Address to the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 25, 1957
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation has heard most attentively the statements made thus for. The task of defining the concept or motion of aggression is indeed a gargantuan one. We have to face this delicate issue in a spirit of fallibility and caution. Sir Francis Bacon began his essay “Of Truth” by saying, “What is truth? Said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer”. If Pontius Pilate were confronted with the task facing this Committee, I seriously doubt if the Roman governor would even ask the question.
At its 368th plenary meeting on January 31, 1952, the General Assembly adopted resolution 599 (VI), which states, inter alia,
“Considering that, although the existence of the crime of aggression may be inferred from the circumstances peculiar to each particular case it is nevertheless possible and desirable, with a view to ensuring international peace and security and to developing International Criminal Law to define aggression by reference to the elements which constitute it.”
This resolution establishes three conclusions:
(a) that aggression is a crime:
(b) that the existence of this crime can be inferred from the circumstances peculiar to each particular case without specifically defining the crime of aggression;
(c) that, notwithstanding this, it is possible and desirable to and to develop international criminal law.
And with this end in view, the question of defining aggression was considered thoroughly at various levels all known to this Committee. However, it is pertinent to observe that the first wave of enthusiasm envisaged in the passage of resolution 599 (VI) was considerably mellowed and dented on a fuller analysis; so that the General Assembly was constrained to take cognizance of the innate catena of complexities by adopting, at its 408th plenary meeting, another resolution, being resolution 688(VII), which stipulate inter alia.
“Considering that the discussion of the question of defining aggression at the sixth and seventh session of the General Assembly and in the International Law Commission has revealed the complexity of this question and the need for a detailed study of:
(a) the various forms of aggression;
(b) the connection between a definition of aggression and the maintenance of international peace and security;
(c) the problems raised by the inclusion of a definition of aggression in the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind and by its application within the framework of international criminal jurisdiction;
(d) the effect of a definition of aggression on the exercise of the jurisdiction of the various organs of the United Nations;
Considering that continued and joint efforts shall be made to formulate a generally acceptable definition of aggression, with a view to promoting international peace and security and developing international law, decides to establish a Special Committee of fifteen members and requests the said Special Committee;
(a) to submit to the General Assembly at its ninth session draft definitions of aggression or draft statements of the notion of aggression;
(b) to study all the problems referred to above on the assumption of a definition being adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly.”
The concentrated research apparently revealed insurmountable difficulties necessitating the adoption of this second resolution. The first resolution was emphatic in tone and intent. It assumed that a definition of aggression would ipso facto ensure international peace and security. The second resolution was more in step with realities of the international situation, in that it sought the exact connection between the definition of aggression and the maintenance of international peace and security. And, therefore, in view of the doubts engendered, the General Assembly requested the first Special Committee to enquire even further into the question.
The deliberations of the first Special Committee necessitated the formation of another Special Committee to coordinate the views expressed by state members and to submit to the eleventh session of the General Assembly:
- a detailed report; and
- a draft definition of aggression.
Among the two proposals submitted for a working plan of the second Special Committee, the Netherlands proposal suggested inter alia,
“To determine whether or not the outcome of these discussions warrants the drafting of a definition of aggression and, in case the answer is the affirmative, to draft a definition of aggression.”
This abundantly indicates that even at so late a stage of study, skepticism was apparent in the minds of some of the delegates on whether a definition of aggression was warranted.
It is, therefore, erroneous in my delegation’s view to submit that the General Assembly’s resolution 599(VI) of January 31, 1952, has irrevocably settled that it is both possible and desirable to define aggression. If that were so the General Assembly would not have formed the Special Committee to consider this case and all its attendant implications at specialized levels. Indeed, the entire raison deter of creating the Special Committees would have become vitiated.
