


Betrayals of Another Kind

Islam, Democracy and The Army in Pakistan

Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chisti (Retd)

H.I.M;S Bt



Reproduced by:

Sani H. Panhwar

Member Sindh Council, PPP

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(Second Edition: Revised & Enlarged)

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PREFACE

In July 1977 the Army took over the civil administration of Pakistan to protect democracy. It was a move widely welcomed by the people at the time. The key man Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq the Chief Martial Law Administrator, later betrayed the trust placed in Pakistan's armed forces, when he proved unwilling to fulfill his pledge of holding elections. Instead of transferring power within ninety days, he became dictator for the next eleven years.

General Zia's intentions were, I am convinced, certainly different when the Army first took over. Perhaps his change of mind is best explained by the old maxim, "power corrupts, and absolute Power corrupts absolutely". . .

The question of responsibility is straightforward in military terms. "A commander is responsible for whatever happens in his command. He is also responsible for whatever does not happen in his command." In Martial Law the rule always is that of one person i.e. the CMLA. He has absolute authority vested in him, and corresponding responsibility. All others are aides and subordinates.

I have watched closely the dramatic events in Pakistan's life, first as a witness to decision-making at the highest level, then as an officeholder and finally, as an ordinary citizen, since 1980. I have always held onto the hope that one day the precise facts would be correctly recorded and analyzed. Instead I have seen many important facts misinterpreted or twisted. People in power often have a tendency to distort history to their personal advantage, or simply, to ignore inconvenient facts. So it has been in Pakistan.

It is almost ten years since I retired from the Pakistan Army and at the same time resigned as a Federal Minister in charge of three ministries. Yet, even today, when people meet me they often talk as if I was associated with Gen Zia right up to his death in August 1988. Some even go to the extent of asking me where I am posted these days. The facts, therefore need to be placed in their true perspective.

Circumstances play an important role in shaping a person's public image. Sometimes they make a person appear controversial. At the time when the Army was sucked into national affairs as a result of a countrywide agitation against the rigging of Pakistan's General Elections for the National Assembly held on March 7, 1977, I was GOC 10 Corps, with its headquarters in Rawalpindi. I stayed there until my retirement. Like other Corps commanders I also became involved in decision-making at the national level, both before and after the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan in July 1977.

Before July 5, 1977, unconditional authority was exercised by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. After July 5, total authority was exercised by the CMLA, Gen Mohammad

Zia-ul-Haq. All other functionaries were advisers, irrespective of their rank. I was also one of them. I do not absolve myself of the responsibility of being an aide in decision making. I have no regrets or second thoughts on the various recommendations I made to the PM or to the CMLA. If given another chance, my recommendations and my conduct would be exactly the same.

Certainly the PM listened to me, but unfortunately he was not allowed to change his policies because of his wily and vociferous ministers. They drowned Mr. Bhutto. As for Gen Zia. I knew he found it difficult as CMLA to tolerate and accommodate my straightforward views, because I - unlike a lot of others - had the moral courage to speak the truth as I saw it.

If I had not been loyal to the country and the armed forces, I would have, like other dissemblers, encouraged and supported those many harmful actions of the CMLA, and drawn on his personal weaknesses and failings for my benefit. Instead, I preferred to expose myself to Zia's displeasure by expressing myself bluntly, rather than remain a silent spectator to misdeeds and mistaken policies.

No one can honestly say that I had an ulterior or personal motive in advancing my views. It is one of those great ironies of life that my sincere recommendations have resulted in misunderstandings.

I have nothing to be ashamed of in my conduct. I am the only minister who resigned during that period in Pakistan. Other generals were used and discarded -- I was used but not discarded, because I myself refused to be used any longer.

Unfortunately Gen Zia as CMLA, like previous Chief Executives of Pakistan, also became rapidly surrounded by opportunists and sycophants, who succeeded in keeping him almost completely in the dark about important but unwelcome facts. I have every reason to believe that I was made the victim of a deliberate campaign of slander and vilification mounted against me by some of my former civil and military colleagues, with Gen Zia's approval, so as to get rid of me as the solitary voice opposing his hypocritical policies.

Since my retirement from service in March 1980, some of my friends and well-wishers have been asking me to write about the events which I had been witness to, or had knowledge of, I planned to do it once Gen Zia had left the throne, so that I could cover his entire regime in one hook. I feel sorry that he died in tragic circumstances. If at first the PM and then the CMLA had not disregarded my recommendations, the course of events in Pakistan might well have been very different.

I was at first reluctant to write this book. The credit for forcing me to write it goes to Akbar Ali Malik, who has a special bent for history. Although busy with his studies at

Gray's Inn for his bar-at-law and a doctorate, he asked me to come to London and to see for myself what had been written about Gen Zia's regime. I did that, and read some of the books published. I found they were full of misinformation, distorted facts wild guesses or biased opinions. So I decided to write the full facts. Posterity should know the truth and draw the correct conclusions. I spent three months in England collecting and collating relevant details about that period. Then I went to Dubai to be with my son Hamid, so that I could find the peace of mind to write.

Whatever has been written here has been recalled from memory with the help of some notes of mine from the period and from books and newspapers. It is very difficult to reconstruct the background of those events of a decade or more ago. I followed the best and safest method, reliving the events in my mind, and checking them with other sources of information.

I should mention here that I tried to refresh my memory of some events and details by going to General Headquarters, but was informed by the VCOAS that I could not examine the records without special permission.

This book is a record of events as I saw them, as I lived through them, as I recall them and as I reacted to them. I hope it will clear all misunderstandings and misconceptions. Let it be seen as a call for accountability and hopefully help Pakistan achieve a more just, stable and viable political system.

My intention is not to write against anybody, or to carry out character assassinations, but to make an honest effort to record events of Pakistan's recent history correctly and without inhibition. This may even help overcome the effects of dishonest decision making by our Chief Executives, of which we have been, as a nation and as a country, victims. From soon after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the death of Quaid-i-Azam M A Jinnah, the Pakistani nation has been betrayed by its rulers, in order to perpetuate their rule. This trend must be arrested if Pakistan is to survive. Betrayals of all kind must stop.

Whatever plans we make today, whatever diplomacy we adopt, whatever sacrifices we make will bear fruit for generations to come. Whatever myopic and selfish politics and policies we follow today will cause suffering to the coming generations. Therefore, I believe whosoever is responsible for taking decisions affecting the fate of our nation must have above all else foresight and the spirit of sacrifice.

As a background to this attitude of mine to life, I have had to narrate here some earlier episodes from my life. They will make my frame of mind and the influences on my decision-making clearly understood.

I would like to express my thanks to Akbar Ali Malik for helping me to make up my mind to write, and for tolerating my whims; Haq Dad and Aizaz Chishti for chaperoning me while in London; Asif Ali Khan and Shahid Aleem Qureshi for their administrative support at Dubai, and my toddler granddaughter Janevi for her musings at every opportune moment.

I am also grateful to my wife Shaheen for providing me with the everlasting moral strength that did not allow me to succumb to material gains. I owe much to Col Jamshed and Hamid for reading the chapters and giving me the benefit of their knowledge and judgment through valued discussions. Lastly, my thanks to Anthony Hyman who helped shape my writing into a book and to Shreeram Vidyarthi for publishing it.

CHAPTER - ONE PLAYING WAR GAMES

I am a career soldier. I joined the British Indian Army back in 1946, straight from college, as a gentleman cadet. I underwent my training at the Officer's Training School Bangalore and was commissioned an artillery officer. At the time of Partition. I opted for Pakistan and joined the Pakistan Army in Karachi in November 1947.

I shall narrate the story of how I took up a military career and how I became a General, at a later stage in this book. Right now, suffice it to say that I am a straightforward, god-fearing and honest soldier, loyal to my country and to my conscience and that I have always served the government of the day to the best of my ability and without any consideration of short-term gains for myself or my dear ones.

I had opportunities to serve in General Headquarters as Deputy Director Military Training (DDMT), Director Research and Development (DR&D) of united Pakistan and as Military Secretary (MS) of the present Pakistan. During my tenure as DR&D and MS I carried out some studies leading to policy decisions which have a direct bearing on a correct understanding of some subsequent events. The most important of these are enumerated below:

- 1) Efficacy of Research War Gaming.
- 2) Defence Needs of East Pakistan
- 3) Dangers of Military Action in East Pakistan
- 4) Nuclear Technology Planning
- 5) Appointment of Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps
- 6) Tenure of Service for Lieutenant Generals

(I should mention here that I tried to refresh my memory of some events and details by going to General Headquarters to read some documents from this period. But I was informed that, without special permission from the Ministry of Defence, I would not be allowed to visit GHQ-- implying that I had become *persona non grata*.)

Efficacy of Research War Gaming

As DR&D I went to visit the Research War Gaming Department of the Ministry of Defence, which had been set up to produce scientific results in war gaming. I was impressed by the efforts put in, I asked Dr. Qureshi if they had run any research war game. They answered in the affirmative. They had done it for the battle of Chamb during the war of 1965. I got interested because I had been in that battle. I asked the

Chief Scientist to let me have the complete run-down on that war game. It was done. If I remember correctly, it was a Baluch battalion's attack on chak Pandit.

I quickly realized that data fed into the war game on behalf of the attacking battalion and the Brigade was entirely concocted. It was shocking, and had naturally led to the wrong conclusions. I scrapped it. Things could only improve if we stopped telling lies at all levels. This was also my conclusion on another study which we had carried out in the R and D Directorate, on why the small arms shooting standards in the Army were so bad.

Defence Needs of East Pakistan

After the war of 1965, the demand grew for greater resources to be allocated to defence in East Pakistan. In early 1971, when tension was increasing in East Pakistan, and there were fears that another war may be impending with India, there was a hue and cry in the East Pakistan papers asking for more participation in the defence forces of Pakistan. Some openly wrote that the defence of East Pakistan did not lie in the war on the West Pakistan front. They said they needed more troops to defend East Pakistan. Politically there was a clash with this requirement, because the Awami League did not want more troops to be inducted into East Pakistan. So to arrive at a viable solution which would be acceptable to the nation as well as the political leaders.

Consequently I ordered an analysis to be carried out in the Research and Development Directorate. The recommendations were sent to Gen Yahya Khan for approval. The main recommendations were as follows:

- a. The Pakistan Military Academy was in West Pakistan whereas the bulk of the population was in East Pakistan. The East wanted training facilities of its own. So a wing of the Military Academy should be opened in East Pakistan. Details of types of courses to be run and staff East Pakistan.
- b. East Pakistan was mostly equipped with Chinese Weapons. For their training they had to come to the Infantry School in Quetta. It was recommended that an Infantry School wing for Chinese weapons be opened in East Pakistan. A close quarter battle wing would also be established with it.
- c. Jungle and riverine warfare were the specialties of East Pakistan. There were no comparative rivers or jungles in West Pakistan. So it would be beneficial to have Jungle and Riverine Warfare Schools started in East Pakistan.

- d. In the field of defence production facilities like those available at the Pakistan Ordnance Factory in Wah, should be created at a suitable place in East Pakistan.
- e. There were very few Air Defence Units in East Pakistan. There was a need to create some more or send some from the West.
- f. The concept of having one Logistic Area Headquarters in East Pakistan was unworkable in war. There was a need to have four such Headquarters, demanded by the clear-cut division of the country by natural water courses.

There were other recommendations too. The main advantages of implementing these recommendations would have been to have ready availability of more troops for defence of East Pakistan, it would also have given more East Pakistanis the satisfaction of participation in the defence of their own country. The recommendations were sent to the President and COAS Gen A M Yahya Khan, who approved the recommendations but endorsed the file: "*Agreed in principle but let us do the cost accounting first.*"

When the file came back to me I forwarded it to the Director Budget, Brig Shariff, to do the needful. It was never done. Soon after, when an airlift of troops started to East Pakistan I asked Gen Yahya to do the cost and was admonished.

It would also be pertinent to state here that I examined the recommendations of the National Defence College Course of 1970 and forwarded it to the COAS for implementation of the workable recommendations, it was not done. What was the good of spending so much money on a course and arriving at the recommendations for the defence of the country, if they were not to be implemented? That was what was happening at higher levels of the Army, and it contributed to the loss of the Eastern Wing of our country.

Dangers of Military Action in East Pakistan

As DR&D of the Pakistan Army. I carried out many studies. Some of them concerned East Pakistan. Those studies had many aspects, including the possibility of carrying out military action in East Pakistan. I had opposed it. Years later, Gen Tikka Khan refuted my criticism by saying that I had been nowhere near East Pakistan (*Jang* Friday Magazine, July 22 - 28, 1983). He was right, I was not in East Pakistan. I was in GHQ, working for the integrity of Pakistan, while he was in East Pakistan doing the opposite. I had explained to Gen Yahya Khan that military action ultimately means the solution of a simple mathematical problem. Who would win -- the attacker (the killer) or the defender (the person(s) to be killed)? If by killing one person the situation could be controlled, then the killer would win, but if the situation would not come under control then some more would have to be killed and there would be mourners and sympathizers of the first person killed, i.e. his wife, children, brothers, sisters, parents,

well-wishers etc. in a proportion which would increase geometrically. You would have to kill more, more and yet more.

In East Pakistan the killer would only be West Pakistani. You would not be able to find an East Pakistani who would kill East Pakistanis. So ultimately the killers would be all West Pakistanis in East Pakistan, and those to be killed would be all East Pakistanis. How could that equation be solved to the advantage or success of the killer? So military action in East Pakistan could not produce the answer. It would only enhance Bengali feelings against West Pakistan, and this could lead to severe consequences.

On hearing this, Gen Yahya Khan remarked to Gen Hamid "Do you see this. I told you we do not need educated people in the Army." I replied that I was arguing thus because the job assigned to me made it my duty to do proper research and put up recommendations. If I had been a Field Commander it would have been outside the purview of my duties. So he said there was a good chance of going to war and asked me if I would like to be posted out of GHQ to an active formation. I replied I would love it and I asked for a posting to East Pakistan. But it was not to be -- instead I was posted to Azad Kashmir.

This was the second time that I had asked for a posting to East Pakistan, I was never posted there. Imagine an officer with twenty-four years of service never posted to East Pakistan. The explanation lay in the fact that postings to East Pakistan were reserved for the privileged ones. It ensured financial benefits and I was not one of the privileged class. The favored ones had to be related to someone who mattered, either civil or military.

My first request for a posting to East Pakistan was in 1968. I had completed my tenure in Command and Staff College, Quetta, and was to be posted out on command duties. The Military Secretary, Maj. Gen M. Nawaz, had come to Quetta on a visit and asked me if I had any preference for posting. (It had been a tradition that the instructors of the Staff College used to get a posting station of their own choice on completion of their tenure in the Staff College.) I asked for East Pakistan where a unit was without a Commanding Officer. He did not promise anything, but he said he would try. On his return to GHQ, Rawalpindi, he informed me that I could not be posted to East Pakistan. I was posted to Malir Cantt (Karachi). That was the nearest I could get to East Pakistan.

On this particular issue of military action in East Pakistan one can say that it was completely uncalled for, and eventually led to the secession of Pakistan's eastern wing because of our intellectually dishonest decisions. The Government at the Centre was at fault. Unfortunately it was a general at the helm of affairs.

Nuclear Technology Planning

India started planning to attain nuclear technology before she got her independence. Dr. Bhabha was head of Tata Nuclear Institute. Indian Atomic Energy Commission was created in April 1948. Dr. Bhabha was then made head of this commission. He was also designated Secretary Atomic Energy Department. He was answerable only to the prime minister. In 1960 after making the atomic reactor India decided to fabricate, by herself, reprocessing plant at Trombay. On its opening ceremony Mr. Nehru said "*Bharat can make atom bomb but it would not do so as yet*".

In June 1967 subsequent to China's sixth atomic blast Indian Atomic Energy Commission was assigned the task to prepare for an atomic blast. Consequently India detonated its atomic device on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran Rajasthan - near Pakistan Border. India declared that the atomic blast was for peace.

I came to know more about Indian research in nuclear technology in 1970 when our agents in India sent me the minutes of a conference held at the national level. I examined it carefully as Director Research and Development, and ordered a study to bring out all the implications of India's nuclear ambitions.

Finally, I recommended that a Technical Academy be established for better training of Pakistan's Armed Forces in technical arms. This was to be located at Risalpur or Rawalpindi. It was to include the existing Defence Science Organization and amalgamated schools of instruction of Army Engineers, Army Signals, Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, together with a new wing of nuclear technology.

This scheme for a Technical Academy was not approved by the c-in-c, but a ten-year plan to master nuclear technology was approved by the then President Gen Yahya Khan. The plans were not put into practice, though, because of the intervening war of 1971. It was only later, in Mr. Z. A. Bhutto's time, that substantive efforts were made to attain nuclear technology.

I was Military Secretary in GHQ when Gen Tikka Khan selected Brig Zahid Ali Akbar to be deputed to Mr. Bhutto for work on the Kahuta plant. It is wrong to say that Brig Zahid was nominated by Gen Zia. Most of the work done in this field by Mr. Bhutto has been revealed in his book, *If I am Assassinated*.

In any discussion of Pakistan's development of nuclear technology, we must take into account that Pakistan is surrounded by nuclear powers. The USSR, The People's Republic of China and India are regional neighbors while the USA is omni-afloat in the Indian Ocean with its own formidable nuclear power. Out of these states, only China is a confirmed, reliable friend. Our relations with the USSR are poor, India is a confirmed enemy and the USA is entirely unreliable. Pakistan must therefore have a deterrent in order to defend itself. I do not agree with those who say that we should not have an

atom bomb. We must have a nuclear deterrent so that we cannot be blackmailed. Without an atom bomb our defence capability is incomplete.

Today, there are at least 350 nuclear plants functioning day and night in 27 countries. At least 52 nations maintain nuclear research facilities. At least 11 nations are reprocessing nuclear fuel, and in addition to the club of USA, USSR, UK, France and China other states including India, Israel, Sweden, South Africa, Japan, Holland, West Germany, Brazil and Argentina have become nuclear, powers.

What then can be the possible justification in trying to stop Pakistan from becoming a nuclear power. Is it simply to undermine the defence potential of Pakistan? Is it intended to deny the Islamic world access to an atom bomb? If India and Israel can be patronized to become atomic powers then why not Pakistan also? The answer seems to be, simply because it is a Muslim Country. It would then have the capability of influencing the oil policy of the world.

It is India after its own atomic explosions, which had forced Pakistan to go nuclear. The same had happened to India in 1964, after the Chinese atomic blast in 1965, the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri ordered Dr. Bhabha to go ahead with an underground atomic blast. This was the time when UK, USA, USSR and France had refused to provide an "atomic umbrella" to India. Let us not forget what Mr. Bhutto said. "The nation will eat grass, but it must produce the atom bomb."

Appointment of Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps

Uniforms greatly pleased Mr. Bhutto throughout his career. His best-known uniform was modeled closely on that of Chairman Mao, perhaps intended as some kind of compliment to China, Pakistan's most important foreign ally. "Chairman" Mr. Bhutto's love of uniforms extended beyond his own person. For Pakistan's Senators, Mr. Bhutto had a special uniform designed, with golden collars for their tunics.

Gen Zia had noticed this weakness in him. He tried to exploit it so as to get closer to Mr. Bhutto. A friend of Gen Zia, Col Chughtai told me that Gen Zia wrote a letter to Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan asking him to invite Mr. Bhutto to become the Colonel- in-Chief of the Armoured Corps. Mr. Bhutto accepted, and Gen Zia, as Colonel Commandant of the Armoured Corps, initiated the case that Mr. Bhutto be made Colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps.

The case came to me as Military Secretary. I opposed it and wrote a minute to that effect, while forwarding it to Gen Tikka Khan, COAS. I had argued that such appointments were not for political leaders, but were traditionally reserved for retired senior officers. The political leaders in government today could be in the Opposition tomorrow, in which case it would be embarrassing for both parties. I requested Gen

Tikka Khan to ask the PM to turn down the offer. Gen Tikka Khan argued that it would be OK, because, in the recent past, Prince Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran had been made the Colonel-in-Chief of the Frontier Constabulary. I explained to Gen Tikka Khan that there was a lot of difference between the cases. Prince Reza would never in his life be in Pakistan politics and sit either on the Opposition benches or be a part of the government. Secondly, there was no comparison between the Frontier Constabulary and the Armoured Corps. The common Army view was that it was an honor which should never have a chance to be dishonored. However, Gen Tikka Khan, for whatever reasons, did not agree with me, and forwarded the case to the PM for his acceptance.

Later Mr. Bhutto was installed by Gen Tikka Khan and Gen. Zia as colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps. What a tradition the Colonel Commandant Armoured Corps set: he hanged his own Colonel-in-Chief -- irrespective of what the offence was!

Tenure of Service for Lieutenant Generals

As Military Secretary at GHQ I noticed that there was an anomaly on retirement rules for generals. Maj. Gen -- 30 years service, or 55 years of age, whichever earlier; Lt Gen -- 57 years of age, no mention of service; Gen -- 3 years' tenure.

Good Major Generals were falling due for retirement before Lieutenant Generals were due to vacate, and the Army was losing good officers.

I discussed this problem with Gen Tikka Khan on sixteen occasions, because we recognized it was an important matter. The Army recommendations reached made a new rule irrespective of age, giving four years tenure to Lieutenant Generals. It was submitted the Ministry of Defence for approval. The final rule approved by the PM was, "Lieut General's tenure will be of four years. The government may give one year's extension only." I was the father of the rule. Therefore when the question of my own retirement came up in March 1980, there was no question of my requesting, or accepting, an extension. As the originator of this rule, it would have been quite wrong for me to do so.

As far as my retirement on completion of four years' tenure was concerned, I had told Gen Zia repeatedly, and in blunt terms, that I would never accept an extension, not only because I was the father of the rule but because he was making dishonest decisions. At the time when he had made a wrong decision to promote Brig Rahat Latif and Brig Masood Akram, I had told him I would be staying in Pakistan Army until the completion of my four years' tenure, and not a day after. I was serving not in Zia's army, but in Pakistan's army, and I did not intend to take baksheesh from him.

Gen Zia had a three-year tenure, but continued for 12 years until his death. Many Lt Generals who towed his line continued serving for 7 to 10 years, eg Lt Gen G. Jillani

served for ten years, Lt Gens Fazle Haq and Jahan Dad for seven years each and Lt Gen S.M. Abbasi for six years. Generals M. Iqbal and Sawar Khan served for four years each instead of their normal tenure of three years. They might have continued if they were not suddenly retired because of their ignorance of an attempted conspiracy or coup in Lahore. Such extended tenures, based on Gen Zia's dishonest decisions, gave unnecessary advantages to loyal lieutenants and deprived good captains of their due rights. This ultimately affected the morale and combat efficiency of the army.

CHAPTER - TWO BHUTTO, ZIA AND MYSELF

Ever since Operation Fairplay much has been written about me *vis-a-vis* Gen Zia and Mr. Bhutto by writers responsible as well as irresponsible. The majority of writers were those who indulged in muckraking to sell their newspapers and magazines. Others had suffered setbacks because of their own misdeeds and past doings, and so indulged in mud-slinging for personal reasons. Yet others were the type to take money and write against anybody. There was no dearth of such writers in our society. Gen Zia had even made some of them his advisers with the status of federal ministers.

My conduct with Mr. Bhutto has been an issue for so long that its logical outcome is that all types of myths, stories and anecdotes are in circulation in Pakistan and abroad. Sometimes they are so funny. The weekly *Hurmat* had even gone to the extent of publishing a concocted interview with Nusrat Bhutto, its cover/title page reading "I will never forgive Chishti". (*Hurmat* Volume V No. 7 of February 8 to 16, 1986). Another magazine claimed that the 1982 elections would be held because Benazir and Chishti had secretly met in the officers' mess of a cantonment. Both interviews were denied by the ladies concerned.

I had no personal rapport with Mr. Bhutto¹, unlike some other generals -- notably Gen Fazie Haq - who had been meeting Mr. Bhutto often while he was a Federal Minister in Field Marshal Ayub's government, and Haq was the Commandant, President's Bodyguard. My dealings with Mr. Bhutto have been those of a sincere government servant with the Chief Executive of the country. I think I acquitted myself well by telling him the truth in no uncertain terms, unlike his sycophant associates and some of my spineless colleagues. I spoke the truth clearly whenever I was asked for my opinion by him or whenever I thought he needed a clear picture. I was never snubbed for my views; indeed, I think he appreciated my frankness. I was neither rude nor audacious, simply frank. He was perfectly kind to me, and why not -- what wrong did I ever do him?

It was I who was responsible for making sure nobody touched Mr. Bhutto's family the night of the coup. Am I guilty of saving Mr. Bhutto -- or guilty of not saving, him, as some others say?

¹ October 1958 Commerce Minister in General Ayub's cabinet (Previously one month with Iskander Mirza as minister), January 1960 minister for minorities affairs, national development and information and newly raised ministry of fuel, energy and natural resources and Kashmir Affairs; 1963 foreign minister; 20 December 1971 President and Chief Martial Law Administrator (Civilian); 14 August 1973 Prime Minister (12 April 1973 National Assembly had passed constitution.)

I came in contact with Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for the first time in June 1972 at Murree, while I was Acting General Officer Commanding Murree Division. Mr. Bhutto was staying at Murree where he was assessing the opinions of different sections of society before going to Simla for talks with Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India.

On May 12 1972, Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Abdul Majid Malik and myself had gone to inspect our troops on location at Lipa Valley on a piece of land which we had recaptured from the Indians. This recapture had raised the morale of the whole nation and had infused a new life into the Army. On our return from Lipa Valley we picked up Brig Dildar, Rana from his Brigade Headquarters and went to the Haji Pir Pass to inspect some of the forward defended localities. From Haji Pir Pass we had to go to Bedori Bulge. As our helicopter landed at Kuthnar De Gali, 13,000 feet above sea level, the snow under the left wheel caved in. The pilot tried to take off immediately but did not succeed, so our helicopter rolled over to the left with Maj Gen A Majid Malik, Brig Dildar Rana, Capt Badar (Pilot) and myself in it. Roll after roll, the helicopter broke into smithereens but luckily, did not catch fire because of the snow. All of us suffered injuries. We were evacuated to Rawalpindi by another helicopter and hospitalized. I was in hospital for about ten days, then left for Murree, where, being the senior most Brigadier, I assumed command of the Division in place of the hospitalized Gen Malik. I was there in that capacity when Mr. Bhutto came to Murree.

One morning it was reported to me that a bullet had been fired by the guard at the residence of the President. That upset and worried me, so I ordered an immediate inquiry. It transpired that the bullet was fired accidentally. Disciplinary action was taken against those responsible for the lapse. Later, I had to attend a call from Mr. Bhutto who wanted to know about the shot. As I explained the whole case to him and assured him that everything was OK. He was satisfied.

Two or three days after the above incident, a conference was to be held at Government House, Murree, which some Federal Ministers were to attend. One of the ministers, a retired general, Maj Gen Akbar wanted to travel in his car on the Mall, Murree, where vehicular traffic was prohibited in summer except for vehicles specifically authorized under a Presidential order. When the minister reached the Military Police barrier near the Divisional Officers' Mess, he asked the barrier to be raised. The NCO on duty did not oblige, and reminded the minister that he was not authorized to use the route. He also pointed out the dignitaries mentioned on the displayed notice, who were permitted to use the Mall. The minister asked the NCO if he could get special permission to use the Mall from the GOC. The case was referred to me and I declined permission. The minister was then rude to the NCO and told him that he would force his way through. He was told by the NCO that in such a case he would be brought back by force. The minister chided the NCO and went away.

The minister must have reached the conference venue late and told Mr. Bhutto the reason for being late, because Mr. Bhutto rang me and wanted to know why the minister was not allowed on the Mall in his car. I explained the circumstances to Mr. Bhutto and suggested that if Federal Ministers were to be allowed to use the Mall then the Presidential orders might be amended. Mr. Bhutto thought over the matter and said that there would be no change of orders. He even said that he would "hold a class for his ministers and teach them how to behave".

The President was still in Murree holding meetings when his Military Secretary informed me that the President would like to spend an evening with the Armed Forces Officers of the Garrison. I asked the MS to find out his preference, whether he would like to be with us for an afternoon tea, a formal dinner, supper or cocktails. I was informed that as Mr. Bhutto had little time to spare, he would prefer to be with the officers at a cocktail party of about 45 minutes duration.

It was arranged accordingly. I received him at the Officers' Mess and introduced him to the officers present. He was delighted to be amongst us and we felt honored. Most of us had seen him on TV and had listened to him on TV and Radio, but had never had the opportunity to meet him face to face. There was suspense and a natural inquisitiveness, along with reservations, respect and even awe.

Drinks were served and everyone was on his feet, also on his toes. I was playing host. We were all listening to Mr. Bhutto with keen interest when he started talking of his impending visit to India. Then he asked me if, my officers would like to ask him any questions. I said if he would allow it, the officers would like to become wiser. Mr. Bhutto, while allowing this, perhaps did not realize that intellectual honesty and straightforwardness were inveterately stamped on the character of an average army officer. He perhaps thought that the pattern would be the same as that of his Federal Ministers, who used to address him as "Hazoor" (Your honor), 'Janaab-e-Aali' (Respected Sir) and 'Aali Jaah' (Highly Placed).

Lt Col Mohammad Saleem (Administrative Commandant Station HQ Murree) was the first to ask a question. *"Sir, you are going to a country which dismembered Pakistan. There must be some personalities amongst our countrymen who deserve punishment for the defeat. Who are the people, in your opinion, responsible for the fall of Dacca?"* Mr. Bhutto was taken aback by this question but he got hold of himself in no time, and answered the question in a very roundabout manner. I could see the atmosphere was suddenly charged and that the officers were not satisfied with his answer. I changed the subject and introduced lighter questions.

I had hardly succeeded in easing the tension when Col Saleem asked another question, *"Sir, you were with Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan in his cabinet and then you left him."*

What were the reasons for his downfall?" Mr. Bhutto replied that, apart from other things, he was let down by his advisers. They used to give him bad advice.

At this, I interrupted and said that I did not agree with that because at that level the advisers were not thrust on anybody but were selected by the Field Marshal himself. So President Ayub slipped up when he selected his advisers. He was to be blamed for making the wrong choice, not the advisers for being bad. Then I said that I hope you would . . . At this stage Mr. Bhutto put his hand on my shoulder and said "*I know what you are going to say but, Faiz, please remember I will never let it happen*" (He proved to be wrong. History repeated itself.)

After some more questions of a general nature he wanted to leave, because he had to host a dinner. I escorted, him to his car, saw him off and thanked him for being with us that evening I was not in a position to assess whether Mr. Bhutto regretted his coming to us, or whether he appreciated the frankness displayed by the officers indicating, after all confidence in, and respect for, Mr. Bhutto.

On the following day, I went to my office early and wrote down all that had happened at the cocktail party. I knew that the Chief of Army Staff, Gen Tikka Khan, would be keen to know what had happened. Sure enough, after about an hour, I got a telephone call from Gen Tikka Khan who asked me what had gone wrong at the party on the previous night, as Mr. Bhutto was annoyed over the behavior of the officers. I explained to Gen Tikka Khan and told him that I had already sent a written report to him on the subject through a courier, and that it would be reaching him in about two hours.

Nothing was heard about all this for some days till Gen Majid Malik was released from hospital and resumed command. I narrated the incident to him when handing over duty and asked him to read the report which I had sent to Gen Tikka Khan. Shortly thereafter, Gen Malik called me to his office and told me that GHQ had asked him why Lt Col Mohammad Saleem should not be made to retire from service for behavior in an insolent manner towards Mr. Bhutto in the Officer's Mess during the cocktail party.

I was shocked to hear this, and told Gen Majid that Col Saleem's behavior was neither insolent nor unbecoming. He was respectful, and behaved within the norms of the officers' code of honor. Mr. Bhutto had permitted the questions to be asked, and no question was asked which could be termed derogatory or unimportant. I said that if anybody was to be blamed, then it must be the senior most officer, i.e. myself. Col Saleem's retirement must not be considered. If anybody was to be made to retire, I would do so voluntarily. My point of view was partially accepted. Col Saleem was not made to retire but, as a punishment, was posted to a unit on the Karakoram Highway where he had already spent four years. I thought, and still think, that that was unfair.

At that time, different types of command experience were required for promotion to the rank of a General Officer. (The situation changed in the days of Zia, who promoted officers without and command experience, which went to destroy the fibre of Generalship.) I was to be posted to command an infantry brigade which could be anywhere in Pakistan. Gen Majid told me that I was being considered for posting as an independent brigade commander in Rajanpur and asked whether would like to go or to continue under his command, in which case I would have to serve at Muzaffarabad. I told Gen Majid that I would not mind serving anywhere and that I would leave the decision to him and General Headquarters. I was subsequently posted to Muzaffarabad as an infantry brigade commander.

At this stage I must state that I served in Azad Kashmir in different ranks and at different places over a considerable period of time. I had fought all three wars in Azad Kashmir. I had physically traversed the entire area from Marala Head-works to Ath Muqam I had always loved to serve the people of this hardy area which was devoid of modern facilities. I was pleased to go to Muzaffarabad. By virtue of my seniority I also became the Station Commander of Muzaffarabad.

During my stay at Muzaffarabad, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan was the President of Azad Kashmir and of the Muslim Conference, The PPP had been trying to assert its influence and infiltrate into Azad Kashmir also. So, over a period of time, the relations between the Pakistan Government, i.e. Mr. Bhutto, and the Azad Kashmir Government, i.e. Sardar Qayum, became strained. The tension and mud-slinging increased day by day. It affected the whole atmosphere of Azad Kashmir and India watched the situation with keen interest. Since the Lipa Valley action, their troops had been on the alert to take advantage of any political situation and exploit it to their military advantage.

I was camping with my Headquarters on the Kafir Khan range when Gen Majid talked to me on the secrophone, and asked me to reach Muzaffarabad as soon as possible and to talk to him from there on the secrophone. I reached Muzaffarabad and contacted him at Murree at about three o'clock in the morning. He gave me my mission, as given to him by Mr. Bhutto through GHQ: arrest Sardar Qayum and take him by a helicopter to Gilgit. Mr. Bhutto had given an order for the removal of a democratically elected President.

I was fully aware of the local civil and political situation in Azad Kashmir, as due to the tension there we had already been alerted for internal security duties, in addition to our normal operational duties which needed a round-the-clock vigil on our part. I frankly explained the delicate situation to Gen Majid and told him that, although I would obey the orders. I felt that Sardar Qayum should not be arrested, that the tension could be eased through a dialogue which could take place at a date place and time convenient to the President, and that I would make Sardar Qayurn available for that Sardar Qayum's arrest was at that stage fraught with the risk of a political uprising in Azad Kashmir.

The thinning out of my troops from forward positions, weakening of my defenses, and working without any local and tactical reserves, would have meant making ourselves highly vulnerable to an attack by the Indians.

I also told Gen Majid to convey to the President that Sardar Qayum had about 150 to 200 armed people at his residence, police guards and his own Muslims Conference *Mujahids* and in a situation like that there was always the possibility of bloodshed, intentionally or inadvertently. Therefore I could not give a hundred percent guarantee that he would be arrested alive. I requested that my view as a local commander be conveyed to Mr. Bhutto before final orders, which would be obeyed in letter and spirit were given. My point of view was conveyed to Mr. Bhutto who luckily agreed with me. I was told to make Sardar Qayum available at Rawalpindi at 5 PM the following day.

I went to the Presidency at Muzaffarabad, unescorted and unarmed, met Sardar Qayum and explained to him the gravity of the prevailing situation. He asked me if I was certain that there was no danger to his life and that he would return to Muzaffarabad safely. He was terribly upset and worried about his life. He showed some distrust in Mr. Bhutto, I calmed him down and assured him that he would come back. This was my word of honor as a soldier to Sardar Qayum. I had got it from Gen Majid before proceeding to meet Sardar Qayum. He then accompanied me to the helipad. When I was escorting him out of the Presidential residence, all the people present there had their eyes fixed on me, wondering what was to happen to their President.

He was seen off by me, received at Rawalpindi by the appropriate protocol authorities, had a meeting with Mr. Bhutto and the matter was resolved. Tension was reduced. He rang me up from Rawalpindi to inform me that all had gone well. I got his telephone connections restored which had been severed previously and made him speak to his residence at Muzaffarabad so that his family could sleep in peace. I also told his people to arrange a good reception for him at Kohala on his return to Azad Kashmir the following day. Overall it was very kind of the President to listen to my advice and act on it. (In one of the later meetings we had, Mr. Bhutto told me that some federal ministers had asked him to retire me compulsorily from service on this issue, to which he had replied that he could not retire an officer who had the moral courage to tell the truth,)

Sometime in May 1973, Gen Majid Malik invited Mr. Bhutto for an informal lunch at Murree. He also invited me to come from Muzaffarahad for this, it was only three of us at table. They discussed a 1973 conspiracy, while I listened. Mr. Bhutto remarked that if the officers had been properly punished in 1971 there would have been no conspiracy in 1973. Mr. Bhutto thanked us for the lunch and left. I felt Gen Majid had a good rapport with Mr. Bhutto.

In November 1973 when Mr. Bhutto visited the Azad Kashmir areas, I was General Officer Commanding at Jhelum with operational responsibility for Eftikharabad (Chhamb), Bhimber, Somani etc. It fell to me to make arrangements for his visit and to accompany him throughout his stay in my area. I arranged a public address for him at Bhimber, followed by a cup of tea with the Garrison officers. This time, it went off very well. Thereafter I took him to forward positions. I made our helicopter land only 100 yards from the enemy troops (I had made foolproof security arrangements for this) so that he might have a feel of life in the forward trenches. I made him address the troops only 300 yards away from the Indian troops. Brig Sher Ali Baz gave him lunch in the Officers' Mess. He went back very pleased with what he termed an "educative trip". During this trip we had discussed the enemy's and our own capabilities in very clear terms, and he appreciated the frankness with which I explained matters.

In August 1974, Gen Tikka Khan told me that he was thinking of posting me as Military Secretary in GHQ. Despite my request to leave me in command of troops rather than moving me to a desk job in GHQ, I was posted to GHQ.

During my stay there, I had many opportunities to meet and listen to Mr. Bhutto whenever he came to GHQ, either to attend COAS Annual Exercise or to attend any of the deliberations of the selection board meetings. On one of these occasions, when a general discussion was going on during the selection of a brigadier for the rank of a major general, I had remarked that "a minister can be made overnight but a general or a statesman was not made overnight. It was a lifetime's effort." Mr. Bhutto had agreed.

After Gen Zia had been appointed COAS, he went to the Prime Minister with a list of Major Generals for discussion and selection for promotion to the rank of Lt. General. He came back with only one name cleared, and that was myself. Mr. Bhutto remarked that he knew Gen Chishti because he had met him off and on. He would consider the others at subsequent sittings. He had also agreed to post me to 10 Corps in view of my intimate knowledge of Azad Kashmir and Northern areas. There the troops sit throughout the year eyeball to eyeball with the enemy under difficult conditions, in very harsh terrain and under operational readiness. It happened that for easier communications the headquarters was located at Chaklala, Rawalpindi. It was a difficult and challenging command, extending from Marala Head-works to Khunjrab Pass with the terrain rising from 950 feet above sea level to 27,000 feet. I think I acquitted myself well and did not surrender even an inch of territory to India.

I met Mr. Bhutto in 1976 on very few occasions and most of the time it was just an exchange of formal salutations, but when President Daoud had come from Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to travel with them as a co-passenger in the helicopter, and then when Mr. Bhutto visited the Northern areas and stayed in Gilgit for three days, I was in regular attendance. I took him to address the troops and visit the Chinese camp and

other sites. I also arranged a dinner in his honor in the Northern Areas Headquarters' Mess.

During the floods in 1976, Mr. Bhutto used to go out of Rawalpindi almost every other day. Gen Zia ordered me to see him off and receive him on each occasion on his behalf. I did it whenever I was present in Rawalpindi. One day, when I received him, Mr. Bhutto asked me not to come to the airport to receive him or see him off, as it must be wasting a lot of my time. I told him that I could not help it because I was under orders from the COAS. In case he did not want me to do it, he could order the COAS to stop this practice. I never, received the cancellation of these orders so I continued doing it. Mr. Bhutto knew fully well that I was not a sycophant or a hypocrite.

It was well-known that Mr. Bhutto did not like or appreciate suggestions or criticism from his colleagues and subordinates. That is why, perhaps most of his associates abandoned him at the earliest opportunity. Many a time I differed with Mr. Bhutto, not for the sake of criticism, but rather to interpret things correctly so that he could benefit. He knew I was a professional soldier, and he respected me for my intellectual honesty. But whenever I told the truth, it was at the peril of my career. Only those who knew Mr. Bhutto can understand this.

During the course of the PNA agitation in early 1977, we had numerous meetings with Mr. Bhutto in which I used to say in clear terms that he should go for re-elections, otherwise the Army would have to take over as an institution. Even if all the generals were sacked, just as long as the army was there, a COAS (it does not matter what rank) would be there and would take over. He understood this point, and agreed. I always aired my views frankly when others would keep quiet and play dumb, whereas outside the meeting hall they would often agree wholeheartedly with me. My frankness, which was acceptable to Mr. Bhutto, has often been a subject of discussion and quite a lot has been written about it. I have been blamed for being too 'outspoken'. It has also been stated that when I talked, it led to "pin-drop silence", or "the PM would get depressed" listening to me etc.

I wonder if I was not supposed to tell the truth. One fact is well-known, and that is that I used to suggest and insist on political solutions to political problems. If this was not done, the army would have no option but to take over. Take for example, if two children start fighting and take knives out to attack each other, would an observer remain a silent spectator or should he intervene to ensure that no bloodshed takes place? The Army was playing a similar role, as an observer to the aftermath of the March elections. I used to recommend re-elections to Mr. Bhutto, as later I did to Gen Zia after Operation Fairplay.

So far I have given details of the contacts which I had with Mr. Bhutto prior to July 5, 1977. (More details of this period are mentioned in the chapters dealing with Elections

and the Election Cell.) After the Army takeover on July 5, 1977, I had three meetings with Mr. Bhutto and each of them was unique.

A week after the takeover, Gen Zia, the CMLA and the COAS, planned to go to Murree to meet the political leaders of the PNA and the former PM who were under leaders of the PNA and the former PM who were under protective custody. Administratively Murree was under my command. So, according to protocol, when the COAS was to visit Murree, I had to receive him and conduct him around unless he specifically wanted me not to do it. I asked him the programme and he indicated that he would like to go on July 15 by helicopter. I told him that I would receive him at Murree, which had been the common drill. He ruled it out and said that I should receive him at Rawalpindi, then accompany him to Murree and stay with him throughout his visit there. Any other inferences drawn of my presence with Gen Zia on this trip would be misconstruing the facts.

On reaching Murree, Gen Zia, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Maj Gen K M Arif and I were received by Maj Gen (later Gen) Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan and conducted to his office. The CMLA expressed a desire that Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Professor Abdul Ghafoor meet him in Gen Akhtar's office. Word was sent, and the three were escorted to the office. Three of us stayed with Gen Zia while Gen Akhtar went to attend to some administrative details. The CMLA and the three leaders talked over a cup of tea. The atmosphere was pleasant. I was meeting them for the first time. When Gen Zia asked them how they were feeling, they replied that they were being looked after very well and respectfully, and, in fact, were being overfed by Gen Chishti who was sending in a lot of mangoes. (This was because they had specially asked for mangoes.) I joked with Mufti Sahib that they were 'Nine Stars' whereas a Great Bear had only seven stars. To this Mufti replied not to worry, because soon they would be reduced to seven since Tehrik-e-Istaqlal and Jamiat U,lema-e-Pakistan were thinking of leaving the PNA.

They wanted to know what was in store for them, to which Gen Zia replied that they (politicians) were tired and were being given an enforced rest. They should stay there for a while, and rejuvenate themselves for the coming General Elections. He told them that he would be seeing the former PM also, and after some days all the leaders would be allowed to pursue their activities in the manner they thought fit. He could not give any specific date for their release. Mufti Mahmood asked Gen Zia if he planned to meet other PNA leaders also, to which Gen Zia replied 'yes'. Mufti then asked him to have lunch with them, to which Gen Zia agreed. Thereafter these three leaders left for the residence where they were being detained. We joined them for lunch after about an hour or so Maj Gen Akhtar also accompanied us.

Gen Zia met the other PNA leaders there. The conversation, was about their eagerness to get out and prepare for General Elections, which they thought they would win by an

outright majority. During lunch Gen Zia addressed Air Marshal Asghar Khan and told him that he did not like the way he had written and addressed the letter to the Armed Forces Commanders. Air Marshal Asghar said that there was nothing wrong in it, and that it was the need of the day Gen Zia told him that it was sedition, and he would like to try him for that. Tempers were high, and Air Marshal Asghar Khan told him to do whatever he could do. He was ready to answer for all the consequences. Mufti Mahmood intervened and defused the situation. After lunch the CMLA had to go to meet Mr. Bhutto. so we left for Government House.

This was going to be the first meeting between Gen Zia and Mr. Bhutto since Mr. Bhutto was deposed. How would they meet? How would they behave? What would be the outcome? All these things must have passed through Gen Zia's mind, but he did not utter a word. He remained calm and composed till we reached Government, House, Gen Zia and myself in one car and Maj Gen Akhtar following us in another. At Government House we were received by Maj Gen Imtiaz, MS to the former PM, who was still with him. We were guided to the lounge and we were still standing when Mr. Bhutto walked in from the adjoining room. He shook hands with both of us. Maj Gen Imtiaz had withdrawn by about four paces whereas Maj Gen Akhtar had stayed outside to inspect his own contingent at Government House. Mr. Bhutto asked us to sit down. Gen Zia sat down promptly whereas I showed a little, reluctance due to decorum and protocol. Gen Zia asked Mr. Bhutto if it was all right with him if I stayed. He did not mind and asked Maj Gen Imtiaz to get us some tea. Thereafter Gen Imtiaz left.

So much trash has been written about this initial meeting that one is baffled by the distortions. But the reasons for the distortions could be the following:

- Zia was the junior most Lt Gen, yet was promoted by Mr. Bhutto as a special favor.
- Zia was never recommended to be the COAS, by Gen Tikka Khan the outgoing COAS.
- Zia was hypocritical, treacherous and perfidious.
- Zia was made COAS because, at Sadiq Hussain Qureshi's residence in Multan, he had taken an oath on the Quran that he would be loyal to Mr. Bhutto.
- Zia had been behaving as if he was a personal servant of Mr. Bhutto etc.

It was, however, a confirmed fact that Gen Zia had sworn loyalty to Mr. Bhutto till the end. It was Mr. Bhutto who got the army sucked in, Gen Zia really had no option left but to take over, and Mr. Bhutto knew it.

There were only three of us at this meeting. The conversation between Mr. Bhutto and Gen Zia started on a very polite note. I was a silent observer. All of us had in mind that Mr. Bhutto was in a terrible fix before Operation Fairplây. He would, not order a

General Election mainly for two reasons. Firstly, what would the world think that he had rigged the elections! How would his name go down in history (he was always worried, about this). Secondly, his, close associates (federal ministers) would not let him do it. The other alternative to come out of the impasse was to voluntarily hand over to the army. That would have meant his political death. He knew it and he would not do it. (I am not writing these points only today. I had mentioned these points in meetings with him and had urged him to go for General Elections, but his advisers -- in particular Hafeez Pirzada would not let that happen. I had told him that his party would still win).

Mr. Bhutto started the conversation. He did not seem angry. He was composed but seemed a little despondent worried about his future as anything could happen under Martial Law. He asked us how we were and how things were. Gen Zia said that through God's kindness everything was under control. Mr. Bhutto said he did not mind the army takeover, perhaps that was the only solution, but more important was how future events should be planned. How would Zia do it? What would his decision be? Mr. Bhutto would be available for help and guidance. Gen Zia should clear the deck, and then they would run the country jointly and smoothly. It was up to Gen Zia how to do it.

Mr. Bhutto said that the military takeover had constitutional implications, but he being the father of the Constitution knew how to overcome those difficulties. Gen Zia should not worry about them, but concentrate on other important matters. It was not easy to rule Pakistan. The Army should not be withdrawn from Baluchistan, and Sindh should be looked after. He said not to worry about what anybody, would say, he would not be vindictive. He also said that Ch. Zahur Elahi's utterances were obnoxious. Everything had been changed in Larkana. He urged that we keep Gen Yahya Khan under constant arrest, saying that if he was released, somebody would kill him. The Hyderabad case should stay. Do not trust "these *Maulvis* and Wali Khan", he warned.

Gen Zia in response said that he was only a temporary custodian. Thereafter it was going to be all Mr. Bhutto's again and he should manage it as deemed fit. Gen Zia said the army would be neutral and hold elections as announced. Mr. Bhutto asked how long he would be in custody, to which Gen Zia said for some days only, during which he should rest and recoup. Mr. Bhutto urged that all the political leaders be let out soon because there was a lot to be done before elections. Mr. Bhutto requested Gen Zia that PPP Ministers under custody at Abbotabad be moved, if possible, to Murree, so that they could meet, as the PNA leaders were together. To this Gen Zia agreed and ordered me to do it. We left for the helipad to return to Rawalpindi. We were, seen off by Maj Gen Akhtar.

The next meeting took place on July 28, 1977 at Murree. I was again with Gen Zia, for reasons explained earlier (Murree being under my administrative control). The CMLA

and five MLA's had reviewed the situation which prevailed from July 5 to July 27, 1977. It was thought that tempers had calmed down, polarization had been reduced, administrative control was effective, peace was prevailing, and there was no apparent danger of confrontation between the PPP and the PNA and that there was now no threat to the life of any political leader. So it was decided by the CMLA that the leaders held under protective custody should be allowed freedom of movement from July 28. For this he would like to meet and inform them himself. It was against this background that we were in Murree on July 28.

This time Gen Imtiaz was not there because he had been withdrawn, according to the instructions of the CMLA. He had reverted to the army. Maj Gen Akhtar was however with us as protocol required. Gen Zia met Mr. Bhutto and informed him that they were free to go and pursue their activities for elections. Mr. Bhutto repeated that he being the father of the Constitution knew how to overcome constitutional problems. Gen Zia should concentrate on providing an efficient and clean administration so that the elections would be fair, impartial and just. He also said that in case of need he might be contacted at Larkana where he intended to go.

Gen Zia said that the PM's aircraft was on standby at Chakiala, and would take him to Larkana after Mr. Bhutto reached Rawalpindi, Gen Zia also asked Mr. Bhutto if, he would like to go to Rawalpindi by helicopter or by car. Mr. Bhutto said that he would prefer helicopter. I told him that both were ready. As Gen Zia got up to go, Mr. Bhutto asked him if he would like to meet the other PPP leaders who had by then reached Government House. Gen Zia said that he would love to pay his respects to all of them. So we moved to the next room where all of them had gathered. Gen Zia met them and stayed with them for a few minutes. Some points which were raised by the former federal ministers included the complaint that so much was being said in the press against the former head of government that the country was getting a bad name. What would the world say? Please do not tarnish the image and name of the country, they said and asked that political activity be allowed in the schools and colleges etc. All the former federal ministers were in good health and seemed eager to take on the challenge. I was again a patient listener there, and do not recall having uttered a single word; I was merely in attendance.

During July and August the weather sometimes becomes very cloudy in Murree due to the monsoons. We had just managed to take off from Murree when the weather deteriorated. As a result Mr. Bhutto could not go to Rawalpindi by helicopter and left by car, so he, could not go to Larkana on July 28. He stayed the night in Rawalpindi and decided to go to Larkana in the morning. I was asked by Gen Zia to see him off. I received Mr. Bhutto at the Chakiala PAF Base VIP room on the morning of July 29 I asked him if he would like to have a cup of tea in the VIP room, instead of standing and waiting outside while his baggage was being loaded and the Falcon being got ready for flight. He accepted my offer and we stayed for some time in the VIP room.

While having tea he told me that he admired and appreciated my frankness and forthright approach in giving unbiased views. He also told me that many times he had thought of announcing the date of re-elections on my advice, based on analyses of the situation, but three of his colleagues did not let him. He wished he had not listened to them. Then out of the blue, he asked me as to what his course of action should be. I was taken aback and kept quiet. What could I say? He insisted on a sincere reply from me. All that I said was that he should go abroad for about a month and have a well-earned rest. He then asked me, with a twinkle in his eye, if I could do anything for him. I told him that he had missed the opportunity and he should wait with patience and prepare for elections. Then the plane was reported ready, and I escorted him to it, saluted him and left the airport as the plane taxied towards the runway.

A third meeting took place with Mr. Bhutto on August 28, I was in my office doing some routine work when Gen Zia telephoned me that Mr. Bhutto was to meet him at his residence at about 2:30 in the afternoon, and that I should also be present at the meeting.

What did I have to do with the meeting? Was anybody else also required to be there? The answer was in the negative. I had to be there as Chairman, Election Cell. I reached Gen Zia's residence and we stood outside waiting for Mr. Bhutto's arrival. He came and I found him off color. He was not the same Mr. Bhutto that I had met earlier. He looked depressed. I guessed it could be an outcome of the rather harsh telephonic conversation that they had had when Gen Zia was at Murree. We went inside and Gen Zia asked him if he would like to have a cup of tea. He said no, he was fasting. (It was the month of Ramzan.)

After the normal exchange of formalities, Mr. Bhutto asked Gen Zia how the progress was towards the October Elections. Gen Zia replied that things were under control and that he would be discharging his duties for the restoration of democracy with earnestness and vigor. Then he asked me how the Election Cell was doing. I told him that we were fairly busy. We had met quite a few political leaders since July 5. I named some of them. When I named Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Gen Zia interrupted and said that he was one person whom he was not going to spare or pardon. He said he would be dealt with properly. Mr. Bhutto remarked that so far he had not authorized anybody from the PPP to meet the Election Cell. I asked him if he would be able to meet the Election Cell if required. He said he would be available at Larkana, and I could contact him any time to discuss anything with him.

He said he did not know Gen Jamal Said Mian, but he knew both Generals Farman and Ihsan. He said Ihsan was all right but Farman was not a good choice. He reminded me how Ihsan was put in the Defence Production Division and Farman in the Fauji Foundation on Gen Tikka Khan's recommendations when I was Military Secretary in

GHQ. Then he complained to Gen Zia that all manner of rubbish was appearing in the newspapers about him and that his character was being attacked. He requested Gen Zia to give instructions to the press to stop it and put an end to this character assassination.

Gen Zia told Mr. Bhutto that the press was free to write what it wanted as he had given freedom to the press. He could not now issue such an order. If Mr. Bhutto wanted to say something against it, he was free to say whatever he wanted to say. If desired, according to the law, he could also go to court against the Press and file libel cases. Gen Zia said that, the civil courts were functioning effectively.

Gen Zia was not warm. He was rather frigid. It was evident that Mr. Bhutto did not expect that kind of response. He became pensive and said that it seemed that the government was interested in his character assassination.

Then he asked me to tell Gen Zia to do something so that the campaign to malign his name would be stopped. I replied that, in my opinion, it was all being done by the owner of the newspapers on their own. The government wanted his character assassination, it would disclose his activities and that of his colleagues while under custody at Murree. The military government would not hit below the belt. Our neutrality was evident. At this he said that it was all propaganda, and I told him that he knew very well all that was confiscated on various occasions was lying in the Corps HQ under the custody of Brig (later Lt Gen) Imtiaz Warraich. He kept quiet and changed the subject. After some time he expressed a desire to leave and Gen Zia and I escorted him to his car. That was my last meeting with Mr. Bhutto, I never saw him again.

Gen Zia before he became the COAS

In early 1966 I was at Chattar Bagh (Azad Kashmir), when I received orders posting me to the Command and Staff College, Quetta, as an instructor. It was a prized job for a professional soldier. I was to reach Quetta by mid April. I had been in the Bagh area for about six, months after my transfer from Chhamb Jaurian to this Sector. My area of responsibility extended from Tatta Pani to Pir Kanthi. It was in this area, Durandi to be exact, that as I got out of my jeep and entered the bunker, a 25 pounder shell hit my jeep and destroyed it. I informed my supported Brigade Commander, Col A. Razzaq, about it. He asked me if I was sitting in the jeep at that time. "If I had been sitting I would not be speaking to you now," I replied.

The Command and Staff College, Quetta, had closed down in 1965 after the declaration of the Indo-Pak war and the instructors were posted out. It was restarted in mid-1966; The first Training Course was scheduled for July 1966. The newly posted Commandant Chief Instructor, and all of us who were instructors reached Quetta by mid-April so that the necessary spadework could be done to start the training classes on time. It was a tradition of the college that the newly posted instructors give maiden speeches only to

the fellow instructors in the Directing Staff ante-room -- these were considered as assessment lectures as well. So all of us had to go through that. As everyone was new, it was decided that everyone would speak and the sequence of speakers would be in alphabetical order. The Commandant Maj. Gen Akhtar Ali Malik, was to be the last speaker and the Chief Instructor, Brig Amjad Ali Khan, the last but one. My turn came on the fourth or fifth day. The subject of the lecture given, for everyone was "Your personal experiences of the 1965 war". I had been involved in that war from April 1965 to March 1966. I was with Gen Akhtar Malik and Brig Chaudhry when the war started and had been intimately involved in its execution in the Chhamb-Jaurian Sector. I began my lecture with a traditional opening story.

"Two stalwarts were passing through Raja Bazar. One of them was the Devil. The other asked him, "How do wars start?" He replied that it was a very simple affair. The Devil spotted two shops side by side, a confectionery shop and a drapery shop. He made his friend, sit in front of them. The confectioner had a cat and the draper a dog as pets. The confectioner was heating the treacle for sweetmeats. The Devil dipped his finger into it, smeared it on the wall and went back to his friend to sit and watch. After a while some flies sat on the treacle smear on the wall. A young lizard started a tactical approach to eat the flies. The confectioner's cat leaped to catch the lizard. The draper's dog barked and pounced on the cat. The confectioner hit the dog with his ladle. The draper got hold of the steel cloth-measuring rod and hit the confectioner. The confectioner retaliated with the ladle. The fight had started. The Devil told his friend to take note of how simple it was to start a fight. "That is how wars start." said the Devil.

After this story I remarked that in the case of the war of 1965. I did not know whether it was Gen Akhtar Malik who had smeared the treacle or somebody else.

Thereafter I related my, experiences of the war of 1965, starting from April 1964 when my Unit moved to the Lahore Front, then to Kharian Cantt, into Azad Kashmir, Chamb, Jaurian, towards Akhnur etc. After the cease-fire I was ordered to Haji Pir Pass where fighting was still going on. (It continued till about February 1966.) I concluded my lecture with my arrival at the college at Quetta. After my lecture Gen Akhtar Malik got up and said that although he was to speak last, as Col Chishti had asked who smeared the wall to make the war start, he would like to speak out Of turn and answer.

So, he spoke to us for about two hours and gave us the complete background on how the 1965 Indo-Pak war had started. That was straight from the horse's mouth. As far as the conduct of the war was concerned, most of us, the instructors, had been involved in it at different places, at different levels, and under different circumstances. The consensus of opinion was that there was no Generalship during the war of 1965. It was only the junior leadership which had acquitted itself well and saved the country.

From April onwards we were to revise and update all papers connected with the Staff Course to be started in July. So we were very busy and used to be together only in the Directing Staff (DS) ante-room for mid morning tea. During one of the tea breaks a fellow instructor walked in with another officer. He was introduced as Lt Col Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq. He had come to Quetta to see his family whom, he had left behind when the Staff College had closed down and he was posted as Assistant Adjutant & Quarter Master General of the newly raised Infantry Division. The appointment did not speak highly of him. The most promising officers go to the operational and intelligence side. We shook hands and continued with our work. We were neither mutually impressed nor attracted. That was my first meeting with Gen Zia.

He was two years and two months senior to me. Zia was an Armoured Corps Officer, while I was an Artillery Officer. I did not know where he was at the time of the Partition -- Indonesia I think ---- nor did I know when he had, come to Pakistan. We had never met before 1966. So the notion that we might have been friends from school or college days at Jalandhar or even neighbors in pre-Partition days is all a figment of the imagination.

My second meeting with Gen Zia, was again in the Staff College DS ante-room about three months later, when he came to Quetta to collect his family to move to his current station of duty. This time too there was no exchange of words other than the normal courtesies. We next met in 1973 when we had assembled in GHQ for the Annual Conference cum Selection Board. We were both Major Generals at that time. He was posted at Multan and I was at Eftikharabad (Chhamb). Once again there was nothing more than the normal exchange of courtesies.

I joined General Headquarters in September 1974 as Military Secretary (MS). One of the duties which the MS had to perform was to prepare the papers of all officers due to be considered for promotion. Their cases were to be discussed in two Selection Boards, viz April Selection Board for consideration of officers for the rank of Colonel and above, and August Selection Board for selection of officers from the rank of Major to Lt Colonel. Preparations and updating of papers meant that the Annual Confidential Reports of the officers under consideration were to be reviewed, checked, endorsed by the COAS (where applicable), filed and then forwarded to the General Officers who were to be members of the Selection Board. (All Generals were not supposed to be members. Only the Commanders and PSO's were members.)

While preparing the papers for the Selection Boards I noticed that the Annual Reports of Officers serving under Gen Zia had ,not been received. In some cases the ACR's were overdue by two years. I wrote him a letter, but to no effect. Then I admonished him over the telephone and he said that he would dispatch them soon. I noticed that he often delayed matters, so I got a letter written to him, and signed by Gen Tikka Khan.

That evoked some response, but not much. I remember very distinctly that for the April 1975 Selection Board. I had to get overdue reports written by Zia on a day-to-day basis when he was in Rawalpindi. All in all, it was a shocking state of irresponsibility. Yet it was during this period that he was promoted to the rank of Lt Gen. I told him that the new rank had added to his responsibilities Laughingly he said, "Yes, *Murshid* (Mentor), I will be careful". He never was.

As Military Secretary at GHQ I used to visit Formation Headquarters and units located all over Pakistan. I also went to Multan where Gen Zia was the Corps Commander in 1975. I visited his Corps HQ and the subordinate Division HQ and attended to the problems of his officers by listening to their grievances. Then I talked to the Garrison Officers on MS matters. I also exchanged ideas with Gen Zia. This can be considered our first meeting when we talked to each other in detail about professional matters. I was to stay, over in the Officers Mess but he did not let me stay there and asked me if I would mind staying with him in the Annexe of his Corps Commander's House. I agreed to stay with him and thanked him for the invitation. At dinner, at his house that Thursday evening, we were just the two of us, because all his family members were abroad. The next day I left for Rawalpindi.

In late 1975, I received a letter from him in which he had recommended that Maj Shakir be posted from Multan to Lahore. He had recommended the case as Corps Commander. I examined the case and informed him in writing that it could not be done. (I had known the Major even otherwise.) Later, in 1976, when it was announced that Gen Zia would be the next COAS, he gave me a ring from Multan and said, "*Murshid*, now you will have to post Shakir to Lahore. Ha. Ha. Ha;" I replied, "Sir, it cannot be done. You are still a Corps Commander. We will see when you become COAS," He accepted this in good humor. That is about all that passed between ourselves as Generals of the same Army till he became the COAS.

Another case which was verbally referred to me was during the period when Gen Zia was a Corps Commander in Multan in 1975, and had invited the PM for lunch. The route nominated ran through the Army officers colony there Gen Zia had asked the ladies and children to come out of their houses to welcome the PM by clapping. One of the officers objected. Gen Zia then asked me to retire him from service. As Military Secretary I refused to do so, because the officer had done nothing wrong. But later, after Zia became COAS, he retired this officer prematurely.

Zia becomes COAS

"I did not recommend General Zia to be the Chief of Army Staff." (Gen. Tikka Khan, quoted in *Al Fateh* March 30, 1978. Awaz Vol 1 No. 11, dated May 1979).

Since Gen Tikka Khan has said it, I can give a detailed account of the background to Gen Zia's promotion, since the whole case was processed through me as Military Secretary of the Pakistan Army. I was sitting in my office in General Headquarters when I received, a telephone call from Gen Tikka Khan, COAS from the Prime Minister's House at Larkana where he had gone for a picnic along with some ambassadors. He asked me if I was going to be in Rawalpindi during the next three days, or was I going to be away on tour because he wanted to discuss something very important on his return from Larkana. I told him that I would be available in Rawalpindi. When he returned from Larkana he called me over to his office. He told me that the PM had asked him if he would like to continue as Chief of Army Staff for another year, i.e. on extension. He wanted my views.

A Military Secretary of the Army has a dual role to perform, firstly the normal function of career planning, promotions, postings, appointments and redress of grievances etc, and secondly to act as a kind of godfather to the officers. So the advice had to be given to Gen Tikka Khan in both these capacities.

I told him that if he wanted to accept the extension, nobody would say that the PM gave it to him on his own initiative, but everybody would say that the old man could not leave his chair and was sticking to it unnecessarily, thus denying, the right of a subordinate general who should be promoted and appointed Chief of Army Staff. I also told him that he had a brilliant career as a professional soldier with about forty years of service to his credit and that he was respected in the country, which he should not put into disrepute by accepting an extension for another year. He agreed and said that his wife was also of the same Opinion. I told him that his wife was wiser than he. He then informed the PM that he would not like an extension but would prefer retirement. It was accepted.

Some days after Gen Tikka Khan's decision not to accept an extension, I went to him and asked him if he would like to send the recommendations for the appointment of the next Chief of Army Staff. He said that there was no hurry about, it because there was still a lot of time before his retirement. I then asked him if he had discussed the matter with the PM, or if the latter had ever shown an inclination towards any of our senior Lt Generals. Gen Tikka Khan replied that he had not discussed it with the PM and he did not feel the necessity of discussing it either, because the PM would appoint the new Chief of Army Staff as recommended to him.

I warned him that it might not always happen that way, in which case it would mean that the recommendation had not been honored. It would be highly derogatory and an insult to the post. Gen Tikka said that there was no fear of that because he was certain that the PM would do as advised. He would, however, give it a thought and let me know some other day. I kept reminding him about it, but he kept on delaying. Then one

day he called me and asked me to take down notes for preparing the recommendatory letter to be sent to Mr. Bhutto.

There were seven Lieutenant Generals under consideration for the appointment of Chief of Army Staff. In order of seniority they were: Mohammad Shariff, Aftab Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Akbar Khan, Azmat Baksh Awan, Malik Abdul Majid, Ghulam Jilani Khan and Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq. Gen Tikka Khan recommended that Lt Gen Muhammad Akbar Khan be promoted and appointed Chief of Army Staff. If that was not approved then Lt Gen Mohammad Shariff was the second choice. Lt Gen Aftab and Lt Gen Azmat were not recommended for the post on grounds of ability and Lt Gen Majid and Lt Gen Zia were not considered for the appointment, because they had just been promoted and had not acquired the requisite experience desirable for Lt Gen Jilani was unqualified as he had no command experience and was not to be considered at all.

I prepared a letter of recommendation accordingly, got it signed by the COAS, Gen Tikka Khan, and dispatched it to the PM. The office copy was retained by me in a Sealed envelope in my office. Nobody knew about these recommendations except Gen Tikka Khan, the Prime Minister, to whom the letter was sent, my office superintendent who had typed the letter and myself. We were expecting a reply to this letter, but it never came. Some days later, while playing golf, Maj Gen Saghir Hussan who was Military Secretary to the President, told me that Lt Gen Zia was going to be the next Chief of Army Staff. I expressed doubt, but never revealed, who had been recommended and who had not been. I asked him for his source of information, to which he replied that it was Lt Gen Zia himself, as he was very close to the Prime Minister through the People's Party stalwarts in Multan. I told him that as I did not know Lt Gen Zia at all, I had no comments to offer.

About a month from the day when the recommendations for the Chief of Army Staff appointment had been sent, Gen Tikka Khan called me to his office and told me that he had been informed by the Prime Minister that he was going to announce in the Cabinet that afternoon that Lt Gen Akbar and Lt Gen Majid had been retired, that Lt Gen Shariff had been promoted to a new appointment of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, a luxury we could ill afford, and that Lt Gen Zia had been promoted and appointed as Chief of Army Staff. These retirements, promotions and appointments were to be announced in the evening news on radio and television.

I requested Gen Tikka Khan that Gen Akbar and Gen Majid's retirements should not be announced, because it would be disrespectful. I asked Gen Tikka Khan as to what had happened to the recommendations sent by him and if the Prime Minister had discussed them with him. He said that not a word had passed between the Prime Minister and himself on this subject, the Prime Minister had done it on his own, completely ignoring his views.

I told Gen Tikka Khan that it was almost a custom of service that when a junior was promoted, the seniors asked for retirement. In that case, when Gen Zia, the junior most general, was being promoted, then the other senior generals views could be asked about their line of action I also told Gen Tikka Khan that in order to respect the uniform, let it be said that Generals Akbar and Majid had asked for retirement when they were superseded, rather than compulsorily retired by the Prime Minister. Firstly, this would not impair the image of the Prime Minister, as had happened when he had retired a lot of generals in one go when first taking over as civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of the country, and, secondly, it would be in accordance with the decorum of the customs of service in the Army. Gen Tikka Khan agreed with me and said that he would talk to the Prime Minister. There was no time to lose, as the Prime Minister was due to announce the changes in the Cabinet that same afternoon and it was almost lunch time.

The Prime Minister was luckily available on the telephone. He was kind enough to agree to our recommendation that only the promotion and appointment of Gen Zia be announced and no mention made of retirements. Before leaving Gen Tikka Khan's office I informed him that I was going to speak to Gen Akbar and Gen Majid and tell them about all that had transpired. He gave me permission to do so.

I went back to my office and talked to Gen Akbar and Gen Majid in Quetta and Peshawar respectively. I told them about Gen Zia's promotion and his new appointment and about their retirements. I had served with both of them in the Chinar Division, so I now advised both of them to leave their offices and go to the nearest brigade and divisional headquarters, and to let their sub-ordinates know that Gen Zia was being appointed Chief of Army Staff and that they being senior to him had decided to opt for retirement, with the Prime Minister kindly agreeing. They accepted this proposal and acted accordingly. In the evening it was announced on radio and television that General Shariff had been promoted and appointed as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in a new appointment, Gen Zia had been promoted and appointed as Chief of army Staff and that General Akbar and Majid had sought premature retirement.

It was my duty to talk to the other Lt Generals who were also in the running for promotion and were senior to Gen Zia. I informed them of the Prime Minister's decision, and asked them their plans on their future employment. Gen Aftab said that he would like to ask for retirement with the request that he be allowed to continue for one month because of some personal administrative problems. Gen Awan said that he would like to continue serving as long as his services were required. Gen Jilani decided to continue serving both Mr. Bhutto and Gen Zia-ul-Haq. Gen Zia became the Chief of Army Staff on March 1, 1976. At this stage I would like to express the Prime Minister's views on Gen Zia as stated by him on July 5, 1977 when he was taken to Government House, Murree, while under protective custody:

"When I was to select the COAS, people told me that Majid was a clever person, but this gentleman has proved to be the same." (Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan's letter DO NO 2145/8/PA dated July 7, 1977)

Why then was Gen Zia made Chief of Army Staff when he was not recommended by the Army? What did Mr. Bhutto see in him? How did Gen Zia manage to be in the good books of Mr. Bhutto? What was Gen Zia's lobby? Who had taught him how to win over a person like Mr. Bhutto?

Many angles have come to light since July 5, 1977, including Gen Zia's own utterances that nobody, but Allah made him the chief of Army Staff, that he was only answerable to Allah and that he was on a divine mission to impose Islam in Pakistan. This issue would not have been solved even if Gen Zia were alive, because he would not tell, and experience has shown that he did not tell, the truth. One thing was certain, that he had to be the best sycophant to win over Mr. Bhutto. I was recently given details of some of the first steps by which Gen Zia managed to win attention from, and then the favor of the Prime Minister. On January 1, 1988, I met Col Zahur Chughtai at a function at Lahore. He was a friend of Gen Zia and had done the Staff Course at Quetta in 1955 along with Gen Zia. He revealed to me that while at Multan Gen Zia used to visit PPP leaders' house, especially those of Sahibzada Faruq, Hamid Riza Gillani, Sadiq Hussain Qureshi and Sajjad Hussain Qureshi (whom he later appointed as Governor Punjab). He literally used to beg for invitations. He had adopted this method of sycophancy to get closer first to them, and then to Mr. Bhutto so that he could become the C-in-C. Gen. Zia had also shown a letter to Col Chughtai written by Gen Zia to Gen Sahibzada Yaqub at Washington to get Mr. Bhutto as Colonel in Chief of the Armoured Corps; He succeeded in getting it done through Gen Tikka Khan as COAS.

But was Gen Zia always like that or was he forced to become one? Who tutored, him to adopt this method to get closer to Mr. Bhutto to become his COAS? Did Zia want to become COAS, or was it a deep conspiracy by someone else who wanted to deal with the democratic elements in Pakistan through him?

I believe it is possible that the CIA got hold of him when he was training in the USA. I wonder why Gen Zia made friends with Mrs. Herring, an honorary Consul of Pakistan in Houston. Texas. May be Zia's stay in Jordan took him closer to the CIA and the fundamentalist Muslims of Saudi Arabia. One thing is certain the he was carefully tutored on how to win over Mr. Bhutto and he did it successfully. Begum Nusrat Bhutto's view is given below:-

"Although during our stay at Sadiq Palace where Mr. Bhutto was staying there were inherent security arrangements yet on one evening Mr. Bhutto's security-in-charge told us that Maj Gen Zia-ul-Haq wanted the security arrangements to be

checked and supervised personally. Mr. Bhutto called him and conversed with him in this context. Later Mr. Bhutto told me that he had found his choice after Tikka Khan. Soon after this incident Mr. Bhutto promoted him to the rank of Lt Gen and gave indications to Gen Zia on which appointment did Mr. Bhutto wish to see him.

On July 5, 1977 I could only say "Thanks, Zia-ul-Haq." What else could I say in civilized words?"----

(Begum Nusrat Bhutto: *Moon Digest* July/August 1986 p 79).

Gen M Zia-ul-Haq assumed the duties of COAS on March 1, 1976. On his first day in office, he planned to meet all PSOs, and other general officers in General headquarters. He had told me that he would not be attending to any paper work that day. I had requested him for an audience just for one important case. He was reluctant and wanted to do it on the following day. I was insistent. He finally agreed to see the papers. I put up the case of Major Shakir and asked him to overrule my decision. But he agreed with my decision. I told him that that was the difference when looking at the Army as a whole as compared to seeing it as a segment from a Corps Commander's eyes. I thanked him for the considerations shown towards justice.

Before leaving his office I asked his permission to tell him the truth if he would tolerate it, because that was the only way I could discharge my duties as MS honestly and effectively. He answered in the affirmative, and said that not only did he want it, but expected it of me. Then I asked him why he distributed wrist-watches as gifts to the ceremonial guard which he had inspected in General Headquarters on his first entry to the COAS office. He said it was a good thing as a goodwill gesture. I realized then that the Army had gone into the hands of an officer who wanted to earn cheap popularity -- may be by corrupting others. That was the start of my difference with Gen Zia on matters of management. We were poles apart and remained strangers till we parted officially on March 30, 1980.

CHAPTER - THREE TOWARDS MARTIAL LAW

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto hosted a dinner for senior generals of the Army, at the Foreign Office, Islamabad, on October 30, 1976. Admirals and Air Marshals present in the twin cities of Islamabad-Rawalpindi were also invited. Some Federal Secretaries also attended. After the dinner a prepared speech was read out by Aziz Ahmed, the Foreign Minister. In his speech, he eulogized the measures taken by the Government to enhance the prestige and combat efficiency of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, That was only possible because of the political stability achieved by the Government under the able guidance of Mr. Bhutto. He dwelt on the fall of Dacca, the return of the prisoners of war, the Simla Agreement and the role of the Armed Forces etc. Towards the end of his speech he said that there was no scope for the generals to indulge in Bonapartism in a democratic society. He had, in the presence of the PM, -indicated in clear terms what the behavior of the generals should be. We thought those remarks were uncalled for. There was no occasion for such comments.

When analyzed in retrospect, it seems that those remarks were carefully planned, and the dinner was a part of a grand design. On November 15, 1976 Mr. Bhutto declared that his Government was fully prepared to go to the polls to meet the demands of the opposition parties. The elections were to be announced within ten days to two months. The National Assembly could also extend the date for General Elections by one year. (According to the 1973 Constitution the General Elections were due sometime in April 1978.)

Some opposition leaders got together on November 21, to examine the political situation prevailing in the country and considered the likelihood of holding General Elections. They decided on December 28 that the United Democratic Front (UDF) would take part in the General Elections. (The UDF had existed since 1972. Its components in 1976 were the Muslim League (ML), Jamiat-i-Islami (JI), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), National Democratic Party (NDP) previously National Awami Party (NAP) Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) Khaksaars and the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC))

On December 31 1976 Mr. Bhutto announced that the decision regarding General Elections would be taken at an appropriate time Meanwhile Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI) declared that the opposition parties would unite into a broad-based election alliance. He demanded that in view of the impending General Elections, Section 144 should be lifted, Section 144 restricts the assembly of more than four persons. On January 2, 1977, the final national and provincial constituencies were

announced Justice Sajjad Ahmed Jan was appointed Chief Election Commissioner. On January 3, Mr. Bhutto remarked that the verdict of the people on elections, whatever it might be, would be acceptable to the ruling party. Air Marshal M Asghar Khan and Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani had already met and explored the possibilities of cooperation in putting up joint candidates. Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri suggested that for free and fair elections, the Election Commission must have administrative authority. It seemed that all the major opposition parties were preparing joint action plans. They were also claiming that the PPP would be defeated in the General Elections. Maulana Mufti Mahmood expressed the hope that an accord would be reached amongst the opposition parties to nominate jointly approved candidates.

On January 4, 1977 it was announced that an Armed Forces Week would be celebrated in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir from January 31 to February 5, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, the COAS, assigned me the responsibility of organizing it in Rawalpindi.

On January 7, 1977 Mr. Bhutto announced General Elections -- they were the first to be held since 1970. The National Assembly Elections would be on March 7 and the Provincial Assembly Elections on March 10. He also said that from July 1, the weekly holiday would be on Friday instead of Sunday. Mufti Mahmood retorted that the Government would have to give practical proof of its honest intention of free and fair elections by releasing political workers and lifting Section 144. With most of the prominent opposition leaders in jail and with no apparent intention of releasing them, Mr. Bhutto had reason to be optimistic about the results. As stated earlier, Mr. Bhutto could delay them for one more year but he did not do so because he had planned for them and was certain to win. After this announcement, the Government party started touring the country in spite of restrictions on opposition parties. It seemed, as if there was only one political party.

Everything seemed to favor a Bhutto victory. There appeared to be no possible challenge to him. He was in power and his party had unlimited funds. He had taken all possible measures to win the elections. The Government machinery was entirely at his disposal. Those who could challenge him in places where he had failed in 1970 had been put in prison. He had the powerful network of TV and radio besides the entire press to support him. He had demoralized and subjugated the bureaucracy and terrorized the people. He had admirers in the foreign press who projected him as the most powerful political leader in Pakistan. He had a great image abroad. He had completely reoriented the state apparatus as a whole into so many instruments sustaining his party and his power. His slightest wish was law. He had converted the information set-up into a eulogy juke box. The undercover agencies had multiplied and their role, privileges and funds had increased to a phenomenal degree.

However, the announcement of elections had electrified the atmosphere. Politics became sharply polarized. In, no time the opposition leaders realized that their only

chance to make an impact on the people's mind lay in uniting, and in forging a strong united front. The election campaign turned into a confrontation between those who wanted to keep Mr. Bhutto in power, and those who did not want his authoritarian rule. On January 8, the Qayum Muslim League decided to cooperate with the PPP in General Elections. On January 10, it was announced that Ghulam Mustafa Khar would start the Muslim League election campaign from Sheikhpura. By this date all opposition parties had agreed that they would put up jointly approved candidates for each seat. They also agreed that the opposition would use a common election symbol.

The common view of the opposition parties was that if they did not unite, the election results would provide Mr. Bhutto with a chance to destroy all his critics. So it was a question of their survival. If Mr. Bhutto was successful, a one-party state would be created. This became a rallying point, for the small Opposition parties. So a nine party alliance (UDF plus TI and JUP) came into being under the name Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Its election symbol -- vital in this largely illiterate country -- would be the plough. Broadly speaking, many of the rightist elements gathered around the PNA while several leftist factions rallied to join the PPP. This was done with commendable swiftness which baffled Mr. Bhutto, because his ubiquitous intelligence agencies had assured him that nothing of the kind would happen. The setting up of the PNA to fight elections jointly meant that there was no chance of splitting the votes of the opposition as had happened in 1970.

Four Provincial Assemblies were to be dissolved from January 13. Khan Abdul Qayum Khan and Yousaf Khattak resigned from the Federal Cabinet on January 12. The same day it was declared that all members of the Khar Group would fight elections on ML tickets. The Chief Election Commissioner announced on January 13 that action would be taken against election officers responsible for rigging. Maulana Maududi declared that only Nizam-e-Islam would be acceptable in Pakistan.

On 16 January Maulana Mufti Mahmood was elected PNA President. It was a great honor to him that he was elected PNA Chief in spite of the fact that he was against the creation of Pakistan. Ordinarily, in an ideological state such people should have no place. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was elected Vice President, Rafiq Ahmed Bajwa as Secretary General and Pir Mardan Shah Pagaro Chairman Central Parliamentary Board. 64% of the seats were to go to the UDF and the, remaining 36% to the JUT and TI. This was reduced to writing and it was binding on all the PNA constituents. The main reason for the PNA cooperation was enmity against Mr. Bhutto. Whatever happened he must be defeated. After his fall the disintegration of the PNA was imminent. The PNA decided to focus on Mr. Bhutto who was supremely confident of winning the elections . . . Mufti Mahmood demanded that General Elections be postponed till conditions reverted to normal in Baluchistan. If his demands were not met, the elections would be boycotted.

Mr. Bhutto started his election campaign with great confidence. He had plans to win. His opponents in the PNA knew what he was prepared to do to win the elections.

Mohammad Hayat Tamman, the notorious adviser of the Nawab of Kalabagh, was appointed in charge of the Election Cell. As against 1970, when a lot of middle class people got elected on PPP tickets, in 1977 Mr. Bhutto thought the rich and influential only deserved the party ticket mostly landlords. (The administration was very happy because everything was in their hands.)

