FOREIGN POLICY
IN
PERSPECTIVE

BENAZIR BHUTTO

Reproduced by
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CONTENTS

Foreword ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1
The Most Allied Ally ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 3
The Bhutto Influence ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 6
Africa and Asia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 7
Vietnam ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 8
The Soviet Union ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 10
The Western Block ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 12
The United States ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 14
India ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 18
Picking Up the Pieces ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 20
The World in 1971 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 21
Mujib-ur-Rahman ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 23
The Simla Summit ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 24
South East Asia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 27
Japan ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 28
Muslim Brothers ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 29
Iran ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 30
The Middle East ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 31
The Islamic World ........................................... 33
Bangladesh ...................................................... 34
Arab Brothers ................................................... 35
Diplomatic Versatility ........................................ 36
Fighting Colonialism ......................................... 37
Exploitation and the Third World ......................... 38
Eastern Europe ............................................... 39
Southern Europe ............................................. 40
Britain .......................................................... 41
Western Europe ............................................... 43
How we got the Reprocessing Plant ...................... 44
Canada .......................................................... 45
Super Powers .................................................... 46
U.S.A. ............................................................. 49
Our Close Friend .............................................. 54
Commonwealth ............................................... 55
Afghanistan ..................................................... 57
Bold Measures .................................................. 59
The Insurgency ............................................... 60
Dialogue with Daoud ......................................... 62
Package or Step-by-Step ..................................... 63
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building a Broken Country</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Falcon Flies</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who gave a seer of blood</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical and Horizontal Polarization</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength Links Ancient and Modern Rome</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Struggle between Rich and Poor</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World War</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy War</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadat’s Sand Prints</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Economic Structure</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khudadad Salahyat</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Peep into Sino-Pakistan Relations</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

The study of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy was written in the period between December 18th 1977 and January 14th 1978, when the author was under detention in Lahore. It does not claim to be a definitive study on the subject. It is, as proclaimed on the cover in its title, a perspective on Pakistan’sForeign Policy.

Author
The Most Allied Ally

Pakistan’s foreign policy has had a chequered history. The main issue has been India. The rest of the policy has been woven round that fabric with the Kashmir dispute as the central pattern. However, it would be a grotesque oversimplification to reduce the gamut of Indo-Pakistan dichotomies to this central pattern. A whole history is involved dating back to an ancient past.

When the subcontinent was partitioned two years after the Second World War, our new State found itself caught by the winds of the cold war. Although the Founder of Pakistan had expressed views on foreign policy akin to nonalignment sentiments, within a few years of his death Pakistan attached her star to that of the Western nations led by the United States of America. So attached did the country become to the United States that her leaders really believed that nonalignment was immoral because John Foster Dulles said so. In practical language this meant that relations with the Socialist States of Eastern Europe, Soviet Union and China were taboo. Although the Soviet Union and China were the immediate neighbours of Pakistan, and powers to be reckoned with, out of fidelity to the United States, Pakistan did not develop more than formal relations with either of them.

PRE - BHUTTO - THE MUSLIM STATES

Being a Muslim State, and created in the name of Islam, Pakistan sought to develop the most cordial relations with Muslim countries. From the inception Pakistan supported the cause of the Arabs over Palestine, although here also difficulties arose in the contradictions’ over alignment and nonalignment policies. So much so that on one occasion Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy, referring to the Arab States, observed that “zero plus zero equal zero”. During the Suez crisis relations between Pakistan and Egypt reached the lowest denominator. After pledging support to Egypt at a meeting with President Nasser in Cairo, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, under instructions from Pakistan and due to the pressure of Mr. Dulles, went back on his word in the London Conference. The basic contradictions arose over the objectives of alignment and nonalignment. Most of the Arab States, including the Muslim States of Indonesia and Afghanistan, were nonaligned. In the hottest or coldest days of the cold war, the U. S. and the Soviet interests clashed quite often. The nonaligned States were closer to the Soviet Union on colonial and Third World issues. These alignments and counter-alignments caused complications for aligned Pakistan in balancing the Islamic bonds with the political aims of nonaligned Muslim States. With
Afghanistan, there was an additional complication. There were bilateral differences. However, with Iran and Turkey, Pakistan was able to develop the closest relations from the beginning because, like Pakistan, both Turkey and Iran were aligned to West, or more precisely, to the U.S. This was the position in that creative decade, when wider options were realistically open to the newly-independent nations of Asia. The guiding factor was the relations with India. Since Nehru chose nonalignment, indeed had a hand in shaping it, Pakistan chose alignment to put the preposition in very plain words. Of course, other important considerations existed but India remained the prime consideration.

MISTAKES

Where Pakistan faltered very badly, almost atrociously; was in the execution of her aligned role. In other words, there might have been a rationale to alignment “per se” and that rationale might be valid to this day. What was unforgivable was its very immature and emotional execution on the hard ground. Clumsy execution made the substance of the policy look more repugnant. There is a catalogue of examples of the execution of policy which is symptomatic of “diplomatic totalism”—fatal to the most powerful of States, to say nothing of an under developed country like Pakistan—consider these instances:

(1) The handling of the invitation of Liaquat Ali Khan to the Soviet Union.

(2) The Vajpai-Zafrullah negotiations in Geneva on the reduction of forces in Kashmir.

(3) The timing of the announcement to join the alliance with the United States.

(4) Ghulam Mohammad’s visit to Cairo before Pakistan joined C.E.N.T.O.

(5) The handling of the negotiations on the U.S. base outside Peshawar.

(6) The Suez crisis.

(7) Suhrawardy’s visit to the United States in 1956 and the pronouncements he made there on the Middle East and China.

The list is much longer. Only the more striking samples have been mentioned. The leadership in Pakistan did not give sufficient attention to the transition that was taking place from the cold war to the lowering of transitions. It did not properly calculate the gradual alteration in the power balances, nor did it visualize the influence of advancing technology of superpower politics. Numerous hints that suggested a creeping change in the cold war strategy and tactics were not taken seriously. The Government failed to recognize the imperceptible alterations taking place under the surface. Pakistan did not bother to make the necessary adjustments to accommodate the suitable changes. No preparation was made to face the situation changing from confrontation to competition, from the cold war to detente. The denials always become more emphatic until the change actually takes place. Pakistan innocently accepted the denials on face value. Statements such as these made by Kissinger on “Pactitus” in Calcutta were explained away as a slip of the tongue by dutiful diplomats accredited to Pakistan. The Krushchev-Kennedy meeting in Vienna received casual importance in our Foreign Office. The allies had to be kept comforted, especially those close to the borders of the Soviet Union and China. It would be like a fly in the ointment if allies and client-states were to become nervous and jump the gun. It was necessary to keep them tranquillized. Pakistan was given the tranquillizers in abundance. Pakistan also did not appreciate that it was possible to differ on some fundamental issues with the United States without breaking the alliance. It thought that diplomacy was like a love affair, on an all or nothing plane. In this way, Pakistan did not prepare for “the rainy day”. In this fashion, Pakistan developed abnormal relations with the United States and the West and sub-normal relations with the Socialist States. One-sided bridges do not exist in politics and diplomacy. Pakistan tried to erect one-sided bridges and in the process got dubbed America’s most allied ally.