The report of the Special Committee on the question of defining aggression states that about twenty-six representatives considered a definition both possible and desirable but out of this category some representatives declared that they supported the adoption of a “generally acceptable definition” which, in fact, may be interpreted to mean that they opposed the idea of defining aggression, because “a generally acceptable definition” could not be found at the present time. Moreover, even these twenty-six representatives did not form what the report calls “a homogeneous group”. They differed in opinion as to the function, the content, and the form of a definition. In order words, they were classified into one group solely on the ground that they agreed in principle to a principle, which carries the art of nebulousness to its apogee.
All this obviously shows that it is fundamentally wrong to hold that the resolution of the General Assembly of January 31, 1952, or any other resolution of that body on the subject has prejudiced the issue to the point where it can be pre-supposed that a definition of aggression is possible and desirable.
In this context, a resolution of the general Assembly is not an irrevocable and an unalterable edict. It is not a judgment of a court of last resort. Hence my delegation firmly believes it is not ultra vires of this discussion to consider if a definition of aggression is both possible and desirable.
Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, Sir, to conclude, so to speak, my obiter dictal by saying that the most salutary aspect of this discussion is that the “End” or “Objective” of all gathered here is identical. That end is, if I may be permitted to take a slight liberty with the wording of the preamble, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of aggression. All are sedulously seeking to find lasting guarantees for the insurance of perpetual peace. This factor is of considerable significance. It establishes an indissoluble link. This spirit and unity of purpose may well be the most important single factor in the achievement of our aspiration.
On the first day of this debate, the distinguished and eminent Representative of Belgium referred to the miraculous achievements of modern science and fell, if I am correct, that this phenomenal progress is evidence of the undesirable fact that homo sapiens can attain his objectives if he labors tenaciously and industriously to that end; and that it is imperative to keep our social sciences in rhythm with the development of world movements; else, our concepts and institutions will face the danger of becoming effete. This is true, but it is a double edged argument. If modern man can launch a sputnik, to use the terminology of the successor, into outer space, he can also define aggression. However, if man’s ingenuity is limitless and if his resources and capabilities know no frontiers; then he is, and indeed must be ingenious enough not only to define aggression but also to circumvent, subvert, and abuse it. A definition, under these circumstances, would literally mean the presentation of our civilization on a uranium platter to a would-be aggressor, to a twentieth century Gengis Khan or Attila; a would-be world dictator who would most certainly find the means to distort and mutilate the definition for his own wicked and gruesome ambitions.
Let us now examine, if under the present state of International Law’s development, it is possible to define aggression. International Law has made tremendous strides since the far flung days of the ancient Greek City States era, and even since the relatively more recent time of Hugo Grotius, From a primitive law, dependent mainly on the sanction of self-help, it has developed into a body of recognized norms. It has institutionalized itself, and at Nuremburg, it asserted itself to that pitch of centralization which made it possible for it to take sanctions against individuals. Nonetheless, in comparison with the highly centralized and galvanized municipal law, it is still in its infancy. It does not have the force monopoly of the international community to enforce effectively all its sanctions. Its efficacy is entirely depended upon the caprice of national sovereignty. In 1935, a decade before the auspicious gathering at San Francisco, that celebrated jurist Hans Kelsen characterized the status of International Law in words which, despite the substantial progress since achieved, to this day remains essentially the same; he said:
“The present state of international law is characterized by the fact that international common law –considered from a technical standpoint –is still in the stage of a primitive system of law, that is to say, it is at a stage from which the legal system of the individual States originally developed. This is a condition of extensive decentralization. There are not –as in a technically developed system of law –central organisms dividing among themselves the functions of making and executing law. The general rules valid for the whole community have not been consciously laid down by a legislator in an exact and regulated procedure, but –as in the beginning of the development of law within the individual State –they have been evolved by custom, that is to say, by the practice of the persons concerned with that law –the members of the community.