Mr. Bhutto had prepared for elections long before. He had prepared the election machinery with great care. He did not want to fight elections at the party level, but at an administrative level. So, recommendations were received from Deputy Commissioners for the issue of party tickets.

The PNA also began its election campaign with a bang. People were united under the banner of the PNA to introduce Nizam-e-Mustafa, to bring to an end the PPP regime (in Mr. Bhutto's own words "*he was the party*") and to usher in democracy. People came out in their thousands to show their enthusiasm for democracy and for elections. Memorable meetings were held and historical processions were taken out. The whole country was involved in the elections, and people started to flock to the meetings and processions of the opposition leaders. The election campaign assumed a revolutionary character.

Although the Government withdrew Section 144 so as to give the impression of a free and fair election, yet the state agencies did their best to put as many obstacles as possible in the way of the people and the opposition leaders coming together. One of the favorite means adopted was to deny them in practice the use of the most convenient and larger places for public rallies, e.g. flooding of Cunningham Park, Peshawar, or Nasser Bagh, Lahore. Other methods towards the same effect, like preventing the leaders from reaching their announced destination in time, were also adopted. But I then they gave up these efforts because the district administrative officers, fearing the public reaction, did not want to be identified as pro-Bhutto. In some constituencies, support for the PNA seemed to be so strong that such methods could not make any material change in the outlook of the people. The PNA leaders had waged an effective campaign pointing to broken promises, widespread arrests, conflict in Baluchistan, corruption, arbitrary use of the Federal Security Forces and intelligence services. PNA leaders said that Bhutto had promised both bread and freedom but delivered neither. During PPP regime our society had drifted towards Western permissiveness.

On January 20, Mr. Bhutto was elected unopposed. Similarly from Sindh, Mumtaz Bhutto, Sultan Ali Chandio, Mujtaba Jatol, Abdul Fateh Memon, Mir Mehrab Khan Bajrani, Makhdum-Zada Talib-ul-Maula and Noor Mohammad Lund were declared elected unopposed. Air Marshal M Asghar Khan said that people would not accept

unfair elections. Objections would be filed against Mr. Bhutto's unopposed election. The same day the Election Commission stopped the PNA from using its election symbol till January 26. On January 21, the PPP candidates from Baluchistan, Mr. Amanullah Gichki, Prince Mohyuddin and Mir Taj Mohammad Jamali were declared elected unopposed. On January 22, Begum Nasim Wali Khan declared that the basic issue was restoration of democracy.

On January 23, 1977 Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan said that after coming into power, the PNA would try those responsible for dismembering the country. (This must have caused a shiver to quite a few, both civil and military.) Mian Tafaal Muhammad said that Nizam-e-Mustafa would soon dominate Pakistan.

Mr. Bhutto announced that if he was given a chance to serve again, he would do two or three more things. He denounced the PNA as an alliance of the kind of people who meet in foreign embassies i.e. foreign agents. Holding General Elections before time, claimed Mr. Bhutto, was the biggest proof of democracy in the country. The PPP manifesto included teaching the Quran as a compulsory subject in Basic Education; 16,000 plots would be allotted, gratis to labor every year; national production would be increased by 50%; adult franchise would be introduced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and women would be given genuine rights.

Mufti Mahmood made a policy statement that the PNA would not boycott the elections under any circumstances. He said that there was no sacrifice that would not be made for the restoration of democracy. The present ruler could not stand against the power of the united masses. On January 27, the PNA was finally allowed to use the joint election symbol of the plough. The PNA demanded that the ruling party should stop the use of Government money, vehicles and TV and radio for its election campaign.

Mr. Bhutto thought that his important political opponents had been neutralized. Whatever remained could be handled with ease. His control over the civil and military administration and his greater resources and opportunities assured success. It was assumed that he could do as he pleased and get away with it. He had ordered a postal ballot for the government servants, including the Armed Forces. His decision to hold elections a year earlier than the due date was a reflection of this confidence. The Press was in the hands of the Government. Public speech-making was often prevented. Transport was not available in remote localities and many opposition leaders were imprisoned. The Government could use the entire system to get votes. Yet, on January 29, Sherbaz Mazari remarked that five years of tyranny and oppression were to come to an end very soon, and the people responsible for dismembering Pakistan would be tried.

Mr. Bhutto had antagonized the capitalists and industrialists. He condemned the PNA as capitalists, and declared that his PPP had adopted the sword as its symbol and that

the sword would eliminate exploitation, cut the chains binding the poor, and bring an end to capitalism.

During an evening with the PM at his residence in Rawalpindi, when the PNA had already been formed, general discussions were going on when he specifically mentioned that he knew everyone of the PNA leaders; They were a bunch of. and he was not going to hand over the country to them, under any, circumstances. Gen Tikka Khan, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Aziz Ahmed were also present on the occasion, in addition to the COAS and senior generals. At the time- it seemed an innocent remark of a sincere man dedicated , to his country, but later it transpired that this was his inner desire and intention. He did not intend to hand over to them. This was confirmed not only by blatant rigging but also by delaying tactics in negotiations and signing of agreements, besides his desire to continue staying on as PM till after the elections. When Mr. Bhutto said that he could not place "Pakistan's future at risk", what he really meant was that the PPP power must continue.

It is interesting to read Benazir Bhutto's views on the PNA leadership as given in *Daughter of the East* (page 71):

"The PNA leaders were not great men or even fine men.....Many of those opposing my father were small provincial men whose myopic views had failed Pakistan in the past and would do so again in the future."

The rigging that followed was a planned affair. This was a clear proof of his intention of not coming to an agreement with the PNA, because he did not want to take a chance that they might win.

On January 30, 1977 Gen Zia-ul-Haq on behalf of the Pakistan Army assured the public that it would do its best to discharge the duties and protection of national prestige were its foremost duties. On the eve of the Armed Forces Week, Mr. Bhutto declared that the pay of the Armed Forces would be increased after elections. On 31 January I made my first public statement to the effect that the Armed Forces were a manifestation of a nation's power and will. The object of Armed Forces Week was to bring the Armed Forces and the civilians closer to each other. In the modern world, war was fought not by the Armed Forces alone but by a whole nation. Gen Zia later, wrote a letter of thanks and appreciation to me, that the Week had been an excellent show and a job well done. He felt that the impact desired by the Week had been achieved to a great extent and that it would go a long way in enhancing the image of the Army in the eyes of the people.

The PPP which had carried Mr. Bhutto to power was his, real strength. But instead of depending on poor workers and masses, he had started leaning on bureaucracy and landlords who made him believe that the coming elections, like the previous ones in 1970, could not be won through the votes of the poor. Therefore such candidates were

required who could spend money lavishly. So in consultation with his advisers, about 172 rich people had been selected for party tickets. Inwardly they did not like the PPP and only wanted to suck the blood of the poor through the PPP. Later events proved that they were not prepared to sacrifice anything for Mr. Bhutto. On the other hand, the parties of the PNA, some of which had fought against the Pakistan Movement were committed to an ideal.

On 1 February, Mukhtar Rana, warned that those who won elections through unfair means would meet a tragic end. A direct appeal to the workers came with a President Ordinance revising compensation rules for labor. The compensation in case of death of a laborer at work was raised from six to twelve thousand rupees. Minimum wage was also raised. On February 4, the PNA warned that results would not be accepted if elections were rigged. They further stated, on February 6, that rigging of elections would lead to a political revolution. Islam was a complete code of life. There was no question of socialism. People were taking a keen interest in the politics of the country. They were attending public meetings, and staying there until the early hours of the morning. The newspapers were not reporting faithfully what was happening on the political front and the way election fever was intensifying. The state-run radio and TV were giving a biased and distorted report of events.

The PPP was witnessing, in the PNA, the surfacing of popular dissatisfaction long suppressed by the regime. It was, the PPP's own circumstances, their own shortcomings and misadventures, rather than the PNA's campaign achievements. Mr. Bhutto's politics had been dictatorial. He was surrounded by sycophants. He had chosen them himself, so nobody else could be blamed. The same situation which I had warned him about in 1972, during a cocktail party at Murree, had arisen. The PNA had come into being at the stage when people were fed up with the Bhutto regime. People took the initiative themselves and stepped forward against Mr. Bhutto without the PNA leaders motivating them much. On February 7, the PNA claimed that 15 persons were injured when their procession was fired upon. One of their offices was also burnt down. They alleged that the PPP workers had attacked on orders from a federal minister. There would be a general strike in Drigh Colony to protest against vandalism.

On February 8, Dr. Mubashar ordered that all businessmen who had received financial favors from the PPP should provide the Party with resources. They should suspend business totally in favor of a political war. Those party workers who would not take part in elections would have their hide stripped. In the PPP rallies and meetings, the audiences were generally brought from long distances on officially provided transport, whereas in the case of the PNA, the people seemed attracted to the opposition leaders and were determined to show their solidarity with them. They were choosing the PNA and rejecting the PPP. The general opinion of the politically conscious intellectuals and the common man was that the Bhutto Government would not give the people an honest chance to choose their representatives.

On February 25, the PNA declared that the whole nation had given the decision in its favor, and rigging would not be allowed in the elections. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto said on the following day that the opposition was planning to destroy Pakistan. On February 27, there was a general strike in big cities in response to the call of the PNA.

March 7 was fast approaching. The nation was to decide whether the PPP should be given the mandate for another five years, or the new leadership be tried. Mr. Bhutto's five year rule had proved his deviation from the Islamic path, both in his public policies as well as in his private life. He did not trust his colleagues. He had said "*I am the Peoples Party and they are all my creatures*". He regarded PPP essentially as a bargaining instrument *vis-a-vis* the opposition. For his real support he had developed paramilitary and police organizations to protect his person and operations. Simultaneously he had politicized the civil service through lateral entries. The Federal Security Force (FSF) was made up of ex-military and police personnel. It had known corrupt, notorious and sadist officers some of which had been sacked by previous governments. Mr. Bhutto rehired them and gave them important jobs. The FSF was a PPP paramilitary force as well as a special police agency to police political matters for the PPP leadership, and hence avoid the use of regular police and armed forces. Wherever Mr. Bhutto went, the FSF was at his side. Command posts were established to filter and analyze all information that might be judged a threat to him or his administration. Opposition critics were silenced through intimidation or incarceration in prison. It took considerable courage to defy the regime and most people dared only comment on the prevailing conditions in the privacy of their homes. Public places, like hotel rooms and meeting rooms, were thought to be bugged. Newspapers were under severe restrictions, and printed only what the government wanted. Mr. Bhutto had converted his socialist dream into a cultist police state. He included landlords and industrialists in his organization.

His suspicious mind had not permitted delegation of authority and diffusion of responsibility. He accepted no equals, dissent, or challenges to his authority. He was the only decision-maker in the country. His imperial style made him treat Pakistan as a personal estate. Fear, intimidation, repression and constant surveillance permeated Pakistani society as the FSF inflicted their brand of punishment on the population. Mian Tufail, Professor Ghafoor, Dr Ghulam Hussain and thousands of others who were victimized, all have tales to tell. This is what had happened during the PPP regime:-

- a. There was no concept of faithfulness to the country by the bureaucracy, the police and the FSF.
- b. Merit was generally, ignored in all cases.
- c. Inequality was practiced instead of equality.
- d. There was increase in unproductive expenditure.
- e. There was artificial increase of prices.

- f. False propaganda was considered a big instrument.
- g. There was increase in gambling, *dacoity* and murders.
- h. There was misappropriation of funds given for natural and unnatural calamity victims.
- i. There was complete breakdown of rule of law.
- i. There was immorality, and lewdness increased
- k. There was low performance of official institutions.

On March 7, 1977, hectic activity by the PPP and the PNA having come to an end, the nation went to the polls. The voters went to polling stations with great confidence. Before the polling closed, the people had started realizing that the verdict of the polls was not going to be free or fair. There were reports of violation of the sanctity of the ballot. Women, in particular, were not allowed to cast their votes. Instead, polling officers, PPP workers and volunteers --- both men and women --- stuffed the boxes with bogus ballot papers. The police were there only to supervise the rigging, and check or maul those who objected to this. Violence took place at polling stations in many cities, and ruling party strong men and officials connived. In the evening, the results announced on TV indicated fictitious results from remote constituencies. In some cases the results were announced when counting was still going on. PPP achieved a resounding victory. It came as no surprise! The extent of this manipulation was so enormous that it cast doubts on the integrity of the elections. Vote frauds were clearly identifiable. Votes were still being counted, as seen by the TV and radio. There was a wave of disappointment as people heard the election results come in. It was announced that the PPP had won 154 National Assembly seats out of a total of 200. This came as a shock to the PNA supporters who refused to accept the results. The PNA accused Mr. Bhutto and the PPP of rigging the General Elections to the National Assembly and misusing the government, bureaucracy and military machine at the hustings. People could not swallow this "landslide win".

It soon became clear that large-scale rigging had taken place. PNA leaders denounced the results as a farce, and decided to boycott Provincial Assembly elections on March 10, Mr. Bhutto contemptuously dismissed opposition claims. The election was rigged to forestall a possible transfer of power. The incumbent refused to submit to public opinion. The nation was plunged into a crisis. Mr. Martin Woollacott wrote in *The Guardian* dated 7 March 1977:-

"Ruthless Concentration of Power"

"One unfortunate yesterday he shouted down that he had been on the way to attend his sister's funeral when his bus, plying a regular route, had been ordered to join the Government procession. This kind of manipulation invites attention to the worst aspects of Mr. Bhutto's regime, of which the unifying theme over the last four years has been a rapid and sometimes ruthless concentration of power.

When faced with an independent institution, or social group -- whether, it was big business, the judiciary, the press, the Baluchi aristocracy, the Punjabi middle-class, or even his own party -- Mr. Bhutto's instinct has been either, to take it over or, if that was not possible, to destroy it.

Thus he has achieved "Control" over the press. over the courts whose independence has been reduced and over the Civil Service, whose security of tenure has been abolished.

He has tamed the big business families by nationalizing the industries which were the basis of the prominence. He has vigorously attacked any kind of independent regional politics sending Pathan and Baluchi political leaders to gaol, and curbing regional tendencies even within his own party. The PPP indeed, has had no internal elections, held on party conventions, and has no central committee.

In other cases, Mr. Bhutto has made deals rather than attacking. He has drawn into his party a majority of large landowners ---the so, called feudal classes --- making their little local zones of influence into elements in his own power structure. Most recently he has laid his hands on another important lever of power --- by nationalizing the agricultural processing industries.

Because his initial targets were big business and political groups, which were arguably dangerous to the unity of, Pakistan, his policies were at first seen as Socialist and Nationalist. But, as the process has gone on, Mr. Bhutto's, career reads more and more like a history book of the Renaissance, the story of some centralizing King.

There is a fatal flaw in the character said one of his former supporters. "He is a total cynic. He believes in rule by fear, he does not, believe in political parties, least of all his own, and he believes that a corrupt instrument is better than an honest one, because he can use it more easily. He may want the right things for Pakistan, but he has driven decency and truth out of our political life."

Stories of his ruthlessness abound, but one in particular has sullied his reputation -- the case of former minister Mr. J. A. Rahim. The picture of police dragging the elderly Rahim, once Bhutto's friend and mentor out of his house by his heels in the middle of the night has stuck in the mind. This view of Mr. Bhutto, a cruel and capricious man, accounts for, much of the decline in his popularity.

But beyond that, his policies have alienated most groups in Pakistani society. Middle class professionals are disturbed at the changes in status of the press,

judiciary and Civil Service. More businessmen are hostile. Farmers are angry about corruption in the handling of seed, fertilizer and water."

On March 9, the General Council of the PNA unanimously rejected elections to the National Assembly which were held on March 7. The PNA nominees declared elected to the Assembly were asked to resign their seats with immediate effect. The General Council demanded that fresh elections should be held under the direct supervision of the Army with a caretaker, government in office. The Council also demanded the immediate resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner for the 'blatant failure' of the Election Commission to conduct free and impartial elections. The PNA leaders appealed for a peaceful, country-wide strike on March 11. They decided to boycott elections to the Provincial Assemblies on March 10. This was the first public test of strength between Mr. Bhutto and the PNA. The people boycotted the Provincial Assembly polls, and once again the PPP resorted to bogus voting merely to prove that the voters had come to cast their ballot.

Army men posted at the polling booths for maintenance of law and order reported to us the approximate strength of the voters who had turned up. The results announced in the evening were not in conformity with the attendance observed. Figures shown by which the PPP candidates had won were far more than the actual number that had turned up for voting. That confirmed that rigging had been resorted to, and the junior ranks of the Army were a witness to it. They had themselves already exercised their right of postal ballot. The boycott strengthened the PNA, and it served an ultimatum to Mr. Bhutto either to hold fresh elections or face a mass movement. The boycott was largely successful, and was accompanied by massive street demonstrations and partial strikes in a number of cities.

The strike ordered by the PNA on March 11 was successful. Work came to a halt in most of the cities. The Council met at Lahore and demanded that by March 14 the elections should be declared null and void, the Chief Election Commissioner should be removed and a new one appointed and the PM should resign. If not, the PNA would start protest demonstrations from March 14. On March 12, Mr. Bhutto offered to have a discussion with the PNA if it had any complaints. However, in a broadcast to the nation, he rejected any suggestion for re-election to the National Assembly. Elections were a settled matter and could not be discussed. The PNA was firm in its demand, for re-election and the resignation of Mr. Bhutto's illegitimate government. The uncompromising attitudes, of both the government and PNA, deepened the crisis.

The PNA observed a nationwide protest day in the major cities and insisted on the immediate resignation of Mr. Bhutto and fresh elections. Clashes ensued and there were several deaths and casualties. Mr. Bhutto admitted at last that in some marginal cases rigging might have taken place. He expressed a willingness to provide the PNA with

some additional seats in the National. Assembly and countermand Provincial Assembly elections. These concessions were taken as an admission of rigging.

We, in the Armed Forces, had always believed that the PPP was the biggest and most powerful party in the country which enjoyed the, people's trust and love. The only other well organized party, but with only a small following, was the JI. The PPP would have won in any case, so why did Mr. Bhutto rig the elections which he would surely have won anyway? It is said it was because of his obsession with a 2/3 majority without which he could not have been able to manipulate the Constitution. Rigging the elections subsequently to rigging the Constitution. When the gambit, failed he blamed it, characteristically, on "massive foreign intervention" hoping to capitalize on the latent hostility to the West which is endemic in Third World countries. We were also certain that in case of re-elections he would still win with a simple majority, irrespective as to when the elections were held. The protests gave birth to a national movement. Due to the blatant rigging of elections, there was also a reaction against the appointment holders of the PPP, civil and political officials, former PPP ministers, and their policies and amendments carried out to the Constitution of 1973. The PNA Movement so born was for free and fair elections . and impartial polling. It was against rigging.

With this it seemed that the PPP had lost credibility with the silent majority. The PNA slogans appealed to them and the PNA started building up their following against the government. The announcement in January that the elections would be held in March had surprised quite a few. There was a common belief that Mr. Bhutto would postpone the elections on some pretext or the other. Mr. Bhutto perhaps wanted to continue ruling supreme in office with a mandate in his pocket. He thought the people would take it lying down, and that the opposition, being divided and half asleep, would be no match.

It seemed Mr. Bhutto could not sense the pulse of the time and so went under the wheel of history. News like the imposition of curfew in the village of the rival politician Sherbaz Mazari, arresting of his school going children and firing on his house led to further tension. This had happened on March 11. Section 144 (restricting the assembly of more than four persons), was commonly defied. On March 15, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada on behalf of the government rejected the PNA demands and said that the elections could not be declared null and void without abrogating the Constitution.

That same day, Khwaja Khair ud Din suggested that Sindh be divided into two zones. It was observed in the Army that the people were rapidly becoming. more extreme in their demands than the PNA leaders themselves. It has been a common pattern in our country that it is not the leaders who lead, but the masses who set the pace and then leaders follow, with things rapidly going out of the leaders' control. It was feared that history was about to, repeat itself.

The PNA Movement was not a movement by one sect, class or ideology. In fact it was a combination of all those elements against dictatorship, which wanted to get rid of Mr. Bhutto and reinstate democracy. This movement had gathered such momentum that it created intense polarization. The, movement, uplifted those who took part as opposition and catapulted the PNA leadership to popularity. The Movement had become a national movement. The silent majority perhaps already had an inbred hatred against Mr. Bhutto's Junta for their undemocratic and violent policies, but they could not speak out openly against them for fear of police violence and neo-fascist methods. Even some of Mr. Bhutto's previous supporters joined forces against him. They were politicians, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, traders, many students and women's organizations. It was not only for the PNA or in support of the PNA, it was for the sincere interest in the restoration of genuine democracy.

People used mosques to stimulate the activities of this mass movement which had started against rigging, but later gave the impression that it was only for Nizam-e-Mustafa. However, the leaders connected with the movement used to mention Nizam-e-Mustafa as well. It was part of the PNA manifesto. Later, this point was highlighted in the movement. Speaking honestly, the connotation of Nizam-e-Mustafa in the minds of the people was social and legal justice. If these two things are available to the people, the system can be termed an Islamic System. When the movement advanced and reached the masses, the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa was also added to the anti-dictatorship slogans.

Some of the PNA components did not believe in the introduction of Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic System) and were only paying lip service. Initially there was no cry of Nizam-e-Mustafa as an objective. The agitation was against rigging and it was only to get rid of Mr. Bhutto, but later on the masses sentiments overshadowed the movement and the leaders having seen the sentiments of the people thought it best to introduce it. For the PNA leaders, it was better to kill two birds with one stone -- end Mr. Bhutto's despotic rule and introduce Nizam-e-Mustafa. Some were even under the misconception that Mr. Bhutto was the real impediment, and if he was removed Nizam-e-Mustafa would be ushered in automatically. It was only by the last week of March 1977 that there was a sharp swing in mood, with a call for the introduction of a religiously-based system taking over from straightforward political demands.

The menace of the CIA was deliberately exaggerated into an explanation for the mass-protests which, threatened Mr. Bhutto's rule. Many PPP supporters still uncritically believe that it was the USA which was behind the upsurge of protests against the PPP government in 1977. There was no such thing as "a secret hand" of the USA or CIA, nor was there substance in Mr. Bhutto's charge that the USA had made him a target because of the so-called "Islamic bomb".

Mr. Bhutto wrote a letter to Maulana Mufti in March to discuss the issues of conflict within the framework of the Constitution. The PNA General Council rejected it. Some PNA leaders were arrested in Karachi and curfew was imposed. PNA demonstrations and processions were taken out in violation of Section 144 against Mr. Bhutto's illegitimate Government in Faisalabad, Sargodha, Multan, Lahore and other major cities. The PNA Karachi Action Committee called for a strike in Karachi on March 21. For the third time, Mr. Bhutto wrote to Maulana Mufti Mahmood to resolve the prevailing crisis, this time he wrote as Chief Executive of the country and not as Chairman of the PPP. Maulana Mufti again rejected it and asked for the immediate release of the PNA leaders. Defiance of law by the agitators was resulting in deaths and injuries caused by the police and the FSF. By March 21 a hundred people had been killed, about a 1,000 injured and about 10,000 PNA workers imprisoned. In view of the prevailing conditions, I issued instructions to the local Brigade Commander to take foolproof security measures at the residences of the PM, of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs Of Staff Committee, COAS and GHQ. This was done in view of the parade taking place on March 23.

A movement is an outside influence on the mind and a sudden tendency to act. It may, be arranged by waking the state of mind, or it may simply be a result of things left to circumstances. Movements are stimulated to activity by thoughts tinged with emotion, sufferings, hopes, religion and by filling the mind with thoughts associated with unfulfilled desires. They always refer to future existence. Promises made during the movement determine the pattern of behavior and give shape to the events that follow. Movements always succeed because of public pressure. The PNA leaders used to sit together and make decisions on some political objectives, swear on the Quran in public gatherings, narrate the Nizam-e-Mustafa manifesto, talk about democracy, lay stress, on the restoration of basic rights and human rights, argue for the dissolution of Special Tribunals like the Hyderabad Tribunal, advocate the independence of the judiciary and the return of prices to the 1970 level, assuring the masses that they would not rest unless democracy was restored, to parliament. But they never meant it.

On March 25 the PNA reiterated its demand for the resignation of the PM and the Chief Election Commissioner and for fresh General Elections. In order to counter the mounting agitation of the PNA, shoot-at-sight orders were issued and the army was called in to disrupt a PNA mass strike on March 26. In spite of this, the PNA strike paralyzed normal life in major cities and towns. The nationwide demonstrations and strikes had proved that the people did not recognize the poll, results and the legitimacy of the National Assembly. Mr. Bhutto then renewed his dialogue offer to the PNA. However, he ruled out the possibility of the dissolution of the National Assembly. Both the Government and the opposition adopted rigid postures, the PNA leaders insistent upon their three points i.e., resignation of the P.M., appointment of a new Chief Election Commissioner and fresh general elections. Mr. Bhutto was determined neither to quit nor to let the PNA agitation succeed. The situation was far from enviable for both the

parties in this national confrontation. There were bloody protests by the PNA. The FSF was playing almost the same role for the PPP that the Muslim League National Guards had played for Khan Qayum's Muslim League in 1958. As street demonstrations mounted, Mr. Bhutto began to make concessions, but they were too little and, always, too late. If he had declared the initial results null and void and at once sanctioned new polls, he might have averted the tragedy of a military takeover.

The Chief Election Commissioner, Justice Sajjad Ahmed Jan, had himself indicated that the elections were massively rigged. The Election Commission had announced that they were preparing to charge a senior PPP Cabinet Minister, Hafeezullah Cheema, with electoral malpractices. Then the PNA campaign was given an unexpected impetus by the stunning electoral defeat suffered by the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Her graceful withdrawal after accepting the verdict of the electorate was in marked contrast to Mr. Bhutto's refusal to acknowledge what had taken place in his country. On April 8, he had said again that National Assembly re-elections were not possible. The PPP had claimed that they had got the votes because of their economic programmes. An analyst had said that if the PPP's claim was taken as correct, then they should have got the maximum votes in the backward areas of NWFP and Baluchistan, where even today average incomes are less than Sindh and where poverty is maximum, but the PPP got only one seat there. Even in Punjab, where the PPP won the most seats, it did not get much in the backward areas of Bahawalpur, D G Khan, D I Khan, Jhang or Sargodha. All areas contiguous to the Indian border in Sindh and Punjab got 100% PPP candidates elected.

On April 9, I had accompanied Gen Zia to Jhelum to attend the Pakistan Army Rifle Association competitions. We were received at the helipad by Maj Gen S R Kallue who accompanied us to the venue. The COAS had the opportunity to meet the organizers as well as a section of all ranks of the Army who were taking part in the competitions. Apart from the direct questions connected with the country, they wanted to know why three Brigadiers had disobeyed orders at Lahore, by refusing to fire on the mob when called upon to do so, in the discharge of their duties, in aid of the civil power. The COAS explained under what circumstances it had happened. He also expressed his hope that the crisis would be over soon because the Prime Minister would be able to control the situation. While at Jhelum, we did not know the latest situation in Lahore. After attending the function at Jhelum we returned to Rawalpindi.

On April 9, the PNA demonstrations took place in Lahore, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura, Gujrat, Sahiwal, Bahawalpur, Cholistan, Jhang, Quetta, Sargodha, Sukkur and Lyalipur. Officially 8 people were killed and 77 injured. Unofficially the figures were much higher. The worst was at Lahore where the PNA Movement took a serious turn from ballot to bullet. Numerous processions taken out at Lahore wanted to converge on the Provincial Assembly building where the newly elected members had to take the oath. The Government did not want them to reach the building.

As the processions approached the vicinity of the Assembly Chambers building, Mr. Bhutto's FSF and the Police intercepted them with tear gas and firing. In order to deal with the PNA lady workers, a newly drafted contingent of police, comprising prostitutes from Lahore, was let loose on them. Men and women police personnel and the FSF dealt with the situation very severely, and by the evening, in Lahore alone, 30 people had been killed and 250 wounded. It was a revolutionary day. Ladies turned the table. *Nath Force* aggravated the situation.

Putting prostitutes and other rough elements in police uniform was the idea of the Inspector General Police. Chaudhry Fazle Haq, who was Federal Interior Secretary but was specially appointed IG Police. Punjab by Mr. Bhutto to deal with the worsening law and order situation. The special police force was given the name '*Nath Force*' by the PNA. Chaudhry Fazle Haq's predecessor as Secretary, of the interior was Brig Muzaffar Malik, who was chief secretary Punjab, at that time. He was also handpicked by Mr. Bhutto to be the Chief Secretary during the elections.

That same evening Gen Zia told me that he was to go to Lahore on the following day to attend a presentation at Gen Iqbal's Corps Headquarters and he wanted me to accompany him. We reached Lahore on the morning of April 10 and drove straight to the Corps Headquarters from the airport along with Lt Gen M Iqbal. He gave an up-to-date account of the political situation prevailing in his Corps area. He explained in detail the conduct of the three Brigadiers whose units were deployed on duties in aid of the civil power. They were all from the same division. He also explained the ineffectiveness of firing on the agitating mob, and explained the ineffectiveness of firing on the agitating mob and explained in detail what had happened the previous day in the vicinity of the Assembly Hall, Maj Gen Agha Zulfiqar was the GOC of those Brigadiers.

After the presentation Gen Zia told me that he thought that both Gen Iqbal and Gen Zulfiqar had lost their nerve and were unlikely to be able to take the further strain of duties in aid of the civil power. He told me that on return to GHQ he would issue orders to transfer both of them and post them to soft jobs. Zia said in no uncertain terms that it was a case of command failure. At lunch time, Gen Zia received a message from Mr. Bhutto, who was in Lahore, that he should see the Prime Minister in the afternoon at the Governor's House. Gen Zia asked me to accompany him along with Gen Iqbal. I told Gen Zia that I had to attend the Pakistan Golf Union Executive Committee meeting that day, but would accompany him if he so desired. He allowed me to stay back to preside over the meeting as its President. Gen Zia went ahead and had an audience with the Prime Minister and returned after about three hours. Thereafter we left for Islamabad-Rawalpindi.

On April 11, the PNA called for nationwide civil disobedience to protest against the alleged rigging of the General Elections. *Time*, April 11, 1977 wrote "Mr. Bhutto's troubles are largely of his own making. While Indira Gandhi went down to honest defeat, the Pakistani PM is reaping the bitter fruits of what was almost certainly a dishonest victory. Mr. Bhutto had called elections for much the same reason as the Indian leader."

Demonstrations degenerated into riots. People could no longer be contained by the police and the FSF. Indira Gandhi's defeat and her yielding power to the other party without any crisis enraged Pakistan. If transfer of power could be achieved so smoothly in the neighboring country, why could fair elections not be held in Pakistan? The nation could not surrender to injustice and would not compromise with the oppressor. They would welcome martyrdom.

Mr. Bhutto's government had no idea what martyrdom was. It only knew corruption, dishonesty, harassment, cruelty and fear. That was what the PNA was telling people. On April 12, 1977, Mr. Bhutto gave a statement to the foreign press in which he said that the elections had been rigged. This rigging he said was done by over keen and overzealous bureaucrats jealous party members and ministers. On April 13, Mr. Bhutto ruled out fresh National Assembly elections. He offered to dissolve the National Assembly and go for reelection provided the opposition first won a two-thirds majority in the Provincial Assembly. He warned that the Army might be called in to restore normalcy. On April 15, Mr. Bhutto called on Maulana Abul Ala Maudoudi, the Founder of Jamaat e Islami.

When Mr. Bhutto responded on April 17, 1977 to the PNA Movement by announcing reconstitution of the Islamic Ideology Council, a ban on drinking and horse racing and closure of night clubs, the lifting of section 144 and abrogation of press publication order, it reflected his intentions to stay on and not to leave the chair. He also said that reelections could be held to provincial assemblies and if opposition was able to win them there would be fresh elections to the national assembly. People were not satisfied. A foreign journalist asked Mr. Bhutto in his press conference at Lahore on 17 April. "Are you under army pressure?". He replied arrogantly, "If anybody raises slight head he will be thrown out as was Sardar Shaukat Hayat from PPP" meaning thereby that he was treating the army also as his own party.

The extent of Pakistan's crisis was much commented upon in the international press.

The Financial Times April 15, 1977 wrote:

The country was his personal fief

Mr. Bhutto has not looked as vulnerable as he does today during the five years since he took office. Instead of having received the popular mandate which he confidently expected from last month's general elections for his second term of office he faces a nationwide

campaign of violence on the streets and civil disobedience that, at the least is likely to render government ineffective, and at the worst threatens a return to martial law.

This bleak situation with its echoes of the crisis through which Pakistan passed in 1969 when President Ayub Khan was overthrown and again in 1971 with the loss of East Bengal-- has blown up with the suddenness of a squall at seaThe shock of the campaign was that it uncovered a wave of hostility against Mr. Bhutto personally for running the country as though it were his personal fief, and against his ruling People's Party for grabbing the spoils of office. Mr. Bhutto would have got wind of this earlier had he not cut himself off by giving senior appointments to mediocre men and by ruthlessly curbing the Press and his political opponents.

The scale of the rigging and the number of constituencies actually affected have largely become an academic issue. But it was blatant enough for the state-controlled radio and television to be broadcasting results before the votes had been counted.

. . . . The net result has been to rob Mr. Bhutto of that important, intangible commodity, political legitimacy. No longer can he claim to be the popularly elected national leader. Even his supporters now discount what they hear on radio or television or read in the tightly supervised press.

The logical conclusion of this policy is a one-party state. It is also a one-party state increasingly dependent on the army, as was shown by clashes in Lahore during the weekend." (*The Financial Times*, April 15th 1977)

To gain popularity among religious sections, Mr. Bhutto dramatically turned to Islam. The Government announced a series of measures aimed at enforcing Shariat Laws in six months, total prohibition and a ban on gambling forthwith.

On 19th April, two days after the Prime Minister had claimed the full support of the workers, twenty six labor organizations affiliated to the Pakistan Labor Alliance declared a nationwide strike to last until Mr. Bhutto resigns. The next day, Karachi, the nerve center of Pakistan's economy, went on strike for an indefinite period. Shops, factories and docks were closed, traffic was stopped and no train left Karachi Station. Opposition supporters threatened to lie on the tracks if Mr. Bhutto called the army to run the railways. PTA joined the stoppage on 17 April after ground staff walked out for political reasons. (Pilots, and engineers were already on strike for more pay).

The political climate of the country remained charged with, violence, several people were killed and hundreds injured every day in clashes between demonstrators and police. In Lyallpur, an industrial town in Punjab, tension rose so high after a series of street battles that the District Magistrate re-imposed a ban on meetings of more than four people within forty eight hours of the Prime Minister's orders to lift it. In Karachi

hand to hand fighting added at least thirteen to the mounting death toll, left the city strewn with debris, and led to the re-imposition of an army-enforced curfew.

Mr. Bhutto's strategy now seemed to match street power with street power. In Lahore he taunted his party workers with being '*women afraid of retaliating*'. The next day gangs from the two sides fought. Mr. Bhutto's men were badly beaten. On 19th April his Peoples Party organized a procession of some 10,000 people in Lahore. Most of the gun-and-dagger toting demonstrators were former squatters who had a, few days ago been given rights to their plots in districts around Lahore, some had been imported in municipal trucks and buses from nearby towns. Two hours later the opposition mustered an even larger march. Mr. Bhutto's attempt to diffuse the conflict with timely give away seems to have failed.

Life in general became uncertain, tense and grim in the major cities. While the world media talked of Pakistan everyday and reported the gravity of the explosive situation, the media at home either lied or were evasive. The people knew that the press, radio and TV in Pakistan no longer mattered. The BBC told them the facts, and improvised street corner notice boards also gave the news. Communication. was by word of mouth or cyclostyled material. It showed the lack of credibility of the mass media.

These comments and many other foreign media analyses were the subject of serious discussion in the Army circles.

The *International Herald Tribune* date April 21, 1977 wrote:-

WHY HAVE PEOPLE TAKEN TO THE STREETS

At the news conference here, Monday, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was asked, as he has been asked so often lately, whether he would consider resigning from office, as the political opposition is demanding.

'Why should I be considering resigning?' he said in exasperation 'I am legally, politically, morally Prime Minister of Pakistan. The people are with me.'

If the hard pressed people of this impoverished land are indeed with him, then why have thousands of them taken to the streets during the last six weeks in violent clashes that have claimed at least 150 lives?

"Bhutto was ruling this country so dictatorially that he didn't realize what the people were thinking" said a leader of the PNA the opposition coalition. "He finally took the lid off the tea kettle just before the election and it has boiled over into what you see in the streets".

Some Bhutto opponents are incensed about official corruption, not just the election rigging, which even the Prime Minister concedes occurred to some extent, not also at the enrichment of some of his PPP officials during his years in office.

Pakistanis who care about civil liberties have been, distressed by the summary arrests and long imprisonment of government critics by press censorship and by the bans on public meetings, generally in force until the election campaign began in January.

(William Borders in *International Herald Tribune* April 21, 1977)

In order to crush the PNA's call for a mass strike on April 22, the Government imposed Martial Law in the three major cities of Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad. Thus Mr. Bhutto resorted to armed action in political affairs. (Later martial law was imposed in Multan which was lifted only on 7th June after the Lahore High Court had declared on 2nd June 1977 that the Martial Law was unconstitutional). PNA bitterly criticized the imposition of martial law. When Mr. Bhutto called on the Army to restore law and order, he signaled his weakness and the Frailty of the FSF.

The FSF had been organized parallel to the Army. Machine guns were given to them and mortars and armoured personnel carriers were on the way. Characters like Najaf Khan, Haq Nawaz Tiwana, Saeed Khan and Masood Mahmood were around Bhutto.

I reported various police lapses to Gen Zia (my letter number 2197/DO/PA dated April 23) for action as deemed fit. I quote this letter verbatim:

"Whereas the Government and the Army was trying to restore normalcy in the country, and whereas the administrative machinery seemed to be taking all steps to keep the things under control, the PPP did not seem to be working in harmony with the Government's policy and the civil authorities found it more convenient to ignore that.

Following observations were made:

- a. Three processions were taken out in Rawalpindi, two of the PNA and one of the PPP. The PPP procession which started from Liaquat Garden was approximately 8,000 to 10,000 strong and was led by Dr. Ghulam Hussain, Federal Minister and Dr Abdul Khaliq, a Punjab Provincial Minister. They were given a free hand to do anything they felt like. The police did not object to any of their actions, some of which were not conducive to the maintenance of law and order e.g., the following was observed by our intelligence staff on the spot:
 - i. The PPP procession burnt and brick batted vehicles houses and shops -- no action was taken by the police.

- ii. The PPP procession burnt Jamaat-e-Islami. Office on College Road -- The police watched it as silent spectators.
 - iii. When the office was set on fire somebody fired with a pistol from the top of the office. In retaliation, a hand grenade was thrown by the procession into the office, resulting in casualties to persons out of whom one died in the hospital. -- No action was taken by the police. (On the contrary, *Pakistan Times*, a government paper, had given a completely distorted picture wherein it was alleged that the individual died due to explosion of a hand grenade carried by him in his hand -- Local police authorities unfortunately confirmed this incorrect version.)
- b 100 workers were received at Rawalpindi Railway Station by Qayyum Butt. MNA from the PPP. Some of them were carrying weapons. These workers fired a few shots in Gawal-Mandi and then went towards Marir Hassān Chowk.

In the PPP procession there were two vehicles and a trolley which contained lethal weapons like Sten guns and rifles -- No action by the Police.

As against the PPP procession, police took very active measures against the two PNA processions. They were continuously tear gassed and *lathi*-charged although they were comparatively peaceful, in spite of their large strength of over 50,000.

It may be possible to give a different impression to the people who read the newspapers outside Rawalpindi, but those who lived in Rawalpindi and those who had seen these things happening could not be convinced otherwise. This is how the credibility of the Government was lost. Because of such incidents, the PNA movement was gaining sympathies of more and more people who were losing faith in the Government and civil administration. People belonging to all sections of society, educated as well as the man in the street, wondered. Was the ruling party helping to restore law and order, or was it encouraging lawlessness? Their impression was that the PPP was encouraging their party workers to do whatever they wanted to do under the umbrella of the civil administration. That could lead to civil war."

The Guardian. April 22, 1977 wrote:

BHUTTO'S REIGN OF TERROR

"Even in an election blatantly rigged in many, if not most constituencies, the opposition got 36 percent of the votes, offsetting the rigging and adding the clearly immense weight of fresh support the opposition has gained in the current agitation, Mr. Bhutto's party is no longer left with an undisputed majority....."

The contrast between the old and new Bhutto was painfully visible at his press conference last Sunday. He was defensive where he used to attack, evasive where once he was forthright. He was blustering, unconvincing and sometimes blatantly untruthful.

He allowed himself and his provincial Chief Ministers to be elected unopposed. (In his native Larkana, the opposition candidate was detained all night to prevent him filing his nomination papers).

The resulting explosion has been too big to be explained by the rigging of a single election. The essential protest, expressed again and again by the Right and the Left, the religious and the secular, the poor and the rich, is against Mr. Bhutto's reign of terror -- a system of institutionalized corruption which had ended by defeating most of its own objectives., fulfillment lagged behind, because of the weaknesses of Mr. Bhutto himself and his system. Ruling by manipulation and terror, he introduced a new corruption into towns and villages. Money for development was systematically pillaged and villagers were exploited by the very officials sent to improve their lot. In town and country the poor were at the mercy of a form of government more akin to a mafia than a modern administration.

Under the system, promotion was for the pliable. Able men in government, administration and the sciences were hounded from their jobs and if they were lucky, allowed to go abroad. How the system defeated its own objectives is apparent in the dismal failures in agriculture. The Punjab and Sindh have the biggest and most fertile stretch of irrigated land in Asia but wheat productivity is still only 0.6 tons an acre, even after the green revolution, compared to one ton in Egypt or Mexico.....

(The Guardian, 22nd April, 1977)

The PNA bitterly condemned Martial Law, as a shield to protect the illegal and unconstitutional government led by Mr. Bhutto and his PPP. The restrictions imposed by the government on processions and meetings could not stop the people from taking to the streets. Even the justified fear of the police and dread of the FSF could not stop them. Mosques had become the pivotal point of political activity. Processions to defy restrictions used to start from the mosques. The Imams and the Ulema in general gave the lead and were in the forefront of the movement. The cry throughout the country was, "Mr. Bhutto must go!" There was hardly a town in the country which did not participate. The people of Pakistan, who had been quietly putting up with one dictator after another, demonstrated vociferously for democracy. It was a popular revolution to destroy Mr. Bhutto's tyranny.

The violence that took place was mostly committed or incited by the government agencies 'or their agent provocateurs. The PNA people kept affirming their faith in

Islam at meeting after meeting. They vowed that they would fight for Nizam-e-Mu'atafa in Pakistan.

On April 27, a joint declaration was issued by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three chiefs, confirming that the Armed Forces were with the government and it was their constitutional obligation to act in such a manner. Gen Zia told me that he never sued or agreed with any such declaration. It was prepared by Gen Tikka Khan on Mr. Bhutto's request, and issued to the press as if it had been issued by the Armed Forces heads. But they did not object to it and it passed. That showed the lack of courage or the intimacy of their relationship with Mr. Bhutto. Gen Zia himself told me that it was a dirty way of doing things, but there was nothing wrong in the context or the spirit in which it was issued.

Mr. Bhutto knew that he was cornered; He addressed the National Assembly on April 28 and claimed that the PNA agitation to topple his government was not indigenous but a colossal international conspiracy against the Islamic state of Pakistan. He blamed the USA for it. He also said that the imposition of Martial Law at Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad was constitutional. He was also worried about the PNA's 'Long March' which was to converge on the PM's house.

In that address, Mr. Bhutto said, "I want to stay in power because I want to accomplish two major objects. My first mission is the restoration of relations with Afghanistan and the second mission is to equip the Armed Forces with modern weapons. There is a third mission as well and that is a peaceful and judicious solution of the Kashmir problem -- but it is complicated and will take a long time."

In order to forestall the 'Long March' on April 30, select workers of the PNA were arrested on April 28. Attock Railway Station, Peshawar Road, Jhelum, Gujrat and Gujjar Khan rail and road routes were blockaded from April 28. On orders received on April 28, road journeys towards Rawalpindi and Islamabad from 16:00 hours that day were banned up to 20:00 hours April 30. Citizens were told to get prior permission for marriages and cinema shows. Entries to Liaquat Bagh. and Ayub National Park were banned on April 29 and 30. The FSF in civvies and wearing PNA badges, received the PNA workers deceitfully. Mosques were searched and many PNA workers were arrested.

Army responsibility. and civil responsibility were divided. While the police did the actual physical blockading of roads, the army contingents were at hand to give support if required. Instances of courage and bold defiance were many. People would come out from a masque at the appointed time, and would be warned by the police not to proceed further but they would not stop. They seemed to have no fear of bullets or death. The people were in no mood to tolerate Mr. Bhutto even if the administration wanted him to stay on. They were ready to defy force. The deadlock between the

government and the opposition had taken a formidable shape. There was a situation of virtual civil war in the country. Hiding the real issues Mr. Bhutto asserted that the conflict between the government and the opposition was not over 'General Elections' but was related to the norms of egalitarian society and economic reforms that had been carried out by the PPP Government. Harsh approach of Mr. Bhutto's administration provided wider popularity to PNA movement.

The PNA got massive support from students, labor organizations, trade unions and women's organizations. Mr. Bhutto was under criticism for his unconstitutional attitude and policies, especially the imposition of Martial Law and the brutal tactics of the FSF. For the first time, women were seen in large numbers in massive antigovernment demonstrations in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Lyalpur, Hyderabad and Karachi. The economy was damaged because of the confrontation between the Government and the PNA. In view of the government's brutality PNA was hitting back with more effective militant methods. Confrontation assumed serious proportions when the Army was called in. Pakistan's ambassadors to Spain, Greece, France and USSR tendered resignations against Mr. Bhutto's dictatorial policies. Three Army brigadiers had already resigned. The Army was acutely concerned over the command failure in Lahore Corps commanded by Lt Gen M. Iqbal Khan.

On 29th April Mr. Bhutto stated that there was a colossal foreign conspiracy behind PNA agitation attempting to stall Pakistan's nuclear capability.

PNA's long march was planned on 30th April. People were to converge on PM House from all over Pakistan and surround it. Government ordered its forces to make the PNA's 'Long March' on April 30, 1977 a failure at all costs. Extra police were called to Rawalpindi from nearby cities, and the Army was deployed. I had been given the duty of making sure that no protesters reached the PM's house. Details were worked out in a coordinating conference presided over by the Interior Secretary Mr. M A K Chaudhry on orders from the PM. I was ordered by the COAS to attend it on his behalf. Army was requested to assist police in making PNA Long March a failure. I went back and briefed Gen Zia about the conference. He approved the action to be taken by the Army all over Pakistan so that the PNA would not succeed. We had gone even to the extent of not allowing passengers to board trains even at major stations like Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar. Nothing was allowed to reach the PM's house ---- not even pedestrians. Mission was fully accomplished. About 10,000 people were arrested in 48 hours.

Thus the PNA 'Long March' to the PM's house was not allowed to materialize. On the evening of April 30, the Prime Minister himself violated Section 144. He went to Rawalpindi Saddar in an open jeep, giving the impression that he had suddenly decided to go there, displaying a letter alleged to have been written by the Americans for the stoppage of Pakistan's nuclear programme. He declared the 'Elephants' were after him ('Elephants' is a common name for Americans' in Pakistan.) It was all stage

managed because the TV cameramen and journalists were there. Impression given was as if people had suddenly gathered to listen to the popular Prime Minister.

On May 5 the PNA proposed a 32-point plan for resolution of the crisis. There were two phases of action. Phase 1 -- immediate lifting of Martial Law, setting free political prisoners, annulment of all amendments to the Constitution not unanimously agreed upon, apportioning time for opposition over radio and TV and an end to censorship. Phase 2 -- Dissolution of parliament followed by simultaneous General and Local elections within 30 days and Mr. Bhutto's resignation immediately, complete reorganization of electoral machinery military's responsibility for security at polling booths, the naming of acceptable governors and dismissal of certain senior civil servants.

The Far Eastern Economic Review May 6, 1977 wrote:-

TWENTY FOUR POLITICAL MURDERS

"Additionally, the disconcerting fact for those who see Bhutto as a leader capable of holding the nation together, is the massive erosion of his own popularity. Like Mrs. Indra Gandhi in India, Bhutto won his election in 1970 by presenting himself as a charismatic leader of the impoverished and inarticulate poor. His slogans '*roti*' (bread), '*Kapra*' (clothing), and '*makan*' (shelter) caught their imagination. The theatrical orator, he declared to the thronging multitudes at the 1970 rallies "Islam is our, faith, democracy, is our polity, socialism is our economy. All power to the people. PPP manifesto was drawn up by J A Rahim, a public official and socialist theoretician.

Bhutto's weakness derives from a trait he shares with many Asian intellectuals who equate intelligence, sagacity and political astuteness, with the possession of academic qualifications. His intellectual arrogance combined with an inflated ego and a prickly vanity makes him intolerant of those who disagree with him.

It was inevitable that, heady with power he would derisively declare of his colleagues: "I am the Peoples Party and they are all my creatures". He expelled from the PPP the genuine socialists, like Mairaj Mohammad Khan, who had strong support among labour, and jailed him. Rahim, too, was forced out of the party. Gunmen fired, shots at his house during his polemics with Bhutto. Rahim had protested against admitting into the party, on Bhutto's '*Farman*' (directive) alone some of the civil servants who had given the Ayub Khan administration a bad name. Bhutto's credibility as a socialist is certainly on the wane.

Bhutto's vindictiveness, too made him many enemies. In his name at least some of these enemies were humiliated, one being handcuffed after his arrest and forced to walk up and down several times a day outside the establishment he had headed before his

disgrace. Another, a business man was peremptorily arrested after, he had spoken privately against bank nationalization. The Karachi Bar Association has said there have been 24 political murders since the PPP came to power".

(Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 1977)

Some PPP members of the Assemblies used their legal entitlement to get arms and ammunition licenses issued to thousands of people, of their party, thus getting weapons distributed through the district administration. Top leaders of the PPP who occupied high offices had begun touring the provinces inciting and encouraging their party-men and organizing an armed confrontation against the people.

The likelihood of Army intervention to, halt the drift to anarchy was clearly seen in the international press. It was highlighted, for example, in a perceptive analysis of the crisis in Pakistan published in *The Economist* April 23, 1977:

"TAKE HIM UP ON IT"

Mr. Bhutto's increasingly defiant opponents have won the savage battle of Pakistan's streets. They have proved their ability to paralyze the country's major cities, to ground the national airline, to outnumber, outshout and outshoot the mobs on the other side. Now it is time for them to validate their victory by nonviolent political means.

This is what the leaders of the Pakistan National Alliance claim they want to do. They say they want a return of the March 7th election, which even the election commission now concedes was marred by flagrant rigging and intimidation by Mr. Bhutto's supporters. But they also insist that Mr. Bhutto must first resign from the prime ministership and turn the government over to an interim authority.

It is this last demand which Mr. Bhutto feels he cannot concede. He insists that he has a moral, legal and political right to his job. His moral claim is clearly, questionable, and were Pakistan a more disciplined democracy, he would be long since gone. The country would no doubt be quieter, for a time; if he did resign. But given his dogged determination to hang on (he has already endured a longer and fiercer struggle than Ayub Khan) he should be taken at his word and challenged at another poll.

Mr. Bhutto has reacted to the pressures of recent weeks like any desperate man in a corner - alternately, flailing out at his attackers and tossing them concessions. Some concessions --- such as this week's sop to the militant mullahs a, ban on drinking and gambling and a promise to enforce Islamic law---have been both irrelevant and retrograde. But at least one offer deserves more often than the disdainful dismissal it got. This was his proposal to restage the March 10th Provincial elections, which were boycotted by the opposition because of the rigging of the national election three days

earlier. If the PNA can prove by winning a majority in new provincial elections that it may well have been robbed of power in March, Mr. Bhutto is committed to holding a new national election as well. He has also offered to allow the army and the judiciary to supervise the voting.

There is one obvious snag in Mr. Bhutto's two tier plan. He has specified that the provincial elections are to be held in all four provinces including Baluchistan.

But even before the rigging question arose, the opposition had decided to boycott the Baluchistan election because of the presence of large numbers of federal troops in the province, where they have been putting down a series of part-tribal, part-political uprisings. So Mr. Bhutto would have to make the further concession of withdrawing troops from Baluchistan for the plan to get off the ground. Since Baluchistan has been Pakistan's most peaceful province during the past two months, and since troop withdrawals should logically be part of Mr. Bhutto's own scheme for political normalization there, this is a demand he should be able to meet.

THE ARMY WOULD BE WORSE

Apart from his feverish desire -to get rid of Mr. Bhutto, immediately if not sooner, the opposition has no good ground for turning down his election plan. The events since March 7th have unquestionably eroded such support as he had at the time of the disputed election. He almost certainly would have won it then without rigging, he might not do so today. So the offer to rerun the election with proper neutral supervision, carries an enormous risk of public repudiation for this man of tender ego. For the opposition it presents an extraordinary opportunity to exploit a shift in popular mood before that mood shifts again the reaction against the continuing mob violence.

There are several other reasons why the opposition should take Mr. Bhutto upon this offer. The strongest that, unless it acts quickly, the initiative will pass from the politicians to the mobs (in some places this has happened already) making an explosion and or an army takeover inevitable. The army, which contains no outstanding public figures these days, has so far been responsive to Mr. Bhutto's orders. If it decides to defy him, it is unlikely to do so - as the opposition seems to be hoping -- in order to put his rivals into power, but rather to impose its own form of military, order. So the opposition will lose as much as Mr. Bhutto if it pushes its campaign that far.

But Pakistani democracy, such as it is, will lose the most. Unlike its neighbor, India, Pakistan has never settled comfortably into imported parliamentary ways. Mr. Bhutto's chief appeal to his countrymen, when he came to power after the 1971 Bangladesh war, was his promise to restore civilian democratic government after 13 years of military rule. He did not exactly fulfill those promises about democracy, his rigid restrictions on civil liberties and press freedom attracted less international censure than Mrs. Ghandi's

relatively milder emergency only because of the lower expectations that were the result of Pakistan's authoritarian past. Yet he did call the first election ever held under a civilian government in Pakistan. If this election is to be abrogated now, by a power seizure, even the limited gains that democracy made under Mr. Bhutto will be wiped out.

Mr. Bhutto's angry enemies should reflect that their - own interest would be served by a peaceful, legal transition. Even if Mr. Bhutto should be returned to power, the chances of a subsequent democratic contest would still be greater than if the army assumed control. And if the opposition should somehow get, itself installed in power by what Mr. Bhutto has called a civilian coup, one coup would all too likely be followed by another and another until, even a rigged election would come to savor of the good old days. With events moving so quickly, the election option may not remain open for long. Grab it, somebody." .

(The Economist, April 23, 1977)

On March 7, 1977, Gen Zia had issued a directive to the Army to refrain from politics. But events were pushing him to step in.

Mr. Bhutto thought that he would be able to control any mass movement with his police and the FSF. He had said in an address to the nation, "I may be weak but this chair is strong. I will not give them dead bodies. The National Assembly elections are over. There is no question of fresh polls now." Mr. Bhutto was caught in a web of his own making. He could not accept the demand of the PNA for fresh polls because it would mean that he accepted that the elections were rigged. The only alternative left to him was to insist that the polls were over. Harsh measures adopted by the government added to the hatred of Mr. Bhutto and the people became even more determined to get rid of him. There was firing in Anarkali Lahore. Earlier there had been *lathi* charge on ulema in Muslim Mosque Lahore. PNA leadership played with the sentiments of the masses.

The Bhutto government was accused of brutally violating the human rights of political prisoners. A dramatic report in May 1977 by Amnesty International, showed how 'confessions' were being extracted by mental and physical torture --- mainly by the police. These tortures, according to the international human rights Organization, included severe beatings, electric shocks applied to private parts, the stringing up of the prisoner to the ceiling, the insertion of chilies in the anus, threat or strangulation and execution, the playing of faked tapes, suggesting the prisoner's family had been murdered, and threats to disgrace a mother, wife or sister. These and oilier violations attracted international. publicity.

On May 11, 1977, the National Assembly adopted a bill to make Friday the weekly holiday instead of Sunday. Mr. Bhutto's government was now desperately trying to lean on Islam. On the same day. *The Times of India* wrote:

".... Bhutto has had his opponents, real or imaginary, beaten up, arrested on trumped up charges, and even murdered, he has banned the National Awami Party, which has a considerable following, he has humiliated leading members of his own PPP, he has dismissed governors and Chief Ministers as if they were nobodies: and he has ruthlessly censored the press."

On the morning of May 13, Gen Zia informed me on the telephone that he was going to hold an important conference in his office and he wanted me to attend it. I asked him about the agenda of the conference. He replied it had something to do with the prevailing political situation. On reaching his office. I found he had gathered most of the Generals in GHQ around him and was waiting for me.

He told us that the PM was thinking of asking for the mandate from the people through a referendum. The point at issue was, 'Should the referendum be held or not?' Maj Gen Abdullah Malik, the CGS, was vehemently for it. Maj Gen Saadat Ali Khan, the E-in-C was totally against it, the other wavered. I was against the idea of a referendum. The nation wanted re-elections, and would not stop short of that. I requested Zia that no recommendation should be given to the PM unless we had a unanimous opinion. We must argue and convince each other. Gen Zia agreed. We argued the pros and cons of the proposal for about four hours, and finally we unanimously agreed that a referendum should not be resorted to.

Gen Zia was to give our recommendations to the PM, who was to address the National Assembly in the afternoon and announce his decision on the referendum. Gen Zia told us that he would go to the PM to inform him about our recommendation that there should be no referendum instead fresh elections should be held. We were to wait for him in his office.

A TV set was available in the COAS office and we listened to the PM's address. Mr. Bhutto said that he would go for a referendum. This was unexpected. So we asked the COAS what message he had conveyed. Gen Zia told us that he had informed the PM that it was the unanimous decision of the generals in GHQ that there should be no referendum and that fresh elections should be held. At that stage we had no way of checking what Gen Zia had really said. It came as a shock to us when, in a subsequent Cabinet meeting Mr. Bhutto addressed Gen Zia and said "General you had told me that the Army wanted me to go for a referendum but today I find that that was not the opinion of the Army". Gen Zia was caught. Out of the whole audience, I was the only one who knew that Gen Zia had told a deliberate lie.

Mr. Bhutto was not prepared to resign at any cost. Rejecting the demand for his resignation, he offered to seek a vote of confidence through a referendum. He insisted that he was placing his fate in the hands of the people because the PNA had turned down all reconciliatory measures. The PNA condemned this proposal as a calculated device to ensure the PPP's illegitimate rule. The General Council of the PNA accused Mr. Bhutto of foisting a one party hegemony. One of the main reasons for the PNA rejecting the referendum was the fear generated by Mr. Bhutto's speech of May 13, in which he showed an inclination for certain administrative changes and reversion to the presidential form of government.

A remarkable open letter, written by the PNA politician retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan to the Chiefs of Staff and Officers of the Armed Forces also came under discussion on May 13. Mr. Bhutto termed it high treason. The Defence Minister said that Asghar Khan could be court martialled for it. The ex-Air Marshal countered that it was not an invitation to the Armed Forces to take over the country. The contents of this letter, which was received by officers around the country, are given below in full.

"May, 1977

I am addressing this message to the Chiefs of Staff and the Officers of the Defence Services of Pakistan.

It is your duty to defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan and to obey lawful commands of superior officers placed over you. To differentiate between a 'lawful' and an 'unlawful' command is the duty of every officer. Everyone of you must ask yourself whether what the Army is doing is 'lawful' activity and if your conscience tells you that it is not, and you still carry it out, you would appear to lack moral fibre and would be guilty of a grave crime against your country and your people.

You should by now have realized that the military action in East Pakistan was a conspiracy in which the present Prime Minister played a Machiavellian role. You know the circumstances in which military action in Baluchistan was engineered and how completely unnecessary this action has been. You are also probably aware of the utterly unnecessary military action last year in Dir in the North West Frontier Province. If you have any interest in National affairs, you must also be aware, that during the election campaign the nation expressed its powerful disapproval of the present regime. Following, the people's rejection of the government, you should have been surprised at the election results in which the Pakistan National Alliance which could muster such overwhelming popular support, could only get 8 out of 116 National Assembly seats in the Punjab. You must surely know that many people were not even allowed to file their nomination papers. Was it not too much of a coincidence that no papers could be filed against the Prime Minister and all the Chief Ministers of the four provinces? That those who dared to try, ended up spending a few nights in police custody. One of them has still not been traced.

Those of you who were even remotely connected with duties in connection with the March 7 election would also know of the blatant manner, in which rigging took place, of the hundreds of thousands of ballot papers of PNA candidates, that had been taken out of ballot boxes and were found in the streets and fields of Pakistan, following the election of March 7. You would also have seen the deserted polling, stations of March 10, the day of the Provincial polls, following the call for boycott of provincial elections by the PNA. Nevertheless the government media announced that an unprecedented number of votes had also been polled, surely you must have followed the movement which called for Mr. Bhutto's resignation and re-election in the country.

The coming out of women in thousands on the streets in every city and town with babies in their arms was a scene that no one will forget. These were the women who Mr. Bhutto claimed had voted for him. The movement proved within a few days that he and his government had been completely rejected by the people. The death of hundreds of our youth and the beating of our mothers and sisters was a scene that may well have stirred you to shame and sorrow. Have you ever thought why the people put themselves to so much trouble? Why must mothers come out to face bullets with babies in their arms? Why do parents allow their children to face police lathis and bullets? Surely it is only because they feel that they have been wronged, that they have been cheated; that their basic right to 'hire and fire' their rulers have been denied to them. They understood, when we told them the truth, that the Constitution, which you as officers of the defence services are sworn to defend, had been violated. Article 218(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan says, 'It shall be the duty of the Election Commission constituted in relation to an election to organize and conduct the election and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law, and that corrupt practices are guarded against.

This, my friends, was not a just and fair election. Mr. Bhutto has vitiated the Constitution and is guilty of a grave crime against the people. It is not your duty to support his illegal regime, nor can you be called upon to kill your own people so that he can continue a little longer in office. Let it not be said that the Pakistan Armed Forces are a degenerate police force, fit only for killing unarmed civilians. How else can you explain the shooting of a spirited lad whose only fault was to show the "V" sign to the Army in Lahore the other day? The spirit of adventure, of defiance rather than servility, needs to be encouraged in our youth and this unfortunate incident is a blot on the name of the Army which would be difficult to wipe out. Similarly shooting by the Army in Karachi on an unarmed crowd is unpardonable. Did you not realize that the poor and hungry people of Pakistan throughout 30 troubled years of our history, had shown only love and affection for our Armed Forces? That they wept when you laid down arms in East Pakistan that they have always prayed for your glory and have literally starved themselves and their children so that you ate well-fed and, our Generals and senior officers can live a life that even their British and American counterparts would not dream of. It pains me to say that that love is now gone. Pray do not let it turn to hate For, should that happen, a tragedy

would have occurred in the history of this nation which we in our lifetime may not be able to undo.

As men of honor, it is your responsibility to do your duty and the call of duty in these trying circumstances is not the blind obedience of unlawful commands. There comes a time in the lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you the time has Come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan. God be with you.

M. Asghar Khan"

On May 14, 1977 the Army was called out in Multan.

At one of the meetings in the PM's Secretariat Cabinet Room, Mr. Bhutto asked Gen Zia, 'General, you said that the Army would support the government whole hog and you would be able to control the situation. How come that the situation is not coming under control?' Zia had not yet replied when Minister Hamid Reza Gillani interjected that the Army was not effective Gen Tikka Khan, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Hanif Khan and Maulana Kausar Niazi were also present Gen Zia said simply that the Army was doing its best. Gen Tikka Khan then said that if two to three hundred were killed, the situation would quickly come under control. The discussion continued.

When asked by the PM for my views, I said I would give my views from the research angle and also asked permission to question Gen Tikka Khan. The PM permitted me to do so I asked Gen Tikka Khan to refresh our memory by letting us know what the principle governing the application of force was when troops were called out in aid of the civil power.

He replied that minimum force should be applied Then I asked him about the effectiveness of fire He replied that fire is always for effect and not in the air. Then Gen Tikka Khan asked me in a sarcastic manner why I was asking those questions as all of us knew those things. But I wanted these two principles to come from him in the presence of the PM I then made my submission.

"Is our army so bad that it cannot kill unarmed civilians at a short range of 25 yards or so?" I said Sir, 42 bullets were fired in Multan and only two people were hit Where did the other 40 bullets go? 43 bullets were fired in Anarkali Lahore and only two people were hit where did the other bullets go? That clearly meant that the fire was not aimed to be effective.

The Generals sitting here are all with you but those who actually fire the bullets, the NCO or the soldier who is actually to shoot is not with you, that is, the Army is apparently obeying orders but in actuality they are not. That is tantamount to disobedience of orders. That shows a lapse of discipline revealing the fissure in the

Army It is the Army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fibre of this Army, breaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Therefore, please do not destroy this Army. Three Brigadiers have already cracked, the junior ranks are cracking now. So please go for re-elections. You will win. Please do not let the cracks come in the Army."

Mr. Bhutto listened, and I believe this started him thinking. Perhaps he might have changed his mind and gone for fresh elections, but his colleagues would not let it happen. They had become a bad influence on him. Pirzada used to be very vocal against any suggestion of re-elections. He seemed to be the deciding authority. Mr. Bhutto asked me what would happen if after re-elections there was still agitation, and troops were required to shoot.

I answered him that in that case they would shoot to incapacitate or kill. "They would not fire in the because they would have the conviction that they were supporting the correct cause. Today that conviction is lacking. They knew that rigging was done and there is no cause to shoot. In the case of re-elections, since the election would be under the Judiciary and the Army, the conviction would be there that the elections were being conducted freely, fairly, and without any prejudice because they would have done it themselves. "I urged Mr. Bhutto to go for re-elections, also raising the issue of accountability. I said that conditions in the country were very bad. People responsible for bringing the country's conditions up to this pitch must be made accountable."

I sincerely wish that another witness to these events, Maulana Kausar Niazi, had given a fuller and clearer description in his book, *Aur Line Kat Gayi*, rather than just saying that Gen Chishti said in a harsh tone to Maj Gen Abdullah Malik that political matters should be solved politically.

From March 10, 1977 the Army had been provoked in all sorts of rude and crude ways but the army had not reacted. It still had no plans except to support the government. But the government had only one mission i.e. to retain power. Unfortunately the opposition also had only one mission, i.e. to get rid of Mr. Bhutto. All other considerations were subsidiary.

A Bill seeking to provide legitimacy for the rule of the PPP through a nation-wide referendum before the end of September 1977 was passed by the National Assembly on May 16, 1977. The same day, in the COAS Conference attended by Corps Commanders and PSOs, it was argued that the Army was not for a referendum but for re-elections. Nobody except I knew that it was Gen Zia who had recommended a referendum to Mr. Bhutto. It was also generally assessed by the Army, Officers that the PNA Movement had taken a new turn to become an anti Mr. Bhutto movement instead of an anti-PM movement. There was no doubt in anybody's mind that rigging was done. (A full dress rehearsal in fact had been carried out in the 1975 elections in Azad Kashmir. Some officers who had played a dubious role in the Azad Kashmir elections were posted by

me, as Military Secretary at GHQ, on orders from the COAS Gen Tikka Khan, to meet the PM's requirements.)

I had never taken the stance either in the meetings with the PM or with the COAS that the National Assembly was an, unconstitutional body or that the PM wanted to introduce the Presidential System of Government. I also never underrated the strength of the PPP. It was not the PPP which people were fighting against. It was Mr. Bhutto whom they did not want as the PM. They wanted fresh elections under the Army and Judiciary.

At this COAS Conference, on May 16, 1977, Gen. Zia told us that the PM would like to meet us and get our views on the conditions prevailing in the country. We told him that it was not normal and that it was for the COAS to give the Army's views to the PM. But Zia said that it was the PM's personal desire, so we agreed, to go. This first meeting was followed by others.

The PM would always be there with his selected ministers Maulana Kausar Niazi, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Hanif Khan, Hamid Reza Gifiani, Gen Tikka Khan and Mir Afzai Khan etc. Sometimes the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff were also there. The PM would ask for our views, I starting from one end of the table.

At one of the first meetings, in early, May 1977, we expressed our views one by one, telling him bluntly that the general law and order, situation in the country was bad. There was a general lack of confidence in the government, and the atmosphere was so charged that its reversion to normal seemed unlikely unless the people were pacified by meeting their demand for fresh elections. As far as we could assess the situation, if the government had decided to go for re-elections, there was a one hundred percent chance of winning the elections by a simple majority. Therefore we recommended that fresh elections be ordered.

Abdul Hafiz Pirzada replied vehemently, saying "How can we have re-elections? We are a democratically elected government. It is our right to form the government and stay in power. We will lose face, if we, go for re-elections. What are these generals talking about? We have done no wrong. There should be no re-elections." Hanif Khan, after this outburst, said, "*Aali Jah* (Your Highness), we cannot have re-elections. How can this happen? It does not happen in a democratic country. It would mean an admission of rigging and a sign of weakness. So it should not be done." Hamid Reza Gillani also supported his colleagues.

We submitted to the PM that we were giving our considered opinion based on the situation as it had been reported to us through our intelligence agencies in the field. If their intelligence agencies were reporting correctly they too would know the true situation. Our duty was to give our views based on the facts as 'reported to us. We

found that the truth was not acceptable to some of Mr. Bhutto's colleagues. Some of them would certainly have appreciated the fact that they had no chance of being reelected, and would lose their ministerships.

Hamid Reza Gillani was once deputed to put the first question to the COAS. "General, you said you were with us; you would support the government fully and throughout, but now you are letting your Generals ask for re-elections." Gen Zia fumbled. Gen Arbab came to his rescue and explained that the entire command structure was being affected. Troops were- not accepting that rigging had not been done. Admiral Sharif used to give his views only occasionally. I do not think Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar ever expressed his views at all.

It was explained to the PM that the generals were with him. It was the lower echelon of the Army which was not with him and was reluctant to fire because of lack of conviction. That situation, if allowed to persist, would hit at the very fibre of the Army. So, in order to save the structure of the Army, it would have to take over because Mr. Bhutto wouldn't hand over power. All the generals sitting there may be sacked, but as long as there was an army there would be a COAS, whatever rank he might be, perhaps even a captain, and he would do it. He would take over because the COAS could not accept the destruction of the Army, risking the end of Pakistan. So he was requested again to consider re-elections as a solution to the impasse.

On May 26, the PNA announced its decision to resume negotiations with the government. The PM was also for a dialogue without pre-conditions. He said an accord could be reached if the PNA was ready for a package deal. Mr. Bhutto said that he was not going to act unconstitutionally or in a perverse political fashion. He would not be a Ghulam Mohammad, who was not a politician and, therefore, dissolved the Assembly. He also did not want to become Iskander Mirza, who in spite of being a civilian President, had imposed Martial Law in the whole country. He would continue to make political efforts. (*Pakistan Times*, May 26, 1977).

Apparently the PNA and the PPP seemed to be more fond of dialogues than timely initiatives. They had been locked in a series of inconclusive dialogues. (It was the unusually lengthy dialogues by Mr. Bhutto, even after agreement on basic points in favor of the PNA, that finally left no option to the COAS but to take over.) Mr. Bhutto was in an acute dilemma. By the end of May. Mr. Bhutto waited the Army to takeover to save himself from an ignoble and humiliating exit and the wrath of the people. He was himself preparing the way for it by using delay and confrontation tactics. On 30 May Maulana Kausar Niazi disclosed that the government had decided to hold talks with the opposition with an open mind.

Government and the PNA resumed negotiations on June 3, to defuse the political situation: A two man subcommittee ---- one from the government and the other from

the PNA --- was constituted to work out details of a formula relating to "basic issues" of disagreement. After the seventh round of talks, it appeared that the results of the package deal between the government and the PNA could be decisive and positive. On June 4 the PPP and the PNA agreed to suspend processions and rallies. On 10 June Ghulam Mustafa Khar came out in support of Bhutto. He declared that the opposition was out, to disintegrate the country. The PNA Movement was suspended when Mr. Bhutto agreed to hold fresh elections and began talks with the PNA leaders, to work out modalities. This was not liked by the people because so many lives had been sacrificed and so much hatred of Mr. Bhutto had developed. People thought the talks were a trap to kill the PNA Movement. They were not in favor of talks with Mr. Bhutto. They wanted to get rid of him and the PPP government and for that they were prepared to make more sacrifices and undergo greater hardships.

As the talks dragged on, the people were getting impatient. Martial Law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore was not good for the image of the Armed Forces. (On June 2 the High Court said it was not in order, and it was lifted on June 7, 1977)

Mr. Bhutto conceded in June to PNA longstanding demand to hold fresh general elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies.

Even official spokesmen for the regime admitted the gravity of the situation. Yahya Bakhtiar, the Attorney General, addressing the Supreme Court on June 8, 1977, in an appeal case, gave the following figures for casualties – and incidents during the PNA movement from March 14 to May 27.

Men's processions	399
Women's processions	248
Lawyers' processions	92
Ulema's processions	80
Students' processions	648
Children's processions	57
Killed	241
Wounded	1198
Security Force Personnel Killed	9
Security Force Personnel Wounded	53
Incidents of riots and looting	162
Vehicles destroyed	1622
Government installations destroyed	18
Shops destroyed	47
Banks destroyed or damaged	58
Hotels destroyed or damaged	7
Cinema Houses destroyed or damaged	11
Offices destroyed or damaged	546
Railway bogies destroyed	32

There was no doubt that the figures given by the Attorney General were low. According to Army, intelligence reports, the number killed was 300. About 80,000 had been arrested for anti-government activities. Were those figures not good enough to indicate that the 'people were against the government'?

On June 16, Mr. Bhutto made a surprise statement in the National Assembly: 'Final accord between the government and the PNA would be signed only after my four-day visit to the Middle East'. By June 17 when Mr. Bhutto left for Riyadh, the PNA leaders got the feeling that the government was not keen or sincere on the parleys, and the PNA decided that the government could not be trusted. Therefore whatever decision was arrived at, it must be protected by constitutional guarantees.

Fears that the talks were a trap for the PNA were coming true. The PNA maintained that the government termed either legal or constitutional. If they did so then the PNA Movement would be an illegal movement. It would then also be an undemocratic movement.

The nation was polarized between the PPP and the PNA supporters. Bouts of uninhibited politicking were leading inexorably to a civil war fomented by Mr. Bhutto himself, who made apparent preparations for civil war. Notably his appointment of Ghulam Mustafa Khar and procurement and distribution of arms. Mr. Khar said "We will repeat 1972 history". Sheikh Rashid said "We will burn Lahore to ashes". Dr Ghulam Hussain said "Nobody will escape our wrath and anger". Mr. Bhutto started reorganizing FSF and police. Two months pay as 'good service pay' was given to police as political bribe. That is why Gen Zia felt compelled to move and takeover.

People were not very hopeful of an agreement because arms licenses were being given to the PPP workers and many of the PNA workers were being arrested. Zia informed us that intelligence reports indicated that the country was heading for a bloodbath on July 5. With weapons distributed liberally to the PPP supporters, the Opposition-led processions were to be fired upon, killing many and creating more tension. At the same time, one of the plans of the PPP bosses was to have, the PPP-appointee Maulana Kausar Niazi (at the time Minister for Religious Affairs) assassinated then blame his murder the "fanatical" PNA leaders who would be shot next, in revenge killings by the rank and file PPP activists. Niazi himself later confirmed that his own party had planned his murder, so he decided on splitting with his former leader Mr. Bhutto and the PPP.

After two weeks of the talks it became clear that Mr. Bhutto was buying time. His determination to stay in power by all means was not doubted by any one. He thought that with the passage of time, people would lose interest in the movement. Then the situation would automatically come under control. Yet when the PNA dropped the demand for Mr. Bhutto's resignation, people showed their resentment. They wondered

how a demand be dropped by the PNA leaders. People had not forgotten Liaquat Bagh. massacre, Tajpura killings, 9 April Punjab Assembly area and 15 April Rattan Cinema area killings.

On June 27 Abdul Hafiz Pirzada said that the government would not receive the PNA's draft as it was not negotiable. Mr. Khar, Adviser to Mr. Bhutto had said "Elections or Movement, PPP was ready for both; ready to meet the challenge of any movement". (*Pakistan Times* 27-6-1977). Mufti Mahmood met Mr. Bhutto on June 28 and Mr. Bhutto agreed that the PNA draft be given to Pirzada. On June 29, Mr. Bhutto and Mufti had a meeting. Mr. Bhutto promised to study the proposal. The PPP and the PNA would have a final meeting on July 1.

Pirzada and Prof Ghafoor had another meeting on June 30 to clarify certain points in the PNA draft. At Quetta, Bugti warned that there would be a mass movement if the government and the PNA failed to reach an accord. Dr. Ghulam Hussain, Secretary General of PPP, said "Agitations attempt will be crushed firmly." (*Pakistan Times*, 30-6-1977)

The PNA, PPP teams met from 2000 on July 1 till 0630, July 2. Mr. Bhutto agreed to hold elections in October and to the creation of an Implementations Committee, with equal representation from the PNA and the PPP. It was announced to the Press that the government and the PNA had reached an accord on the *modus operandi* of the elections and a final meeting would take place on July 3 but a few hours later the PNA denied it, though willing to continue negotiations. It raised 10 new points. This was the second time that such an announcement had been made. (It was first announced on June 14.)

In order to create an impression that Mr. Bhutto sincerely wanted to resolve the crisis, he conceded fresh polls. But he refused to give any constitutional basis to the accord. The PNA leaders insisted on constitutional protection for the accord. The PNA Council met on July 2 and decided that the Government's proposals could not be accepted for lack of constitutional-status to the accord. It said that, without constitutional authority, the Implementations Committee or the Supervisory Council were powerless to ensure the implementation of its decisions.

The PNA Council met on July 3 again. Their lawyers were of the same opinion, and when the Council met. again in the evening, the consensus was that the Government proposals were unacceptable. Air Marshal Asghar Khan told the Press the same thing. At 2130 Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Prof Ghafoor met Mr. Bhutto and told him about the rejection of the Government proposals by the PNA council. The PNA opted for continuing the movement because Mr. Bhutto did not accept their demand for constitutional protection. He said he would give his reaction on July 4.

At about 9.30 in the evening on July 3, Maj Gen K M Arif took Maj Gen Riaz Khan and myself in his car to meet Gen Zia in his residence. He had called us to give orders to take over the government. Gen Zia knew that the PNA and Government meeting was in session at that time. We discussed the situation and Gen Zia decided that he would give the final orders after seeing the outcome of the meeting. We kept on waiting till the meeting was over. We came to know that Mr. Bhutto had said that he would let his reaction be known on July 4. So we thought there was hope that an agreement would finally be reached. All of us heaved a sigh of relief because there was now no need to take over yet.

Although arrangements were ready for the execution of OPERATION FAIRPLAY and there were very good chances of the leakage of their plans, Gen Zia did not order the takeover. This was simply because the Army did not want to do it. He risked his life by delaying the takeover by 24 hours, because God alone knows what would have happened if the plans had become known to the Government. We dispersed at about 11.30 in the evening. I went back home and had a good night's sleep.

Mr. Bhutto held a press conference at 5 minutes past midnight on July 4. He said that the talks had virtually broken down and he could offer nothing more to the PNA. But the PM was willing to meet the PNA team again. He declared in the press conference that the question of reopening of accord reached between the government and the PNA on Saturday morning (2 July) did not arise. Mr. Bhutto also disclosed, that they had raised 10 points because PNA Central Council was not willing to accept the agreement.

For the whole of July 4 there was no communication from Mr. Bhutto to the PNA. It seemed the final agreement would not materialize because the ruling party was not sincere in honoring its commitments. Gen Zia summoned the three of us again as on 3rd July. He was waiting for a call from the PM, to go to him, in case he was required. The call did not come through, so Gen Zia asked the PM if he was required. The PM replied that there was no need for Gen Zia to meet him because "those bastards" were not coming on the correct path, and he would have to deal with them differently. The COAS need not bother, he would take care of things himself. On hearing this, Gen Zia ordered me to execute OPERATION FAIRPLAY.

More than three weeks suspension of the PNA Movement, and the preparations Mr. Bhutto had made to deal with it in the event of the movement restarting had given him fresh confidence. He thought he had got over the difficult period. He thought that the refusal of Pir Pagaro, Mazari, Noorani and Asghar Khan to oppose the accord accepted by the negotiating team (Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah and Prof Ghafoor) would create a rift in the PNA and finally break it. So, he did not agree to further talks. Gen Zia had clearly, seen the risk and the danger in the talks dragging on for a month and had prepared for the worst. Both sides claimed that the talks had succeeded and

both side accused each other of not signing an agreement. In fact: both had failed in evolving a workable. settlement.

Gen Zia took the initiative and ended the agony of the people. Mr. Bhutto held a Press Conference at 2330 hours on July 4 and said that he was willing to meet the PNA team on July 5. It was too late, since Gen Zia had already ordered the PM, who had originally come into power through Martial Law to be removed by Martial Law. OPERATION FAFRPLAY started at 0001 hours on July 5. By that time the newspapers had already been printed -- and they were still talking of the parleys.

"Government, PNA talks likely to resume today. Settled issues to be re-opened if new points raised. PM. warns PNA --- Ready, to sign agreed draft --- PM said his side had already given large concessions. If PNA comes up with new points PPP would do the same. Nawabzada Nasrullah said no new points were raised by the PNA."

Malik Wazir Ali former Secretary General PNA said. No agreement had been finalized between the government and the PNA.....(*Hurmat* Volume II Number 25 of 2-9 June 1983.)

The only pressure exerted on Gen Zia and us to stage a *coup d'état* came from the fast deteriorating situation. We had pressed Gen Zia to convince the PM to agree to re-elections. The selection of date for the *coup d'état* was the prerogative of the COAS since he was to take over as an institution and not as. an individual. The Corps Commanders were to obey his orders to save the country from going up in flames. Gen Zia was to do something which was punishable by death. Nobody would do such thing without careful thinking. He would only do it when he thought it essential A general's job is to risk his life to save the country, and not to risk the country to save his life.

Gen Zia was lucky to have Maj Gen K M Arif as his lifelong confidante. He had experience as a Martial Law, Staff Officer, during Yahya's regime, and handled matters efficiently.