1958

These were the conditions under which Ayub Khan assumed the mantle of leadership in 1958. Being a military man he upheld the past legacy with militant conviction. He annoyed Algeria because he did not want to annoy France. While Farhat Abbas, the Algerian spokesman, was being received as a great freedom fighter in other Asian Capitals, Ayub Khan granted him an interview in secret in Karachi, then the capital of Pakistan. The President of Pakistan was very fond of calling of United States “the natural friend of Pakistan”. The proposal of joint defence was made to oblige the regiments of the global policies of the United States. Only on the question of Israel did Pakistan dare differ from the United States. Here also, more in the empty battle of words and resolutions in the United Nations. Why else did Suharwardy make that horrible Zero statement?
Pakistan supported vigorously the independence of Tunisia and Morocco. But the United States was not vigorously opposed to their independence.

The Bhutto Influence

In 1960, two years after Ayub Khan seized power, a shift of emphasis in method began to appear on the horizon of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. The man responsible for the change was the young and dynamic Minister, the far-sighted and skilful politician, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Let us take the Muslim States. Mr. Bhutto influenced President Ayub Khan to change his policy on Algeria. He made President Ayub write to General Charles de Gaulle a forceful letter on the need for France to extricate herself from Algeria. Ayub Khan had mishandled the country’s relation with Afghanistan. After considerable fulmination from both sides, relations between the two countries were severed. In 1963, as Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto went to Tehran and held a series of meetings with the Afghan representatives under the aegis of the Shahanshah of Iran. The relations were restored. Mr. Bhutto played a principal role in the creation of the Regional Co-operation Development in Istanbul in 1964. He was sent to Cairo on a number of occasions to remove misunderstandings between Egypt and Pakistan. He had numerous fruitful meetings with President Gamal Abdul Nasser on the differences that arose from time to time. When President Nasser visited Pakistan, he requested Mr. Bhutto should be attached to him so that he could continue the dialogue they had begun in Cairo. In Peshawar, Mr. Bhutto averted an unpleasant development over the joint communiqué that President Ayub Khan and President Nasser signed in that city before the departure of the Egyptian President from Pakistan. It is well-known that President Soekarno of Indonesia had great respect and admiration for Mr. Bhutto. There was a period when President Soekarno, one of the architects of nonalignment, had profound misgivings about Pakistan’s foreign policy. He did not endorse Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, even during President Ayub Khan’s State visit to Indonesia in 1961. Mr. Bhutto changed all that after he became the country’s Foreign Minister. In 1964, President Soekarno gave unequivocal support to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir during Mr. Bhutto’s visit to Jakarta. In 1965, Indonesia gave valuable and unforgettable assistance to Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan war. When the Shahanshah of Iran visited Pakistan in 1960, Mr. Bhutto was made his minister-in-waiting. Mr. Bhutto gave more sincere and devoted support to the Arab cause both in and outside the United Nations after be took charge of the Foreign Office. During his term as Foreign Minister it became quite clear to the Arabs that Pakistan had begun to play more than lip-service to their struggle. The Arabs witnessed a new qualitative situation being created.
Africa and Asia

Similarly, a more genuine support was shown to the countries of Africa and Asia. Pakistan got more identified in the just struggle of the African and Asian Colonies for their Independence. For the first time colonialism was openly condemned in Mozambique and Angola and in other colonies. For the first time trade relations with South Africa were broken both openly and clandestinely. Apartheid was attacked with a crusading zeal. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was one of the principal figures in the effect to forge Afro-Asian solidarity. Relations with Latin America improved vastly. Mr. Bhutto was invited to visit Havana in 1959 during his leadership of the Pakistan delegation to the United Nations. Instead of elaborating it is sufficient to say that the visit was cancelled at the last moment due to the exertion of powerful influences.

In South-East Asia the Foreign Minister concluded a Boundary Agreement with Burma, an agreement which had defied solution for seventeen long years. He opened a diplomatic mission in Nepal and accompanied Ayub Khan to Kathmandu, on the first-ever visit by a high-powered delegation from Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto made concerted efforts to give further impetus to relations with Sri Lanka. In this connection, he accompanied President Ayub to Colombo on a State visit and for the first time got an endorsement from Sri Lanka, in the joint communiqué, on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of U.N. resolutions. The dramatic fashion in which he got Indonesia swing from the side of the Indian pendulum to that of Pakistan has been mentioned earlier. Thailand. Australia and the Philippines, being members of SEATO were allied to Pakistan and did not require any special attention to improve bilateral relations with each of them. The same was true of Japan. As a very close partner of the United States in Asia, Japan, had good bilateral relations with Pakistan, as did the SEATO countries.
Vietnam

