Address to National Assembly on Sino-Indian Conflict — Western Arms for India —Pacts with the West — Negotiations with India — Relations with China and USSR on December 4, 1962

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This emergency session of the National Assembly of Pakistan was called when the alarming events that have been taking place in our region had reached a critical stage. In calling this session the intention of the Government was to ascertain the views of the representatives of the nation coming from different parts of the country and belonging to different parties.

We have heard with great profit the constructive suggestions that have been made in the course of the debate. We have always been aware of the strong feelings that exist in the country on the question of Kashmir which we regard as the question of questions for Pakistan. We have taken note of the views expressed on the massive arms aid which has come to India as a result of the Sino-Indian border conflict.

As I said in my speech on 26th November, foreign policy is the hallmark of the sovereignty of a nation, a manifestation of its independence. It is indeed the most important and the most sensitive aspect of a country’s policy. Foreign policy cannot be subjected to mob rule. It cannot be subjected to the clamor of the street. In formulating foreign policy, the Government has to take into consideration not only the immediate interests of the country but also its long-term interests. Moreover, the Government alone is in possession of all the facts about the developments that are taking place, about the currents and under-currents of international opinion and the changes that are taking place in it. All these are matters that have to be carefully considered in the formulation of the country’s foreign policy. In this twentieth century, events move so fast that even in normal times—let alone abnormal times—it is not always possible to take all the honorable members into confidence. This fact is axiomatic. I do not have to dilate on it. Its validity has been appreciated by the House. At a critical juncture, such as the present one, a decision one way or the other, may make or mar the destiny of our people and our country. Those saddled with responsibility have constantly to bear that in mind.

The National Assembly of Pakistan, having been convened to meet in an emergency session, I would like to assure honorable members that Government has taken them into confidence so far as has been possible and so far as has been necessary. We appreciate their response which, on the whole, has been an understanding and accommodating one.

A serious situation has developed around the sub-continent. It was more serious a few weeks ago than it is today; but the crisis is still with us. Its lingering clouds still cast dark shadows over our horizon. However, at the time when the session was convened, we could not foresee certain developments that have since taken place. We could not, for instance, anticipate the unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by the People’s Republic of China, motivated by the highest considerations of peace and goodwill and of the security not only of this area but of the whole world. Nor could we have anticipated certain other events which have logically followed from that cease-fire.

At the time when the conflict on the Chinese border arose, the Government of Pakistan made its own position with regard to it quite clear. We were convinced that the conflict was no more than border warfare, that the war was at best a phantom war and that the only question involved in it was that of the rectification of a boundary which, even Indian leaders some years ago admitted, had been imposed on the People’s Republic of China. Sir, the stand taken by the Government of Pakistan has been vindicated by the unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by the People’s Republic of China and by the offer of peace made by the Chinese Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of India.

We have done everything in our power to exercise restraint. We have cautioned other countries also to move in the matter in a guarded fashion in order to obviate the recurrence of hostilities and prevent an enlargement of the conflict. But notwithstanding our counsel of caution, certain countries, for reasons of their own, have thought it fit to make a voluntary gift of massive arms to India in order to enable it to carry on the war with the People’s Republic of China.

This arms aid given to India by certain Western countries has alarmed us. It is a matter which perturbs the people of Pakistan. If this supply of arms to India is to continue on the present scale, it is bound to aggravate the Sino-Indian dispute and perhaps lead to a more serious situation, escalating into nuclear annihilation. We have the satisfaction that, for our part, we have more than cautioned the Western countries. In their own global interests, these countries have taken a stand and offered arms assistance to India despite our protests. India is unfortunately trying to take advantage of the situation to obtain arms on a massive scale without regard to the dangerous consequences that will ensue from it. These consequences will be dangerous not only for India but also to the whole of this region. By opening its gates, so to speak, to arms from the United States of America and Great Britain, India is undoubtedly aggravation the situation between itself and the People’s Republic of China.

We have been told that India intends to augment its armed forces by no less than 40 percent of their present strength. Let any objective, impartial observer judge and decide whether such an augmentation is commensurate with India’s economic resources, her political viability and her actual defence requirements. To expect India to be able to sustain a force of that size is completely unrealistic. India’s attempt to do so will bring about complications not only in India’s relations which China but also in her relations with Pakistan and even with the other neighboring countries.

We are told that this arms assistance is required by India to drive back the Chinese. This is another dangerous thesis. If India attempts to drive back the Chinese in the terrain where the recent conflict took place, where communications are poor in the extreme that will lead to a situation which will pose a very grave and serious threat to the sub-continent and to Asia as a whole.