A commander is responsible for whatever happens In his command and whatever does not happen in his command. He is answerable for both and cannot be absolved of the responsibility, whatever the circumstances. Normally he has an assigned mission, but there can be occasions when a Commander may be without a mission. This normally happens in higher command. Under such circumstances, a commander is the environment and the overall requirement.. Gen Zia did not, of course, have a mission from the Chief Executive to overthrow the Government. He invented it himself because of the prevailing conditions.

Had Mr. Bhutto signed the peace agreement with the PNA, there would have been no *coup d'état*.

OPERATION FAIRPLAY was not planned overnight. It was one of the contingency plans. I had no contact with any political leader. No guards were changed on the night of the coup because there was no need. They were all under the command of the Local Brigade Commander. Security of plans and security of the life of political leaders including the PM were the main problems. Information, regarding FAIRPLAY was passed only to those commanders who had to take action. All the others were informed only after its execution. Polarization between the PPP and the PNA was too serious a matter to ignore. Anybody could get anybody killed that night through infiltration, into the troops executing the coup. There were many interested in getting the PM killed and many, in getting the PNA leaders killed. An odd shot under the plea of firing in self defence would do the job. Just one recoilless rifle or tank shell, could instantly kill the PM and his entire family.

That was not our game. Our task was to separate the rival parties and to take the political leaders into protective custody. The orders were given to a selected few and the operation was carried out like lightning. No firing in self defence was allowed without my permission. I was available on the radio in case a decision was required. As far as the PM was concerned, I did not allow anyone to come within firing range of his family or himself. The Prime Minister's house was sealed. Nobody was allowed to enter the boundary wall or to go out of it without my permission. Tanks were available but were not deployed at all. They were not even seen by anyone. Recoilless rifles were issued only to the most trusted officers. They were not to be used without my permission.

I have been blamed by some for not killing Mr. Bhutto on the night the Army took over. I have also been blamed by some for installing Gen Zia as the CMLA after the successful execution of the coup. I have no regrets on both counts. They were both necessary. That was the only way to ensure the integrity of the country. If Gen Zia had hesitated and waited a little longer, Pakistan might have become part of confederated India. (Exposition of this point later. Some of the policies in operation even today are leading in that direction).

Only rather minor physical preparations were required for the execution of OPERATION FAIRPLAY. The troops had been deployed for Internal Security duties from March 10, 1977. Additional requirements to forestall the 'Long March' on April 30 had also been met from April 25. Removal of the troops from vulnerable points had not been allowed by the Government. If on April 30 the deployment ensured that nothing should get into the Prime Minister's house, it could be used in the reverse order to ensure that nothing moved out of the Prime Minister's house as well. That is precisely what was done.

Gen Zia did not come into power through a conspiracy. He was sucked in by circumstances. And in the final analysis Mr. Bhutto was himself responsible for bringing Gen Zia to power. The Army had an unpleasant duty to perform. It faced many problems from March 1977 to July 1977 but was patient and supported the government in spite of provocation and hatred shown towards it. Mr. Bhutto had come to the negotiating table with the PNA. Did he not know that if negotiations were not successful, the Army would have to intervene, because it was Mr. Bhutto who got the Army involved after imposing partial Martial Law? At that crucial time, if Mr. Bhutto had had the political sagacity, he would have come to an agreement with the PNA leaders. Perhaps he wanted to do so but his very close associates would not let it happen.

When the whole PNA leadership was incarcerated by Mr. Bhutto, the people not only kept the movement alive, but also made heavy sacrifices to make it a success. Please tell me would anyone get himself crushed under a train only to remove Bhutto? Would anyone get himself killed by the bullets fired by the law, enforcing agencies or the army just to put PNA into power? Would anyone give his life to get the people in power removed? Why did people do all that? It was only for the Tehrik-i-Nizam-Mustafa. The masses led and the leaders followed. The Government knew that the PNA movement was not in the control of any leader or a party. It was street power which was leading it, and it was very difficult for the Government to control it. Thus the 1977 coup was largely the result of Mr. Bhutto's personal weaknesses and political blunders. He should have acted in his own better judgment rather than falling a prey to the recommendations of sycophants and toadies.

Coups d'état in Pakistan have always been regulated by the position of the generals in the Armed Forces. It has always been led by the C-in-C Army or the COAS, and never a subordinate general or a junior officer. There is no chance of such a thing happening in the near future either. The Army generals would not do it, and it is beyond the capability of the Navy and the Air force to do so. In spite of the fact that a serious political and administrative crisis was going on from March 7 to July 5, 1977, the generals kept away. Had they been ambitious or greedy for power, the month of April would have been most suitable, when ruthless killings had taken place in the country.

It has been alleged by some that even before the elections, the Army officers were plotting to overthrow Mr. Bhutto. This is completely untrue. The Army supported Mr. Bhutto unconditionally from March 7 to July 4 1977 in spite of the fact that many officers had friends and relatives who had been brutalized by the excesses of the PPP regime, and that they were rightly resentful over the development of power in the FSF and the police.

The mass agitation had reached a stage when the Army had to decide whether it should continue to be barrier against the masses and get destroyed in the clashes with the

masses or to remove Mr. Bhutto. Mr. Bhutto who had rigged the elections and there was a nationwide agitation against him in which about 300 got killed had been warned many times not to let the Army the wall between Pakistan and India be destroyed. The cracks had already begun with the resignations of three Brigadiers. The Army decided finally on whatever was in favor of the masses, as well as of the Army as an organization Mr. Bhutto was ousted without firing a bullet.

The disorder in the streets and Mr. Bhutto's orders that the troops fire on demonstrators were at the time opposed by many field officers. They shirked at shooting their countrymen. The troops were not firing accurately and effectively. With the fibre of the Army being steadily destroyed, it was heading towards a split and disobedience.

When the situation became aggravated, the Army had to choose to maintain the PPP government or take over. Initially nobody was in favor of a takeover, but as time passed contingency plans for a takeover had to be made. They were not launched till the Army got sucked in and was really left with no other option. The generals had to risk their lives to save the country. Gen Zia stepped forward as a champion of democracy. He had to choose between Mr. Bhutto and the integrity of Pakistan. With the Army on the verge of disintegration, he ordered the takeover. It was carried out with military precision.

Gen Zia's strength was that the Army generals were faithful to the country, and knew that if there was a split in Army it would finish the country.

The responsibility for the revival of military rule was entirely due to the failure of the political leaders both of the PPP and the PNA. The fight was for democracy. History tells us that them human beings have never tolerated oppression violence injustice and tyranny for very long. Civil revolutions and *coups d'état* can only take place, and become successful when the local environments become a symbol of oppression and injustice and the rulers start considering themselves lords or masters of human beings. Bhutto totally miscalculated the nature and extent of the PNA's agitation. The PNA is equally to be blamed with its hybrid composition and lack of cohesion it did not provide a viable alternative to the autocratic Bhutto regime. The PNA was united only from a negative standpoint in opposing Bhutto s rule. They had no positive policies to offer. It is alleged that Gen Zia in his explanation of the situation to the political leaders stressed that troops should not be withdrawn from Baluchistan and that Hyderabad Tribunal should not be dissolved. I do not know what he said because I was not present in the briefing but by that time knowing Gen Zia fairly well I can say that he would have uttered whatever was required of him by the PM. He was not the type who would differ at will with the PM. If he was given the task to prove that the Army should be withdrawn and Hyderabad Tribunal dissolved he would have argued it accordingly and if he had been instructed to prove the contrary he would have also done it with ease. However irrespective of this briefing the decisions required were of political nature and it was the duty of the political leaders to decide what to do and not of Gen

Zia the COAS. It is the political leaders who decide when to go to war the COAS is responsible to decide on the professional angles of conduct of war so that the mission is accomplished with minimum casualties to men and material.

It is quite wrong to say that the PNA and the PPP had come to an agreement and that the Army sabotaged it. From March 7 to July 4 was a long period. the Army supported the Government. Mr. Bhutto used delaying tactics till the Army took Over. He wanted it because he did not want to suffer a political setback.

The question generally asked is why did Zia stage his coup when Mr. Bhutto had said on the morning of July 4 that he was willing to discuss those ten new points, and if the PNA wanted they could come on the morning of July 5 to sign the agreement? Was it a response to the situation prevailing at that time, or was it a calculated move to seize power? One would like to counter-question here. Was it Gen Zia or the Generals who were controlling both the parties and not letting them come to an agreement so that the Army could take over? Was a four month-long period not enough to finalize the details of fresh elections? The situation was actually very simple. Mr. Bhutto did not want to give up power while the PNA leaders knew that they were not capable of forming a government. They were all potential Prime Ministers nine of them.

Zia saw no realistic prospects of a compromise between the PPP and the PNA, because of their mutual distrust and lack of faith. The decision not to take over on the night of July 3/4 was due to lingering hopes of a compromise. But they soon disappeared on the following day when the intentions of Mr. Bhutto became crystal clear. Postponement of the decision to take over on July 4 rebuts the myth that Ghulam Ishaq Khan had told Gen Zia that Mr. Bhutto was to remove him from command. Gen Zia had given his best to Mr. Bhutto from March 7 to July 5. It was Mr. Bhutto who let down Gen Zia and not Gen Zia who let Bhutto down.

Gen Zia. appeared to be the perfect choice of a military leader. He agreed with all of us, the Corps Commanders, not to interfere with the civilian political system. We were all without exception reluctant up to the last minute of decision to move against Mr. Bhutto. During the many Cabinet meetings, attended by the Corps Commanders, it was made abundantly clear to Mr. Bhutto that if the law and order situation did not improve and if he did not go for re-election, the Army would have no option but to take over. It was not expected of Mr. Bhutto to hand over power to the Army voluntarily because that would have meant his political death. Ever since then, Mr. Bhutto's ministers have never told the truth in their versions of what happened. They have instead, displayed a singular lack of moral courage by not recommending fresh elections to the PM, saying that the PPP would win. In the background, there was always the option of the Army takeover to which the PM had once referred: "Take over whenever you want to, I will never hand over. I am a politician."

Mr. Bhutto was playing for time during negotiations. Perhaps he would have let civil war take over the country, but Gen Zia took over in time to avoid it.

The Army took over as champions of democracy. It could have kept its credibility if the CMLA had not slipped. He claimed to be all for re-elections and restoration of democracy. All planning, prior to 5 July was directed towards that. We were certain of accomplishment of this task through Gen Zia who was all for it for the love of the integrity of the Army and the country. At take over it was well appreciated by all of us that in case of re-elections PPP would win. It was with this conviction that we used to tell Mr. Bhutto to go along with the wishes of the people without any worry. Our role was going to be that of a referee. So anybody thinking that the elections were postponed because of the fear of PPP winning them and coming back to power is wrong. Unfortunately, Zia fell into the trap of sycophants and advisors like A K Brohi, Sharifuddin Pirzada, the Egyptian Dr Saad Gabr, the Jordanian Dr. Dualbi, Ali Ahmed Talpur, Justice Cheema and above all Col Siddiq Salik.

I was of the opinion that Army intervention was acceptable as a necessary evil. But the Army was not trained to rule. Its rule should never have been perpetuated.

These are some points from Gen Zia's first speech:

- a. "This changeover started at midnight last night and was concluded this morning. Grateful to God that it was successful peacefully. All this action was done on my orders.....
- b. I understand it in my heart that the existence of this country is in democracy and democracy only. That is why under provocative circumstances and different political pressures the Armed Forces avoided a takeover during the present agitational events. It has been the effort and the desire of the Armed Forces that some political solution be found to the political crisis. In view of this object, the Armed Forces of Pakistan many a time put pressure on the Government that it should come to a solution with its political opponents through negotiations. Time was required for this which the Armed Forces provided by maintaining law and order.....
- c. The Constitution has not been abrogated....President Fazal Elahi Chaudhri has agreed to continue as President for which I am grateful. He will continue acting as Head of State.
- d. A Military Council has been constituted to help him in solving important national problems. It will comprise CJCS, COAS, CNS and CAS. I will act as COAS and CMLA.

- e. I had to come only to fill the vacuum which has been created by the politicians. I have accepted this challenge only as a soldier of Islam. My only objective is to have elections conducted fairly and judiciously, which will take place in October this year. My next three months will be devoted only to election work.
- f. The FSF will be re-organized.

Concluding, Gen Zia said, "I must say that the 'spirit of Islam demonstrated during the recent movement, was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. This is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic System as an essential pre-requisite for the country."

Although this point was never discussed in any of the Corps Commanders meetings, it did not alarm us because on becoming COAS he had given the motto of *Taqwa, Eiman* and *Jehad-Fi-Sabeel Allah* (Piety, Faith and Combat in the, name of God) to the Army. We knew that he had a pronounced bent towards religion, but never to the extent of fanaticism. The introduction of this point into the political speech may have been at the behest of someone else. Those present when the speech was being written may be able to throw more light on this point.

Gen Zia held his first press conference as the, CMLA on July 14, 1977 at NDC Rawalpindi. Some of the important points he made were:

- a. Pakistan was like a placid lake up to March 6, 1977, but on March 7, immediately after the elections, a tornado came up. Agitation and demonstrations started. Arson, looting, murder became so common that civil law enforcing agencies could not control it and the Army had to be called in to discharge its constitutional duty. It was the Army's sincere desire to set a tradition that it would not get involved in politics and that political matters be resolved by politicians. The CJCS, the COAS the CNS and the CAS stressed to the Government that the matter should be resolved politically. (My experience, was that they seldom spoke in the cabinet meetings. However, they might have given their views some other time.) Accordingly they issued a statement voluntarily to strengthen the hands of the Government and to make the PNA believe that the Armed Forces were, with the Government, so that they did not think of leaning on the Armed Forces. (That statement was prepared by Gen Tikka Khan, and released to the press. The Service Chiefs had no option but to own, it.)
- b. The Army was not a democratic organization. But consultations did take place in the Army and everybody was consulted. The Army was united from the ordinary soldier to the very top. The operation, though, took

place on one person's orders. Therefore, as far as the Army was concerned, in that emergency, the final decision to take over and stage a coup was his own. He knew Article 6 of the Constitution. He took action fully realizing the consequences. He said, "If my action proves treason my neck is available."

- c. After reading Nawabzada Nasrullah's statement on July 4, Gen Zia appreciated that there was no scope for an agreement between the Government and the Opposition and if no action was taken the country would be plunged into a blood bath. So he decided to act.
- d. It was normal to foresee and prepare plans in advance. A few days before it was decided to take action, if necessary the code word 'FAIRPLAY' was allotted to the operation.
- e. The profession of Arms also taught respect, so every leader was saluted before being taken into custody, and not only Air Marshal Asghar Khan, as reported. Initially nine political leaders were taken into custody from each of the parties, i.e. the PPP and the PNA. Thereafter one was released from each side, Hamid Reza Gillani from the PPP (this was done at the request of Maj Gen Syed Saghir Hussain, MS to the President) and Pir - Pagara, on his own (2330 hours July 5, 1977.)
- f. The other leaders would be released after one or two weeks. Political activity would be allowed, but not processions.
- g. Why should he hang two or four leaders here and there? That was for the people to decide.
- h. He look over when he was certain that there would be no agreement between the Government and the Opposition and there was clear danger of civil war, because enough arms and weapons had been distributed amongst the supporters of the parties.

He went on to state:

"I am heading an interim Government. I believe in democracy. We have not come to stay in power. We have come to power , General Elections will be held on October 18, 1977. I have given a vow to the nation and by God I will do my best to fulfill it.

Who am I to decide whether the results of the General Elections are good or bad? We will abide by the verdict given by the people."

Narrating the sequence of events leading to the Army takeover in 1977, Gen Zia stated:-

1. *On March 10, 1977 the PNA boycotted Provincial Elections. So we had a senior officers' meeting in Rawalpindi and examined all angles. One of the plans considered was a takeover. All the officers agreed that we should avoid a takeover until forced to as a last resort.*
2. *After April 21, three cities were under the Army. In the first week of May, the environment took a new turn when bullets were fired in Anarkali, Lahore. Three Brigadiers were perturbed. They asked for a posting out, which I did.*
3. *During the first fortnight of May, another important meeting of Corps Commanders took place. We decided to impress upon Mr. Bhutto the necessity of taking a political decision.*
4. *In the first fortnight of June, we realized that the Government was not sincere in its negotiations. So in mid-June an important meeting of important officers was held in the COAS's house.*

I laid out all the details in front of the Corps Commanders at dinner time. All of us decided that the operation to take over seemed inevitable, but the political parties should be given more time. If the political problem was solved amicably, the Army's headache would be over. If events aggravated the situation, then the Army should take over. That night the code word 'FAIRPLAY' was given to this operation.

5. *In the last week of June, I decided that Mr. Bhutto's Government should be finished. OPERATION FAIRPLAY was planned in my house.*
6. *It was decided that the date and time of the OPERATION FAIRPLAY would be fixed by the COAS. We kept it to ourselves and even the CGS was not told. My staff officers also did not know about it*
7. *In the last days of June, Mr. Bhutto started calling Generals to Cabinet meetings.*
8. *One night Khar and Pirzada said, "The Opposition is not stopping its mischief. We will kill all of them. Gen Tikka Khans tone was even harsher. He said: "If ten to twenty thousand are killed for Pakistan it does not matter." Mr. Bhutto said, "See the mood of my ministers? What can I do except be with them?"*
9. *On the first and second of July, Mr. Bhutto stage-managed a drama of negotiations. On July 3, I anticipated real danger and I started exercising takeover.*

10. *Nasrullah's press conference at 5 pm, 8 pm call from PM that I will be called. 10:30pm I contacted PM. I was not required. So I issued orders.*
- 11 *I reached General Headquarters at 12 midnight and supervised the operation*
12. *When I met Mr. Bhutto at Murree on July 15 he mentioned that he anticipated the coup d'état. He said he also thought of dismissing me, but then changed his mind thinking it would be better to have a tried friend as the COAS rather than a new face.*

It has been often wondered why Gen Zia announced elections within ninety days. There was no need to do so if he intended to postpone them later. Some people have gone to the extent of saying that schedule was agreed upon with the PNA. Some even say that the PNA leaders had been meeting with the generals during the pre-Martial Law disturbance period. I do not know about others, but as far as I am concerned no political leader had ever met me in any capacity except Mian Abdullah who was a minister in the PPP government and had come to my office when I was MS at GHQ. He had come with a request to get a doctor who was related to him released. During the conversation he mentioned that he had also joined the Pakistan Military Academy and had stayed there for some time. Later I came to know that he had been drummed out of the Academy. (His relative was not released because he had not completed his conscription period.) I met political leaders, as part of my duty, only after Martial Law. So the idea of anyone suggesting to me, or any political leader suggesting through me, that Martial Law should be invoked and elections be held within ninety days is ridiculous.

During our meetings of the Corps Commanders with the COAS in the chair, when reviewing the law and order situation, we had given the consensus that if the situation so demanded the COAS may impose Martial Law, I but it should be of a temporary nature with only one objective. That objective would be to hold fair, and free elections. There were some Corps Commanders (Gen Arbab was one) who were of the view that no time limit should be imposed. The elections might even be after ten years. There were some who had no opinion at all, or did not want to express their views lest they oppose Gen Zia's mind. But I was very specific on this point, and said that the Constitution would be violated or even abrogated if the elections were not held within ninety days. There was no agreement on this till the final day.

On July 5 when Masood Nabi Noor was told to go to the radio station to announce that Martial Law had been imposed, it was agreed by Gen Zia that elections would be held within ninety days. The Constitution was to be held in abeyance. How the elections came to be postponed later, is explained in another chapter.

There was a genuine desire to restore democracy within the period stipulated in the Constitution. Abrogation of the 1973 Constitution would have threatened the integrity

of Pakistan. There could be a risk of a Unilateral Declaration on Independence by any province. The staying on of the President of Pakistan as the constitutional head, and non-abrogation of the Constitution by having elections within ninety days would ensure the integrity of Pakistan.

There was an unexpected crisis on July 5 when, on being informed of the coup, the President of Pakistan declared he would resign. I went to convince him to stay in office. It was not simply a case of general talking to the President, because we already knew each other well. (There had been along and close family relationship between President Chaudhri and my father in law who were friends and had both practiced as, lawyers.) I managed to convince the, President that the Armed Forces had every intention of holding elections within ninety days, to restore full democracy, and that he should stay on as President. He agreed, and later that same evening Gen Zia broadcast that the President was staying in office. He remained President until September 1978, when Zia replaced him.

The behavior of Gen Zia towards Mr. Bhutto from the time he ordered me to launch OPERATION FAIRPLAY has been a deeply controversial subject. Gen Zia had given instructions that all leaders who were taken into protective custody would be taken out of Rawalpindi-Islamabad at the first opportunity. Arrangements for their accommodation had to be made at Murree and Abbottabad. These were made in a discreet manner so that the element of surprise was not lost. Generals Sawar, Fazle Haq and Akhtar, were to make administrative arrangements. Accommodation for the PM was no problem, as he could be accommodated at any of the Government Houses available at Murree and Nathiagali. Gen Zia had given no specific instructions about him till the last moment. Perhaps he expected that accommodation would not be required for him. On the last day, at the time of giving me the green signal to go ahead with the operation, he ordered me to have the PM taken out of Rawalpindi the same night, whereas the other leaders could be taken out the following day. So instructions were given to Maj Gen M. Riaz Khan to escort the PM to Government House, Murree, the same night.

When I reached Gen Zia in his office at GHQ, he asked me about the progress of the operation. I told him that orders had been given to take the leaders into protective custody and that detachments had gone out to perform the task. I told him that the progress by each detachment commander would be reported to the headquarters' concerned by radio on the Command net. I was an out station on the Command net and would be listening in and keep the COAS informed about the latest developments. Meanwhile the telephone bell of the Green Circuit rang, and Gen Zia picked up the telephone. It was Mr. Bhutto on the line. He asked Gen Zia what was happening. Gen Zia told him that he had taken over and Mr. Bhutto was no longer the PM. Straightaway, without any pause or without any suspense or doubt, came the next question: What were the orders for him? Gen Zia told him that very soon a general

would escort him to Murree, but his family would remain in the PM's house from where they would be sent to Larkana in the morning. Mr. Bhutto asked Zia if he could spend the night in the PM's house with his family, as his children had only joined him that evening, and he could go to Murree in the morning. Gen Zia, without any hesitation, replied that he could do so.

This was against all the planning. Having taken the risk of an army takeover, it was unsound to leave the PM in the House with all the infrastructure available to him. He had all the time and facilities available which he could use to his advantage. The manner in which Mr. Bhutto broached the subject confirmed that he fully expected the takeover by the Army. To me, Gen Zia's willingness to allow Mr. Bhutto to stay in his house confirmed he had nothing against him, and that Gen Zia was honest in his declared aim of holding elections.

Mr. Bhutto had also asked in the same telephone call to Gen Zia, if he could retain his military secretary and ADCs. Gen Zia said that they could stay with him as normal. That was also wrong on the part of Gen Zia. He should have straightaway withdrawn the MS and ADCs so that the PM's couriers were reduced and his activities controlled. If Gen Zia had anything against Mr. Bhutto he would not have allowed these facilities to continue.

Letting Mr. Bhutto stay overnight and leaving the MS and ADCs with him were gestures of good faith or courtesy, but turned out to be mistakes. (It was reported by the Intelligence Agencies on the following day that a lot of documents were burnt with their help in the PM's house, during July 5. It was also reported that boxes full of documents were carried from the PM's house to Larkana.)

This question of letting the MS and the ADCs stay with Mr. Bhutto was later discussed in the MLAs meeting, and the consensus was to withdraw these facilities. Gen Zia ordered their continuation, arguing that these facilities were allowed for a fortnight under the existing rules. He was told that the rules were for normal circumstances; the rules were redundant after OPERATION FAIRPLAY. Gen Zia did not agree. It was in a subsequent meeting that the MLAs forced Gen Zia to withdraw these facilities, which Mr. Bhutto availed of for about a fortnight or so. If Gen Zia's intention had been not to hold elections, he would certainly have withdrawn these facilities from the first day. Unless he was so clever that he was doing everything in an ultra-meticulous manner, which I doubt. It was not in him, both mentally and morally. Zia was genuinely for elections and so were we, the Corps Commanders. Mr. Bhutto was given full courtesies and respect.

Mr. Bhutto was later taken to Murree during the day, on July 5, 1977. He was received there by Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan who, in his letter (DO No. 2145/8/PA of July 7, 1977) wrote to me:

"As required, I received Mr. Z. A. Bhutto at the Government House in Murree on the evening of July 5, 1977. Mr. Bhutto seemed exhausted, worn-out with swollen red eyes. ... I was there for nearly 30 minutes, as it took a long time for the tea to come.

... I concluded that Mr. Bhutto spoke well of Lt Gen Majid. Mr. Bhutto also remarked, "When I was to selecting the COAS, people also told me that Majid was very clever person, but this gentleman has proved to be the same". The gentleman referred in the sentence was obviously meant to be our present COAS.

The Prime Minister's security had, been my main worry and problem because there were many who wanted him killed. My officer's and men's conduct had been so good that I find no words to praise them. They helped me to discharge my duties honorably

I should mention here that when Mr. Bhutto's staff officers were being reverted to their units, Gen Zia told me that nobody was prepared to accept Maj Gen Imtiaz, MS to the Prime Minister. Gen Zia told me that he was going to take administrative action against him and retire him from service. I objected to that, I said if he had done something wrong, he should be court-martialled. He was a good officer and I had posted him to the Prime Minister after getting orders from Gen Tikka Khan, the then COAS. To the best of my knowledge he had carried out his duties honestly and efficiently. He should not be punished for mistakes which he had not committed. On that Gen Zia said, "What do I do with him. No Corps Commander wants him." I requested Gen Zia to post Maj Gen Imtiaz to me and said that I would accept him any time. So, he was posted to me as Force Commander Northern Area. When the posting was, known to Gen Imtiaz, he requested that Gilgit did not suit him and could he be posted somewhere else. Consequently he was posted to Sialkot where he stayed for some time and, thereafter, retired from service.

When OPERATION FAIRPLAY was completed I went to General Headquarters to report to Gen Zia accordingly I met Mosood Nabi Noor the Federal Secretary for Information and Broadcasting there. He had been called from his house to write the news bulletin to be broadcast on the radio. The bulletin was framed very quickly by Gen Zia and his assistants and given to Mr. Noor. When he reached the radio station the news had already started, so he could only get in broadcast towards the tail end of the news that Martial Law had been invoked in Pakistan.

Security of plans and security of political leaders, both of the Government and the PNA, were my major problems. A premature leak of the operation would have resulted in many deaths. So it had to be ensured that the plans were kept secret. Gen Zia had wanted me to use tanks and recoilless rifles. Both of them it were not available in Rawalpindi. They had to come either from Jhelum or from Kharian. I preferred Jhelum.

I was very lucky that I had a wonderful team of subordinate commanders, who did the needful and the operation went off well.

When Gen Zia ordered me to take over and execute OPERATION FAIRPLAY, he may well have feared for the security of his family in the event of an abortive coup. In any event Gen Zia's family was not in Pakistan on July 4/5 He had shifted his family to UK during negotiations under the plea of his daughter's operation. Two sons and three daughters along with his wife were all abroad. On the night of the coup my Corps intelligence Chief told me that there was one 'Puma' helicopter ready to take off at short notice from Dhamial. It could have been for the PM or for Gen Zia but it was unlikely to have been for the PM because he did not know what was happening, and secondly he would not leave his family behind. In any case he had nothing at stake. It could have been for Gen Zia, because he had everything at stake. What would happen to him if OPERATION FAIRPLAY had, failed? I recollected his last sentence to me after giving orders. '*Murshid, do not get me killed.*' So I ordered my Intelligence Chief to keep an eye on the helicopter and not let it take off. It did not matter, who the passenger was going to be.

On the imposition of Martial Law, *halwa* (a sweet dish offered at celebrations) was cooked and distributed throughout the country. There was a great feeling of relief and the day of deliverance was celebrated. The PNA announced that the July 5 coup was an outcome of their efforts.

Gen Zia had given the names of the political leaders and some civil servants to be taken into protective custody. These names were passed on to Brig Imtiaz Warraich for action. I was present in the Brigade Headquarters when Brig Imtiaz Warraich gave the orders to the Detachment Commanders. Those orders included these points:

- a. These orders-are from the COAS.
- b. Political leaders will be treated with all respect which is their due as national leaders.
- c. No misbehavior will be accepted.
- d. All leaders taken into protective custody and civil servants arrested will be taken to the Officers' Mess at Chaklala where they would be provided respectable boarding and lodging facilities.
- e. Radio communications will be maintained throughout the Operation.
- f. No firing is allowed. Use close combat techniques, etc. etc.

The orders regarding the PM's house were that it should be cordoned off. Nobody would be allowed to get in or get out without the permission of Brig Warraich. The Commanding Officer of the battalion on duty, at the PM's house was specially warned that there should be no premature leak. Nobody was to go and meet the PM. The Detachment Commanders did not have any problems locating the leaders or taking them into protective custody except Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Gen Tikka Khan. Khar was difficult to find, but the officers in charge managed it. Gen Tikka created a lot of fuss. He refused to be taken into custody and challenged the orders of the COAS. He took the longest to come out of his residence, and only did so when he was firmly requested to cooperate.

Bhutto - Khar Split

Under the contingency plans to take over the government, in case there was no likelihood of reaching an agreement between the Government and the PNA leaders, we were required to take eight to ten political leaders, each of the PPP and the PNA, under protective custody on orders from the COAS and accommodate them at safe and comfortable places. Gen Zia did not want them to be kept at Islamabad or Rawalpindi. It was finally decided, that after the takeover Mr. Bhutto would be accommodated at Government House, Murree, the PPP leaders at Abbottabad in accommodation to be made available by Lt Gen Sawar Khan and the PNA leaders at Murree through arrangements made by Maj Gen Akhthr Abdul Rahman Khan.

On July 5, 1977 all the leaders were escorted respectfully from the Corps Officers' Mess Chaklala, where they had been brought initially, to their respective residences at Abbottabad and Murree, except Mr. Bhutto who was taken directly from the PM's house, Rawalpindi to Government House Murree. After four or five days of their stay at Abbottabad something happened between G M Khar, Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafeez Pirzada, and there was an exchange of hot words. The exact nature of the matter was not conveyed to me, nor did I bother to find out because it was their private matter. But Khar requested the local Martial Law Authority at Abbottabad for separate accommodation, as he did not like to stay with the other PPP leaders. The matter was dealt with by the local Martial Law Administrator to the satisfaction of the PPP leaders. Gen Zia visited Murree on July 15, 1977 to meet the PNA leaders and the former Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto requested Gen Zia for the transfer of the PPP leaders, from Abbottabad to Murree so that he could confer with them as and when required. This, he said, would also bring the PPP on par with the PNA, who had the advantage of staying together and discussing and planning the steps to be taken for the forthcoming elections. Gen Zia told Mr. Bhutto that the sole purpose of the Army was to prepare the grounds for fair and impartial elections. He would be pleased to shift the leaders from Abbottabad to Murree. He ordered me to make the necessary arrangements for their stay in Murree.

Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman, incharge of the administrative arrangements, informed me that he had made the arrangements and the PPP leaders could be moved to Murree on July 16. Instructions were, issued accordingly to move them, in the afternoon after lunch by car via Rawalpindi and not via Nathiagali, because the Abbottabad-Nathiagali-Murree road was not in a good condition and we could not take any risks.

In the late afternoon I received a wireless. message that Khar had requested an audience with Gen Zia, if possible, while passing through Rawalpindi. His, request was conveyed to Gen Zia who instructed me to see Khar. So I issued instructions that Khar be directed to the Officers' Mess at Chaklala where I would meet him in the evening.

When Khar, reached the mess he told me that he was a worried man and completely upset because his wife was expecting a baby any day, that she, was in Rawalpindi, and that he had no arrangements for her admission to any hospital or maternity home, in Rawalpindi. He asked me if it was possible to do anything about it. I assured him that it should not be a source of worry because arrangements could be made with the Combined Military Hospital.

He then asked me if it was possible for him to talk to his wife and, if allowed, to see her. He was told that being under protective custody he could not leave the Mess premises to go and see her, but we could allow her to see him in the Mess, and that he could talk to her on the telephone from the Mess. He talked to his wife and asked her to see him in the Mess. Thereafter I left the Mess, giving instructions that when she had seen her, husband for about an hour, he should be escorted to Murree after dinner.

After dinner Khar phoned me and asked for my permission to stay the night in the Mess and go to Murree in the morning instead of travelling at night I allowed him that. Thereafter I did not see him on this particular occasion. When I reached my office in the morning I was informed through daily routine reports that Khar had left for Murree in the morning. On reaching Murree he was accommodated along with his colleagues. the other PPP leaders.

The intelligence agencies reported to Gen Akhtar at Murree that a harsh conversation had taken place between Mr. Bhutto and Khar as soon as Khar arrived after that night stop at Rawalpindi. Mr. Bhutto accused Khar of being disloyal and suggested that he had intentionally stayed back at Rawalpindi to join hands with the Martial, Law Authorities to play a role against Mr. Bhutto, to weaken him and his party.

Mr. Bhutto asked Khar to look into his eyes and having looked intently into his eyes Mr. Bhutto said that he could see disloyalty and mischief in Mustafa Khar s eyes Mr. Bhutto said that Khar had become untrustworthy and unfaithful and could not be associated in any future secret planning of the PPP. He also mentioned the differences which had emerged between Khar and Hafeez Pirzada and Mumtaz Bhutto at Abbotabad. Mr.

Bhutto also said that although he had forgiven Khar over the differences which had taken place when Khar had defended the water rights of Punjab *vis-a-vis* the water requirements of Sindh, this collusion with the Martial Law Authorities would never be forgiven.

Khar tried his level best to explain the actual events but Mr. Bhutto would not listen. No reconciliation, was possible. Whereas outwardly they, seemed on good terms, in their hearts they retained a grudge against each other. The situation was further aggravated when on July 24, 1977 Khar, appeared before the Lahore High Court Judge, Zaki ud Din Pal, in Murree in connection with the illegal detention of Tari and Irshad. He deposed:

"Mr. Irshad Chaudhry and Mr. Iftikhar Tari are my very close friends. When I fought the by-elections in Lahore constituency No.6, after leaving the People's Party Mian Iftikhar Tari was in charge of my election campaign. These friends of mine had also left the People's Party because of their differences with Mr. Bhutto. Mian Iftakhar Tari and Irshad Chaudhry were arrested before election campaign. So we got their bail granted from the High Court. In addition, bail before arrest in case of Chaudhry Irshad was also arranged from the court of Mr. Justice Mushtaq Hussain. Although High Court order was operative and bail before arrest had been arranged, even then they were arrested. When I came to know about their arrest and their removal to some unknown place I approached Mr. Anwar, Bar at Law to plead the case.

In my election, great irregularities and rigging took place so that I could be defeated The public meeting in Tajpura was also illegally disrupted and a lot of people were killed. Different methods were used so that people may not be able to vote for me Provincial administrative machinery of that time and National and Provincial Assembly Members were asked to bring bus loads of people from outside the constituency limits so that bogus votes may be cast. At one polling station four hundred votes were cast in one hour. Whereas one vote takes about three minutes This is the biggest proof of a large scale rigging indulged in by the previous government.

I consulted my friends as to what shall I do when Chaudhiy Irshad and Iftikhar Tari were illegally arrested from their homes. My friends suggested to me that I should withdraw myself from politics for some time, otherwise my friends could face grave danger. At that time I was told by the Central and Provincial Governments that they knew nothing about the whereabouts of Irshad Chaudhry and Iftikhar Tari. Thus I was greatly disturbed. I adopted silence because the courts were also helpless on this issue and the administration had also shown their ignorance.

After sometime Sheikh Hamid Mahmud, Chairman National Press Trust came to me and said he could help provided in view of the. overall political situation. I stop opposing the Government. It is pertinent to say that Sheikh Hamid Mahmud was a close friend of Mr. Masood Mahmood Director General, Federal Security Forces. I met when he asked me as to what was the guarantee that Irshad and Tari, if released, would keep quiet and would

not oppose the Government. I took the responsibility that Irshad, Tari and all ten to twelve close friends who were under detention, when released would keep quiet I asked Sheikh Hamid to take me to the place where they were detained. I assured him that after their release I would change my political stance. Then he asked me to sign a paper on which it was written that I had hidden the Dalai Camp detainees at my house He said that he would also sign that paper so that no complications arose I have its copy with me and another copy was with Barrister M. Anwar.

Mr. Hamid Mahinud again met me in the evening and said that it was impossible that my friends be released forthwith but they would be released after some period. Their release got procrastinated and I felt that the Government did not want to release my friends ... Time passed by and General Elections, period in March 1977 approached. Some time before elections, Director General Federal Security Force Masood Mehmood met me and told me that if I did not take part in elections against the Government then my friends would be released. He also wanted the assurance from me that in case I proceed to a foreign country even then in my absence the relatives of Tari and Irshad would not oppose the Government and after their release would not revert to the court against their illegal detention. I assured Masud Mahmud that it would be like that. I called Tari's and Irshad's relatives and instructed them not to oppose the Government in my absence.

I left the country before the elections so that I did not have a confrontation with the Government and that I may save the lives of my friends On my return I contacted Mr. Masud Mahmud and asked him why my friends had not been released as promised. He told me that as Pakistan National Alliance agitation was going on against the Government (because of rigging done in the General Elections) Masud Mahmud then gave clear indications that in order to save the lives of my friends I should join the PPP. So, for my friends, I destroyed my political career and joined the PPP.

On joining the PPP I delivered provocative speeches on the instruction from the party High Command because the PPP workers were greatly demoralized due to the PNA movement I also wanted to establish my sincerity with the party.

After I was appointed an adviser to the Prime Minister. I met him and talked to him about the release of my friends. He promised that they would be released soon.

My differences with Mr. Bhutto arose when I became the Governor of Punjab for the first time. They increased when I became Chief Minister of Punjab. They were regarding the administrative rights of Punjab and National policies. When these differences became intolerable I left the PPP.

It was true that when somebody showed political differences with Mr. Bhutto he used to be jailed and based on his personal likes and dislikes, revengeful action used to be taken against political opponents but sometimes he also showed tolerance.

Mr. Bhutto had told me that he would release my friends by the end of June or in the first week of July. I had also talked once to Mr. Bhutto regarding Mr. Irshad's release when his father had died. Mr. Bhutto had not given any positive reply and had shown his ignorance regarding Irshad's detention....."

(Ref. *Sahafat* Vol II -No 29. 30 dated April 30, 1978 - May 7, 1978).

After this hearing the split turned into a rift and Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Khar were never together again.

CHAPTER - FOUR THE MURDER TRIAL

Gen Zia called me to his house on Friday, September 2, 1977 and told me that he had scheduled a quiet visit to Karachi. He was to take off at 11 am from PAF base Chaklala in the Falcon But he could not go because of an unforeseen commitment. He wanted me to go to Karachi and see Gen Arbab I was to go and tell him to arrest Mr. Bhutto I told Gen Zia that he could telephone that message if not on an ordinary telephone circuit at least on the green line or with the help of a secrophone. He said that the message was only to be given verbally. Then he requested me to go by the Falcon aircraft which was waiting for him at Chakiala I was also required to return by a scheduled domestic flight either on Friday or Saturday as convenient to me. At the PAF base I told the Base Commander that Gen Zia would not be going, instead I would be I was received at the Drigh Road Base in Karachi by Brig Syed Refaqt (later Lt Gen) who took me to Lt Gen Arbab s house I passed on Gen Zia's message and stayed with him for about two hours. During that time I also told him on my own to make sure that no physical harm was done to Mr. Bhutto I came back from Karachi the same evening. That same day Musheer Pesh Imam had said that Mr. Bhutto should be tried, immediately on the grounds that he had become PM illegally through a conspiracy.

On September 3, Mr. Bhutto was arrested on a charge of murder at Karachi. He was sent to Lahore under FIA by the Falcon. Mufti Mahmood demanded Mr. Bhutto's trial, and punishment if found guilty. Chaudhary Zahur Elahi demanded Islami Nizam and the PPP's accountability. Hafiz Pirzada said that Chairman Bhutto's arrest would make no difference.

It was the killing of the father of an estranged member of the PPP which led to Mr. Bhutto's trial and eventual hanging. Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri was killed on the night of November 10, 1974. Before the end of the same year his politician son Ahmad Raza Kasuri registered an FIR (statement to police). naming the PM, Z. A. Bhutto. as the person suspected of commissioning the murder. Nothing was done.

But immediately after the coup on July 7, 1977, the widow of the Nawab applied to the Marital Law Government for justice. Ahmad Raza Kasuri requested that the case be heard by the Lahore High Court. The record was summoned from the Session Court and the High Court asked the Advocate General if the Government had any intention to take this case out of cold storage and put up a challan (first report) against Mr. Bhutto.

The reply of the Advocate General Was significant. He said the Government wanted to bring the case to court to see justice done. Since the Advocate General could not reply on his own, he must have consulted the MLA Lt Gen Iqbal, who in turn would not have

acted without clearance from the CMLA Gen Zia. When the police, after investigations, charged Mr. Bhutto for commissioning the murder, it became a public matter. There were four coconspirators too in this case.

Gen Zia's legal advisers, that is. A K. Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada, would have advised him to proceed, with the case. The only staff office who could have been fully in the picture at this stage was Maj Gen K.M Arif. the COS to the CMLA. All these key people, were to be out-of-turn, beneficiaries later on.

It has been claimed that it was on my suggestion that a White Paper was compiled and published on the discreditable activities of Mr. Bhutto's government, with the aim of reducing his popularity. This is simply not true. Zia never consulted me on the White Paper. His main advisors on these issues were. Gen Arif (with his past Martial Law experience), A K Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada (as legal advisers), Gen Hassan (Chief of National Security). Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Secretary-General in Chief) and Siddiq Salik (his speech writer). I came into the picture only along with the other MLA's and Corps Commanders, as a matter of routine.

It was in September 1977 that Gen Zia asked me to provide temporary office accommodation within my Corps HQ offices to Barristers Anwar and A K Brohi. They would sit there to examine some papers and meet some FIA officials and other people. The accommodation was found in the same barracks in which I had my main Corps offices, and was used by them for about ten days. Barristers Anwar and Brohi took tea with us two or three times during our Election Cell meetings during midmorning tea breaks along with other members of the Cell and our visitors, political or merely social.

I think it was in July 1978, when we were holding a session of the Election Cell, that I was, informed that the relatives of one of the four co-accused in the Kasuri case, along with their lawyer Irshad Qureshi wanted to see me. I asked I them to be brought in, as the Election Cell policy was to meet everyone who asked, irrespective of position or status. I met them in the presence of other Election Cell members, Gen J S Mian, Gen Farthan and Gen Ihsan.

They asked me what would happen to the co-accused if they told the truth in court. They had just obeyed the orders of the Director General of the Federal Security Force. I told them to tell the truth fearlessly. as required by Islam, and to have faith in Allah On this, Gen Ihsan asked why they were worried, since Gen Ziaul-Haq had already given an assurance to the prosecution that nothing would happen to any of them if they told the truth. Gen Ihsan also said that this pledge given by Zia was also known to the MLA Gen Iqbal, A K Brohi and the late Barrister Anwar, as well as the COAS Gen Arif. Gen Ihsan then asked them to go and tell the whole truth and not concoct anything. The relatives of co-accused and their lawyer Irshad Qureshi were satisfied and went away. That is how I came to know more about this case.

I do not know what story Irshad Qureshi spun later on as far as the assurance given to the co-accused was concerned. However, it would be clear to any lawyer, prosecution or defence, that assurances are given only to the approvers and only by the competent legal authority which in this case was the President, Gen Zia, or the Governor of Punjab, Gen Sawar. Anyone else's name mentioned is simply meaningless fiction.

On March 5, 1979 Hafiz Pirzada came to my office to see me about Mir Bhutto's fate. I told him it was no use coming to me at that late stage, especially when he had already gone to Gen Arif and Gen Zia. Everything had been decided between the COS and the CMLA. It was too late now to take him to the CMLA. Lt Gen Shaukat Hassan had earlier come, and I had told him to approach Gen Zia or Gen Sawar directly, because they were the only two authorities who could do anything. Out of the two, Gen Sawar was the more important because if, as Governor, he had accepted the mercy appeal, the case would never have gone to the President.

The speeding up of the stages by which Mr. Bhutto's mercy petition was processed had some very curious, and as yet unexplained, features. I have every reason to believe that it was a plot between Zia and his newly appointed Governor of the Punjab, because all the facts connect.

How, did it come about that the regular procedures were not followed in this case? Why was it that Gen Sawar Khan at once rejected the petition, sending it on to Zia post-haste? Why was everything done in such a hurry, with Mr. Bhutto hanged at night -- itself against the manual? The Governor of the Punjab has the option to accept petitions. If he had done so, then the case would never, have gone further to the final source of appeals, Zia.

Zia had first offered me the appointment of Punjab Governor. I made a free hand in deciding all cases a precondition of accepting the post. This may, well explain why Gen Zia did not choose me, but instead picked Sawar Khan.

When Mir Bhutto was finally hanged on April 4, 1979, and the media asked why the co-accused had also not been hanged. pressure built up on Gen Zia to make a decision. In one of the MLAs-cum-Corps Commanders' meetings. Gen Sawar asked Gen Zia for his decision. Gen Zia replied he would have to hang them, as he could not help it. I reminded Gen Zia of his undertaking given to the four co-accused, as known to me through Gen Ihsan. I also asked him why they were to be hanged, since they had only obeyed orders, as employees.

Gen Sawar interjected that this was the first time that he was hearing all this. I told Sawar it was unbelievable that he did not know everything about the case, since he had himself dealt with it as the MLA and Governor of the province. He had rejected Mr.

Bhutto's mercy petition, had sent it post-haste to the President, had set aside jail rules by hanging Mr. Bhutto at night. How come that he did not know the arrangements with the co-accused? It was obvious that his plea of ignorance was hypocritical.

Sawar kept quiet, while Zia promised he would look into the matter. But he did not honor his word. and hanged the unfortunate men.

I must add a postscript to this. I had gone with Gen Zia when he went to visit UAE. We had called on the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Mr. Bhutto's case was discussed with Sheikh Nahyan. Gen Arbab and Brigadier Anwar ul Haq our ambassador were also present. The Sheikh had said in categorical words that he was a friend of Pakistan, has been a friend of Pakistan and would always be a friend of Pakistan. He expected Gen Zia to do what would be in the best interests of Pakistan. Then he had said that it should be remembered that forgiveness was divine.

Zafar Iqbal Chaudhari told me that His Highness Sheikh Nahyan was in Pakistan when the judgment on Bhutto was to be announced. When the date was made known. Sheikh Nahyan asked Gen Zia not to get the judgment announced by the court when he was in Pakistan. He requested that the date be changed and if it was not possible to change the date then he would like to go back to his country because he would not like to be in Pakistan when the judgment on Bhutto is announced. Gen Zia agreed that he would ask the court to delay the judgment. Gen Zia invited Sheikh Nahyan for dinner, which he declined. Then Gen Zia called on His Highness. After meeting Gen Zia. Sheikh Zayad Bin Sultan Al Nahyan told Zafar Iqbal that he had told Gen Zia that he could negotiate with an alive Bhutto and not a dead Bhutto. He had also told Gen Zia that a dead Bhutto would haunt him and that life for life was a good motto, but in statecraft it had always happened that it was best to treat offenders lightly. He also urged that Mr. Bhutto had done a lot for Pakistan. Nahyan later gave his impression that Gen Zia would hang Bhutto in spite of his assurances to him to spare his life. That, he said, he could see in Gen Zia's eyes.

I had first gone to Abu Dhabi in 1970 as head of a delegation and had enjoyed the hospitality of Sheikh Nahyan when I worked for him for 12 days. He was even so kind that he took me with him in his self driven Mercedes to the camel races and his stud farm. I gave him training and defence plans which he implemented. later on. I advised him on many matters and got some of his previous decisions changed. I worked for him as if I was a local (I was supposed to do so because of our special relationship with Abu Dhabi). We had no ambassador stationed at Abu Dhabi those days. Our ambassador at Kuwait used to cover this area. Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry was our link with His Highness Sheikh Nahyan. That is how I came to know this efficient and thorough gentleman Zafar. We have been meeting each other since then. After the Martial Law in 1977 Sheikh Nahyan requested Gen Zia to let me visit Abu Dhabi for a short period, in my presence, at least on four occasions. Zia always said that he would let me go, but he

never gave me the opportunity to serve his Highness again. What could be the reasons for this, I cannot conceive.

CHAPTER - FIVE WAS I ZIA'S KEEPER?

Nationally and internationally two names were mentioned in connection with the *coup d'état* of July 5, 1977, General Zia-ul-Hāq and myself. Gen. Zia's name because he became the new Chief Executive of the country as the CMLA, and myself for being in Rawalpindi as officer in charge of OPERATION FAIRPLAY. Immediately after the coup the rumor was put about that it was like the Egyptian coup of 1952 where Gen Neguib was the than in front, but the actual person behind the coup was Colonel Nasser. It was said that Gen Chishti was the real mover and Gen Zia was only a figurehead. This was not true, but the rumor suited Gen Zia who could use it to his advantage to apply the power politics techniques as originated and preached by Kautilya.

Either Zia should have destroyed me or I should have destroyed Zia. I had no intention of doing it because firstly it was not in my blood and secondly it would have destroyed Pakistan, according to my strong convictions. I was there to protect Zia, so that the country survived. and not to destroy him. It was in this connection that I had said in one of my interviews that "Pakistan's survival lies in Zia's survival". I would like to explain it further by reconstructing the actual scenario.

Gen Zia is' the CMLA, internationally recognized and accepted as Chief Executive of Pakistan. He is also the COAS. There is no Deputy CMLA or Deputy COAS. What happens in case Zia ceases to be the CMLA, either by a counter-coup or natural or accidental death? (As long as Fazal Elahi Chaudhri was the President, we had a constitutional head of state and there was no danger to the Federation of Pakistan, but the situation changed. when he ceased to be the President and Gen Zia became the President as well.) So, if Gen Zia is dead who becomes the CMLA, i.e. the Chief Executive? (If there is a nominated Deputy CMLA he becomes the CMLA automatically as per traditions of service, but if there is no Deputy CMLA, then someone else has to assume that office.) It could be one of the four senior officers, viz Gen M Shariff, Admiral Sharif, Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar or Lt Gen Iqbal. (The order of seniority of the Corps Commanders was Iqbal, Sawar, Arbab, Chishti and Hassan.) Granted that there is no difference of opinion on the assumption of the CMLA's office by any of these officers, the problem could arise when one of the following happens:

- a. Some Khan Baba in the NWFP says, "We do not recognize Gen --- as the CMLA. We have had enough of it, we do not want to stay in the Federation. We unilaterally declare ourselves as independent and call ourselves Pathanistan, or Greater Pushtunistan, or part of Afghanistan. Mr Khan is the new President." The USSR would recognize Greater

Pushtunistan in no time, and India would have followed suit. Thereafter nobody could do anything to save United Pakistan.

OR

- b. Some Baluchi tribal chief says, on the above lines, we are Greater Baluchistan (including Iranian Baluchistan as well), and it is recognized by the USSR and India
- c. Some Sindhi *wadera* says, on the above lines, we are Sindhu Desh (including Indian Sindh)

The only way to forestall or preempt these eventualities was either to have a Deputy CMLA appointed or to pray for Gen Zia's life. This point I had discussed with Gen Zia on board PIA when we were going to Saudi Arabia. Gen Hassan was also present. Gen Zia had agreed with this and had promised to nominate a Deputy CMLA. Admiral Sharif's name was recommended and Gen Zia had agreed, but the orders were never issued. So, the other alternative of protecting Gen Zia's life remained operative.

Being stationed in Rawalpindi it was my duty to oversee that nothing happened to Gen Zia. My repetition of the importance of the appointment of a Deputy CMLA was construed by many, including some journalists, as MY desire to be appointed to that assignment. It could never be I knew my place. I was low down on the ladder (ranking fourth amongst the Lieutenant Generals). My job was simply to ensure that nobody removed Zia, and put the existence of the whole country in jeopardy. Nobody dared a coup against Zia while I was present in Rawalpindi. Gen Tajamal tried it when I was away in Canada for a fortnight, but did not succeed.

There was much loose talk of Gen Chishti staging a coup against Zia. (Stories and theories were deliberately fabricated by Lt Gen Akhtar DGJSI and his staff.) I went to Gen Zia and told him that there was no truth in those rumors. I told him that although all guards at his office, his residence, at General Headquarters, at the Presidency, at the CMLA Secretariat as well as at other Generals' residences were under my command, yet there was never any thought of removing Gen Zia. To me, as explained above, the removal of Gen Zia by force would have meant the end of the Federation.

So, I offered my resignation to him duly typed, to be kept by him and to be used as and when he liked. I told him that I may be a poor man, but disloyalty was not in my blood. He hugged me and tore up my resignation and said that there never, was any doubt in his mind about that coup business. I came back satisfied. But the backbiting continued. Many went to Gen Zia to poison his mind against me. He decided to make me a scapegoat and destroy me.

Because of the differences that I had with Gen Zia on professional Army matters and on matters concerning the portfolios that he had allotted to me as a Federal Minister, we did not get on well. He never liked my calling a spade a spade. Unfortunately or fortunately I could neither change my method of expression nor could I adapt myself to diplomacy. One thing was certain between Gen Zia and myself, that it was all only, up to March 30, 1980, when I was due to complete my four years' tenure as Lieutenant General. Thereafter I was to be at liberty to choose my own course of action.

Using the media to project me as undesirable, using all available resources and a top General of the Pakistan Army trained in psychological warfare, Gen Zia continued working against me in a subtle manner, as part of a plan to destroy me. The *modus operandi* adopted, by using all media available to them, was to try to establish that Gen Zia was innocent, that the coup d'etat had been planned and forced on him by me, that I was terribly against Mr. Bhutto and the PPP, that I was against bureaucrats, that I was the man behind the throne, that I was very rude and crude, that I was unreconcilable etc. etc.

One of these plans was to give an impression that I was an arch enemy of Mr. Bhutto so that when Mr. Bhutto was to be hanged. someone would attempt to shoot me. This was made crystal clear by Gen Zia's remarks when I was finally leaving him, refusing to stay as Federal Minister after March 30, 1980. He said, "Do not be a bloody fool. Do not leave the Government, otherwise some PPP fellow will stab you in Raja Bazar." I replied, "If it has to happen that way, when I have done no wrong, the sooner it happens the better it is. My young children would learn how to live without me." Life and death are in God's hands.

The whole plan was designed by a general and then executed with the help of a Federal Secretary. (I am intentionally not disclosing the names) The day Mr. Bhutto is hanged, it should be known all over Pakistan that Gen Chishti had gone to Rawalpindi jail and manhandled Mr. Bhutto so that Gen Chishti becomes the most hated person by the PPP. That story was well spread, but got discredited because of my actions. I was warned by a bureaucrat well-wisher of mine not to be in Rawalpindi on the day of Mr. Bhutto's hanging. (This same bureaucrat was initially asked to implement the plan of spreading this rumor of my going to jail and manhandling Mr. Bhutto, but he had refused on the plea that he respected me.) Thereafter the second bureaucrat did the dirty work. Acting on my friend's advice, I left Rawalpindi for Gilgit, to inaugurate the Gilgit Radio Station on April 2 and a bridge on April 3. Mr. Bhutto was to be hanged on April 3, i.e. the night of April 2/3.

A little explanation regarding the movements of a Corps Commander may be useful to comprehend this matter properly. A Corps Commander is at liberty to move in the area of his command whenever he wishes to go and wherever he wishes to go. The COAS

does not have to be informed of his movements because It is all within the Corps Commanders' area. Whenever a Corps Commander moves out of his area no sanction is required for such a move but the COAS is informed of the move.

So my movement did not have to be intimated to Gen Zia. In other words, he did not know whether I was still in Rawalpindi on April 2 or I had moved out. He came to know about it as the time of hanging Mr. Bhutto came closer. In the evening, when he came to know that I was still in Gilgit, Zia talked to me on the telephone and asked me what I was doing there. I told him that I was in Gilgit to perform the opening ceremonies of the Radio station and the bridge. He showed his annoyance by saying that an important event was to take place that evening and I should have been in Rawalpindi. I told him that my presence in Rawalpindi was not necessary, because I was just a Corps Commander and not involved in any Martial Law Executive duties. He insisted that I should be definitely back by the following day, i.e. April 3. I told him that I had to do the bridge opening ceremony and attend lunch. He said that I should leave it to the Force Commander Northern Area and come back to Rawalpindi. We finally agreed that after the opening ceremony of the bridge I would not stay for lunch, but would return straight to Rawalpindi.

He did not have me in Rawalpindi on the night April 2/3, so, Gen Zia postponed the hanging of Mr. Bhutto. The reason given was that the weather was going to be so bad according to the forecast that the C-130 would not have been able to take off with Mr. Bhutto's body to proceed to Larkana, or wherever it was required to be taken. (A C-130 can operate under very adverse terrain and climatic conditions. Also the weather forecast for Rawalpindi area and Larkana areas could not be the same.) It was just an excuse. He wanted me back in Rawalpindi so that my supposed visit to Rawalpindi Jail could be authenticated.

Some news reports show the time sequence:

Jang Karachi (22-3-1979): Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti will inaugurate the Gilgit Radio Station on April 2 at Gilgit.....

Pakistan Times (22-3-1979): Two radio stations of the PBC have been completed at Gilgit and Skardu in the Northern Area The Gilgit station will be inaugurated on April 2 by Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti and the Skardu station on April 16 by the Federal Minister Haji Faqir Mohammad Khan.....

Pakistan Times (3-4-1979): (Gilgit April 2) CHISHTI OPENS GILGIT RADIO STATION. Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti inaugurated the Gilgit Radio Station this afternoon

Pakistan. Times (4-4-1979): (Gilgit 3 April) ,CHISHTJ OPENS ARCH BRIDGE IN GILGIT. The Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti today inaugurated a newly built arch bridge constructed by FWO at Shah Batot on Gilgit Skardu Road in Northern Areas. He paid tribute to the officers and jawans.....

Gen Zia's game was to have me in Rawalpindi on the night Mr. Bhutto was to be hanged, and my effort was to keep away from Rawalpindi. I knew Gen Zia could not postpone the hanging again and again, and I was bent upon not being in Rawalpindi on the day of the hanging. The rumor details had already been supplied down to the intelligence detachment levels, and were to be released with the news of Mr. Bhutto's hanging. It was to be rumored that Gen Chishtj went to Rawalpindi jail to get some confession signed from Mr. Bhutto which he refused to do and as a result Gen Chishti manhandled Mr. Bhutto etc.. etc. I would not be surprised if some officer did visit the jail and a story spread that it was Gen Chishti. Other versions were also spread. One version which appeared in the *Daily Express* London, Monday, May 21, 1979 is reproduced below:

"WAS MR BHUTTO'S HANGING A COVER FOR MURDER?"

**Exclusive by
ROBERT EDDISON**

EX-PREMIER Mr. Bhutto was tortured to death in his cell. His "hanging" was a cover-up, former Punjab. governor Mustafa Khar Claimed Yesterday.

He was kicked to death by an over-zealous brigadier who had been promised a general's baton if he could extract a Confession, said Khar. Pakistan President General Zia ordered hanging to go ahead as if he was still alive and the ceremony was recorded by video cameras.

Mr. Khar, 41, a close friend and political adviser to General Zia, said he was told of the cover-up by highly placed Pakistan Government officials who were ordered to stage it."

Mr. Khar fled to London last year after pressure had been brought on him to frame Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for murder.

The officials told him that General. Zia summoned his top generals and corps commanders to a secret meeting on April 3.

After agreeing that Mr. Bhutto should be hanged, Zia ordered Brigadier Rahat Latif, brother of a top policeman to extract handwritten "confession", from Mr. Bhutto before he died. Zia promised that success would mean a general's baton for him by mid-summer.

Mr. Bhutto was to admit ordering the murder of a one- time political opponent but he continually refused and two kicks killed him.

The Army officers panicked since his death had defeated their plan to hang him later that week. Zia ordered them to have his body carried to the gallows on a stretcher.

Gen Zia was hopeful that I would reach Rawalpindi by the evening of April 3, as promised. I performed the opening Ceremony of the bridge and then left for Rawalpindi by Puma helicopter. Brig Akram was the senior pilot. I had Brig Imtiaz Warraich, the officer who had executed OPERATION FAIRPLAY, with me, along with some other officers. (I had intentionally taken Brig Warraich with me out of Rawalpindi, because of his involvement, with FAIRPLAY. The other officer, Brig Aslam Shah, who was my COS at that time, was already in Gilgit as Force Commander in the rank of a Maj Gen.) I landed at Chilas and spent about half an hour there meeting the locals. Thereafter we started our flight over the river Indus towards Pattan and Tarbella. Short of Pattan I ordered the pilot to go back to Gilgit and not to proceed to Pattan or Rawalpindi because of bad weather: it was dangerous flying through the gorge, I said. I also ordered him not to have any radio communications with Rawalpindi or Gilgit. Maj Gen Aslam Shah met me with worried looks when we landed back at Gilgit. I ordered him not to have any radio or telephone communications with Rawalpindi till further orders. He passed on these orders and we were without communications till I got them restored at 9 pm.

The Aviation Base at Rawalpindi and my Corps Headquarters knew that I was on my way back to Rawalpindi by helicopter. They waited till about dusk then started searching for my helicopter, thinking that we might have crashed (I had already crashed once on May 12 1972). They relaxed a little when contact was made at 9 pm but Gen Zia's worry continued because I was not back in Rawalpindi. He talked to me on the telephone at about 9 15 pm and wanted to know what had happened. I explained to him that I could not come because of bad weather I explained I had tried but could not go through the gorge. So he instructed me to leave early morning on April 4 and be in Rawalpindi by midday I agreed I knew his game (I have said this also when he was alive and it appeared in many newspapers and magazines This is not something which I am narrating only after Zia's death.) I left Gilgit after breakfast and was on my way to Rawalpindi when I told the pilot Brig Akram to listen to the National News on the radio whenever there was a broadcast and let me know if there was anything important. He listened to the news at 11 am and wrote the following on a piece of paper and forwarded it to me: "Mr. Bhutto has been hanged and buried at Larkana".

I passed on that chit to all officers about ten of them travelling with me. We were all morose but we did not discuss it amongst ourselves.

The very same day rumors were afloat that Gen Chishti went to the jail and manhandled Mr. Bhutto. How could this rumor be there all over Pakistan? Who had the facilities to get it done? The PPP or the Government? Obviously the Government. A news item of the period may be of interest here.

Mr. Bhutto was hanged to death in accordance with the law and was not tortured to death as claimed by Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Miss Benazir Bhutto in their press statements a spokesman of the Punjab Prisons Department said in Lahore on Sunday.

Talking to '*Morning News*' he denied the allegations that Mr. Bhutto was tortured to death on the night of April 3 and 4.

He said that the Provincial Home Secretary has issued an order to the Provincial Prisons Department for the execution of Mr. Bhutto The Home Secretary's express letter carried the following message:-

The condemned prisoner Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto s/o Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto should be hanged to death on April 4 at 2 am and relevant rules which debar the hanging at 2 am are hereby suspended (The Home Secretary could not have issued these instructions without clearance from the Governor and MLA Lt Gen Sawar Khan).

If Begum Bhutto or anybody else had any doubts about the cause of death of Mr. Bhutto they could go and get the body examined by any number of doctors they liked both Pakistani and foreign to know the cause of death which of course would be by breaking of the neck.

Pakistan Times (20-8-1979)

After my return from Gilgit I asked Major Gen K M Arif as to how things had gone in Rawalpindi. He told me that when Mr. Bhutto was told at night that he was to be hanged he collapsed (He had been told all the time by his advisers and colleagues that the Army dare not hang him. So the news naturally came to him as a shock).

The doctor was called to check if Mr. Bhutto was in good shape health wise so that he could be hanged. The doctor gave him an injection after which Mr. Bhutto's condition improved. He refused to go on foot outside the cell. So he was carried on a stretcher. While being carried on a stretcher, said Arif, Mr. Bhutto was constantly popping his head up to see where he was being carried. He was certain it was all a joke. But when he reached the site of the gallows Mr. Bhutto realized that he really was to be hanged. Then it was too late. He got up from the stretcher himself and with all courage walked

and climbed up the steps on his own offering himself to Tara Masih the executioner and said 'Finish it'.

Gen Zia in his fervor to destroy me and to carry out my character assassination discarded the rule that loyalty was a two-way traffic, juniors towards seniors and seniors towards juniors. It was expected of him, as the COAS to protect the image of his subordinates. He should have dispelled the impression among the public in the lower ranks of the Army as to the conduct of one of his senior generals by making a categorical statement that I was not in Rawalpindi from April 2 to 4. He did not do so because it was going to be counter-productive to his plans. He kept quiet on this issue from April 4, 1979 right up to his death on August 17, 1988. The Deputy COAS, Gen Iqbal also chose to keep quiet lest it annoyed his COAS. Gen Sawar Khan in his capacity as Governor Punjab had said:-

It is unethical to think that someone would have gone to the cell to torture Mr. Bhutto.

It can be argued that both Gen Zia and the PPP stood to gain by the rumors like this - Zia through my, getting the blame, and the PPP because they attracted more sympathy for the "martyred" PM.

As far as the chain in Martial Law administration concerned, the responsible officers were Lt Col Rafi, in charge of District Jail, Rawalpindi, above him Brig Rahat Latif, above him the Martial Law Administrator, Rawalpindi Division, Maj Gen Saghir Hussain, and at the top was Lt Gen Sawar, MLA, Punjab.

None of these officers lost favor after April 1979. Lt Col Rafi was promoted and became a military attaché abroad; Brig Rahat Latif was promoted to the rank of Maj, Gen, Maj Gen Saghir was promoted to the rank of Lt Gen, and even after his retirement was sent to Jordan as Pakistan's ambassador and Lt Gen Sawar Khan was promoted as the Vice-Chief of Army Staff.

Benazir Bhutto in her book *Daughter of the East* writes, on page 9, "The jail authorities led us back through the jail ward, the courtyard filled with army tents." At this stage I would like to point out that the army personnel, if any, in the jail ward, were under Brig Rabat Latif who was the Rawalpindi District Martial Law Administrator. I have already explained the chain of command. It had nothing to do with me, as far as Martial Law duties were concerned. The troops were mine and available to me for operations, but for Martial Law duties they were on loan to Lt Gen Sawar, the Martial Law Administrator of Punjab. Now the question comes as to why Brig Rahat Latif was SMLA Rawalpindi at this stage, and nobody else. Perhaps a little insight into this would uncover some hidden plans.

As explained earlier, 111 Brigade located at Rawalpindi was one of my reserve brigades. It could be launched anywhere in my operational area at short notice. My operational area included Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. The Brigade Commander thus must be in full readiness at all times from the very first day of the assumption of command. That led to the pre-requisite that 111 Brigade Commander should be an officer who was well conversant with the area of operation. Any areas not known to him must be seen by him at the first opportunity, and he must familiarize himself with the plans. He could be sent anywhere, at any time, in Corps operational area. It was located at Rawalpindi, for ease of travel by helicopters and for no other reason.

It is customary that such a Brigade Commander is posted after the Corps Commander's acceptance. Brigade Commander at the time of OPERATION FAIRPLAY, Brig Imtiaz Warraich, had become my Chief of Staff. Since then, 111 Brigade's Commanders had been changed at Gen Zia's whim and without taking me into confidence. He had been using his authority. When Brig Mumtaz Malik was posted as Brigade Commander without consulting me, I had objected to Gen Zia on the principle that he should have talked to me before his clearance for posting. He agreed, apologized and said that he would consult me next time. (I had nothing against Brig Mumtaz Malik. He had been my student at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, and was in the Frontier Force, same as Gen Iqbal, Dy COAS. Presumably his loyalties were greater to Gen Iqbal than to Gen Zia or me, but I do not think so, because Mumtaz was a straight-forward soldier. It could be that he was posted to my Brigade on Gen Iqbal's advice I was only trying to establish the time-honored principle of custom of service).

Next came Brig Mumtaz's posting to Abbottabad. Gen Zia remembered his words and asked me to give the name of a Brigadier whom I would like to have in place of Brig Mumtaz. I recommended the name of Brig Mohammad Khan who was at the time commanding a brigade at Skardu. He was thoroughly conversant with almost the whole area of my corps, because of his service in those areas over a long span of time. He was a tough infantry commander who could stand the rigors of terrain and connected difficulties. He was also completing his tenure of duty in a difficult area. I asked Brig Mohammad Khan if he would like to come to Rawalpindi as Commander, 111 Brigade. It would be tough for him, yet the choice would be his. He had also been my student at the command and Staff College, Quetta. He agreed.

I told Gen Zia about him and requested him to post him. I asked Gen Zia if I could tell Brig Mohammad Khan about it. Gen Zia allowed me to do so. I asked Gen Zia if I could move Brig Mohammad Khan to Rawalpindi, pending receipt of formal orders, as I was to go abroad for about ten days, and I would like to brief him about the Operational tasks so that he could attend to the preliminaries when I was away. Gen Zia agreed.

I moved Brig Mohammad Khan to Rawalpindi and briefed him about the plans before I left for my tour abroad. When I returned from my tour abroad after about twelve days,

I found that Brig Mohammad Khan had been literally shunted out of Rawalpindi and I did not know anything about it. He had been dispatched in quick haste to Malir as Logistic Area Commander. Why was it done? Why could not Gen Zia wait for my return? Where was the lack of confidence? What was Gen Zia up to and through whom? Postings of senior officers were not carried out like that. What was the emergency? If there was any emergency, it was certainly not based on operational requirements, but could be on Internal Security requirements.

After dispatching Brig Mohammad Khan to Malir, Gen Zia had ordered Brig Rahat Latif to take over the command of 111 Brigade. I objected to Brig Latif's posting, I asked Gen Zia what Brig Mohammad Khan had done that he was sent off in a hurry and why he could not wait for me. He had no sound reason to give. He overruled me. He was the Chief. So it was soldiers of Brig Raliat Latif's command who were under tents in the jail. Brig Rahat Latif had at the time of his transfer been in GHQ performing the duties of Provost Marshal of the Pakistan Army under Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman the Adjutant General. They had the entire Military Police under them. Both became beneficiaries of Gen Zia later on Brig Rahat Latif was promoted to the rank of Major General when he was not recommended for it. Maj. Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman became a four star general without even commanding a Corps but for Gen Zia that meant nothing. His requirements were different he had already previously promoted Maj Gen K M Arif to the rank of a four star general without the command of a Division and a Corps. It was an unprecedented example perhaps fit for *the Guinness Book of Record*.

This is perhaps not the place to discuss these things Suffice it to say that Mr. Bhutto took a dishonest decision to make Gen Zia the COAS against the recommendations of the outgoing COAS Gen Tikka Khan and Gen Zia broke all records by making every second decision a dishonest decision.

I would not bother about Rao Rashid's or someone else's opinion that I would have known everything happening under the Martial Law Administrators because it was beyond then comprehension. But I was surprised at Gen Tikka Khan's intellectual dishonesty when he said that being in Rawalpindi I knew everything and that I would have known everything that was happening in Rawalpindi jail. That was certainly the height of distortion of facts probably with nefarious intent I would like to ask him in all honesty, did he as the COAS let me know, as Military Secretary, everything that was happening under CGS MGO QMG or AG when I was under his command? I was also in GHQ as they were. The answer is NO because I was not supposed to know. Similarly, as a Corps Commander located at Rawalpindi I only knew about the Martial Law affairs to the extent that the CMLA wanted me to know. No more, no less. I was never directly in the chain of Martial Law Administration Command.

However, when Gen Zia in his good judgment thought that a task should be assigned to me outside the normal duties of command, it was allotted, to me, and I carried it out to

the best of my ability and dedication to the Pakistan Army. I never bothered to find out if it was because of greater confidence in me or because of the convenience of my presence in Rawalpindi or both. For example:-

- a. When Gen Zia was not confident of Gen Sawar or Maj Gen Fazle Haq's operational control over Kohistan area in 1976 for internal security duties (when the locals had blockaded the areas of Chinese and Pakistani Engineers, on Karakoram Highway) he had placed that area under my command and I rapidly brought the situation under control. Gen Tikka Khan, Minister for State at the time, may remember that he was sent by Mr. Bhutto to attend the briefings in the CGS Operations Room, GHQ. After restoration of normalcy the area was handed back to Lt Gen Sawar's command.
- b. When it was a question of forestalling the PNA 'Long March' to the Prime Minister's house, Zia deviated from the normal allotment of responsibilities and gave me the responsibility instead of Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khan and Gen Shah Rafi Alam. After the 'Long March' was blocked successfully, responsibility was reverted to the original allottee commander.
- c. A military takeover should have been the responsibility of Gen Ghulam Hassan Khan, because Rawalpindi was his area of responsibility, but Zia asked me to plan and execute OPERATION FAIRPLAY. After the operation I was not a part of the Martial Law Administration. Nor was Gen Ghulam Hassan, because Martial Law Administrators had been appointed, as always, by virtue of their presence in certain stations. The natural choice because of my location for my employment went towards the work in the Centre.
- d. Gen Zia asked me to take charge again when he was in trouble in November 1979, when the US Embassy was set on fire. It was Gen Sawar's area of responsibility. However, I took charge and restored order.
- e. When it was, a question of organizing the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in January 1980. Zia ignored the normal areas of responsibility and appointed me to organize it.
- f. When it was a question of organizing the 12th Rabi-ul Awal Conference in February 1980, he did the same.

I did not mind doing these things as required of me why this 4 April 1979 affair without me? Was it a sudden lack of confidence? Or was it because Zia was certain that I would

not do it? I leave it to the readers to judge. The fact remains that Brig Rahat Latif was appointed 111 Brigade Commander at Rawalpindi against my wishes, was forced on me and later promoted even when he was not recommended. He must have done something out of the ordinary for Gen Zia. What could that be? Whatever that was, it was surely in league with Lt Gen Sawar Khan, MLA Punjab.

Page 13 of *Daughter of the East* reads:-

"Rumors quickly began to circulate about my father's death. The hangman had gone mad. The pilot who had flown my father's body to Gharhi had become so agitated when he had learned the identity of his cargo that he'd had to land his plane and have another pilot called in. The papers were full of other lurid details about my father's end. He had been tortured almost to death and with only the barest flicker of a pulse had been carried on a stretcher to his hanging. Another persistent report claimed that my father had died during a fight in his cell. Military officers had tried to force him to sign a confession that he had orchestrated the coup himself and invited Zia to take over the country. My father had refused to sign the lies the regime needed to give it legitimacy."

Let us examine some points of this paragraph so that we derive the correct picture of events. A coup's legitimacy does not depend on the signatures of a deposed PM. If the signatures are so important and so desirable, are obtained at the time of the coup of the first day. The revolutionary disposal takes place. There was no need for getting any signatures if at all anybody tried to get it at that belated stage. The legitimacy of the coup had been established by:-

- a Reaction of relief of the masses on July 5, 1977.
- b The PPP acceptance of going to the polls on October 18 1977 under the supervision of the Armed Forces and Judiciary, under the Martial Law Government.
- c The Supreme Court Judgment on Begum Nusrat Bhutto's petition.

The second point that I would like to analyze concerns lurid rumors that Mr. Bhutto was tortured in the cell. I do not think anybody did that. If it was done it should be discovered who did it and on whose orders. If they were simply rumors then who invented those rumors and to achieve what aims?

My name had been generally mentioned as the perpetrator in this connection. Who could possibly, coin this rumor? It could be either the Government or the PPP i.e. either Gen Zia or Begum Nusrat Bhutto (being heads of respective interests the government and the PPP)

This rumor was rampant all over Pakistan on the morning of April 4 1979. Did the PPP have such an infrastructure for dissemination of such propaganda that they could spread this rumor all over Pakistan especially with Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto in custody? Surely not. What advantage would—it-have given the PPP? Apparently no advantage. So it is unlikely that this rumor was spread by the PPP.

The other party was the government i.e., the CMLA Gen Zia had the resources to spread the rumor through his intelligence network. It was disseminated down to Field Intelligence Unit levels that this information would be leaked out the day Mr. Bhutto was hanged. To give credibility to this rumor Gen Chishti must be in Rawalpindi the day Mr. Bhutto was to be hanged (In spite of Gen Zia's efforts Gen Chishti was not in Rawalpindi that day.) This is what Col Ghaffar Mehdi wrote.

Zia's saving that he had consulted his colleagues individually and collectively and special circles regarding Z. A. Bhutto's hanging will attain a grave importance in history. It confirms the PPP's allegations that the hanging of ZAB was part of a political process. What was the need to give such a statement when the High Court and Supreme Court had given their judgments on this issue and Mr. Bhutto had only appealed for mercy/clemency to the President. While giving a decision on the mercy petition the Political Leader of the Country does not have the necessity to consult opposition leaders or leaders of party in power but his own heart and soul and use his intellectual powers to assess the righteousness of such a decision.

(Mashriq London June 5-11, 1985)

I do not know why Gen Zia did not allow Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto to accompany Mr. Bhutto's body on April 4, 1979. Gen Zia had said many a time that Mr. Bhutto was being treated as a common man in the eyes of the law. The law states that after hanging, the body of the condemned person should be handed over to next of kin. So after hanging the body should have been handed over to Begum Nusrat Bhutto at Rawalpindi as she was present there. If for some reason the body was not to be handed over to her at Rawalpindi, then she had to accompany her husband's body so that it would be handed over to her at another place. It was decided in the MLA's meeting that both Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto would accompany the body in case the PM was hanged.

The reasons for not doing so would certainly be known to the Martial Law Administrator and Governor of Punjab Lt Gen Sawar Khan, the DMLA Maj Gen Syed Saghir Hussain, the SMLA Brig Rahat Latif, or even possibly to Lt Col Rafi, the CO under whose control the District Jail, Rawalpindi was and of course, to the COS to CMLA. Maj Gen K M Arif. The reasons were certainly not known to me. It came as a shock to me when I was told that the two ladies were not allowed to accompany Mr. Bhutto's body. I never thought that Gen Zia would stoop so low. It was un-Islamic and

also inhuman I asked him questions about this later, but his answer was "*Murshid*, that chapter is closed."

It seemed that nobody really wanted Mr. Bhutto to live. The masses who rose against him in the PNA Movement were against him, the PPP party workers who thought he had deviated from the party manifesto by aligning himself with the feudal landlords and the rich did not want him, and even the PPP leaders on whom had kept secret files were not with him. Above all the silent majority which had suffered at the hands of the so-called PPP workers did not want him. Nobody was interested. There were even some who used to tell Gen Zia openly that Mr. Bhutto should not be spared. They were generals, former ministers, political leaders, civil officials and oppressed relations of the dead or the missing, those whose whereabouts were not known. Someone asked me at a diplomatic party if Mr. Bhutto would be hanged. I replied that either Allah knows or representative Gen Zia knows. Nobody else would know. But of one thing I was certain that if people only rose to save his life, Gen Zia would not dare touch him.

I often used to imagine this scenario: I am on my way to my office in Chaklala. I reach the bridge over the railway line: it is immediately opposite the District Jail Gate and next to the District Courts. I have to go over the bridge to turn left to go to my office. If there are twenty, only twenty people squatting on the bridge in front of the jail gate demanding Mr. Bhutto's release, what would I do? Run over them? Would my escort jeep run over them? No, I would have to reverse and take the route which goes next to Zia's house. If the road passing in front of the jail also has ten to twenty squatters, I would go straight to Zia's house and inform him of the situation. That would surely produce a lease of life for Mr. Bhutto.

But things did not happen that way. The PPP could not even produce fifty people to demonstrate. Apart from his family members, it seemed almost no one was interested in saving Mr. Bhutto's life. Whether Gen Zia's action in rejecting the mercy appeal was correct or not is certainly debatable, but Mr. Bhutto's popularity as depicted by the PPP was certainly not there. There could, therefore, be no brakes applied to Gen Zia's actions. Appeals by foreign governments and rulers were in reality a mere formality (in Gen Zia's words).

Mr. Bhutto had pinned his hopes on the landlords instead of the workers, on the rich instead of the silent poor. And they were the real murderers of Mr. Bhutto.

CHAPTER - SIX

ZIA : THE MAN FROM NOWHERE

Little was known about Zia even by his fellow officers when he took over as COAS in 1976. He was in many respects a rather colorless personality, and in fact never became popular or much respected either in the ranks or by the officers. He must have been virtually unknown in the country as a whole.

Zia's manner was always that of a simple and unambitious soldier. He used to listen attentively, giving the impression that he agreed, but then went on to do exactly what he wanted to do. Soon after Zia assumed the post of COAS, a policy of image-building on behalf of Zia began. It took the form of deliberately building up his image as the austere, pious man of simple tastes. It continued with greater zeal when he became the CMLA. How far this was myth or reality is a matter of opinion. What is certain is that there were distortions of the truth.

Part of Zia's public image was that he, as a pious Muslim, had complete faith in Allah, and resigned himself to whatever was his fate. Actually he was constantly preoccupied and worried about his life. He did not trust doctors, and refused to have his gall bladder attended to until he was physically helpless, and had to have an operation performed by Gen Mahmud ul Hassan.

Like Mr. Bhutto, Zia had a taste for dressing up in new uniforms. Soon after taking over under Mr. Bhutto in 1976, Zia altered the ceremonial dress uniform of the Pakistan Army. Instead of the rather simple, smart uniform with a metallic crescent and star known before, Zia introduced a gleaming white uniform, with a quantity of gold braid making it something of a laughing stock. The epaulettes of heavy gold braid were very gaudy, and proved unpopular with the officer corps as a whole, because they made officers look like hotel commissionaires, and some of them complained.

Zia never learned to trust people. That is why he retained power in his own hands, instead of delegating it. He never appointed any Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, as has been the standard practice. I challenged him on this, saying it was necessary for the country to appoint someone, in case of an accident or sudden death, and suggested Gen Shariff or Lt Gen Iqbal or another Senior Gen. He realized the need but never appointed anybody. He was already the CMLA and the President of Pakistan, and had no sound reason to feel threatened by filling this appointment.

Zia had been sworn in as President on September 16, 1978. Within the Army, few had expected him to assume this post as well as that of CMLA and COAS. Gen Shariff and Gen Zia were due to retire on March 1, 1979, on completion of their 3-year tenure. Gen

Shariff requested retirement with effect from January 1, 1979, and was allowed to retire. I recommended that Gen Zia become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and appoint someone else the Chief of Army Staff, according to seniority.

