restrict freedom of expression at a time like this when Pakistan is devoid of a selfless leadership. Islam seems to have become an instrument for befuddling the masses. In the long run, the slogan will lose its appeal with grave consequences.

Zia is, and has been, against democratic norms and institutions. I don’t say he is vulgar. He believes in vulgar ostentation; he has a vulgar ambition; he has never cherished the principle that all citizens have equal political rights, Bhutto wrote after he had gone through a newspaper article by Godfrey Jansen entitled “Militant Islam: The Soldiers of Allah Advance.”1 Surely, Godfrey Jansen is not a citizen of China. Non-Chinese advance is easily acceptable to the military lord (Zia). Jansen has provided a good bit of food for thought by aptly pointing out that military rule or government established by violence is repugnant to Islam. The deposed Prime Minister desired to know General Zia’s reactions to Jansen’s article. But I do not have the energy and freedom required to know his reaction. As I wish to go through the article once again, I have kept it here, far from the lunatic asylum with Zia as the leader of its inmates.

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1. See Appendix I. (Page Number 49)
POLITICS BEHIND TAKE-OVER

The door of his room in Rawalpindi Jail was closed tight; he looked out late one evening and felt the cold against his face. He felt uneasy – a chill along his spine that was not due to cold really, but the feeling of dark clouds of uncertainty here and, indeed, everywhere in my country. His life had been completely transformed: his ouster in the beginning of July 1977, his abode in absurdity following the Lahore High Court’s verdict, Zia’s fraudulent pronouncements, insisting on the impartiality of his men in the Supreme Court. Bhutto felt it was all wrong – wicked and sinful. He hated the awful guilt of his political adversaries, and eventually he found a way to control himself. He started writing down notes, swearing on my deepest honour that, if permitted to live, I shall fight all those who want to weaken my country.

Bhutto heard with regret that his countrymen are still without a time schedule (of progress), or even an outlined plan. Not even political machinery, capable of being considered at the national level, is in sight.

The hotchpotch of vague promises and the thin blanket of administrative orders asking the people to turn into good Muslims are making it difficult to bear the burden of the bulging heap of unresolved problems – political as well as economic. The result is that even in common places, people now talk of the rise in gross national poverty and general consumer prices. Running from shop to shop with empty kerosene bottles and from one service station to another for engine oil, they should not be expected to hail official claims.

Bhutto also heard with regret that on the one hand hundreds of industrial workers are at present in an unenviable position on account of the deteriorating conditions of public sector undertakings, and on the other, a new educational policy had been formulated without taking note of the changing mood and aspirations and attitude of students and youth.

While Bhutto sat in his cell in Rawalpindi, his admirers as well as opponents heard, on more than one occasion that in the rest of Pakistan industries in the public sector would eventually be handed over to private entrepreneurs. General Zia’s colleagues made efforts to allay public ‘misgivings’ about the presidential order relating to the transfer of nationalized industries. To assuage the ruffled tempers of industrial workers in public enterprises, it was disclosed that out of over 60 units in the public sector, 23 had been labeled as ‘sick units’ and could not be turned over to the private sector, which lacked the resources to rehabilitate them.
There is no denying the fact that the haphazard nationalization policy pursued in the past had proved self-defeating; it threw industry out of gear. There was, however, nothing wrong with the principle of nationalization. Its declared objective was the deliberate use of state power for the welfare of the common man and the limiting of economic advantages of the privileged classes.

In theory, at least, nationalization could be defended on cogent grounds. For instance, it could be argued that large-scale industry in Pakistan did not owe its existence to private enterprise. It was the result of liberal state assistance, notably a generous supply of foreign exchange at confessional rates to the new generation of entrepreneurs, their monopoly access to credit, and the protection afforded them by heavy restrictions on imports which generated a safe market for indigenous manufacturers. The principle of nationalization could also be justified on technological grounds, for, in the developing countries the state has to directly undertake the responsibility for setting up an integrated industrial system. A government has a right to nationalize a certain category of industries to bring down the prices of public utilities.

An average Pakistani does not dispute these abstract principles. What is, however, reasonably disputed is the motivation of Bhutto’s government behind the rash nationalization and the consequences of its hastily improvised moves which were bound to boomerang, as they did. The motive, apparently, was to erode the power of the dissident industrial elite, rather than to bring economic activity within the framework of social policy, or give the majority of people and equitable share in goods and services. This also applied, in a way, to the takeover of agricultural processing units. The object, according to some Pakistani economists, was not to help the small farmers and consumers by passing the benefit of fixed prices to them, but to extend the hegemony of the ruling group over the agriculturists and put them under “a multi-tiered hierarchy of control.”

It is asserted that the lopsided labour policy was also partly responsible for the fall in industrial production. It disturbed the wide spectrum of labour-management relations, encouraged slovenliness and indiscipline among workers, and fanned hostility between employers and employees. The productivity of mills and factories was adversely affected; the increase in productivity was down to 0.5 percent in the 70’s as against 7.5 percent in the 60’s, and 11 percent earlier. What was worse, the public sector resorted to monopoly pricing for instance, in ghee and cement and in the absence of competition from the private sector, the prices of utilities were arbitrarily fixed. Thus, the social compulsions, which provided the initial impulse for nationalization, were forgotten and the interests of the people ignore.
ZIA’S NEW EDUCATION POLICY

Bhutto’s gloomy prognostication about the utility and success of the new education policy apparently followed the confusion created in Pakistan by the statement of different federal ministers between October 1978 and January 1979. In the absence of any clear-cut directives from the authorities to be adopted to implement the new policy, many educational institutions found themselves in a dilemma.

A case in point has been the medium of instruction to adopt by the English medium schools. In the policy announced in October 1978, it was clearly stated that “to start with, all government – sponsored English medium schools throughout Pakistan will be required to adopt Urdu or an approved provincial language as the medium of instruction.” This was in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution, and the new step, which was generally anticipated, was the announcement by the Minister for Education that Urdu “is to be introduced gradually in all schools irrespective of their ownership” indicated a shift from the original policy, which was to apply only to government-sponsored schools. A change in the medium, as argued by Pakistan’s English daily Dawn in January 1979, would entail for them a major re-organization, which they obviously could not be expected to undertake in the absence of specific instructions. Dawn said:

Much vaunted educational reforms have accomplished very little in the past. It is very doubtful if the so-called reforms under Ayub Khan and under Bhutto contributed very much to the tasks of democratizing educational opportunity, raising the quality of education and adapting educational theory and practice to the demands of a society aspiring to modernization without departing from its spiritual and cultural moorings.

Encouragement to Urdu speaking people and measures to promote the Urdu language, are understandable in a country like Pakistan, according to Bhutto. But these measures, he stressed, should not be encouraged at the cost of the essential requirement of international exchanges. He would favour a programme to popularize the English language to meet the needs of the country’s international communications. Emphasis on the need to popularize the Urdu language can only, on the one hand, create tremendous problems in the field of science and technology and on other, result in a hiatus between the existing lot of students and the policy-makers. The emphasis should be on bringing about reform of the college enrolment system, strengthening the teachings of basic theories, improving teaching material and intensifying research.
It will, undoubtedly, pay if the measures are designed to meet the needs of modernization in industry, agriculture, science and technology. Available assistance and guidance, within and from outside the country can be used efficiently only when the English language is not rejected as worthless, Bhutto said.
VOLTE FACE PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY

Bhutto had a suggestion, if not a plea, about the territory, which was converted into a colony in the heyday of his authoritarian’s rule. Its name is Balochistan. Bhutto’s suggestion favoured concessions of greater autonomy from Pakistan’s central government and the judicious use of funds to develop the region. Bhutto explained:

The people of Balochistan are citizens of Pakistan. They are restive; they are determined to seek what was denied to them in the past; they do not intend giving up their desire for autonomy; their intentions are clear. Under these circumstances, if you try to ignore their determination and demand, it might cause a heavy damage to the country’s integrity and solidarity.

Bhutto’s remarks have brought out the two conflicting features of his personality; his repressive measures when he ruled Pakistan, and his altered stance in support of greater autonomy to the region at a time when he was declared a condemned person.

Following the partition of India in August 1947, Balochistan withstood numerous changes, political and administrative. And when in 1956 Pakistan became a republic, taking the official name of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, a movement began developing inside Balochistan seeking its separate cultural and political identity, if not secession from the rest of Pakistan.

The tribal reality of Balochistan has caused trouble not only for the Pakistani government but also for Iran. The nomadic Balouch tribesmen, who make up 60 percent of the Pakistani province’s population of 2.5 million, have about 1 million kin in eastern Iran and about 300,000 more in Afghanistan. In 1972, Pakistan’s Balouchis launched a revolt against the regime of Bhutto, who retaliated harshly over the next four years. At the peak of the fighting, the Shah of Iran, Shah Reza Pehlavi, supplied helicopters and pilots to help 7,000 Pakistani soldiers put down the rebellion of 55,000 bearded, turbaned Muslim guerrillas. Bhutto was grateful to the Shah for his timely assistance, which helped the farmer’s government, put down the revolt.

The deposed Prime Minister tried to assert, in a paragraph in his diary, regarding the North–West Frontier Province that as head of the government he remained very busy attending to other issues, as a result of which a new era of peace, progress and satisfaction could not be ushered in NWFP. Bhutto also had a charitable comment on the performance and aspirations of the Pakhtoon people:
They are illustrious citizens of the Islamic state of Pakistan. Unfortunately, they have not been properly guided; indeed, they have been misled on more than one occasion for no fault of theirs; they have not been understood properly over the years. They deserve sympathy and support from the powers that be in Islamabad.

Bhutto also jotted down a few words in favour of the aged, ailing Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

This veteran freedom fighter is the illustrious follower of Prophet Mohammad. The Khan has set a good example by his marvelous conduct and magnificent courage. The rise in his popularity and in the number of his followers has not been on account of his tall stature. It has been possible as a result of his lofty ideals and commitment to the ‘work is worship’ principle.

Bhutto knew what the Pakhtoon leader had been striving for Ghaffar Khan had not received fair treatment form any of the erstwhile ruling politicians, including Ayub Khan and Bhutto.

Some time earlier in 1970 Bhutto had blamed Indian leaders for inciting Ghaffar Khan against the strong center in Pakistan during his trip to India in 1969. Bhutto, who had not approved of Ghaffar Khan’s visit to India, maneuvered to launch harsh measures against him and his followers for quite some time after his return to Pakistan. It is true that the Frontier Gandhi met several Indian leaders during his visit to India. But, at no stage were Indian leaders reported to have suggested a solution to the Pakhtoon leader’s problem. Nor did he want to get involved in any controversy while in India. In fact he cancelled his visit to Jammu and Kashmir in spite of the formation of two reception committees in the state. Ghaffar khan’s statement then said: “I have heard various reports on the situation in the state (Indian Kashmir) and have decided to cancel the visit for the time being.”
REVOLUTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN & IRAN

Events in Afghanistan also found mention in Bhutto’s diary. Landlocked by the Soviet Union in the north, Iran in the west, the Indian subcontinent in the south and east, and China in the northeast, Afghanistan is situated in the heart of Asia. On the map, Afghanistan looks like a tortoise with an outstretched neck; the Wakhan panhandle, the highest part of the country serves as the neck of the tortoise. There the ranges of the Hindu Kush climb on to join the Palmer, a great knot of mountains where Afghanistan, Kashmir and China meet.

Bhutto was not surprised by the manner in which a Pro-Soviet junta seized power in Afghanistan in 1978.

I had known the extent of Soviet influence as well as the intentions of Moscow for long. As some of my friends in the previous regime at Kabul paid little attention to my fears that emanated from some reliable reports about Moscow’s greedy eye on Afghanistan, I was left with only one course to follow – to be careful and cautious while handling the problem of Pak-Afghan friendship.

Afghanistan is not South Yemen. The Russians and their agents in Afghanistan cannot, ultimately, succeed in combating their enemy within Afghanistan with the help of guns and grenades. Areas of friendship do not fall from the sky; the ungovernable tribal societies of Afghanistan have been hard nuts, resisting all the time expression or activity aimed at limiting their freedom, or hurting their ego.

The population of Afghanistan is made up of a variety of peoples: Pakhtoon, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek. The Pakhtoons and Tajiks are said to be the original Aryans. They differ from each other only in language. The Hazaras are supposed to be the descendants of Genghis Khan’s Mongol invaders. The Uzbeks are believed to be of Turkish origin. The rugged nature of the land of the Afghans has produced a hardy stubborn people. Since its geographic location has made Afghanistan the crossroads for invading armies, the Afghans have also developed excellent fighting qualities.

Bhutto, who had appreciated the good human qualities of a guard on duty in a Rawalpindi Jail, disclosed that this sturdy jawan managed, more often than not, to keep me informed about some internal developments and arrange newspapers and magazines to keep me busy. One day, while going through a Pakistani newspaper, Bhutto came across an article, written by Gwinn Dyer¹, on Afghanistan’s revolution. I read the article. I wish I could know more about the country he said.

¹ See Appendix II (See Page Number 57)
Iran was next. Revolution! Why? Can any genuine revolution succeed under the banner of theocratic in the garb of an Islamic republic? Should the clergy alone rule the country? Is Russia so much involved in the game that nobody else, other than the clergy, has been declared fit for the task? There was nobody in or around his room to answer these questions. As the prisoner Bhutto wrote: And now alone, I was suddenly disturbed, if not afraid. And as I happened to think of my friend, the Shah of Iran, I dropped my forehead against my hand. The cold of my hand seemed to go through into my forehead.

Bhutto’s comment on the Soviet Union’s strategy and ambition was apparently meant to point out that Russia has been anxious to extend its influence almost everywhere for the last so many decades. Bhutto said that although the Soviets became the Shah’s third largest arms suppliers and entered into several commercial ventures with him, Moscow managed to play its game on the soil of Iran.