In the twentieth century there is no question of thinking in terms of driving any one back by force. With the threat of nuclear annihilation ever present in the minds of all sensible people, there is only one proper course of action and that is the resolution of conflicts by peaceful negotiations. Salvation lies in being guided by civilized methods under the umbrella of international law, not by the promptings of impulse or pride or the passions of a newly sovereign people. An attempt by India to drive back the Chinese will lead not only to a full scale conflict between the two sides but also perhaps to a much larger conflict.

We want not only the people of India but also the Western Powers, who, by acting impetuously and playing into India’s hands, have failed to recognize the folly of a course of action which might inflict enormous sufferings on the inhabitants of the sub-continent and of the rest of Asia. By now, India should have learnt that it is suicidal to think in terms of an armed conflict with a major Power like the People’s Republic of China.

The People’s Republic of China is no pimple on the face of India as was little Goa. It is a Colossus. It is a vast indestructible country of 650 million people, united in a common cause and with common ideals for the sake of which they would willingly lay down their lives. It is in the interests of the people of India, of the peoples of the sub-continent and the peoples of our entire region that India should accept the offer made by the Chinese Prime Minister and go to the negotiating table so that this dispute can be resolved in a manner satisfactory both to China and India.

The real purpose of India wanting to augment its forces recklessly is to build up an army for two fronts, to face the People’s Republic of China and to face Pakistan. That is the real purpose of India’s request for massive aid. It is for this purpose that India is making a desperate bid to build up its armed forces. We cannot accept this situation with equanimity. That the people of Pakistan are concerned about it has been shown both in this House as well as outside it. I should like to reiterate and re-emphasize to the Western democracies that they should not rush into this dangerous venture, for who knows it might trigger a world war of nuclear annihilation.

What is required is not only peace between China and India but also disengagement of forces between India and Pakistan. This disengagement can only be brought about if the explosive question of Kashmir is settled on an honorable and equitable basis. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we have always said that we were willing to have such a settlement of this issue.

Now, the recent events, dramatic and critical as they have been, have led to the release of a Joint Communiqué by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. This Communiqué has been the subject of considerable debate in the House. A few days ago, I made a statement with regard to it. I should like to say that we all know that the problem of Kashmir is a tangled one and in it are involved the prestige and the passions of the two nations of this sub-continent. But to solve this complex problem, which has defied solution during the last fifteen painful years, we need to separate passion from policy and pride from the pursuit of a solution. The Joint Communiqué breaks the agonizing stalemate.

It has been said that the Joint Communiqué was actually a conspiracy, of which we have been the victim; that what India wants is to gain time; that India is not anxious to settle the problem; that India considers her occupation of Kashmir as a settled fact; and that constitutionally and politically it regards Kashmir to be an integral and inseparable part of India. All these arguments have been advanced on the floor of the House. If one were to accept them, it would follow that the Joint Communiqué is actually a deception and a fraud and that we should not have agreed to it. Actually these arguments demonstrate the value of the Joint Communiqué, for the Communiqué marks a manifest departure from the position that Kashmir is a dead issue and establishes that it is a live issue and that it is recognized to be such by the Prime Minister of India, after fifteen years of denial of it by him.

Now, let us be realistic. We know that this problem has been frozen or attempts have been made to freeze it. Let us also admit that in regard to it positions have hardened in both countries. The Joint Communiqué has at least changed that situation. In that sense, we have moved forward.

As I said the other day, when a departure takes place from hardened positions, we have to be a little patient and in all fairness we have to create a new climate, such as will generate goodwill on both sides. Without that, however strong the compulsion of events, or the force of circumstances or other good reasons for it, there can be no genuine attempt at negotiation. Therefore, before we enter into the talks and begin negotiations, we have to assume that there is a goodwill and a desire on the part of the other side to settle this problem.

If, on the other hand, we are skeptical and begin with a defeatist attitude, then nothing is going to happen. There will not be a single step forward. If there is to be no step forward, I am afraid no government will be able to settle this problem.

We are not capable of any miracles. However, we are as patriotic as the Opposition. A mere line divides us from them in this House. It is not true or fair to say that we are devoid of patriotism; that we do not feel as strongly on this issue as they do. As I have said, there is only a line dividing them from us; and that dividing line does not give them a monopoly of patriotism, nor are they the exclusive repository of all the wisdom in the land. They are a minority with a majority complex. They should realize that we are as anxious and determined as they are to see an end to the problem of Kashmir.

