Address to National Assembly on The Commonwealth Conference — R.C.D. — Muslim Evictees — Ceylon, Burma and Nepal — Kashmir — Relations with the United States — Cyprus Question — Relations with China — No Basic Change in Policy on August 21st 1964

The Leader of the Opposition and his colleagues, who have spoken this morning, while basically not disagreeing with the Government’s foreign policy, have, nevertheless, attacked it and have, as I shall show, made some statements which are without validity. They have also enquired what the rationale of our foreign policy was. They want to know how exactly we stand with regard to certain great Powers. They have asked for a precise definition of our relations with the United States and a similar definition of our relations with the People’s Republic of China. They said that in the past, i.e., before this Government took over, they were clear about Pakistan’s relations with those and various other countries, but that at present they were not clear about them. Let me explain the situation. Before this Government came into power, irrespective of Pakistan’s fundamental and vital interests, the country was wholly committed as a satellite of a particular Power. This position was fully known. No matter what Pakistan’s interests were and no matter how they were injured, the previous Governments had to toe the line laid down by that Power, and, as its stooge, even behave in a manner hostile to certain other countries. That was the position until 1958. The present Government of Pakistan follows a foreign policy, which is based only on considerations of the country’s vital interests, such as its inherent needs of security and the welfare of its people, and on no other consideration. It is a policy which takes into account our paramount national interests, for whose defence the people of Pakistan, we know, will be ever ready to rally round the present Government and endure any hardships and make any sacrifices that are asked of them. We have developed normal and friendly relations with our neighbors, because that too is in Pakistan’s interest. Under the servile and senile policy, which was followed by the former regimes, no matter how Pakistan’s interests were affected, they did not have the courage to deviate from their behavior as a stooge and a satellite. In contrast with that, the present Government does not hesitate to disagree even with the great Powers who are its allies, whenever Pakistan’s interests so demand. Ours is a policy of self-respect and self-assertion. It is because of this fact that Pakistan’s prestige has gone up in the world and particularly in Asia and Africa.

There was some reference to the Communiqué of the Commonwealth Conference. The Hon’ble the Leader of the Opposition said that we had made much of this Communiqué. I should like to present to the House the facts about it. It is not we who have made much of the Communiqué. On the contrary, it is India that has done so. India has been up in arms against the reference in the Communiqué to Indo-Pakistan disputes. In this context, I shall quote to the House the statement made by the Indian Information Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who was a member of the Indian Delegation to the Commonwealth Conference, just before she left London for her country. Question: “The papers have been carrying reports in the last few days that there is a strong movement in India now for getting out of the Commonwealth. We have known it; it was there all along. Presumably, your father in a sense kept India in. Do you think over ten or twenty years India will stay in or not?” Answer: “Well, it is very difficult to prophesy anything. There has been this movement since the beginning but this time there has been great resentment, if I may use that word, because of the mention of Kashmir (in the Communiqué). It has been a convention that no internal problems should be discussed (in the Conference), because (if they are) then you get involved in an impasse. And our Finance Minister, who was the Leader of our Delegation, Mr. Krishnamachari, foresaw this and really warned the Conference about it.” Question: “Do you think the very fact that it was mentioned in the Communiqué may cause that kind of resentment and that would lead to India leaving the Commonwealth on that issue?” Answer: “Well, as you yourself have mentioned there is that resentment. I am not in India, so I only know what our papers have mentioned.”

Now this statement was not made by or on behalf of the Pakistan Delegation. It was made by the Information Minister of India, who was a member of the Indian Delegation. In India itself, there was an uproar in the Congress Party and in the newspapers, which reflected the resentment in India on account of the reference in the Communiqué to Kashmir. We are not taking any credit for it, but the fact of the matter is that for the first time in seventeen years there has been anything like this reference. It was not a miracle, as the Leader of the Opposition has said, but, nonetheless, there must have been some cogent reasons for it. The House will recall that in 1951, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan refused to go to London to attend the Commonwealth Conference until he was given an assurance that there would be some discussion on Kashmir, even though it be outside the Conference and informally. At that time, the mere fact that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was able to obtain such an assurance was regarded as a great triumph. In the present case, there was a reference to Kashmir in the Conference and a discussion about it in which seventeen out of eighteen countries participated, all supporting Pakistan. That I think is a matter, which is noteworthy. I hope that the members of the Opposition, even if they themselves are not willing to recognize its significance, will, at least, allow the people of Pakistan to do so.