Not long ago, I went through a news magazine. There it was mentioned that the ‘will’ of Peter the Great was published in 1975. There the advice for future Russian rulers was: ‘Approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars, not only in Turkey but also in Persia. Establish dockyards on the Black Sea… In the decadence of Persia, penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf, re-establish, if it were possible, the ancient commerce with Levant, advance as far as India, which is the depot of the world. Arrived at this point, we shall no longer have need of England’s gold.’

Although the victory of Ayatollah Khomeini became imminent with the resignation of Prime Minister Shapoor Bakhtia after the Iranian army withdrew its support, Bhutto seemed to be positive about the negatives:

The Islamic republic, as pronounced by the religion-ridden Ayatollah Khomeini, may not be akin to what the Sunni Muslims have in Libya, or Saudi Arabia. The Shah is not in Iran. His followers and admirers, including those in the armed forces, are still in their homeland. To restore calm and normalcy in strife-torn Iran would not be an easy task.

Whatever the attitude of Pakistan’s former Prime Minister towards Khomeini and the struggle against the regime of the Shah, the fact remains that Ayatollah Khomeini’s triumphant return to Teheran after a long exile brought about a new change in the mass revolutionary movement in Iran.

This change marks a turning point in the political history of Iran. And Bhutto found no reason to dispute it. All that he wanted to do was to sound a note of
caution to the Muslim world against the evil intentions of a set of non-Muslim forces. Bhutto stated.

As I begin to think of this or that no matter that I am prompted to caution the Muslim countries against attempts by some forces (especially the communist rulers of the Soviet Union) at reaping where they have not sown.

Expressions like external forces at play in Afghanistan, conditions created for the Shah’s exit with the support of non-Iranians and Saudi Arabia’s call for caution against Russia’s tactical moves were evidently meant to suggest Bhutto’s state of mind against the apparent desire of the Soviet Union to gain footholds here and there in Asia and in and around Middle East countries and in Africa, especially in Ethiopia and Angola.

Without, of course, concealing his admiration for the Shah of Iran, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister chose to be noncommittal on the factors which eventually resulted in his (the Shah’s) fall: The Shah was reported to have lost contact with the peasants and the mullahs. He lost control over the SAVAK (the secret police). As against this, the huge ruling family in Saudi Arabia found it useful to have its roots in the lives of the country’s people.
BUILDING BRIDGES WITH CHINA

China’s challenge to Soviet leadership of world communism has, according to Bhutto, brought to the fore a reality: the two communist giants – China and the Soviet Union – no longer present one solid front to the free world. After the rift began in the late 1950s when the Soviet Union denounced Stalinism, Bhutto wrote, a section of Pakistan’s leadership initiated a practical move – to build bridges with China for ensuring a flow of advantages for Pakistan’s security.

This move, according to Bhutto, proved very useful when viewed in the context of the march of events across the borders of Pakistan, say, during the last two decades or so. Bhutto maintained that quite a few forces made desperate attempts to weaken, if not wipe out, the basis of Sino-Pak friendship in the past. The outcome has been the birth of areas of greater cooperation and coordination between the people of the two countries. As Chinese support to Pakistan, according to Bhutto, has already aroused some other countries to come closer to the homeland of the Pakistanis, it could prove more useful for us to have China and her people on our side in order to enable Pakistan and her people to feel secure against any intervention, or interference, by outsiders.

Pakistan needs Western technology and aid in view of the fact that China cannot always be in a position to meet Pakistan’s requirements in the economic and defence fields. Bhutto, who felt upset about America’s wait and watch attitude towards internal disturbances in Iran, suggested that the people of Pakistan should not allow their country’s foreign policy to be reorganized to leave a wide space for the Americans and Russians to meddle in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

I am neither anti-American nor anti-Russian and although I have to see the United States and the Soviet Union as friends of Pakistan, I have not been reconciled to the manner in which some circles inside Pakistan have been politicized by agencies working either for America or for Russia. For a while I was upset, when I learnt that the United States did not take a more active role in combating Soviet influence in Iran.

Bhutto asked: Was the Carter Administration so preoccupied that it practically forgot Iran?

In his argument supporting more and more measures to strengthen bonds of friendship between Pakistan and China in the context of the winds blowing in the neighbouring countries, Bhutto said that although the need to have close links with the United States – and as a matter of fact with the rest of the world – had not become less, the contact with China and her people should be regarded as important in view of the advantages it has thrown up for Pakistan. What Bhutto ignored is that once China gained a foothold in Pakistan the people of Pakistan and the
administration headed by Zia would find it difficult to get rid of the Chinese, especially form the northern territory of the country.

China found it easy to develop friendly relations with Pakistan following two important developments: Khrushchev’s declarations of support to India during 1955-56 proving that Russia’s interest in Asia was no less than China’s, and the resentment of the Pakistani press and politicians about the Soviet leader’s statements on the Kashmir ‘issue’ towards the end of 1955. But China had already begun a calculated attempt to gain a foothold in strategically situated Hunza, across the frontier region of Ladakh, in 1951 with a view to fraternizing with the local people. It was also announced then that China had decided to provide material aid to Pakistan to enable her to improve the economy of Hunza and its neighbouring areas. Pro-Peking sentiment became noticeable in Hunza and Nagar for the first time in 1952 when Chinese goods including silk, green tea, cloth and cameras were sold in the region at throwaway prices.

Some politicians in Asia may find the history of the two communist giants a confused torrent of events. Not so the former Prime Minister of Pakistan. He claimed that as a student of history he had tried to study in depth China and the Soviet Union, before he reached the conclusion that Pakistan would profit greatly from her friendship with China.

True, the people of Pakistan cannot afford to live and act and react in isolation and underrate the importance of areas of amity and accord with the rest of the world. But the Pakistanis have to judge things on their merit, without ignoring the geographical factors; and to understand that, in politics, the adage – the nearer the church the farther from god – cannot sound and look practical.

Bhutto’s efforts at closer friendship and greater cooperation between Pakistan and China began after he sought an answer to the key questions: What are the operative motivations of the Soviet leadership? What are the prospects of Russian communist success or failure in terms of the leadership’s objectives? Bhutto has not revealed his answers to these questions. Nor has he given any idea of the situation that forced him to intensify measures seeking a network of ties with China.

As a student of history, as Bhutto called himself, he studied the history of the struggle for power in China (1949-1954), the ideology of Chinese society, the stages of Chinese development, the top leadership, the military, the general setting, changes in foreign economic relations; he had given thought to the future of Chinese communism. Significantly, he did not, in his diary, set out to raise such questions as: What are the operative motivations of the Chinese communist
regime? What are its current intentions regarding the external world? What problems does it confront in achieving its purpose?
THE KASHMIR ‘ISSUE’

I have friends here – and, indeed, everywhere. A human being I am, and a defiant, determined soldier of Islam I have been. What I did, and the principles for which I stood, aroused quite a few critics. Some of them seem to have become my rivals. Whatever their attitude towards me, the fact remains that I have given to my country all that I could have, say, by way of keeping the Kashmir dispute alive. Attempts were made – on more than one occasion – by some forces in my country and abroad to reduce the importance of the dispute. I laboured to keep it alive, as I knew – and history bore testimony to the fact – that several lakh people, involved in the Kashmir dispute, looked at Pakistan with hopeful eyes as far as the question of seeking an agreed solution was concerned.

This is how Bhutto prefaced his views on the Kashmir issue in his diary:

I want to recall certain events of the past. As I do not want public opinion to get confused by the activities of a set of self-styled heroes on the Kashmir front, I want to provide an account of an important story, not told so far. This I want to do to put things straight. The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, visited Pakistan in September 1960 to sign the Indus Waters Treaty. In Pakistan a majority of the people had attached little importance to the treaty at that stage: they wanted a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Soon after the treaty was signed, I met President Ayub Khan and told him that he should forget other issues, except, of course, the Kashmir dispute, and convey, satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kashmir. Nehru stayed in Pakistan for five days; he had discussions with President Ayub. An exchange of views about Kashmir was followed by a communiqué, issued at the end of the talks. There was little progress on Kashmir. The Indian Prime minister had flattered president Ayub, who was taught, by Nehru to breathe and live normally. I was disappointed; indeed, in Pakistan there was disappointment that no progress had been making towards the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Two days after the Indian Premier returned home I met Ayub Khan, gave him an account of the people’s apathy about the communiqué, explained to him their views on Kashmir and their involvement in, the Kashmir dispute, and convinced him that India’s intentions have not been sincere. In the beginning of October 1960 Ayub Khan toured some areas in Azad Kashmir. His visit had a definite purpose. And as he declared at a public meeting in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan could not trust India until the Kashmir issue was settled and the Pakistani Army could not afford to have the Kashmir problem unsolved for an indefinite period. The people and leaders of Azad Kashmir were certainly not off the mark when they began to intensify the liberation movement.

The people of Pakistan in general, and those living in Azad Kashmir and in Indian-occupied Kashmir in particular, have been struggling for a solution to the Kashmir question. Their struggle has a moral justification. At one stage, Nehru had described Kashmir as a ‘Pandora’s box’, which he did not want to open. I was glad, as I
found President Ayub angry about the Indian Premier’s remark in New York. Ayub Khan made use of this expression to hit back. Kashmir, he said, was not a Pandora’s Box but a ‘time bomb’. A time bomb has to be defused. This cannot be done without touching it. In December 1961, Nehru stated that on Kashmir, Pakistan had to accept things as they were and that talks could only be about adjustments of the ceasefire line. He tried to be a dictator. Pakistan, a party to the Kashmir problem, could not be expected to submit to Nehru’s sermons and statements. After my meeting with Ayub Khan it was made clear that Pakistan would not accept any settlement of the Kashmir question on the basis of the ceasefire line. President Ayub talked of other means if a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question proved impossible. He had reason to talk of other means, inasmuch as Indian leaders wanted us to learn to obey them.

Police action by India in Goa in December 1961 was very unfortunate; it was indisputable evidence of India’s aggressive intentions. As the failure of direct negotiations between India and Pakistan, had become a reality. I approached President Ayub and discussed with him the threat posed by India. This was followed by Pakistan’s decision to take the Kashmir question once again to the Security Council. Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan sent a letter to the President of the Security Council in January 1962, asking for an early meeting to consider the Kashmir question. I assisted Zafrullah Khan in preparing a long statement before the Security Council met in the beginning of February 1962.

As the development of friendly relations between Pakistan and China had taken place against the backdrop of Soviet support to India on the Kashmir question, the Chinese government began to assure the government of Pakistan (soon after the Bandung conference) that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries, which could imperil their friendly relations. In January 1961, Pakistan sounded China informally regarding a border settlement. A diplomatic note asking Peking for demarcation of the boundary was sent on March 28, 1961. The Chinese government took a long time to reply, as Peking was busy concentrating its Chinese troops close to the borders of India, as well as reorganizing groups of Chinese infiltrators around Hunza and Gilgit. China responded to the Pakistani proposal in February 1962. May 3, 1962, the two governments issued a joint statement in which they agreed to conduct negotiations to ‘locate and align’ their common border.

Relations between India and China took a turn for the worse after the governments of Pakistan and China issued the joint communiqué. New Delhi got in touch with Peking and Rawalpindi to challenge Pakistan’s right to settle Kashmir’s boundaries with China.

You know the Chinese rejected India’s protest, while divulging some hard facts. We also rejected India’s protest. India had no right to question Pakistan’s right to enter into negotiations with China, to reach an understanding on the alignment of that portion of the territory for the defence of which Pakistan continued to be responsible.
Bhutto further states in his diary:

Following the announcement at the end of November 1962, that President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru had agreed to hold talks on Kashmir and related matters after initial discussions at the ministerial level, the discussions between a Pakistani delegation headed by me and an Indian delegation headed by Swaran Singh were held at different meeting’s. These discussions covered numerous aspects and ideas and suggestions, and figures and facts. And when my friends and I arrived in the Indian capital for further talks, I was not surprised to come across proposals for the partition of Jammu and Kashmir. That time I was not and although we had not given up our position regarding the need for a plebiscite. We had succeeded in forcing India to reopen negotiations on Kashmir. The round of talks between the two sides had not concluded when I got a message from President Ayub, advising me to slowdown and to avoid a commitment on any alternative solution of the Kashmir question. At the end of the last meeting in Delhi, I and Swaran Singh explained, in separate press conferences, that differences were wide as a result of which the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India could not be asked to hold summit talks immediately.

I returned to Pakistan. I met President Ayub and apprised him of the trend of events during the talks. I referred to the message he had sent to me during my stay in Delhi. He did not give a clear picture; he only held out straws; he tried to show that he had better judgment and was in possession of better knowledge of politics and tactical moves.

I did not care a straw. I did not mince words when I told him that since India had agreed to reopen negotiations on Kashmir we had to insist on a solution satisfying our people in general and the Kashmiris in particular. As President Ayub seemed to have developed some sort of weakness, if not a sense of inferiority, in his relations with Nehru, he found it difficult to think and act on his own. More often than not, he had to be fed. In a reference to the Indo-Pakistan talks, I told the Pakistani Parliament in July 1963 that we had lost nothing. Pakistan had gained; it again focused on and highlighted the importance of the Kashmir dispute in the international arena.

The people of Pakistan are, indeed, grateful to the people of China for their support. The statement by the Chinese government in May 1962 in support of Pakistan on the Kashmir question opened a new leaf in the history of Sino-Pak friendship and cooperation. India did not like this development. India was upset when in March 1963, I signed an agreement in Peking on behalf of the government of Pakistan, and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, on behalf of the government of China. The agreement was on the alignment of the border between Sinkiang and Azad Kashmir. India initiated drastic measures against the Muslim population in Indian-held Kashmir. In January 1964, I sent a letter to the President of the Security Council; I favoured an immediate meeting of the Council to consider the unlawful steps taken by the government of India in the
Muslim state of Kashmir. The Council discussed the Kashmir question; I insisted on a settlement of the dispute and referred to the dangers inherent in the denial of the right to self-determination of the people of Kashmir.