We are happy that the agonizing stalemate is broken and that some progress has been achieved. It may be that disillusionment awaits us. I admit that we have been disillusioned in the past. Every school boy in Pakistan knows how generous we have been, how much confidence we have reposed in our adversaries and how on each occasion we were deceived. We know this but I think that with that experience, and notwithstanding the bitterness of the past, we shall be in a better position to enter into these talks. Besides, by entering into them, we are giving away nothing. On the contrary, we are gaining something.

Now, I return to the Joint Communiqué. I states: “The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters.” The words “related matters” are particularly important. I do not want to go into details, as that might affect the atmosphere we are trying to create, a better atmosphere, shorn of the hatred and bitterness of the past. I would, therefore, not like to go into an explanation of “other related matters”. But do consider the significance of these words. When the Opposition demands that we should have made this or that condition, they should take into consideration the words “other related matters”.

There is some contradiction in the approach of the members of the Opposition. On the one hand, their demand is: Fix a time-table and set a time-limit so that India does not procrastinate or get time to consolidate its position further in Kashmir. On the other hand, instead of “other related matters”, they have suggested a catalogue of “other matters”, to discuss which an inordinate amount of time would be required. The other matters they have suggested are no doubt important but, in the context of Kashmir, they are relatively not such. The members of the Opposition demand a speedy conclusion of the Kashmir negotiations, and yet they put forward a catalogue of other issues and say these too should be the subject of discussion. Sir, they approbation and reprobate with astonishing inconsistency and speed.

I submit for the consideration of this House and for the consideration of the people of Pakistan that we should not take a negative attitude. Our efforts should not be counter-productive. We lose nothing by welcoming this latest development of events. We do not endanger our relations with other countries, to which matter I shall later revert. As a point of departure from our old relations with India, we should welcome the present development.

It has also been said by the members of the Opposition that we cannot barter away the interests and wishes of the people of Kashmir that the people of Kashmir should not only have been consulted but should also have taken part in the negotiations. I appeal to their good sense and ask how such an arrangement could have been constitutionally possible. The very fact that it is the question of Kashmir, which I have called “the question of questions for Pakistan”, which comes in the way of normal and friendly relations between Pakistan and India, shows how deep and lasting is our concern for the people of Kashmir. We cannot talk of Kashmir in the abstract. The very fact that we demand a solution in Kashmir means that we are taking into consideration the legitimate aspirations and sufferings of the great and heroic people of Kashmir.

It has also been said that these negotiations should not be entered into because that somehow or the other bypasses the United Nations or weakens our position in the United Nations. This is an argument which I cannot understand.

I should like to refer you to an Article of the United Nations Charter, namely Article 33, Chapter VI, which states:

“1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

“2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.” Now, if one were to go through the important resolutions of the United Nations and the recommendations of its representatives, it would be found that time and again it was suggested that the parties to the dispute, i.e., Pakistan and India, should resort to “negotiations”. This was the recommendation of Dr. Frank Graham and of others who dealt with the Kashmir problem.

Let us leave aside the much maligned Western democracies, who have always lent their complete support to us in the Security Council. Let us leave them aside for the moment. Even the Soviet Union has suggested to Pakistan and India that the best way to solve the Kashmir problem is by entering into negotiations. Such bilateral negotiations have been suggested not only by the Soviet Union, but by all other important Communist countries. They have been suggested by neutralist countries as well. When I went to Cairo, just before the last Security Council meeting on Kashmir, President Gamal Nasser told me that the best way to solve the Kashmir dispute was first of all to exhaust all the possibilities of bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. The same suggestion was made by Ghana and Ireland, and by several other members of the United Nations.

Therefore, by entering into negotiations, we are in no way jeopardizing our position in the United Nations; we are in no way departing from our stand in the United Nations. We are not compromising or prejudicing our position in that world forum. If at any time the negotiations should become in fructuous, we would be free to go to the United Nations, and to go to that Organization with our hands strengthened. We could then tell the United Nations that we had more than exhausted the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter. I repeat that the present developments strengthen our position in the United Nations rather than weaken it.