In respect of the Istanbul accord, I have already made it clear that this is an agreement for economic, social and cultural cooperation and that nobody should unnecessarily read more into it. It is not necessary to take an agreement such as this, which is not a treaty to the Parliaments of the contracting countries. This has not been done in Iran, or in Turkey, or in Pakistan. If it were a treaty, then the constitutions of the countries concerned would require it to be referred to their respective Parliaments. But this is an agreement, an economic social and cultural agreement. As a matter of fact, we have in the past signed many economic agreements with other countries.

There is also an aspect of this matter which is of basic importance. The three countries that are parties to this agreement have, since 1955, been linked through a Pact together with certain other countries, which are not geographically or culturally connected with them. The new agreement, however, provides for cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields in a meaningful and constructive way, outside the ambit of that Pact. In this respect the agreement represents a significant development. Let us assume that such an agreement had existed before the Baghdad Pact came into being and that it was confined to Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq. Then subsequently, even if the policy of Iraq had required it to leave the Baghdad Pact, that country would not necessarily have left the Regional Cooperation Agreement. In that case, our relations with Iraq would have remained warm and cordial, as indeed they are today, but our mutual collaboration would have been much greater. From that point of view also R.C.D. is important. Furthermore, we wish to see other countries of the region to cooperate with us in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Indeed, regional cooperation is possible between all the countries of our neighborhood and ourselves. We have the advantage that while West Pakistan is adjacent to the Middle East, East Pakistan has geographical proximity with the countries of South East Asia. These countries, too, could participate in this or a similar scheme of cooperation. Thus wherever people are poor and need development, they could pool their resources for the common good of all and through collective effort, obtain among other benefits, the benefits of modern technology. I think R.C.D. has great potentialities. Under it the 150 million people of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan will join hands and in due course other countries could also come in. All that we are anxious about today is to wipe out the stigma of poverty and to better the lives of our people and for that purpose to see that our resources are utilized to the best advantage. I am confident that the R.C.D. idea will evoke a sympathetic response in other countries as well.

We have been asked what the Arab reaction to this arrangement will be. What will be the reaction of China to it? Generally speaking, as far as the Arab world is concerned, its reaction so far has not been unfavorable. Some members of the House have referred to what are really cheap pamphlets published in certain countries. We cannot regard these as representative of responsible opinion, and nor is it fair to give a single quotation from one newspaper as an indication of the general attitude of the Arab world. You could, in any part of the world, pick up a newspaper which criticizes every development. Let us not be misled by irresponsible journalistic reports. By and large, the Arab world has not reacted unfavorably to R.C.D. and we hope the Arabs will not take an adverse view of it, for there is nothing in it which is likely to prove injurious to them. On the other hand, if they give it proper and sympathetic consideration, they will find that they too may gain from this arrangement.

As far as the People’s Republic of China is concerned, there has been a positive response on its part. It has welcomed this effort at regional cooperation and regards it an important landmark in Afro-Asian solidarity. This has been stated by the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China. Now, if the whole world had approved of this regional arrangement, and there are in it germs of development for greater prosperity for the people of the countries that have joined it, I fail to understand why the Leader of the Opposition and his followers should be so cynical about it. It is understandable that because it is an accomplishment of the present regime, they must criticize it. But I do not think that they ought to carry their hatred of this regime to such an extent as to find fault even with beneficent things done by it, and thereby spread that hatred not only amongst the people of Pakistan but also those of other countries. The arrangement we have been talking about is an epochal achievement. The President of Pakistan played a magnificent role in bringing it about and he deserved the hero’s welcome which he received on his return home.