Sheikh Abdullah visited Pakistan in May 1964. After his release from an Indian jail in Kashmir, Nehru, who sent him to Rawalpindi to woo President Ayub, flattered Abdullah. I had cautioned Ayub Khan against Nehru’s game. Abdullah was not the leader – and is not the leader – of the people of India; he was – and, indeed, is – ambitious and emotional; he wanted to be the architect of a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, without realizing that his role as an ‘architect’ of the so called Indo-Kashmir link had already exposed him as a man with greed for gain. Abdullah was a welcome visitor to Ayub Khan. He persuaded the President of Pakistan to undertake a trip to New Delhi in June 1964, for talks with Nehru on Indo-Pakistan problems, including Kashmir. Nehru’s death upset Abdullah’s apple cart. Abdullah had to cut short his visit to Azad Kashmir; he flew back to India to attend the funeral of Nehru.

We knew India and her anxiety; she wanted us to look at her with hopeful eyes. India was determined - and will continue to be determined – to force her decisions on unwilling Kashmiris. We did not surrender. The people of Pakistan committed as they are to helping the Kashmiris seek a solution to the Kashmir problem, should not surrender. The outbreak of war between India and Pakistan in 1965 gave another complexion to the Kashmir problem; Soviet leaders established contact with President Ayub to offer help in solving the Kashmir dispute. Ayub Khan had detailed discussions with me on the subject in Rawalpindi before I went to Moscow for talks with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin. India had already accepted the offer to the good offices of the Soviet Premier.

Tashkent was the venue for the conference. There President Ayub and Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri signed a joint declaration after quite a few rounds of discussion between the two sides. As Ayub Khan did not emerge victorious, the people of Pakistan got suspicious about the Tashkent declaration. Many strongly felt that the sacrifices by the people in general and the armed forces of Pakistan in particular, were in vain when viewed in the context of the declaration. This development was a pointer it served as a guideline during my negotiations with Mrs. Gandhi in Shimla (India) after the war between Pakistan and India in December 1971.

With reference to India’s supposed failure to win over the people of Kashmir, Bhutto stated:

Kashmir’s accession to India is not final: neither has the Kashmiris voluntarily supported India’s stand not have they hesitated to challenge the accession. Billions of rupees have been spent by India in occupied Kashmir. But the fears and suspicions of the Kashmiris have not gone. Kashmir is inhabited by a preponderant majority of Muslims. They have not been happy in continuing to remain with India. The majority of the people are opposed to Indian domination.
Some local leaders have lost their conscience over the years. Indian money and sermons and souvenirs have rendered them mollycoddles. One of them is Sheikh Abdullah, unnecessarily trying to build evidence to show that he has dedicated his life to finding honour for the people of Kashmir. The people of Indian-held Kashmir have to launch a search for a dynamic leadership; a new leadership is needed to give a new direction to the struggle for freedom. Kashmiri youth have to play a decisive role; they have to be dexterous; they have to assert themselves as their future is linked with the Kashmir problem.

Notwithstanding the different political philosophy and social aims of the Kashmiris, Pakistan has been advocating that their intimate and deep religious ties with Pakistan make the people of Kashmir eager for affiliation with that country. India as well as the integrationists in the State of Jammu and Kashmir argues, more often than not, that national emotions and economic interests cannot become subservient to religious sentiments. They refer to ‘Azad Kashmir’ and state that at the time of its occupation in 1947, Pakistan’s rulers announced that the people residing in that territory would soon see the fulfillment of their aspirations. What has happened in Azad Kashmir during the last three decades is a sad story of a victimized people; their own co-religionists have held down the helpless people of occupied Kashmir forcibly.

Pakistan has not reconciled itself to the manner in which India has brought about Kashmir’s integration. India’s expansionist designs are more real than apparent, Bhutto wrote, adding:

Following the capture of Kashmir, Hyderabad, Goa and Skim, India stands exposed: India’s expansionist designs have come to the fore to threaten smaller nations in Asia. India has occupied Kashmir but she has failed to capture the hearts of the hapless people living in the area. Kashmiri Muslims are, and will always be, against the Indian hegemony.

Developments during the last three decades in India and Pakistan as also in the parts of the State of Jammu and Kashmir divided by the line of actual control have apparently complicated the Kashmir issue. The people of Kashmir cannot afford to lose the sympathies and friendship of either of the two countries. Nor can India and Pakistan afford to remain perpetually at daggers drawn against each other. While India cannot present Kashmir to Pakistan on a platter, the rulers of Pakistan cannot afford to hail the Indo-Kashmir accession because of the emotional involvement.
UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE

Bhutto as unwarranted interference in the affairs of Pakistan has criticized India’s role in the 1971 sub-continental crisis, which led to the emergence of Bangladesh. He has written:

President Ayub Khan who lacked the expertise and experience of an agile politician, failed in the initial stage to deal with the internal political and economic problems of East Pakistan he was guided by a group of people even when some leaders of East Pakistan put forward proposals for autonomy; the guidance and advice he got could no help him to formulate a proper strategy. Yahya Khan used force; use of force, he thought, was the only solution to the agonizing unrest in East Pakistan.

The dam of bitter reaction to Yahya Khan’s policy ultimately burst. The entire region of East Pakistan got engulfed; big barriers between the two regions of the country got erected. Yahya Khan’s inflated ego was hurt. The people of East Pakistan launched a revolt in the wake of Yahya Khan’s order to kill all those who wanted separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. He was eventually forced to run on rocks; India played her dirty role when she sent in military and semi-military forces to assist the defiant people of East Pakistan. India’s unwarranted interference had fully demonstrated he aggressive intentions towards Pakistan.

After separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan came the fall of Yahya Khan. Indian troops made desperate attempts to deeply entrench themselves in Bangladesh. This posed a challenge to the people of Pakistan. It did not take long to bring about the removal of Indian troops from the soil of Bangladesh. India’s image deteriorated. India deserved it; she had tried to reap where she had not sown. My government took a series of measures to revive the bonds of friendship between the people of the two countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh both professing Islam.

After the 1971 war Bhutto left no stone unturned to procure arms from various sources. He deputed the Pakistani army chief, General Tikka Khan, to Peking to get new arms from China, which the Pakistan’s closest ally and its biggest supplier of arms since the 1965 war. Pakistan is the largest recipient of Chinese military aid in the non-communist world. China signed its first economic aid programme with Pakistan in 1964, and its military assistance programme was extended to Pakistan in September 1965, in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan war.

Bhutto first indicated the existence of some kind of a military understanding between China and Pakistan three and a half months after the border agreement was signed in Peking by the two countries.
Speaking in the Pakistani Parliament on July 17, 1963, Bhutto had said:

A conflict does not involve Pakistan alone. Attack from India on Pakistan today is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and the security of the largest state in Asia and, therefore, this new element that has been brought into the situation is a very important one. I would not, at this stage, like to elucidate any further on this matter, but suffice it to say that the national interest of another state itself is involved in an attack on Pakistan because that state and other states have known India’s aggressive intentions and how India is capable of launching aggressive action against other countries. Therefore, a subjugated Pakistan or a defeated Pakistan is not only a question of annihilation for us but also poses a serious threat to other countries in Asia and particularly to the largest state in Asia.
In his diary Bhutto referred to the horrors of war and said:

After the retreat of Yahya Khan, I had to face an enormous difficulty; a dam seemed to have burst, hitting hard Pakistan’s economy. The strain on modest family budgets was the severest. Wage earners were the worst affected by the standstill of industry and business. There was confusion; our instability had become an open secret; the people were restive as they felt that they lacked efficient administrative and political machinery at the center to guide the country properly. A huge responsibility fell upon my shoulders. I had to reorganize the governmental machinery to implement a new programme for the restoration of peace on the political plane and progress on the economic front.

After the end of the 14-day war between the two countries in December 1971, I became eager to see friends in and around the country. Negotiations between Pakistan and India were launched. I proceeded to Shimla for talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Discussions took place between the two sides. Delight was followed by disappointment and optimism by pessimism during the first two rounds of talks. I found Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers quite rigid on the Kashmir question; they did not want to accord priority to aspects of this question referred to by me. I was also adamant about not permitting distortion of the facts of history and geography.

One day Mrs. Gandhi and I discussed the question in the absence of advisers from the two countries. I found her under constant pressure from her advisers not to yield. I did not require advisers not to yield. I did not require advice from my associates, for I was determined to find a place for the Kashmir dispute in the discussions. That day I found that the Indian Prime Minister was not comfortable; she was engrossed in thought and gave the impression that her tongue did not relish the taste of the hot tea in her cup. There was a deadlock; the talks could not make satisfactory progress.

I was not happy; I felt disturbed by the small progress made during the talks. I was alone in my room that night when D.P. Dhar, a member of the Indian delegation, knocked and had an unscheduled meeting with me. The meeting lasted about half an hour. We discussed alternatives to end the deadlock. My emphasis was on the need to include the Kashmir question in the talks.

The next day I found Mrs. Gandhi relaxed, although two of her advisers looked slightly ruffled. Then a meeting between her and me took place on the question of bringing about normalization of relations between Pakistan and India. Adjustment of behavior ultimately resulted in the announcement of the Shimla agreement (July 2, 1972). Happily for Pakistan and the people of Kashmir, India accepted, once again, the existence of the Kashmir dispute.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC MEASURES

I did not permit the power of the state of Pakistan to be exercised in a vacuum; power was used to achieve certain ends. As Pakistan, like any other sovereign state, became a territorial society divided into government and subjects, I applied the legal imperatives. Men think differently who live differently. John Bright could never see the value of the Factory Acts because, as an employer, they contradicted what he most keenly felt; and a landowner like Lord Shaftsbury, who had no difficulty in seeing the elementary justice of factory legislation, could never see the justice of regulating the conditions of agricultural labour.

As Pakistan had witnessed vicissitudes of fortune after it was established in 1947, I wanted every citizen to obey orders in the Islamic state. A Pakistani is the subject of this state; the contours of his life are set by the norms it imposes. The norms are the law, not the martial law, the brutal law. Nothing illegal, as my government laid down a system of imperatives. Periodically coercion was used to secure obedience to them. This was done to stabilize peace and progress in the country.

A massive campaign was launched to step up production in farm and factory. Socio-economic plans were announced; special cells were formed to help implement these plans. Emphasis was laid on the need to expand and strengthen the country's armed forces. In this connection I enlisted the cooperation and support of quite a few countries. Also, greater emphasis was laid on the need to develop areas of technical and scientific education; a special programme was chalked out to promote nuclear energy, to be followed by production of a nuclear bomb and nuclear arms.

On the question of producing nuclear arms I found some American friends reticent; in the initial stages Washington opposed my move to develop nuclear science and technology in Pakistan. I was determined; I approached France and China for assistance. I found them sympathetic. An agreement with France, and our friendly understanding with China, came to be regarded as a challenge by Washington. American money and influence served as instruments to introduce changes; winds of change began to blow, confusion grew and threats were posed to peace in Pakistan.

I do admit that benefits of my government's socio-economic programme did not reach every citizen of Pakistan before and after the elections in March 1977. Compulsions of the situation engaged my government in the task of handling political matters and dealing with the threat posed to the country by some political elements. As lawlessness and violence threatened the country's stability following the elections drastic measures were initiated as pressure was put upon me by some army officers, including General Zia and the Minister for Defence and National Security, General Tikka Khan.
I wanted the restoration of normalcy; I made strong pleas for public cooperation. I started negotiations with opposition leaders to resolve the crisis. These negotiations created more confusion, but I did not lose heart. I was in search of alternatives; but my search had only begun, when I was removed and jailed.

On July 5, 1977, the army took over the administration. The erstwhile ‘factotum’ General Zia met me at Muree on July 7, when he narrated a cock-and–bull story of the events, which culminated in unnecessarily, that his move was not directed against me but against a class of ‘bastards’ headed by Tikka Khan. I watched him; I was not willing to confront him outright with my knowledge. I knew he was all wrong, wicked and sinful. I hated the awful guilt inside him.
BHUTTOS NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

I want the Muslim nation of Pakistan to possess a strong army, air force, and navy. Every family in Pakistan should provide due attention and assistance in the task of increasing the country’s military power. This can be possible if a member from each family is asked to join the country’s armed forces. I am confident that Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission would vigorously pursue its objective of paving the way for Pakistan, sooner than later, to join the nuclear club. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission should not be afraid of the USA, as I have already told some Americans, including Dr. Kissinger, that they should not insult the sovereignty and self-respect of Pakistan by discussing the pros and cons of the reprocessing plant.

Z.A. Bhutto was justifying an investment of over Rs. 19 crores between 1955 and 1977 on nuclear research, principally on prospecting for uranium and on training scientists in nuclear research, both by sending scientists abroad and by getting them trained within Pakistan by foreign trained scientist.

New Delhi has always been jealous of Pakistan’s defence build-up in spite of a huge gap between the strength of the armed forces of the two countries, the authorities in Delhi have never approved of the path adopted by us in the field of defence with the help and advice of some friendly countries. India spent billions of rupees on the expansion and strengthening of its armed forces. Indian leaders felt the death rattle as they came to know that we in Pakistan had no reason to lag behind. India purchased highly sophisticated weapons and exploded a nuclear device as part of its plan to pose a threat to the security of Pakistan. Shockingly enough, Indian leaders raised a hue and cry as they knew that we were in search of modern weapons as well as technical assistance to produce nuclear arms.

Bhutto took pains to justify his regime’s increased budget allotment for defence (Rs. 423 crores in 1972-73), which he claimed was absolutely necessary to make the Pakistani armed forces among the first in the area. After the Indo-Pak war in December 1971 Bhutto had left no stone unturned to procure arms from various sources. Pakistan took several steps from March to June 1973 to equip her armed forces with medium bombers like the TU-16 and French Mirage fighters. Some Pakistani airmen engaged themselves during this period in imparting training to air forces personnel in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, money from these countries.