As time passed, the most important problem in South-East Asia, and indeed in the world, revolved around Indo-China, with Vietnam being the hub. Greatly inspired by the struggle of the people of Vietnam, Mr. Bhutto developed an enduring respect for their determination and valour. It endorsed his view that no power is stronger than the power of the people. It confirmed his thoughts on the value of upholding a just cause to the bitter end. For Foreign Minister Bhutto, Vietnam represented the struggle of the people of Asia for emancipation, as well as the liquidation of exploitation. He took a passionate and a revolutionary view of the war in Vietnam. His writings and his speeches are covered with a plethora of references to Vietnam. For the same reason, he demonstrated a close identity with the cause of Cambodia. The United States on the other hand had vowed to draw the line in Indo-China and particularly in Vietnam in a much broader sense than the line drawn on the thirty-eighth parallel. Subscribing to the so-called “Domino theory” successive American Administrations sought to make an Asian Waterloo out of Vietnam. The war in Vietnam became an intense domestic issue in the politics of the United States. And in these critical years of the conflict, it surpassed the Israeli issue as the major domestic concern of the United States. In such an emotive situation, both President Kennedy and President Johnson, particularly President Johnson, sought to line up a formidable demonstration of world support of the United States against little Vietnam. Support could come in the form of military contribution or symbolic contribution. Whether big or small, significant or insignificant, President Johnson believed that it was the moral and political duty of America’s friends and allies to make at least a token contribution in a war in which his people were so deeply involved. In Europe, the American President was gravely disappointed with the French attitude on Vietnam. In Asia, Johnson felt pained by the attitude of Pakistan. It was a very delicate task for the diplomacy of Pakistan. Any form of involvement, symbolic or not, violated a basic principle. In the face of saturation bombing a military contribution from Pakistan could not affect the cause of the outcome. Hence, Vietnam and her comrades, which included China and the Soviet Union, were more concerned with the principle of involvement than with its nature. For this reason, Mr. Bhutto sought to keep his country out of the ugly picture. Despite the relentless American endeavor, Mr. Bhutto felt that Pakistan should hold steadfast to a realistic line. And so the U. S. sent Vice-President Hubert Humphery to Pakistan in the spring of 1966 to muster support on behalf of the U. S. The talks took place in Karachi. The American Vice-President argued eloquently but eventually pleaded that Pakistan, a SEATO partner, should make at least a symbolic
contribution. He said that in the cause of freedom American blood was being shed far away from her shores and Pakistan should send sports goods—for which the country was well-known—as a demonstration of symbolic support. Vice-President Humphery was a veteran politician. Without a trace of arrogance or anger, he made out such a strong case that he made the Pakistan side feel uncomfortable. He almost persuaded President Ayub Khan to send badminton and tennis rackets from Sialkot to Saigon. After making a few introductory remarks and after reviewing the other subjects that had come up for discussion, President Ayub Khan told the American Vice-President that Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would explain Pakistan’s position on Vietnam. Mr. Bhutto began to speak at the Government House and continued to explain his country’s position on Vietnam at the dinner which he later hosted at his residence at 70 Clifton. After he concluded, President Ayub Khan told him, “Well done”. It was brilliant, Jack Valentine, a member of the U. S. delegation told Mr. Bhutto after the dinner, “one day you will be the President of Pakistan”. The sports goods from Sialkot never reached Saigon.
The Soviet Union

When Mr. Bhutto became the Foreign Minister, Pakistan’s relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were virtually non-existent. On the German question, the position of Pakistan seemed to appear harder than that of the Federal Republic of Germany. Whereas the two German States had developed trade relations between each other, Pakistan did not have any trade or commercial ties with the German Democratic Republic. But the Soviet Union was more important. That Country, a neighbor of Pakistan’s, with very close relations with India and Afghanistan, had no contacts with Pakistan. Relations between the two countries sank to the lowest level when the U-2 was shot down over Soviet territory. The American pilot, Gary Powers, who was captured alive, confessed that his plane had taken off from the American base outside Peshawar. The Soviet Prime Minister threatened to draw a circle around Peshawar.

Pakistan had decided to join the Western Alliance, but Pakistan was not the only country to have made this choice. It was well within Pakistan’s sovereign right as an independent Nation to Judge her interests. What was not understandable is that for a very long time, Pakistan conducted and executed her Foreign Policy so awkwardly as to make it appear that she was the only country so aligned and correspondently, the only country aligned against the Soviet Union, China and other Socialist States. There was a time when the Soviet Union not only invited the first Prime Minister of Pakistan to Moscow but also took a neutral posture on the Kashmir Dispute. It was much later that the Soviet Union exercised her veto in the Security Council in the Kashmir Dispute. For too many unnecessary irritants were invoked. The display of excessive zeal in the form of diplomatic totalism exacerbated Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union. Whereas other more prosperous allies of the United States charged that country extravagantly for the establishment of U. S. military and surveillance bases on their territories, Pakistan did it all for fun and friendship, when it gave the strategic Badaber base to the United States. This territorial concession infuriated the Soviet Union without Pakistan deriving any corresponding benefits. So much so that on one occasion during the visit of some U. S. Senators to the Badaber base, one influential Senator remarked: “You are suckers”, when he learnt that the base was provided gratis to his country. Before the spectacular advances in technology, before the era of ICBMS, polaris submarines and satellites, the Badaber base was one of the most important and valuable bases to United States. It provided the U. S. a facility to penetrate deep into Soviet territory and parts of China. At one time in an effort to establish some tenuous contacts with the Soviet
Union the Pakistan Government hesitatingly picked up the courage to toy with the idea of sending an economic mission to the Soviet Union. On the eve of its departure, the visit was cancelled by the then Government. In the United Nations also, Pakistan was frequently hand picked to make the most pointed attacks on Soviet policies, if there was an Iron Curtain, that curtain was most visible between Pakistan and the Soviet Union on this side of Europe. This was the Situation in 1958, when Ayub Khan came to power. Once again it was on Mr. Bhutto’s initiative and persuasion that the ice or rather the ice-berg was broken. He visited Moscow in 1960 to conclude an Oil agreement. It was the first ever visit by a Pakistan Minister to the Soviet Union on such an important mission. All the intrigues to prevent the visit from taking place, to make the mission a failure while negotiations were taking place in Moscow and to frustrate the outcome when Mr. Bhutto returned to Pakistan, is outside the scope of this survey. However, it is a fascinating story by itself. The Oil Agreement was the harbinger of a new and better understanding with the Soviet Union without a betrayal of the Western Alliance. By 1965 Ayub Khan paid a State Visit to the Soviet Union. By 1967, collaboration between the Pakistan and the Soviet Union extended and multiplied in all fields, including a limited and short-lived cooperation in the Military sphere. This was a refreshing contrast to the non-existent relationship between the two countries before Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s visit to Moscow in the winter of 1960. These were memorable achievements. As Foreign Minister he also opened diplomatic missions in a number of Eastern European countries including Romania and Yugoslavia. He was the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan, no, the first Minister of Pakistan, to visit their Capitals. He paved the way for fulsome cooperation with the East European nations for the first time in his country’s history. The only country in Eastern Europe with whom he was prevented from establishing rapport was the German Democratic Republic. (This unfinished task he accomplished when he became President of Pakistan in 1971).
The Western Block