“Within the framework of international common law there are no central tribunals whose business it is to apply general rules of law to particular cases. A State inured by another State is the one to decide whether a violation of international law has taken place, and if the other State denies the breach which is imputed to it, there is, under international common law, no objective procedure by which the dispute can be determined. Thus the State whose rights are impugned itself retaliates at its own discretion for the wrong perpetrated, in its opinion, with the measures of coercion peculiar to international law, war or reprisal.”
I hasten to admit that since 1935, International Law has developed by leaps and hounds. However this notwithstanding, International Law, in marked contradistinction to municipal law, is still decentralized law, and the dichotomy between the two laws is enormous. I am aware of the International Court of Justice’s existence but also of the subjective reservations of the states accepting its jurisdiction. I am aware of the existence of the Security Council and of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, but I am also aware of article 27(3) of the Charter, an article that looms over all matters of consequence.
My delegation deeply respects the Charter of the United Nations. However, my delegation believes that no disrespect is shown or intended to this august organization if reality is mirrored accurately. Here, my delegation is fortified by the erudite statement of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom who, during the course of his brilliant speech on September 24, 1957, in the General Assembly said, and I quote:
“This debate is an appropriate opportunity for frank discussion of the state of the Organization –its achievements, its failures, its strength, its weaknesses, its standing in the world, the hopes for its development in the future.
“The United Nations is not a super-state. It is not a world authority enforcing its law upon the nations. The General Assembly is not a parliament of individually elected members legislating for the world. The United Nations is an instrument of negotiation between Governments. It can blunt the edges of conflict between nations. It can serve diplomacy of reconciliation. Its tendency is to wear away or break down differences and thus help towards solutions. In the Secretary-General’s view, the real limitations upon the actions of the Organization do not derive from the provisions of the Character or from the system of one vote for one nation irrespective of strength or size. They result from the facts of international life at the present time. The balance of forces in the world sets the limits within which the power of the world organization can develop.”
These words represent reality so completely that even the most devout worshipper of the United Nations must accept them. For, to conceal such self-evident truth is to do an irredeemable disservice to the United Nations and the cause for which it stands.
There is no escape from the fact that International Law at the present moment bows at the altar of national sovereignty. Indeed the Charter itself is a political instrument. It is inevitable, therefore, that any discussion on the question of the definition of aggression must revolve around both political and legal issues, that is, on met juristic considerations, on factors contaminated by the virus of subjective value judgment. In isolation, and on its own, the attempt to define aggression is, from a pragmatic standpoint, utterly futile.
It is an axiomatic fact that this endeavor cannot possibly be detached from socio-political influences. It gets inevitably recoiled in the web of politics. In these circumstances, are we to have two definitions of aggression, one political, and the other juridical? One based on the foundation of thermo-nuclear strength and the other, an analytical and objective definition, poised rather uncomfortably on the fragile edifice of an international legal tribunal functioning on the sufferance of national sovereignty? If that were to be permitted it would achieve for almost all times the ascendancy of politics over law. It would gravely endanger International Laws’ struggle for the realization of its autonomy to enable it to establish permanent international peace through the rule of law; a system we cherish so dearly. Time and again, men of goodwill have solemnly appealed to sovereign states to submit their legal disputes to the International Court of Justice; but in spite of such pleadings, w find states resorting to other measures in the determination of disputes. In the present circumstances, such conduct is not really a matter for alarm or surprise. The Charter itself places the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on a political organ of the United Nations. By virtue of article 94 (2) it places the International Court of Justice under the domain of politics. Article 94(2) states:
“If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”
In support of my submission I would like to quote from Hans Kelsen’s monumental treatise on the law of the United Nations:
“The Statute does not contain a provision guaranteeing the execution of the decision of the Court against a recalcitrant State. Article 94(2) does not impose upon the Security Council the obligation to enforce the judgments of the Court against recalcitrant parties. It provides for a procedure of appeal in case of non-compliance with the judgment of the Court and makes the action of the Security Council to be taken as the result of the procedure dependent upon the council’s discretion by authorizing this body to chose between two different actions: Either to make recommendations or to decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment of the court. In case the Security Council chooses to make recommendations, it may recommend to comply with the judgment of the Court. But, in making a recommendation under Article 94(2), the Security Council is not bound to conform with the judgment of the Court with which the party concerned did not comply. The Security Council may recommend a solution of the dispute totally different from that decided by the Court. If Article 25 of the Charter is interpreted to apply to recommendations of the Security Council, recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2) has the effect of an appeal to a higher authority. Even if it is assumed that recommendations made by the Security Council are not binding upon the parties, a recourse under Article 94(2) may have the effect of an appeal. For the Council may consider non-compliance with a recommendation made under Article 94(2), a threat to the peace and take enforcement action under Article 39 against the State which does not comply with the Council’s recommendation. That means that the Security Council may enforce its recommendation instead d of enforcing the Court’s judgment. Article 94(2) confers upon the Security Council the power to substitute its recommendation for the Court’s judgment. This means further, that the obligation imposed upon the Members by Article 94(1) and by the Statute of the Court: to comply with the decisions of the Court, may be restricted by application of Article 94(2). By having recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2), the party places the Court under the control of the Council. Since under the Charter self-help (except in the case of an armed attack as self-defense is prohibited, non-compliance with the Court’s judgment may compel the other party to have recourse to the Security Council under Article 49(2). Such recourse may have the effect of transforming a legal dispute, decided by the Court in accordance with existing law, into an issue to be settled a new by the Council according to political principles.”
In these circumstances it would be the quintessence of irony to have only a legal definition of aggression, the interpretation of which may not even by determined by a juridical tribunal, and if determined, not enforced by it. A legal definition would acquire empirical utility only when the International Court assumes an exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes without exception and reservation. However, the international community will have to traverse quite a distance to reach this destination. That would be the first effective step to the super-state as it may be called in a legal sense, and not merely in the language of demagogic politics.
It would, therefore, be a melancholy defeat of the object of defining aggression if we were to try it at the present moment, at a time when it is not possible. It would mean the application of double standards to all international issues and the cruel incarceration of law by politics. Hence, my delegation fears that under the existing conditions of International Law, it is not possible to have a legal definition of aggression. It is only possible to have to political definition. Of course, it can be called legal but in effect, it will have a political connotation, emphasis, and outlook.
Even if my delegation were to concede that a legal definition is possible in a juridical sense, we would still be far away from the solution of the problem. We would immediately encounter a crisis of words, and get involved in a interminable semantic warfare. There would be disagreement on the scope, content, and function of the definition. Should it be in strict conformity with Article 51, or should it be a more comprehensive definition in which the expression “armed attack” as used in Article 51 is merely one from of aggression? Clarification and agreement will also be needed on Article 39 of the Charter, which speaks of “act of aggression”. Would an “act of aggression” mean an armed attack only or would it mean aggression direct and indirect, aggression as envisaged by the Soviet draft resolution, in document A/C 6/L/399? A rigid and a limited definition may well defeat the object of defining aggression, and, on the other hand, an all-embracing definition including “aggressive intent”, “the notion of indirect aggression”, “the notion of economic aggression”, “ideological aggression”, and other forms of indirect aggression may create an anomalous state of affairs in which aggression may become a regular and normal feature of human conduct and thereby lose its dreadfully abnormal, fearful, and emergent meaning. From an abnormal notion it would be turned into a natural notion. This half-exhausted twentieth century is in the grips of the most dramatic ideological battle. In every part of the world there is a clash of ideas, ideas that cannot be easily controlled or liquidated. In so pregnant a setting ideological aggression can be detected in almost every are of the globe. Normalcy would be characterized by the word aggression if ideological aggression were to form a part of it. However, basically, a definition whether narrow or broad is without an obol of doubt, explosively loaded with far-reaching implications, and is fraught with a host of dangers.