"I don't trust anybody," said Zia, claiming he would be. *"at the mercy of the Chief of Army Staff".*

"You have forty generals in the army, and trust none of them? Then this country is doomed!", I replied.

Of course, Zia continued "on extension" right up to his death in 1988.

He was certain that Pakistan's Army being a very disciplined force would never mutiny, i.e. act against its own COAS. Removal of a PM is different compared to removal of a service chief. Zia exploited this to his own advantage, and died in uniform. There was a clique which grew up around Zia. He had progressively altered the higher echelons of the Army, creating a "gang of four", with ties reinforced by marriage alliances.

- Zia's son was married to Gen Rahimuddin's daughter.
- Gen Akhtar's son was married to Gen Rahimuddin's daughter.
- Gen Akhtar's other son was married to Gen Zahid Ali Akbar's daughter.

Gen Zia was the COAS, Gen Rahimuddin became the CJCSC, and was followed by Gen Akhtar. Gen Zahid was chief of WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority).

In addition to these key men, Zia also promoted some officer overdue for retirement (age-wise or service-wise) of all ranks, whom he later adopted as his blue-eyed boys. Zia's inner circle included three men who served as successive Federal Secretaries of Information and Broadcasting. These three were Masood Nabi Nur, Zahoor Azhar (like Zia an ex-student of St Stephen's College, Delhi) and Lt Gen Mujeeb ur Rehman . As Secretaries of Information they exploited the Pakistan media to boost Zia's image.

After Zia became the COAS, there were changes in the set rules and procedures followed to assure fitness for promotion of officers in the Pakistan Army. The ideal was promotion on strict merit, with the basic principle being that no opinion was to be given on officers who had not served under their command, or who were related. A few senior officers held out, but from 1980 there was no open discussion as before, between generals as equals at Board meetings, taking an officer's service record into due account. It even happened that Majors were simply told by Zia that they were promoted, without following the usual procedures

Other changes were made by Zia too. In 1979 he suddenly announced at a meeting of the Corps Commanders.

"We are sending troops to Saudi Arabia. I have good news; Saudi Arabia has agreed we are to send troops, and we will be paid a lot of money."

I was amazed, and at the same time appalled.

"Who gave you permission? We are not mercenaries, after all. If they are sent, it will lead to the destruction of Pakistan's Army. You will see, it will breed discontent and divisions within the Army. They must not be sent."

Zia was taken aback at this sharp reaction. He even abused me, complaining. "I have been working on it so hard, it almost killed me."

Of the Generals present, only Gen Fazle Haq supported me. We made a strong case, and blocked Zia project for a while. Pakistani troops did not go to Saudi Arabia as long as I stayed in service.

The impact of Saudi service was, as I foresaw, thoroughly harmful to the Pakistani Army. Substantial benefits from enhanced salaries bred jealousies, disinterest in service often grew after a tenure in Saudia and the Sunni-Shi'a rift opened up too.

There were many things wrong with the higher echelons of the Civil Service. Selection was far too narrowly based for the good of the service, or the country.

In the Foreign Service, there were many officers who had stayed in Islamabad and never been posted abroad, and many who had been abroad in coveted postings continuously for 6, 9, 12 or more years. What could someone out of Pakistan for such a long time know about his country?

These and other defects were really a result of favoritism and nepotism, and changes were overdue. For the Foreign Service, Zia decided on a rationalization. Every officer must revert to Pakistan after a tenure of 3 to 5 years, before taking up another foreign posting.

Under Mr. Bhutto, there was, of course, lateral entry for his PPP nominees. Under Zia, senior most appointments often went to generals. Zia in effect inducted his party, the Army, well and proper after 1980. But I did not let it happen even once, as long as I remained minister in charge of the Establishment Division. Under me, all new appointments and promotions were done by strict rules and by merit.

The bureaucrats did not like postings away from comfortable cities where they were well settled, for example from Punjab to Baluchistan. Within the Civil Service, there were, of course, some who claimed they were being "victimized", and tried to get politicians, friends, and even Zia himself to intervene on their behalf.

On August 23, 1978, when the politicians were inducted into the cabinet, I gave up the ministerships held. After I left the Establishment Division in 1978, Zia did not give it over to anyone else, but kept it in his own hands. I believe this was because I had served as a check, but he wanted a free hand in any changes made. Zia's playing around with appointments did much to destroy Pakistan's institutions.

The numbers of generals and senior officers appointed to the highest posts in the Foreign Service from 1978 was naturally deeply unpopular with the diplomats. As with the Civil Service as a whole, Zia's playing around with his Armed Forces appointees effectively blocked their own chances of promotion.

Army Service rules retire personnel much earlier than civil. The question of finding a role for former army personnel retired around 50 years of age was not new. A certain proportion were regularly taken into the civil, to compensate for early retirement. By Service rules, a Brigadier retires at 52, or after completing 28 years service, whichever is earlier. With the Civil Service, the age is 60.

No officer at grade 20 or above would like someone blocking his promotion. Entry at an earlier age is fairer not blocking promotion at the top. Army captains entering the police force, for example, is fine, but when army colonels and brigadiers do it is both inefficient (he does not know and is unlikely to learn the job quickly) and unfair to those below the corresponding grade of seniority.

Zia also extended terms of service overall - he did not want to alienate senior officers and officials. Not only one year, but often considerably longer terms were given to his favorites as political bribes. It was basically a search for cheap popularity.

As Minister in charge of the Establishment. Division. I received a letter, from Gen Zia, the CMLA, ordering me to induct about twenty retired and serving officers of the Armed Forces to the civil services. I was upset on receipt of the letter because it was entirely against the decided policy. Action through review boards was being taken that time against the lateral entrants who had been inducted into service during the Bhutto regime. This was towards the accountability process for which the elections had been postponed. Mr. Bhutto was blamed for destroying the institution of civil service of Pakistan, as it was said, by recruiting his own party-men into the civil service and now Gen Zia was going to do it. If the PPP was Mr. Bhutto's party, then the Armed Forces were Gen Zia's party. Their induction to the civil service through lateral entry would be as grave an offence as committed by Mr. Bhutto, So I was not prepared to let it happen

and expose the CMLA to that criticism of the opponents. I rang up Gen Zia and fixed an appointment with him for Establishment Division work as usual, because I used to take decisions from him on all appointments of grade 21 and above. I went to him and took that letter with me.

I showed him the letter and asked him if he could recognize the signatures. He asked, me if I did not recognize the signature. I confirmed the signatures were his own and told him that by writing that letter he was going to commit the same offence as Mr. Bhutto had done, i.e. induction of his own party to the service in an illegal manner. He told me that the officers mentioned in the letter were all good and all deserving cases. I told him that there were set procedures for induction of Armed Forces officers as practiced in Mr. Bhutto's time also, and these should be followed and no short cuts should be adopted. He hesitated a bit and then said that something should be done about them. I told him that the respective officers should follow the laid down procedures and go through the Ministry of Defence. Only then could their cases, depending on the recommendations of the Ministry of Defence, be considered, He asked me what would be the action on the letter written by him. I told him the best place for that letter was his office dustbin. He took that letter from me, tore it up and put it in the bin. I thanked him for that.

When Zia used to claim the Armed Forces as his constituency, I used to tell him that it could not be. The Armed Forces represented the nation, which comprised Sindhis, Punjabis, Baluchis, Pathans, Kashmiris, Gilgitis, Baltis etc. The Armed Forces represented the National Constituency.

Gen Zia's "mission" was dignified with many fine-sounding descriptions, but in reality his mission was to save his own life, which necessarily involved, his staying in power until his death. Zia was willing to hold free, party-based elections only when the people came forward and were ready to give what Zia called "positive results" by which he meant full agreement with his own ideas.

Zia's often quirky behavior and foibles were not only a nuisance, or a source of amazement or amusement, but at times proved -positively dangerous. By his foolish, unconsidered actions, Zia had a part - which inevitably was hushed up - in the burning of the US embassy building in Islamabad, in November 1979. It all began with his vanity.

United States Embassy Blaze

In the profession of arms, all our life and at all levels of command, we had been taught not to adopt cheap popularity measures, but to conduct ourselves with dignity and honor commensurate with the rank and appointment held. Almost all of us in the general rank abided by it. However, I observed something odd in Gen Zia which I had

not seen before either in any of my seniors or my colleagues. A Chief of Army Staff, whenever he went out on a visit, he would ask his Private Secretary accompanying him to carry some currency notes in sealed envelopes, some shirt lengths or suit lengths wrapped in packets, or at times some wrist watches to be given to the personnel of the unit or institution to be visited. During his visit he would inspect the Regimental Quarter Guard, sneak into the cook houses, canteen, welfare centre or wash and toilet rooms and at the end of the visit ask his Private Secretary to dish out the envelopes of money, packets of cloth or watches to the other ranks and non-commissioned officers responsible for the upkeep of the inspected outfit. The money so spent was never from his personal pocket.

As Military Secretary in the General Headquarters I asked him many times not to do it, but he would not stop. I asked him why he was doing it, but he never gave a satisfactory answer. He continued doing so even as Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan, without any imposed restrictions on expenditure. This was being done to become popular in the lower ranks of the Army. There was nobody to stop him in his pursuance of this policy of cheap popularity.

By November 1979 Gen Zia had many sycophants henchmen and intellectually dishonest advisers around him who knew his weakness for gaining popularity, so that he could even at the cost of corrupting discipline continue as a popular Chief Executive of the country. Those lackeys advised him that he should do something which would prove to the masses that he was from them, believed in austerity, was leading a simple life and that he was their well-wisher. In their opinion this could be very well achieved if Gen Zia would start going to his office on a bicycle and, if possible, visit Rawalpindi on a bicycle. This would not only be appreciated by the people but would also cause a lot of saving of petrol, which would ultimately mean saving of valuable foreign exchange, so much of which was required for the development of the country.

Gen Zia had a weakness that he could not say 'no' to any suggestion that might increase his so-called popularity. So he agreed with the suggestions, and agreed to go to his office, only about 500 yards from his residence, on bicycle and to visit Rawalpindi Town on a bicycle, duly planned but unannounced. When I came to know about it from his Private Secretary, I requested Gen Zia not to do it as by doing so he would become a laughing stock. He would not agree. Then I explained to him, in my capacity as Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, that his riding a bicycle would not save any petrol but, on the contrary, would consume more petrol and cost the exchequer a lot more than going in the car, because many additional administrative measures would have to be taken for his security. More foot constables would be required for deployment and more civil clothed army personnel would have to be brought in from distant towns like Jhelum and Attock.

Gen Zia agreed with all that, but said that it was wonderful idea to go cycling as it was good for the health and that he would do it. He would even go to Raja Bazar on a bicycle on one of those days. So on November 17, 1977, Gen Zia cycled down to his office from his residence, discarding all protocol formalities. National Trust Papers, under, the advice of the Information Secretary, and other pro-government papers gave a lot of coverage to this event to pamper Gen Zia. Encouraged with this, he ordered that his visit to the local town on a bicycle should be planned for November 21, 1979.

November 21 turned out to be a bad day. There was sensational news that a band of extreme religious zealots had already seized the Holy Kaaba. Gen Zia was advised not to pursue his plan of visiting the city on cycle. As the programme had not been announced it would not have made any difference, but Zia thought it was the day to cash in on the sentiments of people when their feelings were injured, like the rest of the Muslim world. The sycophants goaded him to go ahead. The local Sub-Martial Law Administrator assured him that everything would remain under control, and that nothing would go wrong. So Gen Zia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, the President of Pakistan and Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army started his tour with an entourage of army officers, police officers, civil servants, aides-de-camp, sycophants, speech writers and journalists, some on foot and some on bicycles, towards Rawalpindi city.

Gen Zia surprised people when he rode a bicycle in the congested bazaars in Rawalpindi cantonment and city without any of the traditional pomp and show. There was no cavalcade or pilots escorting the President. Apparently he had broken all security measures, met the people and mixed with them. (Remember, this visit was unannounced.) At Kamran market he told people that by doing so, i.e. riding a bicycle, he had no ulterior motives of gaining popularity or any political motives. He distributed several hundred bags of *atta* (wheat flour) and quilts among the poor. He even gave money to some people. At Fawara Chauk he recited Kalama-e-Tayeabah along with the people, rode a jeep (discarded his bicycle) because of the rush of people and proceeded to Barni Chauk. There too he distributed *atta*, quilts, and Arabic primers. He also visited Chauk Warris Khan, where he addressed a big crowd of people and said that he had heard the sad news of the unhappy incident of the seizure of the Holy Kaaba in Makah, expressed his deep concern over it and prayed for the success of the Muslims at that hour. Later he addressed the councilors at the Town Hall.

In all he had addressed the people at Kamran Market, Marir Hassan, Fawara Chauk, Barni Chauk and Warris Khan Chauk. At Warris Khan Chauk the police could not keep the people at bay. Those closer to Gen Zia started shaking hands with him and some started asking questions. Some questions asked were about the situation prevailing at the Holy Kaaba. Intentionally or inadvertently, Zia answered that according to some international radio transmissions, the Americans had inspired the attack on the Holy Kaaba (In the morning some foreign radio broadcasts had broadly hinted at the

involvement of the United States of America in the occupation of the Holy Kaaba.) When the people heard this they cried "Allah O Akbar" (God is Great); "Down with America", "Down with Imperialism", "Pakistan Zindabad" (Long live Pakistan), "Gen Zia-ul-Haq Zindabad" (Long live Gen Zia, Islam Zindabad" (Long live Islam), Embassy Chalo" (Let us go to the Embassy) and "Death to America."

There were slogans raised that it was the same America which let us down in 1971, which did not help us and got us dismembered. The American Government was a lackey of the Zionists; now they were up to mischief with Islam. When Gen Zia left, the crowd started thinning out and started moving towards Islamabad. Nothing could deter them. The local martial law and civil administrator thought that they had achieved the results, i.e. enhancing Gen Zia's popularity. They failed to realize that after listening to Gen Zia, the excited crowd had started moving towards the United States Embassy at Islamabad, which was totally dependent on the Pakistan Government for protection.

For me November 21 was to be a long day. I had on my schedule, visits to my Headquarters, my office at the Ministry of Labor, my office at the Ministry of Petroleum. I also had to go to the Ministry of Information, because Gen Shahid was not available and I was also acting as Minister for Information and Broadcasting, to meet the Editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, in connection with the arrest of their journalist Salamat Ali. I had attended to my work at Headquarters and had gone to the Ministry of Labor, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, where I was sitting when my ADC Capt Iftikhar Mahmood came to me and informed me that there was a lot of smoke in the atmosphere and perhaps something was on fire. I peeped through the window and saw a dense cloud of smoke rising nearby. I asked my ADC to find out the details.

Capt Iftikhar came back after some time and told me that an excited and enraged crowd had set one of the US Embassy buildings on fire because of supposed American involvement in the seizure of the Holy Kaaba, as reported by the international broadcasts and confirmed by Gen Zia that morning at Warris Khan Chauk. Many people undoubtedly believed that the USA had inspired the attack on the Holy Kaaba. He also told me that it was rumored that a lot of diplomats were trapped in the building on fire, whose exit routes had been blocked by the mob. In addition he said that the Police and Army contingents had reached the spot and were trying to bring the situation under control. I ordered my ADC to inform the Ministry of Petroleum that I would not be visiting that office and to get the transport ready to proceed to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, so that the editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* could meet me.

I reached the Ministry after a short while and asked them about the latest situation at the Holy Kaaba. I was told that their information was that there was no change in the

status quo. I then decided to talk to our ambassador at Jeddah. When the call was put through, he informed me that the Defence Attaché had gone to Makkah to find out the exact details as to what had happened so far, and that he would let me know as soon as he heard from him on the telephone. I then attended to the requirement of the editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* regarding Salamat Ali, and told him that according to the Chief Martial Law Administrator's instructions nothing could be done for his release straightaway, but I assured him that I would discuss the matter with Gen Zia at my next meeting. The editor was disappointed, but there was nothing more that I could do at that time. (I however later talked to Gen Zia and finally got him released.) After a short while, before leaving the Ministry of Information, I again contacted our ambassador at Jeddah and I was told that our Defence Attaché had been arrested by the Saudi authorities.

As explained earlier, although I had no direct responsibility as an administrator in any part of Pakistan, and none whatsoever in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, yet I decided to go back to my Corps Headquarters to find out if more information was available there. There was no call and no additional information regarding the US Embassy, so it seemed that things were well under control.

At about three o'clock in the afternoon I was discussing Rawalpindi Medical College affairs with my younger brother, Dr Muhammad Sadiq Ali, Associate Professor of Surgery (Whom I had withdrawn from Army because of Gen Zia's breach of promise), when I received a call at my residence from Gen Zia. His voice and tone sounded different. I still remember his words "Murshid, the American Embassy is burning, The situation is very bad. The mob is not allowing anybody to rescue the American diplomats. All will die of asphyxia or get burnt. Please take charge and do something."

I replied that I was very sorry to hear about the incident but that according to the charter of duties it was the responsibility of Gen Sawar Khan, Martial Law Administrator, Punjab, to deal with it. I told him that the Sub-Martial Law Administrator, Rawalpindi, was under Gen Sawar, through Gen Saghir, and not under me. Gen Zia replied that they had all failed and again, implored, "Murshid, do something quick." I accepted the task, to save the lives on humanitarian grounds. I assured him, that I would do my best to control the situation and save lives as ordered by the Chief of Army Staff, and not by the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Therefore I contacted my Headquarters and ordered my Chief of Staff Brig (now Lt Gen) Imtiaz Warraich to send armed men to the US Embassy as soon as possible, with orders to fight their way through to rescue the American diplomats before they got burnt or died of asphyxia. The troops should be careful that while doing so our own men or civilians should not suffer any casualties.

Brig Imtiaz Warraich took charge and issued the necessary instructions according to the prevailing circumstances. Meanwhile I received a telephone call from the US

Ambassador, Arthur Hummel, requesting me to do something quick. (Perhaps Gen Zia had told him that he had issued instructions to me to arrange the rescue.) I assured His Excellency the Ambassador that I would do my best and that he should not worry. That by the way, was the first and last telephone call I ever received from an Ambassador at my residence. The Ambassador also told me that there were about 90 people in the third floor vault, a specially designed windowless, steel walled room about 20 feet by 30 feet. It also contained communications equipment, coding devices and an enormous safe.

When my troops reached the US Embassy premises at about four o'clock in the afternoon the rampage had continued for about seven hours. The toll of dead was an American Marine, an American Army warrant officer, two Pakistani Embassy clerks and two rioters. One of the Embassy buildings was on fire. Some excited people were also on the roof of the burning building.

The troops as instructed warned the crowd to give them, passage to the burning building. Fortunately, the crowd behaved, and the troops reached the building. Because of the heat, the vault doors were jammed, and it had become almost impossible to take the people out through the doors. The only alternative was to try through the ventilators. One of the marines inside the vault had opened the hatch and made contact possible. One by one the diplomats were evacuated onto the roof. From there through a ladder they descended down to the ground.

When the evacuation process was going on at the US Embassy, Gen Zia called me to his residence to discuss some matters. I was sitting with him when my Chief of Staff, Brig Warraich, reported that all the trapped people had been safely evacuated. Gen Zia congratulated me for this and thanked me for getting the evacuation done. That same evening the US President Jimmy Carter rang up Gen Zia to thank him for saving the lives of, the Americans. He had also ordered the evacuation of non-essential embassy personnel and dependents froth Pakistan. Thereupon some 400 Americans, mostly wives and children of US personnel; left Pakistan.

The funny part of this whole action was that Lt Gen (later Gen) Akhtar Abdul Rahman DGISI told Gen Zia that he had himself gone to the US Embassy with two or three of his intelligence men in civilian clothes and had managed to get all the diplomats evacuated through the ventilators. Gen Zia, as was his habit told Gen Akhtar that he had done well. On that same day, the American Information Centre was also burnt by the mob and some other American installations were damaged.

I was told later that Gen Zia had promised the Americans that he would get the embassy building reconstructed at Pakistan's cost. I have been told it was done at a cost of Rs. 250 million. This was a fine or a penalty to the nation because its Chief Executive had, after riding a bicycle to demonstrate austerity, made irresponsible remarks regarding US responsibility for the seizure of the Holy Kaaba.

Desire for a Clean Break

Zia seemed to want a clean break with Pakistan's past. He proposed that Pakistan's Independence Day of August 14, 1947, which happened to coincide with 27 Ramzan that year, should be for all time changed to that date in the Islamic calendar. But the proposal was dropped when he found no support in the Cabinet.

At another Cabinet meeting, Zia produced a modified version of the national flag which had Arabic inscriptions on it. When he moved this idea, it was loudly praised by some members of the Cabinet. Though others kept quiet, nobody raised their voices to object except Mahmood Ali and myself.

I said that: Pakistan's flag as approved by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah should not be and will not be changed for any other design. I am proud of the fact that I did not let it happen. I argued and argued against those proposals until Zia dropped them. I believe that Zia never reintroduced this subject even after my retirement in 1980 because he realized that tampering with the national flag was not such a good idea after all.

Under Zia, fasting rules were made, more rigorous during the month of Ramadan, when dawn to dusk fasting is supposed to be followed by Muslims. Yet hypocrisy was apparent in the arrangements followed. It was a case of one rule for the poor and another for the rich - no punitive action against the well-off, including quite a few government officials, but harsh punishments for the poorer class of law offenders caught taking forbidden pleasures.

Offstage, the mood was more relaxed. Even during Ramadan, luncheons continued to be prepared in the kitchen of the CMLA building in Rawalpindi, for those officials who cared to partake. Though Zia himself always kept the fast and did his five prayers, he did not appear to mind when others ate or smoked in front of him.

Zia always had the habit of meeting foreign leaders alone, holding formal talks just between two. Other members of the government and I accompanied Zia on foreign trips, and met foreign dignitaries in Pakistan, but what was said, between Zia and the various rulers and leaders neither I nor any of the others ever knew for certain. Is it not amazing that, at the national level, we never, knew what was discussed, or agreed? It was certainly irresponsible that no authenticated minutes were recorded of Zia's meetings with King Khalid and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the Shah of Iran, President Siad Barre, President Daoud, Prime Minister J Callaghan, with Gen Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh and, all the other leaders whom he met from 1977. Zia might, well have done damage to the country by acting in this strange way.

Zia remained, extraordinarily, lazy with paper work. Necessary office work was simply ignored. Often I had to chase up written reports on officers, or files which had been lying two or three months with him. I used to go to Zia's house asking for the file sent on such and such a date. Go and look for it in my study, Zia would reply. There would be a great pile of files. Zia was a born procrastinator, he always preferred to give verbal decisions or ignore problems, hoping they would die a natural death. It is said that many thousands of files were found awaiting a decision by Zia at the time-of his death in 1988.

Zia had other strange character traits, apart from this habit of putting off decisions or work on files. One of them was more fit for a psychologist to examine. This was what amounted to an obsession with toilets. Zia had a special fancy almost an obsession, for bathrooms and toilets. He would not share them with anybody. He got them constructed exclusively for his own use wherever he was likely to stay, i.e. COAS house, CMLA Secretariat office, Ordnance Mess, Lahore etc.

For someone who was meticulous about many things, Zia was surprisingly casual about the Army uniform. In fact, many officers felt that Zia never stopped disgracing the Army uniform. He used to do it himself and even let it be done by his daughter. He used to let her dress up improperly as Colonel, General and go along with him on ceremonial occasions, reception of dignitaries and guards of honor. I repeatedly asked him to mend his ways on both these points. He declared he would stop doing these things but never did.

As far as Zia's reputation for personal honesty is concerned I do not have any firm evidence that there was wrongdoing. However, there were a number of curious and as yet unexplained details in Zia's private life Zia seemed to have made friends with some of the most notorious smugglers of Pakistan such as Seth Abid the brother-in-law of Masud Mahmood former Director General of Federal Security Forces and the equally notorious Dohsil. Seth Abid who had many cases against him was totally rehabilitated by Zia to the extent that he was even granted a license to open an investment bank in Pakistan.

On the frequent foreign trips made by Zia, it was common practice for cargo from the plane to be loaded straightaway into a truck to be sent directly to the CMLA's house, without passing through even formal customs scrutiny. Even if there was nothing dutiable or illegal brought in this was strange behavior.

Gifts received from foreign hosts or visitors were never declared as required by rigid rules dating back to the pre-independence era. Some of these official presents were bound to be valuable, in the case of Arab Gulf potentates at least.

One could say quite a number of things about Zia's strong personal interest in the ill-fated Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies North Hatley venture. Perhaps Zia was simply a bad judge of character. After visiting the Montreal "showroom" of this enterprise, I began to suspect the management of milking the financial operations run with Saudi funds for their own private benefit.

My opposition to Gen Zia's policies was noted by many close observers of the Pakistani political scene from 1980, among them the BBC World Service. The BBC (Urdu Service) on 22-3-1980 reported:

"The only suggestion of protest so far has come from Lt Gen. Chishti. At a meeting with reporters which was not put out by the national news agency, he said he was resigning from the Army and once resigned from the Army, the basis on which he is Cabinet minister disappeared too."

On March 24, 1980 a BBC commentary spoke of "deep differences between him and General Zia"

I was the very first cabinet colleague of Gen Zia to speak out in public against his keeping power and withholding general elections. My resignation from three ministries simultaneously with my retirement from the Army in March 1980 was regarded by Zia as "a slap in the face", so I was later told by Zia's brother-in-law Dr Basharatellahi, through a common friend.

At the time, Gen Zia pretended to know nothing of my plans to resign, though in fact I had told him many times in meetings and finally on the evening of March 16. Mine was a principled resignation; Zia had consistently ignored my advice and failed to carry out the pledges on elections. I was never a member of Zia's inner circle. There was no close personal relationship between us, and soon we fell apart over the issue of elections, along with the declaration of a definite date.

It is all the more ironic that some people, for whatever reasons, have chosen to exaggerate my closeness to Gen Zia. The mere fact that Zia used to commonly address me as "*Murshid*" (spiritual mentor or guide) has been deliberately misinterpreted. This was certainly meant by Zia as nothing more than a polite honorific. But Sardar M Abdul Qayum Khan actually used this "*Murshid*" to dub me a dictator, torment tyrant and I know, not what else. In his spite, he conveniently forgot that this term was applied by Zia to many others among his generals and wrote about me in these fanciful and lurid terms (*Kashmir Banega Pakistan* p101):

"Even all the dictators and tormentors of Pakistan put together would not match an equal of Gen Chishti and why not when the President of Pakistan, Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army and Chief Executive of the country Gen Mohammad

Zia ul Haq himself used to stand up for him to receive him and call him *Murshid*."

This attack may not be unrelated to my relentless pursuit of this individual for accountability for the missing funds which Sardar Qayum had responsibility for while head of the Azad Kashmir administration.

Unfortunately, during the Tribunal investigating the case, Qayum's influence prevented witnesses coming forward to press many serious charges of corruption and mishandling of public funds (see Annexure 'A').

It is characteristic of Qayum that though at first a critic, he soon became one of the greatest admirers of Zia ul-Haq, publicly calling for him to become Life President of Pakistan and also Field Marshal, "for services rendered to Umma' Islamiya" (the Islamic world community).

Hostile to Benazir Bhutto's government, Qayum is at the moment a keen supporter of the Punjab Chief-Minister Nawaz Sharif. He may be expected to change again when there is some benefit. Instead of fighting as '*mujahid*' on the Kashmiri warfront, as Qayum claims, he actually distributed rations as a corporal in the Army Service Corps - not a very glorious beginning to a career in politics which has made him wealthy (see Annexure 'A')

In spite of Zia's best efforts I did not compromise on honesty and patriotism. I became Federal Minister twice during Zia's regime and both times did not take up the grants available to refurbish my house. I also declared all gifts received by me, whereas Zia and some other ministers did not do so.

After my retirement, Zia saw to it that difficulties were placed in my way. Petty and mean things were done. He prevented a new business venture I had started from flourishing. My son was prevented from joining PIA. I Wanted to sell my house at Islamabad to look after my family and to clear my debts/loans which I had taken for house building. DGISI Lt Gen Akhtar did not let that house be sold for 13 months. Whosoever approached the house to see it with a view to buy it was told that Gen Zia, would get annoyed if Chishti's house was bought by them. Finally it was sold to Pakistani buyers in USA. The money was taken in Pakistan in Pakistani currency.

An army officer who was a colleague of mine had his land at Sahiwal. He met me and we decided to collaborate on a housing scheme on that land. He was to provide land and together we would develop it and convert it into saleable plots. Profits were to be shared as and when the plots were sold. Intelligence services under Gen Akhtar would not let those plots be sold. The road near which the land lay was completely churned on the plea of converting it into a two-way carriageway. It stayed in that condition for

about a year and a half. The landowner changed his attitude and wanted the payment for the land in one go, I was forced to borrow the money from a bank and give it to him. Indeed I am convinced it was a deliberate attempt by Zia to undermine my financial position. Since then till Zia's crash on August 17 1988 there has been strict pressure preventing sale of the plots. I have yet to assess how things stand now. Maybe the debts and decks can now be cleared.

There were very few occasions when I met Zia after my retirement. They were either marriage ceremonies, funerals, or prize distributions at golf tournaments (I was the President Golf Union), etc. We never met to sit and discuss anything except my resignation, as Chairman of the Islamabad Branch of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies North Hately. Because of this I was kept under vigilance and treated as *persona non grata* and a risk to Gen Zia. He and his ISI Chief were always keen to know what I was up to, I used to speak out openly through the newspapers which were kind enough to give me coverage. (see Appendix 3).

I was clearly not trusted by the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) Even on private visits abroad I was spied on, in Saudi Arabia by Lt Col Gulzar of ISI, and in Canada by the son of Lt Gen Akhtar, Director General ISI.

Immediately after my retirement my telephone was tapped by the cryptographic department, and I was followed around by people from intelligence agencies. Some of those doing it even used to come and see me or warn me, because they had served under me at one stage or another. I live in Rawalpindi the heartland of our Army - and used to have many visitors. Anyone coming to see me at home was chased by the ISI people, who made their lives miserable.

For example, my onetime ADC in Jhelum, a capable officer named Captain Haroon became a Lt Colonel. So I wrote him a letter of congratulation, addressed care of his family home in Lahore. It was redirected, and later he made a telephone call to me saying, "Thank you for remembering me" a short conversation of a standard polite nature. But Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman, Director General of the ISI, gave him hell.

"Why did you ring up Gen Chishti? What did you talk about?"

I remember vividly one Major General (at present a Lt Gen) who came to me actually in tears telling me he had been instructed by Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman to have no contacts with Chishti. I told him not to worry and to follow orders.

Literally hundreds of army officers were intercepted over the years, their conversations gone into closely, and effectively prevented from keeping in touch with me. Quite a few people even stopped coming up to shake hands with me on the golf course or

wherever. They deliberately avoided me instead knowing it was better for their careers. But some were indignant.

Even official functions and parties to which retired senior officers were normally invited were denied to me. There is an annual parade in Rawalpindi on March 23 For four years it was I who had arranged this parade and, the security arrangements under Mr. Bhutto as well as Zia. But after my retirement, I was never invited. No other retired generals as far as I know, were treated like this. I was *persona non grata*. Zia could not tolerate my presence.

The ISI tried to 'freeze' me totally. I must have been thought of as a serious danger someone capable of polluting with the germ of democracy, the minds of all those officers with whom I came in contact Zia feared a political assassination and he always remained unpopular in the Armed Forces in spite of all his efforts to buy popularity.

Because of Zia's vendetta against me my family were, hurt too. Both my brothers-in-law and my younger brother were not promoted in service as they deserved. But we have no regrets.

Gen Zia had established the Army Medical Corps College. He told me that he was in need of good instructors. He knew that I had a younger brother Mohammad Sadiq Ali FRCS in Northern General Hospital Sheffield which is a teaching hospital. He asked me if I could get him over to join AMC College as an instructor and said that he would take him in the rank of a Colonel. I violated the rule of never volunteering in the army and promised to talk to Sadiq. He was reluctant to return to Pakistan as he was well established in Sheffield I told Sadiq that we were trying to do our best to serve our country and that he should return to Pakistan for the country's sake. So he agreed to return. I told Gen Zia that Sadiq had agreed. I also told Gen Zia that he should not be taken in any higher rank in the Army because that would give me a bad name. Nobody would talk about his qualifications but there would be loose talk of nepotism because he was Gen Chishti's brother. So I told Gen Zia that he should be put through the normal procedures.

Sadiq was commissioned in the AMC as a Captain. He was to be assessed for his ability and then promoted to the rank of Major after three months as a classified specialist. He was cleared for a Major's rank much before the expiry of three months by his senior with whom he was working, Gen Mahrnud-ul Hassan and Director of Surgery Gen Shaukat Hassan. So he became a Major quickly. But a year later, when his name was put up for consideration for promotion as Lt Col he was not considered, on the grounds that there were no vacancies. As I read Zia's hand in this, I requested. Zia to let Sadiq resign. He agreed to that, and Sadiq came out of the Army. Sadiq became an Associate Professor in Surgery in Medical College, Rawalpindi and continued there till selected by a team from Saudi Arabia as a surgeon on the personal staff of His Majesty King Khalid

of Saudi Arabia, where he served until Zia disappeared. Thereafter I requested him to come and serve Pakistan. He agreed and has returned to Pakistan, where he is trying now to establish a private practice.

Science and Technology was one of the neglected fields Gen Zia told me, and he wanted to give this a new impetus. He wanted to have a Professor as the Secretary, Science and Technology in the Federal Ministry. I offered him, as Establishment Minister, some names from the universities. He talked to me about Dr. Nisar, my brother-in-law. I told him that it would be narrated as "another talented cousin" or another example of nepotism. I would go along with Gen Zia only if Dr. Nisar was found fit to hold the appointment. He was duly interviewed by Gen Zia found fit and appointed Additional Secretary Science and Technology. He continued serving in that post till just short of my retirement in March 1980.

I had gone abroad for about ten days and when I returned I found that he had been removed from the appointment and reverted to his basic appointment in the University of Science and Technology Lahore. Normally the appointment holders are not removed so quickly. So I asked Zia if Dr. Nisar had done something drastically wrong that he was punished like that. Zia said nothing but apparently he did not like him and had got him changed, wanting to do it quickly while I was abroad he had done in the case of Brig Mohammad Khan. Zia did not have the moral courage to talk to me about it. Outwardly, Zia was all sugar and honey but inwardly he could be venomous. The nation would come to know more about it as time passed by. Gen Zia tried hard to isolate me once I began to speak out in public against his policies from the summer of 1982. One way was by banning me from airport VIP rooms.

I had gone to Islamabad Airport to receive my younger brother Sadiq, who was coming on a month's leave with his family from Riyadh. My wife and another younger brother Aslam were with me. Aslam dropped me in front of the VIP room and went with my wife to park the car. As I approached the VIP room entrance I was told by an ASF inspector that the latest orders on the use of VIP rooms were that retired generals were not allowed use VIP rooms. These were the orders passed Federal Cabinet. This was not news to me. I knew just how low Zia could stoop to keep me away from his associates. I experienced it ever since my resignation from the ministership on March 30, 1980.

I had frequently met many of his advisors, appointees, secretaries, generals and ministers in the airport VIP rooms, during my travels to and from Islamabad, During such accidental meetings one naturally, apart from other things, also discussed prevailing conditions and national affairs. I had expressed frank opinions to them about the situation in the country as I read it, and that naturally was not in favor of Gen Zia. So Gen Zia ordered that I should be denied the use of VIP rooms (automatically denying me these accidental meetings), and the Cabinet passed the orders. The six

Minister Generals who used to be responsible for such decisions were Gen Zia, Gen J S Mian, Gen Saeed Qadir, Gen Arif, Air Marshal Inamul Haq and Admiral Janjua. So they passed these orders as generals against generals, probably because they thought they themselves would not retire at all.

I told the ASF Inspector that I, would not create any embarrassing situation for him by insisting on entering the VIP room. I thanked him for passing that information onto me. (Protocol-wise I could still use the VIP room in my capacity as a former Federal Minister. According to the laid-down order of precedence, former ex-Federal Ministers come immediately after the incumbent Federal Ministers.) I knew the intentions of the ruler, so I honorably withdrew. I told Aslam to receive Sadiq through the normal International Arrivals Channel and I waited along with my wife in my car. Sadiq and his family arrived and we went home and I decided to pursue the matter in my own manner.

The next day I asked the Secretary, Rawalpindi Flying Club (RFC), to come and see me in my capacity as President, RFC. I had been an elected President of the RFC since 1978 and continued until 1988. There are other Flying Clubs as Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and Multan in addition to Rawalpindi, but the RFC has been and still is the best flying club, having produced many pilots for national, and international airlines apart from many private license holders. A flying club president is, in the discharge of his duties at any time during the day and night, required to look up the trainees at the apron, in the hangars, in the lounges, in classrooms, first aid stations, maintenance rooms, refueling points, traffic control towers and other places within the vicinity of the airport. I used to go to some of these places to meet Pakistani and foreign nationals who were student trainees. So I told my club Secretary that as I had been denied the privilege of using the VIP room and other controlled premises on the airport, a letter should be written to the Manager, Islamabad Airport, to issue me a Security Pass so that I could visit those places in the discharge of my duties. The Secretary wrote the letter.

There was no reply in writing but verbally my secretary was told that the general would not be issued with a pass but would be allowed to go wherever he wanted to go after getting clearance from the Manager,, which he would give whenever required. This was not acceptable to me, so I told my club Secretary to tell the Manager, to give a reply in writing. On this he referred the case to the Aviation Division of the Ministry of Defence for guidance. When no reply was received I instructed the RFC to write a letter to the Aviation Division, Ministry of Defence directly for the Security Pass.

Still no reply was received so I got a letter written that if a reply was not received I would be taking the matter up directly with the Defence Minister.

After a few, days, Ali Ahmad Talpur, the Defence Minister, talked to me on telephone and asked what the problem was. I told him that it would be difficult for him to keep

me away, from the VIP room as the President RFC, because these facilities were being extended to other, presidents of flying clubs and I was asking for it as a retired general. Since I was asking for it as the President, RFC I told him that the other Presidents would have to shed this privilege in case he wanted to keep me out of the VIP room. That would create a situation for which I should not be blamed later. I requested him to convey my views to the CMLA. I was subsequently issued a Security Pass which read "Lt. Gen (Rtd) F. A. Chishti, President RFC, is allowed to use all lounges, aprons, VIP rooms at all airports in Pakistan." I availed of that facility until 1988 when I ceased to be President (After this incident, the CMLA Gen Zia tried through his lackeys that I should not get elected as President RFC in subsequent years but he did not succeed Later these orders that retired generals were not authorized to use VIP rooms were withdrawn, thanks, to the Cabinet.

CHAPTER - 7

ACCOUNTABILITY A FIASCO

Accountability is a great collective movement. For its application, it is necessary that each individual of the nation participates. The nation that offers itself to accountability achieves success in the accomplishment of its goals. The nation which does not adopt it or adopts it partially fails miserably in the attainment of its goals and gets divided into different segments, becoming entangled in economic, social, cultural and political snares. This ultimately leads to destruction. A nation which is not capable of self accountability is politically hollow, and helpless to preempt destruction. Words and actions must be in conformity. The accountability of appointment holders is vital because they need to be morally and intellectually honest and diligent. Not even the highest officeholder, the President of a country, should be allowed to go scot-free.

The politicians must have been thinking on these lines when they approached Gen Zia and asked him to force through accountability for prospective national and provincial assembly candidates. The NDP leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan expressed the views that accountability was a part of the democratic process and therefore people should exercise patience while the interim government cleaned up the mess by subjecting the corrupt politicians to the process of accountability. There were a sizeable number of politicians who wanted elections to be held at any cost.

When Gen Zia broached the subject of accountability, which had been frequently mentioned by me at meetings with Mr. Bhutto during pre-Martial Law discussions in the Cabinet Room, I told him that it would be a welcome step. As we should also be prepared for our personal accountability, I said we should start the process of accountability in our own house, from our own constituency i.e. the Army. He agreed, and asked me what I meant. I expressed my views in detail and said that ever since our association with the Pakistani Army (from November 1947 in my case), I had seen many things go wrong with no judicial accountability ever done. Self accountability must start. That was the only way to improve our society. Take the most disgraceful act of the break-up of Pakistan. Nobody had been tried or punished for that. Was it not a military, defeat? Who was responsible for it? Who was guilty of it? Let us try him. It was not only a military defeat but also a colossal political failure and a moral disaster.

I told Gen Zia that he did not have the opportunity of fighting in the 1947 Indo-Pakistan War because armour was not employed. He did not fight in the War of 1965 either, because by the time he reached the Division HQ (as an AA&QMA from Command and Staff College, Quetta), the war had already ended. In any case, the post he held in a newly raised incomplete Division was not a good posting from the fighting point of view. In 1971 Zia was busy protecting the rulers and learning the fine arts of

sycophancy and hypocrisy. He lacked actual experience of service in GHQ to comprehend what went on in decision-making. He had much to learn about the many things for which there should be accountability. I gave a long list of lapses which had gone on in our Army, but which nobody had ever bothered to try to check or punish. Some of them are enumerated below:

1. *Officers whose performance was poor in the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971 were not punished. Some of them later reached the dizzy height' of Generalship.*
2. *Honours and awards were given on fictitious citations.*
3. *Why were war diaries ordered to be destroyed?*
4. *Engineers deployed on road maintenance duties in AK, and the Northern area were doing all sorts of unethical things with impunity.*
5. *The higher command never fought their own battles but always insisted and fought subordinates battles.*
6. *Awards were given to those who got killed by their own mistakes in wars.*
7. *What happened to Gen Akbar Committee Report on the 1971 war?*
8. *Why was it replaced by the Gen Awan Committee Report?*
9. *In the conduct of war, why did we not apply what we had learnt in Schools of Instruction? Why deviate from the book?*
10. *Why was there no outcome of the inquiry into the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951?*
11. *On what basis were thousands of acres of agricultural land allotted to officers and what is the annual produce from them?*
12. *Why was the Hamood-Ur-Rehman Report not published?*

A lot has been written and talked about the Hamood-Ur-Rehman Commission Report without anybody really knowing anything for certain about it. I had asked Maj Gen K M Arif to give it to me to read it. He replied that it was too voluminous a report to read. I said it did, not matter, I would manage somehow or other. He promised to send it to me but it never reached me. So I too have not been able to study this Report, which contains one whole chapter on the moral aspects of Pakistan's defeat. Is it not a pity that the nation has been denied its right to know what was written in this Report? What worse calamity could befall Pakistan than its dismemberment? While the nation does

not know what this Report contains, some of its contents have been disclosed in the international press. *The Illustrated Weekly* of India for instance, (October, 23, 1988), published the following:

For sixteen years, the Pakistan government has hidden from its people the real reasons why it was vanquished in the 1971 war. For fear that it would destroy the nation's fabric forever. J N Parimoo, *The Times of India's* correspondent in Washington, recently unearthed a secret report commissioned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which exposes how a depraved military leadership betrayed the Pakistan people.

Hamood-Ur-Rehman Commission examined 283 witnesses, mostly senior army officers, prisoners of war, who were subsequently released. The Commission submitted its preliminary report in July 1972 and its final report in November 1974. When Mr. Bhutto read it he ordered that all copies of the report be destroyed. He, however, kept one copy with him, reportedly under the mattress of his bed. When in 1978, General Zia-UI-Haq's men raided Mr. Bhutto's house at Al-Murtaza, they found the only remaining copy of the report under his bed.

The report was the severest indictment of Pakistan's army commanders, some of whom had become General Zia's henchmen. The Commission of Inquiry found that Pakistan's Army Commanders and Martial Law Administrators had betrayed its people. A Xeroxed version of the report was smuggled out of Pakistan.

The Commission had recommended that Yahya Khan, the then President of Pakistan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt Gen S G Pirzada, Lt Gen Gul Hassan, Maj Gen Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be tried in public on charges of conspiring to usurp power from Field Marshal Ayub Khan and rigging the 1970 elections.

The Commission also recommended that these officers should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war, both in West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

The Commission also recommended that Lt Gen A A K Niazi, Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, Maj Gen M Rahim Khan, Brigadier G M Baqir Siddiqui, Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Brigadier Mohammad Aslam Niazi all be court-martialled. It recommended that allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness, indulgence in corrupt practices against Gen Yahya Khan, Gen Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj Gen Khuda Dad Khan be properly investigated because there is prima-facie evidence that their moral degeneration resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence.

Similarly, the Commission recommended that investigation be launched into the allegations of personal immorality against Lt Gen A A K Niazi and a number of other officers who were reported to have indulged in looting of money and property, in womanizing, while they should have been preparing plans for the defence of their country.

According to the Commission's report, one of the others, Brigadier Hayatullah, was having a good time with a number of women in his bunker in the Muqbulpur sector in West Pakistan on the night of December 12, while Indian shells were falling on his troops outside in the battlefield.

Another disgraceful episode remain unpunished to this day. A General ran away from the battlefield in East Pakistan, laying behind some nurses and his own ADC, who were supposed to come with him in the General's helicopter. The nurses were then captured and maltreated, and the ADC killed. It came as a shock to many in the Pakistan Army when Gen Zia appointed this same man as Secretary General Defence. This controversial General went on to supervise the work of the Armed Forces at all echelons, under the direct guidance of Gen Zia. In the view of many, officers, four, senior Generals (Gen Iqbal, Gen Sawar, Gen Rahim-id-din and Gen Arif) should not have allowed this to happen but for reasons best known to themselves, they, did not object.

The report says that the evidence of Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah, GOC 16 Division, Maj Gen M H Ansari, GOC 9 Division, and Brigadier Baqir Siddiqui, Chief of Staff Eastern Command, disclosed that seven senior officers in their units were engaged in large-scale looting, including the theft of one crore and thirty five lakh rupees from the National Bank treasury at Siraj Ganj.

Why did Mr. Bhutto take no action on the report?

How much did not Gen Tikka Khan know about it? He was the COAS from March 1972 to February 29, 1976. All POW cases were finalized by him. The reports after analysis used to be finalized by the Adjutant General, Maj Gen A Qureshi and then submitted to the COAS with its recommendations through the then Military Secretary i.e. myself, for finalization after my recommendations. How much did the A G Maj Gen Qureshi know? How many intentional changes were made in the reports to benefit some guilty officers? I would like to reserve further comment. I have demanded the publication of this report consistently since 1977, when the Army took over. Prior to that it was outside the scope of my duties to press for its publication.

I believe it was shameful of Gen Zia not to take action on thereport let alone fail to publish it in Pakistan Intellectual honesty demands that this report be published, even now.

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The question of accountability arose again after the Military takeover. It was discussed at one of the meetings attended by Corps Commanders, MLAs and DMLAS. Some recommendations were made. I had been an exponent of this requirement throughout my service. I had court-martialled officers and men after the 1971 war for their bad performance. I had even done so in the war of 1965 by giving my recommendations to my seniors which were ultimately implemented I had recommended to the CMLA that accountability must start from our own house. Our own constituency, as Gen Zia used to call it, should face accountability first.

During the war we had come down very harshly on subordinate commanders who lost their posts or behaved in a cowardly manner. Here was a case of the entire eastern half of the country being lost and no one being held accountable. I told Gen Zia that we must force through accountability for the loss of East Pakistan. I recommended that Gen A M Yahya Khan be tried on a very simple charge that as C m C Pakistan Army, he failed to defend East Pakistan. Guilty or not guilty? Gen Zia had agreed to this and had said that it was a very good idea It had to be a court martial.

The next question was who should be the President of the court. Could it be a four star general? The answer was no because the only four star generals in the country were the three service chiefs and the CJCSC. So should it be a three star general? It was argued and decided that Gen Yahya be tried by a two star general. Gen Zia said instead of nominating one he would like to have a volunteer. So he asked for a volunteer Maj Gen Fazle Haq volunteered. Then Gen Zia said he would inform his Chief of Staff Maj Gen K M Arif to issue the convening or o orders were issued for some day. So I asked Gen Zia what had I happened. He told me that General Haq had backed out. Then he asked me if I would like to preside over the court, I told him that I would not mind. He promised to issue the orders but he never did. As a habit Gen Zia never said "No" to any suggestion. He always said "Good idea" but he never went anywhere near a thing he did not want to do. That was an unpardonable disservice done to the Army by Gen Zia. I wish Gen Zia had issued the orders. In all fairness to the country, although Gen Yahya is no more now the trial should still be held in *absentia* so that the record is straight, and the hidden culprits unmasked.

The trouble is that we have never punished anybody at the national level. I do not propose punishment without a fair trial. But there have never been trials and people have been getting away with all their misdoings. It has been our failing that we have never punished those who were guilty of looting house breaking dereliction of duty,

inefficiency, bribery, nepotism, favoritism, etc. This is true of lapses in the Boundary Commission Force handling of refugees, rehabilitation of refugees, the Wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971, Martial Law of 1953, 1958, 1969, 1977. Partial Martial Law or July 1977 Martial Law.

In one of the meetings presided over by Mr. Bhutto with his Ministers, the COAS, the CNS, the CJCSC, the CAS and the Corps Commanders present, I had raised this issue. I said the conditions in the country were bad, with lawlessness, rioting, arson, looting rampant. I argued that people responsible for bringing of affairs to that pitch should be made accountable and punished. The only persons tried were 46 Armed Forces officers arrested on March 30, 1973 for an alleged attempt to overthrow Mr. Bhutto's government. Their motive was that the people responsible for the dismemberment of Pakistan, the ignoble surrender of the Armed Forces in East Pakistan, together with the ineffectual military operations in West Pakistan, should be exposed to legal action, or accountability.

Every one of the 46 officers was professionally efficient. A full half of them had been awarded Pakistan's medal Sitara-e-Jurat (S J) in the wars of 1965 and 1971, and they included two with S J and Bar. Two of the officers had escaped from their POW camp in India, after laboriously digging a tunnel over a period of two months. Five of this group had been awarded the Sword of Honor, and three had won gold medals for academic studies.

Many of them had been instructors in the Pakistan Military Academy, Staff College, Army. War College and National Defence College. They were among the elite of the officer corps. They were angry over what they saw as dangers to Pakistan's future, but I doubt if they really planned to stage a coup. It was more a "whispering campaign" than a plot.

The prosecution accused the officers of being guilty of believing the following:

- a) Mr. Bhutto, Yahya Khan and some other generals were responsible for the dismemberment of Pakistan. They were also responsible for the military defeat in East Pakistan and surrender or loss of territory in West Pakistan.
- b) In order to save himself, Mr. Bhutto was defending Yahya Khan and other generals, and he did not want to charge anybody, for the political and military mistakes of 1971. Instead, Mr. Bhutto appointed to high posts the very people who had made blunders, because they flattered the Prime Minister, Gen Tikka Khan was specially mentioned for the military actions he had taken.

- c) Mr. Bhutto intentionally started a slander campaign against the Army, exploiting the National Press trust. They specially mentioned H. K. Burki's concocted reviews appearing in *Dawn*, Karachi.
- d) Mr. Bhutto had adopted neo-fascist methods of ruling and governing, creating the Federal Security Force and doing everything to continue his personal rule.
- e) The country was heading for economic bankruptcy.
- f) Because of the above-mentioned points, Mr. Bhutto had to be removed for the good of the country, through military action. The action was planned between April 11 and 21, 1973.

This group of officers was tried by Gen Zia, who was directed by Mr. Bhutto to award maximum punishment. Some were sentenced to life imprisonment, the rest to prison terms varying from 3 to 14 years.

After Martial Law was imposed in 1977 I approached Gen Zia as Establishment Minister, to get their punishments remitted. He agreed and did it. Some of the ex-officers were even granted "No Objection Certificates", which allowed them to go abroad permanently. However, not one was reinstated in the Armed Forces.

Nine and half year ago, on March 30, 1980, I resigned as a Minister with the portfolios of Labor, Petroleum and Azad Kashmir.

I resigned in order not to deviate from my principles. My resignation letter read:

After an eventful and titanic struggle, a long tenure of duty in uniform comes to an end on March 30, 1980. I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to you especially having assigned me some important portfolios in your Federal Cabinet. In the course of my duties I kept the national interest uppermost in my mind. For me it was fulfillment of a long vendetta to bring out factual and naked realities to your kind notice for the sake of this country, highlighting at times various unpalatable facts on events and personalities. This attitude at times might have been disliked by you, but was certainly disregarded as a solitary voice by some of my colleagues. I feel that during my tenure of duty. I have given my best and have acquitted myself with some credit. Let History be the judge to evaluate and sift the grains of achievement from the chaff.

As a Federal Minister up to March 30, 1980 I drew my strength from the Army as a base, being a General Officer on the active list, which is the case in any Martial Law Regime. On the evening of March 16, 1980 you were magnanimous enough to offer me continuity of my job as a Federal Minister, but considering the new environment I had humbly submitted that I would like to be relieved of the responsibilities of a Federal

Minister with effect from the date I retire from the Army, which you had kindly accepted. I therefore now request the formalization of my resignation with effect from March 31, 1980. In the end I pray that may God give you the wisdom and strength to steer the country out of the existing political and economic crisis. I am certain with your dedicated efforts you will be able to bridge the credibility gap between the government and the nation.

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In 1986, I started writing for Daily Jang on accountability under the heading 'Accountability is vital for the survival of Pakistan, let us force through accountability.' My first article appeared on March 1986. I was scheduled on the same day to address the Bar at Karachi, at their invitation.

The newspaper with my article was circulating from 4 o'clock in the morning. It was read by the intelligence agencies and bureaucrats, who put it up to Gen Zia for his perusal. On reading this Gen Zia instructed Lt Gen J D Khan, Governor Sindh, not to allow Gen Chishti to address the Bar at Karachi. I was advised by my friends in the administration, police, intelligence agencies, barristers-and lawyers not to go to the Bar at 12 o'clock, the time when I was supposed to address them.

I told them that I would not change my programme. So I went at the appointed time, and was there for about 50 minutes. But I was not allowed to speak, because the people hired by Gen Zia's government created chaos, for which they were, no doubt, handsomely paid. The blame was wrongly put on the PPP, which actually had nothing to do with it. Some of the lawyers responsible were well-known to me from the time when they used to meet me as Chairman, Election Cell (1977 - 1980).

The chairman of the Karachi Bar, Shamshad Alam Lari, said that the Bar's head "should bow down, in shame at the manner in which some members of the Bar acted". (*Jang*, March 14, 1986)

This is what the independent journalist Shaziya Bashir Khan had to say on March 20, 1986 in the *Daily News*, Karachi:

Random Thoughts Conduct Most Unbecoming

"In the first place, Gen Chishti should not have been invited to speak at the Karachi District Bar because no matter how controversial he is, he is not a political figure in the sense that he belongs to no political party. But if the President of the Bar invited him, the lawyers of Karachi should have permitted the man to speak for himself rather than pelting him with tomatoes and

generally behaving like juvenile delinquents who have had a peg too many. Was General Chishti sitting on the bench which condemned Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to death? If not ... and if this is a matter of principle, then all those like him should be discriminated against because they were one and all responsible for the Martial Law and not any one person ... Why doesn't anyone dare to pelt tomatoes against them when they are invited to speak in the High Court Bar's functions? Simply because they are still in a position to strike back and Gen Chisti is not? Is this what Pakistanis are made of -- the instant one is down you kick?

Gen Chishti can by no stretch of the imagination be held responsible for the death of the late Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. If anyone can at all be held responsible for his tragic fate, it is the entire people of Pakistan who with their traditional habit of condemning anyone who is unfortunate enough to be made head of state in Pakistan, were responsible for taking him to that point in history from where he could go only to the gallows. What I would like to know is how many of these lawyers and all those who today use Mr. Bhutto's name to further their own personal interests, went to Kot Lakpat Jail to save the dying man whose death was perhaps made worse by his disillusionment in the people whom he loved so much and for whom he worked 22 hours of the day? Did anyone lift a finger to save him?

If not, what right have any of us to condemn anyone else? And condemning someone simply because he is more powerful than you are or because he disagrees with you is something which is typical only of a Pakistani.

We alone, no matter whether due to our lack of education lack of civilization intolerance and general dissatisfaction with the fact that Utopia does not and cannot exist are capable of denying everyone except ourselves the right to hold an opinion contrary to anyone else's. Perhaps because the century of Voltaire is truly gone and none of us has the greatness of spirit to say to anyone except ourselves: you may disagree with me but I will defend your right to say it with my life. On the contrary, all we are proving is that after 5000 years of civilizing influence, we are all born free and yet keep each other in chains.

This incident, shocking in the very fact that one of the most educated and respected segments of society has stooped to behavior more compatible with the idea of semi-educated hooligans and certainly not lawyers does however force one to realize that the repressed resentment of the general public has reached dangerous proportions against those they see as a threat to the democratic process of course, this in no way exonerates the lawyers in their disgraceful behavior because the essence of democracy is the freedom to express yourself and the right to defend yourself and your actions. Nevertheless, it

provides food for thought. In nine years, this is the first time people have had an opportunity to express themselves. And it is interesting that their first reaction is violence directed against any one they associate even remotely with. suppressive, anti democratic institutions"

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All those actively organizing and running Martial Law and all those who were directly connected with Martial Law, during the period July 5, 1977 to December 31, 1985 should be held accountable for the following decisions of national importance during the period:

- Why was Martial Law imposed on July 5, 1977?
- What action was taken against all those who were, responsible for creating conditions Conducive to the imposition of Martial Law?
- Why were those who held positions of importance between the period 1972 to July 5, 1977 not made accountable?
- Why were the decisions taken by the Supreme Court in connection with Elections not implemented?
- Why couldn't Gen Yahya Khan be tried for failing to defend East Pakistan?
- Why were the General Elections postponed?
- What were the functions of the Election Cell to prepare for elections?
- Why were restrictions imposed on the Courts powers?
- Why non-Party Elections?
- Why were the Armed Forces sent abroad in service?
- Why was the Constitution changed?
- Why the December 1984 Referendum?
- Why not the transfer of power?
- How was Z. A. Bhutto treated while in custody?
- Why did Gen Sawar Khan reject Mr. Bhutto's to mercy petition?
- How long did it take for Mr. Bhutto's mercy petition to reach Islamabad from Lahore.

- Why the delay of 48 hours in Mr. Bhutto execution?
- Who was in the Rawalpindi jail organizing structure?
- Why was Gen Zia the COAS on extension from March 1, 1979 right up to his death?
- When and why was Blood Money enforced?
- Why was the Minister of Law appointed as Attorney General, and allowed to practice in the courts?
- What properly did those people connected with the Martial Law regime gain, and what private funds are stashed away in Pakistani banks, or sent away abroad?
- What prompted civilians to accept posts the Martial Law government?
- Why were accelerated and out-of-turn promotions and extensions commonly given to Civil and Armed forces personnel?
- What life-long facilities have been granted to Generals. Admirals and Air Chief Marshals?
- Why was 'Black Money' issued?
- Who are the officials who received gifts and kept them for themselves instead of handing them over to the State?
- Why was State money wasted?
- Why is bribery on the increase?
- Why were those who destroyed orders, not punished?
- Since I was a minister for a while during the 8/2 years of Martial Law, I too must be accountable for many of those decisions. I gladly offer myself for accountability.

CHAPTER - EIGHT THE ELECTION CELL DIARY

The Election Cell was created on August 13, 1977 to facilitate the solution of election problems being referred to Gen Zia the CMLA, by various political parties and leaders. It was located at Corps Headquarters, Chakiala. I was appointed its chairman and the following were nominated members:

Maj Gen Jamal Said Mian
Maj gen Rao Farman Ali Khan (Rtd)
Maj Gen Ihsan Ul Haq Malik (Rtd)

It had nothing to do with the functions of the Election Commission, which under the law, was responsible for the preparation of voters lists, delimitation of constituencies, receipt of nomination papers and their scrutiny, polling arrangements etc. This cell was created only to guarantee fair and free elections and to take steps to make the atmosphere peaceful and conducive to holding elections. The CMLA was determined to have fair and free elections and the Election Cell was to help him in the matter.

While creating the Election Cell the CMLA had reiterated on the same day at Peshawar and Kohat when addressing troops. "October elections is our goal. The Armed Forces are determined to hold elections und peaceful conditions hand over to the people's representatives and revert to barracks Believe me it be the shortest Martial Law."

As far as creating peaceful atmosphere was concerned this was not only the Martial Law Government's responsibility it was also the responsibility of the citizens, political parties and their leaders For this purpose it was desirable that there should be mutual consultations between the CMLA and political leaders. The CMLA himself was so busy to find much time have talks with all political leaders as and when required. The issue was further complicated because there were too many political parties in our country. Therefore it was difficult for any one person, to talk with the leader each party individually. So it was decided that the Election Cell was to meet all people leaders and otherwise and to convey their views to the CMLA. It was expected that the political dialogue would continue in this manner. The cell s doors were open to everyone. No invitations were to be issued so that there would be no distinctions or preferential treatment. I made it clear that the Election Cell would in no way clash with the Election Commission whose job was basically administrative and not to discuss politics and the prevailing political conditions in the country with the politicians which the Election Cell could do. However the Election Cell was a non-political entity.

I performed the duties as Chairman till August 23, 1978 when I refused to be sworn in as a Minister. (for reasons explained in an chapter). The Government disbanded the Election Cell after the formation of the civilian government on August 23. As the Federal Government was also responsible for holding General Elections in the country as early as possible, this responsibility of the Election Cell was also passed on to the Cabinet

At our initial meeting, I requested the members to always remember the commitments that the CMLA had made to the nation in respect of elections. These commitments, as stated by Gen Zia in his address to the nation on July 5, 1977, were:

- a. 'Free and fair elections will be held in October this year (within 90 days), and
- b. Pakistan will progress via Islam and Democracy because Pakistan's survival lies in this.' This, concept is liked the most by Pakistanis.

Later at his press conference as the CMLA, Gen Zia said on July 14, 1977: I have to stay only for 90 days. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Maulana Mufti Malimood should keep a watch on the future. During 7 March elections nobody had Islam on top of his or their manifesto. Nizam-e-Mustafa emerged only during agitation. The masses forced it on PPP and PNA. The PM accepted it. Definite arrangements are being made to hold elections in October 1977.

The Military Council does not intend taking any action against political leaders. There will be accountability of some corrupt officials in the administrative set up but only 'big fish.' My only aim is basically fair elections but for this we need peaceful conditions. We do not want to stay for long. Not a day more after elections.

All tribunals except the Hyderabad Tribunal, which is of a special nature, have been dissolved. Elections are the sole purpose.

Presently we want an atmosphere conducive to holding elections, peaceful and with tranquility.

Elections will be held within 90 days. Transfer of power will need some time.

In his address to the nation on August 14, 1977 Gen Zia said:

I assure my countrymen again that elections will be held on due date. Elections are a means to an end, i.e. establishment of a strong democratic government. So far the politicking has been without rules but this time it would be with specified rules.

The Election Cell had meetings with many political leaders with a view to seeking their views and suggestions for holding the elections. I always insisted that the elections should be held and power transferred to the people's representatives. It was not up to the Armed Forces to run the country. Martial Law was an unnatural method of governing, acceptable as a stopgap measure. Conditions must be brought to normal as soon as possible and civil rule restored. It Was all the more important when talking, of Islam (Which is a synonym for Justice) - Justice for the individual, the nation and the Country. Imposition of Martial Law would only be justified if the purpose for which it was imposed was fulfilled, otherwise there would be no justification for it. On August 14, 1977 General Zia had also said that the Armed Forces considered the restoration of democracy essential for the survival of Pakistan, and since any person frustrating this mission was not only an enemy of democracy but, also an enemy of Pakistan, he would be administered the punishment he deserved.

I now list some of the major events which had taken place before the creation of the Election Cell.

On July 9, 1977, Gen Zia had been advised to demonetize the currency. He agreed, but did not do it. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and A G N Kazj's advice against it had prevailed upon him. Demonetization would have taken the extra financial sting away from some political Parties.

All political activity had been banned to bring the law, and order situation under control.

Gen Zia, together With Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Secretary General-in-Chief, Maj Gen K M Arif, COS to the CMLA, and I had gone to Murree on July 15, to meet the former PM and the PNA leaders who were under protective custody. Prior to this or, Gen Zia had, on his own, sent Air Marshal Noor Khan to Murree on July 13, to find out, through Sher Baz Mazari, if the PNA leaders would be agreeable to meeting him. Gen Zia had not disclosed this to me. (There were no restrictions on visitors meeting the leaders under protective custody. They also had free use of the telephone, though this was monitored and taped by the Army. Mr. Bhutto could still use all the facilities, that were his due including the services of a Military Secretary and ADC's. Gen Zia reassured the PNA leaders and Mr. Bhutto that he had no political ambitions, he had taken over reluctantly and was working for free and fair elections. Gen Zia also told Mr. Bhutto that he would win the elections. When Mufti Mahmood asked Gen Zia if he had any plans to try Mr. Bhutto, Gen Zia replied in the negative and retorted "Try for what?"

PPP leaders had been shifted from Abbottabad to Murree so that they could be made available to Mr. Bhutto as and when required. Military Council meeting held on July 18, had reviewed the steps taken till then for holding the elections and was satisfied with the progress of work. Anti state activities were made punishable with death.

The privilege of meeting guests given to the PPP and the PNA leaders under custody was withdrawn on July 19 because they were misusing it. They had tried to give a political color to their meetings, to project their political views. Their relatives could, however, still meet them with prior permission from the Martial Law Authorities. Azad Kashmir leaders viz Sardar M Ibrahim Khan, President, Mr. A Hameed Khan, PM, Sardar M Abdul Qayum Khan, Chaudhary Noor Hussain. Pir Ali Jan Shah-President AKPPP. Mr. K H Khurshid met Gen Zia in his office at GHQ, discussed future course of action and signed an agreement to have the elections held in AK in October 1977 but ten days after the elections in Pakistan.

The nation was told on July 27 by the CMLA that limited political activity would be allowed with effect from August 14. The Constitution was not abolished or abrogated. October, elections would be held under the 1973 constitution.

All political leaders under protective custody were released on July 28. Mr. Bhutto was seen off by me at the PAF base Chaklala on July 29, Gen Zia informed me that he had appointed Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khajj, a person of his choice, as Adviser on National Security. (Letter Number 57/1/CMLA dated 29-7-77)

The Election Commission announced that the elections would be held on October 18. The PNA on August 3, 1977 said the election schedule was acceptable to them. The PPP decided to take part in the elections also. The Armed Forces' role as referee was acceptable to them. Sardar Ibrahim Khan resigned as Kashmir Chief Executive of the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir but would continue as President.

On August 4, the PPP announced it would take part in the elections. That meant it recognized the Martial Law regime. Gen Zia wanted to assess for himself the reaction of the troops. I requested him to visit my formations at any convenient date. He came to Jhejum on August 4. After his visit he wrote to me that having met a good cross section of all ranks in the Division at Jhelum he had returned to Rawalpindi with greater confidence whatever we were doing to restore democracy and normalcy in the country. (GHQ letter number 17/3/COAS dated 26-8-1977).

Prince Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan arrived at Islamabad on August 8 and had discussions with Gen Zia who was assisted by Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Secretary General in Chief, Mr. Agha Shahi Secretary General Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maj Gen K M Arif, Chief of Staff to the CMLA and Mr. ShaH Nawaz, Additional Secretary Foreign Affairs. I was nowhere near them Mr. Bhutto started his election campaign on August 8 reaching Lahore by air from Multan. At Lahore he was given a grand reception. Filing of nomination papers started on August 8. The same day at Lahore there was a big gathering as public meeting in favor of PPP.

On August 9 Gen Zia had a quiet dinner with Prince Hassan at Murree. Maj Gen K M Arjf and I were also invited. We went to Murree by road traveling in separate cars. Gen Zia was to stay in the COAS's house at Clifdon and I was to stay in the Corps Commander house at the Chinnar Division Officer's Mess. Prince Hassan was staying at Government House, Murree, where the dinner was being held. We reached the COAS's house in the afternoon. I requested permission to leave. Gen Zia asked me to stay for a cup of tea. We sat on the lawn and were having tea when Brig Zafar PS(C) approached Gen Zia and informed him that Mr. Bhutto was on the line for him. Gen Zia got up and went to attend the telephone call. The conversation started nicely and politely, but gradually became harsher. I did not know what Mr. Bhutto was saying, naturally, but I could hear Gen Zia loud and clear. The conversation ended badly, as far as I remember like this:-

No. It cannot be done. I cannot give concessions. We are judicious to both sides. If we are not allowing them we cannot let you have it either. No, that stage may not come. You may never have an opportunity. I will sort it out before that. However, I wish you good luck.

When Zia came back after the telephone call, I asked him if everything was all right. He said it was nothing, only some trivial matters. I told Gen Zia that Mr. Bhutto would not make a call on trivial matters. Gen Zia kept quiet and looked upset. I realized the crack had come. I left soon afterwards telling Gen Zia that I would meet him at dinner.

The Azad Kashmir Assembly was dissolved on August 10 and elections were announced for October. Maj Gen Abdul Rehman Khan (Rtd) was sworn in as Azad Kashmir Chief Executive.

Gen Zia said on August 11 that no impediments would be allowed to be put in the way of fresh General Elections. It was felt that the freedom given to the Press was being misused.

The Election Cell was officially created two days later although it had been functioning since 5 July.

On August 15, 1977 Gen Zia said "Anti democracy elements will be dealt with ruthlessly". On August 16, Gen Zia said that if Islami Nizam had been enforced in time, the common man's basic problems would have been solved long ago. The real purpose of elections was to establish a democratic government. Those creating obstacles in the democratic process would be treated as anti-state elements. Elections would take place as scheduled. Our leniency should not be construed as weakness, warned Zia. There was no change in mission.

August 18 was the last date for filing of nomination papers. The PPP had done their planning, whereas the list, of the PNA candidates was still to be finalized.

On 21 August Yousaf Khattak met the Election Cell and recommended that elections should not be held because there were tendencies of unilateral declaration independence (UDI) in the provinces. Secession may take place after the elections. He said PNA was disintegrating. Pressure should be maintained on it so that it retains its integrity. Bhutto should be disqualified and not allowed to become PM. There were better people available than him in PPP like Khar and Jatoi.

On August 23 Gen Zia told BBC: "Some people's misdeeds will be revealed to the nation ten days after the General Elections. Mr. Bhutto should come to court and answer the allegations. Restoration of democracy will be successful." Mr. Bhutto told BBC on August 26, "If I have to appear in court I will raise some basic questions. Then the country may face a crisis of Penal Code which I do not want." (Thus he challenged the government. It was all done through BBC. My thoughts went back to the telephone conversation between Mr. Bhutto and Gen Zia.)

On August 28, Mr. Bhutto met Gen Zia for about two hours, at his own request. They discussed the future of the country, its stability and integrity and the grave constitutional danger, facing it. Mr. Bhutto insisted that impartiality during elections was vital, and that the election atmosphere would be affected if party workers were arrested on a large-scale before the elections. Mr. Bhutto also complained of a campaign of slander let loose against him by Gen Gul Hassan and said that his character was being assassinated. In this meeting Mr. Bhutto and Gen Zia undoubtedly sized each other up carefully.

When Maulana Kausar Niazi, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi met me for the first time after the 1977 Coup. Maulana Kausar Niazi told me that he was against the likely confrontation between the PPP and the Army. He thought that in order to save PPP and its leader an understanding with the Army was a must. I assured him that there was no possibility of confrontation because the mission of the Army was quite clear which was to have the elections held, in which PPP would undoubtedly win, and then to hand over the power back to Mr. Bhutto before reverting to the barracks. If the results would not be accepted by the losing parties they would be dealt with an iron fist. The Army and the Judiciary would supervise the elections.

On August 29, Haneef Ramay said that Bhutto's intention was not to fight elections but instead to have civil war in the country, the Lahore High Court Bar demanded Mr. Bhutto's arrest. Several political leaders who called on the Election Cell also said there were cases against Mr. Bhutto, and that accountability should be the first order of business, before fresh elections. Some even said that Mr. Bhutto should be arrested immediately and tried in an open court. Chaudhary Zahur Elahi said that Mr. Bhutto

had violated the Constitution and committed treason. Air Marshal M Asghar Khan also declared that Mr. Bhutto should be tried before any elections. People should know if he was guilty or not. He should be tried in an open court. For his part, Pir Pagara said the danger was not to the Pakistan federation but to Mr. Bhutto's life.

One September 1, Gen Zia in his Press Conference declared:-

It is not in Quran nor has it been revealed to me that elections will be held on October 18 and nothing will happen thereafter.....

In my Opinion the Presidential System, which is closer to Islam, is more suitable for Pakistan. I will put it up to the National Assembly on October 28 and leave the decision to the next government.

Elections are scheduled for October 18. It can be changed by a day or two on people's demand I will have no objection. Let October 18 come. You will know my intentions by then. My Government is an interim government. Everybody knows that we will hand over power to the new government on October 18. This country can be kept together by Armed Forces and not by politicians. There may be some days delay in election but not months.

Parties with manifestos against Pakistan ideology and Islam will not be allowed to take part in the elections.

By talking about the presidential form of government Gen Zia resiled from his committed stand of neutrality. I told him he should not have done this. He said it was only his person view, and really not applicable because of the impending elections. His remark that there may be some days delay in the elections was perhaps, after his brooding over the problems which Mr. Bhutto had discussed with him on August 28.

More demands were made to the Election Cell that Mr. Bhutto should be tried immediately and that the PPP should be held accountable.

Mr. Bhutto was arrested in Karachi on September 3, for murder and sent to Lahore.

On September 5 came a new proposal. Amir Abdulla Khan Rokri met the election Cell and suggested that elections should be postponed. It was not based on any selfish motives, he said. The integrity of the country was more important than elections. If elections were held under Martial Law and if the results were not accepted by the country it would lead to anarchy. There was a possibility of that eventuality. So he was against elections. He recommended that a National Government should be formed first and the Constitution amended to make the COAS the president of the country. Except for Defence, all other portfolios and power should be with the PM and elected parliament The National Government on assumption of duties should declare the

election schedule. In this manner, transfer of power to the people would be facilitated. In order to make sure that Martial Law was not imposed again, the Armed Forces should share power. We could attain democracy only through give and take.

Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayum Khan, President of the Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference met me on September 7 and discussed Kashmiri matters. Later he wrote to me that various officials in charge of Kashmir Affairs were corrupt and partisan and were likely to influence the forthcoming elections in favor of the Azad Kashmir People's Party, they should therefore be transferred. It was a well known fact that Brig Bāshir Malik, Additional Secretary, was closely associated with the election campaign in March 1975. He addressed the public meetings at places where Azad Jammu Kashmir refugees were settled in large numbers. He was accompanying Azad Jammu and Kashmir President on that election tour. He could not stay neutral or just His presence was clearly in aid of People's Party. That kingpin of the PPP for Azad Jammu and Kashmir may be removed Inspector General Police was acting on the advice of Chaudharv Noor Hussain who had bribed and blackmailed all the previous inspectors General of Police. I discussed the letter with the CMLA and necessary action was initiated as directed by Gen Zia.

On September 10, it was reported by the intelligence agencies that the tactics being hatched by the PPP High Command were a desperate mixture of rumor mongering and wild promises. The PPP planned to:-

- Start a whispering campaign against Gen Zia on the lines that he has taken money and is a CIA agent and anti-PLO.
- Say Mr. Bhutto had been released on orders from King Khalid. A warning had also been given by the Shah of Iran.
- Announce that all the land holdings over half an acre were to be distributed among the poor after the PPP forms the Government.
- Pledge to workers total control of production under the new policy.
- Promise anything to get votes. Do not worry about their fulfillment.
- Spend one hundred and fifty million rupees to buy support of village *maulvies* and labor leaders.
- Infiltrate the PNA and say that Gen Zia will not hold elections and will perpetuate his rule.
- Lie low till the election campaign starts-Thereafter strike.
- Agitate on the PNA lines, regarding asset cases. Plan to generate mass momentum.
- Make a good start on September 19 at Rawalpindi. Hire and bring in people from outside.
- Grave danger of a split in the PPP. Any, delay in elections increases risk.

- Campaign on regional lines in Sindh - emphasizing Punjabi exploitation of Sindh. Portray Mr. Bhutto as the liberator of Sindh.
- Say in the Punjab the PNA is breaking Pakistan by giving tickets in the NWFP and Baluchistan to anti Pakistan elements.
- Make speeches in the Punjab, to influence Army *Jawans* (soldiers).
- Start Punjabi exploitation bogey in the NWFP and Baluchistan.
- Develop the theme that the poor have been exploited by the rich.
- Allege that whipping and lashing sentences ordered against the PPP workers had not been executed because of fear of the PPP reaction.
- Tell workers stay contented in jails, if they feel the PPP is winning. If they led the PPP is losing, use enough weapons against the government. That would enable bargaining. Initially forgive all generals in case of a win. Later replace the COAS.
- Have a no-war pact with India and reduce the Army. Increase the FSF. Take revenge and rule as a dictator.

Reacting to Gen Zia's suggestion regarding the Presidential System, the PPP said that only Parliament and representatives of the people could decide the issue. The PNA was divided. Air Marshal Asghar Khan said the proposal deserved consideration. Prof Ghafoor said the Central Council of the PNA had given a unanimous mandate in favor of a parliamentary form of government. They were committed to elections to the legislative assembly and not to a constituent assembly.

These views of the political leaders strengthened the arguments of the Election Cell. Consequently, Gen Zia postponed his idea of changing the form of government. Instead, he concentrated on the eradication of Bhuttoism and started laying more stress on the Islamisation of Pakistan politics.

A conference was held at GHQ lecture Hall, Rawalpindi on September 13, 1977 to evolve a code of conduct for political leaders and workers. It was presided over by Gen Zia and was attended by all important political leaders of Pakistan including Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Abdul Hafiz Pirada. The Election Cell members were also present. The meeting lasted for about four hours and an agreement was reached on the conduct of political parties in the scheduled elections. Later Gen Zia held a press conference and explained the code which stated that any manifesto could be published by any political party, but it must conform to Pakistani ideology, Islam and the country's solidarity. Disturbances in law and order would not be allowed. Elections would be held on October 18. Gen Zia explained the facilities that would be given on radio and TV to all political parties.

During the conference Brig Zafar, Gen Zia's Private Secretary, tiptoed into the conference room and gave Maj Gen K M Arif a chit to be given to Gen Zia. It read. "Telephonic message from Lahore - Mr. Bhutto has been released on bail." I noticed that Begum Nusrat Bhutto, and Abdul Hafiz-Pirzada were gazing at Gen Zia. They might have guessed something as they whispered to each other and Pirzada went out. He came back after about five minutes and gave the news to Begum Nusrat Bhutto that the Court had released her husband on bail.

Lt Gen Iqbal had been ordered by Gen Zia that in case Mr. Bhutto was released on bail, he should be rearrested after he had left the High Court premises. Gen Zia wanted to know if this had happened. A chit was sent to Brig Zafar who, after sometime, reported that obviously Mr. Bhutto had not been rearrested. Gen Zia was upset and became visibly shaky, this was apparent in his conduct of the conference from then.

After the conference he asked Gen Ihsan and myself to accompany him to his office. There he asked his PS(C) about the reasons for the slip up. Brig Zafar replied that Brig Bashir, COS to Lt Gen Iqbal, had told him that they had not rearrested Mr. Bhutto for lack of written orders and fear of likely repercussions. He could be arrested any time later. On hearing this Gen Zia became livid, and said that his orders had been disobeyed.

He talked to Lt Gen Iqbal and admonished him. There was a lengthy argument. Lt Gen Iqbal, MLA Zone 'A', refused to arrest Mr. Bhutto. Gen Zia said that he would sack Lt Gen Iqbal for disobedience. He also wished he had taken action when there was that failure of command in Lahore in April. He repeated he would retire Lt Gen Iqbal. We kept quiet.

I was wondering what Zia's next move would be. Would he call off the elections, postpone them, have Mr. Bhutto rearrested or let the PPP win in the October 18 elections? He did not give any hint what he intended to do. Gen Ihsan and I left after sometime Gen Ihsan said Zia would neither sack Gen Iqbal nor go for elections. He was right on both counts.

Mr. Bhutto was rearrested on September 17 along with ten other PPP leaders, under Martial Law Order Number 12. That order could not be challenged in any court. Gen Zia also ordered that they be tried in Military Courts. He said that after going through the confidential files he had come to know that Mr. Bhutto and his colleagues were guilty of murder, and had failed the people's trust. Who gave Gen Zia those secret files; who briefed him on them? Certainly not the Army. Those files were only with the civil administration. So it must have been some of the bureaucrats who knew what was in the files, where they were located and to what purpose they could be used. Someone certainly knew how to get close to the boss.

On September 18, Gen Zia reportedly stated in an interview to *Keyhan*, the English daily published from Teheran, "I had told Mr. Bhutto that he is a murderer and a usurper." We discussed these remarks in the Election Cell and were of the opinion that such remarks would do no good. They could plunge the country into a new polarization between the Army and the PPP. (It later turned out that this interview had been concocted by an unscrupulous journalist.)

Justice (Rtd) Shaukat Ali, President Pakistan Muslim Liberal Party, met the Election Cell on September 19, 1977 and gave the following views:

- a. The country can have a stable government only if it is administered by honest politicians. Politics need cleaning.
- b. Whereas the PPP is a sinking ship, the PNA is a conglomerate of contradictory political orientations and, therefore, not capable of steering the country to a successful goal.
- c. General Elections be postponed till March 1978.

It is further suggested:-

- i. Credentials and funds of political parties be checked. Political parties which do not have roots in all four provinces should be banned.
 - ii. Encourage only those political parties which believe in the ideology of Pakistan and not in the ideology of autonomous provinces.
 - iii. Do not allow any independent candidate. They pollute politics for petty gains.
 - iv. Electoral rolls prepared by the PPP contain bogus voters while genuine ones have not been included. Update them.
 - v. Constituencies were carved out to suit the PPP candidates. Adjustments should be made there.
 - vi. Identity cards be introduced to avoid bogus voting.
 - vii. Let the PPP and the PNA tempers cool down and polarization be reduced. The PNA however is incapable of handling the government.
 - viii. Arrest of Mr. Bhutto will be hailed by all democratic quarters in Pakistan. No one is above the law. If Wali Khan, Bizenjo and several others can be tried why not Mr. Bhutto and his colleagues?
- d. The Turkish Constitution with some modifications be adopted for Pakistan.
 - e. Schools and colleges be denationalized.