The Hon’ble the Leader of the Opposition has been critical about our policy with regard to Kashmir. We are told that it is useless to negotiate with the Government of India. You will remember that when we had six rounds of negotiations with that Government there was, in this House, a hue and cry against them and the Government was condemned by Opposition members for entering into them. They themselves admit that there are only two ways of solving the problem of Kashmir, i.e., either by war or by negotiation. The Leader of the Opposition recognizes that the cease-fire which came into effect in 1949 precludes the possibility of solving it by war. In any event, as a wise man and father of many children, he is conscious of the devastation a war can bring, and of the destruction of life and property that it can cause. He, therefore, discards war as a method of settling disputes and concedes that negotiation is the only way of settling them. But when we enter into negotiations, with equal force and eloquence, he deprecates our doing so. The only explanation of this attitude is that the Opposition must criticise and find fault with everything which the Government does. But from the practical point of view this attitude is wholly unhelpful. Furthermore, he enters a caveat with regard to negotiations. He says we must negotiate, but only on our own terms. Negotiations in themselves imply a spirit of give and take, moderation, conciliation and accommodation. He says, on the one hand, we should under no circumstances be moderate, conciliatory or accommodating; on the other hand he says that the Government of Pakistan should negotiate.

Actually, our basic difficulty with the leaders of the Government of India is also of a like nature. One of the reasons why India has not been able to settle its problems either with Pakistan or with any other of its neighbors is that the Government of India does not possess the spirit required for negotiation. Past experience has shown that India does not believe in the principle of give and take on a reasonable and honorable basis. That is why it has problems with Pakistan and problems with its other neighbours. Only recently, we hear, the High Commissioner of India in Ceylon addressed a gathering of Tamils and told them that the time would soon come when the Tamil language would have what he called its due place in Ceylon. That naturally caused consternation in that country. India seeks interference in the affairs of other countries and even seeks to impose its will on them. That has caused problems not only for us but for our neighbors as well. I should like to mention one particular problem. In so far as the eviction of Indian Muslims to Pakistan is concerned, India maintains that as a sovereign state it has the right to evict its Muslim citizens. It claims the right to unilaterally and arbitrarily declare that these Indian Muslims are not Indian citizens, but that they are Pakistan infiltrators. On this pretext they are thrown out from India into Pakistan. This is India’s position as far as Indian Muslims are concerned. In the case of Ceylon, millions of Tamils, Indian citizens have gone into that small island. India demands of the Government of Ceylon under no circumstances to treat them as Indian citizens. According to the Government of India, the Government of Ceylon, has no right, whatsoever, to say that these persons from India, who have been infiltrating into Ceylon for years, are infiltrators, and that all that the Government of Ceylon may do is to declare them stateless citizens. Now, when the Government of Ceylon asks the Government of India to negotiate the question of their status, the Government of India refuses to do so. When we ask the Government of India to negotiate a settlement of the problem of Muslim evictees from India— and their nationality and origin are ascertainable—the Government of India refuses to negotiate. When we say that there should be an international commission or some other body to help decide this matter, India refuses to agree and says it has the sovereign right to throw out these people from India on the basis of its own determination as to whether they are Indians or Pakistanis. When Ceylon asks India to negotiate, or to agree to the setting up of a conciliatory commission or some other machinery for the determination of the status of the Indians who have infiltrated into Ceylon, India declines and declares that the Government of Ceylon has no right to treat those people as Indian citizens. It is the application of these inconsistent standards which is responsible for the difficulties between India and its neighbors. We sympathize with the legitimate grievances of the Government and people of Ceylon. We must not forget that Ceylon is an important and friendly neighbor of ours.