I have always been a great believer in the United Nations, and I still believe that it has come to play an important and decisive role as an instrument of peace in the world. We, the peoples of the smaller countries, in particular, must see to it that the United Nations is strengthened. Pakistan’s policy has always been to lend complete support to all United Nations resolutions and to strengthen the United Nations and all its organs. But in regard to the Kashmir problem, there is a contradiction in our approach to the United Nations. When we go to the United Nations, there is cynicism. We are asked: What will the United Nations do? What has the United Nations done? Why repose confidence in it? How long are you going to keep this problem shelved by taking it to the United Nations? Thus, when Government activates the problem in the United Nations, there is a feeling of frustration in the country. People think that the United Nations is subject to big Power pressure and because of the veto, nothing fruitful will emerge from it. That is the attitude when we go to the United Nations.

When we agree to bilateral talks, we are told with brazen inconsistency that, the Security Council being seized with the case, the talks will jeopardize our position in the United Nations. What then should the Government do? I should also like to submit that when, after a discussion in the Security Council, the veto has been applied, the sequel must necessarily be a dialogue between the parties. When the two parties disagree, the veto thwarts all positive approaches. Some countries support India, others support Pakistan. Any resolution that is tabled is subject to the veto. If the veto rules out mediation or arbitration, we have no option but to exhaust the procedure of bilateral talks.

We have been reminded of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, namely those of 13th August, 1948, and 5th January, 1949, respectively. These resolutions are there. They call for a plebiscite preceded by demilitarization. We have had debates for a number of years on the question of the implementation of these resolutions. When any proposal is made to facilitate their implementation, it becomes subject to the veto.

Although negotiation is the only proper course at a certain stage, and in a certain phase of a dispute, yet we find that it has become suspect. It is felt that it is dangerous. What is really unusual about our willingness to talk? Even the United States and the U.S.S.R., in spite of the United Nations and in spite of so many other avenues of getting together, have had, on a number of important occasions, direct negotiations, the most recent ones being when President Kennedy, after his election, met Premier Khrushchev in Vienna. Nobody expected that all the problems of the world would be solved through them, that there would be complete and general disarmament, that the question of Berlin would be settled and that the Soviet Union and the United States of America would begin to live in eternal comradeship. Nobody expected such results. But that did not preclude the two Heads of States from meeting.

No responsible government should be prevented from making efforts to narrow down its differences with other governments. By negotiation one does not lose anything. Direct action today might lead to a complete destruction of our cities, our homes and mosques. We must not put our country into jeopardy. I have confidence in the people of Pakistan, and I know that they are capable of the greatest courage and of the greatest sacrifices. But we should not be told by future generations that we were irresponsible, that we unnecessarily led the country into the kind of action which a Chenghiz Khan might take. That would be the result of direct action!

It has been said that there should have been pre-conditions to the negotiations. Why should there be pre-conditions. Our case is known to the whole world, and is known in every home, in every village and town in Pakistan. We have repeatedly and solemnly stated it. Our case is known to the other side, as theirs is known to us. We are entering into negotiations with our case fully explained and known to the whole world.

What is the meaning of a dispute? What is the definition of a dispute? In a dispute there is a claim and a counter-claim. When you enter into negotiations for the settlement of a dispute, your claim is known to the other side and the claim of the other side is known to you. Thus the parties know what the subject of negotiation is. There can, therefore, be no question of pre-conditions.

I would not like to say any more about the Joint Communiqué. We are going through a difficult and perilous period. In the crucial days ahead we should speak with a united voice. Our endeavor should be to create an atmosphere of goodwill and understanding such as will be conducive to a settlement. We shall enter into the negotiations with full knowledge of our past experience. What is the object of the Ministerial level meeting in the first instance? If we come to know that there is on the other side no goodwill and no intention to tackle the problem in a realistic manner and to find an equitable and honorable solution of it, then the Summit Conference will, I think, be unnecessary. In the meantime, our vigilance has to be maintained and we should be prepared for all eventualities.

In the past, although the odds have been against us, India being the larger country, with greater resources, we have, nevertheless, shown that we have the capability and the courage to meet eventualities, which might endanger our national life and security. When I say that we should maintain our vigilance, I mean vigilance over every part of Pakistan. The territory of East Pakistan is as sacred to us as that of West Pakistan. There can be no real defence of Pakistan without proper safeguard of the frontiers of East Pakistan. The defence of East Pakistan is, in a sense, even more vital than that of West Pakistan. The defence forces of East Pakistan are to be augmented and strengthened especially in the light of the present developments. I should like to inform the House that a new reoriented look is being given to the problems of East Pakistan and its defence requirements.