Pakistan’s defence budget rose by more than 88 percent during Bhutto’s regime. It was Rs. 423 crores in 1973-74 and Rs. 798 crores in 1976-77. This increase in expenditure does not reflect the free arms and equipment Pakistan received from China and other friendly countries.
According to the London Institute for Strategic Studies, in 1976-77, the last year of Bhutto’s rule, the Pakistan army had 14 infantry divisions, two armored divisions, two independent armored brigades, on air defence brigade, five squadrons of army aviation, and its total strength stood at 400,000 (including 29,000 Azad Kashmir troops). In addition, there were 500,000 reservists. Besides, Pakistan had also mobilized most of the 90,000 prisoners of war who went back from India by 1974. The total strength of Pakistan’s naval personnel was 11,000 in addition to 5,000 reservists. Pakistan’s air force had an effective strength of 217 combat aircraft, including French Mirages. Indian authorities however felt that these were conservative estimates.

It has been a matter of habit with India to doubt Pakistan’s bona fides. 1973, I met the Shah of Iran to discuss with him the utility of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). I even suggested to him to take steps to bring India also within the ambit of this organization, and when talks on tripartite cooperation between Pakistan, the Gulf States and France on the production of arms were at an advanced stage in November 1975. Indian leaders, especially Mrs. Gandhi, made use of strange language to denounce Pakistan. In reality, the development was that French leaders had expressed their belief that on the basis of the proposal by the Shah of Iran for the establishment of a joint armament industry by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, both Turkey and Pakistan were in a position to provide skilled manpower. It was not difficult for the two countries to get Arab money for joint arms ventures and for buying Western technical know-how.

New Delhi’s reaction was the opposite of sweet as a joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit to Pakistan of the Turkish President Mr. Fahri Koruturk, expressed deep satisfaction at the development of bilateral relations between the two countries. The meeting followed this between the Iranian ambassador in New Delhi and the Indian Premier, Mrs. Gandhi a message from the Shah of Iran explaining that the Regional Cooperation for Development, which comprised Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, should be expanded to include Afghanistan, India and Iraq. Mrs. Gandhi’s refusal to be guided or dictated to by others not only embarrassed the Iranian ambassador but also surprised the Shah of Iran who later considered India as her personal estate there was no need to waste our time and energy on the squeezed orange.

I have liked Mrs. Gandhi for her pleasing personality. I have admired her father’s glorious past and glorious contribution to the task of building democratic norms and institutions in India, excluding of course some areas like Indian-held Kashmir. If Nehru was a democrat, his daughter, Indira Gandhi, was the apposite of her father in operational technique and talent and tact. Mrs. Gandhi left no stone unturned to harass Pakistan when she ruled India for about a decade. Of all people, my wife, Nusrat, and our daughter Benazir, seem to have been satisfied with Mrs. Gandhi’s sympathy for me. They had to be told that her sympathy for me was expressed after her countrymen in the battle for the ballot.
In late April 1978, I saw a newspaper from London. I was startled when I read a story\(^1\) on how the Indian people suffered terror, torture and forced sterilization for 19 months under Mrs. Gandhi, notwithstanding pleas for pity and compassion. They story was on the agony of the Indian people, including Muslims.

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\(^1\) See Appendix III, (See Page Number 60)
KARAKORAM HIGHWAY

General Zia is mistaken if he tries to convince his countrymen that he deserves the credit for throwing open a road to friendship, in other words, the Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan with China. There can be no dispute if I say that I have been responsible for involving China in the task of assisting Pakistan in building the road. Zia knew little when plans for an all-weather road between Pakistan and China were originally drawn up in 1959. Pakistan wanted the land link with its northern neighbour and also wanted to open up the vast untapped mineral wealth of the region. As I was greatly interested in the development of northern Pakistan, I devised ways and means to enlist unconditional support and aid from China. The Karakoram Highway has already been completed and thrown open to vehicular traffic. Of all the countries, India indulged, unnecessarily, in a battle of protests. India has no business to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan; Pakistan has benefited, and is going to derive advantages, by remaining in close association with China, wrote Bhutto in his diary.

The 537-mile Karakoram Highway stretches from the Indus valley of Pakistan to Sinkiang province in China. With the opening of the road northern Pakistan will become accessible; the strategic equation of Central Asia will also be altered. At this rooftop of the world, where as many as 33 peaks rise 24,000 feet high, the borders of five countries lie in close proximity, Pakistan, China, India, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The new road, according to Western commentators will mean that even better links can be forged with China, and the replacement of the Chinese artillery and tanks, which now form the bulk of Pakistan’s arsenal, will not depend on a long sea route or a perilous air link.

The Karakoram Highway is a two-lane carriage way with gentle gradients and sweeping curves allowing traffic to maintain a high speed? Pakistan could hardly provide one battalion of army engineers for the construction of the road, and local labour along the line of the road was poorly qualified for work. China moved in a vast number of workers and soldiers and equipment and largely did the job by itself. Lahore camps were established along the route. As many as 30,000 peoples, became involved in the project. The construction took ten years to complete. Some 400 workers lost their lives in landslides, avalanches and other mishaps, including harassment by rebellious tribesmen.

China and Pakistan have officially maintained that the Karakoram Highway is a trade route. They do not proclaim the military significance of the road. But New Delhi discounts its trade aspects and Indian defence experts are worried about its strategic implications for India’s security. With Kashmir as the focal point of tension in the area, the security question naturally looms large. The
Karakoram Highway gives the Chinese direct access to Gilgit and from there to the heart of Pakistan. Even more important, it provides for the Chinese a backdoor entry to the Arabian Sea, and hence an infinitely shorter route to west Asia and Africa.

When China and Pakistan launched the project in 1968, India lodged a protest but its protest was ignored, and construction work was carried on. After the inauguration of the Karakoram Highway at Gilgit by General Zia and China’s Vice-Premier Keng Piao on 10 June 1976, the Indian foreign ministry summoned the Pakistani and Chinese envoys to lodge another protest, which also Pakistan promptly rejected. Pakistan’s claim that it has a right to construct a road through occupied Kashmir was based on its argument that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has never been recognized as a part of India. Pakistan, therefore, maintained that India had no grounds on which to protest, in international law.

A new road is now being built by Pakistan with Chinese aid and assistance, to provide a two-lane carriageway between Skardu and Yarkand. This strategic road will be known as the Mustagh mountain pass. As Skardu is situated across Kargil in Ladakh, construction of the Mustagh Highway will have noticeable strategic importance. Estimated to cost more than Rs. 35 crores the road is being built where there were only footpaths. Pakistani and Chinese engineers and labourers would require huge stocks of explosives to dislodge big boulders and blast hanging mountain cliffs and rocks between Skardu and Yarkand.

Chinese soldiers and technicians played a notable part in building a 160-mile road between Gilgit and Skardu. The Chinese were also reported to have assisted Pakistan in the construction of two strategic routes from Skardu and Burzilbad to Gultari across Drass in the Kargil sector. Before its capture by Pakistani troops in 1948 four roads were used from Kashmir and four from Ladakh to reach Skardu, the principal town of Baltistan.
I am sure, continued Bhutto in his diary, that my country will never ignore my performance during my struggle for procuring better equipment for the soldiers of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. I enlisted the cooperation of America, China, Britain, France, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and the Gulf States as part of my plan to modernize my country’s armed forces. And as I look back, I do draw a measure of satisfaction from the encouraging situation created or our armed forces over the years. Pakistan’s armed forces are not yet self-sufficient; their strength has to be increased, they have to be equipped with modern weapons, which can easily enable them to kick out at the enemy.

Bhutto was not incorrect when he tried to emphasize his achievements as a builder of his country’s military strength after its 1971 defeat. In 1973, New Delhi received reports about Iran’s willingness to supply two squadrons of Saber aircraft and some supersonic bombers to Pakistan. Iran, these reports said, had decided to provide Islamabad with these aircraft at a ‘nominal’ cost view of Teheran’s growing interest in Pakistan’s efforts to improve relations with Iran. Reports also said that Saudi Arabia had conveyed its willingness to supply several Saber and F-5 fighters, and that Kuwait and Jordan had provided substantial financial aid to Pakistan to enable it to procure military hardware from various sources.

In February 1974, Pakistan started negotiations with France on the question of obtaining three Atlantique Breguetic Maritime reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft were to be used as action devices against submarines. France had planned to supply to Islamabad some Curtail anti-aircraft missiles to serve as all-weather interceptors of low altitude targets. Certain developments since the beginning of December 1973, gave a new dimension to the arms build-up in Pakistan.

After consultations with Bhutto and Major General Fazle Hakim, who was then the Defence Secretary of Pakistan, French Foreign Secretary Jean De Lipkowski told newsmen on December 9, 1974, that he had, among other things, assessed Pakistan’s arms requirements. This was followed by Bhutto’s discussions with Sheikh Isa Din Suleman of Bahrain on December 10, 1974, before he (Bhutto) explained in Islamabad on December 16, 1974, that contact had been established with France and the Gulf States regarding the defence needs of our area, as Pakistan had been denied arms by USA.

In October 1975, China’s top armament experts had flown to Pakistan on an inspection tour of industrial and defence units in that country. These experts
also discussed with officials of Pakistan’s defence ministry the question of Chinese assistance and guidance to Rawalpindi in the production of ground-to-air missiles in Pakistan. Later, Pakistan started negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the question of procuring from them military hardware and additional financial assistance.

The Shah of Iran had left Larkana for home on February 27, 1975 after a three days visit to Pakistan during which he had seven hours of talks with Bhutto. The two leaders reviewed the international situation. In the words of the Shah, there were no differences of discussed. The US decision to lift its embargo on arms sales to Pakistan was reported to have enabled Bhutto to envisage how Iran could resell to Pakistan some military equipment which, although second hand, would not be obsolete and would be cheaper.

A team of Pakistani defence experts returned to Rawalpindi in the beginning of January 1976 after negotiations. In Teheran, Pakistani experts were reported to have finalized arrangements for additional hardware from Iran. Pakistan’s preference was for armoured pieces like heavy tanks fitted out with the latest model of guns and machine guns; personnel carriers and armoured cars; field pieces including self propelled 175mm guns, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank missiles; and sophisticated equipment like electronic detection, jamming and tracing devices which would misdirect enemy missiles.
ACQUERING NUCLEAR TEETH

During Bhutto’s visit to Peking in May 1976, a secret pact was made for China to help Pakistan produce nuclear arms. A part of Bhutto’s diary revealed:

Fifteen percent to twenty percent of the work had been shelved for further talks with French and Chinese leaders; the major portion of the project had been completed, and we had thoroughly prepared ourselves to show the world that we also knew how to explode a nuclear bomb... My countrymen wanted me, and my government, to produce a nuclear bomb. They talked, more often than not, about India’s possession of nuclear devices and nuclear arms. Indian leaders should not shout; they should know that Pakistan would, sooner than later, explode a nuclear device.

In October 1978, the British Department of Energy and Trade was reported to have started inquiring into a Pakistani deal with a British firm for the supply of £1.25 million worth of electrical control equipment which goes into a nuclear bomb. But it was only when Bhutto, after having been overthrown by Zia, disclosed that he had brought Pakistan to the verge of full nuclear capability, that the British government made investigations. According to a section of the British press, the Pakistan government had placed an order with a British electrical machinery manufacturing company for equipment which it said it needed for a textile plant but which could be used for a nuclear project.

In the British House of Commons, the government was asked by a Labour Member, Frank Allan, whether the supply of equipment essential to the manufacture of nuclear weapons had the government’s approval. This was in July 1978. At that time, Trade Secretary Edmond Dell had said that the contract would require government approval only if the equipment related to the provisions of the Export of Goods (Control) Order of 1970.

What seemed to have led the British government to conduct an inquiry in October was Bhutto’s assertion that we were at the threshold of full nuclear capability when I left the government to come to this death cell, as also General Zia’s quest for reprocessing facilities. Bhutto’s statement was smuggled out of his Rawalpindi prison cell and it appeared in the British Press. In his 319 page document, Bhutto said:

Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.
Bhutto intended to share with Arab countries Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Saudi Arabia was also reported to have indicated to Pakistan that it would be willing to finance a reprocessing plant for the manufacture of plutonium in return for the use of this facility for itself. The purpose of Bhutto’s reference to Pakistan’s nuclear capability in his defence statement was to establish that the Americans had engineered opposition to him because he was unwilling to accept US advice against Pakistan going nuclear. Bhutto said that Dr. Henry Kissinger had told him that he was insulting US intelligence when he claimed that the reprocessing facility was required to keep Pakistan’s atomic power stations going.

You know I have helpful friends not only in China but also in Saudi Arabia. As Prime Minister I built strong bridges with Saudi Arabia. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement on a plan to assist each other in building the defence strength. The agreement was designed to enable the two countries to come closer to each other in the light of the growing need to establish a united Muslim bloc. The agreement was intended to enable Pakistan to obtain financial assistance from Saudi Arabia for purchasing effective equipment for our armed forces—Bhutto said.

China, according to Bhutto, had agreed to share technology with Pakistan for setting up a big factory on the outskirts of Karachi to manufacture powerful tanks and anti-tank missiles. Chinese consent to the project, he said, was known during his visit to Peking in 1976. China had also agreed to build two industrial units in Pakistan’s northern territory, he added.

A page of Bhutto’s diary indicated his anger over India’s opposition to the American decision to supply F-5 aircraft to Pakistan.

I become emotional as I saw an Indian newspaper, describing as highly regrettable the American decision to supply F-5 aircraft to Pakistan. Indian External Affairs Minister Vajpayee had no business to pass judgment on the defence problems and requirements of Pakistan. There was no logic in the argument advanced by the Indian newspaper that Pakistan’s desire to augment its military power, and Washington’s favorable response to it, could have only one meaning: Interruption of the process of normalization which India had been pursuing steadily for the last few years with considerable success. I never questioned the right of India to become a satellite of the Soviet Union as a result of the defence treaty of 1971 between the two countries. I never tried to indulge in acts of throwing up absurd arguments; my purpose was to strengthen Pakistan on all fronts.