So far as the evictions are concerned, we have offered to negotiate with India. We have proposed other means of settlement, such some kind of machinery for conciliation. India has refused to agree to anything. These unfortunate Indian Muslims are being thrown into East Pakistan, which is a most densely populated area and already over-crowded. We just cannot afford to take these people in. The evictions are a form of economic aggression against Pakistan. Our patience is being worn out, and a time might come, unfortunate though it will be, when the situation deteriorates to such an extent that we are compelled in the interest of our own survival to act on the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

I shall now pass on to refer to the after-effects of the nationalization laws adopted in Burma. As a consequence of those laws, we have had to make certain adjustments in our relations with Burma in the interest of our own people in that country. But this was done in a spirit of understanding and cooperation with the Government of Burma. India, however, showed no such spirit. It violated the new nationalization laws of Burma and converted its Embassy in Rangoon into a bank, a depository of the wealth of its citizens in Burma. The result was that relations between Burma and India worsened. We, in Pakistan, agreed to a solution of the Nef river problem with Burma in a spirit of give and take. In a identical situation, India has refused to do so, and its Nef boundary with Burma remains unsettled.

Relations between Nepal and India may now be improving. We certainly hope that they would improve. In the past, however, relations between these two countries were bad and India took every opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal. Thus in trying to understand India’s attitude towards Pakistan, it is necessary to appreciate the mentality and approach of India, not only towards Pakistan, but also towards its other neighbours. Pakistan is the most important of India’s neighbours, if only because India regards Pakistan as its Enemy Number One.

This brings me back to the question of Kashmir. That question has to be looked at in the context of the overall position to which I have referred. There have been certain important developments in regard to Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah has been released from jail. We have been told not to claim any credit for it. We have not claimed any credit for it, but the fact of the matter is that our efforts in the United Nations did help in some ways. We did not entirely precipitate the events that led to the release of Sheikh Abdullah though his release was at least to some extent connected with our taking the case once again to the Security Council. But we are not trying to seek any credit for it. However, Sheikh Abdullah’s release has, undoubtedly, given a new aspect to the Kashmir situation. We have been watching with great interest and with deep concern all that is happening in Kashmir. The Indian Government has suggested that our President should meet Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. We are always ready and willing to negotiate with India our outstanding differences, but for negotiations to be productive of results, it is necessary that there should be a change of the heart in India and some evidence of India’s willingness to settle the Kashmir dispute. A meeting at the Summit always arouses a considerable degree of hope and expectancy. People expect something concrete to emerge from a Summit Conference. It was for this reason that in 1962, when it was suggested that there should be a Summit Conference between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub, we took the stand that it would be preferable to have first a meeting at a lower level in order to clarify the issues and define the ground rules. That is why negotiations on a Ministerial level were in the first instance undertaken. We still abide by that approach. A Summit Conference should take place only when there is some indication of progress, if not of a complete settlement.

Thus we feel that it would be preferable to have a meeting of Ministers again to prepare the ground for a Summit Meeting. But that should come if there is a sincere desire on the part of India to reach a settlement with Pakistan. Are there any indications of that? One fails to see any. If there had been such a desire, India would not have resented an innocuous reference to Indo-Pakistan disputes in the Communiqué of the Commonwealth Conference. There are no indications except the speeches that have recently been made. But speeches have also been made in the past.

The economic situation in India is deteriorating rapidly. We are concerned about it because it involves the fate of people who have shared with us a common past. Poverty in itself is a terrible thing but now we hear of hunger stalking India, and of starvation and food riots in that country. This situation is most deplorable, and we would be happy to see a speedy end to it.

India has a large population to feed. She has more than 400 million people. We fail to understand why, when its own population is starving India should take on the added burden of the four million people of Jammu and Kashmir. It should release these people from its colonial rule, so that they can associate themselves with Pakistan and get a release also from the misery of want and hunger. If India did that it would be relieved of a great liability. In any event, the destiny of those people is linked with that of Pakistan.