Assuming a definition is possible, is it desirable? A definition’s immediate effect would be to stultify and hamper the progressive growth of International Law. In this respect, my delegation noted with approval the distinguished representative of Ceylon’s reference to the Law of Torts, when he made his lucid statement during the course of the discussion on the Report of the International Law Commission.
Because of the enormous dichotomy in the degree of centralization, the only branch of Municipal Law that can be profitably compared with International Law is the Law of Torts. Like General International Law, the Law of Torts is in a stage of dynamic growth. If the Law of Torts had been codified at a premature juncture, an irreparable harm would have been done to the province of jurisprudence as a whole. The Tort of Negligence would not have emerged and bloomed to its fullness. Out of the historic judgment of Lord Atkin in Donohue v. Stevenson emerged not only a Tort of Negligence but also a philosophy of law establishing beyond all reasonable doubt, the virtue of undefined norms. “The categories of negligence are never closed”, said the sagacious law Lord, and so it truly was; with the result that redress and relief is now readily available to all who suffer and groan physically and financially for the negligence of their fellow citizens. If the Law of Torts had been stultified and cramped within the four walls of a definition, it would not have been possible for thousands of individuals to seek and receive relief according to their due. And certainly it would not have been possible for the distinguished representative of India to extend the Principle of the General Duty of Care to the ambit of International Law and argue, as he rightly did, that the principle enunciated in Donohue v. Stevenson imposes a duty of care on every state in its international conduct.
The virtue of undefined legal terms has been well described by an eminent American authority and to summarize the thought of my delegation in this respect, it would perhaps be beneficial to quote an extract from the Supreme Court’s decision in Davidson v. Board of Administrators of the City of New Orleans (96. U.S. 97 1878 p.103, 104) for in this case the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to define the exact meaning of the term “ Due Process” for much the same reasons that compel us to shy away from a definition of aggression. I now quote the relevant passage: –
“… if, therefore, it were possible to define what it is for a State to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in terms which would cover every exercise of power thus forbidden to the State, and exclude those which are not, no more useful construction could be furnished by this or any other court to any part of the fundamental law. But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive and satisfactory, there is wisdom … in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an important phase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require…”
If it is wise to keep the door open for the development of law in the highly centralized system of Municipal Law by avoiding a priori definitions, how much more wise and beneficial it would be to emulate this policy in the highly decentralized system of International Law. Are we so certain, so dogmatically committed to the belief that the categories of aggression are closed and therefore fit for definition?
Those nurtured in the system of the Common Law have seen through experience the inherent weaknesses of defined terms. It is true that even in countries where the Common Law prevails, the dictates of modern society have compelled to some extent the codification of laws. No effort has, however, been made to codify laws that are in the process of development. The Common Law countries present an excellent opportunity for judging simultaneous and side by side the workings of both codified and uncodified laws in one legal framework. Suffice it to say that codification gives rise to a host of new problems, particularly those pertaining to interpretation. Most certainly it is no automatic machine that produces the required results on the insertion of the proper coin. At times not infrequent it gives rise to problems far more complicated and difficult that those that existed prior to codification.
Law is a coercive order. This is a characteristic of law recognized from time immemorial. Without the element of force, law is reduced to naught, instead of maintaining order it becomes a part of anarchy, For this very reason it is not infrequently asked if International Law is true law. If International Law possesses the ingredients of coercion, it is true law; if it can take effective remedial and prohibitive sanctions against civil and criminal delicts, it is true law. As the distinguished Representative of Colombia so aptly said, and I quote. “There could be no society without law, and no law without penalties”.