Some Indian newspapers argued that the armaments which Pakistan, got in the fifties and the sixties were no longer needed as the liberation of Bangladesh had radically altered the military map of South Asia, Pakistan’s relations with China had been improving for several years, and its President "is a
faithful follower’ of Bhutto’s policy. China, according to an Indian paper, had secured an access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean by the grace of Pakistan; if Pakistan accelerated a process of collection of arms, which can have only one target, namely, India would be forced to equip itself to meet this challenge.

The Pakistan Mission at the United Nations issued two press releases in the middle of October 1978, attacking India’s decision to acquire 200 or more jaguar deep-penetration strike aircraft, and the reasons India had advanced for its decision. The first press release expressed Pakistan’s grave concern over the addition to the Indian air force, already the fifth largest in the world, of an entirely new weapons system. This new aggressive capability can be used only in the South Asian region and, therefore, is bound to aggravate the sense of alarm and insecurity among India’s smaller neighbours. In its second press release, Pakistan criticized the statements of the Indian Defence Minister and External Affairs Minister, that the United States had started supplying F-5 aircraft decided to acquire the Jaguars.

Bhutto said in his diary: I may not live for long. I have a word for my countrymen, especially the Pakistani armed forces; as purchase by India of jaguar deep strike aircraft poses a threat to Pakistan’s security, the citizens of Pakistan should be prepared at all times to meet and repel aggression from quarters which have always sought to impose their will on us.
THE OPPOSITION

The existence of a strong body of opinion in Pakistan against Bhutto was known for some years, and the number of his opponents began to increase after November 1973, when the Pakistan people’s Party workers began talking about ruthless action against those who opposed his government and policies.

The extent of the bitterness of his opponents became apparent as numerous changes were brought about not only in the leadership of the armed forces but also in the political and administrative set up in the country, to suit the requirements and aims of the Prime Minister. Political groups, especially in the North-West Frontier Province, were discouraged; force was used against those who campaigned for regional autonomy. Hundreds of persons were arrested and leaders of students unions and youth federations in Lahore, Karachi, Hyderabad and the cities and towns of Balochistan were threatened with punishment if they continue to incite public opinion against Bhutto’s policies.

A strong wave of resentment against Bhutto began to grow when some army officers were dislodged and General Zia-ul-Haq succeeded General Tikka Khan as the army chief on March 1, 1976, superseding a number of senior officers. The appointment of General Tikka Khan as Minister for Defence and national Security also generated a mixed reaction.

While political groups opposed to the Pakistan People’s Party described Bhutto as a ‘cannibal’, some of his associates, including Maulana Kausar Niazi, Religious Affairs Minister, Aziz Ahmed, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aga Shahi, Foreign Secretary, and Yusuf Buch, adviser to the Prime Minister, had reason to keep their fingers crossed. They were conscious of the fact that several army officers, including General Zia-ul-Haq, would find it difficult to restrain their dislike for Tikka Khan but the PPP hailed Bhutto’s various steps and regarded the appointment of Tikka Khan as quite suitable for the implementation of the party’s programme against the ‘unhealthy manoeuvres of our enemies in and outside the country’.

The appointment of Tikka Khan in the midst of political turmoil in Pakistan was regarded by some circles in India as another big step towards the revival of military dominance over the county’s politics.

These circles felt that the political battle over the election results tended to grant a fresh lease of life to military over lordship. That Bhutto had failed to render the army harmless became quite evident when General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, who had been sent into diplomatic exile by Bhutto,
resigned their posts and returned to Pakistan. This had repercussions in the army and partly necessitated the induction of General Tikka Khan in the Cabinet.

The former Prime Minister and his party, the PPP, were aware of the rapid growth of a determined opposition, before the country went to the polls in March 1977. And though Bhutto was unswervingly confident of his party’s victory in the elections, a section of the Administration (supported by the Federal Security Force personnel and Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau) resorted to malpractices in an attempt to secure an absolute majority for the PPP in the National Assembly. The Federal Security Force consisting of about 35,000 men had been set up by Bhutto and was attached to the Interior Ministry. As the election results came in, the nine-party Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) alleged large-scale rigging. The PNA boycotted the elections to the provincial assemblies on March 10, 1978, and launched a countrywide agitation.

The extent of the conflict, its range and bitterness, could not be obscured by Bhutto’s government, as violence and clashes between supporters of the PPP and the PNA spread almost everywhere, especially in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad, and West Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP. While additional army units were rushed to Balochistan and NWFP the PNA, Bhutto pressed into action several hundred personnel of the Federal Security Force to assist supporters and workers of the PPP in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad where anti-Bhutto demonstrations had assumed serious proportions by the middle of April. And as street battles went on in these areas, feelers were put out to indicate Bhutto’s willingness to hold new elections. The Opposition PNA leaders refused to be taken in by these feelers; they insisted on Bhutto’s resignation and the imposition of Presidential rule before fresh elections were held.

The former Prime Minister retaliated by arresting PNA leaders and taking repressive measures against his opponents. At least 374 people died, 1,500 persons were wounded and 75 others were reported missing in the violence as the agitation spread from one city to another.

Disregarding General Tikka Khan’s advice, tendered to him in Islamabad on April 19, Bhutto imposed martial law in the major cities or Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad, the focal points of agitation, on April 21, General Zia-ul-Haq was not for imposition for martial law; he favoured continuous of the round-the-clock curfew clamped on Karachi and Hyderabad earlier. But his view did not impress Bhutto.
RETURN TO MARTIAL LAW

The imposition of martial law came ahead of the Opposition’s call for a nation-wide strike and demonstrations on April 22, 1977 demanding the resignation of Bhutto. Demonstrations gave rise to the danger of further violence and bloodshed. In Hyderabad, retired Major General A. A. K Niazi, a leader of the PNA, was arrested a few hours before the imposition of martial law. He was detained under emergency regulations for making ‘objectionable’ speeches. General Niazi was the officer who had signed the surrender documents at Dacca in the 1971. Niazi was arrested at the house of a retired army major, who was also detained.

Earlier on April 20, normal life in Karachi the largest city in Pakistan, was paralysed as a result of the general strike called by trade unions supporting demands by the PNA for Bhutto’s resignation and the holding of fresh elections. Shops, backs, markets and textile mills stopped functioning and railway traffic was seriously affected.

The Times, London, said in a leading article at the time that the crisis in Pakistan “may now be such that only army mediation will settle it”. While comparing India and Pakistan, the paper felt that the Opposition in Pakistan had probably been encouraged by Mrs. Gandhi’s defeat.

What is unhappily true of Pakistan is that its stability as a new state is still in question. Its politics are more regional than national. Instead of accepted irrigation channels through which the political waters flow, that country is liable to occasional disorderly floods. And the more Bhutto’s attempts to command them have proved inadequate. The Opposition leaders have been spurred on by the desertions Bhutto has suffered from his own party.

The paper said that the Opposition would hope that its ranks would first be inspected for a likely alternative to Bhutto.

In this respect of Pakistan’s Opposition alliance is very different from India’s. No one of the caliber of Jayaprakash Narayan or Morarji Desai or Jagjivan Ram or of even the Jana Sangh leaders will be found among Pakistan’s opposition groups. Nor are fresh elections likely to throw up a suitable candidate if Bhutto is finally force to call them. Pakistan may have to soldier on with the best Prime Minister it has got.
Measures, which followed the imposition of martial law, failed to curb political turbulence. The Pir of Pagaro, a religious-cum political leader with a tribal base, had wholly identified himself with the PNA. He was placed under detention at the International Hotel in Rawalpindi on April 30, as the police battled with hundreds of opposition demonstrators demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. The Pir had played a central role in talks since April 26 among jailed PNA leaders at the Sihala detention center near Islamabad.

The situation in other parts of Pakistan, especially in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad, did not show any sign of improvement in spite of the presence of army personnel and steel-helmeted policemen. Hundreds of supporters of the PNA indulged in violence and fought pitched battles in the streets of Karachi with police and PPP workers for two days in the beginning of May, following the hurricane tour of Pakistan’s largest city by General Tikka Khan on May 2.

This development was followed by an hour-long meeting at Islamabad on May 5 between Tikka Khan and some other ministers, including Maulana Kausar Niazi and Finance Minister Abdul Hafiz Pirzada. Tikka Khan favoured what was described as use of massive force and opposed negotiations with PNA leaders. But as the days rolled by, Bhutto began to accept the views earlier expressed by the President, Foreign Affairs Minister Aziz Ahmed, General Zia and others in favour of talks with PNA leaders.

Abdul Hafiz Pirzada told the Associated Press of Pakistan on May 31 that the economic situation “is grim”. He said that the 1977-78 financial year would be a “head year” as country’s 60 working days “have been lost so far and the decline in gross national production has been estimated at 400 to 500 million dollars.” The country had also lost about 400 million dollars in export earnings, he added.

A report from Paris said that following the two hour meeting there between Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed, and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the USA and Pakistan had agreed to restore bilateral relations to the friendly footing that existed before Bhutto accused Washington of backing the opposition campaign to overthrow him. While Vance said, “we value greatly the long and close friendship we have with Pakistan”. Ahmed said:

The talks were very friendly and constructive. In the end we agreed, irrespective of the differences that cropped up recently between our two countries, that both countries wish to restore their relationship to the former state of mutual friendship and confidence and would like to see them improve further.
While martial law, enforced in Pakistan’s three cities, was lifted on June 7 as a result of the satisfactory progresses made in the government-opposition negotiations, more that 13,000 prisoners were freed by June 13, during and after the visit to Kashmir by the Indian leaders, Prime Minister Morarji Desai, Home Minister Charan Singh, and Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, from June 19 to June 27, 1977, attempts were made by Bhutto and some of his associates, including Communications Minister Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, to divert the attention of the Opposition by raking up the Kashmir issue and the growing domination of militant Bharat in Indian-held Kashmir.

Earlier, on June 20, Pakistan’s ruling leaders, including Aziz Ahmed and Tikka Khan, told two leaders – Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, vice-president of the PNA, and Ghafoor Ahmed, its secretary general – that they should cooperate with the government in view of the movement of the Indian army close to the border with Pakistan. Reference to the Indo-Pak border came soon after the sub-committee level talks between the PNA and the government, regarding details of the accord on holding fresh elections fizzled out. Ghafoor Ahmed said in Islamabad “differences exist not only in regard to the date of dissolution of the National Assembly but also about other matters of a fundamental nature.”
THE FALL

Within hours of returning from a five-day visit to a number of Muslim countries, Bhutto met the opposition leaders at Rawalpindi on June 23, 1977. The opposition did not seem to be interested in his proposal for a defence treaty embracing all the Muslim states. The PNA leaders pressed for his resignation, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and for the holding of fresh elections in the country, before taking up matters like Indo-Pakistan relations and the formation of the Islamic defence alliance.

The opposition warned (on June 28) that it would resume nation-wide agitation on July 1 unless the government accepted its proposals to end the four-month-old political crisis. Ghafoor Ahmed accused the Finance Minister of blocking the negotiation processes. It was on June 27 that the Finance Minister issued a communiqué on behalf of the government making it clear that the authorities would not negotiate under duress, and rejecting any form of ‘ultimatum’.

Bhutto and leaders of the PNA met at Rawalpindi on July 1 in a final effort to seek a formula to resolve the crisis. The talks started under a cloud of renewed violence in the Punjab and in the exchange of fire between rivals factions, nine supporters of the PNA were wounded, four of them seriously. Even so, the PNA and the government reached an agreement on all points for holding new general elections. The two sides jointly announced this at the end of their 10-hour nightlong session, which ended on Saturday (July 2).

While details of the accord were into disclose, the withdrawal of troops from Balochistan was among the issues discussed by the two sides. The opposition was represented at the talks by its President Maulana Mufti Mahmud, vice-President and secretary general, Bhutto and two Ministers, Pirzada and Niazi, represented the government.

However on July 3 the PNA put forward ten new demands, some of them formulated by Bhutto’s strong opponent, Air Marshal Asghar Khan. Predictably Bhutto told reporters in Islamabad on July 4 that he had reached the limit in what he could concede. He accused the opposition of wanting to reopen negotiations that had ended with an agreement and of going back on its commitment. Bhutto said that for the first time deep differences had emerged within the Cabinet on continuing the talks with the PNA.

Tikka Khan was against negotiations with the opposition leaders; he had felt insulted by certain remarks made by the two leaders of the PNA, Air Marshal
Asghar Khan and General Niazi, against his handling of the PNA supporters in Karachi and Lahore during the period martial law. Bhutto did not agree with Tikka Khan’s stand, nor did he want adoption of ruthless measures against troublemakers.

Events took an unexpected turn in the affairs of Pakistan on Tuesday (July 5). The army took over civil administration in the country, imposed martial law and promised ‘free and fair’ elections in October in what it claimed was a ‘necessary step’ to check the country’s drift towards political chaos. About 17 hours after a pre-dawn round-up of the country’s political leaders, among them Bhutto, the Pakistan army chief General Zia-ul-Haq announced in a broadcast that he would be the chief martial law administrator and that a four-member military council would ‘assist’ the President, Fazal Elahi Choudhury, who had agreed to continue in the office. National and provincial assemblies were dissolved and all ministers and governments dismissed. All political activity was banned. General Zia said that the powers of the judiciary are not being curtailed except that it would have no authority to challenge the validity to martial law orders.”

Chief Justices of the provinces were appointed governors of their states. Politicians taken into custody included Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Maulana Mufti Mahmud, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the governors, of Sindh, Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, General Tikka Khan and Maulana Kausar Niazi. Trade union activities were banned and strike in educational institutions prohibited. Martial law orders issued in Islamabad on July 11, 1977 provided for the death penalty for damage caused to public property, and amputation of hands for theft, dacoity or looting.

Pakistan, a Muslim nation of 70 million, thus became the second country after Saudi Arabia to introduce amputation as provided for in the Shariat. General Zia considered the immediate introduction of Islamic law as an essential prerequisite for the country’s progress; the 1973 Constitution had envisaged the introduction of the Shariat in seven years. Initially all sections of PNA leadership cooperated with Zia-ul-Haq, in enforcing the Islamic law, although later differences developed within the PNA leadership. On his part Zia, as Bhutto noted in his diary, has given them the comforts of life. It was, however, a different matter that, as Bhutto further noted, their greed for gain has thoroughly exposed them; they cannot be depended upon.