With the States of Western Europe and the United Kingdom Mr. Bhutto cultivated respectable and cordial relations. It is a cruel misnomer to consider that he harbored any innate prejudices against the Western Nations of Europe or the United States. He took giant strides to improve Pakistan’s relations with France and the Federal Republic of Germany. He was more successful with France and the Federal Republic of Germany. He was more successful with France because the reading of President Charles de Gualle on the World situation was more in conformity with Mr. Bhutto’s own interpretation. For essentially the same reason Mr. Bhutto was on very good terms with Chancellor Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, after Adenauer, the pace of the progress in the inter-relationship was not as fast as it was with France. The reason being that whereas President de Gaulle’s successor, President Pompidou, continued to follow the thinking of President de Gaulle in the field of Foreign Affairs, the successors of Chancellor Adenauer in the Federal Republic of Germany, were more inclined to take a position that might not upset the United States on China and Vietnam and on some other issues. This was understandable. The interest of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, although very close, were not identical on world issues. The Federal Republic of Germany had the problems of the other Germany. Despite these factors, Mr. Bhutto concentrated his main efforts on improving Pakistan’s relations with these two principal States of Western Europe. He also developed good contacts with Italy. He was on cordial and intimate terms with the top leaders of most of the Western European States. He believed in the European Common Market and he recognized the potential strength of Western Europe as a fourth pillar in the World’s structure for peace and stability – the United States the Soviet Union and China being the other three. After the loss of her Empire, Mr. Bhutto felt that the United Kingdom ought to return to Europe where he believed she essentially belonged. Mr. Bhutto had great respect for Mr. Harold Mc Millan, for Sir Alexander Home and for Mr. Edward Heath. He was not a great admirer of Mr. Harold Wilson. He clashed sharply with Wilson on Vietnam, on Southern Rhodesia and on Indonesia in two Common-Wealth Conferences. Yet Mr. Bhutto was conscious of developing the most friendly relations with the United Kingdom. He was actually aware of the presence of a large number of his countrymen on the British Isles. Their interest could not be ignored. However, he thought that these interests could not be protected by adopting a cringing attitude towards Britain like the other complex ridden leaders of Pakistan; these interests could only be protected by following an honorable and natural attitude towards Britain. This is exactly what he did
and it won him the respect of British leaders. A shrewd British political observer once remarked, “the fact that Mr. Bhutto hit it oil splendidly with Duncan Sandys, shows that Mr. Bhutto has no problem in striking a good relationship with any British leader.”
The United States

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is too astute a politician to underestimate the power or position of the United States of America slaving a scientific mind, Mr. Bhutto appreciates the dictates of objective politics. As a scholar of history, he is actually conscious of the role of the balance of power in its modern context. He knows the value of “power politics” and the influence of “Real politics”. He respects the progress of Technology in the mightiest industrial complex. He is aware of the contribution of geo-politics and economic dialectics in shaping history. With this appreciation, a man like Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would not ignore or hold in disdain the central position that the most powerful industrial state occupies on the international scene. He is cognizant of it. He has always taken it into account in formulating his country’s Foreign Policy.

Mr. Bhutto has had contacts with every American President from the time of President Eisenhower to President Carter. He held discussions with all of them except President Jimmy Carter, with whom he had official correspondence before the change in July 1977. He knew all the American Secretaries of States from the time of Mr. Dulles to that of Dr. Hennery Kissinger. He was well-acquainted with a number of Vice-Presidents, Senators and Congressmen. His discussions with all these leaders of America from the President to the Congressmen were always pleasant and useful. (The only jarring encounter was with President Johnson over China and Vietnam). He hit it oil’ splendidly with President Kennedy. His relations with President Nixon were very cordial. The first meeting took place when Mr. Nixon visited Pakistan in 1954. Mr. Bhutto developed great respect for the intellectual calibre of Dr. Kissinger but not for his tactics.

This shows that on the level of the politics and on the level of personalities no difficulty arose. The political power was understood and respected. A clash of personalities did not arise with any of the American leaders. Where then did the difficulties arise? The difficulties arose over principles. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was flexible over many issues. However, he was equally inflexible over issues which he considered to be of vital importance to Pakistan’s basic interest. As much as he believes in compromise, he subscribes with great determination to an uncompromising position on fundamentals. It would not be possible to discuss all the issues in this survey. The question of colonialism and neo-colonialism with all their attendant’s implications are being excluded, not because Mr. Bhutto did not take a firm position on them but because it would be beyond the scope to discuss them here.
During the time of Mr. Bhutto’s tenure in office from 1958-to 1966, and specially after he became the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in January 1963 the differences of major purport related to:—

INDO-PAKISTAN DISPUTES:

This focused on the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The United States preferred some acceptable compromise. Mr. Bhutto was unwilling to compromise.

PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

The United States wanted to keep China isolated and did not like Pakistan to develop relations in depth with that country. Mr. Bhutto believed that it was essential for Pakistan to develop relations, in depth with China. He told President Kennedy in October 1963, a month h,fore his assassination, that United States herself would develop contacts with China in the beginning of the next decade. (Kissinger went to China from Pakistan in 1971).

VIETNAM:

The United States wanted some form of Pakistan’s involvement in Vietnam and Mr. Bhutto believed that any form of involvement in Vietnam would be fatal for his Country.

MIDDLE EAST:

The United States did not expect Pakistan to recognize Israel, but she hoped that Pakistan would confine her support to the Arab States in the United Nations, and outside the United Nations, to the semantics of diplomacy. Moreover, the United States expected Pakistan to keep a distance from what she considered to be the radical Arab States. Mr. Bhutto refused to commit the support to a limited nature. He made it quite clear that in the event of another war in the Middle East, Pakistan would support the Arab cause to its fullest ability. Besides, he said that lie would like to have joint ventures between Pakistan and the Arab States in all fields including in the Military field. He also said that to Pakistan all Muslim States were equal in fraternity and that as a Muslim State; Pakistan could not draw a distinction between radical and non-radical Arab and Muslim States. Mr. Bhutto said that he wanted the same degree of co-operation with Iran, Turkey and Indonesia. The U. S. did not approve of the idea of cooperation with Indonesia.
PAKISTAN’S GROWING CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE:

Although the U.S. did not press this claim, the growing relations of Pakistan with these countries were causing concern to the United States. Mr. Bhutto felt there was no need for concern as Pakistan’s growing relations with those Countries were not inconsistent with Pakistan’s treaty obligations. The U. S. did not like Mr. Bhutto reminding them that the NATO powers, including the United States herself, had developed more expanded contacts with the Soviet Union and the Socialist states of East Europe.

PAKISTAN’S MILITANT SUPPORT TO AFRO-ASIAN CAUSES.

The United States expressed anxiety over the so-called militant and aggressive support which she considered was in contrast to the past policy of moderation in manifesting that support. Mr. Bhutto explained that Pakistan was a member of the family of Afro-Asian-States and its support to their legitimate causes constituted a common struggle. As such, the support had to be sincere and full-blooded. He further explained that the escalation in the manner of support could not be construed as a stance against the United States.

Aside from these differences which were not such as do not exist between allies, Mr. Bhutto found that additional complications arose which unnecessarily exacerbated the differences. These, in his opinion, were the following:—

1. The United States had become accustomed to dealing with docile governments in Pakistan. The change in the attitude and the style caused surprise and irritation to United States leadership, particularly to the State Department bureaucracy.

2. The influence of the powerful American lobby in Pakistan which assured American leaders and the State Department bureaucracy that the young Foreign Minister could be eased out by them.