The Government understands the disappointment of the House and of the people of Pakistan in regard to our membership of the defence Pacts. We had thought that the Pacts would serve a useful purpose. But in the cold ruthlessness of international politics, we cannot expect a perfect alliance or a state of relations which would be ideal from our point of view alone. Such an expectation would be divorced from reality. Nevertheless, I recognize that we have been disappointed by the half-hearted and sometimes lukewarm support we have received from those who are members of the defence alliances with which we are associated and from whom we expected substantial support in our difficulties.

I must state here that we shall not hesitate for a moment to withdraw from these Pacts, if and when Pakistan’s interests so demand. We entered into them to promote the interests of Pakistan and its people. If those interests are not promoted, if they are not safeguarded by the Pacts, then let it be known that we shall withdraw from them and adopt a policy which will promote and safeguard the highest interests of the people of Pakistan and its security.

The criticism to which the Pacts have been subjected in this debate reminds me of the reply which Socrates gave to one of his pupils, who had reported to him that a certain individual had been abusing the philosopher. Socrates said that he could not believe it and added: “It is impossible that the person you mention should abuse me. I have done him no favor. I have never obliged him. Why should he find fault with me?” The Pacts are there. We are critical of them.

The fact is that as defensive arrangements they have not been altogether without value to us. They have had their meaning in the larger context of things and they have served their purpose. In the present circumstances, in the present denouement of events, let me tell the people of Pakistan and their leaders that we cannot permit ourselves to lapse into the coma of isolation. It was in such state of isolation that we became the victim of aggression-aggression which snatched away Junagadh, Manavadar and Kashmir from us.

I should like to make it clear beyond all doubt that we have friendly relations with the People’s Republic of China and that nothing will be permitted in any way to endanger those relations. Our relations with China are an independent factor in our foreign policy and not contingent on any other. This has been made clear to the House. We shall see to it that, as events unfold, our point of view and our position are explained to and understood by the Chinese Government. That is our duty and we shall discharge it. In the best interests of Pakistan, we shall maintain the spirit of goodwill, friendship and cordiality with the great People’s Republic of China.

Similarly, it will be our endeavor to maintain good relations also with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. The present Government and the predecessor Government achieved some degree of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union by entering into an oil agreement with that country. We shall welcome further cooperation with it in the economic and other beneficial fields, cooperation which may be of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and to Pakistan

In conclusion, I would say again that the Government ha benefited greatly from the discussion that has taken place in this House. We have taken into consideration the views expressed by its members, representing various shades of opinion. For our par we have. as far as possible, taken them into confidence in respect of all developments.

I shall be expressing the sentiment shared by all sections of this House when I say that after the dust of this debate has settled down, it will be found that we stand united on many matters. We do believe that India and the People’s Republic of China should settle their conflict in a peaceful manner. This is the only honorable way in which they can come to terms. India should accept the offer of negotiations made by the Prime Minister of China. We believe that Pakistan’s friendship with China is a growing factor in our foreign policy and that it does not depend on any other factor. We believe in the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and with other states, in particular with the Muslim countries, and not excluding the neutral countries. With many of these countries, we have a host of affinities. We are thankful to Turkey and other countries which have taken up a constructive attitude in the present Sino-Indian conflict.

We feel that the Western Powers have disappointed us. We have cause to feel this disappointment because we are gravely concerned about the rush of arms to India. Nevertheless, we assure them that our relations with them will remain steadfast, provided they appreciate Pakistan’s position and recognize its point of view that the arms assistance to India must inevitably pose a very serious threat to the entire sub-continent.

Finally, we believe that nothing will be lost if we promptly enter into negotiations with India. We should, of course, be very cautious and should bear in mind the difficulties that we have encountered in the past negotiations. Let us make this last attempt. It will enable us to find out whether there has been any growth of goodwill for us in India and whether circumstances have led it to realize that good relations are in the best interest of both our countries.

These negotiations will, in no way, prejudice or jeopardize our stand in the United Nations. On these issues, I think, there can be no difference of opinion amongst us. It is not a question of the personal satisfaction of individuals. It is the question of the future of Pakistan. It is the question of the future of our people.

Pakistan was created by a great man. To preserve it, we shall make every sacrifice in the way in which Pakistanis are known to make sacrifices. I appeal to all to speak with one voice and tell the world that Pakistan stands united and will not surrender on any vital issue. I pledge my word that we shall persevere in the cause of Kashmir, and shall never abandon it. We want a peaceful settlement of all disputes. We shall stand by this principle.