Pakistan and Nuclear-Proliferation Larkana, December 29, 1966

In defence of the United Nations resolution for a conference of non-nuclear states to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, Mr. Pirzada, the Foreign Minister, has given some reasons which require to be answered.

In one form or another, at three separate places, Mr. Pirzada’s rejoinder expresses satisfaction over the resolution because it has been “widely supported”. In reality, when 56 States including all the great nuclear Powers in the United Nations, except United Kingdom, abstain, the resolution cannot claim to have a record of “wide support.” Those who are familiar with the procedures of the United Nations know that in such situations an abstention amounts to a polite negative vote. If a more pointed barometer were to be sought it would be found in the recently composed preparatory committee for the conference on which, according to Dawn’s New York correspondent, even neutral European nations like Austria and Sweden refused to serve.

We simply cannot take any solace in the attitude of states which are immune from a nuclear challenge from their neighbors and for whom this nightmare is never likely to arise. Pakistan’s position is entirely different because, for us, the nuclear threat is real and immediate. What is of paramount importance is not the support of non-nuclear nations but the attitude of nuclear states. It is their attitude and conduct which is of decisive significance to the problem of proliferation.

Except for United Kingdom, which for understandable reasons supported the resolution, all the remaining nuclear powers abstained. China, the fifth nuclear power, which is outside the United Nations, has time and again denounced non-proliferation as a means of nuclear monopoly.

In our own region, India, which is reported to be on the threshold of becoming nuclear and for Pakistan the only country that really matters in this particular context, opposed the resolution. Thus, without much difficulty, it can be seen that the support of nuclear “have-nots,” so to speak, is not pertinent to Pakistan’s predicament.

Indeed, with India remaining outside the net of the resolution along with all the nuclear powers save United Kingdom the raison d’être of the diplomatic exercise collapses and the “wide support” from here, there and everywhere except from where it matters is rendered meaningless.

Mr. Pirzada contends that the resolution calls for a conference and does not bind Pakistan to an agreement. A resolution emerges from an agreement in spite of what Mr. Krishna Menon repeatedly claimed to the contrary in his marathon speeches in the United Nations on the Jammu and Kashmir resolutions.

But let us for once agree with Mr. Pirzada and Mr. Menon and concede that in this special case a resolution is not an agreement. Even this concession, however, does not carry us far because the purpose of the conference, at the very least, constitutes the framework of an agreement which commits Pakistan without a corresponding commitment from India.

It is reported that the main conference is to be held in about two years. This would mean its assemblage, perhaps, under the awesome spiral of a radio-active sub continental sky caused by the detonation of an Indian nuclear blast. In such ominous circumstances Pakistan would find itself deliberating on a nonproliferation treaty.

Mr. Pirzada has quoted my speech in the General Assembly to justify the resolution. According to him as recently as January, 1965, speaking on the subject in the General Assembly, I said, “We urge that an international conference should be called at which all the countries of the world, including those at present not members of the United Nations or not represented there, should examine this whole question in detail and devise strict arrangements which would make it impossible for non-nuclear powers to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.”

As a lawyer of sufficient duration. Mr. Pirzada should not find it difficult to set; the fundamental difference between my proposal covering all states of the world and the present restricted resolution. The operative part of my proposal lies In the universality of participation. There is a world of difference between a conference of ail states Including those which are in a position to prevent proliferation and a Conference confined to those who have no prescription to proliferate.

The crux of the matter is that basically only the nuclear powers are in a position to prevent proliferation. It is the principal responsibility of nuclear powers to arrive at an international agreement on disarmament, including non-proliferation and the eventual destruction of all nuclear weapons. It is for this overriding consideration that my proposal sought to commit all the nuclear powers to an agreement on non-proliferation.

It is so important that it can be repeated that non-proliferation can be achieved effectively only if the existing nuclear powers bind themselves to a treaty to prevent proliferation. Otherwise, nuclear weapons will spread as they have in the past. Nuclear powers cannot on the one hand acclaim non-proliferation in principle and on the other actively assist India and Israel to acquire nuclear capability.

If Pakistan had succeeded in calling for a conference of all states, including all the nuclear powers as proposed by me in 1965, there would have been cause for genuine satisfaction. If we must use complimentary words, the present exercise can be called a triumph in futility. Short of diplomatic etiquette, the resolution will find acceptance only among states for whom the problem is too remote or non-existent and from those states who want selective proliferation as a part of nuclear monopoly.

Pakistan faces a problem of an extraordinary magnitude. We cannot take any dubious satisfaction from a resolution which does not prevent India from becoming nuclear but which is likely to circumscribe our own freedom of action in this most vital of all fields.

Pakistan will always find it difficult to quantitatively keep pace with India; but qualitatively we have maintained a balance in the past and will have to continue to maintain it in the future for our survival. It is for this reason that as Foreign Minister and Minister-in-charge of Atomic Energy, I warned the nation sometime back that if India acquires nuclear status, Pakistan will have to follow suit even if it entails eating grass.

It will thus be seen that my criticism of the resolution is not opposed to national interest and security. Quite the opposite; it has been made in the interest of the nation and should be welcomed. It is dangerous to take aim with a gun loaded with blank cartridges. There is no contradiction between what I said in January, 1965 and what I say now.

At the appropriate milestone, time, that harsh and impartial spokesman, will open its lips, as undoubtedly it must, to point the finger of accusation.