3. The tendency in the State Department to forget the contributions and to remember only the difference when it comes to dealing with the Third World States and the leaders aligned to the United States. (Perhaps for this very reason Premier Chou-en-Lai told Dr. Kissinger not to forget Pakistan—the bridge that made his visit to Peking a reality).
4. Unlike the Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Russians, the Americans are too big to admit their mistake, their miscalculations and their errors of judgment.

5. The arrogance of power which even a seemingly modest Secretary of State Dean Rusk could not conceal, despite his best pretences. According to Mr. Bhutto, Mr. Adlai Stevenson was perhaps the only American leader who was genuinely modest and full of humility. Mr. Bhutto says that is why Stevenson failed to be the President of the United States.
This leaves India. No citizen of Pakistan needs a sermon on Indo-Pakistan relations. Indo-Pakistan relations are a part of living history. These relations are like a house-hold article in every home in this country. Much can be written on Indo-Pakistan relations. Leaving aside the psychological the historical differences, omitting the religious and economic considerations, forgetting the psyche and the sentiment let us simplify the position and say that all these factors and more, all the differences, and more, get channelized into the Kashmir dispute. Let us assume that the Kashmir dispute is the capsule of this hoary history. Let us say that it portrays and symbolizes the whole struggle. It appears that the possibility of an equitable and peaceful solution on a bilateral basis rescinded after the visit of Pandit Nehru to Pakistan in 1953 and more clearly after Pakistan joined the Western alliance in 1954. The chances of a solution through the United Nations diminished when Nehru persuaded Attlee to change the British stand on the Plebiscite Resolution and more clearly after the Soviet veto in the Security Council. The problem is one hundred per cent political, but experience and events have defied a political solution either on the bilateral basis or on the multilateral basis. A military solution was available in 1962 during the Sino-Indian conflict and in 1965 during the Indo-Pakistan war. Those who have been in Government know that due to a number of factors, Pakistan’s military option began to decline after 1965 and that, with the passage of time, the military advantages would be reversed as well as the disparities. For this reason, the period from 1962 to 1965 was essential to Pakistan in exercising a non-diplomatic and a non-political option. The narration can be made much larger but not shorter. Since the essence has been discussed, let a full stop follow to the chapter of Indo-Pakistan relations. No purpose is served in adding salt to the wounds by discussing Tashkent and the pre-Tashkent events.

In the realm of multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations is the star of the show. Before Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto entered the United Nations as Pakistan’s immaculate and debonair spokesman, the flood-light was on India’s Krishna Menon. The galleries were always packed to hear Menon. The halls that were nearly empty when Pakistan took the floor changed when Mr. Bhutto assumed leadership of Pakistan’s delegations to the United Nation’s General Assembly and Security Council. His speeches were fiery and forceful. Mr. Bhutto spoke the voice of Asia. Mr. Bhutto articulated the sentiments of the teeming masses of the Third World. He shook the corridor of the United Nations with his eloquence and his scintillating brilliance. He has left a mark in the United Nations as one of the most gifted leaders to have adorned the World body.
In a manner replete with glory, the man from Larkana changed the course of his Country’s Foreign Policy. He transformed a sleepy and supine Foreign Policy into a dynamic one. He flowered what was once a desert by the force of his personality and principles. He came on the horizon of Pakistan’s politics like a sparkling star. He changed the destiny of his Country’s Foreign Policy from that of a client to that of a champion. He gave Pakistan a place of honour in the chambers of power. Without a doubt lie put the stamp of respect and dignity on the face of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. These were his monumental contributions from 1958 to 1966.
Picking up the Pieces

We now come to December 20th, 1971, the day on which Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had the honour of becoming first elected President of Pakistan. It was dismembered Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto had warned of the coming crisis in August, 1971 when the Indo-Soviet Treaty was concluded in New Delhi. Again in September, 1971, he warned that if power was not transferred to the elected representatives, the Country might fall apart. Alas, power was not transferred to the elected representatives. The Indo-Soviet Treaty was not given the attention due to it. On the contrary, relations were further embittered between Pakistan and the Soviet Union in Persepolis, where General Yahya Khan exchanged hot words with President Podgorny of the Soviet Union. When it was too late, when Zero hour had struck, in a desperate scramble Yahya requested Mr. Bhutto to visit Peking in November, 1971 and to rush to the Security Council in December, only ten days before the fall of Dacca. In conditions that appeared hopeless, Mr. Bhutto became President of Pakistan. However, in a manner characteristic of the man he rallied the dispirited people and promised to pick-up the shattered pieces. He picked up each piece and with matchless artistry rebuilt a beautiful Urn, a more beautiful urn than Keat’s Grecian Urn.
The World in 1971

Since this article is on Foreign Affairs, we are not discussing Mr. Bhutto’s tremendous achievements in internal affairs of the Country. We will pick-up the thread of Foreign policy where Mr. Bhutto had left it in 1966. When he took over the reins of the country in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, Mr. Bhutto found the world changed. The Soviet Union and the United States had moved away from the hostility and confrontation to co-operation and detente. The United States had come to recognize the power and reality of the Peoples Republic of China. There were hard indications that negotiations to end the senseless war in Vietnam were on the anvil. Relations between Western Europe and Eastern Europe had taken a more pragmatic turn. The Hallstein Doctrine had been buried. Chancellor Willy Brandt used Ost Politik in dealing with the question of two German States and in tackling the larger European question. Britain had joined the European common Market. Portugal was on the verge of losing her colonies in Africa. President Sadat had come to power in Egypt on the death of President Abdul Jamal Nasser. A young and revolutionary leader called Muammar Gaddafi had overthrown the Monarchy in Libya. A Federation of the Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf had been formed. Above all, from the stand points of the sub-continent, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 had led to the creation of the State of Bangladesh. Mujib-ur-Rahman the leader of the dismembered part of Pakistan was still in jail in West Pakistan, and now Pakistan. On the international plane Pakistan stood isolated. Except for the sympathy of Iran and Turkey and the Arab States, Indian propaganda had been so effective and mistakes of Yahya Regime so monumental that the general sympathy and support was heavily tilted against Pakistan. The United States Administration tried to be useful but American public opinion was very hostile. China also tried to be helpful but was unable to prevent the calamitous outcome of the war. The Soviet Union gave unbridled support to the other side. The British also became hysterical for once in their calm and reserved approach to the problems of their former Indian Empire, by supporting the cause of Bangladesh. For the Nations of Western Europe, who believed or wanted to give that impression, Britain became the path-setter on the ground that nobody understood the sub-continent better than the British. The nations of Eastern Europe followed the Soviet lead. In Africa, only the Muslim States like Nigeria and Somalia were sympathetic to Pakistan. The other African States either supported the other side or kept silent because of the secessionist potential within their own national boundaries. In South East Asia and the Far East, Australia and Japan were more conspicuous in leaning towards the Indian position. To a lesser extent, with the exception of Vietnam and Cambodia, both of whom were embroiled in their own wars, the other States of the region took the same position. Essentially speaking although not on a case by case basis Pakistan stood precariously isolated in December 1971. Many a
Foreign office analysts were busy with the question of whether the rest of Pakistan would be able to stand the physical and psychological shock of the dismemberment of its majority province, a province which the advocates of Bangladesh described as “the captive Market”. States familiar with the Pakistan-Afghanistan difference, were of the opinion that the total dismemberment of Pakistan was only a matter of time. This is the grim external situation inherited by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when he became the first directly elected President of Pakistan. Internally, the Country did not have a Constitution and the economy lay in shambles. India held 90,000 prisoners of war and over 5,000 square miles of territory in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. And in the former princely state of Kashmir substantial losses were incurred in the northern Part.