According to Bhutto, Pakistan is passing through a civil war of nerves with the imminence of violent civil war lurking behind the façade of outward calm.

The present silent civil war of nerves will soon erupt into open conflict, he wrote.
As I feel that Afghanistan has gone communist, I foresee the eruption of trouble inside Pakistan in view of Russian influence having reached the Khyber. The Russians want to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean across Balochistan like thirsty camels. And those incredible Afghan gorges, much deeper, more beautiful, far grimmer than the Khyber, are like bayonets pointing to Peshawar.
‘I AM NOT AFRAID TO DIE’

I am not a mendicant: I am not going to ask for something by way of alms; I am not going to sit up with forepaws raised. I am sure my countrymen will not sit silent; they will not let General Zia go scot-free. General Zia is currently trying to decide whether he can strengthen his hold on the country by executing me. Perhaps he does not know that there may be a Gaddafi down there, some radical major or colonel in the Pakistani Army. We could wake up and find him in Zia’s place one morning.

Jotting down his thoughts in his diary, Bhutto wrote that General Zia may not be willing – or able to realize it at the present moment, but barring himself and a handful of his advisers and followers, the rest of the world is bound to look upon my hanging as a political murder.

He further reflected: You cannot stop me if my days are numbered. I am not afraid of death. What I detest is the manner in which I have been treated in the prison cell. And what has pained me is the harsh treatment my friends, my colleagues, my followers and members of my family have received after I was removed and jailed. On May 21, 1978, my wife, Nusrat, had a meeting with me in the Rawalpindi prison. She wept as she gave an account of how my friends, relatives and supporters had been tortured as part of General Zia’s plan to bring about annihilation of the forces loyal to me. All that I could do on the occasion was to educate my wife about the need for utmost caution while functioning as the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party.

I kept my self-involved in writing letters and notes and reading newspapers and news magazines after Nusrat left the prison cell. Two junior officials, on duty, were of immense help to me, although they posed as hard-liners in the presence of other members of the jail staff. The two official proved themselves considerably intelligent while undertaking the responsibility of smuggling out some of the letters and documents I had drafted for some heads of governments and for some of my friends. And as my friends in China, Saudi Arabia, London, Libya, Syria, Washington, France and Iran received the letters, General Zia was approached to keep politics aloof from the legal issues arising from the Lahore High Court’s verdict.

I did not write any letters to the Indian Premier, Morarji Desai. I knew that Desai and general Zia had reached an understanding with the help of America on the need to see me out. In spite of Desai’s stand against me I managed to have quite of few friends in India. New Delhi always stood against my stand: to strengthen Pakistan economically, to build bridges between Pakistan and the rest of the world, to help freedom struggles in colonized territories, including Indian-occupied Kashmir, to develop scientific and nuclear technology in Pakistan, to pursue an independents foreign policy, and to strengthen and modernize the country’s armed forces.
I did disclose that I drafted several letters and prepared some documents in the prison cell. A long letter – you can call it a memorandum – was sent out to Dr. Kurt Waldheim. Zia might have been surprised, if not shocked, by the manner in which my son, Murtaza, placed it before Dr. Waldheim. If Michael Hart in New York could give you a list of the hundred most influential people who have every lived, you should not hesitate to assert that I was the only person who, in the most agonizing moments, endeavored successfully while writing letters, weaving real stories and drafting documents, to make them pages of unabated importance.

On October 23, 1978, Murtaza Bhutto, 24 year old son of Pakistan’s former Prime Minister, met the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, and handed over a letter, smuggled out of Bhutto’s death cell, saying that a false murder case had been foisted on him by those in power, and appealing to the world community to take note of it. Murtaza, a student at Oxford, came to the United Nations from London to talk to Dr. Waldheim and present his father’s letter, complaining that physical cruelty and mental torture were being meted out to him in his cell. Without exaggeration, I tell you that I have been treated worse than Nazis or the victims of ‘apartheid’ in Africa would treat a Jew, the letter said.

I would request you to circulate this message to diplomats at the current session of the General Assembly. As yet another session of the General Assembly convenes in New York to discuss issues of war and peace and presumably human rights, it must know that the elected leader of Pakistan is being subjected to brutal hardships ever since the ‘coup’ teat’ of July 1977. By now, friend and foe alike know that a false murder case has been fabricated against me, in which I have been in solitary confinement for over a year and in a miserable death cell for over six months in appalling conditions.

I am not receiving proper medical treatment although I am urgently in need of it. The conditions are so unbearable that on two occasions I was compelled to go on a hunger strike to protect my honour. Relevant world leaders are aware of the documentary evidence as to why my life hangs in the balance, my blood, if it spills, will surely stain their hands and in history they will owe a debt of blood.
Appendix-I

THE SOLDIERS OF ALLAH ADVANCE

The claim is vehemently being made that Islam is central to every aspect of life, including politics, in countries with Moslem majorities, nothing new in this. The assertion and the political pressure that accompanies it have always been present in the structure of a Moslem state. What has happened in the past few years in that this Islamic pressure has fissured, or broken through, the weakening structure of several Moslem sates more or less simultaneously, leading spectacularly to the uprising in Iran.

That fact that, in the final quarter of the twentieth century, Islam has the strength and the vitality to assert the claim to centrality raises the question why this assertion could come from Islam and not, in anything like the same strength, from the other two major multinational religions, Christianity and Buddhism. Several reasons suggest themselves.

The most obvious, yet the least mentioned, is Islam’s relative youth. Islam is just under 1,400 years old, Christianity is getting on for 2,000 and Buddhism was born 2,600 years ago. Religions have their own morphology and are not strangers to the waning powers of middle and old age. In the year AD 1400 the Christian church was incomparably the most powerful and most vital force in Europe; it was just a century away from the climatic summation of Aquinas; within half a century for the poetic summation of Date and the terrors and ecstasies of the black Death; the new impulse of the Reformation was just beginning to be felt – Wickliffe had just died and the martyrdom of Hues was 15 years away. Although Buddhism at the same age in AD 800 was showing signs of its years, it was still widely practiced through the length and breadth of India and was the main religion of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Islam, in its vigorous early middle age, is still an expanding religion, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (and with two converts a week in Denmark), the Hajj, the largest and most varied concentration of human beings in the world today, is now drawing 1½ million pilgrims to Mecca; its numbers grow by 100,000 every year. This vast annual assemblage both expresses and enhances the unity and dynamism of modern Islam.

Another reason for the aliveness of Islam today is that, as a religion and a society, it has never been allowed to relax or to become hidebound or fossilized.

1 By Godfrey Jansen
From it earliest years Islam has been under challenge, political, spiritual and cultural, from the Christian west. The political and cultural challenge has been at its most intense, and inescapable, in the past hundred years. How very different the history of Islam would have been, how much more like the history of Islam would have been, how much more like the history of Buddhism, if its original home had been, say, Indonesia. On its home ground at the crossroads of three continents, hard up against an expanding Europe, Islam has had to be vigilant in self-defence.

The spiritual challenge, that is Christian missionary endeavour, has faded away. The missionaries may finally have realized that Islam was singularly immune to proselyte sat-ion perhaps 2000 converts, at most, in the past century. When missionaries and European colonial administrators criticized Islam as “backward’ and “petrified”, they were talking only of the outward and organizations of the religion and of its society, which were indeed backward. Beneath the shell, the faith remained strong at popular level and in daily life: hence the lack of converts.

But Christian criticism stung the Islamic modernizers into a re-examination of their faith. This led them, in addition, to make a useful criticism of Islamic society and institutions. Paradoxically the Christians’ criticism of Islam, made mostly in the second half of the nineteenth century, came at a time when the numinous was ebbing form their own faith, and the west tipping over into its present seemingly post-Christian phase.

AND SALADIN AWOKE

Europe’s political challenge to Islam met at first with greater success. Beginning with the crusades the challenge ended, after the First World War, with Britain, France Holland and Russia dominating almost the entire Moslem world. That the spirit of the crusades die-hard was shown in 1920 when France’s General Guard entered Damascus; one of the first things he did was to visit the famous tomb just outside the Umayyad mosque, knock on its door and say to its inmate: “Saladin, listen, we have returned”.

De-colonization has since removed the direct political challenge of Europe from the entire Moslem world, except from Soviet Central Asia. (But for the Moslem Arabs a western military-political challenge remains through the western outpost of Israel.) Much of the present vitality of Islam can be explained by the fact that Islam, in its most direct form, its ulemas or mullahs (the name of Islam’s spiritual leaders differs from country to country), took a direct part in the struggle against the western colonialists. In the first two decades of this century in country after country – in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, in Egypt, Syria
and Iraq, and in Indonesia – the national movement was led, and often created, by religious groupings.

The struggle for popular freedoms in Iran produced one major irony. The mullahs, who were largely responsible for wresting a constitution form the Shah in 1906, persuaded Reza Khan (the present Shah’s father) in 1924 not to follow the bad republican example of Ataturk’s anti-Islamic Turkey but to crown himself as monarch.

The most serious western challenge to all Islamic countries today is on the plane of culture: the world-wide “culture” of the materialistic affluent society – drugs and pop music and pornography, the corroding acids of modernity. In this sense Islam rejects the west as a source of decadence and middle values. And the more so when the local political allies of the west tend to be unrepresentative, dissolute or repressive rulers and the local economic partners of western multinational companies are grasping and corrupt. Against them Islam seems to provide certainty of belief and correctitude of behavior.

**NOT JUST A RELIGION, MORE A WAY OF LIFE**

One manifestation of Islam’s return to tradition is revealed in the increasing numbers of young women in the Middle East who are covering themselves up with robes from head to foot – to the dismay of some of their mothers, who fought for the freedom to wear short skirts and unveil their faces. In Egypt, Syria and Jordan it was the humiliation of defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the hollowness at the heart of society that produced the defeat, that led the younger generation to turn to Islam and young women to the wimple and the ankle-length robe, usually in white, which they believe to be Islamic fashion. In Iran, however, young women are going back to the black Chadar, because of the spiritual confusion caused by a process of westernization that accelerated dizzyingly after the rise in Iran’s oil revenue produced by the semi-victory of the Arabs in the 1973 Arab-Israel war.

For all these reasons the precepts of the Koran are today binding admonitions on the average Moslem, orders that he takes seriously and strives to obey. Among these is the affirmation that Islam is a total faith, a complete way of life, not just a religion. Islam claims authority over everything the Moslem does, including his political and economic activities. The dichotomy of God and Caesar does not exist in Islam. To talk of an Islamic state in a Moslem country is almost tautologies, for in such a country there can be, according to the Koran, no other sort of policy. To talk of a secular Moslem country is to talk of a contradiction in terms.
That very shallow reformer, Kamal Ataturk, tried to make a secular state of Moslem Turkey, and the failure of that attempt is now being written in letters of blood. Turks turned their backs on Ataturk’s anti-Islamic reforms and took their religion underground, into the mysticism of Tasawwuf and the closed brotherhood of the Tarikas. Once the anti-religious pressure was released, Turkish Islam came surging to the surface.

Every Moslem thinker worth the name has agreed with Ibn Khaldun, perhaps the most acute analyst of public affairs the Moslem world has ever produced, that the political order in Moslem countries must be based on the sharia, the canon law. But there are other bases too for Islamic polity. There are the sacred revelations of the Koran, the Sunnah, or the traditions of what Mohammed did, the Hadith, or the traditions of what he said, plus examples drawn from the period of the first four righteous caliphs following Mohammed, the Kalifa al Rashidun. This multiplicity of authority is just as well, for what the sharia actually consists of is still unclear, apart from the 500 verses in the Koran relating to legal subjects.

After the Second World War, as the Moslem countries achieved independence, politicians and religious leaders (and political leaders of religious mind) tried to develop, popularize and implement in several of these new states the ideas of an Islamic state that Moslem thinkers had already put forward.

The countries where these attempts have repeatedly been made, and in some instances are still being made, are Morocco, Libya, Egypt (especially through the Moslem Brotherhood which had strong offshoots in Sudan, Jordan and Syria), Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. The length of this list shows that “militant Islam”, so much in the news today, is actually nothing new. Indeed, much of the modern history of these countries, which include the six largest and most populous in the Moslem world, has concerned the struggle for and against militant Islam. Additionally, there are countries such as Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and some of the Gulf emirates where the state polity is said to be Koranic. With so wide and varied a geographical spread it is clear that there can be no uniformity in the Moslem world’s present day response to the challenge of Islamic politics.

WHAT MILITANT ISLAM IS NOT
At the start of any definition of “militant Islam” it should be stated that there are two things it is not. It is not Moslem nationalism and it is not, in one sense at least, pan-Islam. The most systematized ideas on Islamic polity have been produced by the Moslem Brotherhood, by the Jamaat-i-Islami of Abu al Mawdudi in Pakistan, and by the Masjumi party under Mohammed Natsir in Indonesia. All these three agreed in emphatically denouncing nationalistic and
pan-Islamic ideas and programmes: Mawdudi even refused to take part in the Indian Moslems struggle for Pakistan and the Moslem Brotherhood violently opposed Nasser’s Arab nationalism.

There opposition to nationalism may seem strange, since Moslem religious grouping took such a leading part in the “nationalist” anti-imperialist struggle. But the thinkers of these movements explain that, for them, that struggle was not nationalist but a patriotic rejection of the imperialist and Christian west, something essentially negative. For them, positive, post-independent feelings of loyalty to the nation state were the worship of a new false god.

They were right to sense in nationalism a dangerous competitor to their ideal of exclusive loyalty to “Islamism”, for it there is any force that could counter militant Islam it is nationalism - just as it is the only force that has countered the powerful current of communism. The Moslem renovators condemned nationalism not only because it is a politico-spiritual heresy but also because separate national loyalties split up what should be the single unit of Dar-ul-Islam, the house of Islam.