- f. Denationalize ghee mills and other industries except banks.
- g. Gen Yahya be tried. He should not go unpunished.
- h. Qazi courts be established at the district level to start with.
- i. Re-enter the Commonwealth.
- j. Kashmir issue be highlighted.

All this set the stage for the trial of Z. A. Bhutto, the erstwhile PM and for the postponement of elections.

On September 23 Begum Nusrat Bhutto said in Lahore, "Our fight will continue even after the October 18 Elections. If the election gates are blocked, routes to revolution will open. No assembly will work without Mr. Bhutto." Then she swung her red scarf in the air and declared, "The people should prepare for elections and revolution. Now the sword will be used as well as yelling." This was *Bhuttoim*.

Members of the Election Cell went to Quetta on 24 September and met local political leaders. It seemed that polarization had taken place amongst Baluchies and Pathans. Most of the leaders had shown their worry about Greater Independent Baluchistan. They alleged the census had been carried out wrongly. That had affected the delimitation of the constituencies. Baluchies had been given extra rights.

On 26 September Ghulam Mustafa Khar met Gen Farman, Member Election Cell, and recommended that elections should be postponed for one year or so. A national government should be formed.

On September 28, Gen Zia presided over a meeting attended by all MLAs and Corps Commanders. Postponement of elections was considered. There were three Generals who were for postponement (Sawar, Hassan, Ghulam Muhammad). Only one of them was an MLA. The Other six Generals were against postponement (Iqbal, Arbab, Abdullah, Majid, Abbasi, Chishti) After a long discussion, Zia decided to postpone elections and insisted, "I demand loyalty."

On the same afternoon Khar, Jatoi, Kausar Niazi, Mir Afzal, Hamid Raza Gilani and Noor Hayat Noon met the Election Cell and recommended that the elections be postponed and no new date given. Martial Law must become strict, and accountability proceeded with through civil courts.

The next day Gen Zia announced that the decision on whether elections would be held or postponed would be given by October 10. Efforts would be made to investigate cases

of assets etc., by October 18, so that those who were to be disqualified would not be eligible to take part in the elections. Meanwhile, Agha Shahi addressed the UN General Assembly in New York. He reiterated the pledge of the interim government that, after October 18, power would be handed over, peacefully.

On October 1, Zia postponed elections indefinitely, explaining, "Political parties have not given their manifestos. A personality cult has replaced programmes and policies. Character assassination is taking place. There is a cry from the country that accountability should take place before elections. Holding elections under the present circumstances will be inviting a new crisis. So the elections are postponed till further announcement, to save the country from perils and people have the correct picture after accountability. I assure my countrymen that there would not be a single day's unnecessary delay in handing over power to people's elected representatives."

The people may have wanted the results of accountability first, but who were the people who were facing accountability charges? Who had given details of the doings of those people? It was certainly not the Generals. Nor was it the politicians. It was only the record holders who knew the details, that is to say, some key civil servants, all under the Secretary General-in-Chief. So the bureaucrats had won the game.

The Election Cell tried hard to create an environment in which elections could take place and power could be transferred. The Election Cell never asked any politician to make a demand for postponement of elections. Unfortunately, most of the PNA leaders, instead of demanding that Mr. Bhutto's trial be left to their government, welcomed each move against the PPP leaders. Some second line PNA leaders kept demanding accountability of the PPP leaders and workers alike. Why were people keen on accountability first, elections later?

The masses have always been cheated at the time of elections. Tall promises had been made which could not be fulfilled at any cost. It was well known that the administration had been protecting and patronizing the corrupt, and treating the peace-loving silent majority with cynical contempt. Justice had openly been denied to the people at lower levels of the system. Every citizen knew what had happened in the past regime. With this background, the people feared that if elections were held without accountability first, the same corrupt and dishonest exploiters would again come into power through the sheer strength of their money. So they felt it very necessary that there should be accountability before elections. The accountability process, they said should be restricted not only to those who were to take part in Elections, but should include all previous ministers; even chairmen and other local body appointment holders, so that no exploiter of the masses stayed in the run for elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. It was expected that by this means it would be ensured that the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies would not be monopolized by feudal lords and capitalists and the nation would be rid of the bad and corrupt elements.

Gen Zia postponed elections on the plea of accountability as demanded by the people through their spokesmen, but, unfortunately did not proceed with accountability. The Martial Law Administrators are to be blamed for that. There was no retrieval attempted of ill-gotten wealth, no control of administration, and corruption and injustices only increased.

The Election Cell had recommended to Gen Zia not to postpone elections because the postponement would lead to destruction of the morale of the Army, despondency, despair and uncertainty. Delay in elections would misguide the nation to become anti-Martial Law Regime, it advised. Thereafter the Election Cell came under attack.

On the other hand, a whole range of arguments were used by several people to prevail upon Zia to postpone elections. They belonged to such political parties who would never have a chance to be in the government. They told him:

- a. He was never recommended to be the COAS. He became the CMLA because he was the COAS. So God had made him and so he was answerable to God only. God wished him to impose Islam in Pakistan and to lead the Ummah Islamiya.
- b. They had dreamt that they were doing '*Tawaf*', (circumambulation) at the Grand Mosque of Makkah and he was leading in front.
- c. People wanted to be ministers without shouldering any responsibility (In Martial Law the responsibility is only that of the man in uniform-overall responsibility of the CMLA).
- d. People wanted to exploit the situation for financial benefit.

It was however wrong to say that right from the first day as COAS, Gen. Zia had ulterior motives, or that he was merely, buying time as the CMLA on the pretext of accountability and introducing Islamic Laws.

The Election Cell met with the CMLA on October 2 as desired by him Zia was upset because he thought I was very popular. Before the assembled senior generals. Zia said the other Corps and Division Commanders were jealous of me. He told us that Gen Farman and Ihsan were spent forces. He showed anxiety and lack of confidence in us. The reason was that we were against postponement of elections. I suggested that he disband the Election Cell. We could not do extra work when there was a lack of confidence. He requested us to carry on but in a "diplomatic manner".

He called us for another meeting on October 3. This time I saw Gen Zia alone before the meeting. I explained the unhappiness of Gen Farman and Ihsan at this criticism of them.

I also explained my behavior, and assured him that I was keeping myself in the background. I was not a Martial Law Administrator, no was I meeting the Press, foreigners or anybody else. So why should the MLA's be jealous of me? If it suited Gen Zia, I would go on long leave, a posting abroad or even retire. Then Gen Zia explained to me the current opinion about the alliances and the likely grouping in the Army. The names that were linked were Shariff and Iqbal, Sawar, and Jilani, Arbab and Hassan Zia and Chishti. Zia said I was in the habit of pressing points strongly. Their ultimate adoption gave the impression that I was to domineering.

On October 6, I was supposed to go to Risalpur for the PAF Passing Out Parade along with the COAS, but I decided not to go. The Election Cell called on President Fazal Elahi Choudhary. He thought Gen Zia should become the President and form a national government. A few impartial political leaders should be co-opted. His experience since 1935 indicated that the country was not yet fit for democracy.

The members of the Election Cell by now felt frustrated because our advice was not being adhered to. We thought immediate steps must be taken to establish image and credibility through a national government. Law and order should be strictly enforced. Prices of ghee and cement should be controlled. Local Body elections should be held as soon as possible. If there was no value of the Cell it should be disbanded.

On October 30, Gen Zia declared, in Kuwait, that Pakistan's Armed Forces have no political ambitions nor did he want political benefits. The objects of the Armed Forces was to hold fair elections. Problems could only be solved through political government.

On December 4, Gen Zia repeated in Quetta "Elections will be held 60 days after accountability is completed. When accountability would be completed I cannot say. The Armed Forces role is to defend the country. We desire no power. Our survival lies in Islami-Nizam." (Zia had switched in five and a half months from democracy to Islam. Why? Who had been brainwashing him? Not the Election Cell).

And on December 9, 1977 Gen Zia again said addressing the Pakistan Jurist Council Lahore. "I had said on July 5, 1977 in front of the nation that Martial Law is a curse on the nation we should hand over the government to the people. On 21 December Gen Zia told the Press. If circumstances demand PPP can be put under restrictions (banned)".

Gen Zia then assigned me the responsibility, as Chairman Election Cell to analyze the prevailing political situation in the country, and to recommend a course of action which should be adopted. Consequently, a political analysis was prepared and sent to him vide my Corps HQ letter No G4562 dated December 26, 1977. It was subsequently readout on December, 29 on the CMLA's instructions at a conference in which the following were present:

Gen Zia ul Haq	COAS and CMLA in chair,
Lt Gen M Iqbal Khan	Corps Commander and MLA Punjab (Zone A)
Lt Gen Sawar Khan	Corps Commander and MLA NWFP (Zone B)
Lt Gen Jahanzeb Khan	Corps Commander and Arbab MLA Sindh (Zone C)
Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan	Corps Commander and Khan Advisor National Security
Maj Gen Ghulam Muhammad	GOC Quetta and Incoming MLA Baluchistan (Zone D)
Maj Gen Abdullah Saeed	GOC Outgoing MLA Baluchistan
Maj Gen Riaz Khan	Acting DGISI
Maj Gen K M Arif	MS GHQ & COS to CMLA
Brig M Younas	P S To COAS

A verbatim copy of the analysis is given below:

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Background

1. Martial Law was imposed on the country on July 5 1977 due to a state of lawlessness in the country. The political parties had failed to reach an agreement and there was a deadlock in the political negotiations. The aim of Martial Law as announced by the CMLA was twofold. Firstly to disengage the political parties to end the state of deadlock and secondly to hold elections within a period of 90 days.

Expectations

2. Prior to July 5, 1977, the situation had deteriorated so much that the public clearly condemned the continuance of the PPP government and considered that the solution to the problem lay either with the PNA or with the Armed Forces. Thus Martial Law was highly applauded. However, the public expected a conventional Martial Law with an inherent firm and tough attitude which were the characteristics of past Martial Law Governments. The expected improvement in the essential aspects of day-to-day life i.e. reduction in the cost of living, improvement in law and order situation etc. This did not materialize thus very soon a state of disappointment set in and the people expressed the reasons as democratic or benignness of Martial Law instead of expected conventional Martial Law experienced in the past.

Prevailing conditions

3. Important characteristics of the current political atmosphere are that:

- a. Martial Law is not supreme law It is under the Judiciary. With this status, where there is a combination of Martial Law and Judiciary, the situation is not clear cut and Martial Law has lost much of its inherent impact.

- b. The law and order situation has deteriorated. The Police and Civil Administrative machinery has been ineffective in dealing with the situation either due to inherent intentions or genuine inefficiency.
 - c. Corruption has increased.
 - d. Communication between the masses and the government is lacking. Hence lack of confidence in the Martial Law Government.
 - e. The Public feels that the country is being ruled by bureaucrats who were responsible for the failure of the Ayub, Yahya and Bhutto regimes and will also bring the current government to a failure.
 - f. The slate of the economy is far from satisfactory - The reasons may be:
 - i. State of uncertainty in the Private Sector, who are shy of investing money.
 - ii. The foreign capital is not forthcoming due to the present government being an interim one.
 - iii. Labor and industrial problems have not been solved in their entirety.
 - g. Certain long term measures are being undertaken by the Martial Law government. i.e. First Five year Plan. This is contrary to the repeated assurance by the Martial Law Government to hand over powers to the elected representatives at the earliest. People have serious doubts now regarding the Martial Law being extended over a longer period. This is not liked by the people.
 - h. There is a considerable credibility gap. The people do not have a desired degree of faith in the commitments made by the Martial Law Government. In the Army, the subordinate ranks are losing faith in the higher echelons of command because of the repeated changes and contradictions in the directions of National Affairs.
 - i. The attitude of Russia is hostile. They may create a critical economic situation and thus help socialists/pro-communist forces.
4. In the present situation, non-PPP politicians are unhappy because there is no progress in the political field and they are losing ground with the masses. The PPP politicians are lying low because time is in their favor.
5. The public is not happy because Martial Law is not up to their expectations.

6. Internationally, the situation is not favorable because of the martial law government being an interim one.

Elections

7. The following parties have a following in all the four provinces of Pakistan:

- a. PML.
- b. PPP.
- c. TIP.
- d. JI

8. The following parties are strong in the provinces as indicated against each and have a negligible influence in other provinces:

- a. NDP. Frontier and Baluchistan;
- b. JUL Frontier and Baluchistan, and
- c. JUP Punjab and Sindh.

9. All political parties favor early elections after completion or partial completion of the accountability process. However the PPP and the JUP hold the view that the elections need not wait for the finalization of accountability.

10. All political parties expect that the elections will be held in 1978 and any effort to postpone the elections beyond 1978 will not be welcomed. Instead it may open the way for politics of agitation. The Supreme Court in its decision on the case of Begum Nusrat Bhutto versus the Chief of Army Staff have also indicated that the elections should be held as early as possible, indirectly, implying that the law of necessity will not hold good if elections are not held in the shortest possible period. The elections may therefore, either be held before the monsoon season or during the latter half of 1978.

The following factors must in favor of holding elections before the monsoon season:

- a. Power must be handed back to the elected representatives of the people as promised by the Martial Law Government.
- b. A permanent Government will be in to deal with the poor economic conditions.
- c. Maintain the credibility of the Armed Forces who are committed to hold elections at the earliest.
- d. Internationally the effect of holding early elections will be highly favorable.

11. Elections in the early part of 1978 should be so held that the elected representatives are integrated in the planning for next year's budget. The elections should, therefore, be completed by April 30, 1978.

Political Aim

12. Hold fair elections and transfer power to elected representatives of the people before May 1978.

Implications

13. The process of essential accountability must be completed before the elections. Undesirable elements should be disqualified under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) at the earliest. Cases pending in the courts or to be filed in the courts may continue but the elections should not be delayed for their finalization. The Constitution should be amended to authorize remission of sentences in these cases by the President only.

14. The Hyderabad Conspiracy case should not be withdrawn. It should continue either in the tribunal or any other court of law, but the finalization of the case may be expedited. The Tribunal or Court may even drop the case. Those acquitted should then be allowed to contest the elections, if otherwise not disqualified under the EBDO.

15. The Martial Law Government should encourage political parties having a satisfactory influence in all four provinces. It may also give guidelines which will help in providing a dependable, patriotic and stable government to the country.

16. Political affairs in the country must be controlled and guided by a group of experts located in HQ, CMLA. No decision should be made by the Martial Law Zones independently.

17. The law and order situation must be improved through a firm grip. The announcement of elections may create a state of ineffectiveness in the civilian administrative machinery which must not be allowed.

18. A Ministerial Council at the Centre should immediately be appointed to take care of various departments and also establish an immediate rapport with the masses.

Political Parties Act

19. As an immediate measure, there is need to issue a Political Parties Act which should include:

- a. All political parties to be registered.
- b. Alliances between various political parties should be allowed.
- c. Manifestos of each party be vetted by the Supreme Court to ensure that these are in line with the ideology of Pakistan.
- d. No party should be based on religious sect.
- e. Elections be held on the basis of adult franchise.
- f. Elections to the Senate should be through direct voting and for this the minimum educational standard of voters, should be Matric. The elections to the Senate should be held within six months of the General Elections. The Senate should be given some more powers under the Constitution.
- g. The restriction of two years on retired Government servants for contesting the elections as candidates should be removed.
- h. People in the Tribal Areas be given Voting Rights.
- i. Each party should declare to the government as well as to the public the source of Party Funds.
- j. Crossing of floors from one Party to another Party after having been elected should be prohibited.
- k. There should be no Independent candidates.

Constitutional Amendments

20. The Supreme Court in its verdict (Page 5 *sub para* 3a), has accepted the amendment to the Constitution by the Martial Law Government under the law of necessity, and in the interest of the general public. The following amendments are recommended:

- a. The Political Parties Act should be supported by a constitutional amendment.
- b. All politicians disqualified under the EBDO by the Martial Law Government, or debarred due other reasons now or by the previous governments must not be freed from the restriction of taking part in the election before the expiry of the disqualification period. A Committee comprising the following should be appointed through a constitutional amendment to ensure its implementation and if necessary review the cases of disqualifications under the previous governments.
 - i. President of Pakistan.

- ii. The Chief of Army Staff.
- iii. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
- iv. Attorney General

Recommendations

21. The summary of important recommendations enumerated above is as follows:
- a. The elections must be held not later than April 30, 1978.
 - b. A Ministerial Council to be formed at the Center to look after various departments on the basis of short term planning which should be subsequently integrated with long term planning.
 - c. The country must be administered with a firm hand until the elections.
 - d. The process of EBDO (Elected Bodies Disqualification Order) must be completed at the earliest.
 - e. Constitutional amendments as given in *para* 20 above should be introduced.
 - f. The Political Parties Act should be promulgated at the earliest. The time schedule of elections should also be issued.
 - g. Political guidance should be given to ensure the emergence of a capable, patriotic and stable government as a result of elections.
 - h. All political guidance and control should be vested in a group of experts in HQ CMLA.
 - i. The Hyderabad Conspiracy case should be decided through a court, of law.
 - j. Martial Law Government should refrain from introducing long-term reforms which should be left to the elected government.

On February 18, 1978 Air Marshal Asghar Khan demanded a firm date for elections be announced immediately. The PNA leader Wali Khan said the process of accountability could be completed within two months provided the cases of corruption against the political leaders were entrusted to military courts for trial. Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan suggested early elections in Azad Kashmir, and said the process of accountability in Azad Kashmir may be given up if it could not be taken on correct lines.

However, Gen Zia was markedly more negative about elections by the end of February.

"Steps taken on July 5, 1977 were not taken at any body's behest nor to please anybody. Its responsibility falls on me. I am not answerable to any political party. I have to answer to the People of Pakistan and God. Interim government is finished. I will hold elections when I see that the results will be positive. God has given us the opportunity to throw the bad blood out of Pakistan. Elections is a political process but not something without which we cannot digest our food. Forget about elections till I see that the results will be positive."

(Gen Zia's address to Jirga at Sibi February 23, 1978)

CHAPTER - 9 ELECTIONS: YES OR NO?

On March 8, 1978 in my capacity as Advisor to the CMLA for Establishment I attended a meeting presided over by Gen Zia, CMLA. The Chief Election Commissioner, Secretary Election Commission Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Maj Gen K M Arif COS were also present. The meeting was called to discuss various important matters connected with the elections. After discussions, the following decisions were taken:

1. There would be separate electorates for minorities with multi member constituencies.
2. Each Province should be the constituency for separate electorates, for both the National and Provincial Assembly.
3. The minority seats in the National Assembly would be increased from 6 to 8, with the Punjab and Sindh getting 3 each on the basis of population and Baluchistan and the NWFP getting a minimum single seat each. The Provincial Assembly minority seats population. There would no reservation for any community within the minorities.
4. Each minority elector would have a single, non-transferable vote.
5. The question of a separate electorate for women is shelved.
6. Fresh electoral rolls should be prepared for the whole country. The general rolls and the rolls for the minorities should be prepared simultaneously, but primed separately. Any person who would attain the age 21 by January 1, 1978 would be enrolled as a voter.
7. There would be general and fresh delimitation of constituencies. It was pointed out that it may take one year.
8. The notification of August 7, 1977 calling upon the constituencies to elect their representatives would be rescinded, but the date of issue of the notification would be informed to the Election Commission.
9. The CMLA would take such action as he may consider appropriate for the association of political parties with the preparation of fresh rolls and delimitation of constituencies.
10. Chisht would be incharge of day-to-day operations of the Elections inquiry Committee headed by Brig Nayeem.

As political activities were banned in the country with effect from March 1, 1978 for one month (under MLR No 33), the Election Cell considered it appropriate to hold parleys with various political parties to assess the political situation and to determine the next political move by the government before expiry of the ban on political activities. There were three main questions before the Election Cell:

1. Should the elections be held in the near future?
2. In case the current political situation was not considered conducive to holding elections at an early date, then what should be the form of government until the elections were held? The views of the political parties on the formation of a National Government, with representation from political parties, were also to be solicited.
3. What were the views of the parties regarding the restoration of political activities?

Consequently, the Election Cell, met the PML (Pagara Group), NDP, JI, TIP, Pakhtoon Khaw NAP, on March 16, 1978; PPP, JUP, PDP March 18, 1978; AJ&K Political Parties i.e. Muslim Conference, Azad Muslim Conference, Liberation League, JI (AK) and PP (AK) on March 21, Maulana Mufti Mahmud contacted me on 14 March 1978 and informed me that all component parties of PNA would like to meet the Election Cell as one body and not as individual parties. So it was decided that PNA would meet the Cell on 18 March, 1978. Maulana Mufti Mahmud undertook the responsibility of informing all the parties in PNA. NDP could not be contacted by him and it came on 16 March. JUP also did not come as PNA but met the Cell separately.

A summary of the views of these political parties and the recommendations of the Election Cell, were sent to Gen Zia by my Corps HQ letter No 905 1/7/MI/P of March 20, 1978. Excerpts from this summary are given below:

Views

The National Democratic Party were of the view that:

The elections should be held after the process of accountability was over. The limit for completion of accountability could only be assessed by the government. The NDP would wait till that time. (The general impression gathered was that it may take anything up to three years to complete the process).

Till the elections, the ML authorities should run the government with a moral firm hand. (The NDP was neither in favor of a politically represented National Government nor would it like to join such a Government). Restoration of political activities may or may not be restored depending upon the reaction to the announcement of judgment on the murder case against Mr. Bhutto.

To speed up the process of accountability, Military Courts may be empowered to try the cases.

In the provinces, acting Governors be replaced by permanent incumbents who should also be provincial MLAs.

The competency of most of the members of the Advisory Council was not satisfactory.

The government must clean up the civil administration of officials having a pro PPP leaning.

Why Taimur Shah Jomezai, Yousaf Khattak and Aslam Khattak were invited to the briefing conferences by the CMLA.

There is a need to improve upon the communications between the government and the public. District Boards be revived with nominated members.

The government must pay, more attention to the provision of basic amenities to the common man, i.e. foodstuffs, law and order.

The Tehreek e Istaqial Party's views were:

Elections must be held as early as possible without waiting for the completion of the process of accountability. The public expects elections in October November 1978 The date of elections must be announced at the earliest.

Till the elections ML should run the government (The TIP was neither in favor nor would it join a National Government because it is not in the interest of the country).

Ban on political activities must not be extended beyond March 31, 1978. Party elections, which is an indoor activity, should be allowed.

The process of accountability was unsatisfactory.

ML has lost a lot of ground in the field of credibility. People have started feeling that the Armed Forces will not hand over power to a civil government. This impression must be dispelled by making an announcement at the earliest regarding the future course of national policies and then by sticking to it.

Aslam Khattak and Yousaf Khattak invited to the CMLA briefing conferences had no standing.

Bureaucracy must be screened to eliminate po-PPP officials who shared responsibilities in the promotion of policies of the PPP government.

The selection of most of the members of the Advisory Council was not satisfactory.

The government must concentrate on the basic issues affecting the common man.

The process of accountability by the ML government should be confined to certain selected persons.

Work on updating electoral rolls should start immediately.

The question of separate electorates should be left to the next elected assembly and so should amendments to the constitution.

The NAP (Pakhtoon Khwa)'s views were:

Elections must be held at the earliest. The public expected elections any time before November 1978. An announcement must be made at the earliest.

The administration must be run by the ML authorities with a more firm hand. They were not in favor of a politically represented National Government nor would they join it.

Ban on political activities should not be extended beyond March 31, 1978.

The government must take special efforts to create a better atmosphere of credibility.

The competence of some of the advisors was not satisfactory.

Electoral rolls must be updated and this work should start straightaway.

The Pakistan People's Party faced some internal problems and after discussion it was considered advisable not to meet any PPP faction. However, during informal talks with those who attended they expressed their desire to cooperate with the government in any way the latter wished.

The Pakistan National Alliance wanted some time to offer a reply. There appeared to be no unanimity of views. But the state of uncertainty in the country, the need for the date of elections be announced at the earliest and the need to revive political activities before March 31, 1978 were mentioned. So was dissatisfaction with the selection of some of the advisors.

The Jamiat i Ulema i Pakistan felt that:

Elections should be held at an early date. An announcement to the effect be made at the earliest to end the state of uncertainty.

A politically represented National Government was not necessary.

Ban on political activity should not be extended beyond March 31, 1978. It is indirectly helping the PPP. The statements of the PPP leaders before the courts continue to be published in the newspapers.

A speedy disposal of cases of accountability should be ensured.

The process of accountability should be confined to a few and must not take more than six months.

Bureaucracy should be screened to eliminate pro-PPP elements.

Mr. Bhutto must be tried for treason in a Military Court.

The state of communication between the government and the public is not satisfactory.

Recommendation by the Election Cell:

There are two options before the government in order of preference:

1. Early elections, not later than December, 1978.
2. Elections in 3 to 5 years. Till then form a National Government to govern the country.

Option 1: Early Elections

Excepting the NDP and some other parties belonging to the PNA (final decision yet to be conveyed), all other parties have favored this option. The Election Cell also feels that this is the best option under the circumstances. Elections must be held as soon as possible as promised and power handed over to the elected government. The limiting factors may seem to be too many, but early elections can be held and the country saved, provided the following steps are taken:

The month of elections be announced on March 22, 1978 by the CMLA. The Election Commissioner must then work out a programme and set in motion the election machinery. This will help in ending the state of uncertainty and reestablishing the credibility of the government.

The procedure of disqualification in respect of politicians should be changed. The decision should be taken by the CMLA himself after taking into consideration the entire spectrum of the political situation and national Interest. If desired the Election Cell may be consulted in the list of disqualified announced latest by April 20, 1978.

Political activities should be allowed after March 31, 1978 in a planned progressive manner. Timely announcements are required to ensure smooth action.

A political parties Act should be published before March 31, 1978 to ensure a disciplined political development in the best interests of the country. The details can be worked out by the Election Cell.

Till the elections, ML must be enforced with a more firm hand. No lawlessness can be accepted.

The government must pay special attention to economic conditions. The basic necessities of life must be made available at reasonable prices even if subsidization is required.

The press should be carefully guided and supervised to ensure a peaceful atmosphere. Permanent ML officers be posted down to the district level. Appointments of Deputy Corps. Commanders, Deputy Division Commanders may be necessary in some cases.

Certain constitutional amendments will be required to protect the actions taken by the ML regime so that these are not undone by the elected government. These amendments, when required, can be drafted by the Election Cell.

Option 2 Elections after completion of Accountability

Some political parties, in particular the NDP, favored elections after completing the process of accountability which may take more than three years. If it is decided to postpone the elections, it will have certain inherent disadvantages it will widen the credibility gap with the government. There may also be a strong internal and external reaction. However, holding of elections in the existing chaotic political situation may fail to produce a viable and stable government and the country may face yet another crisis. There is, therefore, a requirement to create an atmosphere of confidence and stability, rebuild national institutions badly damaged in the last couple of years and finally hold elections. How soon can the desired atmosphere be created? How can the government's credibility be established? How can agitations as a reaction be avoided? How can the foreign reaction be made favorable? These questions may be given serious thought. The following steps are recommended:

A National Government be setup to run the administration of the country under the CMLA. Preferably, members of the cabinet should be first tier leaders or, in exceptional cases, second tier leaders of the political Parties. These leaders should enjoy a good reputation in the country. Most of the parties, however, are not willing to join the government as it may seriously damage their image in the public and may well be the end of their political life. The majority of them wanted the government to appoint capable and efficient technocrats, including the senior officers of the Armed Forces as ministers. A *via media* can, however, be found by picking the cabinet in consultation with political parties.

There should be no bar on members on the cabinet contesting the next elections. However, the government will be required to resign three months prior to elections.

The National Government should function under the umbrella of ML. The uniform must remain in the background and act as an invisible force.

Governors of the provinces should be permanent and also act as MLAS. They should be members of the Armed Forces. The provinces should be administered through Governor's rule. Back up support for internal security can, be provided by local formations.

A long term ML should gradually be civilianized. The Armed Forces must get back to their professional duties at the earliest and must on no account be exposed to civilian duties for a long time. This is true for the senior as well as junior leadership and men. They should be kept away from undesirable attractions as well as political influences. The protection of the Army from adverse effects, keeping them professionally oriented and ensuring their loyalties to the government is necessary. This must be ensured and for this there will be a requirement to post a separate, whole time COAS or Dy COAS who should solely be responsible to run the affairs of the Army. Yahya-Hamid arrangements may be taken as a guide.

In case, this option is adopted, the Constitution will have to be suitably amended and political parties disbanded. These steps have certain inherent implications which must be examined before deciding on this option.

Selection of Option

Events are moving fast, therefore a decision must be taken quickly as to which option should be adopted. If this is not done, events may go out of control. The government has banned the political activities till March 31, 1978 and it is recommended that the announcement regarding the selection of option be made before March 31, 1978 preferably on March 22, 1978. The state of uncertainty must end. A bold declaration by the recommended with each, option are ensured. The Election Cell may be given an audience by the CMLA to personally explain both the options. It is also recommended that the selection of option be decided by the CMLA in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Corps Commanders. The Election Cell, however recommends Option 1. i.e. Elections at an early date.

We had a meeting of the Election Cell on March 27 to deliberate how to reduce the number of political parties in the country. It was decided that a process of evolution through successive elections was desirable. It was also necessary, that newspapers should perform the role of opinion-makers, and their views should help in nation building.

Meanwhile, Gen Zia was going his own way. On April 8, he told at the Sindh Governor's reception in Sukkar. *"We can have elections even today but elections are only a means. What is the use when its results are not positive? In the political process, attention*

should be paid to the foundation first. Elections should first be held at the grass-roots level. So, I have my attention more towards villages and towns. Therefore we are paying our attention to Local Bodies Elections. We should become Muslims in a true sense." He more blatantly betrayed his ulterior motives in an interview to BBC, televised on April 12, 1978. He said: *"There is some hand, the hand of providence, perhaps, which is helping me out, and if I am the man who it appears God has chosen to do something for Pakistan, and if He gives me the strength. by God, I will do it"* (Times of India 14-4-1978).

I knew well whose words these were. Soon after the imposition of Martial Law in the country, there was a reception in Gen Zia's house. We were sipping soft drinks on the lawn. A gentleman approached me and said: "Mashallah, what a graceful look! Handsome personality. Completely Islamic outlook. Son of the soil" and whatnot.

I told that gentleman, "We had a professor in our college at Ferozepur by name Nand Kishore. He used to teach us English in degree classes. He used to say, "My dear children, the best weapon in the world is sycophancy, and when you tell someone, 'Sir, you are never flattered', you have done it." So I said, "Brohi Sahib, I still remember the words of my worthy professor. You may try it on the Big White Chief; he will love it."

It seems he did.----- and with great success!

Several politicians who met the Election Cell that April also felt that elections should be delayed. There were others who felt that a National Government --- a combination of various political parties, technocrats and military men -- should be formed.

The question of a National Government was discussed in detail in the meeting held with the CMLA on April 15. The issue of a National Government was first raised by the Election call in a meeting with the PNA leaders on March 18, 1978, the Election call started that the present regime had, after taking into consideration all aspects of complaints and difficulties raised by the PNA delegation before the CMLA at the meeting held on March 4, 1978, proposed that the PNA should share responsibility in order to solve the problems of the people. After the briefing session of political leaders, on March 4, the CMLA had a prolonged meeting with leaders of the PNA the same evening in which, besides members of the Election Cell, MLAs of all provinces also participated. The PNA leaders had a free discussion on various national issues including a programme for elections, accountability and problems of the people. After the March 18 meeting, the Election Cell invited the PNA leaders for another meeting on March 22. The PNA said that Kausar Niazi should not be included in the National Government, but would make a definite decision on the question of joining the proposed National Government prior to their second round of talks with the CMLA. The PNA said it had accepted in principle the proposal to form a National Government without any rigid preconditions but would not join any government, which "Kausar

Niazi or anybody else associated with the tyrannies of the Bhutto regime are included." The PNA wanted the Army to maintain status quo. It did not want Presidential rule.

Katisar Niazi divulged on April 22, 1978 that Mr. Bhutto had plotted his assassination. He revealed Mr. Bhutto's plans to get him and Ghulam Mustafa Khar murdered in Sindh and also claimed that Pir Pagara had been targeted for assassination in Punjab. Mr. Bhutto's aim had been to sow deep discord between Sindh and Punjab which would enable him to play the role of a peacemaker.

The proposal to form a National Government of all parties ran into difficulties not only because members of the PNA resolutely opposed any PPP representation in such a government, but also because of rivalries between the PNA members. There was a general ineptitude displayed by the PNA for playing the political game. They were nervous and doubtful about their own ability to handle the intricacies of day-to-day administration. Their failure in the field of administration would lead to their being discredited in the eyes of the people, who would eventually turn against them.

The Election Cell kept insisting that the proposed government should include all parties including the PPP in order to make it fully representative, because we were neutral. The PNA leaders were averse to becoming partners of the PPP after they had launched an intense struggle, rejecting in the process Mr. Bhutto's offer of some form of partnership. Meanwhile, Maulana Kausar Niazi, in a letter, to the CMLA, had withdrawn the PPP's offer to join the proposed National Government because Maulana Multi Mahmnool and some of his associates were extremely allergic to their joining it.

The government now gave a directive to the Election Commission to start work on the preparation of fresh electoral lists and fresh delimitation of constituencies. It would take nine to ten months to complete the task. (This was contrary to the advice of the Election Cell because it meant one year's delay in general elections) On May 7, 1978 Gen Zia said that political parties and their manifestos would be registered and their sources of income declared and subject to audit. No political party should be anti Pakistan.

Mr. Justice (Rtd) Shaukat Ali sent the following suggestions in writing on May 16, 1978. There was no political party in the country which could poll a majority of votes at the centre and in the provinces. The situation in the NWFP, Baluchistan and Sindh was far from satisfactory and parties with a regional parochial outlook could emerge victorious and thereby create complications for the country Steps should be initiated to evolve a strong national party with its roots firmly planted in the masses.

Coming to the polls at this juncture would be tantamount to asking the nation for its verdict for a further division of the country. No Patriot who subscribes to the ideology of Pakistan would ask for elections now except those politicians who are power crazy, however short-lived that power may be.....

The Election Cell should co-opt four additional civilian members one from each province then prepare the ground for general elections. These members would start working for the evolution of a strong political party in the country through the meetings with people from all walks of life (That was not our game).....

Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the NAP being tried with 90 others on charges of activities against the State was granted general amnesty. I had recommended to Khan Sahib that he should not accept general amnesty, he should seek vindication through the court so that his honor was restored. He had agreed. Why he eventually accepted the amnesty and what transpired between him and Zia, I cannot say.

On June 19, 1978 Gen Zia briefed Keng Piao, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China on the internal situation in Pakistan and said:

The PPP had entered power through the backdoor with ulterior motives since 1968. They also had a gang of four Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mumtaz Bhutto Hafiz Przada and Nusrat Bhutto. Through their polemics they set tenants against landlords, students against teachers, employees against the employers, labor against industrialists, and people against the government. Mr. Bhutto had not listened to Chou En Lal's advice that Pakistan was not to disturb social systems. He ignored this advice. He thought he was the only one with brains. Mr. Bhutto dealt with political opponents in a cruel manner. The present case was that of a civilian murder. The present government had nothing to do with it and was not associated with it. Mr. Bhutto had got 36 political opponents murdered. Definite information was available about seven cases He had adopted crude methods had unnatural acts done to some enemies, and had also got girls raped. Mr. Bhutto told Dr. Ghulam Hussain to work in the party or face crude measures. Dr Ghulam Hussain stayed, outwardly loyal but inwardly scared and disloyal.

Mr. Bhutto had no elections held within the party. He talked about democracy but in fact was a butcher of democracy. He rigged the elections under a set plan. He had rehearsed this plan in 1975 in Azad Kashmir. He got political leaders physically thrown out of the National Assembly because of political differences. His sole aim was to have a one party rule - his own political party rule which was undemocratic. He wanted to establish an autocratic rule forever. He misused government money although officially he was drawing 'No Pay'. He and his family wife and children bought a lot of property which the poor country could not afford. There was a mass campaign against him by the people from January 7 to March 7. Agitators faced bullets unique in Pakistan against Mr. Bhutto and his regime. We supported him and his government because the Army was reluctant to enter politics. We did not know his doings.

From March 9 to June 1, 1977 we urged Mr. Bhutto to agree for fresh elections. Two weeks warning was given to him to resolve the issue. He had suggested. Take over if the PNA wins. Have Martial Law, I will help you.

We took over on July 5 and ordered elections in 90 days. After taking over we realized we had a wrecked economy. There was no production. Exports were low. Foreign exchange was so low that it could last only 90 days. It seemed impossible to exist. So I had to change the date of elections. I ordered accountability for their misdeeds.

Mr. Bhutto's case is a private case. We will let it go through the normal process of law. The Supreme Court has given the verdict in the Nusrat Bhutto case. If we had not taken over, Pakistan would have been ruined. There would have been civil war or neighboring unfriendly countries would have walked in. Mr. Bhutto's case is in the High Court and Supreme Court. Both are independent. The sentence can be retained, commuted or set aside. Clemency can only be exercised by the President who is bound by the advice of the CMLA. Law is the same for everyone, but as the highly placed are more responsible there should be greater punishment for them. Unfortunately it is not the case.

Mr. Bhutto was leaning towards Russia. How could he go to Russia and not to China? Mr. Bhutto had said China could not give Pakistan anything because of her own commitments. So Russia was the only answer. Gaddafi had talked to Tito who in turn talked to Brezhnev, who confirmed that Mr. Bhutto could come for talks. But before he could hold talks with the USSR, the Army took over. The Generals decided that China's friendship could not be abandoned.

I explained to Gaddafi that Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Syria have oil and gold. What do we have? What do we give? Russia never gives anything free Will Gaddafi give us gold? No. The Chinese are our sincere friends. They have given millions of dollars, and help in the 1965 War with India and moral support in the 1971 War. We cannot desert China That is our foreign policy.....

Since July 5, the economic situation has improved. Your arrival has removed despondency and demoralization. We tried to help Afghanistan on your advice, so that she can have friendship with Pakistan. But Daoud leaned towards Russia. Young Afghan officers were being trained in the USSR. What can Afghanistan do?..... Money alone cannot defend a nation. I know we should pay attention to basic needs, i.e. water, food, education, health, electricity, development etc but I say security comes first.

It was quite a long homily on regional politics and national policy. On June 20, all the PNA parties except the NDP decided to join the government. The Muslim League also decided to join, whether any other party joined or not. The PNA parties had to submit the names of their party representatives on June 21, but Maulana Mufti and Nawabzada Nasrullah put up four additional demands which included calling off accountability process against Sardar Qayum. No decision was given on the points raised by the PNA. It was decided that if the PNA did not join, Martial Law would administer the country on its own. The Muslim League, ignoring all other parties, joined the government.

Gen Zia in his address to the nation on June 25, 1978 said:

The formation of civil government does not mean that we have deviated from our objective. Our basic purpose is still to hold elections. You may remember I had declared to hold elections within three months in my first speech. That was a reflection of my true intentions and feelings. I had sacrificed my personal pride when I postponed elections and ordered the process of accountability. The Military Government had no political designs on July 5, 1977 neither do they have such designs today nor will there be any in the future. Our object is to hold fair and free elections in which all parties will have an equal chance.

It is our earnest wish that elections should be held as soon as possible, so that power can be handed over to the people's representatives. Democracy is not the name of only national and provincial elections. It should, start from enrolment of party members and elections within parties so that any leader or a party which boasts of democracy demonstrates its commitment Don't we have political parties in our country who have never had election within their ranks?

Next elections, instead of a joint electorate, will be on the basis of separate electorates. Separate voter's lists will be prepared. Present voters' lists will be reviewed. Limited political activity would be allowed after three months, with Local Bodies elections to be held by the end of 1978 on a non-party basis.

Maulana Noorani and Air Marshal Asghar commented that the non announcement of election dates had frustrated people's expectations. Maulana Mufti said that the PNA would support the government but no PNA representative would join the cabinet.

There were some MLAs and Generals against the inclusion of Chaudhary Zahur Elahi in the cabinet. The President, Fazal Elahi Chaudhri, was also against him because of a personal family feud. Gen Zia informed the Muslim League that Chaudhary Zahur Elahi could not be taken as a minister. The Muslim Leaguers refused to join the cabinet without him. Gen Zia thought he would be losing face if the Muslim League did not join. He talked to me and said the main hurdle was the President, who was not agreeable at all.

I requested Fazal Elahi Chaudhri, the President of Pakistan, to grant an audience to Chaudhary Zahur Elahi to iron out the differences, he declined. I talked to him again, and finally he agreed. So I sent Chaudhary Zahur Elahi to meet Fazal Elahi Chaudhry. They met and reconciled. Gen Zia was satisfied. I also talked to the MLAs and Generals who were against Chaudhary Zahur Elahi, and convinced them to accept him. After lengthy arguments they all agreed and the Cabinet was finally formed on July 5, 1978 with the following main objectives:

- a. To take steps for Islamisation.
- b. To create conditions for holding elections as soon as possible.

- c. To improve social life in the country.
- d. To produce internal cooperation within the country and to enhance prestige abroad.

It was a 22 member cabinet (17 ministers and 5 ministers of state). All ministers were to take precedence according to alphabetical order. I was also made a minister, and the portfolios allotted to me were Establishment Division and Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas.

Gen Zia clarified in his press conference the same day that the three service chiefs would also attend cabinet meetings in view of their appointments. The Military Council would stay. Gen Zia said that his colleagues were answerable to three powers -- God Almighty, their conscience and the next legislature. Limited political activity was to be allowed after three months. Local Bodies elections were to be held by the end of 1978 on a non party basis.

Gen Zia formed this Cabinet to save face, because the requirement was for a National Government and we had been working for it. Maulana Mufti considered the Muslim League's decision to join the government as an "Objectionable Act". Fairness of elections became doubtful if they were to be held with Muslim League ministers in office. It seemed that Gen Zia's "positive results" really meant the return of the Muslim League to power. The formation of the Cabinet indicated a definite loss of neutrality, towards the political parties.

CHAPTER - TEN COMMITMENT OR COVER-UP?

Maulana Kausar Niazi met me at the Chinese reception at Islamabad On the evening of September 30, 1978 and asked me if he could visit the Election Cell office the next day to discuss some important matters with me. I told him that our doors were always open to whomsoever wanted to meet us. So he met me on October 1 and his points as given below, were sent to Gen Zia (vide my letter 2197/DO/-PA dated October 1, 1978.):

- a. Overall situation in the country, is not frightfully happy.
- b. Cabinet Ministers are skeptical about the functioning of the Cabinet and feel that under the circumstances they will not be able to produce results.
- c. It will be advisable to ban political activities, dissolve the present Cabinet, activate the Military Council and dispense with four provinces by creating a federation of 15 to 16 provinces.
- d. Law and order seems to be slipping out of the hands of the administration.
- e. There is too much of leaning towards orthodox Islam which is construed as a danger to Islam, by Deobandis, Shias, Christians, Ahmadies Communists etc., who do not advocate adherence to orthodox Islam.

Mir Afzal Khan, a former minister of the PPP, met me on January 21, 1979. He brought some very interesting points to my notice. According to him, while he was travelling by PTA from Karachi to Rawalpindi, Begum Nusrat Bhutto deliberately occupied a seat next to him and told him:

- a. Mr. Bhutto would not be executed. To give full authenticity to her statement she said if that happened, she, was prepared to be shot. She further reiterated that the Judiciary had been influenced, and a number of foreign heads of states had already given full assurance that no harm would come to Mr. Bhutto.
- b. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the President of the UAE, would continue to stay in Pakistan till such time as Mr. Bhutto's case was decided. Gen. Zia had promised the President that Mr. Bhutto would not be hanged.
- c. Riazul-Khatib, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, had requested his government that he should be withdrawn from Pakistan. However, King Khalid had ordered him to stay till Mr. Bhutto's case was finalized. The King had assured the ambassador that Gen. Zia had promised that Mr. Bhutto would not be executed.

- d. There existed a simmering discontent within the Army and very soon Gen. Zia would be removed from the scene by one of the generals, who was constantly in touch with the PPP. Therefore, dark clouds of uncertainty would soon disappear.
- e. The PPP would continue its policy of confrontation with the Army and the Government junta. They were perpetually being pushed to the wall and hence had no other option.

According to Mir Afzal Khan Hafiz Pirzada had a keen desire to meet Gen Zia.

I sent this information divulged by Mir Afzal Khan to Gen Zia in letter No. 9015/71ML/P dated January 22, 1979, along with the following recommendations:-

- "a. As far as Begum Nusrat Bhutto's utterances that certain foreign Heads of States have assured the safety of Mr. Bhutto, it appears a canny scheme and well thought out propaganda to sustain/provide cohesion to the Party and to confuse the general public. To ascertain its correctness, Provincial Governments could be instructed to Verify it through their own intelligence sources.
- b. As far as a coup in the Army is concerned, it is baseless speculation by the PPP. All the generals are with the President and the loyalty of the Army is beyond doubt.
- c. Negotiations with the PPP seems to be a lucrative idea. We should adopt a neutral stance and exchange views with all parties. Saner elements within the PPP with a balanced approach should be encouraged.
- d. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto are more rabid than Z.A. Bhutto. The support which they were receiving from the PPP warrants constant vigilance.
- e. Hafiz Pirzada's offer/conjecture can be evaluated in its correct perspective and a suitable response initiated as desired by the President."

Maulana Kausar Niazi visited me on January 23, 1979 and with his political finesse made the following points:

- a. The nation was highly incensed and worried about the judgment in Mr. Bhutto's case. In case the death sentence was passed, he felt, the Government was likely to come under incessant pressure to which it might succumb.
- b. After the Supreme Court decision, the Maulana stated prophetically, there would be a new surge towards the manifestation of fresh alliances between the political parties. The PNA was likely to break up owing to a split in the Muslim League. The PPP might also join some other party/group.

- c. He hoped that the date of elections would be announced before the decision was taken in the Supreme Court. There would be abysmal chaos if the schedule was given afterwards. It would then be tantamount to a concession given under pressure.
- d. Government should adopt a neutral stance by shedding the PNA. Ministers from the Cabinet.
- e. Mr. Bhutto, in all probability, would refer his case for review once the announcement was made. During this period maximum pressure would be generated for his release both from within the country and from abroad.
- f. In case Mr. Bhutto's death sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court the PPP was likely to disintegrate and join the Progressive Group. In that eventuality even the henchmen of the Party would capitulate. It would thus prove a plus factor for the Government,
- g. After the recent parleys with the President, the PNA was giving the impression that Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan had been virtually absolved of his charges pending before a Tribunal.

All these points were made out to Gen Zia by me in my letter No. 2197/DO/PA dated January 24, 1979.

Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan visited me on February 4, 1979 and in his guarded and noncommittal style made the following points which were conveyed to Gen Zia vide my letter No. 2197/DO of February 5, 1979:

- a. Sardar Sahib highlighted his dual responsibility as Secretary General of the PNA and President of the AJKMC. (Apparently this was intended to convey his importance and authority, and also to explain his difficult position, being required to steer a course protecting the interests of both the parties).
- b. He disclosed that during a recent session, the Muslim Conference had given him full authority and mandate to negotiate with the PNA and to take any decision he deemed appropriate, and that he had prevailed on his Party members that they should agree to:
 - (i) Continuance of Brig M Hayat Khan as the Chief Executive of Azad Kashmir.
 - (ii) Appearance of Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan before the High Court Tribunal.
- c. He recommended that purely for expediency and to save face, Sardar A Qayyum's case should be tried by the Supreme Court and not the High Court Tribunal.

- d. As a personal favor I should meet Sardar A Qayum Khan so that the existing misunderstanding could be removed in the overall interest of the Party and the Government.
- e. Provision and legal position for the appointment of a serving Brigadier as the Chief Executive of Azad Kashmir be examined.
- f. A few cases in which ex-parte decisions were taken by the tribunals should be reopened/reconsidered.

His party and he himself believed in extending full cooperation to the government and the Army.

Sardar Sikandar was informed by me that it was not possible for the Government to change its stance every day. Hence Sardar A Qayum Khan would have to appear before the High Court Tribunal. However his right to appeal before the Supreme Court could be examined. I conveyed my willingness to meet Sardar A Qayum on any convenient date. Gen Zia was informed accordingly.

Anwar Aziz, a former PPP Minister, called on the Election Cell on August 6, 1979. His views were:

- a. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto are the mainstay of the PPP, otherwise here was nothing in the party.
- b. Extreme confrontation existed between the Army and the PPP. He considered that this confrontation would not only lead to the destruction of the Army and the PPP but would also throw long shadows on the integrity of the country. In that traumatic process the Army was likely to suffer the most, as no army can stand against the will of the people.
- c. Apparently we were heading for a head on clash. Therefore, to save the country radical steps must be taken immediately.

Thereafter he gave the suggestions given below in his capacity as a Pakistani citizen, and not as a member of the PPP.

- a. Local Bodies Elections should be held as soon as possible. He thought that the basic unit should be at the village level and the Council should be at Tehsil and not at the District level.
- b. All political parties should be banned and general elections held as soon as possible on no-party basis.

- c. To reduce friction, the President should appoint his deputy in the form of a DCMLA or COS who could start negotiations with the PPP. Currently the party was not inclined to have parleys with the ML regime.
- d. To defuse polarization Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto should be tackled with more care and respect. Constant pressure on them would further harden their attitude and may enable them to gain more popularity amongst, the masses.
- e. All tribunal cases should be finished and individuals allowed to contest elections on a non-party basis in November 1979, if not earlier.

Anwar Aziz's views and suggestions were sent to Gen Zia vide my letter No. 2197/DO/PA dated August 8, 1979.

Maulana Ghulam Ullah met the Election Cell on August 9, 1979 and raised the following points:

- a. The political situation had deteriorated and the PPP was likely to emerge successful in the General Elections. In that eventuality, religious and pro-Islamic forces would suffer a great setback. He expressed his unequivocal opinion that under those circumstances no elections should be held. If the PPP wins there would be no Islam and no Pakistan.
- b. He expressed dissatisfaction with the attitude of the PNA leaders who had adopted an unrealistic attitude and were forcing the government to hold elections. He was critical of Maulana Mufti Mehmood's stance.
- c. He strongly advocated that the prices of consumer goods must be reduced and controlled. It would help in restoring the image of the ML regime.

His views were conveyed to Gen Zia vide my letter No. 2197/PA of August 11, 1979.

Khawaja Khairuddin of the Muslim League Chattha Group met the Election Cell on August 11 1979 and emphasised the following points:

- a. Holding of elections on November 17, 1979 would be tantamount to the destruction of the country.
- b. The country was not well administered. The law and order situation and price control left much to be desired. There existed a state of discontent and despondency. The nation was looking for a change.
- c. In his opinion the Muslim League could not unite as long as Pir Pagara remained President. An ideal arrangement would be for Gen Zia to accept the Presidentship of the Muslim League.

These views were conveyed to Gen Zia vide my letter No 2197/PA of August 12, 1979.

On October 21, 1979 Mian Muhammad Akhtar Pagganwala wrote to me that he had been abroad recently and had met a lot of Pakistanis there. They were of the view that banning the political parties was a good step in fact it should have been done earlier. There should be no elections until the economy of the country was built up and people got relief from high prices caused by inflation.

It was the aim of the Election Cell to force Zia's hand if necessary, over the point of setting a date for General Elections. We wanted the nation to know we had done our best. As part of a prearranged, plan we three generals plus one unofficial member (co-opted by Gen Zia) had decided that I on behalf of the Election Cell should strongly press in my speech before the Local Bodies Convention a scheme which amounted to a *fait accompli* against Zia.

Our strategy was to put pressure on Zia forcing a confrontation, even though it was an indirect one. We had decided that the three hundred-odd assembled councilors of the Local Bodies Convention would elect on the spot twenty of their members to form an interim Cabinet, charged with the specific mission of getting democracy restored as quickly as possible. The onus was thus, on them. They were, after all, the duly elected representatives of the people. Why should they not elect among themselves the Ministers?

I had also suggested that we should help the councilors to come to a decision fairly rapidly about the twenty members to form a Cabinet by a rather simple means: closing the doors of the building, laying on plentiful supplies of drinks, but at the same time arranging to have toilet facilities out of order. They would be stuck there until they came to a decision.

I thought we had an understanding between ourselves Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali Khan (Retd), Maj Gen Jamal Said Mian and I plus Mahmood Haroon, Minister for the Interior and prominent industrialist. But at least one of the members of the Election Cell must have leaked our plan to Zia, because not only was the Local Bodies Convention abruptly brought forward and convened in my absence, without any explanation, but I was prevented by my trip to Canada from attending the Convention, and as it turned out, no time was even allotted in the proceedings for the Election Cell members or even any spokesman from the ministries I was responsible for, to speak. The *fait accompli* was Zia's not ours.

First of all Zia met all the political leaders of the defunct political parties in the National Assembly building where the Local Bodies Convention was to be held. During these meetings, important political and international matters were discussed, including the

latest events in Afghanistan, relations with the USSR and USA etc. Zia appeared to take those national leaders who met him into confidence. They included Pir Pagara, Mian M Daultana, Abdul Qayum Khan, Abdul Wali Khan, Mian Tufail Muhammad, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, Professor Shah Farid ul Haq, Khawaja Muhammad Safdar and Chaudhry Zahur Elahi. All in the absence of the Chairman, Election Cell!

What Zia told them was later mentioned to me by Chaudhary Zahur Elahi. Zia wanted the Islamic *Khalifate* (caliphate) revived. He wanted to be the head of an Islamic State. Islamisation and a Majlis Shura-in which the nation would be represented and which would be completely in line with the Islamic system-were what he was eager for. Some of the assembled politicians advised Zia not to do it, but to revive the Senate and run the country till elections were held. The Senate could be used as a platform to express different ideas on the national affairs.

All sessions of the convention were presided over by Zia. More than 300 councilors attended. All four Governors, Federal Ministers and Senior Civil Servants also participated. Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq, Local Bodies Minister J. S. Mian, and Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi in their speeches spoke of the country's economic conditions, the councilors' powers and duties and foreign affairs. The councilors put forward their own problems and proposals to solve them, with the main theme being the situation in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion, the numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Pakistan's defence potential. There was no mention of the restoration of democracy or future elections.

After a *coup d'état* it is obligatory for the Armed Forces officers executing or supporting the coup to give a helping hand to the new ruler, the CMLA, in administering the country. Why is it that democracy-loving civilian politicians volunteered themselves as ministers? It was only sheer selfishness.

The veteran Sindhi politician Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi had agreed to become the Prime Minister of the interim government in February 1980. I made him meet Zia in February, and everything seemed resolved. Then I was sent off to Canada, on what turned out to be a fool's errand, and on my return everything had changed. Zia was completely in the clutches of the fundamentalists and other selfish and unprincipled advisers.

A national government composed of representatives of all parties was to be the first stage of the long awaited transfer of power to a civilian government. The Martial Law government had invited all political parties to join a National Government (April 1978). It was the need of the hour. The uniqueness of the experiment was undeniable. The National Government was to come in under the aegis of Martial Law.

Although the wrong doings of the PPP in office were the main factors in making necessary the imposition of Martial Law, the PNA politicians defying the PPP regime cannot be absolved of some responsibility for ushering in Martial Law. But now whatever had been agreed between Mr. Bhutto and the PNA could be implemented under a Martial Law. National Government as a Supreme Executive Council. Instead of a Council of Advisers it would be a Cabinet Constitutional guarantees demanded by the PNA and not given by Mr. Bhutto could be granted through the National Government under the umbrella of Martial Law. Election work the main issue when the Army took over could thus be completed.

But bitterness between the parties was so intense that this scenario did not succeed. The PNA refused to sit with the PPP in the envisaged National Government. The PPP thought it better to depict itself as the oppressed and the Army as the usurper. The PPP tactics were to fight as the underdog against the Army so as to regain the people's sympathy. So initially neither the PNA nor the PPP wanted to combine in a national Government.

When the Army got rid of the PPP and started the process of accountability, the Military Government seemed ethical but if the PPP would now sit with the PNA in a National Government it would be a farce or so the PNA claimed. To us in the Armed Forces this would not be a farce because we were neutral. Those who wanted to join or not join would do so of their own accord.

When "accountability before elections" became Zia's slogan, a National Government became an absolute necessity. Internationally it would have been better than a military government. The Election Cell started meeting with political leaders, inviting them to join in the National Government. I requested politicians to cooperate fully for the good of the nation.

Some political leaders had recommended that this projected government be installed on July 5, 1978, the first anniversary of what they described as "Mr. Bhutto's fall". Gen Zia had even agreed to it. Cabinets were to be formed both in the centre and the provinces. This was intended to fill the vacuum which existed between the people and government, due to the absence of cabinets. The ministers were to have full authority, and were to fly flags on their residences and cars, a practice which Mr. Bhutto had stopped.

Gradually Martial Law was to fade out, and power be transferred with ease to civilians, the general aim being to restore democracy quickly. At the time when negotiations were going on with the country's political leaders, the Lahore High Court condemned Mr. Bhutto to death. Some people thought a National Government was being formed so as to get rid of Mr. Bhutto. They refused to appreciate the fact that there was a set procedure after the High Court judgment which would not be circumvented, but their

doubts remained, because they were created by the PPP, the party naturally most interested. (The procedure involved was Mr. Bhutto's appeal to the Supreme Court and, if applicable clemency appeals to the Governor of Punjab and to the President of Pakistan).

Talks followed from March to June 1978. The PNA insisted that the National Government should be only of the PNA parties, with the PPP declared unaccountable. The PNA leaders said they would not compromise and accept the PPP without Mr. Bhutto. At one stage, Zia had offered, in Peshawar and Faisalabad, that if the PNA amalgamated as one party, he would hand over the government even without elections. I requested Mufti Mahmood to announce a shadow government but he could not do it.

The Election Cell visited Karachi and Hyderabad to meet the political leaders to discuss the National Government. Its formation would have been useful for the impending budget, and it would have facilitated the transfer of power. On May 23 and 24 the PNA General Council met in Lahore. Mufti Mahmood is believed to have written to Zia after this, confirming acceptance of the proposal for a National Government. Zia never showed that letter to me, nor did he make any mention of the PNA's acceptance.

Unfortunately, the sincere efforts and good intentions of the Military Government were interpreted by some as its weakness. The idea of forming a National Government did not seem workable, and the emphasis shifted towards a coalition government.

Parleys with various political leaders took place on June 14, Mufti Mahmood, Prof Ghaffoor, Mian Tufail, Chaudhary Zahur Elahi, Maula Bux Soomro, A.K. Brohi, Gul M. Jozegai, Gen Abbasi, Gen Farman and I were present when Gen Zia openly requested cooperation. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was not present. Talks were due to follow on June 16. They continued for three hours with Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Ashraf Khan present. They finally agreed to form a coalition government with each party to give the names of its candidates for ministers.

But it was not to be. On June 25, 1978 Zia addressed the nation on TV and declared that the National Government idea had been dropped. He said Pakistan had many politicians but very little politicking. He meant the rival politicians were divided in their opinions on the formation of a National Government and sharing power with the Martial Law administration till such time as elections could take place.

Zia said that he would appoint the cabinets in the centre and provinces on his own. Association in his cabinet of persons picked for talent would give him the opportunity to serve Pakistan better, and also speed up the process of accountability so that the necessary conditions for free and fair elections were created.

The very, next day Pir Pagara said that if Zia included any Muslim Leaguer in his cabinet, the Muslim League would not take any action against them. Perhaps Martial Law, the PPP and the Muslim League could get together, but Zia was averse to the idea. Other politicians, Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Maulana Noorani, were against any National or coalition government being formed. Of all the parties in the PNA, the Muslim League joined the government first, without even consulting the other partners in the PNA, the cabinet was sworn in on July 5, 1978.

Parleys with the PNA, however, continued. Mufti Mahmood was not certain if the PNA ministers would be able to do anything in the cabinet. He ultimately agreed to cooperate, though, on two conditions, firstly that the elections be held sometime in 1979, and secondly that steps be taken towards Islamisation.

Though the Federal Cabinet was formed on August 23, 1978, the Provincial Cabinets were not formed. It was agreed between the PNA and Gen Zia that A. K. Brohi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi would not be retained as Federal Ministers. But Zia insisted on retaining Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi as Minister. I decided to quit because Zia was not fulfilling the agreement. I had laboriously worked out with the PNA. Then Zia asked, "*Murshid*, what face would I show to the nation when my own generals, refuse to sit as ministers?"

I replied. "It is very simple. You simply tell the nation that you are civilianizing the Cabinet. It would go down as a credit to you, and not as a discredit. The only persons who would curse you would be Gen Hassan and Gen J. S. Mian".

CHAPTER - ELEVEN WHO KILLED ZIA?

On August 17, 1988, at about 5 pm local time, I was sitting in the living room of my, son Hamid's villa in Dubai, listening to my grand-daughter Janevi's musings, when the telephone bell rang. It was Zafar Iqbal Chaudhary, Managing Director, Bank of Credit and Commerce (Emirates). I had known him since 1970 when I visited Abu Dhabi as a leader of an Inter-Services delegation to assess training requirements of the Abu Dhabi Armed Forces. He informed me in a choked voice that Gen Zia-ul-Haq had died in an air crash near Bahawalpur. Some other generals and senior officers were also with the President in the aircraft, but he did not know the details.

I was sorry to hear the news. I was aggrieved but not shocked. It was tragic but not unexpected. I was mentally prepared to receive this news ever since 1983, when I had warned, in a press interview, that his prolonged stay in power together with unstable economic conditions in the country would lead to political assassinations. Even he was certain of his impending, violent death. He was always worried about his life and would not even sleep at night. He preferred to go to sleep after his morning prayers. He would not trust anybody with security and safety arrangements. But in the end all these precautions did not work. In his characteristic manner, he thought it safer to have a crowd of VIPs with him, violating all protocol and safety precautions. He took the innocent with the guilty. May God bless their souls.

Who killed General Zia?

The Pakistan Air Force Hercules (C-130) had taken off routinely from the airfield, climbed to about 5000 feet and then suddenly burst into flames, killing Gen Zia and 29 others, including US Ambassador Arnold Raphel and Brig Gen Herbert Wassom, the Chief US Military Attaché. Circumstances strongly suggested sabotage but there is no proof that murder was committed. Unfortunately, many people wanted him dead. He had no friends. He had become friendless because of his own doings. He had stabbed his friends and well-wishers one by one, increasing the number of his enemies. He constantly lived with the fear of a sudden unnatural ending to his life.

Such an end was foreseen by many students of history. Only a few days before the air crash, Gen Muhammad Azam Khan, in his last open letter published in Pakistani newspapers, had warned him to immediately resign from both civil and military appointments and to hand over to the people's representatives by election through the Supreme Court, arguing that this was the only way for him to survive and that he had only a limited time to accomplish that.

I wish he was alive. I wanted him to live, so as to face the nation, and to be accountable to it for all that he had done and for all that he had not done. Perhaps every well-wisher of Pakistan thinks the same way.

Did he deserve the death he got?

He died in the same manner as those who got killed in the Ojhri Camp blast. God has his own methods to dispense justice. May God be merciful to them. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) said that one should pray that Allah may not put one through an unnatural death.

I did not accept Gen Zia's death as the result of an air crash. I interpreted it as murder, a political assassination. Since then I have read the condensed version of the main report of the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry into accident of C-130 BS No. 62-3494 on August 17, 1988. It states that the accident was most probably caused through the perpetration of a criminal act or sabotage. The Board also recommended that an investigation be ordered to determine the perpetrators of this criminal act of sabotage. The government has so far failed to provide an answer as to how it happened and who did it. Every Pakistani and well-wisher of Pakistan would like to have an answer to these unsolved mysteries. It seems that the government is shirking its responsibility by just saying that it was an act of sabotage and if at all anybody knew the truth he has opted to remain silent.

I will try to analyze the matter, as my national responsibility, so that things are seen in their correct perspective. That might also help to keep the record straight. Unlike our national policy, which has been to keep the people ignorant and in the dark, whether on the still unsolved assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951 or the fall of Dacca.

I am not preaching what I myself do not practice. I believe in public and speedy enquiries. An incident took place in 1979 when I was Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources. At about 10 pm I was informed telephonically by Masih ud Din, Secretary, Ministry of petroleum, that one of the rigs at the Tut oilfield had caught fire and that we had suffered heavy loss of life and material. I was shocked to hear that, because to me it seemed nothing but an outcome of complacency and dereliction of duty. I instructed the Secretary to provide all help, and relief, charter an aircraft to take me to the site in the morning and to arrange for Press and Television representatives to accompany me. I would leave the Chaklala Airport at 6.30 am with all officials connected with oil drilling.

When I reached the airport the next day the Secretary told me that the television team, journalists and the staff from the ministry were ready to go but he recommended that I should not take them with me otherwise the whole world would come to know what

had happened and we would get a bad name I told him that the rig at the oil field was not anybody's personal property. It belonged to the nation and the nation had the right to know the truth. Instead of the rumors reaching the people would like the truth to reach the people and that too through the official sources. So I took the whole contingent with me and we reached the oilfield.

Everybody was given the opportunity to go around wherever he wanted to go ask questions from whoever they wanted to ask and assess the things for themselves. Before leaving the place I gathered the oilfield staff to address them offered my sympathies and condolences and promised to do for them whatever was required of me. A journalist asked what action would be taken against the people responsible for the accident, I told him that I would order an inquiry and then take action in the light of the findings and recommendations of the inquiry. On this the journalist said sarcastically. An inquiry means cold storage. I asked him to explain his point and he told me that whenever the government had ordered an inquiry it was interpreted that the matter had gone into a deep well and that the outcome would never be known. I assured him that it would not be the case with me as it had never happened that way in my profession of arms. I asked him to wait and be patient and talk to me after twenty days. I ordered the inquiry got the findings and recommendations examined them and ordered necessary action. Some were dismissed demoted transferred some increments of pay were stopped while appropriate compensation was paid to the next of kin of the deceased and others who deserved it. All this was done within the stipulated period in fact before the target date fixed. As luck would have it before the expiry of twenty days I met the same skeptical journalist at the airport when I was going to Lahore and asked him if he had heard about the outcome of the inquiry. He said very sheepishly that it had happened for the first time. I told him that I had never been a minister in any of the previous regimes.

Reverting back to the inquiry ordered to find out about the circumstances in which the Hercules crashed and to apportion blame, the report has already been submitted to the government. The condensed version of the main report, retaining the original investigation and analysis of the accident along with the Board's findings and recommendations has been published. Yet the nation does not know the key answer as to why it happened and who did it, or through whom it happened. Is it because with the passage of time this matter too would settle at the bottom of the deep well?

The government has been calling the crash an accident, most probably caused through a criminal act of sabotage. I label it a political assassination. Who was responsible for that accident? Certainly some of those whose duty it was to protect the aircraft and the crew. They could not be ordinary civilians, but were Armed Forces personnel and people on the payroll of the Ministry of Defence. From both the Army and the Air Force, in uniform and in civvies. Those who had failed to discharge their duty were guilty of negligence and dereliction of duty. The C-130 aircraft could only be approached

through these people. There could not be two opinions about that. Someone has been used as a pawn, as a tool, as a means to that crash, either voluntarily or bought by money, but by whom? That is the question.

In my opinion, the main culprit of the "accident" is Gen Zia himself. His policies and actions brought affairs to such a desperate state that the nation had to suffer a loss of twenty-nine very valuable lives. Zia had a long, list of enemies. His killers could be any of the following, or a result of collusion between some of them.

- a. **The USSR.** The Russians had complained bitterly about his support to the Afghan Mujahidin. The Soviet Government had repeatedly accused Zia of violating the Geneva peace accord. Only two days before the crash, the Kremlin had warned that Pakistan's obstructionist policy *vis-a-vis* the Geneva accord on Afghanistan could not be tolerated.
- b. **Afghanistan.** Zia's death was going to give an immediate and important benefit to the Afghan government. The crash also killed Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman who planned the clandestine policies and played a key role in shipping supplies to the Mujahidin. The WAD agents in Pakistan are the prime suspects. In any case, the Afghan regime was likely to do anything that Moscow asked it to do.
- c. **India.** A long-time foe, Pakistan's oldest and most bitter enemy. It had long-standing border disputes and fears of the nuclear programme of Pakistan. India also has been accusing Pakistan of stirring up Sikh extremists on the Indian side of the border. Only days before Zia's death, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had warned that Pakistan would have cause to regret Its behavior.
- d. **The USA.** It had its own interests. If Zia had lost his grip, a change of face was desirable. The US Ambassador and the Defence Attaché may have fallen prey to courtesy. They could not refuse a ride with Zia. Washington knew by 1988 that Zia could not last much longer as Pakistan's Chief Executive.
- e. **Iran.** The Shiite minority in Pakistan thought that Zia espoused the wrong brand of Islam. Earlier, their leader Allama Arif Hussain al Hussaini was assassinated, and some of his followers had blamed the crime on Gen Zia and his supporters. They wanted the Islam of Khawaja Mueen ud Din Chishti, and not Wahabism. Ayatollah Khomeni had never granted Zia an audience, in spite of all his efforts.

- f. **Political parties of Pakistan.** Zia kept promising democracy but never delivered it, choosing instead to impose Islamic Law. Some were against the imposition of Islamic Law, complete with public flogging and the curtailment of women's rights. Dissolved Provincial and National Assembly members were not all that friendly either. Domestic opposition parties were after his blood. There had been an attempt on his life in 1982 by trying to shoot down his plane with a surface-to-air missile. Fundamentalist Muslims were also against him because Zia had failed to impose Nizam-e-Mustafa. Most of the politicians considered his eleven and a half year rule as repressive, leaving behind nothing but death and mortgages, hunger and unemployment, exploitation and discrimination, drugs and corruption, heroin and Kalashnikovs.
- g. **The Pakistani Armed Forces** could not be above suspicion. There had been an attempted coup against him in 1980. Whatever device was used to disrupt the controls of the Hercules could not have been used without the active cooperation of one or more members of the Armed Forces. If the device was activated . through remote control, it could be from the ground or from the air, housed in a light aircraft, fighter aircraft or a helicopter. There was a lot of difference between a Chief of Army Staff and a Deputy Chief of Army Staff or a Vice Chief of Army Staff. After seeing the retirement pattern of the Deputy and Vice Chiefs of Army Staff, nobody could ever imagine or think of becoming the Chief of Army Staff in Zia's lifetime.
- h. **The Ahmadis.** The venom that Zia let loose against this minority had made them his arch enemies. They had shifted their head office to the United Kingdom.
- i. **Relatives** of men and women and children who died in the Ojhri Camp blast did not want him alive on personal grounds.
- j. **People** who had suffered at his hands because of intellectually dishonest decisions taken by him on promotions, appointments and retirements in the civil service, armed forces, judiciary and other services.
- k. **Relatives** of those whose mercy petitions he had rejected, and especially those whom he had promised that nothing would happen to, as well as relatives of those who were shot by government agencies on his order and policies.
- l. **Some idealists** who always thought that Zia was improperly dressed and got the uniform disgraced by letting his daughter wear it.

One can keep adding to the list if one had the patience, but at this stage I would like to make some observations about the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.

- a. The Board of Inquiry had a US technical assistance and advisory team comprising six USAF officers. I wonder why it was necessary from the very start of the inquiry proceedings. Our own air force officers are certainly equally good, if not better in professional competency. In this inquiry, God knows how many national matters would have been discussed which the foreigners had no business to know. Does this mean that we have no self-sufficiency and sovereignty in our own affairs? Referring the matter to them at a later stage as a consultative body would have been a different matter. Such dependence has lowered our prestige internationally. We should respect ourselves and be responsible and answerable to ourselves in national matters. Internationally there are no friends or enemies. Every country has its own ulterior motives. We should safeguard our own interests.
- b. Why were so many VIPs on board one aircraft? Who was responsible for this? It was widely assumed that the Russians and Afghans were after Zia's blood for supporting the Afghan Mujahidin. Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman was arranging the supplies of weapons to the Mujahidin, and Ambassador Raphel was providing much of the weapons as the US representative in Islamabad. Why were these and other key people traveling in the same aircraft? Where and when could there be a better opportunity for political assassination than this? Was it Gen Zia's doing or was it completely accidental?
- c. The aircraft was at Bahawalpur Airport from 09:27 to 15:46 hours. Who had access to its cockpit, and with what purpose? There were no telltale signs it was said, but was any attempt made to trace them?
- d. Loading of two crates of mangoes on board at Bahawalpur was understandable. They could be from a friend or a well-wisher in the mango-growing area. I But I cannot understand the loading of a presentation case of aircraft models. Where did these models come from? There was no model manufacturing industry in Bahawalpur. If they had been the models of tank MIAI, they could be from there. But certainly not aircraft models. I have my doubts about those models and the intentions behind them.

- e. It was said that the activation of gases in a container, during flight, either manually, remotely or, automatically, would result in the insidious incapacitation of the flight deck crew. Unless it was automatically done, it would have had to be activated by someone on board the aircraft, tantamount to committing suicide. Or it would have to be activated through remote control. Minute examination should lead to the correct answer. Investigations should be pursued.
- f. It is normal for autopilot to be engaged once the aircraft is safely airborne. Therefore the incapacitation of the crew had to take place before the engagement of the autopilot. If the autopilot had been engaged, the situation would have been entirely different, because the aircraft would have continued to fly and given sufficient time for a reaction from people on board. It clearly indicates that the people involved were fully conversant with operational flying and protocol intricacies.
- g. Why were proper autopsies of the crew not carried out? Was that lapse intentional or dereliction? If it was intentional, then there were very many hands behind the scene which must be exposed, for the sake of the well-being of the country.

I have no firm evidence to doubt the findings of the inquiry, but I must warn that it could be a completely cooked-up report. If I had my way the inquiry would be reopened. In saying this I mean no ill-will to anybody. I only mean goodwill to Pakistan.

With Zia's death the general who had appeared on the scene, from nowhere with the promise of 'FAIRPLAY', suddenly disappeared from the scene with 'FOULPLAY', He also practiced Foulplay after promising Fairplay.

CHAPTER - TWELVE LOST LABOURS

Ever since the inception of Pakistan, repeated promises and attempts have been made to improve the lot of unskilled workers and laborers. Unfortunately, none of these promises bore any results.

When I was appointed Minister of Labor, I inherited a situation of general despondency among the laboring class. I set about developing a comprehensive labor policy for Pakistan.

Ever since my refusal, in August 1978, to serve as a Minister in the Federal Cabinet, some of my senior colleagues had been asking me to reconcile with Gen Zia and give him a helping hand in administering the country. I was not willing because I was quite happily employed in my job as a Corps Commander. Gen Hassan and Gen J. S. Mian even used to taunt me that they lost their ministerships because of me. They wanted me to become a Minister again so that they could also rejoin the Cabinet. Gen Zia asked me once or twice if I had changed my mind about becoming a Minister again. I replied in the negative, and requested him to let me stay on in my job till retirement (on 30 March 1980).

On March 23, 1979, Gen Zia announced that General Elections would be held on November 17, that year. A question was raised whether the-Civilian Ministers would be allowed to continue as Ministers till the election, date or would be relieved. The consensus of the Corps Commanders and PSO's was that those who were to take part in the elections must resign, so that a neutral stance could be maintained by the government. There was also a feeling that the country would be better administered without the Civilian Ministers.

The PNA Ministers used to complain that they had no real power authority over the bureaucracy, whereas the civil servants not only listened, but were actually scared of the generals who were Ministers.

Gen Zia decided to induct the Generals back into the Cabinet. I was persuaded by the Deputy COAS not to refuse. My refusal would have indicated a .split in the Army, which, in his opinion, would be harmful to the Army. So when Gen Zia asked me to become a Minister again I agreed.

He reshuffled the Cabinet on April 21, 1979, and allotted me the portfolios of three ministers viz. Labor, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, Petroleum and Natural

Resources and Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, in addition to my Command of the Corps. In order to keep the bureaucrats happy, he did not give me the Establishment Division which had been with me previously.

Pakistani workers have many excellent qualities. When treated decently and honestly, they are quite capable of producing good work, as seen in the achievements of the millions of Pakistanis working abroad. Through their hard work, in various foreign countries, they have attained great prosperity. Yet in Pakistan itself the results are very different. Sadly, the conditions are lacking at home in which their qualities could shine. When Pakistan came into being there were only two textile mills in West Pakistan (present Pakistan), at Lyalpur and Okara, two sugar mills in the Frontier Province and three cement factories, at Wah, Dandot and Rohri. The crude oil production of the whole country was just 300,000 barrels, per annum. The total electricity production through thermal plants was 30,000 Kilowatts and another 10,000 kilowatts through hydel power. It was not sufficient even to provide light to the big cities. There was no machinery or any arrangements to set up a factory in West Pakistan. Technically trained manpower was not there at all in the vast agricultural tracts of West Pakistan. However, immigrants who came from all over India comprised craftsmen, artisans, engineers, supervisors, professional managers etc. They did not migrate because there were lucrative jobs waiting for them in West Pakistan, but they migrated for promised Islamic values. All of them made sacrifices for a love for Islam and a love for Pakistan. They applied themselves to giving industrial uplift to the country.

This Labor Class, as it came to be known, worked day and night for the progress of the country and also fought against the enemy, side by side with the soldiers, in each war. They also rose against the dictators to get rid of them when they could not tolerate them any more. It is tragic that so little has been done for them. Their plight is still pitiable. Their welfare, health, accommodation, training, along with the education of their children were all grossly neglected. Pakistan's workers needed a sound labor policy.

A Tripartite Labor Conference was convened by the Martial Law Government immediately after it came into power in 1977. Employers and Labor failed to make any substantial proposals to improve labor-management relations or increase productivity. When the report went to the CMLA, he directed that a labor policy be formulated on scientific lines. So for the first time in the history of Pakistan, a Labor Commission was constituted by the government to examine measures necessary for bringing about tangible improvements in industrial relations. Recommendations given by the Labor Commission were to form the basis for a national labor policy beneficial to the whole country. The Ministry of Labor would examine the Labor Commission's recommendations consult other departments and ministries on them and then frame its own recommendations. (*Pakistan Times and Nawa e Waqat* 12-7-1979)

I gave the guideline that since Pakistan was an Islamic State, the Islamic concept of equality would have to be fully enforced in all walks of life and everybody must respect it. The Islamic system i.e. *Musawat e Mohammadi* if truly implemented could end poverty ignorance and unemployment in the country. But the system could not come into force if everyone worked for that goal Islam was the first religion to introduce the concept of "dignity of labor and hard work" to the world. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) had himself done physical labor to set a shining example for his followers. The teachings of Islam went to the extent that anyone who shirked hard work would not be a friend of Allah the Almighty or the Holy Prophet. Similarly the Holy Prophet had emphasized to his followers the importance of paying fair wages to the laborer promptly.

Three groups were involved in industry at this time *viz* labor management and the government. Unfortunately all three were not functioning as they should Workers were not putting in honest labor, managements were not willing to pay the labor their rightful dues and government officials were not supervising labor management relations properly. The new Labor Policy would make sure that all three functioned properly. Workers would get fair wages and other facilities employers would get their rights, while labor officials and inspectors would be held accountable for their actions.

I also emphasized the need for improving training facilities for labor especially for those who went abroad to seek employment. Then as now there were very few training facilities for workers Training institutions both in the public and private sectors were not functioning satisfactorily. I highlighted that the profession of teaching had suffered a lot as it held little attraction for the brightest and most capable professionals. Salaries were low and other facilities were not available. If the country was to be made, strong and prosperous, first-rate teachers would have to be produced. I directed to Technical Centres to produce instructors of good quality. As continuity in training was necessary to improve performance. National and Provincial Training Boards for workers were also seriously considered. I directed Justice Attaullah Sajjad on May 7, 1979 to have the Labor Commission Report ready for presentation to me within six weeks. It was ready, by June 20, 1979.

There had been complaints against the Labor Attaches posted in the mission abroad. There were too few of them to deal with the Pakistan immigrant's problems. I discussed this with Gen Zia and requested him to appoint more Labor Attaches in the countries where we had the most workers, e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai), Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, Oman, Denmark and the United Kingdom. He agreed and, selected the new attaches himself. I briefed them before they left to take up their new assignments. I asked them to make all-out efforts to promote the image of the country abroad, and to serve Pakistanis working there with complete dedication. They had to look after the interests of their compatriots and to provide all possible facilities to them.

They were also warned that all types of manpower exporters would be visiting the prospective employers abroad. Strict action would have to be taken against dishonest promoters, whereas all facilities should be given to honest manpower, exporters. The national image should not be tarnished for money. This policy was also stated to the Manpower Promoters' Association in Pakistan. Recruiting Agencies responsible for getting a bad name for the country would get their licenses cancelled. As unskilled manpower was neither well paid nor much respected, it was planned to launch a collective training programme to produce technically trained tradesmen for employment abroad.

I visited the Overseas Employment Corporation (OEC) at Rawalpindi to check its performance. In spite of the fact that it had to compete against some very well established manpower exporters, it was doing all right. However, I noticed that it was not properly organized to serve the backward areas where private entrepreneurship was also lacking. In order to help the residents of those areas to get their due chance of serving abroad, I ordered OEC branches to be opened at Mirpur (Azad Kashmir) and Quetta. Because of heavy population demands from Lahore and Peshawar, I also sanctioned branch offices at those places.

In June 1979, I led a Labor delegation to the People's Republic of China. The delegation's visit coincided with the Chinese National People's Congress which was meeting after about 10 years. All the top Chinese leaders would be very busy. But there would be little point of my visiting China if there was no audience with the Premier Hua Guofeng. I had been told that on a recent visit he had not given an audience to Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. Consequently I informed the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan that I would lead the Labor delegation only if an audience with Premier Hua Guofeng was confirmed, otherwise I would depute someone else to lead it. After some days he confirmed that the Premier would grant me an audience for as long as I desired. I was grateful and led the delegation.

Premier Hua Guofeng received me after 10 pm on June 26 and we talked for 80 minutes. Much of our discussion concerned foreign policy and Soviet "hegemonism" in Asia.

Our delegation was very impressed by the Management Worker relationship in China. It was based on complete teamwork emanating from very cordial relations. There was great emphasis on the dignity of each and every profession and calling. Pakistan management was not reconciled to the idea of the delegation of power. It was quite the opposite in China, where there was complete decentralization of authority with commensurate responsibilities. Workers were taken completely into confidence before setting annual productivity targets. In fact, the targets were unanimously agreed upon in the Management Worker Joint Meetings. This made a very sound base for planning. There were no professional trade union leaders in China were redundant. The

government talked directly with the workers in China the entire nation worked hard to attain self-sufficiency and national self respect. Pakistan could learn a lot from them.