The International outlook called for review and mobilization of support by the Muslim States to strengthen Pakistan’s position in the world. With this end in view, the new President invited the Shahanshah of Iran to Islamabad. The Shahanshah responded to the invitation and was again the first Head of State to visit Pakistan. President Bhutto paid an unscheduled and an unannounced visit to Kabul to discuss future relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He made two lightenings journeys to the Muslim States of Africa and the Middle East to muster support for Pakistan. He invited the President of Romania to visit Pakistan. He also invited Sheikh Zeid, the new President of the U.A.E Federation to make a state visit to Pakistan. In January 1972 he went to Peking for the same purpose. He got the Chinese leaders to block the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations until there was a comprehensive settlement in the sub-continent. He went to the Soviet Union in March 1972 to repair the damage done to the relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. It was a very difficult mission but President Bhutto succeeded in arresting the deterioration. He opened a constructive dialogue with the United State on Pakistan-U.S. relations.
Mujib-ur-Rahman

After completing the spade-work, President Bhutto turned his attention to the sub-continent. Mujib-ur-Rahman was his prisoner. He had two alternatives available. One was to keep Mujib-ur-Rahnian as a hostage until a comprehensive settlement was reached or to make a magnanimous gesture by releasing him. President Bhutto had two important meetings with Mujib-ur-Rahman. He told the Bengali leader that despite myopic pressures to the contrary, he had decided to release Mujib-ur-Rahman unconditionally. At the same time, MR. BHUTTO PASSIONATELY PLEADED WITH MUJIII-UR-RAHMAN to preserve some form of unity between the two wings. He made it clear to Mujib-ur-Rahman that in the event of his agreement, HE WOULD STEP ASIDE. AND MAKE ROOM FOR MUJIB-UR-REHMAN TO TAKE CHARGE. The Bengali leader refused to make any commitment although he did hold out a faint hope for what obviously now appear to be tactical reasons. Mujib-ur-Rahman was released. He went to London in a P.I A. Jet placed at his disposal by President Bhutto. From London he went to Dacca and received a mammoth reception. Soon thereafter Mujib announced in an equally huge public meeting that for twenty years he had been working for an independent state and now his dream had been realized in the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. He also threatened to try the Prisoners of War for war crimes on the pattern of the Nuremberg trials. The reaction in Pakistan was sharp and bitter. The clamor for not recognizing the new state under any circumstances rose to great height. This created a deadlock. President Bhutto knew that the deadlock would operate against the interest of Pakistan. He knew that the only way to reconciliation was through recognition. He realized that the longer the contacts remained broken, the faster would Bangladesh move away from Pakistan. The deadlock had to be broken but it should only be broken with the consent of the peoples of Pakistan. He therefore undertook a strenuous tour of the country to explain to his people, the imperatives of recognition. In the beginning, the reaction was terribly hostile. The opposition parties sought to fully capitalize on the emotional hostility of the people with the slogan “Na Manzoor” (Don’t accept). However by the sheer dint of his courage and conviction, slowly and gradually, the people began to agree with the persuasive logic of their leader. The resistance began to mellow and melt. But since its hard core persisted, President Bhutto did not take the decision to recognize Bangladesh until an opportune time. He decided to wait until the ultimate resistance broke down and until the suitable opportunity arose.
The Simla Summit

Simultaneously he turned his attention to India. The two problems of the future relations with India and with Bangladesh were inter-connected. One could not be solved without the other. Actually, India held the key. The prisoners of war were in Indian custody, the occupied territory lay in their control. Mujib-ur-Rahman and the Indian Government worked in close collaboration. In such difficult circumstances President Bhutto went empty handed to Simla in the end of June, 1972. Hardly had the protocol ceremonies concluded when the negotiations bogged down.

The Prime Minister of India insisted on a simultaneous settlement of all Indo-Pakistan disputes including Kashmir. President Bhutto suggested that Indo-Pakistan disputes should be settled step-by-step and not in one stroke. He went on to suggest that the Kashmir dispute should be taken up after the other disputes and differences had been gradually resolved. The polemics continued for four days. President Bhutto extended his stay in Simla.