Therefore, it may be argued, they should welcome and not reject pan-Islam, which tries to bring the Moslem states together. But while believing fervently in Islamic brotherhood, in Islamic solidarity and even in Islamic universalism (as exemplified in the great pilgrimage of Mecca), the reformers condemn secular political pan-Islam because it does not try to transcend the nation-state but merely seeks cooperation between separate existing national units.

Political pan-Islam is not truly supranational but merely but merely international. Because of this essential flaw it is not surprising that all the many attempts at pan-Islamic organizations initiated by Pakistan in the 1950’s quickly faded away; and similar attempts now being financed by Saudi Arabia (including something called the Moslem News Agency) show no signs of taking root. Since it operates only on the secular level, the separate national interests of the Moslem states will always defeat political pan-Islam, Witness Moslem Bangladesh tearing itself away forms Moslem Pakistan, Moslem Arab fighting Moslem Arab in Yemen, the battle for the Western Sahara. Indeed, the emotive root of the pan-Islam concept, of the wrathful Moslem world rising as one in some vast jihad or holy war against the whole west, seems to have been a bogy.

POLITICIANS WHO USE ISLAM

Spread across a variety of Moslem countries, it was inevitable that very different sorts of Moslem leaders should create militant Islam in varying forms.
At least three types may be distinguished. First, there is the professional
politician, essentially secular and non-Islamic, who simply tries to harness the
still-living force of Islam to achieve his political goals. The most conspicuous of
these was Jinnah, who brilliantly manipulated the hopes and fears of India’s
Moslems to create Pakistan. Of the same order, but at a lower level, is Mr. Bhutto
who, far all his westernized sophistication, when in a tight corner, cleverly
played the Moslem card as in his attractive but meaningless slogan “Islamic
socialism”.

Turkey has produced the Justice party, which was originally helped to
power by its election promise to lift the Cembalist ban on making the Hajj. It now
also has Mr. Erbakan and his more fundamentalist National Salvation party. In
Morocco, King Hasan his tried to invest himself with religious charisms Egypt’s
King Faruok did in the last days of his reign, when he produced a wholly
spurious genealogy tracing his descent from the Prophet. It is some politicians of
this sort who have given Islamic brutal things they have (wrongly) done in the
name of the faith.

DIVINES WHO USE POLITICS

The second type of Islamic militant consists of men of religion – Ulemas,
sheikhs, ayatollahs – who are active in politics. As individual leaders they can be
found in every Moslem country. But in some countries they have organized
themselves into recognized political groupings. These include the Nahdatul Ulema
in Indonesia; two groups in Pakistan, the Jammiat-ul -Ulema-i-Islam and the
Jammiat-ul-Ulema-i- Pakistan; and the loosely organized ayatollahs in Iran. And in
addition there is the entire body of sheikhs in countries such as Saudi Arabia,
which claim to be, already, Islamic states.

These two types have certain common characteristics. Their objective is
the Islamic state, a rigid scheme that they are unable or unwilling to define in
any detail. Their sort of Islamic revival seems to go along with an anachronistic
revival of the institutions of seventh-century Islamic. So the Islamic aspect which
they seek to give this state mostly concern external superficialities; amputation
for thieves, stoning to death for adulterers, the banning of liquor and the
repression of minorities, such as the Ahmadiyyah repressed by Mr. Bhutto’s
regime in Pakistan. They are also advocates of political pan-Islam and they are
united in a common opposition to the third, more serious, type of Islamic
militant

These are men, not professional politicians, who have nevertheless gone
into politics in order to implement their Islamic ideals in public life. Such are the
Muslims brotherhood in the Arab world and the Jamaat-i-Islami, in Pakistan. In
their structure and organization the Brotherhood and the Jamat are similar to one
another and have maintained steady contact. They are highly motivated and disciplined firmly organized in a cellular pattern. Their mass membership is mainly drawn from the urban lower-middle class, though many of their leaders are scholars and professional men. The governments of their countries have at various times, banned both groups, since they accept the use of violent means; they have successfully withstood a degree of repression amounting to persecution. Today they are the most evident and threatening alternatives to the regimes to the countries, with the most influential being the Jamaat, who are ideologues are listened to by a sympathetic ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq. They are respected for their integrity and feared for their single-mindedness, but have also over the year’s earned grudging admiration for their social service schemes.

They have always been modern enough to accord great importance to the power of publicity. Thanks to their voluminous publications we can discern, to their voluminous publications we can discern, in considerable detail, their overall plans. What they want is not so much an Islamic state as an Islamic order, Nizam-i-Islam or Nizam-i-Mustafa. This is a more flexible, more comprehensive concept, not just society strictly regulated by the rulings of the sharia but a new society informed with Islamic ideals, reformed and updated to accord with modern conditions.

This third group of Islamic militants argues that while, in politics, the prime sources would remain the Koran, the Sunnah, the Hadith and sharia law, there would have to be new and independent legislation because even those four authorities together do not cover large areas of modern life. For those areas the governing principle would be “non-repugnance” would be decided by a small committee of “righteous men”, with the Koran, the Sunnah and so on. A small committee of “righteous men”, not all of who need be ulemas or sheikhs, would decide non-repugnance. Islamic politics would be democratic, under a strong elected head.

Military rule or governments established by violence are repugnant to Islam; a stipulation that shows how wide the gap is between the Islamic idea and Moslem practice, for in only two Moslem countries, Malaysia and Turkey, is the government popularly elected and not based on the ultimate sanction of military force. Thus for ultra-orthodox Saudi Arabia to be ruled by a royal family in flat contradiction with Islamic tenets and its own Wahabite (a particularly austere Moslem sect) beliefs, Islamic militants go on to argue that Moslem countries should be one-party states: for how, they ask, can there be other parties beside the party of the righteous? The idea that there might be two righteous parties is not explored. Abhorring the materialism of the west and the atheism of Marxism, the ideal foreign policy of Islamic countries is non-alignment: a policy now being preached by Ayatollah Khomeini.
In the economic field Islamic reformers of every type reject the taking of interest, and therefore the modern banking system, as we know it, and would derive most of their country’s revenue from the Zakat tax on personal income. Pakistan’s Jamaat movement would place this tax at 2-½%. Private property would be permitted but severely restricted; there would be a low ceiling on land ownership and all the principal means of production and distribution would be nationalized. Both the Moslem Brotherhood and the Jaamat recognize the importance of trade unions and have tried, unsuccessfully, to extend their influence to them.

In social affairs women would be accorded a respected position, but subordinate to that of men. Egypt’s Brotherhood sees nothing wrong in women going out to work, but Pakistan’s Jamaat does. The latter object to birth control while the former does not, both groups are uneasy with Koranic injunctions on divorce, polygamy and the punishment of disorders. Divorce, they argue, must be made as difficult as possible, while polygamy is virtually impossible under the conditions laid down in the Koran and, in any event, impossibly expensive except for a few. Amputation for repeated theft should, in theory, never happen because in the Islamic order there would be no need to steal to live. Under Koranic conditions, which include four eyewitnesses adultery can virtually never be proven.

It is when dealing with the position of non-Moslems, or even Moslem minorities, that Islamic reformers get into difficulties. People of all faiths, they say, would be equal before the law. But even the Koran makes some minorities more equal than others. In a professedly Moslem state, non-Moslems cannot but be second-class citizens.

All Moslem countries are fated, one might say doomed, to do one of two things: to deny the laws of Islam and opt for a secular state; or persist with the arduous task of trying to produce an Islamic state, or, even more difficult, an Islamic order. Only if and when, perhaps in a couple of centuries, the Moslem world enters its post-Islamic phase will Moslems be able to escape from the challenge of a living and total faith.
AFGHANISTAN’S REVOLUTION IN TROUBLE

Things are going sour for the Great Sour Revolution, as Afghanistan’s communist rulers call their military coup of last April. (Saur is the Afghan name for April). Nur Muhammad Tarakki, President of the Revolutionary Council, has simultaneously taken on the armed forces, the rival and more radical communist party in Afghanistan, and the conservative tribes. Especially against the tribes, he is not doing well.

Last month (January) while President Tarakki was in Moscow signing a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, about 5,000 rebels Pathan tribesmen were massing to attack Chigha Saris, the capital of Kunar province near the Pakistan border. The anti-communist guerrillas have held several towns along the border in the Khyber Pass region for months now, and they hope that Chigha series’ fall would spread the insurrection to the tribes near Kabul.

The communist government is taking the threat very seriously. It has moved at least 12,000 extra troops and attack helicopters in to Kunar and Norristown provinces, and the air force is bombing rebel-held villages daily. The anti-government leaders who have fled to Pakistan and set up the movement of Islamic Revolution are exploiting both religious and clan loyalties to raise tribes against Kabul.

Tarakki is well aware that such uprisings have actually destroyed the regular army in Afghanistan as recently as 50 years ago. The well-trained, Soviet-equipped Afghan Army of today, is a much tougher opponent, and is unlikely to be defeated by the tribes alone. It is, however, badly split by the purges that the government has carried out since the April coup, in which thousands of troops fought each other in central Kabul.

Moreover, even the left-wing officers who backed the coup were split between two rival factions of the People’s Democratic (Communist) Party, the dominant ‘People’s’ group, and the more radical ‘Flag’ faction. In August the regime arrested its own Defence Minister, General Abdul Khaddar, the man who led the pro-communist forces in the April fighting, on the charges of plotting a coup against the new regime.

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1. By Gwynne Dyer
In September Tarakki’s group also turned on the rival ‘Flag’ faction of the communists, driving them out of the government and branding them as ‘Lackeys of black reaction and imperialism’. The present regime is increasingly isolated even in the narrow circle of educated Afghan civilians and officers who make up the political elite (in a society that is 90 percent illiterate). Only the Soviet-trained Air Force can now be considered unreservedly Loyal to the regime.

President Tarakki now holds the Defence Ministry himself, and there is clearly concern in the regime about what is going on within the army. Yet the backing of the Army is critical to the Marxist revolution’s survival since it has no popular support at all outside Afghanistan’s few smallish cities.

The only discernable benefit of the revolution so far for Afghanistan’s 11 million peasants has been the cancellation of debts. The land reform programme is still being worked out, and the ambitious 5-Years plan, initially promised within 30 days of the revolution, has been postponed until next spring.

In an attempt to calm the suspicions of the deeply religious Afghan masses, President Tarakki goes to the mosque on important occasions to pray for the ‘consolidation of the revolution’. However, he has already had to declare a ‘Holy war’ on the Muslim Brotherhood, a semi-secret Society amongst Afghanistan’s mullah.

The Afghan communists’ ambitious plans for rapid modernization on the Marxist model could well run into the same grass-roots religious and anti-foreign opposition led by mullahs that has destroyed the Shah’s Western-style modernization drive in next-door Iran. Tarakki’s Soviet patrons have made between 40 and 50 technical, economic and scientific agreements with Afghanistan since April, but are clearly doubtful about the country’s chances of leaping straight from feudalism to soviet-style socialism.

Moscow has provided large quantities of modern tanks and combat aircraft to Afghanistan’s armed forces since April, and tripled the number of its military advisers to almost 5,000 (one for every 24 Afghan soldiers). Last month it signed a treaty guaranteeing the new regime Soviet support against internal sub-version and external aggression. But the Russians are clearly reluctant to get caught in a civil war where all the latent Afghan hatred of foreign intervention could be turned against them.

In spite of the introduction of political commissars – the ‘Political Department of the People’s Democratic Party in the Azad Forces’ – the regime is obviously not confident about its hold on the Army. Even left-wing officers may not be reliable, as many support the rival ‘Flag’ faction of the Party. The mullahs
are spreading anti-government propaganda amongst the peasants, and there is already a spreading revolt amongst the eastern tribes.

If some combination of rebel tribes and restive soldiers should seriously threaten the communist regime’s control of Afghanistan, several thousand Russian combat troops could be in Kabul within three hours down the newly constructed road from Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Union might hesitate to go that far, however, as the Afghans have a well-earned reputation for fierce and unanimous opposition to any foreign invaders.

If the present trend of rising unrest in Afghanistan continues, Moscow may soon have to decide whether it is worth running that risk to save President Tarakkiss government.
A NATION’S AGONY

The bulldozers had done their work. They stood there in the sun, all 16 of them, as if panting from their exertions. As the roar of their engines died, a new sound swelled and rose high over the city. People stopped to listen. Even on that oppressively hot afternoon in Old Delhi, what they heard chilled them: the wailing of women, the screams of children, and the groans of injured men.

The police and the bulldozer drivers looked on indifferently. Before them stretched an enormous expense of rubble, over which clouds of dust still hung—the wreckage of the thousand or more homes they had just destroyed. Many of these dwellings had stood for more than two centuries, housing generation after generation of the same family. Now they were obliterated. Their former owners stood helplessly amid the debris, stunned by what had happened.

Some of the 10,000 people who had lived here were already corpses. They died as they tried to escape the relentless advance of the bulldozers. Others perished as they jumped terror-stricken from balconies and windows. Still the police killed more as they tried to defend their homes.

When the assault had begun, the bulldozers crashing through one house after another, veiled mothers had clutched their children to them, standing protectively in their doorways: they were clubbed down in successive attacks by police. When atones started flying the police opened up with revolvers and rifles? Men, women and children were shot. Nothing was sacrosanct: a battering ram smashed down the door of a mosque where householders had taken refuge. One inside, the police wielded their batons freely. The Imam who had been leading prayers was brutally beaten as he tried to protect his young son. Outside, the pillage went on....

The toll of the dead and injured in what came to be known as the Turkmen Gate Tragedy may never be known, for it took almost exactly two years ago, in April 1976, at the height of Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s infamous Emergency. Press censorship ensured that there was almost no public mention of what many Indians now regard as one of the most appalling outrages against human rights in their country’s tortured history.

At the time, as rumours of the incident spread, most people would simply have shrugged resignedly, regarding it as merely another instance of the Gandhi’s obsession with “slum clearance” schemes. For it was not just that
newspapers were censored. The lies and the deceit of the Emergency were so all-prevailing that it is only now, thanks largely to the investigations being made by the Commission of Inquiry under Mr. Justice Shah, that the full extent of the horrors perpetrated in its name is being exposed.