Those who regard International Law as true law consider that the most effective and potent sanction of International Law is WAR, both defensive and aggressive. According to the protagonists of this school of thought, the theory of bellum justum is an inextricable part of International Law. My delegation does not express any views on the merits of this theory. We only say that it is necessary to reckon with this theory and its manifold implications, if we are to define and declare aggression an international crime. A situation may arise, as has happened so often in the past, calling for the application of this doctrine. The theory of Just War is not confined to the right of self-defense. Aggressive collective action is conceivable. “Counter-war” is the only effective reaction against an unpermitted war. If war is a delict, counter war must be a sanction. The theory of bellum justum fell into eclipse during the era of unbridled and unfettered national sovereignty. But, once again, it is reasserting itself in the field of International Law. So argue those who subscribe to this theory. They also say that it forms the basis of many important landmarks in Positive International Law, such as the Peace Treaty of Versailles, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Kellogg Pact. It is even traceable in Article 51 of the Charter.
This doctrine creates complications of very great magnitude not so much in the exercise of legitimate self-defense measures but when aggression, technically so-called, becomes necessary or is thought necessary as a sanction of International Law. History is studded with a plethora of cases that blur the line between measures of self-defense and unmitigated aggression. Legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense and aggression are concomitantly interwoven. The latest instance of this is epitomized in the Korean conflict. Each party accused the other of aggression and each claimed that it was exercising the inherent right of self-defense, although aggression was so manifestly clear that the United Nations were able to take peremptory measures.
A situation may arise in which State A accuses State B of organizing or encouraging the organization of armed bands within its territory or of subversive infiltration and on this pretence, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense, attacks and subdues State B. In such an event, the victim may appeal to another state or states, either under treaty obligations or under the rules of General International Law, to comes to its rescue. Interference by other states withstanding; the intervention would be a just resort to counter-aggression against State A.
The distinguished Representative of Colombia has stated, as an instance of indirect aggression against France and the United Kingdom, the German attack on Poland in 1939. This may be one interpretation of the chain of events that unleashed the Second World War. The proponents of the doctrine of bellum justum would, however interpret the declaration of war by the United Kingdom on Nazi Germany as an act of just aggression against a violator of International Law.
It may be argued that under prevailing conditions, a state cannot abuse its right of self-defense beyond a given limit. The latter part of Article 51 of the Charter would be an effective bar against the abuse. This argument, if advanced, would be found wanting in actual practice. For, in such a contingency, the veto right may have the opposite effect. Instead of preventing action, or counter-action, if would thwart the cessation of hostilities, once hostilities have started in the case of an abused exercise of the right of self-defense.
In view of the possibility of the occurrence of such abuses under the existing conditions of International Law and without a radical amendment or revision of the Charter, is it really desirable to classify aggression as an international crime? A crime forbidding counter-aggression on occasions when civilized nations are bound ethically and legally to fulfill their solemn obligations of individual and collective action against the misdeeds of a naked aggressor, an aggressor who vainly and shamelessly seeks to conceal his aggression behind the façade of the abused right of self-defense. International Law would be relegated to a set of empty norms if it’s most effective coercive sanction is so circumscribed.
Hence, it is my delegation’s concerted view that at this rather critical juncture, it is neither possible nor desirable to define aggression. Furthermore, we believe that we have the machinery, competent, capable, and mobile enough to take appropriate corrective action against aggressive acts, against other breaches of the peace, the threats to the peace, and all other disputes and situations endangering international peace and security, without defining aggression. On the contrary, a definition may quite conceivably act as a barrier against quick and decisive counter-action, and bog down the proceedings of the Security Council by a prolonged and futile discussion on the niceties of interpreting facts. As a definition would inevitably entail a drastic revision and amendment of the Charter, perhaps it may be more opportune to explore the possibility and necessity of a definition at the time when the revision of the Charter comes up for consideration.
My delegation has voiced its apprehensions vis-à-vis the possibility and desirability of defining aggression. However, as Pakistan is incontrovertibly dedicated to the cause of peace, it is a fundamental tenet of our policy to approach all issues impartially. My delegation does not harbor any preconceived prejudices. Issues of such paramount importance cannot be tracked in a dogmatic and doctrinaire manner. We have indicated the more apparent, or what may appear to us to be the more apparent, impediments in the path of a definition. But if even one out of this galaxy of jurists is able to dispel our doubts, we are quite prepared to examine sympathetically and objectively the suggestions and proposals made to that effect. Society is composed of far too many imponderables for there to be a finality of decision on such questions.