The Labor Commission report was received by July 12, 1979. Its 502 pages contained 2,560 recommendations covering the entire spectrum of Labor Management relations. It would be thoroughly examined and a new Labor Policy would be announced after the approval of the Cabinet. It would help to increase domestic production, consumption and boost export.

The new Labor Policy would enforce Islamic concepts. Fair wages would be ensured and better facilities for workers training would be created. Labor would be given its rightful place in society. Some of the points to be included in the Policy were:

- a. Pre-requisites of a job and the training facilities for it.
- b. Methodology for on-the-job training for upgrading and Promotions.
- c. Post retirement rehabilitation schemes.
- d. Award of pensions in the private sector.
- e. Foolproof safeguards against exploitation of workers both in public and private sectors.
- f. Security of service.
- g. Better facilities for medical care and education of children.
- h. Compensation in case of an accident.
- i. Minimum period of attendance during a calendar year.
- j. Incentives -- Profit / bonus linked with productivity.

I talked to the Pakistan National Federation of Trade Unions on July 23, 1979 in Karachi at a two day seminar. I told them that 95% of the Labor Commission recommendations were unanimous and would be included in the Labor Policy. It would be designed to increase production while workers' and administrators' rights would be safeguarded. The relationship between Labor and Administration must improve, I said and quoted Tipu Sultan: "One day's life of a lion was better than 100 years of a Jackal's life." Living in honor was a great thing. Those who wanted to live like that had to face many ' hurdles with courage, tenacity and determination.

In September 1979 I led a delegation to Saudi Arabia to see the working and living conditions of Pakistanis there. I visited the Al-Kharaj Electrification Project being

executed by a Pakistani company. I also visited some camps in the vicinity of Jeddah, and exchanged views with our workers. I also met with the Saudi Labor Minister Ibrahim Ankari in Jeddah and we discussed the following:

- a. No sympathy should be shown to illegal immigrants. They should be deported. The Pakistan government would take stern action against them. Action against the Manpower Exporters Would also be taken in cases where it was found that they had sponsored the immigrants illegally.
- b. Bangladeshis and Indians were giving a bad name to Pakistanis. In some cases they had managed to acquire Pakistani passports and were posing as Pakistani nationals. Any immigrants of that nature when arrested should be deported.
- c. Pakistan was more interested in working on specific projects rather than exporting manpower only. So the Saudi government should consider Pakistan for projects through normal international competitive channels.
- d. Dispatch of the dead bodies of workers who had died in Saudi Arabia to their next of kin in Pakistan was normally inordinately delayed, due to lengthy procedures being adopted by the Saudi government. These procedures must be revised and streamlined, so that corpses are sent to their destination quickly.
- e. There were very many pending death compensation claims.
- f. Disbursement of old age benefits and Social Security amounts (5 + 8%) should be made either directly to the individuals or through the Government of Pakistan. It had already been inordinately delayed.
- g. Work with South Koreans on the Projects on which they were working should be allowed. Their Ambassador had agreed after discussions with me.

On October 16, Gen Zia said in an address: "Labor will not have the right to strike, employer will not have the right to lockout. The Labor Commission report has been received. Decisions on this will be given soon". (*Nawa-e-Waqat* 17-10-1979)

Talking to the newsmen during a visit to the Pak-German Technical Training Centre in Lahore, I told them that the country needed one hundred thousand skilled workers annually for local and overseas requirements, but the training institutes in the country were only producing seven thousand, including those trained under crash programmes. The government was trying to improve the working of the technical institutes and ensure that the existing capacity was fully utilized.

I also told them that the government would discourage the trend of going abroad for employment. However, if people wanted to go, they should go at least with some skills. Unskilled, workers got neither proper jobs nor reasonable pay abroad, If they had some

skills, they could get good salaries and also earn a good name for their country. I also directed the National Training Bureau to conduct a survey of Vocational and Technical Training Centres to find out the exact number of children of overseas workers, so that suitable assistance could be provided for their education. I wanted some places made available for the children of overseas Pakistanis in such institutes, and the Ministry for Labor would pay for it.

On 28 November the Cabinet under the chairmanship of Gen Zia considered the Labor Commission Report, draft Labor Policy and Draft Speech of the Labor Minister. A sub committee was formed which would examine the reports in detail and put up recommendations to cabinet. (*Nawa-e-Waqat* 29-11-1979)

On December 11, 1979, while I was in Karachi with the Chairman and members of the Third Wage Board for Journalists and Press Workers, I asked why there should be a Wage Board for Journalists only. Why not a National Wage Board which would continue fixing the remunerations of the workers according, to prevailing conditions? In our society we lacked equality and justice. A cook was paid different wages according to the status of his employer. The entitlement of a coolie at a railway station was much less than the entitlement of a loader at the airport. Yet, both were doing the same job. Car drivers, similarly, got different rates of pay. We would have to remove those differences. The word 'labor' had become derogatory in our society. Everyone who worked for wages, doing physical work or mental work, was a laborer. Henceforth he should be known as a worker. I was also a laborer or worker, not self-employed but on monthly wages. I strongly pleaded for the constitution of a permanent Wage Board for everyone, which would keep) under review the wage structure on the basis of the price index prevailing in the country. It was my Endeavour to see the establishment of such a National Board.

At the Seminar on Accidents Prevention held on September 26, I conveyed my views that "industrial accidents are a source of loss not only to employers and workers, but also to the entire community. It is necessary from the economic and humanitarian standpoints to wage war by all possible means against industrial accidents." Inaugurating a Vocational Training Programme of Overseas Workers under the auspices of Overseas Workers Foundation in early February 1980, I said only a united, disciplined and technologically sound Pakistani nation could overcome external pressures. Economic strength and stability could not be achieved unless the country had adequately trained and skilled manpower. resources. Further, unless technically trained manpower was sent abroad, men who went out for jobs would be little more than slaves. The government's bias should therefore be in favor of technical training. At Mirpur, Azad Kashmir, replying to the address of welcome by the Managing Director of the Overseas Workers Foundation, I said that overseas Pakistanis should invest money in projects which could contribute to the well being of the country. I was there to lay the foundation stone of a residential school for the female children of Pakistanis

abroad who needed to preserve their culture and Islamic values, which could not be easily done by sending their daughters to western schools. Pakistan had about 1.7 million workers abroad whose children needed attention.

In speech after speech, I was reflecting the draft Labor Policy. But that Policy was no nearer enunciation. On February 13, 1980 the daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* wrote an editorial "What happened to the Labor Policy?"

I was 'ordered' by Gen Zia to go to Canada on February 18, 1980 and could not inaugurate the Overseas Welfare Foundation Housing Project on February 23. In Ottawa, on March 3, I told the Pakistani community that the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation had been established to provide them the maximum facilities. The Foundation had already taken a number of measures, including a housing project for Pakistanis working abroad. Residential plots would be bought in different areas of Pakistan and the Foundation would build houses for its members. I also told them, that the Foundation had drawn up a programme of establishing residential schools for girls whose parents were working abroad. The first of these schools was being established in Mirpur. I was determined to make these schools among the best in the country. 900 scholarships, based on merit, were to be awarded annually to the children of overseas Pakistanis.

I should mention here that when I assumed responsibility as Labor Minister, I checked with the Secretary, Ministry of Labor about the prospects of constructing some houses for workers. He told me that there was 120 million rupees in the Housing Fund. So I was mighty pleased that I would be able to get some houses constructed for the workers. I had also decided that they would be 7 Marlas. (210 sq yards), not 5 Marlas, each. I talked to Gen Zia. He agreed. But the money was not actually made available, either by the CMLA or by the Finance Minister.

In Martial Law, all authority lies with the CMLA. Nobody else wields effective power. So when you can't do anything, why be a Minister? Perhaps, Ghulam Dastgir Khan, my successor can answer this question better.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Finance Minister of Pakistan, said on March 10, 1980 (the day I got back from Canada), that the Labor Policy would be announced soon. But this proved to be untrue. I resigned as a Federal Minister twenty days thereafter. There have been many Labor Ministers since then, but my successor was Ghulam Dastgir Khan, handpicked by Gen Zia, for qualities best known to him, and made Minister overnight. In an interview with the Urdu daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, he said that nothing had been done about the formulation of the Labor Policy during my period of office. He was not required to be honest. He has never held an office of responsibility where honest decision making was pertinent. The fault was of the man who appointed him. Gen Zia was an omnipotent Chief Executive from July 5, 1977 to August 17, 1988. He just did not

want the labor Policy to be issued. He needed only to give me a date for its announcement, for everything was ready. But he never gave the go ahead.

CHAPTER - THIRTEEN A CANADIAN CONNECTION

As President of Pakistan Zia fell prey to many charlatans confidence tricksters and outright crooks. With his own rather narrow outlook on life Zia seemed to have a special weakness for believing the earnest sounding, idealistic -- but all too often misleading speeches of those who professed to be working for the Islamic '*ummah*' (or world community). One of the outstanding examples of this is Zia's uncritical support given to the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies of North Halley, Canada.

It wasted a considerable amount of money and effort in schemes which were not inherently unsound, but were certainly mismanaged.

Dr. Saad Gabr originally a Moroccan, was a naturalized Egyptian with a long career as an activist in the Muslim Brotherhood. He was about sixty five when I first met him on Zia's insistence. My first impressions were wholly unfavorable, and proved to be quite correct, especially on his behavior in financial matters.

Eventually there was a financial liability incurred by Pakistan, though the majority of the costs were borne by Saudi Arabia.

Zia's \$10,000 gift came from the national exchequer, not from Zia's own personal resources. And the administrative costs of maintaining offices in Pakistan, as well as local salaries of employees were paid by the Pakistan government.

An American lady, a Joanne Herring, was supposed to be closely associated with the marketing affairs of the Institute, and Zia appointed this lady Honorary Consul of Pakistan in Houston, Texas a post which I believe she still fills.

But to begin at the beginning.

I was very busy in the supervision and coordination of the overall arrangements for the extraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference to be held in Islamabad from January 27 to 29, 1980, when I was directed by Gen Zia to receive Dr Saad Gabr and attend to him. We met in my office on January 28. He started praising the President of Pakistan for the work which he was doing for Islam. He wanted to help Pakistanis to achieve affluency. I was rushed for time, as I had to go to the venue of the Conference in Islamabad, so I took him along with me and listened to his long story on the way. I could see another A K Brohi in him, both for ability and sycophancy. I was obliged to deal with him as Minister for Labor, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis.

Dr. Saad Gabr was an adviser to Dr Abdullah Oamer Nasseef, Vice President of King Abdul Aziz University (KAAU), Jeddah. It had an organization known as Technology Seminar devoted to serving the cause of promotion of technology in Muslim countries. They had developed and organized a scheme to help uplift the living standard of the Muslim masses working in cottage industries all over the Muslim world. The salient features of the scheme were:

- a. Promoting, marketing and exporting of products to earn foreign exchange.
- b. Providing technical assistance to improve productivity through quality control.
- c. Providing religious guidance to develop a healthy community. They were impressed by the President's announcement of Nizam-e-Mustafa. They had approached the President in February 1979 and offered their services for a pilot project in Pakistan. If approved, a comprehensive programme could be established when required. The President liked the idea and wanted the proposal to be examined by the Planning Commission. It was examined, and by August 1979 the President had approved the following action:

In the first phase,

- a. The Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) in collaboration with KAAU would organize export of handicrafts and other cottage industry products;
- b. The EPB would integrate the plan with other ongoing programmes;
- c. Target markets for specific products would be - indicated to the Bureau;
- d. The EPB would be the focal point for information, designing and production adaptation; and
- e. Necessary funds would be provided by the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan.

The second phase would commence when enough relevant information had been obtained. A new organization might then become necessary. Further phases would depend on success.

According to the Ministry of Planning and Development, a project entitled "Threadlines Gallery", on somewhat similar lines, was already under successful implementation in the Ministry of Industries for development and promotion of textile handicrafts in the country. Market promotion efforts made by Joanne Herring of the USA had also shown some success.

I did not show much interest in the project as explained by Dr. Gabr, but we were supposed to discuss the proposals with the CMLA a couple of days later.

Dr. Saad Gabr, Gen Rahimuddin, Maj Gen Arif and I met Gen Zia as desired by him. He gave us an exposition of Dr. Gabr's plans and said that it could be a good opening for the amelioration of the financial conditions of our people. Ultimately it could be good for the whole of Ummah Islamiya. Material and conceptual work could be done simultaneously. An officer had gone from the EPB to the KAAU, Jeddah to discuss the modalities. The operational side of the scheme would be Pakistan's responsibility. For quality control and setting technical standards, a Special Technical Training Cell (STTC) should be opened at Islamabad. It would work along with the technical training programmes under the Ministry of Labor. He asked me to help Dr. Gabr find suitable accommodation for the STTC in Islamabad. The KAAU would have a liaison office in Pakistan. Provincial governments would help to locate suitable production centres for cottage industry items. Marketing would be the responsibility of the KAAU, and be done through Dr. Gabr's outfit in Canada. We were asked to give all possible help to Dr. Gabr to make the project a success. Technical knowhow so received could also be used for defence production.

Dr. Gabr explained that the implementation of the project was slow due to the communication gap between the EPB and the Technology Seminar of KAAU. A delegation of experts from King Abdul Aziz University and North Hatley was to arrive in Pakistan by the end of January to visit various handicraft and cottage industries centres to assess the capabilities of craftsmen and artisans. It had been delayed because, firstly, Dr. Gabr was preoccupied and, secondly, the setting up of the Special Technical Training Cell at Islamabad under the CMLA's secretariat had changed the organizational set up.

Dr. Gabr also gave details of the North Hatley organization. He suggested that a delegation from Pakistan should first go to Canada, see all these facilities on the ground and then the Saudi and Canadian delegations should come to Pakistan. He also requested the President to come to North Hatley for the inauguration ceremony of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies. The President agreed to look into all this. I expressed my reservations and said that the Ministries of Industries and Production should be involved in the schemes. Maj Gen Arif did not utter a word.

Gen Zia called me in the first week of February and told me that he had authorized Maj Gen Shahid Hamid (Rtd), Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Hamid D Habib, Chairman, Export Promotion Bureau, and Akhtar UI Islam, Director, Export Promotion Bureau to go to North Hatley, Canada, and New York to see the facilities and arrangements which had been made there for promotion and sale of handicrafts. He also told me that he was a founder member of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies, North Hatley, along with Dr. Abdullah Oamer Nasseef, Dr. Saad Gabr and Sheikh

Jamjon of Saudi Arabia. Its inauguration was to take place in the first week of March. He was giving a token donation of \$ 10,000 towards the Institute. He could not go to attend the inauguration and desired me to go and represent him.

I showed my reluctance, reminding him that Lieutenant Generals who were completing four years tenure were due for retirement next month and I was one of them. So I would like to stay in the country rather than go abroad. There were many administrative details I had to attend to prior to March 30, 1980, when I was completing my four years tenure. I requested Gen Zia to send someone else. But he overruled me and requested me to go as Labor Minister responsible for technical training of manpower.

I had not answered him yet when, in the same breath, he said my wife would not be allowed to accompany me. I had no plans to request Gen Zia that he should sanction her travel, but when he objected unnecessarily, I changed my mind and decided to go. I told Gen Zia that my wife was a free citizen of Pakistan, had a passport of her own and could go anywhere in the world unless he had imposed restrictions on her. Gen Zia said there were no restrictions. He said the only reason was that if her travel was sanctioned others would also ask for their wives to go with them. I told him that it was not a good enough excuse, however she would go with me and I would pay for her. I also suggested that, as I would not be staying as Minister for long, he should send someone else, either accompanying me or preferably in my place, who could take follow-up action. He agreed to send Maj Gen Saeed Qadir with me. We left for North Hatley on February 19, via Saudi Arabia.

There were wild guesses in the international press on my sudden departure abroad. Two of these reports stated:

In Pakistan a high Official of the Military Government, Gen F.A. Chishti, left on a tour of the USA, Canada, UK and Saudi Arabia yesterday (Tuesday). No announcement had been made about the tour earlier. Radio Pakistan said that besides other things, Gen Chishti would also have talks with the officials of the World Bank. Names of the other members of his delegation have not been disclosed. Official sources in Islamabad say that ' Gen Chishti will meet Pakistani immigrants in all the four countries and he has no plans of meeting with government representatives. But news agencies have reported from Pakistan that the General's visit may also relate to Pakistan's effort to seek military, and economic assistance following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

(Voice of America reported on February 20.)

One of the high ranking military commanders of Pakistan Lt Gen F A Chishti has left on a tour of foreign countries He would visit Saudi Arabia, Britain, America and Canada. Reuter reports that the Pakistan newspapers have come to know that Gen Chishti would fulfill the request mission as the special envoy of the Pakistan CMLA Gen Zia. During his stay in the countries, he is believed to exchange views on more supply of arms to

Pakistan. It may be recalled that the Carter Administration wants to convert Pakistan into a base for its military tactics.

(Radio Moscow reported on February 21.)

On February 20, we called on Dr. Nasseef at KAAU, Jeddah. He talked highly of Dr. Gabr and his outfits in North Hatley and Montreal. Dr. Gabr as mentioned earlier, was a Moroccan by birth and an Egyptian through naturalization. A member of the Muslim Brotherhood, he was sentenced to death but managed to escape from Egypt, started afresh in the UK and finally settled in Canada. All efforts he put in were for Islam, Dr. Nasseef said. (Making money and amassing wealth seemed to be his hobbies. He gave the impression of being a spendthrift, but was in fact very thrifty.) Dr. Nasseef explained to us the working of the Technology Seminar of the university. Having performed Umrah and paid respects to the Holy Prophet (PBUH) we left for London on February 22.

We were in London for four days. I called on our Embassy, met many Pakistanis and had to speak to the Press. BBC gave full coverage on 26 February 1980. It said "... Gen Chishti said that in place of a military aid, Pakistan attaches importance to an agreement with the USA under which his country's security is guaranteed against an aggression ... He said that after 1978 military coup in Kabul, Pakistan had arrived on a conclusion that the Soviet Union has now made an entry into Afghanistan forever. He accused the USA of not accepting at that time the view of Pakistan for which it is now sorry ..." I had also said that honorable and graceful transfer of power had never taken place before in Pakistan. The present regime would like to hand over power gracefully and walk out.

On February 27, we left for New York on our way to Canada. We flew by Concorde, after breakfast, and were in New York at breakfast time. It was a novel experience. Princess Grace and the Prince of Monaco were our fellow passengers. It was a matter of pleasure to see them travelling as commoners. Dr. Gabr received us at the airport. My son Irfan was also there. He was doing his flying training, at my cost, to get his Federal Aviation Authority Commercial Pilot License. He was already a holder of a Commercial Pilot License from Pakistan. I had sent him to the USA because, in Irfan's opinion, he would have better chances of getting a pilot's job with PIA if he had double qualifications. He got his FAA license but could not get a job with PIA, in spite of his repeated efforts because he was my son and I was not in the good books of Gen Zia. It was only after Gen Zia's death that PIA accepted him in 1988 as a First Officer.

Irfan was introduced to Dr. Gabr who suggested that if Irfan would join the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies for training, he would straightaway start, him on seven hundred dollars a month. He was already paying Faiz, Lt. Gen. Rahim ud Din's son, six hundred and twenty-five dollars a month as agreed by the President, Gen Zia. I

thanked Dr. Gabr for the offer but declined. I told him that I, would like to maintain my family's independence. We stayed overnight in New York.

In the morning a very interesting news item, quoting a radio Moscow Broadcast, was brought to my notice. It read, "Pakistan generals have realized that they can get a good opportunity to secure enormous foreign assistance by joining Washington's political game. Although haggling, over the deal is continuing, the basic factor of the deal is quite clear. (Had the Russians read Gen Zia's mind, or was it that Gen Zia got the clue from it!)

We left in a chartered aircraft the next day on a six-day visit to Canada to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies and to see the North Hatley organization on the ground. At Sherbrook Airport we were received by the Pakistan charge d' affaires (we had no ambassador) and the Mayor of the town. Dr. Gabr seemed to have substantial properties in the village of North Hatley, comprising offices, living accommodation for students, his own very luxurious home and three or four other independent houses. He had a fleet of cars. It seemed he was a big business man and a philanthropist of ample means. We were introduced to Mandi Abdel Jalil of Morocco and Dr. Ahmed Bahafzullah of KAAU, Jeddah.

The North Hatley Organisation (NHO) was a commercial enterprise established by Dr. Saad Gabr. It was intended:

- a. To establish and run departmental stores in Canada and North America.
- b. To invest in cottage and small industries in the Muslim countries for production of goods that could be sold in NHO Departmental Stores.
- c. To invest in profitable business and industry internationally.

On March 1, we were shown the facilities in the promotional show room of Dar Saida located in the heart of the business centre of Montreal. We were impressed with the decor, display arrangements and the quality of goods available in the show room. The same evening I presided over a meeting at North Hatley. I emphasized the importance of the Handicraft Development Project and informed the meeting about the keen interest shown in it by the President of Pakistan. I was entrusted with the task of supervising the project personally and making it a success. I also remarked that due to unchecked immigration of skilled and semi-skilled labor there had been an acute shortage of such workers in Pakistan. Being minister in charge of manpower and overseas employment, it was my duty to train a sufficient number of skilled workers to meet the internal and overseas demands for Pakistani workers. I had already reorganized vocational centres, and had started crash training programmes in Pakistan.

I also told the meeting that, at the suggestion of Dr. Gabr, Gen Zia had approved the setting up of a Special Technical Training Cell (STTC) at Islamabad in order to provide technical assistance to our artisans and to ensure production of quality handicrafts. This would serve two purposes, firstly, ensuring improvement in the living and working conditions of our artisans as well as better earnings for them and, secondly, to produce quality goods with a view to earning more foreign exchange for Pakistan.

At a meeting on March 3, Dr. Gabr outlined the salient features of the project and work done so far. He informed us that the Charity Trust of North Halley, which was a non-profit earning institution, had provided necessary funds for infrastructure facilities required for marketing of Pakistani handicrafts and cottage industry products in Canada. A development and promotional show room had been established with an investment of one million dollars, excluding the cost of the building. A wholesale warehouse for storing and marketing of Pakistani handicrafts and cottage industry products all over Canada had also been set up at a cost of about \$60,000 near Dorval Airport, Montreal. Similar facilities would be created in New York, provided the production was geared up and supply of goods ensured from Pakistan, but a manager, was already employed there. Dr Gabr claimed that the project would have far reaching effects on the economy of the country and social and living conditions of the masses of Pakistan. He also observed that the role of the Export Promotion Bureau was vital for successfully running the project and the Bureau, in his view, was the backbone of the project.

I observed that there was an urgent need for carrying out immediate studies in Pakistan on various handicrafts.

The following aspects should be broadly looked into:

- a. Existing production, and how to increase it.
- b. How to improve the quality of goods produced at present.
- c. Availability of quality raw material to artisans at competitive prices.
- d. Improvement in packaging of handicrafts.
- e. Gradual improvement in the earning capacity of artisans.

Hamid D Habib, Chairman of the Export Promotion Bureau, said that they had sent a cross section of handicrafts and cottage industry products for display and were testing the marketability of those items. I had a quick trip to Ottawa to meet the Pakistani community. After a night stop I returned to North Halley to attend the inauguration

ceremony of the Institute of Ummnah Islamiya Studies, I received a telephone call from Gen. Zia. He wanted to know how many more days I was planning to stay in Canada. I told him the itinerary. He wanted me to cut short my visit and get back home as soon as possible, because something very serious had happened, but he would not give me the details on the telephone. I said that if he wanted me so badly, I could leave behind Gen Saeed Qadir and be with him in no time. He asked, me to stay for the ceremony and then return.

We attended the cornerstone-laying ceremony of IUISNH on March 5. The Institute, was being established by Dr. Gabr in response to an appeal made by President Zia while inaugurating the Shariah Faculty of the Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, in February. Vocational training facilities were to be developed at the Institute. Gen Zia, Dr. Oamer Nasseef, Sheikh Jamjon and Dr. Saad Gabr were to be the Founder Members of the Institute. Mr. Mandi Abdel Jail, Dr Ahmed Bahafzullah, Maj Gen Saeed Qadir and I were elected as Members, Board of Governors.

One disturbing thing which came to my notice through the international media was that the First All Pakistan Local Bodies Convention had started on March 5, with Gen Zia presiding. This convention was originally supposed to be held at the end of March. Nothing had been mentioned either in the press or by anybody else why this Convention was summoned in a great hurry when two ministers holding four ministries were abroad. Only the Election Cell members, Maj Gen Jamal Said Mian, Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali (Rtd), and the Interior Minister, Mahmood Haroon, knew the Election Cell plans which were to be discussed in the convention. Gen Zia, obviously, did not want me present. He had ordered me to be abroad so that he could thwart the efforts to revert to democracy.

On reaching Islamabad Airport, on my hurried return, I was received by Maj. Gen K M Arif, COS, to the CMLA. He told me the details of the attempted *coup d'état* by Maj Gen Tadjamal Hussain (Rtd). It could not have possibly succeeded. Our army is a very disciplined force. It would never disobey its chief. That was exactly why Gen Zia would not shed uniform.

I was due to retire from the Army on March 30, 1980. My last official meeting with Zia took place a few days before that. Zia invited me and my wife to dinner at his official residence, but I attended alone.

Also present that evening for dinner were Gen Saeed Qadir and Dr. Saad Gabr. During the meal, I was again asked to stay on as a Federal Minister by Zia, but I rejected the offer without hesitation. I had already announced my resignation as a Minister on March 18 in Lahore.

I thanked Zia, and said, "You have been kind. I assure you, you won't find me doing anything which is anti Pakistan, anti Army or anti Islam, But please don't push me to the wall. If I am forced, I will hit back and you know I am capable of it. Let us part as friends."

Zia then said, "I wish you had continued as a Minister."

"I'm sorry," I replied, "I cannot trust you."

By then I had completely lost faith in Zia's intention to fulfill his repeated pledges to restore democracy and transfer power to the people's representatives in Pakistan.

As I left after dinner, Dr. Gabr requested me to drop him at the State Guest House where he was staying. When we reached the State Guest House, he asked me in for a cup of green tea. He tried to convince me to continue as a Minister. I told Dr. Gabr that I could not do it. I could not serve Gen Zia any longer in administering the country because he was not listening to advice, and was taking dishonest decisions. He could not be trusted. This discussion continued for about forty five minutes when Gen Saeed Qadir also joined us. They would not let me go till I agreed to continue as a minister, they said, but I would not agree. After, about an hour's haggling I managed to leave, telling them that I would do anything else for them, but would not agree to stay in the Government with Gen Zia. Although Gen Zia gave me this last supper at his residence, he never dined me out from the Army in the Officers' Mess, according to the traditions and customs of the service. There were many reasons for that!

Dr. Saad Gabr, Mandi Abdel Jail and Dr. Ahmed Itahafzuilah, all members of the Board of Governors. IUISNH, called on me at my residence on April 29. They requested me to become the head of the Islamabad branch of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies of North Hatley. I thanked them, but told them that I could not accept it without the concurrence of the President and I would not like the President to be bothered about it. So I asked them to please choose somebody else. They insisted and asked me if I would accept it if the President agreed. I said I would. It would be honorary up to March 30, 1981, and thereafter I would, have to be paid. They agreed. Presumably all of them, along with Lt. Gen Rahimuddin, went to Gen Zia on May 1 and got his approval. Dr. Gabr informed me about the decision and said that I would be required to attend a meeting in Jeddah on May 10. We would be leaving for Karachi on May 7, I agreed.

The meeting was held in King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, and reviewed the progress of the activities of handicrafts and other projects in Pakistan, initially sponsored by the Technology Seminar of the University. In the letter sent to the President of Pakistan, jointly signed by Dr. Nasseef and Dr. Saad Gabr, it was stated that the projects which were based on the studies sponsored or carried out by the KAAU should continue as originally planned, new projects would be initiated from

Islamabad through the branch office and I would henceforth supervise and coordinate the activities of all projects to ensure 'a smooth, uniform and speedy realization of the objective.

I came back to Pakistan on May 14 and was required to attend another working committee meeting of the Board of Governors at London on May 22. On return, I wrote a letter to Gen Zia on June 4, 1980, in his dual capacity of Founder Member of the TUIS, North Halley, and President of Pakistan. In addition to details of the organization and its performance I stated that the Islamabad branch has started but was facing teething problems as it needed staff and transport, and that I was not in a position to be effective as no Pakistan money was available (foreign currency from North Hatley was banked) I requested a lump sum grant. I never got a reply.

At the board of governors' meeting on May 22, held at London I raised the following points as a matter of policy:

- a. As Head of the Branch at Islamabad I was to deal with two types of funds and two types of currencies. Foreign exchange component received from North Hatley and Pakistan currency component received from the Government of Pakistan. Once these currencies come into my charge, would I be the final authority to decide how to spend those amounts?
- b. In the discharge of my responsibilities to whom would I be accountable? To the Board of Governors at North Hatley, I supposed, and to nobody else. Not even to the Founder Members. That should be in conformity with the bylaws of the North Hatley Organization

I had requested that the policy decisions on these two points be given to me in writing. Without clear instructions on these points in writing, I would not deal with any money except travel and incidental, charges. Dr. Saad Gabr told me that he would let me know. Pending that, he said, he would deposit a million dollars in the account. I refused to accept that. I returned to Pakistan and worked for the Islamabad Branch in an honorary capacity hoping that the decision would arrive. It never did. I was requested to attend the Board of Governors' meeting in September 1980. I showed my reluctance because no decisions were coming forth, either from Gen Zia or from the Head Office at North Halley. I was told that the decisions would be taken at the coming meeting at North Halley. So I left for London on my way to Canada.

The day I was to leave London for Montreal we had planned a lunch with some friends and officials. We were waiting for two of them at the hotel when they came in a hurry and said that they would not be able to join us for lunch because they were suddenly required to go to Paris. Gen Zia's plane had been stopped at Paris because there was heroin or narcotics on board. (They were both intelligence officers). They had to rush to

Paris so that the information was not leaked to the Press. Gen Zia was on his way to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly there.

The meetings of Board of Governors' of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies and the North Hatley Organization were held from September 29 to October 2. During these meetings, I found out that the organizations were not functioning smoothly. There were many shortcomings. Primarily three elements were involved, *viz* the local staff i.e. Canadian consultants and solicitors. Arabic speaking members of the Board of Governors, and myself. In some of the working meetings when some critical point would crop up, the conversation would change to French, when locals were concerned, or to Arabic when other members were concerned. I would be at a loss to understand the point. I raised its significance but it did not change the *modus operandi*, so I told them that I would not be attending the meetings.

I noticed that there were cars but no chauffeur. The cars were on hire and not the property of the North Hatley Organization. Dr Saad Gabr was very secretive about everything that he was doing, and would not answer any probing questions. He would refuse to answer any questions connected with funds or finances, including sources of income and heads of expenditure. He would proudly display his Pakistani Passport issued to him on orders of the President of Pakistan. The Board of Governors would not give answer to my questions regarding finances, responsibility and accountability. I told the Board of Governors that under those conditions it was difficult for me to work. Dr. Gabr said that on his next trip to Pakistan -- to get physical possession of the plots allotted to Dr. Nasseef and himself by the President of Pakistan, in Islamabad -- he would meet all my requirements after discussing all points with the President. He requested me to continue till then.

When I was at North Halley in Canada, Gen Zia was in New York. Hectic activities were going on at diplomatic and other levels to arrange that the Canadian Government should invite Gen Zia for a day's official visit. It bore no fruit. Prime Minister Trudeau had flatly refused. It was from North Halley that I talked to Gen Zia in New York and told him that I had to undergo bypass heart surgery on October 18 in London. He asked me to meet him in New York. I expressed my inability to do so. We agreed to meet at the Pakistan Embassy in London on October 6, 1980.

In London I immediately entered hospital for bypass heart surgery. Magdi Yaqub did, a neat job and put four bypasses. In the surgeon's words, before, the operation, it was "a miracle" that I was still alive. It was God's grace, and through well wishers' prayers.

Dr. Gabr visited me at the Princess Grace Hospital after the operation. He left £1,000 saying that I would need it. I was reluctant to accept it, but he insisted and gave it to me. This amount was returned to him at the first opportunity, on my next visit to Canada. I am mentioning it because on one of my subsequent trips to KAAU, Jeddah, I

found that there was an impression there that my bypass heart surgery was sponsored by Dr. Gabr and that he had spent much money on me for it. Not a penny was spent on me by the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies, or by the Technology Seminar or by any other foreigner. Let the record be straight.

I went back to the Islamabad Branch office in December 1980. There I found out that nothing had happened on my request for staff, transport, funds or fixture of responsibility *vis-a-vis* accountability. In other words I could not be effective. This was because my effectiveness was not desired. They had no moral courage to say so either. I sent a message to Dr. Gabr about this state of affairs. He said he would be coming in December. He came to Pakistan to attend Gen Zia's daughter's wedding on December 25. He asked me if we could meet on December 24, and when I told him we could, he asked if I was going to attend the President's daughter's wedding. I told him that I would not be going as, my wife had not been invited. He advised me to attend and requested me to accompany him to the State Guest House, where the reception was being held on the morning of December 25. I agreed on condition that I would not stay there for long. I would just go, shake hands and come back. He agreed. So we went. I congratulated Gen Zia on his daughter's wedding and came back. The Islamabad Branch problems remained unresolved.

Dr. Gabr before his return to Canada requested if I could be in North Hatley in January. He wanted to review the plans of the North Hatley Organizations. He told me that he had also requested Mandi Abdel Jalil to come and that he had agreed. Mandi Jalil and I had become quite friendly, so I agreed. I reached North Hatley on January 7, 1981.

Some important events took place on this trip which are worth putting on record. Firstly, Dr. Gabr asked me to accompany him to visit a factory site. He did not tell me any details. His pilot had inadvertently left the layout chart of the factory fully displayed on a board. Its function was of a dubious nature, clearly a factory for producing armaments. I refused to go with Dr. Gabr.

Secondly, I went to meet our Ambassador at Montreal in the office of our Consul General, Salim Saifullah. From there we went for lunch at the Ambassador's invitation. Dr. Gabr accompanying me. The same night, the office of the Consul General was burgled. Nothing was taken except a timepiece. The papers in the drawers and cupboards had been displaced. The message was received!

Thirdly, I attended a lunch in Montreal, given in honor of a Prince from Saudi Arabia by Dr. Saad Gabr. During our conversations at lunch I gleaned some information about the source of income of the North Halley Organization and the desired functions of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies. The Prince said that it was unfortunate that no work was being done in the conceptual field of the Institute. The stress seemed far more

on the material side. Dr. Gabr said that he would discuss it with Gen Zia on his next trip to Pakistan. It was difficult for me to be a party to unknown plans.

Fourthly, Dr. Sand Gabr told me that Lt Gen Akhtar Rahman's son had come from the USA and was enquiring about my activities. (Gen Akhtar was DGISI and his son was in the USA studying, but this was a cover.) His coming to North Halley in winter with a temperature at minus 42 degrees Celsius did not bother me. If they wanted to know what I was doing, they were at liberty to do so. I had nothing to conceal. I told Dr. Gabr to accommodate Gen Akhtar's son next to my room so that he could keep watch on me or bug my room if he wanted to. Dr. Gabr obliged. He stayed there for about twelve hours and went away.

I discussed the functioning of the Islamabad Branch with Dr. Gabr and Mandi Jalal. There was no response to my queries about responsibilities and accountability. I told Dr. Gabr that I was resigning as the Head of Islamabad Branch and as Member of the Board of Governors. He said it was not in his authority to accept the resignations. The matter would be considered by the Board of Governors when it next met. So, I requested a meeting. I was told that the Board meeting would take place in April 1981 at Islamabad.

The meeting took place at Gen Zia's residence. Dr. Gabr and Dr. Nasseef were present. Sheikh Jamjon's proxy was with Dr. Gabr. I explained the circumstances to the Board, and requested them to accept my resignations. I was asked to give them a few minutes to consider it. I left them alone. I was called in after a few minutes and told that my resignation as Head of the Islamabad Branch was accepted, but would I carry on as a Member, Board of Governors. I kept quiet on the issue. However, I have not met Dr. Gabr or any other member since then. I have not received any message from North Halley either since then.

After my resignation as Head of the Islamabad Branch of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies, North Halley, the branch was split into two. The conceptual work was given to the Quid-e-Azam University and the material work was given to the Ministry of Production under Lt. Gen. Saeed Qadir. How much money has come since then? How has it been spent? It is anybody's guess.

CHAPTER - FOURTEEN

SOLDIERING FOR THE PEOPLE

The armed forces i.e. army, navy and airforce are all central service cadres. Their loyalties are always to the centre from induction till retirement-even after retirement Civil armed forces i.e. rangers constabulary, levies etc. are political cadres and their loyalties are to the province to which they belong to.

Article. 244 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan deals with the oath to be taken by the members of the Armed Forces. The text of the oath reads. "I ... do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required by and under the law."

The Armed Forces should stay away from politics because they do not belong to any political party, but belong to the country. Their behavior should be completely neutral and judicious They must enjoy the full confidence of the masses. If they forfeit this confidence, they can never defend the country. They can only enjoy the confidence of the people if they are loyal and obedient to the constitutionally elected government. It is therefore the constitutional role of the Armed Forces that they act on each constitutional order of the government. Quaid-e-Azam had given similar directions to the Armed Forces, i.e. they should stay loyal to the Constitution and elected government.

The defence of a country is a demanding job. The Armed Forces cannot work at part-time defence and part-time politics. They are on duty 24 hours. When involved in politics, they get weak in defence potential. If they stay long in politics, they also start losing respect. This is generally due to the man, one man only, the decision-maker, the head of the Armed Forces, the CMLA. Some officers have recommended a role for the Pakistani Armed Forces similar to that of the Turkish Armed Forces in their country's politics. Yes, but Pakistan is not Turkey. Every country has its own problems and its own pride. Turkish pride is based on their never having been ruled by any other country. Who was responsible for that pride? Naturally the Armed Forces of Turkey.

What a parallel to draw with Pakistan. We have not yet even fixed responsibility, leave alone punishment, on those who brought disgrace to our country and the Armed Forces with the fall of Dacca. Let us do it now; it is still not too late. Accountability always pays dividends.

The Armed Forces constitutional role is to cooperate with the civil government. In the initial draft of the 1973 Constitution, Article 243 states the Armed Forces will act under

the supervision of the central government and that the Heads of Army, Navy and Air Force will be appointed by the central government. So the basic control is with the PM.

When Mr. Bhutto wanted to extend to the members of the Armed Forces the rule banning the participation of civil servants in politics till two years after their retirement, he referred the case to Armed Forces Headquarters for their comments. Gen Tikka Khan was the COAS and I was the MS at GHQ. The COAS discussed it with me. I told Gen Tikka Khan that the PM should be advised not to do it because its extension to the Armed Forces would be construed as high-handedness, being a change in the terms of service I recommended that this be added for future entrants at the initial grant of commission and not made applicable to the current officers cadre. I do not know what transpired between the PM and the COAS but the PM did not agree and passed the rule that no member of the Armed Forces could take part in politics till two years after his retirement from service.

Members of the Armed Forces are basically civilians who voluntarily join the defence forces for a limited period of their service, and become civilians again after their retirement. They have every right to take part in political activity after their retirement after the stipulated period as stated in prevailing orders. It is so in many other countries too. The USA is the leading democratic country in the world today. They have a high proportion of retired Armed Forces personnel holding jobs after elections. Why should we be allergic to our members of the Armed Forces who decide to enter politics after their retirement? An administrator gets into office and then motivates the people to work whereas a politician is inducted into office through popular vote and tries to acquire the administrative capability. Neither of them can be successful without having both the capabilities of motivating and administering. In our country we lay no emphasis on these requirements.

Gen Zia amended Article 243 during Martial Law through Presidential order No 14 dated 1985. Two additions were made to the original

- a. The President will be the Supreme Commander and the Armed Forces will be under him (It left the administrative control with the PM but as an institution or an entity, the Armed Forces came under the President).
- b. The President will appoint the heads of the three services. (Previously these appointments used to be made by the PM).

An interesting point to note is that as Gen Zia was the COAS, the actual command of the Army went to the Deputy COAS or later the VCOAS. He was *de jure* COAS. As the appointment of VCOAS was not mentioned in the amendment to the Constitution, its appointment stayed within the jurisdiction of the PM.

Article 245 states that the Armed Forces will operate under the orders of the central government and will perform the duties to ward off external threats and help the civil administration in their duties in aid of civil power.

In an era of constitutional government, soldiers and politicians have their respective well-defined spheres. The functions of the Armed Forces are subordinate to the orders of the civil government. The Armed Forces must leave political and national decision-making to the civilian government. It is that government's job to decide between war and peace and between different political roles. The Armed Forces are allowed complete freedom in their professional functioning, but it is civilians who decide the overall role of the Armed Forces. It is the civilians who are the representatives of the people, head of the government or the country. It is they who make generals. Such civilian control confines the armed forces to maximizing in professional competency. The Armed Forces' professional role is non-political and normally, comes into action only in response to an external threat. The Army, because of its apolitical tradition and its responsibility for external defence against real threats, has managed to maintain its focus on its profession rather than on political roles. The chain of discipline and command has never been broken, and the great bulk of the Army has never become involved in the debilitating intrigues of the political arena. Faced with the real test of accountability, it is always ready to act correctly. It has skills that are lacking in the civil bureaucracy:

- a. The Armed Forces have a rigid hierarchy where commands are obeyed instantaneously. (Under war conditions any delay is a matter of life and death.
- b. The Armed Forces have many specialized branches which can be used effectively for civilian purposes as well, e.g. Army Engineers, Army Medical Corps, Army Education Corps, Army Signals, Army Services Corps, Army Postal Services etc. It possesses all the skills which a civilian government requires and in addition does not have to deal with the delaying influence of political imperatives.
- c. The Armed Forces have technical skills lacking in the civilian population at large.
- d. Armed Forces personnel are better trained as - compared to civilians because of better resources allotted to them by the government due to the defence needs of the country.
- e. During a natural crisis, the armed forces are relied upon more than the civil e.g. calamities like floods, earthquakes, locusts etc.

- f. The Armed Forces have an assigned role of internal security for which periodic rehearsals are carried out.

In this context the following quotation may not be out of place.

"It is the duty of the Armed Forces to fight a war, but to decide that war is inevitable or not, what should be the nature of war, is the duty of the civil government. Basic principle of a democratic government and armed forces is that they should maintain their organization and discipline When a problem between the government and a section of the people becomes very tense then the individual that suffers the most is the common man and the country Under these circumstances one has to call the troops in support of government whereas the job of the police is to punish, the job of Armed Forces is to save and protect. Politicians have the right to change their views but the Armed Forces cannot deviate from their organizations and discipline".

(Daily Musawat, June 4, 1977)

"Some people say that if the Army had not come to help the Government then the Government would have succumbed to their demands. That means army is an independent organization which is a third party between the government and the people, which should act independently. But under the, constitution Armed Forces are under the government and this is the specialty of a superior democratic country"

(Mashrtq, June 7, 1977)

"Some think that the Armed Forces on orders from government should not act to restore law and order in other words they 'should remain, silent spectators of national destruction The Armed Forces is a fluid organization which has to face every challenge Whether the crisis is external, creation or internal, so that peoples' minds can be made seditious, or seeds of hatred and difference are sown ... If internal crisis is allowed then external crisis cannot be faced effectively.....A soldier is required to be extraordinarily patient and firm of will power, should pay no attention to unnecessary provocation, criticism and allegations. A soldier always takes: the right step according to the prevailing environments.

(Daily Jang, June 8, 1977)

It may not also be out of context here to mention the controversy about the letter which Air Marshal Asghar Khan wrote to the Armed Forces chiefs and officers during the PNA agitation in 1977. Asghar Khan since then has said many times that he was not asking them to rise against the government. All that he had said according to his version was that unlawful commands should not be obeyed and that only lawful commands should be obeyed. An official press note in that connection was issued by the PPP government on May 5 1977 The official spokes man had said:-

It is evident that Pakistan's territorial integrity will be defended within and outside the country. The enemy is present outside and within. Who will live if the country is defeated internally? It is the duty of the Armed Forces that whenever they are ordered they should obey in aid of civil power.

For this purpose an ordinary, magistrate can also request the Armed Forces for aid on behalf of the civil administration. As far as the central government is concerned, it is at liberty to make Constitution Clause 245 operative. This is a legal, order and it is the duty of the Armed Forces that whenever they are asked they should protect the life and respect of the people without any prick of the conscience.

They have done the same by restoring law and order in Karachi, Hyderabad, and Lahore thus creating conditions, conducive to negotiations between the politicians.

Every member of the Armed Forces is proud that he has taken part in saving the country which was being pushed towards anarchy by selfish people. Their services have been appreciated by those poor and downtrodden masses who had borne unmentionable troubles after elections in addition to the peace loving citizens. Similarly those who are used to the traditions of democracy' have also praised the conduct of the armed forces in restoring sanity.

It is quite clear that though all members of the Armed Forces have a right to exercise their vote, yet they have no right to take part in active politics. Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan's message is tantamount to undermining the loyalties of the Armed Forces. It is further surprising that a former chief should preach sedition. The question arises, "did the retired Air Marshal display moral ethics and a clear conscience when he was with the British and Pakistan Armed Forces or when he was himself a party to the abrogation of the Constitution in 1958."

(Hilal, May 6, 1977)

Hilal is the official, weekly newspaper of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Its views, therefore can be said to reflect those of the military establishment. In its editorial note on the above government statement it stated:-

... when the law and order situation within the country starts going out of control of the civil administration, the Armed. Forces are there to help the government in restoring the situation.

When the industrial life of the country is paralyzed, business houses are closed down, property is set on fire, human life becomes the cheapest thing of all. Towns, villages and districts instead of being the bastions of peace become the killing grounds and then it becomes obligatory for the government that it should use all forces at its disposal to

protect the life and property of the peace-loving citizens. One of the most effective sources of help available is the Armed Forces.

When to call in the forces in aid of civil power,, and what duties to entrust to them is decided by the government of that time which keeps the country's social and international situation under vigilance.

There is absolutely no room for doubt that Armed Forces are not the rulers, but an arm of the government. Their job is not to take national decisions, but to act on them. That is why they keep themselves away from political impurities and are always ready and united to obey the constitutional government"

"Armed Forces have played a crucial role in arresting the country's drift towards an administrative paralysis and anarchy, cannot be denied The forces unleashed by the political confrontation between the government and the opposition were irrevocably leading the country towards economic collapse and political chaos. It was evident to everybody that the fundamental interest in the country could be gravely jeopardized if the downward slide continued. The situation was such that it could lead to what a Defence Ministry spokesman called," a defeat from within".

The Army entered Lahore on the night of April 21/22, 1977 with the mission of 'preventing Lahore from burning', with a view to restoring peace and tranquility and with no other purpose at all. Lahore does not belong to an individual or a group of individuals or a political party. It is a national asset and the heart of the Punjab. It must be the duty of any responsible government to preserve it against lawlessness. Armed Forces have been made the target of provocations, insinuations and invidious only because they have been trying to protect the country from the dangers which many do not perceive. Realism and honesty demand that the people should be thankful to the Armed Forces for playing their appointed role, which is to uphold the Constitution and act as custodians of the 'life, property and honor of the people of Pakistan'.

It has been said that if the government is not legally constituted then all orders issued by them would also be illegal and it is not obligatory for the Armed Forces to obey them. Can it ever be part of the Armed Forces' duty to assess whether the government is legal or illegal?

Let us not run away from reality. Instead, we should examine some bitter truths. The Armed Forces have always been called in aid of civil power whenever it was in trouble may it be floods, locust, internal security, earthquakes, epidemics, tree plantation, law and order breakdown, counter insurgency, election duties, anti dacoits, displays on arrival of Heads of states or dignitaries. It has always been used as a panacea for all ills of society. As a general statement, one can say that whenever the Armed Forces are called in, conditions could have deteriorated to a point where there was no other

option. Their calling, presence and functioning in nation-saving tasks has always been applauded. So it can be inferred that whenever there are serious troubles, the taking charge of the situation by the Armed Forces cannot be in itself unwelcome or undesirable. This is especially true when the political institutions remain unstable and unbalanced due to the mistakes of politicians, mutual confrontation and lack of principles whereas the Armed Forces are well organized. This is also applicable to a *coup d'état*. The Army assumes a political role because it considers itself the most efficient institution in the entire country. The reliance of the civilian governments on the Armed Forces for the maintenance of law and order, their help to cope with natural calamities, contribution towards developmental and welfare programmes had built the image of armed forces. Simultaneously this had tarnished the reputation of civilian authorities.

It is also a fact that the Armed Forces, though welcomed initially, when they dig in their heels and put on civilian dress, provoke a different reaction from the people. Things gradually deteriorate, then a stage comes when those heroes are labeled villains. Gen Ayub Khan was welcomed when he was persuaded by Iskander Mirza to sack the Republican Party and given a hero's welcome when he got rid of Iskander Mirza. Yahya Khan was acclaimed a hero when he got rid of Ayub, but Bhutto was received as a hero when he took over from Yahya. Mr. Bhutto became a civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator, because without this label he could not control the situation. This proved true because in spite of all powers assumed under the constitution prepared or amended by him, he was rocked by the masses. It would have been better if it had not happened that way, but as it did happen, we cannot change history. The so-called people's and elected government behaved in such a manner that the PNA had to be formed to challenge the PPP's intention to stay in power forever. It was only when Mr. Bhutto realized that it was impossible to create a crack in the PNA that he reverted towards negotiations. There was an admission of rigging and broad agreement to go for reelections confirming indirectly, the illegality of the government. Mutual lack of confidence did not let them finalize the details. In fact there was no intention to do so. It was only when the government's malafide intentions became transparent that Gen Zia ordered the takeover. The Armed Forces in this instance acted to save the country from more bloodshed and anarchy. Daily *Hurriyat* dated 30, July 77 expressed: Every democrat should be grateful to the higher command that they did not think of a military take over from 10 March 1977 to 4 July 1977.

One of the most distinguished writers on military matters, Morris Janowitz has written:

"An Army is a crisis organization. Be the crisis an outcome of external aggression or an internal one engineered to subvert the minds of the people, to sow discord and dissension and fissiparous tendencies, the Army has to meet the challenge. The external threat can hardly be met if the rear is allowed to crumble. Thus the concern for internal order is an inherent aspect of crisis management for any army in the world. The Army cannot be

lured into inactivity. It must react in all sincerity for the greater good and integrity of the country".

The solidarity and well-being of Pakistan takes priority. The Armed Forces desired that the decision to take the country out of a quagmire be taken by the nation through their representatives. That is why it urged the PM to go for re-elections. The Army wanted restoration of complete democracy in the country. What undermined the civilian institutions and the political process more than anything else was the repeated and extensive use of regular troops for the sustenance of civilian authority. This exposed the weakness of the civilian leaders and created the impression that the Armed Forces could salvage a situation whenever the civil leaders were unable to manage their affairs. This destroyed the inherited principle of civilian supremacy and military aloofness from active politics.

* * *

In Aid of Civil Power

Pakistan has been facing internal security (IS) problems ever since it was created. Armed forces had been called in aid of civil power for one reason or the other *viz* floods, locust, riots, earthquakes, tree plantation etc. As the requirements had been too frequent the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) had been worked out so that troops reach without any loss of time. These procedures are well known and are rehearsed jointly by the civil authorities and armed forces in peace time when the conditions are normal. Civil administration provides the list of vulnerable points (VPs) and personalities to be protected in case of disturbances. These normally include residences e.g. Presidency, PM's residence, Minister's, CJCSC, COAS, Chief Justice, Commissioner, DC's Office, Tehsildar's office etc. Installations e.g. TV station, Radio Station, Telegraph Office, water tanks, bus stops, courts, electric grids, electric companies, sewerage controls, district jails, police stations, schools, colleges etc., post offices, telephone exchanges, hospitals, airports, railway stations etc. Thereafter plans to protect them are made and rehearsed jointly. VPs or VIPs are jointly identified. Plans made to protect them. So in other words there is nothing important which is not known to the Armed Forces units which are to respond to the call for duties in aid of civil power. Final decision on the list depends upon the civil authorities who have to send it to the Armed Forces in writing so that plans may be made accordingly.

Troops are not normally called by the civil authorities unless they feel that the situation is beyond their control. When troops are called in aid of civil power some of the principles which are followed are:-

- Minimum force is to be used.
- Automatic weapons are not used for automatic fire.
- No firing in the air. Fire has to be effective, Not to kill but to incapacitate.

- No firing at random but on specific persons as targets as indicated by the commander.
- Injured are, given immediate medical aid.
- Civil authorities cannot order troops, to fire.
- After taking over the situation the Military Commander decides how to restore normalcy etc.

For duties in aid of civil power or internal security duties Azad Kashmir Northern Areas and whole of Pakistan is divided into areas of responsibility which are assigned to various commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force Pertinent details are as under:-

- a. Lt. Gen, Sawar Khan responsible for IS duties in NWFP.
- b. Lt. Gen. F.A. Chishti responsible for IS duties in AK and Northern Areas. He would place his brigade located at Rawalpindi under the command of GOC Kharian (Maj Gen Shah Rafi Alam) for IS duties in Rawalpindi and Islamabad Districts.
- c. Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khan responsible for IS duties in his corps operational area and Rawalpindi civil division comprising Attock, Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat Districts. GOC Kharian was responsible for Rawalpindi civil division for which he had to take 10 Corps brigade located at Rawalpindi under command but for employment in Islamabad and Rawalpindi Districts only.

It may be noted from the above that though located at Rawalpindi I had no duties in aid of civil power or IS duties in Pakistan territory but my Brigade Commander at Rawalpindi had to take orders for IS duties etc. from the GOC Kharian to whom he was also responsible for all commissions and omissions and not to me.

Martial Law Administration

Exposition given in subsequent paragraphs may clarify many doubts. During martial law the country is administered by CMLA. He may appoint a Deputy CMLA. (Gen Zia never appointed any). It is divided into various areas of responsibility called zones. eg Punjab-Zone A, NWFP Zone B, Sindh Zone C, Baluchistan Zone D, Northern Areas Zone E. Each Zone is administered by an MLA. Thus the set up which emerged on 5, July 77 was:

CMLA:	Gen M Zia ul Haq
MLA Zone A:	Lt Gen M. Iqbal Khan
MLA Zone B :	Lt Gen Sawar Khan

MLA Zone C : Lt Gen Jehanzeb Khan Arbab
MLA Zone D : Maj Gen S.M. Abbasi
MLA Zone E : Maj Gen C.A. Majid.

A zone is divided into various Sub Zones. These normally coincide with the civil administrative division boundaries comprising various districts and each Sub Zone is administered by a DMLA. Each Sub Zone is further divided into Sub-Sub Zone which normally correspond to a civil administrative district and is administered by SMLAs (Sub Martial Law Administrators).

So SMLA Rawalpindi and Islamabad was never under my command for Marital Law duties. He used to take orders directly from the DMLA Rawalpindi Division i.e. GOC Kharian, and responded to him. All installations in Rawalpindi and Islamabad districts were under his command. This naturally included the Rawalpindi District Jail as well.

CHAPTER - FIFTEEN

CRISES OF FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN POLICY

The main purpose of a country's foreign policy is to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to develop economic prosperity for its people. It is governed by many factors, constant as well as variable. Constant factors are those which are connected with geography and history. Variable factors are the internal conditions of a country and the realities of global and regional geo-politico-economic environment. Interaction amongst themselves and between the constant and variable factors determine the foreign policy postures of a country at any given time. The formulation of foreign policy is a continuous process. It is in fact an effort to try and match the desirables with the possibilities. Irrespective of the genesis of a country, certain principles guide the formulation of a successful foreign policy. Some of them are

(a) Permanent interests

Countries do not have permanent friends or permanent enemies. They have only permanent interests e.g. safeguarding of territorial integrity, ensuring economic prosperity, ensuring the security and safety of its people. (Only one month after the Russians had carried out their aggression against Afghanistan, President Carter had said, on January 23, 1980, "any attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region, will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the USA and such an assault would be met by any means necessary including military force".) Could it be said in the context of Pakistan? Third world countries, in the face of the self-interest of the . superpowers, are powerless.

(b) Sound national defence

In modern warfare, no armed forces can defend the country on their own. It has to be the complete nation at war. There are many contributory factors towards the attainment of sound defence e.g. quality and quantity of weapons with which the armed forces are equipped, combat competency of the armed forces, mobilization plans and reliability of their being honored by the nation, infrastructure required for the operations of war, state of economy and for how long it can sustain the war effort international standing of the country, allies (if any) and their reliability, logistic support sufficiency etc.

(c) Peoples' trust

If the people do not trust, the government they will not go along with the government's policies. National cohesion is essential.

(d) Self reliance

An essential pre condition for an independent foreign policy is self-reliance.

(e) National unity

Cultural cohesion of the people and their economic well-being is required in addition to international diplomacy.

(f) Geo-political considerations

The party in power or the ruling class interests and preferences would need examination.

(g) Short and long term perspectives

Institutionalization of power and decision-making serves the national interests better than management on a day-to-day basis. i.e. Crisis management.

U.S.A.

Quaid-e-Azam's guidelines on foreign policy were tantamount to a neutral and non-aligned policy, but as far as the Islamic World was concerned it was not neutral. He considered Islamic countries gains as gains of Pakistan and he believed in defending the rights and claims of Islamic countries as of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan and Khwaja Nazimuddin followed the same policy. It changed after Khwaja Nazimuddin's unconstitutional removal. In Mohammad Ali Bogra's time, Pakistan got involved with the USA in defence pacts and the foreign policy basics underwent change. Until the abrogation of the defence pacts with the USA, during Mr. Bhutto's period, Pakistan's foreign policy remained almost the same as what Bogra started. Instead of foreign policy being non-aligned and non-committed, it was under the USA. A verdict on the defence pacts with the USA should not be given in a hurry without reviewing the relations with India. There were many problems immediately after Independence e.g., refugee problems, river water problems, disparity in defence etc., mostly due to India's obduracy. Pakistan's security was felt to be at stake. So it had to get arms and ammunition urgently from anywhere. During the Korean War, when the USA requested all UN members for help, Pakistan had refused. It was then privately asked to send a brigade to Korea, and in return get the equivalent of a division's arms in return Pakistan declined saying that it needed troops itself to get the Kashmir issue solved. When Bogra signed the defence pact with the USA Nehru withdrew his offer to solve the Kashmir issue. The USA never helped or put pressure on India over Kashmir. Prime Ministers Bogra Ch. Muhammad Ali Suhrawardy and Noon wanted to stay on the right side of the USA, and never did anything without clearance from the USA for fear of losing their posts. It was so bad in Noon's time that even top secret talks in the cabinet used to be conveyed to the USA not by American agencies but by some Pakistanis to keep Pakistan in the good books of the USA. It was the fault of the Pakistani rulers that they accepted the USA as their superiors.

It is said that Iskandar Mirza had ordered Martial Law with the USA's. clearance, but Ayub removed him without the USA's concurrence. But even during Ayub s period

Pakistan was subservient to the USA It was then that the USA took Pakistan for granted and cultivated relations with India. Pakistan had the USA's moral help. That is what forced India to the USSR India continued getting closer to Russia while the confrontation between the USSR and Pakistan increased. During Yahya's time, India and the USSR signed a pact. Russian help to India dismembered Pakistan. Pakistan was isolated from the rest of the world in the 1971 War. In spite of Pakistan's defence pact with the USA Nixon took no interest Pakistan cannot rely on America s friendship.

With the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet thrust in Afghanistan Pakistan became a first line state for American policy makers. The USA forgot about narcotics, human rights Martial Law, democracy and nuclear proliferation. It even gave F-16's to Pakistan. It wanted to replace Iran with Pakistan as its key regional ally to secure oil routes. This time it was Martial Law again. It was Gen Zia's government.

The main drawback in a Martial Law government is that there is no organized opposition (Only individual's views like mine can be there). So a single person formulated foreign policy. He did so to retain his chair and benefits and not for the well being of the country. Gen Zia did not respect public opinion he wanted to leave his affairs to God and be accountable only to Him. He got Pakistan involved in the Afghanistan issue. After a 3.2 billion dollar economic and military aid agreement with the USA the relationship entered a new phase. It had no effect on the non aligned status or Islamic Conference membership. We had not supported the USA fully and made the USSR our enemy. All the big powers are interested m our 350 mile long Baluchistan Coast. USSR India collusion cannot be ruled out.

In 1980 Brzezinski came and said that the 1959 Agreement is operative. "Pakistan is our friend and I have come to tell the world." (I was not allowed to attend the talks I was not even introduced to Brzezinski.) If the USA is in earnest let the 1959 Agreement be converted into a treaty and any attack on Pakistan including an attack from India be considered an attack on the USA.

It is said that no party can come into power in Pakistan without American help. This is because Pakistan is completely in the lap of the USA. It is also said these days that the USA is happy because democracy has been restored in Pakistan. But there is a consensus of opinion that whatever the US policy has been towards Pakistan since 1980 in spite of all assurances it is not based on sincerity of purpose. This view also holds that when hard times come the USA will leave Pakistan alone in the field as before US leaders statements lead to this feeling. Brzezinski had said if India attacks Pakistan the USA will not help. To Communists he had said we will fight you Senator Peter Galbraith said the USA should consult India before supplying weapons to Pakistan. The US ambassador to Pakistan has been making statements tantamount to interference in internal matters. Pakistan is not only threatened by Russia and Afghanistan but more so by India. It has previously tried to liquidate Pakistan but when Pakistan talks to the

USA the US runs like hell. It shows no understanding or commitment The USA is following a policy of appeasement. towards India and ignoring Pakistan. Will the USA keep quiet if India in collusion with the USSR attacks Pakistan? Nuclear technology for Pakistan is a danger to peace but to India it is an aid to pursue nuclear programmes What contradictions?

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has remained the main problem of Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1980's. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan were showing signs of a dramatic improvement shortly before the Saur Revolution took place in Kabul. President Daoud himself had made two visits to Pakistan, holding unexpectedly cordial talks with Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto in 1976 and with Gen Zia in 1977 and 1978. Daoud had long been a fervent supporter of Pakhtoonistan a policy which inevitably brought his country into rivalry with Pakistan since the early 1950s, when he had served as Afghanistan's Prime Minister.

President Daoud came to Pakistan in May 1976. I had the honor of meeting him and listening to some of his ideas about foreign relations. I represented the COAS on most of the occasions when he was not physically required accompanying him whenever protocol demanded. One of the occasions was when Mr. Bhutto took President Daoud to Murree in the helicopter. They conversed profusely on Durand Line economic facilities Pakhtoonistan Baluchistan and training facilities for the armed forces. President Daoud wanted a helping hand from Pakistan which was not forthcoming. He was inclined to recognize Durand Line as an international border. He said if he could get economic help he could get rid of the Russian yoke.

President Daoud visited Pakistan again in August 1977. Talks took place between President Daoud and Gen Zia. I recommended that Gen Zia tell Sardar Daoud that Pakistan had no disputes to be resolved with Afghanistan and that if there were any from his side we would be pleased to discuss and settle them. There was the possibility of getting the long disputed Durand Line recognized as the international frontier. Daoud had shown his willingness to recognize it in 1976 when he had visited Pakistan. I had the opportunity to be present at some of the unofficial talks and discussions. President Daoud seemed deeply worried about the Soviet Union. He wanted good relations with Pakistan. There was no Pakhtoonistan problem as the NAP leaders had signed the 1973 Constitution.

He was prepared to accept the Durand Line as an international boundary. I had asked Gen Zia to clinch this agreement, but Gen Zia had suggested that it would be more befitting to get it done on his visit to Kabul. President Daoud did not hesitate to agree. Subsequently, when Gen Zia went to Kabul on October 10, 1977, he did not include me in the entourage to accompany him, for reasons best known to himself. (I had about 90 kilometer common border with Afghanistan to defend as my area of operational

responsibility and was a witness to Durand Line conversations between President Daoud and Mr. Bhutto and President Daoud and Gen Zia.)

He took Gen Sawar and Gen Hassan. However, in Kabul, to my disappointment and surprise, there was no agreement or announcement about establishing the Durand Line as an undisputed border. On his return, I asked Gen Zia what had happened. Gen Zia told me that President Daoud was under some pressure. Thus we missed two opportunities, one with Mr. Bhutto and the second with Gen Zia.

President Daoud came back to Pakistan on March 5, 1978 in the course of a tour of the region. He did not stay for more than a day in any country, but in Pakistan he stayed three days. He had been to India, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran. Daoud had told King Khalid that relations with Pakistan would be better. He was introduced to Pakistani politicians also. The functions were arranged so as to give President Daoud the impression of complete reconciliation. At Lahore he talked about love, fraternity and brotherhood. He said Afghanistan was entering a new period of history. Before going back to Afghanistan talking to the Press, Daoud clarified that Afghanistan wanted peaceful negotiations to resolve all its problems with Pakistan. In turn, Gen Zia responded saying that with President Daoud's visit, mutual confidence and friendship would increase in both countries.

Daoud's three day visit to Pakistan left the impression that Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan were never better. He had said, "Nothing remained of what had kept us apart and all fears and doubts had been allayed. The substance of relations was more important for us than the formalities and words. In a nutshell, except for the day to day problems, there is nothing to bedevil relations This was to be his future policy. But President Daoud's change of face might not have been a welcome sight for others. He was toppled shortly afterwards.

We were in the middle of a Cabinet meeting on April 27, 1978 when the dramatic news of a coup in Kabul reached us. We were informed that Daoud had been killed, and that the situation was still far from clear in the Afghan capital. The Cabinet meeting was cut short, but the CMLA asked some of us to stay back to deliberate on the coup in Afghanistan. I gave my views at length. The coup had taken place when President Daoud was in Kabul and not abroad. That meant the intention was not only to take over but also to arrest him or assassinate him. This could not be a simple affair. It was definitely Russian-sponsored, because Moscow must have been made unhappy by the recent leanings of President Daoud towards Islamic countries, and away from the USSR. (The USSR was the first country to recognize the new regime in Kabul. Since the majority of the Afghan Air Force officers who had spearheaded the takeover operation had been trained in Moscow, that was only to be expected.)

It was not difficult to determine the cause or its motives. The assassination of the Afghan Communist chief, Mir Akbar Khyber, on April 18 in Kabul at the hands of a rightist, was a good indicator. The coup had met with violent opposition from troops loyal to the late President. It showed a split in the armed forces. That could be used to our advantage. The new regime should not be recognised. Afghanistan would fall under total Soviet domination unless we acted swiftly to exploit our potential influence. The defence of Pakistan lay in the defence of Afghanistan. We should install a favorable government in Kabul, using friendly Pushtun tribes. At the same time, Pakistan should use this golden opportunity to occupy positions on the Durand Line.

I argued that, unlike most coups, this one was not the coming to power of a junta but of a political party. Afghanistan's traditional role of a buffer between the USSR and ourselves was finished. Pakistan must be defended by sitting in Afghanistan. We should do whatever we could to arrange a friendly government headed by pro-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan. Tribal leaders might be sponsored to do it. However, my views did not find favor.

The majority of the members in the meeting did not agree with me, and said that such an action could not be initiated. It was Afghanistan's internal matter. The cabinet members almost pounced on me, and said that tribal area terrain was hostile and we would not be able to maintain a defensive posture militarily, if required. I told them that if my troops could sit at an altitude of 12,000 feet throughout the year, eye to eye with the Indian Army, why could they not sit in a friendly tribal area against an army not as good as the Indian? I was told I did not understand the mentality of the Pushtun tribesman.

One thing became very clear during that meeting. We knew nothing in depth about our neighbor Afghanistan, although we claimed a centuries old relationship, both historical and religious. Our knowledge was superficial and often wrong. Why were we such strangers, in spite of being so close geographically? Through this coup Russians could mean reaching warm waters, stopping China's influence in Asia or getting a lead on Americans.

The special Cabinet meeting was concluded by Gen Zia, with the instructions that the Afghan issue be kept under constant surveillance by special cell, that it meet at least once a week and recommend the course of action to be adopted the deliberations of the Cell would be a closely guarded secret. The names of the members would be intimated later. I was never made a member of the Afghan Cell Perhaps my knowledge of Afghanistan was too meager, perhaps 60 miles of common border in my area of operational responsibility in Wakhan District/Northern Area was of no importance perhaps Gen Zia did not want me to know what he was up to or maybe he wanted to please the majority of the Cabinet members who were quite vocal against my proposals.

At any rate, the first meeting of the Afghan Cell was convened, and I came to know that I was not a member. I then asked Gen Zia bluntly why he was keeping me out of it. His reply was in his typical hypocritical manner he indicated that I would be better employed away from it. In spite of this, I tried to keep Myself in the picture regarding the Afghanistan issue as befitted my responsibility for the area of my operations till my retirement on March 30 1980.

As a result of the coup in Afghanistan the Russian influence had increased manifold. It had given a tremendous boost to Soviet prestige in general and had made its influence in Afghanistan a factor to be reckoned with. Afghanistan's position as a buffer state had been compromised. The Russians had for the first time entered the South Asia region and had in Afghanistan a safe and strategically important base for operations. Their influence would radiate eastwards to Pakistan and India westwards to Iran and southwards to the Arabian Sea's warm waters.

In June 1979 I led a delegation to the People's Republic of China I had the honor of an audience with the Chairman Hua Guofeng where we discussed points of mutual interest. Our Ambassador Muhammad Younus was also present. Whereas there was general agreement on all points there was a marked difference of opinion on one point. I had maintained that the coup in Afghanistan was Russian sponsored and that sooner or later the Russians would walk in to pursue their overall designs. The Chairman maintained that the Russians were unlikely, to move physically into Afghanistan. The Premier referred to the situation in Afghanistan particularly to the anti government demonstration of June 24 1979 and enquired about the general situation Afghanistan was blaming both China and Pakistan for interfering. This was merely an excuse for the Taraki Government's, failures. The Afghan refugees were not all refugees in the conventional sense. Ethnic and tribal affinities had long existed on both sides of the border and running away from suppression the people of one side had unite naturally chosen to come and stay with their friends on the other. They had always carried weapons. There was no plausible method of stopping them from entering Pakistan for refuge. The Minister then drew attention to the forthcoming Pakistani elections and expressed fears that the Russians wanted to interfere in the region.

The Premier gave a detailed expose of Russia's expansionist moves. The strategic focus of the Soviet union was in Europe. It had made special efforts in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to control the flow of oil to Western Europe. Russia could send its troops to East Europe but could not do the same for the Middle East the Persian Gulf and Africa where it was utilizing Cuban troops. He also talked about Somalia and Ethiopia President Daoud who was beginning to show independence was killed and replaced by Taraki. In the two Yemen's, two Presidents were assassinated in 24 hours. Their expansionist and interventionist policies were designed to control the sea gates of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, to starve Europe of its supplies of oil.

In Afghanistan the Russians had succeeded in establishing Taraki's regime and could therefore not be expected to leave. Unless the people resisted their encroachment the Russians would not go away by themselves. When the Afghans rose against them there would be nothing the Russians could do about this resistance. The number of people killed would not matter because many more would rise to replace them. It was, therefore, necessary to support the struggle in Afghanistan.

In the face of Russian expansionism China and Pakistan should heighten their vigilance and prepare themselves by first getting united and becoming strong themselves. Thereafter, they should unite with the Third and Second World countries to oppose Soviet hegemonism and expansion.....

China was aware of the efforts made by Pakistan to resist the Soviet Union ... Since the Soviet Union could do nothing against China and NATO, its efforts were directed towards the soft South where it could wage wars.

One evening in January 1980, when I was playing golf on the Rawalpindi Golf Course, the club marker came to me and informed me that the Chinese Ambassador was around and would like to talk to me for a minute or two. I asked the marker would His Excellency like to come where I was playing, or would he meet me when I reached the club house. I was told that he would like to see me on the course. So I said that he would be welcome. He came, shook hands with me and said that he had a message for me from the Chairman. He did not know its full meaning. The message was "General, you were right. He said that and went away. I promised to explain this remark to him at our next meeting. The Russians had arrived I had been right when talking with the Chairman in Peking.

The Russian motives in invading Afghanistan were perhaps largely defensive. It was to stave off a victory by Islamic insurgents that might have given dangerous ideas to the USSR's large Muslim population. But where would the doctrine of self-defence end? In Pakistan? The Gulf? The Arabian Sea? Could Islamic fundamentalism become a domestic worry to the Kremlin? Russia's 50 million Muslims make it the world's fifth largest Muslim State. Most of the Muslims live in Central Asia and the Caucasus border with Iran Azerbaijanis, Turkomen and other Muslim minorities in the USSR could become targets of attempts to stir up an Islamic rebellion against all foreign domination of Muslims. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also, of course, roused the Islamic States.

I was made responsible for the emergency meeting of Islamic Foreign Ministers to be held at Islamabad, on January 26, 1980. It was already January 12, and the time was very short. In spite of my being not associated with the Afghan Cell, I accepted the responsibility. I deployed all available resources and made arrangements for the receptions accommodation, security, travel, lodging, catering, seating and recreational

arrangements for all those VIPs who were to come. Even Gen Zia agreed it was very well organized.

I remember one unpleasant decision which I gave on the seating arrangements. There was very little space for the Press, in the Press Gallery of the National Assembly Building, the venue of the meeting. About 250 journalists had come from overseas alone. So more accommodation was required. When my attention was drawn to it, I noticed that the contiguous two galleries were reserved for the bureaucrats. I cancelled their reservation. Were they going to tell the world what happened in the conference? I argued. They did not mind. (I hope!)

The conference went on very well as far as the arrangements were concerned. But although I was supposed to be present throughout, I was not to enter the main hall of the conference where the deliberations and speeches were going on. Gen K M Arif as COS had free access to it, not me. I did not bother about it. I knew Gen Zia's attitude to me too well. We started as strangers in 1976 and were still strangers, because our ideas on intellectual honesty were different.

Soon after the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser, USA, visited Pakistan's border with Afghanistan (in February 1980) along with Warren Christopher, US Deputy Secretary of State. They had talks with Gen Zia in Rawalpindi about how to protect the most vulnerable and strategic area of my operational command, contiguous to China, USSR, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Many officials attended these meetings including the DG ISI, Lt Gen Akhtar. I was however, not even introduced to these gentlemen let alone allowed to participate in the discussions. The time had come for me to quit office and I was eagerly waiting for March 30, 1980.

After Brzezinski had gone Lt Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman Director General ISI came to my office in Corps HQ and asked me for a favor. He wanted a little area in the regimental area of my Corps LAA Regiment at Ojhri Camp for the dumping and storage of some arms and ammunition to be placed at his disposal for some clandestine operations, I refused. There were no underground storage facilities in that area. It was insane to have explosives in the open there because proper igloos did not exist and Ojhri Camp was too close to Islamabad Airport the highway and civilian housing. I also told him that I was no party to Brezezinski and was not going to be a party to the ISI either.

He told me that he would refer the matter to Gen Zia which he did Gen Zia then asked me to allot some area to the DG ISI, Lt Gen Akhtar. I again stated my inability to oblige as it was fraught with dangers.

I told Gen Zia that as an instructor in the School of Artillery I had taught for four years that badly stored ammunition would produce unpredictable results (And it certainly did). Gen Zia asked me what could be done I told him that the DG ISI could have it after my retirement on March 30, 1980. Lt Gen Jahan Dad Khan, a close colleague of Gen Zia must have made Ojhri available to him after I handed over the command of the Corps to him.

The risk of storing explosives and ammunition at Ojhri Camp was revealed to everyone in April 1988 when huge explosions devastated a wide area and killed over one thousand people by many estimates.

The USSR knows Islam had managed to survive, if not flourish in the Communist world. If the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan finally succeed in throwing out the Communist Government an Islamic Republic of Afghanistan sandwiched between Iran and Pakistan, would put a community of Islamic nations with 130 million Muslims on the southern border of the USSR. Such a force would strengthen the hands of the Soviet Muslims living in Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in their dealings with Moscow. Moscow may not like it. The Russians will not let Afghanistan go out of their sphere of influence.

Gen Zia's personal commitment and involvement, made the Afghan issue the central theme of his government and foreign policy, and indeed of Pakistan's politics. The USA, with the support of its allies, would presumably be prepared to go to war with the USSR over the Gulf states which supply 60% of the West's oil, but it would not go to war in case of a Russian attack on Pakistan through Afghanistan. So we should try, to keep the Russians at bay by having a friendly government in Afghanistan.

As far as the Afghan refugees are concerned, they have suffered terribly from the war. Most of them have left everything behind, them. But there are saboteurs and drug smugglers amongst them. Some of them have bought expensive property in Pakistan. Where did the money come from? Even if it is true that the border has about 300 mountain passes in hospitable and inhospitable terrain, ranging from 13,000 to 15,000 feet altitude, and it cannot be sealed, refugees could not cross check posts in cars and Mercedes Benz trucks without the connivance of the authorities. The refugees must go back, and conditions conducive to their honorable return must be created. But then has everyone who came through the Khyber Pass gone back? How would they be tackled if they chose to turn against Pakistan? The guerrillas are well armed, and security could present big problems.

INDIA

Certain quarters in Pakistan still feel that India has not accepted Pakistan's existence from the core of its heart. India does not want to speak on equal terms but only hegemonistically, which Pakistan cannot accept at any cost. India is desirous of

unilateral economic benefits from trade in the region. India is against other countries strengthening their defence potential. It is also against Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme which is necessary for economic development.

India has always desired that the root cause of three wars with India and Pakistan, Kashmir, be settled through bargaining, but Pakistan stands on its solution based on UN resolutions. Indian newspapers had reported that Mr. Bhutto and Indira Gandhi had agreed during their talks in Simla in 1972 that the only solution to the Kashmir problem would be to freeze the line of control with minor adjustments. The Simla Agreement was only meant to normalize Indo-Pak relations in the wake of war. That stage has passed. Pakistan wants to go beyond the Simla Agreement and bring the two neighbouring countries closer by removing the threat of an armed conflict. A close relationship with Pakistan based on mutual understanding and peaceful cooperation would entirely change the atmosphere.

Relations with India have been strained ever since Pakistan's birth. They have fought three wars. Indira Gandhi was very hostile to Pakistan. Rajiv Gandhi also suffers from Pakphobia. He always talks about an attack from Pakistan, blaming Pakistan for Sikh terrorist problems. He is making his people successfully believe that Pakistan has exploded an atom bomb. The Indian leadership is now considering ways and means to defend itself against a Pakistani attack. Let us take a more detailed look at India.

The Indian Army is equipped with most modern weapons, it has operational plans, mobilization plans and positions prepared along the sensitive borders of Pakistan along Sindh. Most likely stores and ammunition have already been dumped in echelons.

The Punjab situation is not under control because of the Khalistan issue. For this India blames Pakistan, to exploit anti-Pakistani feelings, and to cover their own mistakes.

There is Indian obduracy on all disputes-Sallal Dam, Wullar Dam, Indian-held Kashmir.

India blaming Pakistan for training Sikh and Kashmiri saboteurs for operations in India, so that a cause to attack Pakistan can be established.

Psychological warfare, through radio, TV, VCR and books. (The book, Gathering Storm, not written by Benazir Bhutto, but labeled as such to create ill-feeling against the Army.)

Propaganda against Pakistan so that internationally it may be attacked any time and justified.

History being used against , the Muslims-invaders, enslavement, inter-marriages, conversion, to Islam by force and taking loot out of India etc.

Atom bomb stunt against Pakistan-including delivery system. False rumors about establishment of American military bases on the Baluchistan Coast.

Pakistan using economic aid from the USA and other countries for defence purposes because that much more becomes available to the Pakistan exchequer.

Psychologically preparing Indian nationals for aggression against Pakistan whenever required, to take their attention away from their own social, economic and cultural problems.

Constantly canvassing USSR that Pakistan would be used against it, especially when they have withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Assuring the USSR that India always safeguards Russian interests. Options available to India as expressed by their analysts and defence research scholars are:-

- a. Continue two way talks with Pakistan and convince Pakistan not to send saboteurs and terrorists (though Pakistan is not actually sending these).
- b. Destroy anti India (i.e. Khalistan) bases in Pakistan by hot pursuit. (There are non setup in Pakistan).
- c. Clandestine operations in Sindh and Baluchistan with the goal of secession from Pakistan.

India prefers the third option for obvious reasons but it would be better to combine all three.

India is no longer a secular state. It is a fanatic Brahmin State. All others are being labeled as hostile. Anti Muslim riots is a common pattern. Sikhs are being exterminated Sikhs and Hindus are clashing as on two nation theory. Sikhs have given the sacrifice and laid the foundation of Khahstan. It is only a matter of time. It took Muslims 90 years to regain freedom in the shape of Pakistan. Indian Held Kashmir shows pro Pakistan feelings. Indian Held Kashmir Muslims have seen that they are gradually being converted in to a minority through settlement of Hindus in great numbers in Kashmir. Hindus in Bombay want all others to quit.

The proposal that India and Pakistan renounce war is nothing new. Nehru proposed it in 1949 and it was repeated by India when Mohammad Ali Bogra was PM of Pakistan. It was reiterated again in 1963 when talks on Kashmir failed and in 1965 at Tashkent.

Only a lasting peace would enable India and Pakistan to devote their resources to eradicate poverty and build a sound foundation for a better life for their 900 million people. The geopolitical situation and the tension built up due to the Afghan issue demand that India and Pakistan should adopt a pragmatic approach to their problems.

Pakistan is a buffer state between Communism and India. If Pakistan goes red Russia cannot be stopped. So India should have friendly relations with Pakistan. Both are peace loving states and should live in a friendly manner. Pakistan is scared of India and cannot trust it. A peaceful settlement is only likely to be achieved if and when the propaganda war is stopped. It cannot be done till the Kashmir issue is solved. The sooner it is settled the better it would be for both nations

USSR

Pakistan has faced pressure from the USSR, not only because of Afghanistan. At one time, the USSR was secretly flying military supplies for Ethiopia through Karachi. Zia had mentioned it to me after I had come back from Somalia. One day it was reported to me that a Russian aircraft had landed at Karachi and was parked near the runway with Russian military guards on it. I ordered that it should not be allowed to take off without inspection. The Russians would not agree to the inspection. The Soviet ambassador Mr. Azimov approached Gen Zia and all of us met at Zia's residence. I admitted that I had stopped the aircraft. The ambassador threatened us with dire consequences. We did not change our stand. We were then blamed for supplying arms and ammunition to Somalia. I admitted that it was a little token aid to our Muslim friends with which in any case it could not hope to win the war against Ethiopia.