Unfortunately, colonial powers are always reluctant to liquidate their colonies. This is shown by the history of colonialism all over the world. Only recently when I made a comparison between India and Portugal, based upon an objective analysis of their respective positions, the Indian Press indulged in all manner of slander against me. Well! They may continue to do that. They may continue to attack me until the cows come home. But there are certain facts that are undeniable. We know that the British have liquidated most of their colonies; the French have done the same; the Dutch have done the same; the Belgians have done the same. Only Portugal and India retain colonies. Portugal retains Mozambique and Angola; India retains Jammu and Kashmir. One of the reasons why India and Portugal are on bad terms is that they are competing, each to retain its colonial domination. And this is no criticism of India. On the contrary, it is only a statement of facts.

We hope that the international situation and the basic interests of India will compel its Government to come to a settlement with Pakistan. On our part, we will continue to strive for an honorable and equitable solution of the Kashmir question. Let me tell this House that we shall never tire in our efforts to secure for the people of Jammu and Kashmir their right of self-determination. This is our national duty and a national obligation which Pakistan has to fulfill. Reference has been made by some members to our relations with the United States and with China. As we have often said, we do not like the deterioration that has taken place in our relations with the United States; but it is not something of our doing. We have many interests in common with the United States. That country has contributed greatly to the economic progress of our people. Whatever our failings and faults, we are not an ungrateful people. We are mindful of what Americans have done for us. We, on our part, have never wavered in fulfilling our obligations to them. But, unfortunately, there has come about a freakish situation which has caused some strain in our relations with the United States. It has been imposed upon us. As I said at the very outset, nothing is more important to us than the preservation of the interests of Pakistan and its people. We shall continue to regard that as our primary obligation. We hope that the Government and the people of the United States will appreciate the difficulties confronting our country.

We have been given assurances by the United States that in the event of aggression against Pakistan, the United States will come to Pakistan’s assistance. However, in practical terms, this assurance, which I have no doubt has been given with good intentions, is one of doubtful value. As I said in a previous session of this House, it is very difficult to determine who the aggressor is and who the victim is especially in modern warfare. By the time the question is debated and determined, the carnage will have taken place and all the damage will have been done.

Will the United States be in a position to make the assumption that India is the aggressor and Pakistan the victim? Furthermore, what kind of assistance will the United States be prepared to give us? Will it be withdrawal of economic and military aid to India; or will it be economic sanctions or some other action in the United Nations? Or is it to be a NATO type of assurance that aggression against Pakistan will be treated as aggression against the United States? In addition, will the United States be willing to guarantee not only Pakistan’s own frontiers but also those of Azad Kashmir? As far as we are concerned, the destiny of Kashmir is linked with our’s and, therefore, it is imperative that Azad Kashmir should also come within the scope of that assurance. These and other considerations have to be taken into account. It is not that that we do not want to overcome the present difficulties but the situation is grave as well as complex and we cannot accept any illusory assurances. We cannot lull our people into a false sense of security. To do this would be to practice deception on them. It would be much better to squarely face the crisis in our relations with a powerful and mighty ally than to deceive our people into believing that the assurance given to us is enough to safeguard our national sovereignty and other interests.

We have seen in the case of Cyprus, as the Leader of the Opposition has pointed out, that military assistance provided by the United States to Greece and Turkey was used by both those countries against each other. This is a most recent example which demonstrates that, from a practical point of view, such assurances cannot really be meaningful.

With regard to the Cyprus question itself, we are happy to note that there has been some helpful development and we hope and pray that a satisfactory solution of it will soon emerge. We are, however, surprised at India’s attitude in the matter of Cyprus. In the past, India used to preach and even seek to dictate what was good for the world. But of recent years, India has been rather shy and reticent. We have seen that on the question of Viet Nam, although occupying an important position as Co-Chairman of the International Control Commission, India has been altogether silent. In the case of Cyprus, however, the Government of India promptly came forward to offer sympathy and support to the Government of Makarios, thus confirming the common aim of the two governments. The Government of India is engaged in the liquidation of the Muslim minority in its territory; the Government of Makarios is engaged in the liquidation of the Turkish Muslim minority in Cyprus.