However, with this qualification my delegation must state categorically that despite the fast changing pattern of human activity, there are certain immutable factors. My delegation is fully aware of the character and function of this committee albeit it cannot be denied that on occasions the terms of reference of the various committees overlap. The question under consideration is not exclusively a legal issue. That it is part legal and part political is an incontestable proposition. If it were strictly a legal issue it would not have caused so much perplexity. By its very nature, it brings to the fore political and even socio-economic problems. But even strictly legal issues involve the legitimate discussion of facts. However, in deference to the apparent sense and feeling of this Committee, my delegation will state in general terms a matter of fundamental concern to my country.
If there is a generally acceptable definition of aggression, if we are to close the categories of aggression, that definition must include economic aggression. In this respect, paragraph 3(a) and (c) of the Soviet draft resolution is not specific enough to dispel the fears of my delegation. If we are to adopt a definition, then that definition must contain a separate article on economic aggression stating clearly and unambiguously that economic aggression or indirect aggression is perpetrated if lower riparian’s are deprived of their natural rights in use of rivers which flow through two or more countries. My delegation cannot overstate the importance of this issue.
An armed attack is gruesome and odious because of the damage in inflicts. Hence, everyone agrees that an armed attack is aggression, pure and simple. If more devastating and deadly damage to life and property can be inflicted without an armed attack, without the use of force, by means far more callous and perfidious, then such means must constitute a part of aggression as much as an armed attack.
If there is any interference in the normal and assured supply of irrigation waters, my country would face the threat of total annihilation. It would be the most invidious form of aggression. It would turn green alluvial and fertile fields into a scorching desert. It would create wide-spread famine, frustration, and fear. It would make it virtually impossible for any authority to control civil strife and bloodshed. Starvation would compel civilized human beings to resort to cannibalism. It would shatter all concepts of decency and morality. This indeed would be the outcome of such an aggression.
This is a situation not peculiar to my country. There are other states that, due to their geographical position and their economic reliance on supply of irrigation waters from an international river must take cognizance of such a form of aggression.
Economic blockade of land-locked countries may, likewise, have similar results and, therefore, my delegation will support the proposal of the distinguished Representative of Afghanistan made in this connection provided there is a generally acceptable definition of aggression and provided on merit, my country’s great neighbors recognize our legitimate fears and are prepared to admit that violation of riparian rights can cause as much if not more economic havoc as an economic blockade of a land-locked country. There could be no better demonstration of my delegation’s bona fides than this voluntary acceptance of facts based on merits.
I have taxed a great deal of your time and patience but before I close I must appeal to you, my distinguished colleagues, that we must strive tirelessly and continuously for the search of the necessary political equilibrium and adjustments guaranteeing the maintenance of perpetual peace. This is a duty we owe not only to our own war sick generation, but to our progeny. We are impounded by our Charter not only to save ourselves, but also the succeeding generations from the scourge and carnage of war. I have often heard it said that in the event of world conflagration, there will be neither victor nor vanquished. This seems obvious, but even if there is a sham and farcical victory, it will be that of the dying over the dead, and the dying will have the dubious thrill of glory by witnessing the utter demolition of civilization; the destruction of our homes and universities, our centers of art and science, our mosques and temples and churches, our Taj Mahals and Westminster Abbeys; and among the wailing of orphaned infants and crippled widows, the victors will breathe their last breath. So it is our sacred duty to work for a lasting peace and to give a ring of reality and not merely that of hope to the words of an English poet who visualized the day –
“… when the war drums beat no longer and the battle flags are furled, in a Parliament of Man, in a federation of the World…”