In 1985 Gen Zia said that a superpower had clearly warned that if Pakistan continued to help the Afghans it would have to pay for it. Apparently there is no problem with the USSR as far as bilateral relations are concerned. Pakistan has good relations in the field of trade and technology. Soviet Pakistani relations have promoted cooperation in trade, economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields. There have been political contacts between the leaders of the USSR and Pakistan for the growth of mutual interest and the desire to know each other better, only natural for neighboring nations. Both sides have shown a desire to go on strengthening political, economic, scientific, cultural and artistic contacts and expanding the field of cooperation. Efforts will continue for further strengthening and development of good neighborly cooperation in the interests of peace, social progress and understanding between nations.

CHINA

The relationship with the People's Republic of China is an important pillar, of Pakistan's foreign policy. It is an enduring and close association. Do we really have good relations with our neighbors -- India, Iran, Afghanistan, USSR? China is the only exception and the US is too far off to be relied upon.

ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

Being an ideological state. Pakistan has always tried to enhance the cause of Ummah Islamiya and to establish and strengthen brotherly relationships with Muslim countries. As an active member of the Islamic Conference, Pakistan has always tried to establish close cooperation in political, economic, cultural and social fields with Islamic countries.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

As a member of the non-aligned movement. Pakistan has steered its course cautiously so that it performs its non aligned role effectively. It has fought against pressure from big powers. It has fought against colonialism, racism and hegemonism.

Pakistan's foreign policy should be to help safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to make friends with other nations of the world, to enhance the national image and prestige of Pakistan abroad, and to help accelerate the process of socio- economic development of Pakistan and its people.

Pakistan should be against war, oppression, discrimination and inequality. Pakistan should support peace, freedom, justice, human rights and development of social justice. Above all else, Pakistan should try to follow an independent non- aligned policy.

CHAPTER - SIXTEEN

GENTLEMAN CADET TO GENERAL

It was early 1946. I was a resident student of RSD College, Ferozepur, India and was in my final year BA studying economics and political science. One fine morning, as Mohsin Sheikh, Ashfaq Ahmad (Talqeen Shah), Mohammad Younus and I came out of the college tuck shop, we saw a lot of students gathered round the Principal's office. Apparently a British Officer, a Major in Indian Army, had come from Lahore Cantonment and was interviewing boys keen on joining the Indian Armed Forces. We wondered what he was up to, because World War II had just ended. Why did he need people to join the forces? Gossip continued on these points while boys went in and out of the interview room. Since we four were not really interested, and thought it was better to complete our studies than to become mercenaries we did not go in to meet the Major. But we hung around with the others.

At about four in the afternoon, the Major came out and said, "Well, boys, I am very encouraged with the response that I have received, from you. I am sorry I can't see any more of you as I have to go back to Lahore. If any of you are interested I will be at my residence in Lahore Cantonment tomorrow morning. You are welcome to see me there, if you so desire. Before I leave I would however like to remind you of the central government's decision that competitions for entry into the Indian Civil Services (ICS) have been stopped and vacancies in future are to be filled by Armed Forces officers who would be released from the services. You may like, to join the Armed Forces as a commissioned officer rather than wait for the resumption of competitive examinations. Best of luck to all of you." Three cheers for the Major, we said.

All sorts of questions now had us arguing in search of answers. Should we do our BA? What would we get after that? When would the ICS competitive examinations be resumed? What would the life be like as a King's commissioned officer? What would be the privileges? What would be the hazards? How would the family take it?

In the evening, Younus asked me whether we should attend the economics honors class on the following day, or take a quick trip to Lahore Cantonment to meet the Major and also see an old friend.

We decided to go Lahore. And early next morning, we boarded the Punjab Mail at Ferozepur. We reached Lahore at about half past eight in the morning and it was raining. The Major's residence was only about four hundred yards from the railway station. So we got hold of a Tonga and proceeded there.

We pressed the call bell with thumping hearts. Would we be arrested, chided or treated as gentlemen? We were still thinking about all this, when a smart and neatly dressed bearer came out and asked us who we were and what we wanted. We told him that we had come from Ferozepur to meet the Major, as suggested by him yesterday. In a few minutes the Major in civies now, walked into the room where we were waiting. He stayed with us for about forty minutes. He offered us a cup of tea, enquired about our journey, asked some general questions, and finally gave us some forms to be filled in. Thereafter he said that he had initially selected both of us to appear before an Inter Services Selection Board (ISSB) in due course and that we would be informed when.

After about a month we received instructions to proceed to the ISSB at Bareilly. Joining dates for both of us being different, my friend went first. I followed. I stayed three days in Bareilly. There were about forty candidates from all over India. MSc's from Calcutta and Madras universities, BA's from United and Central Provinces, Intermediates from Punjab and North West Frontier Province, some serving soldiers from Indian state forces, some princes from unknown states, some robust looking Anglo Indians, some well turbaned smart Sikhs and some meekish young men. Over the three days all of us had to take several written group and psychological tests, cross obstacle courses, participate in discussions, stay under observation during meals etc. I still remember the interview I had with the psychiatrist, a British officer in civil clothes. He asked me if I would join the ranks or as a Viceroy's Commissioned Officer if I was not selected for the King's Commission. I told him that under those circumstances I would prefer to continue my studies till graduation then think of doing something thereafter. Off we went to our homes, without knowing what was in store for us, but certain that out of our batch of forty five some must have been selected.

I was selected for training as a Gentleman Cadet, Younus could not make it. There were two courses to be run, one at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, for regular commission, and one at the Officers Training School (OTS), Bangalore, for short service commission. The duration of the course at the OTS would be roughly half that of the Academy. I had a choice, because my age made me eligible for both courses. I opted to go to the OTS, Bangalore. When I reached there, I found that Sikander Lal Chawla and Abdul Ghafoor from Punjab, Newton from Delhi and Jemadar Hazura Singh from the Royal Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers had made it from our batch at the ISSB, Bareilly. Chawla later retired as a Brigadier in the India Army, Ghafoor as a Lt. Col. in the Pakistan Army, and Hazura Singh died in an accident as Major in the Indian Army.

At the OTS, Bangalore, we were told that ours was going to be the last Short Service Commission Course there and thereafter only the IMA would function. Bangalore was a wonderful place. It was also a centre of high technological training in different disciplines. I still have a clear impression of the Hindustan Aircraft Factory visited by us, assembling aircraft even at that time, whereas in the areas later known as Pakistan --

East or West -- there was not even a proper nut and bolt factory. The climate remained moderate throughout the year. We did not need any woollies, cotton cellular clothing was good enough throughout the year. I bought my first pair of woolen uniforms, in Bombay on my way to Pakistan, in November 1947. Gentleman Cadet (later Lt. Gen) Jahanzeb Arbab was also there at the OTS, Bangalore, where I met him for the first time.

Our head dress in Bangalore, during parade hours was an olive green drill beret with a white band. Our walking out headgear was a khaki drill side hat with a white band. Peaked hats were only worn by officers and not by GC's of the OTS, Bangalore. One afternoon, we saw about six cadets standing outside the Adjutant's office with peaked hats and white bands around them. We asked where they were from and why they were standing there. We were told that they were Gentlemen Cadets from the School of Artillery, Deolali, and that having failed to make the grade as Artillery, officers they had been switched to Bangalore to continue their training as Infantry Officers.

It had been a career pattern in the Indian Army that cadets who could not make officer grades in the Indian artillery or other arms and services of the Indian Army, used to be reverted to infantry training. In the initial selection., the best cadets used to go to the Armoured Corps and Artillery, the next best to the Engineers, Signals and Infantry. The sight of these cadets, who included some British nationals amongst them, was very discouraging. because only a week earlier six of us, out of a course of 120, of which 50 percent were British, had been selected to go to the School of Artillery for training. No cadet had been earmarked for the Armoured Corps because there was already a surplus of officers. So we were rightly scared as to what would happen to us if we were not able to make the grade there.

Since ours was going to be the last course, and there would be no OTS to revert to, we informed our Company Commander, Maj Truss, that we did not want to go to Artillery School. We were told to "shut up" and to do as ordered. So we went to the School of Artillery, Deolali. There our class started as six, but when we got our commissions, we were about 30, out of which ten were for the Royal Artillery. The seniors had joined us after relegation. That is where I met Lt Sawar Khan (later Gen) and Gentleman Cadet Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan (later Gen) for the first time. It was February 1947.

1947 was a year of terrible disturbances during the partition of India. During these disturbances I was at Deolali. All kinds of news used to reach us as to what was happening around the country. In June-July the postal systems were disrupted. I had no news of my parents and other family members from July 1947 onwards till after I reached Pakistan in November 1947. I had the option of continuing serving in the Indian Army or to opt for Pakistan. I opted for Pakistan. Then came 14 August 1947. India was divided. We got our Independence. Pakistan was created. Long live Pakistan. Those of us who had opted to serve in Pakistan were told by Brig Frowne, Commandant, School of Artillery, that the Pakistan contingent -- comprising Officers,

Viceroy's Commissioned Officers, Non Commissioned. Officers, other ranks and civilians paid out of the defence budget -- would go to Pakistan by rail, along with the Pakistan share of the School of Artillery, guns, prime movers, vehicles, arms, ammunition and technical stores, on a date to be fixed later. It transpired later that it had been planned by the Indians to derail our train near Bhopal, massacre all ranks and confiscate the guns arms and ammunition, because of the fear of our likely participation with all these elements in Kashmir against the Indian Army. This information had leaked out through a Muslim Moplah infantry officer, who at the time could not be easily placed from his name as to whether he was Muslim or Christian. He was on the staff of an army headquarters in Junagarh. Consequently Brig Frowne refused to dispatch the Pakistan contingent by train and demanded that it be sent by sea Brig Frowne left India for the UK in 1947 and much later joined the Royal Pakistan Artillery in 1952 as Commander Corps Artillery.

So far we had been living together quite amicably as one community of bachelor officers in mixed bachelor officers quarters - Hindus Muslims Sikhs Christians. But now our quarters were segregated. For security reasons all Muslim bachelor or single officers were lodged in one locality. That was where after some days a Muslim Havildar, a technical assistant was stabbed and killed in front of our quarters by his non Muslim colleagues. It happened when we had gone to our mess for dinner and we came to know about it on our return through the police who had arrived there. Nobody was arrested or punished.

Our contingent was later moved to Transit Camp Kalyan where we were to stay till our voyage to Karachi was arranged. We stayed there for about a month before moving on to Bombay. Very shabby and inhumane treatment was meted out to us during our stay at Kalyan. There was only one dining room for the whole lot of officers single or married along with them families, purdah observing ladies and children. All of us were required to eat all our meals in just one hour in the dining room. No room service was allowed. No provision of fresh milk was made for children. There was no running water in the living quarters except for half an hour in the morning. The camp commandant whose father had been killed in Hindu Muslim riots at Ferozepur, was taking revenge in his own manner. Some of us stayed away mostly at Bombay to reduce the congestion in the officers mess at the transit camp. Finally we sailed from Bombay in two ships on different days. I reached Karachi in the first week of November 1947.

It is pertinent to state here that at the time of partition there were no Armour, Artillery. or Infantry regiments or battalions which were totally Muslim units in the Indian Army, whereas there were many complete Hindu and Sikh units. This was due to British policy since the 1857 War of Independence and, was aimed at preventing Indian Muslims in army service becoming a potential danger to the Raj. As a result, when the Armed Forces partition took place, our share of manpower in uniform arrived as individuals, platoons or oddly constituted companies. Similarly, as all the ammunition

factories and major military equipment depots were in India, our share of all these remained in India, in spite of the promises made to Pakistan.

On reaching Karachi, we saw that Pakistan's behavior with the outgoing non-Muslim refugees was much better than meted out to us by India. After disembarkation at Karachi, it was noticed that while refugees migrating to India were allowed to carry everything, we had been deprived of our major belongings, including our personal weapons. During the migration of Muslim refugees to Pakistan, the number of women who were abducted will never be known accurately. Suffice it to say that thousands of families were finished at the hands of non Muslims bands who had the tacit support of army and militia. Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State were killed under a premeditated set plan. All this was planned to strangle Pakistan at birth.

Pakistan absorbed the influx of refugees by a kind of miracle. They were generally not very demanding. They accepted whatever was offered, though some locals exploited the situation under the pretext of "helping" refugees. Some looted the houses, misappropriated valuables and took over valuable properties becoming rich overnight. There was no check, no ethics and no accountability. This produced a class of upstarts. They assumed the role of administrators and rulers through their ill-gotten wealth.

And suffering through their hands continues till today. Most of the Rehabilitation staff responsible for giving comfort and justice to refugees were corrupt and dishonest. This, of course, made for dishonest decisions and created avoidable problems for the refugees. Decisions given on property disputes were generally wrong. Nobody bothered. The flood gates were open to the dishonest to become rich. Some of this same class later used their new wealth to move into politics.

Today we are being ruled mostly by them or by their children. We have no hope to get rid of these yokes, till we discard the personality-oriented political parties and introduce parties based on collective leadership in which people come and go, but the parties carry on forever. We cannot give the prerogative to the filthy rich to rule over us forever.

ANNEXURES & APPENDICES

ANNEXURE 'A'

CHISHTI AND AZAD KASHMIR

I

As Minister for Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, I was responsible for the following achievements:

1. Radio stations at Gilgit and Skardu.
2. Property rights given to refugees from Srinagar valley and Jammu.
3. Pensions granted to war widows of 1947, 1965 and 1971 wars.
4. Introduction of local self-government and right to vote in the Northern Areas.
5. Recovery of money from co-operative banks.
6. Development of road network through the work of Army engineers.
7. Allotment of land to Mangla Dam displaced families in the Jhang district of Punjab, and monetary grants to them to settle there.
8. Accountability of all office holders through tribunals, without any exception.
9. Local Bodies Elections for the first time held in Azad Kashmir.
10. Abolition of seats quota reserved for AK President, Prime Minister and for AK Federal Minister, with admissions to colleges open only on merit.
11. Additional places reserved for AK students in Medical colleges and Engineering College in Pakistan.
12. Doubling of penalty in case of AK students of Pakistani Medical and Engineering Colleges who did not return to serve the areas.
13. Improvement of medical facilities in inaccessible areas

During my tenure as Corps Commander of Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, I did not let the Indian Army erect pillars or dig a trench or erect barbed wire at any point along the line of control, or surrender an inch or territory to them. It was unfortunate that under the Simla agreement, *de facto* and *de jure* positions of the previous ceasefire line were not honored, and the areas which were in physical

occupation of the belligerent were retained. This was tacit acceptance of the fact that whatever is grabbed by force is retained.

I had requested Gen Zia to take his Cabinet Ministers on an orientation tour of the northern Areas. I arranged for them, to be taken to Irshad Pass, Mintika Pass, Khunjrab Pass and some important places along the line of control in the Kargil sector. Gen Zia expressed his genuine appreciation of the opportunity afforded to him to spend three memorable days in the Northern Areas. He summed up his impression in his letter NO 17/3/COAS, dated October, 7, 1978, addressed to me which read: "My visit to the Northern Areas, on October 3 to 5, 1978 was at once a heartwarming and a rewarding experience for me. Wherever I went, whatever I saw, whoever I met, left an indelible impression on my mind. I have come back with a sense of re-assurance that our men serving in these areas are made of exceptional mettle and capable of rising to immeasurable heights. Whether it was the enthusiastic welcome by the people on the waysides, the earnest response of the public at the meetings, the constructive approach of the notables during the exchange of views, the excellent state of organization of Army Units, the extraordinary ardour of the troops at work, or the perfect harmony between the Military and the Civil, authorities and local population, every feature bore the unmistakable stamp of your guidance and leadership. I wish to thank you sincerely for all this"

Such letters of appreciation made people jealous of me.

* * * * *

An ugly situation had developed in 1977 in Kohistan Area, between northern region and the NWFP. Pakistani and Chinese engineers were working on the Karakorum highway there. The locals, had blockaded the Chinese route and were not letting them go to their campsite. Relations between the locals and the Army units had become bitter. Internal security duties were involved. That area was actually the responsibility of Lt Gen Sawar Khan, and Maj Gen Fazle Haq. They had shown their inability, though, to handle the situation, So Gen Zia placed Kohistan under my command, and I issued the necessary order to deal with the situation. An additional brigade from Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khan was given to me for this. A clash had taken place at Dubair on May 3, 1977. The situation became extremely complicated due to the security of the Chinese and our engineers. A mere show of force could endanger their lives. The combined efforts of civil and Army, authorities managed to control the situation. Six people were killed, 57 were held and Karakorum was finally cleared of road blocks. Brig Mir Abdul Nayeem and Mohammad Azam Khan, Commissioner, Hazara Division, had done well. I recommended some of the officers and men for gallantry awards, but they never received them.

* * * * *

II

The Sardar Qayum Case

On June 19 1978 Sardar M A Qayum Khan former President of Azad Kashmir and Member of the Constituent Council of Rabita al Alam al Islami wrote a letter to Gen M Zia-ul-Haq CMLA with a copy to me. The contents are given below:-

It is a great irony that my honest and sincere efforts to extend wholehearted cooperation to your government since the very beginning, have ultimately resulted in serious misunderstandings and the sword of vengeance drawn against me The lobby against me has gained the upper hand and succeeded in creating the wedge My regime shall be remembered in history as the golden age for rule of law, morality, administration trust of the people with credibility of course development of the Azad territories and solidarity with Pakistan compared to all the preceding and the following periods put together The worst of my enemies, Mr. Bhutto, who publicly slandered his own choices, and the handmade government Muzaffarabad also admitted the historically eventful tenure of my government

.... I wish to draw your attention to the so called charges and say that

- I. The tale of my accountability is nothing but a deliberate canard meant only to revile my person.
- II. By any standards it appears to be pure and simple vindictive victimization and not accountability, and I do not merit victimization at the hands of a regime that I have not only wished well, but have desperately strived for its success and sought to enlist cooperation for it inside and outside the country.
- III. So far the notification is grossly unlawful as it has no legal support. Is it not strange that the Government issues a notification without any legal cover? Till today no legal cover has been provided to it Complexion of the Azad Kashmir High Court is such at the moment that I would better not go to them for any redress. The less I say about it the better. It is more of a political group than of jurists.
- IV. I have been singled out which is again very unfair by any means while there have been other Presidents also, and some of them are notoriously known for their misdeeds and even opposition of the basic ideology.

- V. Honesty and integrity is my only asset which has been challenged most mercilessly and unfairly through those who are at the lowest ebb of honesty and ability by any yardstick, etc etc.

We as the most aggrieved people at the hands of the previous regime and victims to their tyranny, were rightly expecting a redress at the hands of this regime Our impression of brotherhood and equality in rights of citizenship is perhaps an illusion....."

Sardar Sikandar Havat Khan had approached me to get Sardar Qayum's case withdrawn from the Tribunal. He claimed it was derogatory and an insult to a component party of the PNA. I showed my inability and told him that all cases have to go before a tribunal, therefore I could not make an exception. Then he requested me to allow Sardar Qayum to see me. I agreed to this, as I had nothing against him personally.

Sardar Qayum came to me after a day or two and showed his gratitude for all that I had done for him so far. Thereafter he requested that his case be withdrawn as he was a former President of AK and an active member of the PNA. I asked him point blank if he considered himself guilty or innocent, He kept quiet. Then I said, if you are guilty then how do you expect us to drop the case when the CMLA is laying so much stress on accountability and if you are not guilty then why do you worry, your respect will be enhanced when the Tribunal declares you innocent. He was rather upset and dissatisfied. He told me in clear terms that he would like to do his best to ensure that he does not have to appear before the Tribunal. I told him to please himself. He left my office an angry and worried man.

One day Mufti Mahmood talked to me about Sardar Qayum's case and asked me to help him to overcome the difficulties and to drop the case against him. I told Mufti Sahib that it wasn't me who was insisting upon Sardar Qayum's case because I had no personal involvement in it nor was I gunning for him. It was the Azad Kashmir Government which had taken up the case as all other cases, and all were equal before the law and as per the CMLA's policy, there would be no exceptions. I showed my helplessness, even if I had wanted to intervene. I advised Mufti Sahib not to make it a prestige point and to let Sardar Qayum's case be dealt with like any other case. Mufti Sahib said that he would like to discuss it with Gen Zia. I told him that he could please himself, but he would be wasting his time as there was enough against Sardar Qayum according to the Azad Kashmir Chief Executive's reports. Some days after this, Gen Zia wanted me in his office to discuss Sardar Qayum's case so I went and saw him.

Gen Zia told me that Sardar Qayum being a PNA leader and quite helpful in coordinating matters between the PPP and the PNA might be excused and his case not forwarded to the Tribunal, and if already sent it might be withdrawn. I told Gen Zia that I would give him a clear picture and thereafter accept the directions and decisions

given by the CMLA. So I showed him the letter of Azad Kashmir Chief Executive Brig Mohammed Hayat Khan (No CE/977-EC/78, dated June 25, 1978). After reading the letter, Gen Zia said that there would be no change in the decision already taken, and Sardar Qayum should try to defend himself. The letter was a damaging indictment of Qayum's misuse of state funds.

There is an overwhelmingly large number of Cases of grave financial irregularities, favoritism, abuse of power and misapplication and diversion of public money committed by Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayum Khan, former President Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which were brought to the notice of this government and it was on the basis of substantial and fully supported and corroborated proof provided by rebuttable evidence that the matter was finally referred to the Disqualification Tribunal for fair and judicial determination of the issues involved. The instances of the glaring irregularities and corruption are so numerous and overwhelming in number and gravity that all allegation and charges could not be included in the reference.

13 main cases for investigation of corruption and misappropriation of public money were detailed in the letter, plus 17 additional allegations of financial misconduct and gross irregularities. They included improper awards of contracts to close friends, irregular payments and dealings with state funds and reinstating government employees dismissed on charges of corruption.

I had also shown Gen Zia a letter dated 14, June 1978 which Mir Abdul Aziz Editor *Insaf* had written to the Azad Kashmir President and Chief Executive. It read:-

"Reference of Sardar Abdul Qayum to a Tribunal for accountability was a very wise step. In fact it was overdue. Otherwise there was an impression that accountability was meant only for the People Party Azad Kashmir. Even the Chief of the Jamait Islami Azad Kashmir recently pointed this out.

I have nothing personal against Sardar Abdul Qayum, but the fact remains that he remained in power in Azad Kashmir for most of the time when Mr. Bhutto was in power in Pakistan, and the allegations, were brought against him in Pakistan, and the allegations were brought against him in Press, on the platform and even in the Assembly".

*** **

After reading this book i.e. '*Betrays of Another Kind*' Lieut General M. L. Chibber (Retd) of the Indian Army wrote the following letter to me:-

Lieut Gen (Retd) (Retd)

M. L. Chibber
20-1A MAX DRIVE
MORRISTOWN NJ 07960 USA
19 August

Dear Faiz,

I have just finished reading your book "*Betrayals of Another Kind*". I enjoyed reading your frank, upright and candid views and feel that as a fellow soldier I must write to you to see if I can get you interested in a crusade Indo-Pak Reconciliation. Let me first introduce myself.

I started life at OTS Bangalore. We might have had an overlap because Brig Said Azahar and I worked for Maj Trus till August 1946 when we left for IMA to be in the Second Regular Course. I retired from Udhampur as G.O.C-in-C Northern Command in August 1985. Thereafter I was Chief Executive of Management Development Institute at Delhi and currently I am a Nehru Fellow for 1990 and 91 to research the introduction of Nation Service in India. I am here in connection with my research. The address above is that of my son-in-law as my firm base while I and my wife move around in the U.S.A. We shall return to India on 4 Nov.

My wife and I have been, working for Indo-Pak reconciliation as a small offering to the next generations and our children. We hope that they will have a more peaceful subcontinent than what we had. I incidentally have been, of late, trying to build public opinion in India for our crusade and I frequently write in the press.

On our way to the U.S.A. We stopped in Switzerland to participate in a conference on reconciliation organized by the Moral Rearmament people. It was essentially for the Germans, Poles, the Russians and some other East Europeans. We participated and gave our views on Indo-Pakistan situation and our endeavors. What I saw was remarkable. The MRA promotes the practice of reconciliation and overcomes "hurts" and "hates" by observing four absolute values which are common to all religions—absolute Honesty. Purity Unselfishness and Love I am mentioning these because I can make out from your book that you have practiced these.

Besides insisting in the press we also interview people to get and give ideas we have met about a 100 people so far who have a role from the President of India downwards. On your side Dr. Mubashar Lieut Gen Atiq ur-Rahman (my IMA Company Commander) Nasim (your current UNO Ambassador and few others. I hope someday we can meet and discuss this matter further, In case you are interested, then do drop a line. With warm regards

Yours

(CHIBBER)

PS

I am writing care Said Azahar and hope that the letter reaches you.

A facsimile of the letter is at Appendix 1. I replied General Chibber's letter on 17, October 1990 at his U.S.A. address. I do not know whether it reached him or not because I never got its acknowledgement My reply sent to him was as following:-

Lt Gen F A Chishti (Retd)
1 Akbar Road
Rawalpindi Pakistan 46000

Dear General Manohar,

Thanks for your, letter of 19th August which reach ii me a couple of days ago through Brig Said Azahar. I am glad to know that you have read my book "*Betrayals of Another Kind*".

I appreciate your approach We remain comrades in arms. Whereas you have held some appointments of national importance since your retirement in Aug 1985. I have been a free lance critic since my retirement in Mar 1980. Like yourself I also had the honor to serve, in Kashmir and Northern Areas. This should have common direct bearing on our thinking on the Indo-Pak reconciliation idea which you have undertaken as a crusade. It is certainly noble and worth attaining but I do not see it materializing because injustice never breeds cohesion. Unfulfilled promise of India of letting the Kashmiris exercise their right of self determination seems to be the main hurdle. Let this hurdle be removed and reconciliation would follow as fall out.

I am also for love, peace and prosperity, for our posterity in the Subcontinent, but with honor. To me religion is something between the individual and its creator. Let the individual practice it the way it wants to. The state should however provide all facilities to all citizens to enable them to practice it the way they want to. As far as human rights are concerned their violation, does not matter how trivial or minor it may be, must never go unpunished, First punishment must follow first mistake. Only then can we make our subcontinent worth living.

Let us practice the traits of intellectual honesty, judiciousness, uprightness, frankness and the courage to call a spade a spade as taught to us in the profession of arms.

I do not mind meeting anybody or attending any meeting on Moral Rearmament sponsored by anybody and anywhere in the world. We owe better world to our children.

With best wishes to your lady wife who as you say is a, helping hand in your crusade, and warm regards to both of you.

Yours
(CHISHTI)
17-10-1990

Almost about the same period, when this letter was written, the Kashmiris were struggling for their rights and giving supreme sacrifices of their lives to attain it. They would Inshallah, succeed very soon in their mission.

* * * * *

ANNEXURE 'B'

CHISHTI ON ELECTIONS

Report and Recommendations of the committee for General and Local Bodies Elections (Sent by Lt. Gen Chishti to Gen Zia-ul-Haq, September 30, 1978, Corps HQ letter 2197/PA)

General and Local Bodies Elections

Gen Zia wanted a critical analysis of the situation prevailing in the country to be carried out with a view a determining the time frame, for holding General and Local Bodies Elections in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. For this he appointed a new committee with me as its Chairman. (The CMLA Secretariat letter 571/CMLA of August 17, 1978.) The recommendations of the committee as follows were sent to Gen Zia under my signature. (My Corps HQ letter 2197/PA dated September 30, 1978)

Commitment

The President has already made an unequivocal reiteration that 1979 will be the year of General Elections.

Apprehensions

The country is passing through the most critical phase of its troubled existence. It is facing deep-rooted problems in almost all spheres including political, economical, ideological and psychological spheres. The most dangerous aspect of the situation is the people's increasing loss of faith in their destiny as a united nation.

The present mood and psyche of the nation is a pertinent point. The national euphoria and the dawn of expectations which greeted the military takeover in July 1977 have disappeared and have given way to national bewilderment, apathy and despondency. Suspicions have arisen regarding the intentions and duration of Martial Law.

While committed to cultivating and promoting the Islamic Ideology on the basis of which it was created, Pakistan has to protect itself from the dangerous cross-lire of Communism and Secularism.

The increasing social and economic impoverishment of the masses may erode the very roots of the polity and lead to the growth of national frustration manifested by parochialism and regionalism in its most virulent form.

No single political party or group seems to be in command of the political situation.

Assumptions

A civilian government is essential for the progress and well-being of Pakistan.

The uncertainty and political vacuum cannot be sustained for long without detrimental results.

Leadership cannot be thrust on people.

Steps will continue to be taken to establish the credibility of the Martial Law Regime.

Government would be able to control the law and order situation whatever be the judgment of Z. A. Bhutto's trial.

Analysis of the Problem

So far in Pakistan, NO government has ever handed over power to, the next government with honor. They have always been ousted. Se before that stage comes, the Martial Law Regime must hand over gracefully to a civilian government. This is only possible after General Elections. Suitable seasons to have elections are spring and autumn. Each one has its pros and cons. To establish the preference, of one over the other some factors have been discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

The present Federal cabinet should be dissolved well before the election date. After the dissolution, Martial Law will have to show a complete stance of neutrality.

Peace must prevail prior, during and after elections. Choice of the government will be made by the people.

The integrity of the Armed Forces must be maintained.

Political Environment

The PNA consisted of nine parties. Only a few had some following at the national level whereas the remaining parties were merely regional in nature having a limited influence. During the agitation these parties showed complete identity of approach and cooperated till their mission to depose the government was achieved. Soon after the imposition of Martial Law, difference of opinion and cracks appeared. Rightist and Leftist elements of PNA, owing to their un-natural alliance, soon separated. This state of diversity and amalgamation tended to compound the problems giving no clear sense of

direction to the nation. Very soon we may expect a fresh alignment and grouping of political parties purely as a marriage of convenience based on self aggrandizement, similar to the collusion of the PNA as witnessed against the previous government. In this context, Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam and the Pakistan Democratic Party may sooner or later leave the PNA. This would leave only the Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami with the government. These issues will remain and are likely to be aggravated till such time as elections are held. The reading of the situation must ensure that the elections are held before the massive movement starts. The odd cases of law and order, though isolated; are a part of an overall design which must be ruthlessly curbed.

As far as the PPP is concerned, it has demonstrated a semblance of unity and order. Minor dissensions and splits did take place (Maulana Kausar Niazi Group), but not with any great ramifications. As expected. the party has shown no signs of disintegration. It has not met political death. The overall political scenario in the region, i.e. the emergence of a new regime in Afghanistan. recent riots in Iran and secular trends in India, are likely to throw long shadow on our political developments and party affiliations/programme/stances/attitudes. As time passes, forces opposing the government, specially the leftists, are gaining more strength. Because of Islamisation and the leaning shown towards orthodox Islam. Shia, Ahmadies, Christians and other minorities are adopting an anti-Martial Law stance. Fringe groupings and their alignment are likely to aggravate the situation.

The strength of the PPP lies in the economic contents of its manifesto. Its main theme is that of socialism with a diluted coloring of Islam. The PNA. under the positive slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa using the will and the blood of the people initially gained substantial ground. But the alliance of convenience soon drifted into insipidity. Due to new grouping the disintegration process within their lines has become inevitable. A rising of leftist forces is also pronounced.

- (a) In case the elections are held in October 1979, the rift in the PNA and other rightist elements is likely to accentuate resulting in a total loss of confidence of the public. With the passage of time, PPP would certainly capitalize on the weaknesses and correspondingly may improve its position. By this phenomenon as more time passes the attitude of the general public may harden against the government. This contingency would allow additional time for political grouping/alignments which is unfavorable to the government.
- (b) In case the elections are scheduled for April 1979, national confidence would be restored in the Military Regime thereby injecting a healthy trend and spirit in national politics. It will wipe out all speculation and uncertainty, and revitalize the Army's image in the eyes of the nation.

Correspondingly, it will weaken the opposition forces and facilitate the emergence of saner and patriotic elements to lead the nation.

Conclusion

- i) To arrest further political polarization and deterioration, elections must be held as soon as possible, preferably in April 1979.
- ii) To keep the situation and events under control, political activity should be banned till such time as a schedule for the elections is given.
- iii) A time schedule for early elections must be drawn up and announced to put the nation at rest.

State of Economy

For underdeveloped nation like us, the economic factor is of an immense importance. Political health, social viability and the military potential of a nation is really dependent on the economic factor. The masses who are poor and unable to make both ends meet are most susceptible to propaganda and exploitation. Therefore, due care must be taken to control and minimize national economic vulnerabilities. The annual budget announced recently is not in conformity with our professed goals. It is not accepted as a poor man's budget. Promulgation of taxes in the middle of the last financial year was not appreciated. The need is to trigger off immediate ameliorative measures. Today, the salaried men, including the personnel of the Armed Forces, are the most hard-hit people. Despite all earnest efforts, the economic situation has not really improved. An interim government, as declared by the President, can never overcome a state of uncertainty about the future, leaving all those who control the economic aspect sitting on the fence and waiting. The slump and lack of confidence of the public, over a prolonged period of time, could well result in agitation and violence for which other issues are then only an excuse. Hence the urgency to hold elections.

If elections are held in October 1979, the Martial Law government would be obliged to prepare another fiscal budget, i.e. for the year 1979-80, and answerable to the nation for its success or failure. However, with our present economic potential the possibility of bright prospects is remote. In case elections are conducted in April 1979, an elected government will shoulder this burden and Martial Law Regime would stand vindicated by fulfilling the, pledge of holding early elections. Moreover, an elected government would be in a better position to solicit economic assistance from external sources, especially the western democracies, who are allergic to military regimes.

Conclusion

Resuscitation and regeneration of the economy would be quicker if elections are held before the fiscal year of 79/80, as it would extirpate tendencies of uncertainty and vacillation.

Armed Forces

On clamping of Martial Law, the Air Force and Navy remained bitter as they were not consulted. Even today, their participation is negligible and they feel that without rhyme or reason they are getting a bad name. The Army has always acted as a bulwark and is indeed the backbone of the nation. However, in the recent past, its combat worthiness has deteriorated. No new arms and equipment could be acquired and inducted in the Armed Forces. Psychologically the Army mind is geared and trained to operate in a military way, so it is disturbing to find the Martial Law government being blamed for actions taken by politicians in the cabinet. Further, there are pressures on the Army personnel from vested interests from outside trying to further undermine their confidence in themselves and the Army. The cohesion of the Army and the total faith of the nation in the Armed Forces must be ensured by reducing their exposure to Martial Law involvements. The Armed forces should remain an organization in being ensuring national stability. General feeling exists amongst all rank of the Army to hand over power to an elected government and revert to professional soldiering and other preoccupations as soon as possible.

Conclusion

To maintain the state of morale and proverbial discipline of the Armed Forces it goes without saying that elections must be held at the earliest. Considering this factor alone April 1979 would be preferable.

International Relations

The Russian interest in the region is well-known which has practically manifested itself by the change in Afghanistan and the current troubles in Iran. The furtherance of these objectives will include Pakistan. This could be aggravated as a meeting point against our professed resolve for Islam by the Russian interest coinciding with India's secular approach. The western world being the champion of democracy, which we also profess to believe in, is naturally against a military regime, and so will always have reservations for providing economic or other support to such regimes. It is historically true that where inner, cohesion and stability do not exist outside powers particularly the leftist elements, take the maximum advantage by exploiting the disturbed internal condition.

It does not matter what Morarji Desai (PM of India) says. It is a fact that India has not reconciled with the existence of Pakistan. Therefore the Armed Forces should not dissipate their effort in running the country.

If we take an overview of the region we find that both our neighbors i.e. Iran and Afghanistan are in a relative state of turmoil. The crisis situation has been engineered by a power which is hostile to our ideology and alignment. Once the situation stabilizes in Afghanistan she may be inspired to act as an instrument to create chaotic conditions and instability in Pakistan. Therefore we must endeavor to regain balance and political stability before Afghanistan can clear the deck and is in a position to look outward. Time is again at a premium and hence the need for early elections.

Conclusion

April 1979 would be preferable for elections.

Administration.-Law and Order.

It is our basic dilemma Martial Law was imposed with unexpected speed to arrest worsening political and economic conditions manifest in the widely deteriorating law and order situation in the country. Its imposition reflected the will and its effect was the inherent tall expectations of the people. The bureaucracy, though a small percentage of society, is most influential. It cannot be expected to be loyal to the Military Regime. Some of them indulge in corruption and others act as spectators. The labor force and certain other insidious elements are becoming a pressure group and are taking undue advantage of limited political activity and a price hike. With dejection and appalling bewilderment the intelligentsia see the politicians struggling in the wake of vested interests. This sense of dissatisfaction may act as a prelude to a gathering storm Minor incidents of law and order, i.e. courting of arrests hunger strikes by the journalists vituperative propaganda campaigns etc. could be certain pointers of the potential threat which is mounting with the passage of time.

If the bureaucracy is incorrigible, and the law and order situation poses a potential threat, then we must hasten the process of elections. If the election schedule is announced in the very near future and elections are promised and held in April 1979, it would certainly put the nation at rest. If the elections are planned for October 1979, events would keep simmering for a much longer time and may erupt in sudden violence. The political clout of the PPP should be taken seriously. It would always try to create a law and order situation for the government.

Conclusion

An early announcement of a date for elections in April 1979 will take the sting out of people.

Z. A. Bhutto's Trial

As the trial has been prolonged, all eyes are fixed on the outcome of Mr. Bhutto's case. Over a period of five to six years, he had become, through persistent propaganda, a personality cult to the masses. He certainly has some Appeal for the labor and other classes. Whatever the situation, his case has to be decided. There can be three contingencies:

- i) Death penalty is confirmed and sentence executed.
- ii) Long rigorous imprisonment is awarded.
- iii) Is set free.

Each one of the above sentence may carry some, if not, far-reaching, repercussions both internally and externally. However, in case of extreme punishment, i.e. death penalty, the reaction is likely to be more violent than in other cases. It also may not be exonerated by the civilized world. Some of the allies may show resentment and disapproval causing a 'cooling' process in mutual relations. However, awarding long imprisonment backed with an early announcement of elections may prove more fruitful. Nonetheless, any further delay in deciding the fate of Mr. Bhutto is thoroughly counter-productive. It is creating more problems and is attributed as a weakness of the government, giving rise to much speculation and rumor. Certain quarters who would have voluntarily joined and strengthened the hands of the government are sitting and waiting.

As is evident from the progress of the trial, the case will reach its culmination in about a month's time, i.e. the verdict of the Supreme Court may be passed by about the middle of November 1978. Let us examine the effects of various punishments as stipulated above by confronting them with the options of the date of elections.

a. Death Penalty

The reaction is likely to be violent, but comparatively short-lived. If elections are planned for April 1979 it may hamper the progress of various modalities of the Election Commission. So, it will become a negative factor. To ensure smooth and uninterrupted progress thorough vigilance and preparation will have to be triggered much in advance. In case the elections are planned for October 1979, the violence would have died its natural death allowing sufficient time for completion of the task.

b. Long Rigorous Imprisonment

The general public has so far failed to predict the outcome of Mr. Bhutto's trial. However, if long imprisonment is awarded it may not be more than a storm in a tea cup. The general public is likely to be resigned to his fate. However, instances

of minor agitation cannot be ruled out. For this contingency, (elections in) April 1979 would suit more aptly.

c. Set Free

If Mr. Bhutto is set free, he is likely to rally a sizable section of the people and create a serious crisis. The process of elections would be seriously retarded.

Mr. Bhutto must be tried for other offences as part of accountability. Leaning on the Kasuri (murder) trial may seem unethical.

Conclusion

Preparations should be made for elections in April 1979, but the date should only be announced after Mr. Bhutto's present case. If the situation is not conducive the elections should be held in October 1979.

Options

If 1979 is the year of elections as declared by the President the following options are available:

- a. Option Alpha, Early elections in April 1979
- b. Option Bravo, Elections in October 1979

Option Alpha - Elections in April 1979

Advantages:

It will wipe out the state of uncertainty and speculation and rejuvenate healthy political and economic activity.

Reinstate the prestige and honor of the Armed Forces and re-establish their good intentions and credibility.

Allow early disengagement of the Army from civil affairs thereby reverting it to professional activity. Dispel doubts of the general public and weaken the opposition forces thereby strengthening the hands of patriotic and saner elements.

Would cause dissension and split in the opposition leftist forces and malicious elements of the PPP.

Under an elected government the country will make rapid economic progress by acquiring more assistance from the western world.

Disadvantages:

Less time to prepare for General Elections. Therefore all steps must be taken with urgency and resolution.

Local Bodies Elections will have to be conducted after General Elections.

Would not allow formulation of Provincial cabinets.

Partial completion of the process of accountability.

Option Bravo - Elections in October 1979

Advantages:

More of a cushion period will be available to make foolproof preparations for elections, i.e. electoral rolls, redefining of constituencies, ballot papers etc. The present civil government will be able, to consolidate their gains and mature their policies. Provincial cabinets will have some time to function and establish a rapport with the masses. It will be possible to hold Local Bodies Elections prior to General Elections in April 1979.

The process of accountability will be completed.

Disadvantages:

The present regime will be exposed to criticism for a longer time bringing a bad name to the Army. The opposition will continue to harden which may present an ugly situation as was the case between March 1977 and July 1977.

External pressures are likely to increase against an unelected government.

Will cause lowering of national morale and slowing down of economic emancipation.

In case of any further deterioration of economy and the law and order situation it might open the floodgates of agitation resulting in a difficult position to control.

The Armed Forces, especially the Army, will be required to withstand heavy strain and friction and their professionalism will suffer.

Option Adopted

Keeping in view our empirical analysis and conclusions as drawn from various factors it is recommended that Option Alpha, i.e. holding of elections in April 1979, be adopted.

The crisis has accentuated to a grim situation. Events are moving fast and hence a decision should be taken with the same speed and, urgency.

If the elections are to succeed in April 1979, the following actions must be completed.

- a. Radical and revolutionary steps to accelerate the process of elections, i.e. preparation of ballots, electoral rolls, verifications, printing, selection of staff must be geared on a top priority basis.
- b. Arrangements to ensure a congenial law and order situation must be made while preparations and election campaigns are in full swing.
- c. All-out efforts must be made to improve the general administration and price control. A short-term measure to improve the availability of consumer goods would pay large dividends.
- d. The integrity of the Armed Forces must be ensured.
- e. Vigilance must be maintained and any labor or political processions should be ruthlessly blocked.
- f. Corruption and black marketing should be eliminated.

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II LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

Unlike certain successful democracies, the history of local government in Pakistan has been chequered. For obvious reasons, the British introduced local self-government as a measure of expediency and broadened its scope gradually. However, the worst times

were to be faced by these institutions after independence. Whatever the short comings of the system, the Basic Democracies Order of 1959 and the Municipal Administration Ordinance of 1960 did provide viable institutions for local development and administration. The abolition of elected bodies in the rural and urban local areas in June 1971 brought an abrupt end to the local government system which had the potential of being developed and utilized for national good. The operation of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 was suspended and that of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance made impossible. The period from June 1971 onwards could be described as the bleakest in the history of local government of Pakistan.

Need for Local Government

The roles of local government institutions are many. In the first place, these institutions are essential for political health, they serve as a cushion between the broad masses and the national government and enable the latter to devote themselves to problems of national importance. Local governments provide a training ground for the political leadership and are cradles of political regeneration. Local institutions also provide a medium through which the functions and powers of government could be decentralized.

The role of local government in the development of rural and urban areas is always significant. One of the misfortunes, of rural development in Pakistan has been the lack of consistent institutional support for such efforts. In fact, rural development in all the developed countries has taken place through local government, and there seems to be no other way to secure participation of the public and to introduce accountability in such programmes.

During the operation of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, thousands of cases of civil and criminal nature in compulsory or optional jurisdictions of the conciliation courts were decided locally. Studies indicated that over 65 percent of the cases were decided by the conciliation courts through an unanimous verdict by representatives of the parties. It was for this reason that the appeal from the decisions of these local courts were insignificant as compared with the appeals against cases decided by the ordinary courts.

The law and order situation has been a major concern of all governments including the present one. However, the potential for improvement in the existing police administration is not there. Certain structural changes, will have to be brought about in police administration (by way of public participation the maintenance of law and order) if the situation is to be brought under control. For this purpose, the local councils will have to be invested with limited police powers sooner or later as is the case in most countries In Pakistan the system of village police was tried in six districts from 1961-64. It was successful but was abandoned primarily because of the resistance from the police

and revenue departments. The creation of local government is therefore necessary if their involvement in the improvement of law and order is desired. It has been recognized that agricultural and industrial development in Europe and America is to a large measure due to the local government.

Structure

At present the Union Councils and Zila Councils in the rural areas and the union/town/municipal committees and municipal corporations in the urban areas exist under the law and are being looked after by official administrators. There could be many opinions on the structure of local governments in the rural areas and urban areas. However, there are advantages in building up on the existing structures. Since 1972 and with the introduction of the integrated rural development programme efforts have been made to justify the creation of a local government institution at the Markaz level all over the country. The markaz level institutions are to be between the union councils and district councils. Even the substitution of union councils by Markaz level institutions (which will cover about 50 villages) has been suggested by certain quarters. In this controversy, the genesis of integrated rural development is lost sight of. We are trying to stick to this concept even more faithfully than its promoters. We must not make Pakistan an experimental ground for alien concepts. Experimentation in institution building is very costly. This is being increasingly realized even in the most opulent countries.

In the circumstances, the union councils in the rural areas and the union/municipal town committees as well as the municipal corporations in the urban areas should be revived through elections. However, the local government institutions at the village level are necessary in addition to the union council. The village level organizations could make the services of almost three hundred thousand local leaders available for the promotion of Village. development as well as for the solution of unlimited problems.

Finance.

There are many areas in which the autonomy of the local government institutions could be secured. However, unless the local governments are financially autonomous they will remain under perpetual subjugation of higher levels of government and will flop any time the grants are stopped. It appears pertinent to point out that the basic democratic institutions in their initial stages made remarkable progress in attaining self-sufficiency in the matter of finances. However, with the introduction of PL-480 grants, the local efforts slowed down. As soon as the PL-480 grants were withdrawn, the rural development activity came to a standstill. The effects of federal or provincial subversion could be similar. It would, therefore, be necessary that the sharing of certain taxes with the local governments is made mandatory and certain other taxes are exclusively

reserved for local councils. The present taxation powers of local governments have been described as residuary. In Japan, 70% of the national budget is spent through the local authorities. In Pakistan, it could be empirically proved that the local governments have been made to shoulder expenses which should ordinarily be incurred by federal or provincial governments. Without financial strength, therefore, the creation of local government institutions could prove to be an exercise in futility. In fact, a number of steps in this direction could be taken pending elections, so that the local councils when constituted do not find themselves presiding over empty treasuries.

Disadvantages

While the importance of local government should be recognized, it should also be kept in view that these institutions will not be able to turn the country into a heaven. On the other hand, partly due to ignorance on the part of elected councilors and partly due to the election of untested candidates, the local government institutions created in the first elections will make a large number of mistakes. There will even be cases of corruption and graft. However, local accountability is always rigorous and the situation would improve in one or two elections. It would be necessary, therefore, to publicize the possible short-comings of the local government so that the people are vigilant at the time of elections and the government does not pin unnecessarily high hopes on the young institutions.

Elections

A question has arisen whether the local government elections should be held before or after the elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. There could be a case for holding local government elections after the General Elections if the local elections were to jeopardize the General Elections, or time available is inadequate. On the other hand, local bodies elections will sift local leadership and would throw up leaders for General Elections who are really interested in national issues.

Another question is how to hold the local elections quickly in the absence of revised electoral rolls. In this respect, it may be stated that if the elections are fair, at the local level, the existence of a certain number of bogus voters' lists would not make much difference because the bogus voters could be detected at the time of voting. Necessary provisions can be made for the identification of voters at the polling stations. An alternative to the utilization of the existing electoral rolls is to prepare electoral rolls for each local area. It may not be necessary to print the rolls prepared for each local area/ward. This procedure was tried in the 1965 local elections. The results of that elections were never questioned and the elections to the union and other councils were reasonably fair.

Yet another alternative could be to partly replace the secret ballot type of elections. The secret ballot elections besides being costly, time consuming and difficult for quick repetition might also hamper mass participation in development activities. Our communities in the rural or urban areas are used to such informal elections on several occasions. In the USA also it has been shown that notwithstanding provisions for secret ballot elections for the village councils, elections at these levels are more often than not through, consensus which is reached outside the polling stations. In fact, the village level organizations should be fully representative, commanding general confidence of the community and be responsible to the entire village. Elections at the village level, therefore, should try to reflect a consensus. Consensus could be arrived at through show of hand or otherwise and the details could be provided in the elections rules to be framed. If this procedure is adopted, there will be no need for electoral rolls at the village level.

In the urban areas, the communities at Mohalla level are not usually well-knit because of the fluidity of population. Therefore, in the urban areas, the existing electoral rolls could be utilized or else new unprinted rolls prepared at the ward level, as stated earlier. This work should not take more than a month in any case and it should be possible to hold local Government Elections within the next three months. Another consideration could be to stagger the local elections. It should be possible to hold elections to the different rural and urban 2-3 month's time. In that way, the existing staff and facilities with the Elections Commission or with the Provincial Governments, as the case may be, would be adequate and would not need expansion and save unnecessary expenditure.

Recommendations

General Elections must be held in April 1979.

Local Bodies Elections can be organized after the General Elections as these are not really agitating the people. It is not a critical factor.

The process of accountability should be expedited and may continue even after the schedule of elections is announced.

The Political Parties Act should be promulgated at the earliest along with the time schedule.

The present Government must be dissolved ninety days before the election. It would probably mean that Provincial Cabinets may not be constituted. Once Cabinet is dissolved Military Council should take effective charge of State Affairs.

Schedule of elections must be announced before the Supreme Court decision on Z. A. Bhutto. It will restrain much of the reaction on the part of the public.

No amendments should be incorporated in the Constitution by the martial Law Government. It will create a serious legal crisis.

General Elections should be held under the supervision of the Armed Forces and Judiciary.

Members of the Cabinet (though dissolved) should be allowed to contest elections.

AK elections can be held simultaneously with Pakistan Elections but it will be better if these are held (1 week later).

The Army must be kept as a 'Force in being' for any subsequent involvement. A full-time Election Commission must be appointed so that work can start and the public is reassured.

Detailed and independent analysis with regard to holding of elections may, also be undertaken by the experts and the Foreign Office.

* * * * *

Staff Check

Schedule of Electoral Rolls - D Day Basis	Days	D	Day
1. Preparation of Draft electoral rolls	30	15	Nov - 14 Dec. 1978
2. Filling of claims and objections	15	15	Dec -29 Dec. 1978
3. Decision of claims and objections	15	30	Dec - 14 Jan. 1979
4 Printing of final electoral rolls	15	15	Jan -29 Jan 1979
5. Printing of polling schemes and purchase of material	10	30	Jan -09 Feb 1979
6. Calling of nomination papers, scrutiny, appeals, decisions, allotment of symbols and withdrawals	15	10	Feb - 25 Feb 1979
7. Printing of ballot papers	10	26	Feb-05 Mar 1979
8. Preparation of bags and their dispatch of polling stations etc	7	6	Mar 13 Mar 1979
117 days (approximately 4 months)			

Notes

1. If delimitation of constituencies is required to be undertaken, work can commence simultaneously, or the cushion period of one month can be utilized for this purpose.
2. Government machinery will be fully mobilized to complete work as per above schedule.
3. Printing of lists to be done simultaneously in all Provinces and AK.
4. Work to commence on November 15, 1978.
5. Elections can be held during the first week of April 1979 at the latest.

Representatives of the following political parties met with the Election Cell:

	Party	Party President
1	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	Begum Nusrat Bhutto
2	Pakistan Muslim League (Pagara Group)	Pir Pagara
3	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani
4	Tehrik-e-Istiklal	Air Marshal Asghar Khan
5	Jamaat-e-Islami	Mian Tufail Muhammad
6	National Democratic Party. (NDP)	Sherbaz Mazari
7	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. (JUI)	Maulana Mufti Mahmud
8	Pakistan Muslim League (Qayum Grpop)	Khan Abdul Qayum Khan
9	Pakistan Musawat Party	M Haneef Ramay
10	Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)	Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan
11	Pakistan Muslim League (Chatha Group)	Khawaja Khair Ud Din
12	People's Progressive Party	Maulana Kausar Niazi
13	Liberal Muslim League	Justice Shaukat Ali
14	Jinnah Muslim League	General Azam Khan
15	Muslim Conference	Sardar M Abdul Qayum
16	Jeway Pakistan Party	Nabi Bakhsh Zebri
17	Khaksar Tehrik	Ashraf Khan
18	National Awami Party Pakhtun Khawa	Mahmud Achakzai
19	Gharib Awam Party	Tanweer Hussaini
20	Azad Muslim Conference	Chaudhary Noor Hussain
21	Azad Kashmir Jamat Islami	Colonel Abbasi
22	Azad Kashmir Jamiat Ulema	Sahibzada Atteq ur Rehman
23	Azad Kashmir People's Party	Sardar Ibrahim
24	Kashmir, Liberation Party	Ansari
25	Jamiat Ulema Ehal e Hadis	Ehsan Elahi Zaheer
26	Hazab Allah Swad e Azam	Maulana Ghulam Ullah
27	Pakistan Millet Party	Ahmed Raza Kasuri

ANNEXURE 'C'

CHISHTI'S PRESS CONFERENCES

Press Conference of Lt. Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd) held at Rawalpindi Flying Club in July 1983.

As know when I retired from the Army in March 1980, on the basis of completion of four year's tenure as Lt. General. I also resigned from all appointments of a federal minister and I suppose my unexpressed resignation as Chairman, Election Cell went along with it. Since then I have been observing the events in Pakistan as a common citizen dedicated to its well-being and solidarity. Today, I would like to give my views on the prevailing situation, for whatever they are worth because it is said that some fateful decisions are to be taken by the Chief Executive of the country on or before August 14, 1983.

I have always preached intellectual honesty and have practiced it all my life, to the best of my ability. I am proud of saying that whenever required, I have always given my candid, frank and true opinion, without bias, fear or reservation, not only to the Martial Law government, but also to the previous government. Federal ministers and other government functionaries, who have listened to me from time to time will certainly support this statement of mine, provided they have the moral courage which most of them lacked.

It is my conviction that since the death of Quaid-e-Azam, father of the nation, Pakistan has been a victim of intellectually dishonest decisions taken by the Chief Executives of the country, whether civilian or military. Dishonest decisions are taken willingly or unwillingly. Willingly when the incumbent wants to continue to retain the chair unwillingly when the analysis given by the underdogs is dishonest. It is dishonest because the tendency is to carry favor with superiors and to give views that would please them or suit them. The originating lower level agencies normally express the truth, but as it travels up it gets distorted and misconstrued. Hardly works expressed at a lower level becomes "Works hardly" as it reaches the decision maker. Hence a wrong may be even dishonest decision Just two examples will suffice.

i) The grant of an extension in service as C-in-C to Gen (later FM) M Ayub Khan. He was made C in C in 1951 and should have retired on completion of his tenure in 1954 or, so and NOT left as C-in-C till 1958 to stage a *coup d'état* for whatever reasons it was done. I am not commenting on the validity or the honesty of the decision to appoint him as C in C or even his promotion to the rank of a general.

ii) The military action in east Pakistan. Before the decision was taken it required the solution of a simple mathematical equation i.e. "How many people would have to be

killed to bring the situation under control (when the killer is West Pakistani in East Pakistan and those to be killed are all East Pakistanis when you kill one person the ratio to be killed increases algebraically to infinity.....) So this would have led to a logical conclusion of a political solution. When this was explained to the CMLA by me, in my capacity as Director of Research and Development of the Pakistan Army, I was given a reply which I will NOT share with you at present.

Today Pakistan stands at a very critical juncture. Intellectually dishonest decisions will produce unpredictable results. The law of necessity which justified the imposing of Martial Law in 1977 has long since ceased to exist. The government should not lean on it any more. It should reinstate or restore the Constitution of 1973 and transfer power peacefully to the elected representatives of the people. Steps should also be taken to maintain the amity between the Armed Forces and the People of Pakistan....

It is my conviction that the whole nation appreciates the gravity of the situation. People are praying for national security, solidarity and the well being of the country. They are looking forward to the restoration of democracy under the 1973 Constitution. NO future plans, whether in the economic field or political field, can succeed or produce results unless the people are involved in their preparation and execution in a respectable manner and they can share the responsibility of formulation of plans. This can only be done when the people have the right to select or reject their rulers NOT BY FORCE but through ballot. They should be allowed to do so through their elected members of provincial and national assemblies. Further delay on this issue may complicate matters and produce undesirable results.

Accountability, economic stability, restoration of law and order, and the outcome of positive results have been used as levers for the continuation of Martial Law. The results have been to the contrary. Accountable people stand honored and rehabilitated and IN COMMAND. Economically we are at the lowest, under terrible debts and high cost of living. Law and order can be deduced from the newspapers which are nothing but crime reports. Corruption, bribery, accidents, fraud cases etc have increased. Social evils are creeping in. Parochial and regional feelings are gaining ground which are detrimental to national integrity. Mutual confrontation of tribes, religious orders, economic groups are hitting hard at the foundations of the country. Unemployment is on the increase Dearness laughs at the salaried people. The nation does NOT even enjoy the rights which it inherited on independence in 1947.

For the last four years or so, the people have been deprived of their basic human rights on the plea of Islamisation. Haquq ul Ibad do not exist. After the introduction of PCO each ML order has negated the principles of Islam. The entire national life is bound in between ML orders. Islam is not allowed to penetrate into ML orders. Islam cannot even comment on these ML order whereas, as per Islam, Martial Law is un-Islamic. How can you make people believe that Martial Law can introduce Islam when it does

not even give basic rights, i.e. Haquq ul Ibad. No nation can benefit from Islam when it is deprived of justice, freedom of action, freedom of press and speech basic rights ... Haquq ul Ibad. It is high time exploitation of Islamisation is stopped and basic human rights are restored. This country was created in the name of Islam and can only exist if properly run on Islamic lines. Haquq Allah and Haquq ul Ibad. Let the government give the nation Haquq ul Ibad completely and the facilities to practice Haquq Allah. Let Islamic Democracy be restored. Let democracy be established.

I request all the political parties to ... forget about each others past mistakes They should learn to coexist with opponents and opposing parties. They should stop maligning each other's characters and washing dirty linen in public. Let differences of opinion be resolved in a friendly manner and not transformed to enmity Let all parties and Martial Law Authorities sit together and resolve the differences and find a workable solution.

Simultaneously, the mutual relationship between the Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan should be strengthened. Steps should be taken to remove the lack of confidence. For the effective defence of the country, the Armed Forces will always need the full and complete support of the nation. Let them have it. They should also become a symbol of defence of the country and be neutral in their dealings. They have only one role, not political but military, and that is the defence of the country The Armed Forces can only be efficient when they practice soldiery and NOT Martial Law duties.

Politicians are valuable assets of our country. But they cannot produce any results unless their views are respected. It is not only their right to criticize the government, it is their basic human right to do so. Their voices should not be suppressed.... Inshallah, soon there will be justice, political prisoners will be released, the Press will be free, the judiciary will be independent (they will soon know the difference between the chief justice and acting chief justice), Haquq ul Ibad will be restored and the people will be able to lead a real Islamic life, which at present is non-existent in any of the 43 Muslim countries of the world, PROVIDED . THERE ARE NO INTELLECTUALLY DISHONEST DECISIONS.

Lt. Gen F. A. Chishti (Retd)

* * * * *

Chishti denounces the continuation of Martial Law

Former Federal Minister Lt. Gen (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti has said that there is no hope of any practical political structure on August 14, nor should the people believe that any promise of a general election on a date fixed by the present government will be fulfilled.

In an interview to a local Urdu daily, Gen Chishti demanded the immediate release of Asghar Khan, Benazir Bhutto, Nasruallah Khan and other political prisoners. He said that if at all they have committed any crime these political prisoners should be tried in an open court.

Gen Chishti, who was a member of the very first cabinet that Gen Zia ul Haq had formed after taking over the reins of power said that unless intellectual and professional dishonesty is removed the problems of the country cannot be solved. He suggested that in this regard, the process of accountability of the present regime can be started.

He said that though he himself is not a politician, he still demands that a provisional government should be formed which can hold fair general elections in the country within the stipulated time. He has further suggested that no member of the provisional government should participate in the general elections, and that it should consist of honest and non-controversial persons.

Gen Chishti said that this is the only way, through which the present government can transfer power in an honorable manner. Because, he said, so far no government has quit office on its own. Government has always been forced to do so.

The retired general said that at present, the people do not even have those rights which they had inherited at the time of independence in August 1947. He said that in the name of a promised Islamisation, the people are being denied their fundamental rights for the last so many years, and that after the imposition of Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) every act of the present government is un-Islamic.

He said that it is his belief that with a greater unity of the politicians, and with the power, of millions of citizens of the country, the government can be forced to transfer power. He said that he hopes that soon people's right would be restored, political prisoners released, and the courts again given powers to carry out their work independently, the Press set free from all restrictions, and the people of the country given the option to live in the true Islamic way.

Star News Desk, July 20, 1983.

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Gen Chishti files defamation suit against Mian Tufail

LAHORE, December 27: Former Federal Minister, Lt. Gen (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti has filed a complaint before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore and the Station House Officer, Cantonment, to register a case against the Amir of the (defunct) Jammat-

i-Islami, Mian Tufail Mohammad, under the Pakistan Penal Code for making a false statement about his role in the July 5, 1977 takeover of the government by the Armed Forces.

In his complaint, he said Mian Tufail Mohammad had accused him of staging a *coup d'état* and installing Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. This imputation had been made in an interview to the daily *Jang*, Lahore. The interview was a distortion of facts and intended to malign him and destroy his image at home and abroad, particularly at home. The interview had tarnished his image among political workers, leaders and the Pakistan Army.

He said the 1977 takeover was not individually planned by him, but by the Pakistan Army on the orders of the Chief of the Army Staff, on the basis of the unanimous decision taken during many deliberations by the corps commanders of the Pakistan army and the Chief of Army Staff, to restore democracy in the country which was disrupted as a result of mass agitation against rigging during the 1977 general elections. He said that as local commander he was put in charge of OPERATION FAIRPLAY and as an army officer carried it out in letter and in spirit.

Gen (Retd) Chishti said Mian Tufail Mohammad had, in his statement, implied that the takeover was an individual act. Thus Mian Tufail had deliberately maligned him in the eyes of the people and the Army. He said Mian Tufail had given the interview to a staff reporter of the newspaper who had taped it, and the tape available with the newspaper represented irrefutable evidence against Mian Tufail. He requested the police to impound the tape, and register a case against Mian Tufail

Dawn Friday December 17, 1984

* * * * *

Chishti speaks out against non-party elections

Today I feel it my national duty to give my views on the current political situation through you i.e. THE PRESS, to the government and to my fellow countrymen.

A decision has been made to take the nation to the polls on a NON-PARTY basis This seems to have been based on the misconception fed by the results of the Referendum and sycophantic advisors regarding what the nation wants. I think the nation still wants the elections on a Party basis.

There is NO politician whose hobby is spending money on elections. Having spend some money and got himself elected individually on a NON-PARTY basis with an

uncertain tenure, that elected politician would naturally try to get his money back as soon as possible and perhaps make more money than actually spent. This is THE BASIS OF CORRUPTION. If the intention is to eradicate corruption, then elections SHOULD NOT BE HELD ON A NON-PARTY basis; on the contrary, they should be held on a party basis

Elections on a Non Party basis will demolish the political institutions and political parties in the country. It would bring PYGMIES into the field of politics. To become an MNA one may have to spend ten lakhs and an MPA five lakhs at the minimum. Non Party elections will turn politics into a BUSINESS VENTURE... It would be only a smuggler, a black marketeer, a hoarder or a big landlord who would be able to contest elections on a Non-Party basis.

The *coup d'état* was staged in 1977 to annul the effect of massive rigging and to restore democracy in the country. The Supreme Court had given its verdict accordingly. The Court, however, observed as follows:-

"The Court, therefore, expects the Chief Martial Law Administrator to redeem this pledge which must be considered in the nature of a mandate from the people of Pakistan who have by and large willingly accepted his administration as the interim government of Pakistan."

Therefore, it would be seen that to withhold the elections for such a long period and to continue with Martial Law is a violation of the order of the Supreme Court. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not *suo moto* take any action and call upon the CMLA to hold the elections according to his commitment in the Court. It is unfortunate that the very Court which validated the Martial Law became the victim of the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981 and the superior judiciary of the country was clipped of its power and today the superior Courts of Pakistan cannot annul any Martial Law Order or Regulation. It is again unfortunate that the Superior Judiciary did not rise to the occasion as one man. If it would have, the country's fate would have been different.

I would like to say a few words about the Referendum. The Nation has spoken the truth, but it is unfortunate that it has NOT been interpreted correctly by the government. The nation had gone for passive agitation and the correct result of the Referendum negates the policies of the government. Therefore in the light of the verdict of the Referendum, the present schedule announced by the CMLA is NOT according to the wishes of the people of Pakistan. I and my colleagues do not believe in confrontation but we would like to advise the government and Gen Mohammad Zia ul Haq in particular, to see the writing on the wall, to see what the nation wants and NOT be misguided or go astray by wrong reports....

I am convinced that at present the nation is not satisfied with the present government nor with the political leadership. We are conscious that there are a number of political parties. Despite this, they have failed to achieve what the nation wants. Therefore we, the like-minded people in all parts of Pakistan have decided to form a new political party and that party will have in its Central Committee, 25 members from each Province, and as such each Province will have equal representation its spokesman will be elected by its founder members for a period of two years. Likewise there will be a spokesman of the party in each Province. Briefly, the Manifesto of the party will be:

1. Defence of ideological and territorial integrity of Pakistan.
2. Reorganization of the Armed Forces of Pakistan to improve its capabilities.
3. Free education up to matric, equal opportunities to all on merit basis and free health facilities for the citizens.
4. To provide maintenance allowance and shelter to the unemployed.
5. A strong and independent Judiciary.
6. To make Pakistan an Islamic Welfare State, but the name of Islam will not be exploited.
7. To guarantee fundamental rights as contained in the Quran and Sunnah; which are divinely inalienable and cannot be abrogated by any legislation.
8. Joint electorate so that a strong Pakistani Nation should emerge.
9. Women and minorities should be provided with an important role in the nation-building.
10. Elected Chairman of the district will be the boss and NOT the Deputy Commissioner who will be his secretary.

To conclude, I would say that in the face of prevailing circumstances it is high time that we, the like-minded people, should be on one political platform and take the nation and the country out of the quagmire towards a, modern, progressive and scientific Islamic Welfare State. If you agree, please contact Justice (Retd) Shaukat Ali or myself.

Lahore January 13, 1985
Lt. Gen FAIZ ALI CHISHTI (Retd)
Spokesman of the New Party

Press Conference by Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd) held at The Hilton, Lahore on January 13, 1985.

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Press Conference of Lt. Gen (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti

I have decided to meet the Press after the General Elections as I feel that despite these elections there is no political stability in the country. Rather, the leadership of smaller Provinces is more aggrieved. The nation as a whole wants to get rid of Martial Law.

We know that the major political parties did not participate in the General Elections as Gen Mohammad Zia ul Haq ordered the same on a non-party basis. It is also no secret that the leaders of the political parties and their workers were detained before the general elections, and therefore I cannot describe the general elections *impartial and fair*.

Gen Zia's Intention to hold General elections was not different from that of Gen Yahya Khan who did not want to hand over power to the civil representatives and wanted to divide and rule. Likewise the mind of Gen Zia was to take the nation to individual elections and, as a consequence thereof, to have such representatives who could be at his beck and call, so that he and his henchmen could succeed in creating a puppet legislature and a hen-pecked civil government so that he could rule the country for another period of five years.

Despite the fact that he and his clique were aware of a weak legislature that would emerge as a result of so-called non-party elections, even then Gen Zia made drastic constitutional amendments which in fact have crippled and paralyzed the National Assembly. The manner in which Gen Zia has made amendments in the Constitution shows that he had no confidence whatsoever in the newly elected members of the National Assembly. By amending the Constitution through the revival of the 1973 Constitution Order 1985, he has in fact abrogated and annulled the Constitution of 1973 and given a new one-man Constitution to the nation. Was it justified on his part to do so when a new National Assembly had come into being? He has in fact made a mockery of the Constitution. It is perhaps the only Constitution in the world which refers to the name of an individual in the Constitution as a Head of State. Gen Zia has become the so-called elected President through the process of referendum in which the nation decided to stay away. The participation of the nation in the referendum is no secret. In short the nation rejected him in the referendum. Yet Gen Zia through a revival of the 1973 Constitution Order, 1985 became the President and has assumed the power to dissolve the National Assembly and has foisted himself on the nation for a period of another five years as against the will and mandate of the nation.

I foresee that the political situation will further deteriorate in Pakistan as the people in smaller provinces feel and rightly too that their participation in the affairs of the government is lacking and the time may come when the smaller federating units may be unwilling to be a part of the Federation. Therefore we have to take steps immediately so that the smaller provinces remain a part of the Federation and the people of these provinces continue to have faith and confidence. For doing this, their participation in the affairs of the government is a must. To achieve this end it is necessary that the people in and out of the National Assembly should fight for their rights for the withdrawal of martial law and all other, black laws and ask for the restoration of power of the superior Judiciary.

The nation is watching its representatives very, closely and wants them to honor the commitment with which they became members of the Provincial and National Assemblies. The nation does not believe that its representatives will help to perpetuate a one-man rule rather the nation wants its representatives to eliminate the despotic rule from the country....

The Supreme Court unfortunately did not fix a timetable for holding elections and permitted the stay of one man for an unlimited period. Such a mistake should not be repeated by the National Assembly. The nation wants, through its representatives the cancellation of uncalled for constitutional amendments and the lifting of martial law as early as possible. The timetable must be given to the nation. The nation cannot be taken for a ride.

At this juncture I must congratulate a section of the press and the MRD in particular for their struggle which they have continued against one-man rule for the last 8 years. It is on account of their struggle that we find a little political activity on the national scene.

I must say that on account of the wrong policies of Gen Zia's government the nation is today facing load shedding, inflation, a price hike, corruption and unemployment. In short, during his tenure, all the important institutions in the Country stand disrupted and the word of Zia is Law....

... the nation must rise as one man to restore democracy and once democracy is restored the claim for confederation will evaporate.

Dated April 25, 1985

(Sd/-) Lt Gen (Retired).
Faiz All Chishti

Statement of Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd)

I speak because of my conviction that the nation must know the truth and that history must be recorded correctly Who does not know the circumstances under which the

Army took over on 5 July 1977 to save the country from an impending blood bath? ... Please recall the CMLA's speech "...." we have separated the parties and taken the leaders into protective custody ... elections will be held within 90 days. If it has not happened it is because the CMLA did not want it to happen Martial Law is always on man's rule arbitrary and absolute The present Martial Law is no exception.

Every other day we read ".....killed "in an encounter with police's. "....." Who does not know what it means? (A police officer should know better than other.) Who does not know how these encounters are stage-managed? Could not this happen during OPERATION FAIRPLAY? Were there not parties interested in getting rid of certain personalities? ANYBODY could have got killed but this was NOT ALLOWED to happen - NOT even in self-defence. It was accomplished bloodlessly and NOT a single bullet was fired. I am grateful to Allah for the guidance given to me and the strength of character given to my Command.

I did not serve in any individual's private army. I did not become a General as a bounty from a General. I served in the Pakistan Army as per Rules and Regulations and bade farewell to the noble profession of arms on 30 March 1980 on completion of the required length of service as a Lieutenant General. I did not beg for an extension-NOT even for a single day. Simultaneously I refused to continue as a federal minister and resigned from three ministers.....

My conduct throughout my service in the Army, including the Indian Army, has been strictly according to the ethical code prescribed for an army officer. I am proud of it and I have no regrets. I have never been employed on 'police' or 'intelligence' duties. I have never practiced all that goes with such appointments. Through Allah's kindness, I have never been anybody's lackey and have had the courage to call a spade a spade. I have also faced the consequences. I have always given unadulterated advice NOT ONLY to the CMLA and his colleagues but also to the late Prime Minister and his federal ministers when called up on to do so. Let history be the judge in evaluating my contribution.

I have never been afraid of accountability. I have offered myself for it many a time. In fact, I have always been an ardent exponent of the canons of accountability. Nobody is above the law and everybody is accountable including the chief executive of a country. THIS IS WHAT ISLAM IS. So let us have it. In my opinion, accountability of the following is ultimately inevitable:-

Dismemberment of Pakistan

Prevailing economic conditions

Referendum 1984

Key persons associated with the Martial Law Regime since 5 July 1977.

Whereas the process of accountability for the first two can be initiated without difficulty, no steps can be taken towards the remaining two unless the constitutional amendment that "... nothing whatsoever that has been done by the Martial Law Regime since 5 July 1977 can be accounted for etc etc" is vacated through a Presidential ordinance or by an act of the National Assembly. For this, lifting of Martial Law Becomes a pre-requisite. The CMLA will NEVER allow it.

Unless the MNAs honor their commitments made :to the electorate on this point i.e. immediate lifting of Martial Law, they will have no place on the roll of honor before long, and will be responsible for further aggravating the constitutional crisis and sense of deprivation of the provinces.....

The Afghan issue need very careful handling. Historically, whosoever has come through the Khyber Pass has never gone back. Let there be a clear cut demarcation between the Afghan Mujahids and Afghan Refugees. They cannot be synonymous.

Lahore
May, 15, 1985

F.A. CHISHTI
Lt. Gen (Retd)

ANNEXURE 'D'

CHISHTI : A BACKGROUND

General FAIZ ALT CHISHTI was born at Jullunder on June 13, 1927. He had his education in MR College, Fazilka and RSD College, Ferozpur. He joined, the Officer Training School, Bangalore, in 1946 and was commissioned in the Royal Indian Artillery in 1947. On Independence, he opted for Pakistan and reached Karachi by sea in November 1947. He is a triple graduate viz Punjab University; Command and Staff College Quetta; Land Forces War Academy, Istanbul. He is a linguist, proficient in the Turkish language.

In his command assignments, he held appointments as an Artillery Brigade Commander, an Infantry Brigade Commander. General Officer Commanding an Infantry Division and. General Officer Commanding a Corps. . In 1977, Rawalpindi was his Headquarters and that was when he was ordered by General Zia ul Haq to and execute OPERATION FAIRPLAY a bloodless *coup d'état*.

General Chishti had the opportunity to serve in General Headquarters on such important staff appointments as Deputy Director Military Training, Director Research and Development, and Military Secretary of the Pakistan Army. He was also the Chairman of the. Pakistan Army Missile Committee. Earlier, he had been an Instructor in Gunnery and an Instructor in command and Staff College. He was also elected Colonel Commandant of the Azad Kashmir Regiment a unique honor for a non-infantry officer.

He was on the battlefield in the 1947, 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars. He retired from active service on March 30, 1980 on completion of his four year's tenure as a Lieutenant General. During his service he was awarded the Hilai-e-Imtiaz (Military) and Sitara-e-Bisalat.

During General Zia-ui-Haq's Martial Law Regime, he performed, simultaneously with his duties of..a Corps, Commander, the following duties assigned to him:-

- a: Adviser to the Chief. Martial Law Administrator, with the status of a Federal Minister, in charge of the Establishment Division, Federal Inspection Commission, Azad Kashmir and Northern Area Affairs from April 1978 to July 1978 and thereafter a Federal Minister for the same portfolios from July 1978 to August 1978.

- b. Federal Minister for Labor Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis: Petroleum and Natural Resources, Azad Kashmir and Northern Area Affairs from April 1979 to March 1980.
- c. Chairman, Election Cell from August 1977 to August 1978 and from April 1979 to March 1980.

On retirement from the Army on March 30, 1980 he resigned from all the three ministers. He argued that once his commission had expired, there was no legal justification for remaining in a military government.

During his service career, he led delegations to Abu Dhabi in 1970 as Head of an Inter-Services Training Team to the United Kingdom in 1976 as Head of an Inter-Services Delegation to the British Army Equipment Exhibition; to Somalia in 1977 as Head of a Training Team; to the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries in 1978 to assess the functioning of Pakistani Embassies; to Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China in 1979 as Head of a Labor and Immigration delegation to Canada in 1980 as Head of delegation to the inauguration ceremony of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies North Hatley of which he was elected member Board of Governors.

He has been elected President, Pakistan Golf Association from 1977 to 1983 and elected President, Rawalpindi Flying Club from 1977 to 1988. He is a member of the Institute of Strategic Studies of Pakistan, International Institute of Strategic Studies; London, and The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrew's, Scotland.

ANNEXURE 'E'
REVIEWS AND OPINIONS

- Appendix 1 London Letter 23 November 1989
- Appendix 2 "*Keh Tuti Jahan Jahan Pey Kamand*" 24 December 1989.
- Appendix 3 Conflict Bulletin - February 1990
- Appendix 4 Insight into alarmist thinking - 2 April 1990
- Appendix 5 Zia the man from nowhere - 24 April 1990
- Appendix 6 General Chishti's Great Betrayal !- 17 May 1990
- Appendix 7 "Salman Rushdi of Pakistan Army"- 23 June 1990
- Appendix 8 Cover Up of the Great Betrayal -23 August 1990
- Appendix 9 Another Point of View - 28 September 1990
- Appendix 10 Chicanery and horse trading -6 November 1990
- Appendix 11 Chishti's version of Zia's Martial Law - 7 December 1990
- Appendix 12 Betrayals of Another Kind - Summer 1991

LONDON LETTER from ANTHONY HYMAN
(The Khaleej Times -23 November 1989)

ONE of the best known generals of Pakistan's army is currently visiting England, and is due to arrive in the UAE later this month.

General Faiz Ali Chishti appeared on British TV recently, in a long, wide-ranging and remarkably warm interview with London-based journalist Tariq Ali on Pakistani politics, and in particular on the Zia-ul-Haq period, on which he has many facts to reveal in a new book. Transcript of the TV Interview is appended below.

Betrays of Another Kind. Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan, (Asia Publishing House, 45 Museum Street, London, WC1), gives many original interpretations, and claims to set the record straight.

As one of the senior generals of the army in 1977, Faiz Ali Chishti played an important part in the first phase of military rule under General Zia.

Both in the TV interview and in entire chapters of his book, Chishti had much to say about Gen Zia's character and abilities, the coup in 1977 and what followed it.

He argues in great detail that the armed forces were forced to step in after the Bhutto regime sank into chaos, but that there was every intention among senior army officers, and by Gen Zia himself at the time, to hold free elections within 90 days.

How it came about that a new dictatorship was imposed on the people of Pakistan, and how martial law stretched on for years instead of months, is explained in this book.

The major obstacle to holding fresh elections was, he writes, Gen Zia himself, who, claims Chishti, was gradually convinced by a circle of sycophants that he himself was the ideal ruler.

TRANSCRIPT OF TV INTERVIEW BY MR. TARIQ ALI

Tariq Ali: Good evening, it is not every day that Bandung File has a general in the studio, leave alone a general who has written a book. Today we are proud to welcome General Faiz Ali Chishti now retired, but once a leading general in the Pakistan Army who has just written a book called "*Betrays of - Another Kind; Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan*".

General Chishti, thank you for joining us this evening. Can I start by asking you what made you write a book? After all it is not something for which Pakistani Generals are well known.

Gen FAC: Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to be with you. There were two main reasons for writing this book. Firstly as there were three parties involved in 1977; the government itself, the P.N.A., and then the Army which ultimately took over. I thought somebody from our side must also state the facts, as they were so that the history is recorded correctly. Unfortunately in our country the facts are not told. We believe in giving wrong information. I have gone through many things, especially during the research, and I found that it was misconstrued versions wrong stories, false things etc. So I thought it as my duty to the nation that whatever I knew I should record it for history, for posterity, for the research scholars so that we can ultimately learn some lessons.

T.A.: Now you, General, were centrally involved as a Corps Commander and as one of Zia's colleagues in the *coup d'état*, of July 77, which led to ten, eleven years of military was proposed but the majority of Corps Commanders opposed that decision. Is there any truth in that?

Gen C: But why, why should these ideas even come to one's mind whether he should be killed on takeover or not. The takeover, depends, was for what purpose The takeover was not for all times to come. The takeover was only to separate the parties so that the elections can be held again. So if you are thinking of killing the Prime Minister then how can you separate the parties and have them come back again. Well

T.A.: That was the claim, of General Zia ul Haq when he made his address to the nation that within ninety days there would be elections. But it could be argued that he did not even inform his own high command of what his plans were and that there were very few plans, in fact, to go for a general election. That he had another plan, which was that the country had to be held together for whatever reasons by the Army and the second argument you see says that the United States was indirectly involved in the *coup d'état* and that Zia was their man.

Gen C: On this question I cannot give any categorical answer because if we say, that Zia had different plans that means the higher command of the Army that is the five Corps Commanders were not in picture as to what his thinking was. That means shall we say, that he took all of them for a ride and then he decided what to do. I do not think that was the case. I do not think so. This is just thoughts in retrospect, fabrications, all those ideas etc. I do not think so. I think Zia was genuine in separating the parties and, initially, having the elections re-done in ninety days. All those things, all discussions, all

actions which did take place initially were towards that but at a later stage he went astray.

T.A.: Could that later stage be the reception awarded to Bhutto when he arrived in Lahore? Lots of people say and your book mentions that fact. It was a turning point that when Bhutto arrived in Lahore he himself, it is said, was surprised at the very large crowd which had turned out to greet him thus indicating that if a general election was held Bhutto's People's Party would win and General Zia not being a fool probably understood that if that happens the one thing that would definitely happen is he would be dismissed as Chief Of Staff.

Gen C: During the discussions with the Prime Minister in the Cabinet every time we have been saying that. To go for elections, People's Party would still win.

T.A. : You knew-that.