After all the prolonged discussions and the matching of wits, it appeared that President Bhutto would have to return to his country without an agreement. On the last (lay, he told his daughter Benazir that he would make a final effort when he was to visit the Indian Prime Minister on a formal call to say farewell. Later that evening, he was to host a return banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and her delegation. The banquet at 8.30 P. M. was the last item on the agenda. The meeting at 4.30 in the evening was the last-but-one item on the agenda, the formal farewell call by the President of Pakistan on the Prime Minister of India to thank her and her Government for the hospitality. There was a general view visible in the mist of the hills of Simla. Members of the Pakistan delegation began to pack. The journalists were told to put their note books away. President Bhutto left his residence at 4.00 P. M, as it took hall an hour to reach the residence of the Indian Prime Minister. Before leaving, he gave a smile to his daughter and warned her not to feel disappointed if he came back without any results. He did not tell any one else that he intended to convert the protocol visit into a final working session. During the drive to the Prime Minister of India’s residence, Mr. Bhutto ruminated over his first visit to Simla with his father. It was in 1934. He was six years old. He recalled his last visit to Simla in 1946 when he had a heated discussion with the well-known Indian Civil Servant Ghorwalla. It was in the Cecil Hotel and the subject was the partition of the sub-continent. Ghorwalla who had been a District Officer in Larkana in 1931, told Mr. Bhutto, “young man you are as brilliant as your father and as full of confidence as your late uncle Wahid Baksh”. President Bhutto arrived at the Prime Minister’s residence as he was recalling past memories of Simla. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was
standing on the steps to receive him. He quickly alighted from the car and shook hands with her. Mrs. Gandhi led him to the Study and ordered tea. After the usual pleasantries and, when the tea trays were taken away, Mrs. Gandhi was lidgiting with her hand bag. She thought that the President of Pakistan was about to take leave. The tension was apparent. Mr. Bhutto broke the silence by telling the Indian Prime Minister that he was not going to leave without making a last ditch effort at reaching an agreement. He told the Prime Minister of India that an agreement would have the way for the healing of the deep wounds. But the failure to arrive at an agreement would make them incurable. He spoke to her for about half an hour and by the end of it the Indian Prime Minister said that without making a commitment, she would consult her principal advisors once more and give her answer at the banquet. On this optimistic note the President of Pakistan returned to his residence and flung open the door of his sitting room and told his daughter that hope had returned. After that he summoned his Chief Advisors and gave them an account of his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister. When Mrs. Gandhi arrived, she told Mr. Bhutto that she was willing to make a final effort at the banquet. When the banquet was over, Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto went to a small sitting room adjoining the Billiard Room. While the two leaders re-opened the negotiations, the Indian and Pakistan Ministers and Advisors sat in the Billiard Room. The draft agreement was amended and modified several times. It went up and down from the sitting room to the Billiard Room. After two hours of intense negotiations there was an Agreement. A typewriter had to be found. The main hall had to be converted into the ceremonial room for the signing of the agreement. The inquisitive journalists were hanging around. When the doors of the room opened, both leaders came out looking less tense and more cheerful. All the Ministers and officials applauded them. In a few moments the hall, where the agreement had to be signed, was filled with the important personalities of both countries and with scores of journalists. The historic Simla Agreement was signed by the President of Pakistan Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on behalf of the Government and the people of Pakistan and by Madame Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India on behalf of the Government and people of India. The Agreement is an open covenant. It is regarded as a model agreement. The present government has proudly inherited it. It has proclaimed with equal pride to abide by it. The Simla Agreement has become the pivotal agreement in the determination of Indo-Pakistan relations. It is like a text book. If there had been one secret word or a single secret line in it, after July 1977 it would have been blasted like a nuclear bomb. But there is no secret provision in this famous agreement. With hindsight, how unkind it seems when such malicious and irresponsible charges were made in the past by some or our small time politicians. The Simla Agreement is a miracle in modern diplomacy. It enabled the 5,000 square miles of territory to be returned to Pakistan. It enabled the 90,000 prisoners of war to come back to their homes honorably without going through the humiliation of the war trails repeatedly
threatened by Mujib-urRahman. The Simla Agreement committed India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes and differences peacefully on a step by step basis. It stipulates that after completion of this process, the Jammu and Kashmir dispute will be the subject matter of negotiations without prejudice to the position of India or Pakistan. What more could have been expected from the man from Larkana who went empty handed to Simla to negotiate for his country with Indian leaders? Everyone knows how difficult it is to negotiate with Indian leaders. Everyone knows the rigid position they take and have taken in the past yet Mr. Bhutto achieved the breakthrough. How did you do it Sir?” was the question put to him by Hafeez Pirzada, Education Minister, on his return to Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto told his Minister that he did it because he had with him the prayers of the poor people of Pakistan and because Mrs. Gandhi rose above the humd rum of the Court circus. He added, she showed more of Motilal than of Jawaharlal in her vision. The President of Pakistan paid rich tributes to Mrs. Gandhi for the cooperation shown by her to make the Simla Agreement possible. The world, however, has paid the tribute to Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for this outstanding achievement.
South-East Asia

Having put his relations with India on a firmer footing, Mr. Bhutto took some quick steps to reinforce his Simla success with the other States of the subcontinent and South East Asia. He consolidated Pakistan’s links with Nepal the country with which he had opened the original links as Foreign Minister. He did the same with Sri Lanka. Madame Bandaranaike visited Pakistan and later Mr. Bhutto paid a return visit to her country. His friend President Ne Win of Burma who had known the President of Pakistan since 1958, came to Islamabad and Mr. Bhutto was to make a return call to Rangoon after the elections of March 1977. In a series of dazzling decisions, the President of Pakistan altered the course of Pakistan’s substantive policy towards South-East Asia. He announced Pakistan’s withdrawal from SEATO, thereby removing a malignant anomaly in the country’s relations in that region. He dispatched an Ambassador to Hanoi and immediately recognised the unity of the divided country when Saigon was taken by the forces of North Vietnam. He pulled his country out of the United Nations Commission on Korea and supported the principle of unification of the two Koreas by peaceful means. He sent an Ambassador to North Korea and, as Prime Minister, undertook an important journey in May 1976 to that country. The reception given to the Pakistan leader by President Kim II Sung in Pyongyang was unprecedented. It had to be seen to be believed. He fortified Pakistan’s relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia and Japan. The Prime Minister of Australia made brief visits to Islamabad. The Prime Minister of Malaysia and the Paramount Ruler of the Federation came to Pakistan to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two Islamic States. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Dr. Adam Malik, an old friend of the Pakistani leader, came to Pakistan on a number of occasions. President Suharto invited Mr. Bhutto to make an official visit to Indonesia. This visit was to take place this year. Mr. Bhutto was also scheduled to visit Australia. Both as President and as Prime Minister, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a studied effort to give greater dimension to Pakistan’s relations with Japan.
Japan

Mr. Bhutto had developed an admiration from the days of his boyhood, from the time he read of the Russo-Japanese war and the American Commander Perry’s forced entry into the land of the rising sun. He was in the final years of his schooling days when he wept bitterly over the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During his University career, he watched with admiration the miraculous post-war recovery of Japan. When he was Federal Minister he often urged that Japan ought to open a dialogue with China and play a leading role in the politics of Asia. When he led the Pakistan delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, he told the leader of the Japanese delegation that within a decade, the United States would open dialogue with China and the news would be broken to Japan in a “Voice of America” broadcast. He was disappointed at the very conservative position taken by Japan in the economic development of the poverty stricken nations of Asia. He observed repeatedly that in Japan’s own interests, she ought to come out of the seashell and use her enormous economic power for the constructive stability of Asia, and that her politics should be more oriented towards a purposeful mission in Asia. He warned that Japan’s foreign policy, tied almost exclusively to the apron-strings of an American treaty, was far too restrictive and risky for a giant like Japan. These views made him describe Japan as “an economic animal” at his press conference in Algeria in June 1965. The expression stuck. His critics tried to misconstrue it but failed. The Japanese Government extended a warm invitation to Prime Minister Bhutto to make an official visit to Japan. The invitation was given in 1976 and the visit was tentatively fixed for April 1978.
Muslim Brothers