Hitherto, neither the Indian population nor the rest of the world have had more than a blurred notion of what the Emergency really entailed. Only gradually has it become possible to piece together the jigsaw of misery and repression.

As I have discovered in the course of weeks of investigation, fear casts a long shadow. Many Indians, I suspect, long to forget what their country went through. Yet as the image of Indira Gandhi once again looms—her breakaway faction of the Congress party was last week recognized as the official Opposition—it is more important than ever to reassess why it was that India’s voters turned their backs so decisively on Mrs. Gandhi a year ago and elected one of her former victims, the 82-year old Morarji Desai, as Prime Minister in her place.

In retrospect, the Turk man Gate Tragedy was probably the turning point for Mrs. Gandhi.

Turk man Gate is one of the entrances to the ancient city of Old Delhi. Around it, over a period of 300 years, had developed a thriving Moslem community. The people who lived there were not *jhuggiwallas*—shanty-dwellers—and their homes were not *jhuggis*. Many were *pucca*, built of bricks and mortar. But a scheme was afoot to move them; the area was regarded as an eyesore. Sanjay Gandhi, the Prime Minister’s son, had become closely involved with the Delhi Municipal Authority, and it was he, above all, who was behind the successive attempts to “beautify” the capital.

In evidence to Mr. Justice Shah, the city’s former Lieutenant-Governor, Krishan Chand, has said that Sanjay was the “inspiration” for all demolition programmes in Delhi during the Emergency. In this case it seems that a plan had been prepared to erect a 50-story commercial block on the Turkman Gate site.

Typically the bulldozers and the police moved in, like a battle line of tanks with infantry support, without warning. The rampage that ensued continued for days, with an almost medieval gusto. Women were raped; their breasts were scarred with burning cigarettes; their jewellery was torn from them. What remained of their homes was systematically looted.
More than 1,000 of those who were not killed during the upheaval were arrested under Emergency legislation. They were sent to prison without redress, where they joined an estimated 150,000 people already locked up at the whim of the Gandhi Government and its lieutenants.

As for the rest of the former inhabitants of Turkman Gate, they were herded into trucks and transported to a barren tract of land across the Jamuna River, some 13 miles away. They had no drinking water, and other basic amenities were non-existent.

Naturally, the only public acknowledgement of what had occurred was in the form of officially-instigated reports complimenting the Government on the success of its farsighted “slum clearance programme” in the area, but in the view of the writer Uma Vasudev the Turkman Gate Tragedy “closed the gap between the subterranean terror and the open cruelty” of the Emergency. From that moment, many Indians believe, Mrs. Gandhi’s appalling regime was doomed to die. The horrors had reached a pitch where decent people would simply have to react. Indeed, it was after Turkmen Gate that the Government began to be talked about as the “Indi Amin Raj.”

It is hard to grasp the scale of what that phrase really meant for the people who suffered under the 19 months of the Emergency. Where does one begin? The statistics of terror are staggering. In an exclusive interview with the Sunday Telegraph in October 1975, Mrs. Gandhi dismissed as wildly exaggerated reports that there were 100,000 political prisoners in India. But my inquiries have shown that these reports were far from exaggerated. If the imprisonment of satyagrahi (passive resistance activists following the hallowed principles established by Mahatma Gandhi) is included, the total number of political prisoners during the emergency was certainly more than 250,000 and possibly as high as a half million. Add to these figures the seven million Indians sterilized under the nashbandi campaign so energetically pursued by Sanjay, and something of the magnitude of what happened can be understood.

Certainly, one did not have to be a political opponent of the Government to experience its indiscriminate savagery. Ram Kirshan and Pyare Lal, for example, were simple villagers whose misfortunes befell them solely through a geographical accident: their villages, Sambhalka and Kapashera, happened to be close by Sanjay’s car factory at Gorgon. They were demolished, as witnesses have told the Shah Commission, without the villagers being given any notice of the bulldozers’ approach.

The bulldozers left Ram Kirshan and Pyare Lal destitute, “destitute. “Only the sky above me and the earth below me is what I am left with,” Kirshan told the
Commission. “You can see only our bodies,” said Lal. “For all practical purposes we are dead – we are living corpses. We have lost everything. We can not educate
MIDNIGHT KNOCK AT THE DOOR

One of the bulldozers, the villagers remember, had borne a plaque. It read: “I am blind by the eyes and deaf by the ears.” Turkman Gate was no isolated incident.

For those who had the temerity to criticize the regime, or even to intercede on behalf of its victims, the outcome could be a great deal more dangerous. Take the case of Inder Mohan, 56 years old, a gentle, softly spoken social worker. He made the mistake of pleading personally on behalf of the shopkeepers ejected from the vicinity of the giant Jamia Mosque in Old Delhi. Two days later, at midnight, there was a heavy knock at the door of Mohan’s flat in Curzon Street. Police rushed in and pinioned him: “we have instructions to give you third degree treatment.” And they did.

Mohen was a veteran of India’s independence campaign and had been gaoler by the British. “But this,” he told me, “was a thousand times worse than anything I ever experienced under British rule.”

For the most prominent of those arrested during the Emergency, goal was more or less tolerable, despite the long months of solitary confinement. For less fortunate prisoners and those who had been brave enough to oppose Mrs. Gandhi’s overthrow of the country’s democratic constitution, it meant torture and deprivation on an atrocious scale.

The methods favoured by the regime’s torturers were unsophisticated; many of them dated back to techniques employed by the Moguls. Besides being subjected to the inevitable beatings, their feet hanged prisoners for hours at a time; their ears were viciously boxed with cupped hands until the victims bled and lost consciousness; they were forced to lie naked on ice slabs for long periods.

There were refinements, such as the so-called “ruler” treatment, widely used in Kerala. The victim would be strapped to a bench, his head suspended at one end. A heavy “ruler” with rounded edges (more like a log) would be placed on his legs. Two policemen would then sit or stand on each end of it, police men would then sit or stand on each end of it, rolling it up the prisoner’s body. Ligaments would tear bones crack. At least one victim was crushed to death.

The torturers at Karnataka had their own specialty: the “aeroplane.” The victim’s hands and feet were tied behind his back with a long rope; the end was
hauled over a pulley, leaving him dangling in mid-air, bent into an are of grotesque agony. From official reports now an are of grotesque agony. From official reports now available it is clear that almost one in three imprisoned satyargahi was beaten, denied food and water and put on the “aeroplane” – and these people were passive resisters of the Government.

I have talked to numbers of people who underwent such treatment. Their accounts add up to a sickening catalogue of brutality.

In Haryana State, fiefdom of the hated Bansi Lal (Mrs. Gandhi’s Defence Minister and one of the men closest to Sanjay) a school teacher called jai Parkash was forced to stand all night in an open field in winter while police poured buckets of cold water over him. Later, he was bound, placed on a cycle rickshaw, his face blackened, and he was paraded through town while being spat on and beaten by police.
CAMPAIGN OF BODY-SNATCHING

At Delhi University, where the Emergency induced an atmosphere of persecution and panic almost as soon as it was declared, the secretary of the student’s union was arrested. He was suspended upside down and severely beaten while interrogators tried to extract information about underground resistance to Mrs. Gandhi. Burning candles were applied to the soles of his feet. Chili powder was jammed into his nose and rectum. But he refused to confess to a non-existent plot against the Government.

One of the most disagreeable cases involved Lawrence Fernandes; 45 year old brother of George Fernandes, the Socialist leader who is now Minister for Industry in the Desai government. George was in hiding, Lawrence was thought to know his whereabouts. As he entered the local police station he was knocked down by a sudden, stunning blow to the head. For a few minutes he was unconscious. When he came to he found he had been stripped and was being beaten with lathis, heavy police riot sticks which broke one after another…. 

“I was writhing in pain on the floor. I begged, I crawled I begged again. They were kicking me round like a football.”

He lost consciousness ones more. After some hours he woke with an enormous thirst. He pleaded for water. An officer ordered a constable to urinate in Fernandes’s mouth.

His condition became critical and there was talk among the policemen of killing him and making it look like suicide. But eventually he was taken before a magistrate, having been warned first that his family would be liquidated and his mother would be raped before his own eyes if he mentioned the torture. Of course, he went back to prison. Today Lawrence Fernandes bears poignant witness to the excesses of the Emergency: deafness, a lame left leg and acute psychological damage.

It was not only members of the Fernandes family who suffered. Snehalata Reddy, a famous and very beautiful film actress, was merely a friend. She was imprisoned for eight months, She suffered frequent asthma attacks; her health deteriorated; she was denied visits by her family.

“God! Every day I dread to wake up. What new way will they invent to torment me?” she wrote in her diary. “I will die here slowly, like a forgotten song”.
Her asthma grew worse. It is believed she was given doses of cortisone. Eventually she was paroled and finally released. She was overjoyed. Five days later Snehalata died of a massive heart attack. It was January 25 last year just seven days after the announcement of the elections that were to rid India of the ‘Idi Amin Raj.’

If one were to multiply such cases by many hundreds, even thousands, the scope of the terror might come close to being measured. The agony of the people seemed interminable: the midnight arrests, the imprisonments on trumped-up charges, and the corruption by favoured officials. Little by little witness-by-witness, the Shah Commission is unearthing the bitter recollections. Nowhere, however, was routine intimidation used more widely than in the nasbandi birth control programme. It was here that Sanjay Gandhi’s extraordinary influence on the course of the Emergency was felt at its harshest, at its harshest. Professor Ashish Bose of the Institute of Economic Growth at Delhi puts the matter bluntly: “The innocent Indian masses, for the first time in the history of the country, were subjected to an outrageous body-snatching exercise marked by vulgarity, cruelty and brutality – all because Sanjay wanted to emerge as a national leader by demonstrating his ability to implement a national programme.”

The worst sufferers, Professor Bose believes, were the harridans (mostly municipal sweepers), peons and clerical staff, school teachers and, in particular, the peasants in large tracts of northern and western India.

A horrifying example of the excesses committed in the name of nasbandi occurred in Old Delhi shortly before and Turkman Gate Tragedy. On the evening of April 14, 1976, several posses of policemen slipped into the city and started patrolling the street markets, always crowded at that time of day. Anyone looking remotely shabby was arrested and held on vagrancy charges. In less than three hours 80 people were rounded up, mostly porters and rickshaw-men. The next morning they were taken to Dujana House, a nashbandi camp near the Jama Mosque, and told by the Lieutenant Governor of the city that they were to be sterilized. An elegantly dressed woman, one of the bureaucracy’s female acolytes, was there to “motive” them with a few well-chosen words.

Evidently, she failed. The men had to be forced by the police to go into the operating rooms. Within two hours they had all been sterilized.
MILLIONS GO INTO HIDING

Sanjay inspired a fanatical zeal among the nasbandi officials. In Delhi a circular went out to public employees warning that those who were eligible for sterilization would be paid their salaries only on production of a sterilization certificate.

The 10,000 teachers in the capital’s primary schools were ordered to “motivate” five people each for sterilization. Head teachers were empowered to “detain” pupils until their parents had been sterilized.

Inevitably, the rate of sterilization shot up. In June 1975, it was 331 a day. By July it was an average 1,578 a day. When special camps were set up that August, the figure rose to 5,644. nasbandi had become a dread word to 650 million people – one-seventh of the world’s population.

As the programme spread, resistance grew, often with bloody results. At the village of Nark-dish in Uttar Pardesh, for example, 13 villagers were shot dead by the police when they put up a struggle. At another village, Muzaffarnagar, 25 people were killed after a mob began throwing stones at police and nasbandi officials. Throughout India, villagers learned to flee to flee to the fields at the first sign of approaching authority. Hiding by day and emerging only at night became a way of life for millions of Indians.

Decades of health education were set back overnight, for such was the fear of nasbandi that even the diseased would rather lie low than face immediate sterilization in hospital as a precondition of treatment. There can scarcely be a more poignant testimony to the terror, which gripped India during the Emergency.

And so the nightmare went on. Looking back on it today, it is hard to understand how little the rest of the world and even many Indians realized to what depths the largest democracy in the world had sunk. How did Indira Gandhi remain Prime Minister for as long as she did?

Two years ago, the last place one would have sought an answer to such a question would have been No. 1, Safdarjung Road, Delhi: a Georgian-style bungalow built between the wars, set amid ample lawns and henna bushes and towering old trees. It has been the official home of the Prime Minister of India since Mrs. Gandhi succeeded Mr. Shastri in 1966; it was from here that she and Sanjay ran the country during the Emergency.
Now, however, its occupant is Morarji Desai, and it was there that I asked him why this enormous country with its vast population and democratic traditions, had failed to resist.

Some people did resist, he pointed out; but they were goaled (like himself). Some newspapers resisted; but they were silenced. As for the rest, he said, “it is not that everywhere there was demoralization. It is the history of the country. We were all governed by fear - for more than 12 to 15 centuries, quarrelling among ourselves.

“Once an American asked me, about 35 years ago, what was our population? I said about 400 million. He asked: ‘How many Englishmen are governing this country?’ I said not more than 3,000 or so. And he said: ‘Even if they were only sheep, more shepherds would be required to look after them.’ It was castigation, but deserved.”

That uncomfortable lesson Mr. Desai is now intent on teaching his people. His Government has been accused of being obsessed with the Shah Commission and other investigations into the Gandhi years. But it is a dangerous criticism to make. By most standards, Mrs. Gandhi and her coterie should be finished. The reality is rather different. She presents herself as a martyr and the saviour of the Indian people. She dismisses the Emergency as having been simply “a stronger dose of medicine for a severe disease.” And, with her recent successes in the State elections, there are alarming signs that her political star may be waxing once again.

“That is why”, says Mr. Desai, “Indians must learn the lesson that they can never escape from their wrongs, howsoever powerful they may be ... and for the people as a whole the lesson is equally clear; that they must not submit to these things. And they must have no fear.”

Even a year after Indira Gandhi was deposed, that is still a tall order.