Gen C: We never had any doubts that People's Party will not win. Even, to that extent, we said, even - shall we say, side-tracking this question slightly, even later on we knew that whenever elections are held on party basis People's Party will win. Doesn't matter when the elections are held, if the elections are held after two years, five years, ten years. Whenever they are on party basis it will be the Peoples Party which will win. Now coming back to this question again, initially, I have no doubt in my mind, nor did any of other Corps Commanders, that there was any other intention in Zia's mind also that it is only a question of separating the parties and having the elections done because all steps were towards that. Everything was oriented towards that. The question is as to when did Zia change his mind. That is the question that you would like to know and in the book I have tried to give the answer to that also. See General Zia ul Haq had one weakness, that is, anybody who will go and talk to him will convince him for a thing and the last man who went would perhaps go with the last decision.

T.A. : He was very impressionistic.

Gen C: He was very impressionistic. I do not know what exact word to use. During the routine or even office routine etcetera many a times it happened that I had, in one capacity or the other, gone to General Zia to seek a decision - I have been his staff officer, say Military Secretary in G.H.Q. when he was the Chief or as a Federal Minister dealing with three, four ministries or whatever it, was. If I have gone to General Zia for a decision and I have taken a decision from him and two hours thereafter if somebody has gone to him he got his mind changed and the decision was changed. There is no reason why that should happen but it did happen. So anybody telling him that when Bhutto comes "he will remove you" etcetera is understood, it is implied, these things do not matter but when somebody tells him that if Mr. Bhutto comes back "he is going to hang you" then perhaps he would think twice and I have no reasons to believe that Zia

did not have full faith in Mr. Bhutto that he would not even touch him. First meeting which I have mentioned in my book which.

T.A.: First meeting after Martial Law.

Gen C: After Martial Law on 15 July in 77 on which many things have been written. I was the only witness because I was the only one at that time present.

T.A.: Could you describe that meeting?

Gen C: I have given it in the book. I have written it in the book. It was absolutely pleasant. There was no harsh exchange of words, no ill feelings etcetera. Mr. Bhutto said, "Yes, you have taken over, OK, perhaps that was the right thing for you to do but now the question is how to deal with the situation. How to run this country because yours has been a different task, mine has been a different task. You do not know what are the problems in running Pakistan. Pakistan is not an easy country to govern. It has many problems. Therefore, you have done this, OK. It is your judgment. Now clear the deck and let us do the things again so that we run this country". Now, what I want to highlight is for the sake of the people. There was no abusing. There was no exchange of harsh words. There was no - there was absolutely nothing which has been said - even people have gone to the extent that Mr. Bhutto slapped Zia or Zia was harsh and rude. There is no such thing. So I personally think, as I have mentioned that the things went wrong with telephone call which I have mentioned.

T.A.: You have mentioned that telephone call.

Gen C: And that is where I think Zia got scared, may be worried, and then.

T.A.: You think, in that telephone call, which you described in the book, it is that you were at General Zia's house

Gen C: Yeah

T.A.: And the phone rang and they said - it is Mr. Bhutto on the phone and he went to answer the phone and you saw him being angry but does anyone know what transpired? What Bhutto said to him to make him angry?

Gen C: You see. It is very difficult because, I think he was speaking from Lahore or where ever, it was after that.

T.A.: After that big meeting.

Gen C: That meeting etcetera. So what could he say? Now, as I am sitting in the lawn and as you know it is Murree and the telephone is in the verandah. If you know Intelligence School, next to that, the Chiefs house is there. Now I can't listen in what the other side is saying but what-ever this side is speaking I can listen. I could write perhaps, if I could be dishonest - intellectually, write couple of things but I can't write anything because I do not know what the talk was but it must be something which later on, may be as, told by somebody else as to what Mr. Bhutto's intention would be, scared him.

T.A.: One of the other things you described in your book is that when Bhutto was first arrested on the charges of murder and the High Court in West Pakistan. in Lahore, rather gave him bail General Zia was very upset by the bail decision and ordered General Iqbal, who, was then Corps Commander in Lahore to arrest him immediately after the bail and Iqbal refused. This is unprecedented, a general refusing to carry out a military commander's order in that fashion, is it not?

Gen C: It is.

T.A.: But Iqbal did it.

Gen C: This is what happened.

T.A.: That indicates another thing that come what may at that stage Zia was determined that Bhutto had to go.

Gen C: I won't answer this question because I am not in a position to do so. As you said earlier if it was in Zia's mind to stay or carry on then he may be having many things in the mind but how I know that Iqbal was given that order was that in case Mr. Bhutto is released on bail he is to be arrested otherwise he may become a law and order problem. All that I know, Zia was saying that his release may increase the law and order problems. Therefore he should be re-arrested. I won't link it with that trial etcetera but unless it was in his mind, which may be, I can't say categorically what his mind was but he was worried about the law and order problem. That it may lead to some law and order problem.

T.A. : The other point you make in the book is that the Martial Law Commander in the Punjab as Governor could have pardoned Bhutto or could have commuted the death sentence to a sentence for life but instead he sent it to General Zia. Now, given the Supreme Court decision, which was a split decision - very narrow majority for sustaining the High Court decision in order to hang Bhutto, was there no discussion at all in the upper reaches of the Army, to put pressure on Zia to spare former Prime Minister's life?

Gen C: One of the solution given was that why should we decide this case? Why not leave it to the next elected government? That used to be our majority opinion.

T.A.: That it should not be dealt with now.

Gen C: See, the point is what has the Army taken over for. The Army did not take over to rule over the country for a prolonged period. The Army had taken over to have the elections done within ninety days. OK if it cannot be done in ninety days do it in hundred days, do it in three hundred and sixty five days, in a year's time etc which we have been trying. I think my book is full of the authenticated letters which I have been writing, actually pressing him hard and hard to go for elections. Now if we have to go for elections this trial case let it continue. Let it take its own course. Let the next government come and decide what to do. If it is only when you have the intention not to have the elections done then it will be different but then we the Corps Commanders won't know. It is his own intention which no body will know except his own self and if, Mister Tariq I would like to say, another thing is that in our country when a person is condemned, when he is sentenced to death the mercy petitions, they keep on pending for years and years. Actually one of the methods to keep the man alive you know our country, is to approach the people and say that 'pend the case'. So what was the hurry that it should be sent in twenty four hours time. My point in writing this thing is something which is not appreciated by the people, the facts which are misconstrued.

T.A.: The other thing which you give another version of there were lots of rumors, as you know, after Bhutto was hanged. One story which is very widespread and believed by people common people that Bhutto's book Daughter of the East she refers to this story without saying whether definitely, whether or not it was true and lots of people who saw the dead man's body say that there were no hanging marks on the neck which are there. What is your information on this?

Gen C: My information. I have given in this book because when I came back from Gilgit, and then I asked General Arif. He was the nearest man who could give the best information and he confirmed it- the man walked up the stairs himself and he was hanged. Mr. Addeeb Javdani, I think, has done lot of research on it. He has been writing quite a few articles on this. I do not think there is any truth in it that he was killed before he was hanged.

T.A.: In which case why did they bring the hour forward? Normally according to the Jail Manual a condemned prisoner is hanged at the crack of the, dawn. If Bhutto was hanged some hours before that, under the cover of darkness.

Gen C: In the book have I not asked, this question myself?

T.A.: That is why I am asking you?

Gen C: As to why these Jail Manuals were over-ruled, what was the need? Why was he hanged at night? Violating, I think his worry may be law and order problem. That is, if it is done during the day it may lead to law and order problems. But then, whether it is day or night law and order problem. would be there, if it had to be there. It would be the same.

T.A.: It would be the same.

Gen C: It would be the same. Why do it at night? This is the question which I have asked myself as to why it was done?

T.A.: General, what do you think is going to happen to Pakistan? We have an elected government again and after a long time and yet we still have a strong and powerful army in place. Given that there has been the Army has got very used to exercising power. The one thing that did happen with General. Zia is lots of young army officers even got perks. Do you think the temptation is permanently present to take over?

Gen C: This is something which is generally said which is absolutely wrong. The Army is never keen to take over. It never was and it never will be but the circumstances force them into it. Let the politicians not fail again. I am not ruling out the Army will not do it. Army will be very very careful. In eighty eight when Zia died it is often said that General Beg did very well by not taking over. I personally think he had no option.

T.A.: I agree with you.

Gen C: He had no option at all and if he had taken over. I think you never study, history with ifs and buts - I think if Beg had ordered Martial Law at that time and taken over. I think the country would have

T.A.: Fallen apart.

Gen C: Fallen apart. A complete blood bath with civil war. He had no option but to let the normal channel take place. Now this leads me to another explanation. When the institutions are not destroyed things can work but when the institutions are destroyed things do not work automatically. Zia dies. Who becomes the President? When Zia dies in the air-crash. Institutionally, the Chairman of the Senate because it is laid down. It is said that when the President is away it is the Senate Chairman who starts acting. This is what I have, I think in a way, tried to bring it out in the book. He never, appointed anybody- as to in case of an accidental death what happens. He leaves all open because he won't trust anybody. If in Zia's time-it was there that the Senate

Chairman, there is no Senate, the Speaker - there is no Speaker because it is Martial Law - so in case of an accidental death there must be some method. Now in this case when Zia dies Beg had nothing else to do but to obey the Acting President of Pakistan which is there.

T.A.: General Chishti, thank you very much for joining us this evening.

Gen C: Well very kind of you again to call me here. I hope I have been able to clear some points, some doubts. But towards the end I would say that there are many gaps in the book which I would have loved still to clarify but the space was not there. Thank you very much Mister Tariq.

"KEY TUTI JAHAN JAHAN PAY KAMAND"

(Mashriq Weekly, London, 24th December 1989)

TRANSLATION

Review by A. R. BANGISH

"... HIGHLIGHTING THE POINTS WHERE THE LASSO BROKE"

The book under review can undoubtedly, be called impressive. Its author, who according to the publisher, is a "man of inner circle", a general who stayed in the power junta after the army took over in 1977. This book is impressive from the point of view that it throws light in detail on the political conditions and the character of the politicians and the army personnel.

The author states that the democratically elected Prime Minister Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in collusion with the Army (In General Yahya's regime) never regretted on the demise of about quarter of a million Bengahes because by doing so the power would have stayed with the West Pakistan. The author also states that General Zia ul Haq who played the role of a ring master in the politics of the country successfully and who was very successful in letting the West believe that he could take a stand as a wall against the expansionistic designs of the Soviet Union, was a crazy man and he had the craze to get a toilet constructed in every new office which he used. And when he repeatedly broke the promise to have the elections held freely and judiciously and destroyed the credibility of the Army all his colleagues *viz* generals brigadiers colonels corps commanders and regional martial law administrators were loyal to him to the extent of stupidity and they never raised a voice against him nor did they ever try to depose him.

Lt Gen Chishti is not tired in praising the organization and professional discipline of the Army. If we believe in the picture depicted by General Chishti who believes in God who had taken an oath to be loyal to the country and is sincere to his mission then a question comes to one's mind as to why these brave soldiers lost each war to the Indians why did they act madly in East Pakistan and why did they hang the democratically elected Prime Minister who single handedly got ninety thousand prisoners released from Bharti prisoners of war camps.

Basically this book seems to an election manifesto. And one gets a feeling that the author is girdling himself to re-enter the politics and wants to declare himself not responsible for the mistakes made in the Zia era. The problem is that it is difficult to ascertain whether General Chishti has written autobiography or history of his time he wants to expose the army for is giving a free gospel on patriotism to his fellow countrymen.

In the book the author on his own has also commented on the political events eg "Who killed Zia" in which he has written "Did Zia deserve the type of death which he met. He died in the same manner as the people who had died in the Ojhri Blast God has his own ways to dispense justice. The Holy Prophet had said that we should keep on praying to God that one should not meet an accidental death."

The author states that I do not consider Zia's death as a result of an air crash. It is a murder a political murder. I would like to comment on it as my national duty and responsibility so that the events may be seen in their correct perspective". He further writes "In my opinion the real culprit of this accident was General Zia himself. His policies and actions had taken the conditions to that pitch that the nation had to bear the loss of twenty nine very valuable lives. List Of Zia's enemies was very long. People responsible for his murder can be any of the Russians, Afghanis, Americans, Iranians, Pakistan political parties, Armed Forces of Pakistan, Ahmadies, Ojhri Camp effectees etc.

Similarly under the title "Bhutto, Zia and Myself" he has mentioned the early events of 1977 which were not known to anybody other than these three. He has given as to what Bhutto told Zia in their first meeting after he was taken into custody "Pakistan is not an easy country to govern. When General Zia would clean the deck then he in collusion with the Army would jointly administer the governmental affairs, Mr. Bhutto said that he had no objection in the takeover by the Army. Perhaps that was the only solution. But the important thing is that how to plan for the future events".

Whatever is his intention, in the book it has been assumed that many things would be known to the people in Asia and the West. There are many references to the names and events which the readers would not know. Quite frequently he has used their first names from which it is definitely not clear about their rank and status. Nor can one guess their relationship with the author.

Another thing which is felt while reading the book is that the author feels himself to be an intellectual. He considers himself to be superior to his colleagues. In some sentences he has depicted harshness for not becoming the deputy to the king, as to why he was not made Deputy Chief of the Army Staff or Vice President.

Somebody has said "Morality, and bravery is the synonym for lack of opportunity and desire". (Perhaps he meant to express "Morality is either lack of courage, or lack of opportunity, or lack of appetite." After reading General Chishti's book and after coming to know the futile attempt to run him down one cannot come to know as to what was lacked by the author. The fact is that he could never become Martial Law Administrator or COAS He feels hurt about it and reflects it.

The book is published in UK but printed in India. Perhaps for this reason Jammu and Kashmir has been shown as part of India on the maps at the start and end of the book, whereas it is a disputed territory. (Publishers say that the map will not make part of the Pakistan Edition). The printing is good. Selection of photographs is also reasonable. The quality of the paper used could be better. The price can also be stated as reasonable.

CONFLICT BULLETIN

Winter Issue February 1990 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict & Terrorism (London)

Book Reviews

Betrays of Another Kind: Islam, democracy and the Army in Pakistan
by Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd).

Betrays of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan. Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd). Asia Publishing House, London. pound 12.95
Reviewed by *William Gutteridge*

In Conflict Study No. 227 entitled "Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State?" Anthony Hyman discussed the continuing role of the army in Pakistan. If Benazir Bhutto is to survive politically, military cooperation to achieve economic reform and the modernization of the infrastructure will be an important indicator of success.

General Chishti until recently an almost unknown figure even apparently to his publisher, actually participated in the events which brought General Zia ul Haq to power in 1977. According to Anthony Hyman's own explanatory introduction to the book it was Chishti who planned the takeover of the capital at the time of the 1977 coup "and it went off like clockwork."

The execution and planning of the coup are treated in detail in this book which is worth reading for this account alone especially as like its predecessors in 1958 and 1969 it was peaceful and encountered no violent opposition. The chances of failure were however, obviously there General Zia himself had chosen to send his wife and family out of the country to London for medical reasons.

The direct topical interest of this book however lies in General Chishti's account of what happened afterwards essentially the decline, and eventual demise of the Zia regime.

It is a version of Pakistan's recent history which needs to be approached with caution in the light of the turn of events an element of self-justification is not surprising. Autobiography in such circumstances could be a hazardous undertaking.

The case for regarding General Chishti as an honest, upright professional soldier does however, seem to stand up. It is not only his professed reaction to the ignominious hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the father of the present Prime Minister, in 1979 which conveys the impression of Chishti's decency and integrity. (He claims that Zia deliberately contrived to have him present at Rawalpindi at the time) Chishti's record on the matter of democratic elections is what is most convincing and certainly well documented.

The General's account of the circumstances surrounding Bhutto's hanging is also compelling reading in itself though as in other passages there is an occasional confusion in the narrative.

The main thesis of the book is simple and conventional - "power corrupts and absolute Power corrupts absolutely". The army, Chishti willingly admits had to intervene in 1977 to prevent impending anarchy. A state of lawlessness prevailed.

The understanding was that the army would be a caretaker pending free and fair elections to be held within 90 days. This was a commitment made and remade by General Zia in his first few months of power.

The hinge of General Chishti's experience, which he has now described was his appointment as Chairman of the Election Cell and his insistence throughout the period that "Martial Law was an unnatural method of governing acceptable as a stop-gap measure". When in 1985 a plan for non-party elections was announced, still under Martial Law, he held a press conference issuing a statement to the effect that such elections were A BASIS FOR CORRUPTION and not a means of extirpating it. He proclaimed I himself in favor of a state based on democracy and Islam, what he called "a modern progressive and scientific Islamic Welfare State". That such a concept is in practice elusive Benazir Bhutto would probably agree. No doubt, too, she will privately have sympathy for the sentiments expressed in the final paragraphs of Chishti's extraordinary book.

He attributes Pakistan's current ills to "a class of upstarts" who "assumed the role of administrators and rulers through their ill-gotten wealth." He ends by appealing for a democratic party system relying on collective leadership. We cannot be concludes "give the prerogative to the filthy rich to rule over us forever."

In spite of the overtone of naive idealism combined no doubt with genuine Islamic faith and patriotism, General Chishti's recollections are better documented in a personal way than most autobiographies. It would also be a "Betrayal of Another Kind" not to draw attention to the serious contribution which he makes to understanding the taxonomy of military coups.

Any student of these frequent events and of military rule must welcome such a detailed insider's account however, retrospectively refined. Moreover, General Chishti attempts to unravel important questions such as "who killed Zia?" add more than a little spice to what is already a fascinating story.

If the lessons of recent Pakistani history, which the General often implicitly makes clear, were taken seriously enough the prospects of avoiding conflict in a more modern Pakistan would be considerably enhanced.

INSIGHT INTO ALARMIST THINKING
(The Muslim, Islamabad, 2 April 1990)

REVIEW ARTICLE By: TARIQ RAHMAN
Insight into alarmist thinking

Faiz Ali Chishti, *Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan* (1989, London & Delhi. Rawalpindi: PCL Publishing House, 1990), pp. 260. Price Rs 300.

Lt General Faiz Ali Chishti has been in the press ever since General Ziaul Haq imposed martial law on July 5, 1977, removing Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from the prime ministership of Pakistan. Till March 1980, he was a Corps Commander and a minister and after that he kept giving statements, generally against Ziaul Haq, off and on. Many people believed that he was the power behind the throne and responsible for much that happened in Zia's early years. That is why a book written by him is a document of great importance. It can tell us much about Zia's martial law and if read in conjunction with other personal accounts such as Rao Rasheed's *Jo Main ne Dekha*, Kausar Niazi's *Aur Line Kut Gal* and Benazir Bhutto's *Daughter of the East*, it can help us understand much of this era of Pakistan's history. Of course, like most personal narratives, the view of this narrative is bound to be self-exonerating and opinionated, but the distortions introduced by the egoistic element can be corrected through cross-checking with other narratives. The value of the narrative lies in presenting unknown facts and documentary proof of certain events and mental attitudes.

MARTIAL LAW

Chishti's account of the martial law is most valuable in telling us how the professional military officers may have seen the events of 1977. He contends that Mr. Bhutto's undemocratic actions, the rigging of the March elections and the brutality of the police made all the parties come together to form the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). This body came under the influence of the fundamentalists and started raising Islamic slogans later. The army commanders were not in favor of shooting demonstrators and three senior officers resigned in Lahore. On May 13 Zia asked his Generals whether they would suggest that the prime minister ask for a mandate from the people through a referendum. The Generals said that the PM should go for elections and not for a referendum. Gen Zia however, told the PM that his Generals had suggested a

referendum. According to the author, "I was the only one who knew that Gen. Zia had told a deliberate lie"

Chishti does not draw any conclusion from this act of Zia but goes on to offer his own opinion why the military takeover was necessary. He says he told Mr. Bhutto that:

It is the Army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fiber of this Army breaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Therefore, please do not destroy this Army. Three Brigadiers have already cracked, the junior ranks are cracking. now. So please go for re-elections. You will still win.

He goes on to reveal that the Army Intelligence had indicated that 300 people had been killed and 80,000 arrested. He also refers to reports of the Amnesty International according to which there had been illegal detention and torturing. Given these facts the Army Generals must have felt justified if they suggested re-elections. This does not explain however why martial law was imposed Chishti does indicate that the plan for the coup was one of the contingency plans made much before the actual takeover. He also tells us that the talks between the PNA and the PPP were taking place. At 9:30 on the evening of July 3 and Maj Gen Arif, Maj Gen Riaz Khan went with the author to Zia's house. Gen Zia said that he would give the final orders after seeing the outcome of the meeting of the PNA and the PPP.

PNA TALKS

Nothing was agreed upon in the meeting and Mr. Bhutto said that he would meet the PNA again on July 4. On the same night says Chishti Gen Zia ordered me to execute Operation Fairplay. The question remains why when most of the killing had occurred in April and the PPP could meet the PNA again was this time chosen for the coup. The author provides no answer and gives support to the hypothesis that Gen Zia saw his way to supreme power in the land and did not miss the chance.

Chishti's own theory is that power spoilt him later and he says that the coup was peaceful (this also exonerates him since he was the one who controlled it) and Bhutto was allowed to retain some of his privileges for some time. Be that as it may Zia was prepared for any contingency. The author tells us not only that Zia had sent his family to England but that a helicopter was ready in Dhamial on the night of the coup Chishti says he ordered that it should not be allowed to take off unless he allowed it. One wonders what would have happened if the coup had failed and Zia actually asked the pilot to fly away?

After this comes proof that Chishti and several other people did advise Zia to hold the elections in 1978 or 1979. However Zia did not listen to them. He also suggests that the trial of Bhutto was a plot between Zia and his newly appointed Governor of Punjab

(Gen Sawar Khan). He points out that the hanging itself was against all regulations. Though he does not say why he did not resign then he does give evidence to support his claim that he was not in Rawalpindi when the hanging took place. He claims that Zia had decided to spread rumors that he had tortured Bhutto and he deliberately went away from Pindi so as to have an alibi.

This is not the only example of Zia's lack of integrity that he has produced. He also says that Zia did not actually take anyone who supported him to task though he talked of accountability. Fraudulent and questionable ways of accountability led to political purges but did not actually bring anyone who had betrayed the national trust to account. Ziaul Haq was so unscrupulous, according to Chishti that he promoted Army officers on the basis of personal choice. In the civil service too, he alleges, officers were put in without regard to the rules of selection. Moreover Zia did not relinquish the position of the COAS because:

Our Army is a very disciplined force. It would never disobey its chief. That was exactly, why Gen Zia would not shed uniform.

There were however, attempts at coups but Chishti gives us no details of these.

The book contains certain appendices some relevant to the main subject of the book Ziaul Haq's rule and others only to the author's role in national and international affairs. Some chapters of the book are not about the sequence of events but contain Chishti's views about the Army. These views are not different from the views of Pakistani military officers as presented by Stephen P. Cohen in his book *The Pakistan Army*.

Another chapter which is not relevant from the point of view of the narration of events is the autobiographical chapter 16 (Gentleman Cadet to General). This could have come in the beginning if the book had been written in a chronological sequence. As it is the chapter is quite out of place. Indeed the fact that the time sequence has not been adhered to creates repetition and makes the book less interesting.

The most important contribution of the book is one which the author never intended: it gives us an insight into the military mind. It becomes obvious that the military considers itself the only institution that can safeguard the integrity of Pakistan. At one place the author says that if Zia had died without there having been anyone to take his place, anyone in the NWFP, Sindh or Balochistan could have declared his province independent. This is an untenable assumption since Pakistan is a federation by the will of the people and not by military, force. This implies that the will of the people is so weak that anyone can declare the provinces to be independent. It is this fallacious thinking which has made the governments of Pakistan deny legitimate demands of the provinces in the past and created ill-will.

The military solution of East Pakistan could not prevent it from becoming Bangladesh and it is evident. That Pakistan is a federation because the people want it to be so and not because the Army has decided that it should be so. This alarmist thinking gives the Army too much power and justifies undemocratic acts by those in power. This is not to deny that some people may, or that Gen Chishti may, have sincerely felt that it was the Army which kept the country together. What needs to be driven home is that this thinking is fallacious and must be abandoned if the provinces and the Centre are to live in an atmosphere of trust.

Chishti contends that Zia was not popular in the Army nor were all Army officers as religious as he was. In this he is right for the Army was never given to religious fundamentalism. The officers were somewhat Westernized and despised the *mullahs*. They were not, to be sure, leftist in their views but they were a part of the modern, more or less apolitical, elite which the British had created in the civil service and the armed forces. Zia himself came from a lower middle class family which was religious. Chishti may not be correct when he conjectures that Zia may have been influenced by the religious fundamentalists, though there is reason to believe that he was sympathetic to them even before the coup. The fact that Zia did manipulate Islamic symbols to stay in power has been confirmed by Chishti as it has been by others.

Chishti presents the point of view of a professional officer. Even granting that he is sincere and has not deviated from the truth, this view is simplistic. The main problem is that the view is based on the assumption that individual politicians make mistakes and the Army takes over to correct these mistakes. This is not correct in the case of the other coups of Pakistan, nor does it seem to be the fact in this case. In fact, it seems more plausible to conclude on the basis of Chishti's own evidence that, at least Zia if not all the others, was ambitious of ruling the country. Why, after all did Zia advise the prime minister not to go for elections? Why did he act when a decision could be taken soon? These are not questions which can be easily explained away on the hypothesis that all Zia wanted to do was to conduct elections. In any case, political systems are complex and Chishti's theory does not take that complexity into account.

For instance, Army rule reinforces hierarchical and undemocratic tendencies and leads to an undemocratic culture. Thus, army rule is not beneficial for a country. The author does not go into these intricacies of political theory and remains at the level of individual actions and personalities in his analysis. He also assumes quite erroneously that the middle class professionals who draw salaries are hit by inflation. The people who are really affected are the working masses who live on uncertain and abysmally low wages. It is this system of production of wealth which the army as well as the civilian bureaucracy have defended. This is a fact to which the author pays no attention. It is, of course, possible that he is genuinely not aware of these aspects of politics. However, his assumption of neutrality on the part of the Army is not really correct.

Whether he knows it or not, the Army like most other conservative institutions, is on the side of the *status quo*. These theoretical attitudes have political implications which should be analyzed when the institution is being studied. To concentrate on the individuals is fundamentally inadequate for a theoretically satisfactory analysis, of politics. However, for such an analysis, books like this serve as original documents. Thus, inspite of its faults and inadequacies. Gen. Chishti's book must be given credit for being a valuable document for the study of an important period in the history of Pakistan.

(The Muslim, Islamabad, 24 April 1990)

**ZIA: THE MAN FROM NOWHERE,
By Jamil Ur-Rehman**

Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti writes that his former boss Gen Zia ul Haq was the man from nowhere. Lt Gen Chishti believes that Gen Zia was a CIA man. Perhaps it was due to his CIA connection that he got the top job of the army superseding six generals senior to him Chishti poses the question. Was it a deep conspiracy (Zia's appointment as COAS) by someone else who wanted to deal with the democratic elements in Pakistan through him?

There are hardly any books by people who have been directly involved in the military takeovers in Pakistan Field Marshal Ayub Khan's autobiography '*Friends Not Masters*' is self laudatory and a one-sided version of his takeover. A book by General Iskander Mirza, deposed and exiled after having masterminded Ayub Khan's takeover, could have been an interesting reading and added valuable information to the history of military takeovers in Pakistan. General Yahya Khan and his colleagues many of them still alive have never told their story. Therefore it is a welcome surprise to read *Betrayals of another kind* written by Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti the man responsible for executing the Operation Fairplay.

Gen Chishti puts the blame squarely on the politicians for the revival of military rule on 5 July, 1977. He maintains that it was due to the failure of PPP - PNA negotiations that forced Gen Zia to step in and save the country from disintegration Gen Chishti claims that Mr. Bhutto was told repeatedly by the corps commander that if law and order situation did not improve and if he did

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501 BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND

not go for reelections, the Army would have no option but to take over. Gen Chishti reveals that Gen Zia was reluctant to take over and nearly risked his life by advancing the execution of Operation Fairplay, by one day in the lingering hope that politicians would reach a compromise.

LEGAL ASPECT

Gen Chishti does not talk about the legal aspects of the coup. He does not say whether the corps commanders had ever pondered that Operation Fairplay was a violation of the Constitution and those who were entrusted with its execution were committing treason.

If Gen Chishti and his colleagues were only concerned with following their chief. In their opinion their first duty was to the chief, everything else including the constitutional niceties were secondary. Does this mean that the Army Chief has acquired the right to act extra-constitutionally if and when he felt that integrity of the country was at stake?

Pakistan in its short history has suffered three military dictators, all chiefs of the Army. The first military dictator, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, was installed in 1958 by President Iskander Mirza. The second military dictator, General Yahya Khan, maneuvered an invitation from the head of state to seize power in 1969. The third General Zia ul Haq, took over power in 1977 on his own initiative. That military coup was planned and executed at the orders, of the army chief without the complicity of the sitting government.

The army rank and file on all three occasions had followed the orders of its chief in blind faith. It had never occurred to the army, from generals at the top to the jawans at the bottom to question the legitimacy of chief's takeover and his subsequent rule. The legitimacy lay in his position as the head of the army and in the success of the coup. The navy and Air Force always acquiescing to the army takeover. There is no instance on record of any man in uniform resigning his post in protest against the military takeover. In fact, there is no instance of any government servant, high or low, displaying his distaste of the military dictatorship by resigning his post. Perhaps it does indicate that all the three takeovers by the army chiefs were timed to perfection. The public was ready for them. The record shows that a large number of politicians not only welcomed the military takeovers but were falling all over themselves to extend cooperation to the military dictators.

The military takeovers in Pakistan have always been accomplished with remarkable ease. It is mainly due to our third-rate political structure, that the chief of army could simply walk in and depose the constitutional government without encountering expressive resistance from any quarter. This third-rate political structure turns rotten in no time whenever it gets the opportunity to hold power. The army chief thus finds no difficulty in dismantling a political structure which has been weakened by in efficiency corruption nepotism and jobbery, It is difficult to explain away this malady. Is it the frequent interruption of dictatorial rules responsible for our third rate political structure? Or is it our third-rate political structure which facilitates army takeovers?

WHOSE FAULT

It was the weakness of political structure which had led to PNA agitation and subsequent law and order situation, Mr. Bhutto was holding cabinet meetings intermittently in which some top army commanders including Gen Zia also took part. At one such meeting Mr. Bhutto asked Gen Zia General you said that the Army would support the government whole hog, and you would be able to control the situation. How come that the situation is not coming under control? Gen Zia replied that the Army was doing its best but Gen Tikka Khan Defence Advisor, was not satisfied. He observed that if two or three hundred were killed the situation would quickly come under control Mr. Bhutto then asked Gen Chishti for his views Gen Chishti before stating his views got two principles established by questioning Gen Tikka Khan that (1) Army applies minimum force when called out in aid of the civil power and (2) that it always fires to hit, and not in the air. Gen Chishti then addressed Mr. Bhutto, "Sir, 42 Bullets Were fired in Multan, and only two people were hit. Where did the other 40 Bullets go? 43 bullets were fired in Anarkali Lahore and only two people were hit." Gen Chishti explained to Mr. Bhutto that Generals are with him but the soldiers who do the actual shooting are not. According to Gen Chishti the soldiers were firing in the air. Which was tantamount to disobedience of orders. Gen Chishti then pleaded with Mr. Bhutto, *"It is the Army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fiber of this Army breaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Therefore, please do not destroy this Army. Three Brigadiers have already cracked, the junior ranks are cracking now. So Please go for reelections You will still win. Please do not let the cracks Come in the Army"*.

Gen Chishti has recalled the Proceedings of this Cabinet meeting from memory. He does not say when this particular meeting took place. Memory can play tricks. It is not easy for the narrator of an event to remain objective particularly when he himself was involved in that event. The whole truth can only be known when the proceedings of the Cabinet meetings are made public. It is about time that existing secrecy laws are amended. The new law should remove the secrecy veil from some selective government papers. The government papers of twenty-five year ago or older should not be hidden from the public. The official papers relating to national security can be given a longer lease of secret life. The nation would greatly benefit by leaning about its past from the authentic government records.

Gen Chishti argues that the Army had taken over as champions of democracy. Then he goes on to lament that the Army could have kept its credibility if the CMLA had not slipped. "Unfortunately, Zia fell into the trap of sycophants and advisers like A.K. Brohi, Sharifuddin Prizada, the Egyptian Dr. Saad Gabr, the Jordanian Dr Dualbi, Ali Ahmed Talpur, Justice Cheema and above all Col Siddiq Salik".

Gen Chishti in his capacity, as the chief of Election Cell has extensively discussed various politicians and their behavior who used to meet him from time to time. Most of them were against holding of general elections in a hurry. It goes on to prove that our

political structure is indeed third-rate. It was these politicians who were responsible in strengthening the hands of Gen Zia and providing him the opportunity to rule at will.

GENERAL CHISHTI'S GREAT BETRAYAL

(MAG 17-23 MAY 1990)

BY PARVEZ ALI

If we begin by accepting that "history is not a web woven with innocent hands" and, that "all great events have been distorted, most of the important causes concealed and all who figure are so misunderstood, and misrepresented that the result is complete mystification," then Gen Chishti's book *Betrays of Another Kind* published only after the death of Gen Zia is a queer interesting study. In an attempt to wash himself white enough the man who was known to be the 'Iron Man' of Martial Law regime and who led their 'Operations Fairplay' otherwise 'Foulplay' to the world in July 1977, to commit high treason against the state. Gen Chishti tries to project himself as an innocent man who "actually had limited power and authority in the Martial Law government" and who "was never a Martial Law administrator" notwithstanding his alleged incessant desire to become Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, which Zia kept denying to him on purpose and to Gen Chishti's dismay. Amidst the mid-night raiders who toppled a constitutionally elected civilian government, Gen Chishti projects himself as the good guy while others he describes as bad and Gen Zia as the ugly.

The book is full of contradictions and if read in conjunctions with other books on the events of that traumatic period Gen Chishti would fail the litmus test of being the Mr. Clean and Mr. Straightforward and Mr. Outspoken that he wants his readers to believe. Thus books like *If I Am Assassinated by Mr. Bhutto* a masterpiece of stunning truths, *Aur Line Kat Gal* by Mauianā Kausar Niazi, *Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya* by Prof Ghaffoor, *Jo Maine Dekha* by Rao Rahshid, *Kashmir Banega Pakistan* by Sardar Qayyum, give a different view of how Martial Law was imposed in the country and the 'dictator' like role that Gen Chishti played those days.

Gen, Chishti claims that Operation Fairplay was not planned overnight. It was one of the contingency plans. He says "I have no regrets about it or for installing Gen Zia as CMLA, because if. Gen Zia had hesitated and waited a little longer, Pakistan might have become part of Confederated India." "The logic is both queer and absurd. He says "Zia saw no realistic prospects of a compromise between the PPP and PNA". yet, he cites Mr. Bhutto's Press Conference of 4th July saying "if the PNA w they could come on the morning of July 5 and sign the agreement. "Gen, Chishti has no explanation to give if he asked that if Gen Zia had patiently waited for four months, why didn't they wait just one more day. This is exactly what Prof Ghafoor and Maulana Niazi ask in their

books mentioning that the PPP-PNA accord had been reached, when Martial Law came through the chimney after swearing allegiance to Mr. Bhutto. Gen Chishti blames that "the 1977 coup was largely the result of Mr. Bhutto's personal weaknesses and political blunders" saying that "Gen Zia did not come into power through a conspiracy. He was sucked in by circumstances". Yet he contradicts himself by saying I believe that it is possible that the CIA got hold of him (Gen Zia) when he was training in the USA. May be Zia's stay in Jordan took him closer to the CIA ... He questions "Did Zia want to become COAS or was it a deep conspiracy by someone else who wanted to deal with the democratic elements in Pakistan through him?"

While the book is studded with Gen Chishti's photographs sitting next to Gen Zia, as his right hand man, and whom Gen. Zia always called his *Murshid* the spiritual mentor or guide, he says "I was never a member of Zia's inner circle This is rather impossible to believe. The man who was entrusted the exclusive responsibility to execute Operations Fairplay for which Gen Chishti takes pride, who remained Corps Commander of Rawalpindi during Zia's days, who was given important portfolios of three ministries, who was made Chief of the Election Cell and who was called upon by Gen Zia to execute all top secret, operations cannot claim innocence by saying that Gen Zia never trusted him or that he was never in his good books. What is more Gen Chishti himself from Jullunder even defies the famous Jullunder Connection calling it merely a figment of imagination. He talks of Zia's adroitness in manipulating his fellow generals and says Zia used any one and every one irrespective of ethnic groupings. He says there was a clique which grew up around Zia. He had progressively altered the higher echelons of the army creating a gang of four with ties reinforced by marriages alliance thus Zia's, son was married to Gen Rahimuddin's daughter, Gen Akhtar's son was married to Gen Rahim's daughter, Gen Akhtar's son was married to Gen Zahid Ali Akbar's daughter. And there were the top bureaucrats and officers over due for retirement who were promoted and adopted as his blue-eyed boys and Zia fell into the traps of these sycophants who made him believe that he was the one chosen by God to do something about Pakistan as he told BBC on April 12, 1978.

PIOUSNESS

The book is a severe and, gruesome commentary against the person of Gen Zia by a person who was so intimately involved in the conspiracy of imposing Martial Law and remaining with that regime as a front man for three years even though he cites the High Court judgment of June 1977 which had declared Martial Law as illegal. He describes Gen Zia's colorless personality, who was a deliberate liar who was hypocritical treacherous and perfidious who broke all records by making every second decision a dishonest decision and whose quirky behavior and foibles were not only a nuisance or, a source of amazement or amusement but proved positively dangerous like his foolish unconsidered action - which inevitably was hushed up - in the burning of the U.S. embassy building- in Islamabad in November 1979. He says Zia was vindictive who

was outwardly all sugar and honey but inwardly he could be venomous and the nation would come to know more about it as time passed by. He says Zia started deliberately building up his image as the austere pious man of simple tastes which Gen Chishti calls distortion of the truth. He says "Zia's public image was that as a pious Muslim (Zia) had complete faith in Allah and resigned himself to what was his fate. Actually he was constantly preoccupied and worried about his life and he constantly feared attempts at assassination or a coup. He did not trust doctors and refused to have his gall bladder attended until he was physically helpless. He was so scared of death that he used to go to sleep after morning prayers. Of his hypocrisy he says while there were one set of rules he prescribed for the poor even during Ramadan luncheons continued to be prepared in the kitchen of the CMLA building in Rawalpindi and he did not appear to mind when others ate or smoked in front of him. So much for his piousness.

Describing Gen Zia as shockingly irresponsible Gen Chishti says he believed in earning cheap popularity even by corrupting other and he gives examples of such bad behavior. He says Gen Zia had a weakness that he could not say no to any suggestion that might increase his so called popularity yet according to Gen Chishti Zia always remained unpopular in the Armed forces inspite of all his efforts to buy popularity. He changed set rules and procedures for promotions in the Army. It even happened that Majors were simply told by Zia that they were promoted without following usual procedures. It was after all his constituency. Zia according to Gen Chishti was a born procrastinator and always preferred to give verbal decisions or ignore problems. He always had the habit of meeting foreign dignitaries alone and it was highly irresponsible that no authentic minutes were recorded of Zia's meetings with foreign heads of the government. We also know that he used to move around with state files and used to show them to foreign dignitaries.

He says Zia was extra ordinary lazy with paper work. Necessary office work was simply ignored, which is why many thousands of files were found awaiting a decision by Zia at the time of his death in 1988. It is yet another thing that in matters of his interest he introduced immediate action throughout. Gen Chishti says "Zia had other strange traits, apart from (the) for psychologists to examine. This was what amounted to an obsession with toilets. Zia had a special fancy, almost an obsession with bathroom and toilets. He would not share them with anybody". "He was surprisingly casual about the army uniform". "Zia never stopped - disgracing the army uniform. He used to do it himself and even let it be done by his daughter. He used to let her dress up improperly as Colonel, General and go along with him on ceremonial occasion and reception of dignitaries and guards of honor". Gen Chishti feels that among other reasons Zia could perhaps have been killed by "some idealists who - always thought that Zia ... got the uniform disgraced by letting his daughter wear it."

One whole chapter of the book is on a mysterious 'Canadian Connection' which Gen Chishti seems to have purposefully avoided to expose in full. Gen Chishti says "Zia

seemed to have friends with some of the most notorious smugglers of Pakistan such as Seth Abid, the brother-in-law of Masood Mahmood (who got Mr. Bhutto hanged) ... and the equally notorious Dohsil."Gen Chishti also cites examples of Zia's evil doings and tells us of Zia's plane being stopped in Paris for carrying narcotics/heroin, but this 'Canadian Connection' of an organization in North Hatley, Canada, of which Zia was the founder member which he describes of a 'dubious nature' needs a thorough probe more so if it is still continuing. Surprisingly, Gen Chishti admits of his being appointed by Gen Zia as a member of the Board of Governors of this operation and as the Head of its Islamabad branch, he admits of having the 'novel experience' of travelling on Concorde, and chartered flights, to Canada, and Jeddah etc, in connection with this clandestine operation called North Hatley organization as Zia's representative. Yet he pleads ignorant and innocent saying the main figures in this operation, Dr. Saad Gabr, who was given a Pakistani passport on Zia's orders, would not answer any question on the operations. He speaks of it being very secretive and says it was difficult for me to be a party to unknown plans, so he resigned. It is surprising that a general who claims that "A general is paid to risk his life for the country, not the country for his life", leaves the readers groping in the dark on such a dubious, clandestine activity concluding How much money has come since then? How has it been spent? It is anybody's guess. "As member of the Board of Governors of such an operation going on in Canada, for which the Canadian Prime Minister he says flatly refused to invite Gen Zia for a day's visit to Canada Gen Chishti cannot plead innocent when he associated himself with it for such a long time and went to lay the foundations of the project at North Hatley. How could Gen Chishti tolerate active association with a Moroccan-born Dr. Gabr who was sentenced to death in Egypt and finally settled in Canada and who was given special Pakistani passport by Zia. Why didn't he question Zia in the national interest on such an operation, when he cites examples of his bold encounters with Zia on different occasions going as far as telling Zia that the best place for his written orders was the dustbin. It is indeed questionable that Gen Chishti who laid the foundation stone of the project led delegation after delegation to such a dubious project resigned as its Chief just because he did not know anything about it. In the garb of promoting export what dubious activities went around he says he could not make out. When he thought he was at a loss to understand and could not change the *modus operandi* he said he would not be attending the meetings?

It is this aspect of pleading innocent wherever an accusing finger, can be raised at his conduct that continues to annoy a reader Who would for example believe him when he claims ignorance about the circumstances of Mr. Bhutto's ignoble, cold blooded, and calculated execution that took place right under his nose when he was the inner circle of Zia? Having played a truant by purposefully hiding himself in Gilgit on the night of the execution because a senior bureaucrat had informed him of a plot that Zia had hatched to malign him, he says he does not know anything about what really happened? He pins responsibility on others like Brig Rahat Latif etc who he says might have manhandled Mr. Bhutto to extract some confession in return for the promised

promotion from Zia. What about the video tapes on which the hanging ceremony was recorded?

One wonders why Benazir Bhutto hasn't dug open the whole truth. His pleading ignorant only goes to show his extreme indolence and ineptness. Who would believe him when he says that he accepted all those portfolios as Minister incharge of Establishment where he shunted out all those who were called Mr. Bhutto's sympathizers, Minister of Labor, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, Petroleum and Natural Resources, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, in addition to being Corps Commander and Chief of Election Cell just because he thought that his refusal would have indicated a split in the Army which in his opinion would have been "harmful to the, Army? So when General Zia asked me to become a Minister again I agreed." How good of him to show his national commitment? Who would for example believe him when he takes all the credit for executing a coup with military precision and says that "nobody was allowed to get in or get out" of the P.M. House. Yet he says that according to intelligence agencies a lot of documents were burnt by Mr. Bhutto with the help of his Military Secretary and ADC's and that 'boxes full of documents were carried from the PM's house-to Larkana on the night of the coup? Who would for example believe him when he says he had no knowledge of the White Papers, and "Zia never consulted me on the white papers" on which his main advisers he says were Gen Arif, Brohi, Sharifuddin Pirzada, Gen Hassan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Siddiq Salik? Who would for example believe him when he pleads ignorance about the Kasuri murder case and accountability? He questions who had given details of the doing..." "It were certainly not the generals. Nor was it the politicians. It was only the record holders who knew the details that is to say some key civil bureaucrats, all under the Secretary-General-in-Chief. So the bureaucrats had won the game" as he puts it, as if the Military Junta, him included, were composed of angels.

INTRIGUING

Gen Chishti does however deserve credit for continuing advice Gen Zia on holding the promised elections which is borne out by his official notes sent to Zia that he has cited. As Chief of the Election Cell, he exposes the macabre conspiracy of the political leaders against the PPP and his commentary shows the greater intrigues of keeping the PPP out of power come what may. He keeps pleading the holding of elections saying that "Martial Law regime would stand vindicated by fulfilling the pledge of holding early elections", or to tell Zia in writing that "to maintain the state of morale and proverbial discipline of the Armed Forces it goes without saying that elections must be, held at the earliest." As Chief of the Election Cell his analysis of the PNA's 'unnatural alliance' which having used 'the will and the blood of the people' had 'drifted into insipidity' with 'crack appearing with no clear sense of direction' while the PPP demonstrating 'semblance of unity and order' with 'no signs of disintegration' speaks volumes on why Zia never kept his solemn pledge 'for elections that he gave to the nation after reciting

verses from the Holy Qur'an, gave to the supreme Court and even gave at the Holy Kaa'ba. His commentary on the conduct of PNA, Muslim Leaguers, JI who opted as junior civilian partners in the Martial Law regime shows their 'evil designs.' He reports that Mr. Jatoi had agreed to become the Prime Minister of the interim government in February 1980. One wonders what the whitewashed uncle has to say on this exposure by Gen Chishti?

Equally ignoble comes out the role of politicians like Maulana Niazi, Hafeez Pirzada, Khawaja Khairuddin, Aslam Khattak, Yousuf Khattak, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Mir Afzal Khan and many others who kept advising him and Zia those days, and put him astray. Yet it was Gen Chishti who went ahead implementing schemes of National government, elections of local bodies and requested politicians to cooperate fully, for the good of the nation, which kept delaying elections. He says there his rule was just, acting as a Post Office. What an explanation to wriggle out of the conspiracy! Gen Chishti also deserves credit for advising Zia in writing not to amend the Constitution because 'it will create a serious legal crisis'. He also claims to have refused to Gen Zia and Gen Akhtar Abdur Rehman of ISI to allow the dumping of gun powder for Afghanistan at the Ojhri Camp, as long as he was the Corps Commander of Rawalpindi, yet he quietly skips telling anything about what happened at Ojhri Camp which killed thousands of people. He takes credit for capturing the Lipa Valley during the days of Mr. Bhutto, but does not mention a single word on the loss of the Siachin Glacier. This is really intriguing.

One cannot but agree with him into to when he demands accountability saying intellectual honesty demands it. He wants trials on poor performance of military officers in the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971. He wants trial of Gen Yahya and his colleagues even in absentia, he pleads release of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission report, he demands release of Gen Akbar's report on 1971 war which was replaced by Gen Awan's report, he demands enquiry on the allotment of thousands of acres of agricultural land to military officers, he demands enquiry on the ill-doing of Gen Zia as to why elections were postponed why the Constitution was changed, on the December 1984 Referendum, on why Zia continued as COAS on extensions up to his death against all army rules, he wants enquiry into the property of those who were connected with the Martial Law regimes and the private funds which were slashed away or sent away abroad. He insists on holding trials of Army officers for their misdoings looting, house breaking, dereliction of duty, inefficiency, bribery, nepotism, favoritism etc during the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971 and Martial Laws of 1953, 1958, 1969 and 1971. He wants enquiry on why black money was issued. He says "I gladly offer myself for accountability" for many of his own decisions.

Gen Chishti knows best that even if the country reaches a point of disaster by the ill doings of the high ups, no one can dare to institute accountability, and that too against military officers in this country. True that he walked out of Zia's umbrella, the day he

was retired from the army, but no matter how innocent, how outspoken, how righteous he may paint himself, he cannot wipe himself clean, for having been the chief architect and the chief executor of the 'Operations Fairplay' which ought to be named 'Operations Foulplay' and for committing high treason against the State. One also wonders why such a self proclaimed outspoken and courageous man with conviction had planned the writing of the book Once Gen Zia Had Left The Throne?

SALMAN RUSHDI OF PAKISTAN ARMY
(*Pakistan Observer* Islamabad 23 June 1990)

Lt General (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti's newly published book "Betrayals of Another Kind" has been described by the political observers in the capital as yet another attempt to defame the armed forces of Pakistan.

OBSERVER has learnt that the book has been produced as a result of a deal struck between the retired General once reported to be on the hit list of AL ZULFIKAR and the PPP in London in 1989. According to reports General Chishti being one of the few characters still alive who were at the helm of affairs at the time of execution of the former Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto was fearful of the possible repercussions of the case. In order to get his past sins, pardoned he entered into an agreement with the PPP leaders and to establish his change of heart presented this book which is a deliberate distortion of past events full of disinformation half truths and outright falsehoods.

The book contains 16 chapters including the one narrating his nature of relationship with Bhutto and Zia, background of Martial Law imposition, trial of Mr. Bhutto, postponement of general elections process of accountability initiated by the military regime and who killed Zia. In view of the biased presentation of facts observers feel that the book is a continuation of the campaign started in 1971 to defame the Army a link in the propaganda chain started over Radio, TV and sponsored articles and books like "*Pakistan Crisis in Leadership*" by Fazal Mueqem and "*Witness to Surrender*" by Siddiq Salik both commissioned by the PPP governments of Z. A. Bhutto.

Knowledgeable sources who had the opportunity to closely watch the conduct of General Chishti, are not really to buy the version of events coined by him and opine that through his shameful work (the book), General Chishti has proved to be the "Salman Rushdi of Pakistan Army". The author has disgraced the uniform which he once wore to malign and denigrate most of his superiors and colleagues and indirectly the army - apparently the real target of those at whose behest he authored this spurious book.

The most intriguing part of the whole episode, these sources say, is that Chishti toured England, Zimbabwe, UAE and perhaps India to seek guidance from his links. The first edition of the book was published in India (Tricolour Books) in 1989 through Indian assistance. The sources question as to who financed 47,000 copies of the book of President Zia. The number is perhaps largest published in Pakistan in one edition.

Another source claimed that with coming to power of PPP government in 1988, Chishti was in panic and despite his big moustaches he was frightened man hiding himself from the wrath of the new rulers. He was in a fix what to do because of his role in the execution of Bhutto as some reports suggested that the General tortured the former Prime Minister when he was in death cell in Rawalpindi Jail. He asked for abject apology and undertook any service that was required of him, the source, said adding that he became the cat's paw to write against Zia and his colleagues and smeared them with his falsehoods. The way the book has been written it is clear that he was helped by experts in disinformation and insinuation. Who employed and commissioned these experts? Is he the real author or mere rubber stamp? These questions are being asked by the observers.

Habibur Rehman
Pakistan
OBSERVER
Evenger from Islamabad.
Saturday June 23, 1990.

Cover-up of the great betrayal Ghayurl Islam

PAKISTAN has not recovered, even after 13 years, from the shock of the traumatic events of 1977 and the most repressive regime born out of those events. The long dark night of tyranny, spread over eleven years, has shaken the foundations of the State and society which will take a long time to stabilize. The events and the causes have been written about by many people from various angles, but mainly by those who were insiders only up to July 4, 1977, and thereafter were excluded from the shaping of events.

Now has come aversion from one who was an insider during the dying days of the democratic regime and a full player during the stabilization period of the military dictatorship. Lt. Gen (rid) Faiz Ali Chishti was corps commander of Rawalpindi, and in that capacity he had seen from close quarters the long-drawn-out negotiations between the PPP Government and the PNA leadership and later was the main actor in the planning and execution of the infamous "Operation Fairplay" and subsequent consolidation of the regime.

His book, *Betrays of Another Kind*, purports to record the evolution of the main events of that period. It is a detailed justification of the military take-over which was resorted to for patriotic reasons to save the country from civil war and not, he says, in pursuit of any ambition to rule and draw material advantages of State patronage. The junta was initially serious, according to Chishti, in holding the promised elections within 90 days, but the commitment was betrayed by Gen Zia supported by other, "sycophantic" and "spineless" members of the military council. Chishti says he insisted on fulfillment of the commitment up to the last. However, the book explodes the myth of free and frank discussions in the military high command. The generals are seen in the book as endorsing whatever the boss desired and never insisting. (Chishti excluded, of course) on ideas not likely to be liked by the top man.

Let us see what Chishti has to say about the takeover. No mention is made of when and by whom the idea of a take-over was first mooted. Chishti must have been a key player at this stage as he was holding a crucial office and without him no action could have succeeded. Political scientists had seen a take-over coming nearer as military involvement had grown greater in stages - the calling of the army in aid of civil power,

martial law. In three cities, participation of generals in political discussions, etc Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite all his, intelligence and cleverness, displayed his naivete in not recognizing this fact. Chishti says the army was sucked into the crisis against its will. He even tries to exonerate Gen. Zia. He says: Gen Zia did not come to power through any conspiracy. He was sucked in by circumstances. But the way Zia schemed to get the job of COAS and then stooped low to say close to Bhutto, putting himself above any suspicion, leave no doubt that he was playing for high stakes. According to Chishti, Gen. Zia proposed that Bhutto be made colonel commandant of his regiment (Armoured corps) - an honour always given to an ex-military officer. On Bhutto's visit to Multan, Gen. Zia, Corps Commander, brought out officers' and jawans wives on the streets to clap and welcome the Prime Minister, again something that had never happened before. Zia made friends with the PPP leaders in Multan, begged invitations from them, got himself recommended to Bhutto for the post of COAS and took an oath on the Quran at Sadiq Hussain Qureshi's house to remain always loyal to Bhutto. This is how he got the job on March 1, 1976, superseding seven senior generals, against the recommendation of the then COAS Gen Tikka Khan.

In Pakistan, the traditional Opposition leaders play safe; they become brave and defiant only when they are assured of the covert or overt support of elements in the military which has ruled the country for 23 years. This has been and still continues to be their track record Bhutto himself chose open defiance when he became aware of Yahya's ambitions. The attitude of open defiance and public display of hatred and contempt for Bhutto shown by the PNA leaders during the elections and Asghar Khan's statement that the PNA would not accept Bhutto even if he won may now, in retrospect, be linked with what was cooking in GHQ. In his first Press conference, quoted by Chishti, on July 14, 1977, Gen Zia said: "On March 10, 1977, the PNA boycotted provincial elections. So we had a senior officer's meeting in Rawalpindi and examined angles. One of the plans considered was a take-over. All the officers agreed that we should avoid a take-over until forced to as a last resort. Gen Zia did not reveal the exact date, nor does Chishti, of the officers meeting. But from the context, it is clear that it was immediately after July 10, Between July 10 and 15 there was a lull-no- street demonstrations, no breakdown of law and order, no rioting, no killing, no arrests. Then why had the idea of a take-over been mooted and why was it discussed? Obviously some of the elements in the army were in contact with some of the Opposition leaders. This was later hinted at by the PNA leaders themselves (including Mufti Mahmood, Prof. Ghafoor and others) when they talked of the intransigence of some of their colleagues who had obstructed a political settlement and had preferred a military take-over.

Another hint about outside collusion is dropped when Chishti says that when Gen. Zia made his first announcement he (Chishti) was surprised to the addition of the last paragraph which was not there when the Corps Commanders discussed the speech. Chishti writes: "The introduction of this point into the political speech may have been at the behest of someone else." The point referred to find here was: I must say that the

spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement, was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. This is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country. Chishti says the introduction of this point did not alarm him then. In fact it should have done for the stated purpose of the take-over was only the holding of election within 90 days, not the restructuring of the State and society.

The intention of the corps commanders about the stated objective is clear from the following: During our meetings of the Corps Commanders with COAS in the chair, when reviewing law and order situation, we had given the consensus that if the situation demanded the COAS may impose martial law, but it should be of a temporary nature with only one objective. That objective would be to hold fair and free elections. There were some corps commanders (Gen Arbab was one) who were of the view that no time limit should be imposed. The election might even be after ten years. There were some who had no opinion at all, or did not want to express their views lest they oppose Gen. Zia's mind. But I was very specific on this point and said that the Constitution would be violated or even abrogated if the elections were not held within 90 days. There was no agreement on this till the final day.

With the traditional simplicity of an army officer, Chishti analyses the PPP-PNA struggle as having, been provoked by the tyrannies the Bhutto regime had perpetrated in strangulating civil liberties, indiscriminate arrests of opponents and their persecution. At one point Chishti writes: "It seemed that nobody really wanted Mr. Bhutto to live. The masses who rose against him in the PNA movement were against him, the PPP party workers who thought he had deviated from the party manifesto by aligning himself with the feudal lords and the rich did not want him and even the PPP leaders on whom he had kept secret files were not with him. Above all the silent majority which had suffered at the hands of the so-called PPP workers did not want him. Nobody was interested. There were even some who used to tell Gen. Zia openly that Mr. Bhutto should not be spared

White Paper

All this may be partly true and partly part of the campaign which gave birth to the huge volumes of White Papers in whose compilation Chishti pleads total non-involvement and says: "His (Zia's) main advisers on these issue were Gen. Arif (with his past martial law experience). A. K. Brohi, and Shanfuiddin Pirzada (as legal advisers), Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Secretary-General-in-chief) and Siddiq Salik (Zia's speech writer).

But one thing is clear. On the eve of the election, the nation stood deeply divided and the reason, as stated by - political scientist Dr. Mohammad Waseem, was that while individual members of the elites had prospered under Bhutto, the over-all thrust of his

reforms and legislative activity in general was in favor of the subaltern class. Bhutto's Government thus manifested significant features of an 'intermediate regime' defined in terms of both input of class support and output of class legislation (Politics and the State in Pakistan.) This obviously alienated the elite and the propertied and rich classes, and these included most of the generals. Thus, the military intervention of July 5 was on the side of the classes alienated from the Bhutto Government. But Chishti says that "Zia took the initiative and ended the agony of the people". Chishti asserts that the question of legitimacy of the regime had been settled by "the reaction of relief of the masses on July 5, the PPPs acceptance of going to the polls on October 18 and the Supreme Court judgment on Begum Nusrat Bhutto's petition".

Regarding support of the masses, it is pertinent to recall that Chishti himself at several places mentions that had the elections not been rigged, Bhutto would still have won and in re-election he was sure to win again. This was the reason why the junta felt jittery when Bhutto visited Lahore on August 8 to a roaring welcome: why Zia shied away from holding elections until 'positive results' were ensured: why the PNA leadership advised Bhutto's disposal before the elections. The fact is that the military regime never acquired legitimacy despite attempts to bring the people into submission through hanging, floggings, incarceration, mass murders in 1983, and the sharpening of ethnic animosity through encouragement to terrorist gangs (Aligarh Colony, Orangi, Hyderabad, etc).

One myth that some army elements have woven around themselves, and on which the nation is fed, is: "It is the army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fiber of this army breaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Men who hold this view need to be reminded that Pakistan was brought into existence by the united will of the people, through a democratic process, not by the army, which either did not exist at that time and if it did in embryonic form it was serving the interest of the foreigners. The day the army alienated the people of East Pakistan, it could not hold the country together. West Pakistan remained together in 1971 not because of the army (It had been beaten) but because the people of the four provinces wanted to stay together and it will stay intact till the people so wish. The sooner the army sheds this notion, of being a 'savior', which often prompts it to kill democracy, the better for the country.

Betrays of Another Kind is more an attempt to hide relevant facts of national interest about the critical period than to reveal them. Chishti is liberal only in exposing the character of his boss Gen. Zia who is depicted as a sycophant, a liar, promoter of favoritism and nepotism, hypocritical, dishonest having no moral courage, outwardly sugar and honey but inwardly venomous. This assessment of Zia's character will be contested only by those who themselves have a similar make up. As against this Chishti glorifies himself as being an efficient officer, patriotic, incorruptible, a fearless, of holder of principles, a great lover of democracy, and having managed crises which others were

incapable of doing. If he had his way, he says, he would have held free and fair elections within 90 days.

Chishti writes about other minor events like U.S Embassy blaze, the Canadian connection (Dr. Saad Gabr), Joan Herring's appointment, Zia's CIA connection, the behavior of prominent PNA and PPP leaders, the accountability fiasco etc.

Important Events

Two more important events need to be mentioned, Chishti writes that present COP leader (and now caretaker Prime Minister) Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi had almost become Prime Minister in March 1980 under Zia. He writes: "The veteran Sindhi politician G.M. Jatoi had agreed to become Prime Minister of the interim government in February 1980. I made him meet Zia in February and everything seemed resolved. Then I was sent off to Canada on what turned out to be a fool's errand, and on my return everything had changed. Zia was completely in the clutches of the fundamentalist advisers".

Another important event that took place during the time Chishti was still in office was the revolution in Afghanistan and the Soviet intervention. Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan crystallized during this period. Chishti defined the long term objective of the armed forces in Afghanistan thus: "The defence of Pakistan lay in the defence of Afghanistan. We should install a favorable government in Kabul". Strategy: "Use friendly Pushtun tribes. At the same time, Pakistan should use this golden opportunity to occupy positions on the Durand Lines". He further adds:" Pakistan must be defended by sitting in Afghanistan. We would do whatever we could to arrange a friendly government headed by pro-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan".

Although we aspired to wear the mantle of the British in the region, we were unaware of the country in which we were going to embroil ourselves. About the meeting of the high command where Afghanistan was discussed, Chishti himself writes: One thing became very clear during the meeting. We knew nothing in depth about our neighbor Afghanistan, although we claimed a centuries old relationship both historical and religious. Our knowledge was superficial and wrong. Such was the leadership which was going to install its men in Kabul.

Weapons

After plans had been finalized with Brezezinski, Reagan's National Security Adviser, in February 1980, to receive weapons for Afghan refugees. Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rehman, DG ISI, came to Chishti's office and asked him a favour. Chishti writes: "He wanted a little area in the Regiment at Ojhri Camp, for the dumping and storage of some arms and ammunition to be placed at his disposal for some clandestine operations. I refused. There were no underground storage facilities in that area. It was

insane to have explosives in the open there because proper 'igloos' did not exist, and the Ojhri Camp was too close to Islamabad Airport, the highway and civilian housing I also told him I was not a party to Brezezinski, and was not going to be party to the ISI either". The Ojhri Camp became available to the ISI on Chishti's retirement a month later.

"The risk of storing explosives and ammunition at Ojhri camp was revealed to everyone in April 1988 where huge explosions deviated a wide area and killed a thousand people", writes Chishti.

About the last days of Zia in the chapter Who Killed Zia?, Chishti writes: "He (Zia) was always worried about his life, and would not even sleep at night. He preferred to go to sleep after his morning prayers. He would not trust anybody with safety and security arrangements". At another place Chishti says: "Gen Zia's mission was dignified with many high sounding descriptions, but in reality his mission was to save his own life, which necessarily involved his staying in power until death".

Speculating on who killed Zia, who had made innumerable enemies, Chishti clinches the issue. He writes: "Whatever device was used to disrupt the controls of the Hercules could not have been used without the active cooperation of one or more members of the armed forces (His own constituency). They may be people who had suffered at his hands because of intellectually dishonest decisions taken by him on promotions, appointments and retirements in civil services, armed forces, judiciary and other services or relatives of those whose mercy petitions had been rejected and specially those whom he had promised (Bhutto's murder trial co-accused) that nothing would happen, as well as relatives of those who were shot by government agencies on his orders and policies.

Chishti speaks derogatively about, a large number of his military colleagues. Most of them are alive. That they have not reacted can only lend substance to his assessments and charges.

ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW (Dawn 28 September 1990)

BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND by Lt. Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Rtd) published by PCL Publishing House Rawalpindi, 1990. Pp 290. Rs 300.

The traumatic events of 1977 and the following years which have landed Pakistan in the worst political, economic and, above all, survival crises of its existence have been the subject of casual study by many writers. They have mainly sought to derive political advantage from their writing.

Betrays of Another Kind is another kind of writing. It is an account of what happened in those crucial years by a person who had been privy to the unfolding drama for some time. Later he was one of the main actors shaping the events Lt Gen (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti was the corps commander of Rawalpindi in 1977 and in that capacity he was deeply involved in the goings-on at the GHQ.

The book is an attempt to prove that the Army was sucked into the national crisis against its will and that it had no ambition to seize power. The book deals in quite some details with Bhutto's failings such as the prolonged negotiations with the PNA during the critical four months of 1977 the rigging of elections and the excesses committed against political opponents.

But these are facts which have already been widely publicized. What is more interesting is the account of events which have so far been shrouded in speculation. Thus Betrays of Another Kind throws light on some hazy aspects of Bhutto's murder trial and attempts to clear the author of the charges of having been involved at any stage in the trial or in Bhutto's execution.

Zia's character has proved to be controversial. For some people he was pious honest polite and the embodiment of traditional values in personal behavior. For others he was the opposite. During his regime the heroin and Kalashnikov culture took birth and prospered. The author of Betrays of Another Kind projects a highly negative image of his chief.

He gives details of the events that took place from January 7, 1977 when Bhutto announced the general election up to July 5 when the Army took over. He speaks in great detail about the activities of the Election Cell which he was heading. There is a conscious attempt to exonerate the Army high command from the charge of conspiring to take over power until according to the author, the situation seemed to be getting out of control when Bhutto decided to bring his supporters out on the streets in the first week of July.

However, Gen Zia had, disclosed on July 14, 1977 in Rawalpindi that the takeover was considered as early as March 10. Chishti writes, quoting Zia: "On March 10, 1977 the PNA boycotted provincial elections. So we had a senior officers' meeting in Rawalpindi and examined all angles. One of the plans considered was a takeover. All the officers agreed that we should avoid a takeover until forced to as a last resort."

One fails to understand how even consideration of a takeover could be justified as early as March 10 when the PNA agitation had not yet started. The first protest took place on March 15. This fact gives some substance to suspicions that at least some elements in the Army were in league with some elements in the PNA who were preventing an agreement. Mufti Mehmood Prof Ghaffoor and some other leaders are on record about the intransigent attitude of their colleagues.

Much has been written on how Gen Zia was selected to be COAS against the advice of the incumbent COAS superseding seven Lieutenants General. Chishti writes Zia was made COAS because at Sadiq Husain Qureshi's residence in Multan he had taken an oath on the Quran that he would be loyal to Bhutto.

A number of rumors circulating during the early martial law days are confirmed by the author. Some of these are: "The veteran Sindhi politician Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi had agreed to become Prime Minister of the interim government in February 1980. I made him meet Zia in February and everything seemed resolved. Then I was sent off to Canada, on what turned out a fool's errand, and on my return everything had changed. Zia was completely in the clutches of the fundamentalists and other selfish and unprincipled advisors.

Bhutto's trial understandably receives extensive treatment. According to the author, the four co-accused of Bhutto had been promised amnesty. He (Chishti) came to know about the assurances in July 1978 when Irshad Qureshi, advocate, met him. In Chishti's presence Gen Ihsan (a confidant of Zia) told the lawyer that since Gen Zia had already given an assurance to the prosecution that nothing would happen to any of the co-accused, they should not worry. Contrary to this pledge which was also known to Gen Iqbal, A. K. Brohi, Barrister Anwar and Gen Arif, the accused were hanged.

Chishti is critical of the corruption and the lack of accountability, which crept into the administration.

Revelations that make interesting reading are about the US embassy blaze, the Canadian connection (Dr. Saad Gabr), Joan Herring's appointment as Honorary Consul, behavior of important PNA and PPP leaders, and the Army's perception of the Afghan crisis in the early days.

The image that Chishti projects of himself as an efficient army officer, with the capacity of crisis management, patriotism, ardor for democracy, incorruptibility and outspokenness can be commented upon only by those who know the General personally or have worked with him.

Rumors in the early martial law days depicted him as the strongman of the junta and a possible rival to Zia. From his own book, he comes out absolutely clean in the company, generally, of sycophants and small characters. Many of the actors, painted in black, are still alive. It remains to be seen whether and when, they react to the narration of events in *Betrays of Another Kind*.

GHAYURUL ISLAM

CHICANERY AND HORSE TRADING (The Hindu, 8 November 1990)

BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND Islam Democracy and the Army in Pakistan by Lt General Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd.) Tricolour Books, 9662b Islam Ganj, Azad Market, Delhi 6 Price not stated.

Here is a book on the rise (and fall) of General Zia written by his right hand henchman Lt General Chishti who was called *Murshid* (guru) by Zia at the time of his accession to power. Gen Chishti's role in the military regime of Zia did not last more than a year or so after which he resigned in protest against Zia continuing his rule without conducting the elections promised in 90 days. This book is a justification of Gen Chishti's role in bringing about the military rule and a condemnation of Zia's regime after he resigned. From the text and even the illustrations there is no doubt the author thinks no end of himself an opinion which the reader does not have to share. It must be added that the author hails from the Punjab which rules the roost in Pakistan no matter, who is in power in Rawalpindi.

The book was first published in 1989 by Asia Publishing House London (this Indian edition being apparently published to carry the message to the Indian readership languishing under doses of democracy) and contains an interesting introduction by Anthony Hyman. He poses a very valid question. Why did Pakistan have its first experience of military rule within a decade of independence while in the neighboring India where there is a large, well disciplined professional force, the tradition of civil dominance over the military has been accepted. No answer is given.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave Pakistan its first constitution which should have rightly, been on the Statute Book soon after the formation of Pakistan in 1947 when a Constituent Assembly, similar to the Indian had been setup. He also held the first elections in the country which made him Prime Minister. So much of chicanery double dealing and horse trading went on that he found himself at loggerheads with the general populace and the opposition parties and he had to depend on the army and martial law to keep himself in power.

Soon the Army under Zia took over. By sheer force of habit the Pak army took to political power like duck to water. Lt General Chishti helped in the process as the theoretician who was convinced there was no other alternative. In this book he says he soon parted company with Gen Zia who wanted to cling on to power at all costs. Zia

was a secretive man who could manipulate his army officers and their loyalties by suitably proffered patronage and threats. As for public pronouncements it was a well known joke in Rawalpindi to say that CMLA short for Chief Martial Law Administrator meant Cancel My Last Announcement. Chishti parted company from his *Shagrid* or *Chela* within a year. This book explains the hows and the whys.

The main theme of Gen Chishti is that there should be accountability in the political administration of the country and every politician should stand or fall by this test. As to who should hold this test of accountability he thinks that officers of probity, like himself should judge for themselves through tribunals. He does stretch a point and say that even military officers are accountable in so far as they are doing a political job as in the case of Zia himself.

It is obvious that the author's blind spot is the army que army. He is convinced that the Pakistan Army is really "Pak" pure as driven snow, steadfast in their attitudes and loyalties to their officers under any circumstances. This obedience and loyalty do not embrace politicians or even elected representatives if they are said to be bad for their country by their Supreme in Command. Over the years successive military regimes ranging literally, from A to Z (Ayub Khan to Zia) have been lording it over in Pakistan. Mainly the Army be it noted.

The other two wings of the fighting forces have their own grouse as being discriminated against in the matter of distribution of spoils. That this kind of thing is still taking place is clear from recent events when an elected Prime Minister is dismissed on the day previous to her facing a no confidence motion in Parliament. In this instance action is taken by the President but it is clear who pulls the strings. And one presumes the circus will go on according to a pre orchestrated programme.

The book contains a more or less detailed account of how Bhutto was first protected by Gen Chishti against the public and later jailed and put on trial and ultimately hanged. But there is nothing new that we have not learnt from other sources. It is significant that Gen Chishti considered it safe to publish this book only after Gen Zia was well and truly dead beyond recall and resurrection.

Coming from the Military Secretary (and later officer in charge of the Election Cell for an Election that never took place) during the last days of the Bhutto regime and the takeover by Gen Zia this book is of some historical interest. Apart from the author's justification of the role he played during these times there is nothing to recommend this look to any serious student of current events.

V Abdulla

CHISHTI'S VERSION OF ZIA'S MARTIAL LAW

In his candidly written book *Betrayals of Another Kind*, Lieut General Faiz Ali Chishti has revealed certain dark spots long hidden from the public view by vested interests who never wanted a just process of accountability to be initiated in the civil and military echelons even after the trauma of surrender in East Pakistan in December 1971.

Says Lt Gen (Retd) Chishti on page 119 of his book (published by Asia Publishing House London 1989) that the Hamoodur Rehman Commission constituted in 1972 to enquire into the causes of the surrender, had inter Alia recommended that Yahya Khan the then President of Pakistan General Abdul Hamid Khan (Chief of Army), Lt Gen S G M Pirzada, Lt Gen Gul Hassan, Maj Gen Umar and Mai Gen Mitha should be tried in public on charges of conspiring to usurp power from Field Marshal Ayub Khan and rigging the 1970 elections.

These officers should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war, both in West Pakistan and East Pakistan....

Lt Gen A. A. K Niazi, Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, Maj Gen M Rahim Khan, Brig G M Baqir Siddiqui, Brig Mohammad Hayat, Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi all be court-martialled. (All these officers served in East Pakistan during the better part of 1971 and surrendered to India in December).

Who is General Chishti and what were his compulsions to present his version of the events leading to the imposition of Martial Law in 1979 ? Chishti happened to be the Principal Staff Officer in the GHQ under General Tikka Khan then Chief of Army Staff, dealing with postings promotions retirement of the Army's officers cadre. The appointment is designated as Military Secretary (MS) not be confused with the protocol related functions of M.S. to the President, Prime Ministers, Governors etc etc. Discloses Chishti (page 25/26) that one day Tikka Khan called him to send a recommendatory letter to the Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, for the next Chief of Staff, as General Tikka Khan had refused Bhutto's offer for an extension of one year. Reveals Chishti there were seven Lieutenant Generals under consideration for the appointment of Chief of Army Staff. In order of seniority they were Mohammad Shariff, Aftab Ahmed Awan, Muhammad Akbar Khan, Azmat Bakksh Awan, Malik Abdul Majid, Ghulam Jilani Khan and Mohammad Zia ul Haq. Gen Tikka Khan recommended that Lt General Mohammad Akbar Khan be promoted and appointed Chief of the Army Staff. If that was not approved then Lt Gen Mohammad Sharif was the second choice. Lt Gen Aftab

and Lt Gen Azmat were not recommended for the post on grounds of ability and Lt Gen Majid and Lt Gen Zia were not considered for the appointment because they had just been promoted and had not acquired the requisite experience desirable for it. Lt Gen Jilani was unqualified as he had no command experience and was not to be considered at all.

Be that as it may, the man from nowhere as Chishti calls Zia ul Haq in his book succeeded Tikka Khan. Four Lieut Generals senior to Zia ul Haq Aftab, Akbar, Azmat Majid resigned and Chishti a senior Major General found himself promoted and commanding a corps with HQ based at Rawalpindi. This was the military line-up when Bhutto ordered polls in 1977.

The elections in Pakistan and post election country wide agitation launched by the PNA were being closely monitored by the world media in general and generals of the Pakistan Army in particular. Chishti gives us an independent account from an article published by the *Financial Times*, London, on 15 April, 1977 on the postelection crisis in Pakistan.

"Mr Bhutto has not looked as vulnerable as he does today during the five years since he took office. Instead of having received the popular mandate which he confidently expected from last month's general election for his second term of office, he faces a nation-wide campaign of violence on the streets and civil disobedience that, at the least, is likely to render Government ineffective and at the worst threatens a return to Martial Law".

And Martial Law it was, as Army perceived it, to save the country's integrity to stop bloodshed and, what was perhaps the most serious aspect of all, to control the command crisis within the, Army when three brigadiers commanding brigades deployed on internal security duties in Lahore refused in, rapid succession the higher command's order to use force against the unarmed civilians - men, women and children, old and young. General Chishti's account of those fateful days and his marshalling of facts (page 65) cannot be lightly brushed aside. Chishti's narrative:

It has been alleged by some that even before the elections. the Army, officers were plotting to overthrow Mr. Bhutto. This is completely untrue. The Army supported Mr. Bhutto unconditionally from March 7 to July 5, 1977.....

Initially nobody was in favor of a take-over, but as time passed, contingency plans for a takeover had to be made. They were not launched till the Army got sucked in and was really left with no other option.....

The mass agitation had reached a stage when the Army had to decide whether it should continue to be a barrier against the masses and get destroyed in the

clashes or to remove Mr. Bhutto. Mr. Bhutto' had been warned many times not to let the Army be destroyed.....

But there was something more serious and sinister than blood in the streets - wheel jam strike, bringing the life to a standstill from Wagah to Keamari, refusal of Army officers to order their troops to shoot their countrymen On page 69 of his book Chishti has given us this blood chilling account of one particular Cabinet meeting proceedings.

In the last days of June Mr. Bhutto started calling Generals to Cabinet meetings. One night Khar and Pirzada said: The Opposition is not stopping its mischief. We will kill all of them Gen Tikka Khan's tone was even harsher. He said if ten to twenty thousand are killed for Pakistan it does not matter Mr. Bhutto said: See the mood of my ministers? What can I do except be with them?' So General Zia takes the fateful decision in the last week of June 1977, to remove Bhutto's Government. Chishti quotes Zia: I decided that Mr. Bhutto's Government should be finished. Operation Fairplay was planned in my house. It was decided that the date and time of the operation fairplay would be fixed by the COAS. We kept it to ourselves and even the CGS (Major General Abdullah Malik) was not told (page 69)

So, Lieut General Faiz Ali Chishti, Rawalpindi based corps commander and known for his professionalism, hard work and strict disciplined found himself, without volunteering given the responsibility of implementing Operation Fairplay - euphemism for the Army *coup d'état* on the fateful night of 4/5 July 1977, which was carried out with drill-square perfection and without any bloodshed or damage to property.

Chishti fully supports the imposition of Martial Law in July 1977 as he feared that the breakdown of command discipline in the army. combined with the threat of Bhutto's colleagues to kill thousands of citizens, would have triggered a tragic chain of events, inviting Indian aggression and forcing Pakistan to become part of confederated India. But he does not justify the prolongation of the Martial Law, and strongly feels that elections, as promised (twice) by General Zia should have been held. Chishti also blames political leaders for the perpetuation of the military regime, as they demand accountability first. The net result was that Gen Zia who rose to supreme temporal power by operation Fairplay and ruled for eleven years without either restoring democracy or subjecting the society to an evenhanded judicious accountability, died a victim of Operation Foulplay hints Chishti in Chapter 11.

After the imposition of Martial Law, the Zia Chishti power equation worked satisfactorily for some time but with the passage of time the king and the reluctant king maker developed grave differences of opinion on important policy matters. Chishti reasons:

The main drawback in a Martial Law Government is that there is no organized opposition (Only individual's views like mine can be there. So a single person formulated foreign policy. He did so to retain his chair and benefits, and not for the well-being of the country. Gen Zia did not respect public opinion he wanted to leave his affairs to God and be accountable only to Him. page 202)

Gen Chishti in this writer's view had three main aims for writing the book first to put the record straight as to how he became responsible for executing the coup, second to present cast-iron proof that he was on inspection tour of the Northern Areas when Bhutto was hanged third to distance himself from Gen Zia's eleven years rule.

What Gen Chishti and others of his class have not understood is that when you come by fire and sword, you stay in power, till removed or moved out or eliminated by fire and sword. There is no such thing as short-term Martial Law? This is the lesson of history. The alternative to the breakdown of civil administration as a result of rampant corruption administrative efficiency, executive coercion is not the substitution of the constitutionally elected government by a military junta through a coup. The remedy lies in asking for a fresh mandate from the people. This is what Gen Zia and his colleagues should have resorted to in 1977. They did after all retain the institution of Presidency under President, Chaudhry Fazal Elahi after the coup, for some time. What factors stopped them from restoring democracy as repeated promised. The answer to the riddle is provided partly by Chishti in his book. Amos Perimutler pertinently remarks in his book of essays, *Political Roles and Military Rulers*: The military interventionists are on the whole not "progressive" ... they are not revolutionary and are at best reluctant reformers ... They are certainly a ruling class not a revolutionary or progressive social class.

Col (Retd) Syed Ghaffar Mehdi
Nation Daily - Friday 7 December 1990

BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND (*An Indian Bookworm's Journal Summer 1991*)

This is a fascinating book written, by as the publisher's blurb claims an insider a general who was very close to the seat of power after the army took over the reins of power in Pakistan in July 1977. Fascinating because it vividly reveals the malaise that afflicts today's Pakistan her politicians and soldiers alike.

We are told that the democratically elected people's Prime Minister, the late Mr. Z. A. Bhutto had no compunction conniving with the army (under Gen Yahya Khan) in planning to kill a quarter of a million Bengalis in order to retain power in West Pakistan hands. We are told that the late Gen Zia-ul-Huq, who successfully played the ring to all the politics in his country, and conned the West into believing that he was their bulwark against the Soviet expansionism was a crank who had a particular fad for building new toilets wherever he had an office. We are also told that while Zia was playing havoc with the army's credibility by continuously postponing the long promised free and fair elections all his army colleagues Generals Colonels Brigadiers, Corps Commanders and regional MLAs were such subservient spineless idiots that they never raised a dissenting voice or made any attempt to dethrone him.

Basically the whole narrative of this book reads like an election manifesto creating the feeling that the author is desirous of getting back politically, in the saddle and is desperate to establish his innocence in whatever wrongdoing the Zia regime has been or can be accused of Trouble is it is difficult to make out whether he is writing an autobiography, a history of his time, an expose (of the army establishment) or delivering a gratuitous sermon in patriotism to his countrymen.

Another flavor permeates from this book. The author betrays his own sense of superiority - an intellectual snobbery over his peers He frequently spills out his bitterness at not being crowned the king in waiting i.e. deputy CMLA, or COAS or Vice President, or whatever.

What is most striking is this General's naivete about the power game. His moral outrage at the antics of the late Zia ul Huq does not arouse any sympatric chords in the hearts of those who know that the brave (and wiley) will inherit the earth. Intellectuals will be left to fume and to be cast aside.

Who was it who said - Morality is either lack of courage, or lack of opportunity, or lack of appetite. After reading Lt Gen Chishti s account and of what we have heard of his

failed attempts at outsmarting the late Gen Zia, we do not know what was lacking in the author's personality. The fact remains, he never made it to the throne of CMLA or COAS and he is bitter about it.

The book though published in the UK, was printed in India. Hence, perhaps, the map on end-papers showing Jammu and Kashmir as if it were a sovereign country and not a disputed territory between India and Pakistan.

Khwabi Faisalabadi
Page 10: An Indian Bookworms Journal Summer 1991
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