In respect of our relations with the People’s Republic of China, some members of the Opposition have said that circumstances have so conspired that those relations have improved. Let us give the credit for that improvement to circumstances. Obviously, circumstances must have the effect either of leading to success or failure. In the past when they were in power, circumstances were against them and they failed. Now circumstances have helped us and we have succeeded. However, our relations with China are not of a negative character. They are not based only on the fact that China has a dispute with India and we have a dispute with India. That is not the basis of Pakistan-China relations. They are based on positive factors. China is a close neighbor of Pakistan, with a common boundary of almost four hundred miles. As a small country, we believe that the United Nations cannot be strengthened without the presence of China in it. You cannot hope for the rule of international law with seven hundred million people debarred from participation in the United Nations. That is why we have supported the admission of People’s Republic of China into the United Nations. It was wrong of the Hon’ble the Leader of the Opposition to say that we did that only last year. As you will recall Sir, in the year previous to the last year, you yourself, as a member of our Delegation to the General Assembly, cast a ballot in favour of the admission of People’s China. We believe that China should be admitted to the United Nations, because without it international law cannot really be reinforced. We also believe that without China’s participation in the United Nations, you cannot bring about a permanent and lasting settlement of disputes in South East Asia. We believe too that you cannot have meaningful and constructive disarmament that is general and complete disarmament, which is the cherished goal of all, so long as the People’s Republic of China, representing seven hundred million, is absent from the United Nations. We are a part and China is an important part of Asia and Africa. We shall collaborate with China and with all other peace-loving countries for the promotion of the solidarity and welfare of the people of Africa and Asia, and for the liquidation in these countries of the forces of colonialism and its ramparts still maintained by Portugal and India. We shall collaborate with all those countries which believe in the salvation of the people of Asia and Africa, and China is a most important one of them.

Nothing will give us greater satisfaction than to see the eventual; I would not call it a settlement, but a recognition, of the realities of the situation as between the United States and China. A breakthrough in the difficult, though somewhat artificial situation, between those two great Powers is urgently called for. If it could come, that would be the most important single factor conducive to international peace and security. In the realization of this objective, Pakistan will be ready to play whatever modest role it can. We are not saying this spirit of presumption. We know that world conditions require that at a certain stage there must be some relaxation in the tension between the United States and China. The present situation cannot last for long. Because of the impasse between them, the people of the United States and the people of China are the losers and, indeed, the people of the whole world. The forces of history and the compulsion of events are bound to move irresistibly. It is wrong to say that a detente or good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are in the interest of world peace and at the same time to maintain that the isolation of China is in the interest of world peace. These double standards are obnoxious and cannot be applied to diplomacy in this second half of the twentieth century. We hope that slowly the force of reason and the processes of negotiation and accommodation will bring themselves to bear upon and lead to an improvement in China-United States relations. I repeat, we will be willing to undertake whatever limited role we can play in this matter.

Before I conclude, I wish to state that the present foreign policy of Pakistan is predicated and based on only one consideration, and that is the security and the well-being of the people of Pakistan. There are no other considerations. We are not willing to sacrifice the basic interests of Pakistan, no matter what advantages—illusory, false superficial advantages—which any other considerations might bring. We are not boasting that our foreign policy is independent, because we do not like the application to it of clichés and labels. All that we would say is that without making any alteration in the basic structure of the foreign policy of the country, we are pursuing it with self-respect. On the same basis in the past, they pursued a foreign policy of subservience which deprived Pakistan of all prestige. In order that there should be; some independence in our policy, there are those who want us to leave the Pacts. They should know that we have achieved that independence without making the change which they advocate. To those who are opposed to a basic change, and at the same time do not mind subservience or dependence we say that there will be no such change, and. while our policy will be conducted under an umbrella, it will be without loss of dignity or independence. To those who tell us that we can follow an independent foreign policy only by making a change in our alignments, we say that in the dynamics of the twentieth century, we can pursue an independent policy without making such a change. The present Government has served the interests of Pakistan with courage and fortitude, but without altering the basis of the country’s foreign policy. But if a basic change becomes necessary in the interest of the country, that change will be made.