After concluding the Simla Agreement, the then President of Pakistan turned his attention to the Muslim states of the Middle East and Africa. He opened diplomatic missions in Somalia, Mauritania and Guinea. Captivated by the history of Turkey from the days of his youth, Mr. Bhutto maintained a natural respect for that great country. He was always prepared to strengthen the bilateral relations, always responsive to greater cooperation within the framework of RCD. He developed very close relations with Turkish leaders from the time of Menderes. He had very greater admiration for Ismat Inonu, and it is well known that this Turkish statesman of renown had a soft corner for the Pakistani leader and expressed it on numerous occasions. The best proof of what Mr. Bhutto felt for the Turkish people is summed up in the remarks he made in the Distinguished Visitors Book at the Mausoleum of Attaturk when he visited it in January, 1972. He had visited the Mausoleum many times in the past. This time he went there as the President of Pakistan a month after the Indo-Pakistan war and the dismemberment of the country. He wrote that the visit had a special significance. As the President of Pakistan he was paying the homage to seek inspiration from the great Attaturk, the great leader of the Turkish people who witnessed the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and overcame it with glorious triumph. The words written in that book speak for themselves. While a Pakistani journalist was nothing the comments of his President, Mr. Bhutto put his hands on the shoulder of the journalist and told him that lie could have written them in his tears if it were possible.
Iran

Mr. Bhutto has always been very sensitive to the geopolitical situation of Pakistan. For this reason, as well as for historical, cultural and religious reasons he has valued the importance of Iran. He has always seen the relations between Iran and Pakistan in their comprehensive context: In its totological setting which is quite different from what he calls “diplomatic totalism” and which he adores. The Shahanshah of Iran has defined his attitude towards Pakistan so clearly that further elaboration is not necessary. However, the ideas of the two leaders provided fertile ground for the enormous expansion of relations between the two neighbouring countries. During the tenure of Mr. Bhutto as President and Prime Minister, the Shahanshah of Iran visited Pakistan formally and informally on a number of occasions. As already stated, the Shahanshah of Iran was the first head of state to visit Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Later on, the Shahanshah and Queen Farah Pahlavi visited our country on official visits. They also made informal visits. During these visits, the Iranian monarch and his Queen were Mr. Bhutto’s honored guests at “Al Murtaza” his ancestral home in Larkana. The State visit of President Bhutto and Begum Nusrat Bhutto to Iran in the summer of 1973 was incomparable in pageantry. In addition to this unforgettable State visit, Mr. Bhutto went to Iran with the Shahanshah on many occasions as President and Prime Minister. His visit to the Kish islands in 1974 was marked by its informality. Mr. Bhutto spent two eventful days in Kish as a guest of the Royal family. He returned to Pakistan with a commitment of Iranian loans of almost a billion dollars. The bilateral relations were elevated to greater heights. Joint economic ventures in various industrial enterprises were concluded. Collaboration in all fields multiplied qualitatively and quantitatively. RCD was given much more attention on the multilateral level.
The Middle East

With the separation of its eastern wing, Pakistan’s gravitational force moved more towards the Middle East. There was no problem in giving finer shape to the relations between Turkey and Iran, but the contradictions in Pakistan’s aligned policies and the non-aligned policies of the Arab countries required an honest reappraisal. Mr. Bhutto believed that the time had come to downgrade the sloganism and the verbosity and to upgrade the policy of positive integration of common objectives. He realized the full importance of the emergence of the United Arab Emirates Federation and that of the Persian Gulf states generally. This was a new factor of crucial significance. He gave very serious personal attention to the developments in this neighbouring region. He recognized the power of its oil, its strategic value, its propinquity to Pakistan and the fact that the region’s wealth was attracting more and more of his countrymen to the States of the Persian Gulf. He assiduously sought to win the confidence of the leaders of the Persian Gulf states, by following in letter and in spirit the policy of non-interference, by agreeing to collaborate with them on their terms and according to their interests, provided that the collaboration did not conflict with a principle of Pakistan’s foreign policy. This means that he decided not to compete with the British, the Iraqis, the Sudanese or the Egyptians, or for that matter with any of the others in cutthroat competition for posts or positions. He left it entirely to the leaders of those states to decide whom they wanted. He refused to do any lobbying. He left the questions to be determined on merit and on the good sense of the leaders of the Persian Gulf states. Once the UAE wanted to change a senior officer of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force suggested that the President of the UAE be requested to keep the officer on the ground that he was very competent. Mr. Bhutto refused. He told the Chief of the Air Force to comply with the request. When it was rumored that the Forces of these countries would be “Arabised”, Mr. Bhutto refused the suggestion to impress on them the benefits of “diversity”. He observed that the rumor was impractical and that it would be counterproductive to lecture wise men on an issue of common sense. It was in this sense that he agreed to their terms of cooperation and won their confidence and respect. His other anxiety was to make it abundantly clear that Pakistan was not present in the Persian Gulf as a rival or competitor of Iran or Saudi Arabia. He repeatedly told the leaders of these States that Pakistan’s position in their countries did not have the slightest hegemonic pretentious. He assured them that being vehemently opposed to hegemony in principle as a repugnant policy; he could not be expected to have such fatal ambitions for his country. This is how Mr. Bhutto paved the way for a perfect understanding with the Persian Gulf states. In the rest of the Middle East, Mr. Bhutto followed a policy of sincere cooperation. He improved Pakistan’s relations with Syria, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and above all, Saudi Arabia. He closed the chapter of
misunderstanding with Iraq over the Iraqi Embassy affairs and embarked on a new chapter of brotherly cooperation. With Egypt and Kuwait also he improved his country’s relations.
The Islamic Summit

When the Arab-Israel Ramazan war of 1973 took place, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto considered it to be a war for Pakistan. It did not rest content with militant statements in the fashion of the previous governments of Pakistan. He was determined to demonstrate the support in concrete terms. He did this and won for Pakistan the lasting appreciation of the Arab states. As a measure of fraternal reciprocity and on account of Mr. Bhutto’s diplomatic agility, his efforts were crowned with success by the Islamic Summit Conference which took place in Lahore on January 1974. It was a great honour for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It was a great tribute to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In a sense, it was a culmination. Mr. Bhutto, as the Chairman of this Islamic Conference, presided over the conference of Muslim Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Minister’s with sophistication and grace, with the full luster of his experience as an ace diplomat. It was a great and glorious day for Pakistan. It was a great day for the world of Islam. It was at this Conference that the Palestine Liberation Organization was unanimously acknowledged as the sole representative of the people of Palestine. The Second Islamic Summit Conference was an outstanding victory for the foreign policy of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. There can be no two questions on this issue. However, Mr. Bhutto has repeatedly stated that without the invaluable support and co-sponsorship of the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the Conference might not have seen the light of day. The late Monarch of Saudi Arabia and the Prime Minister of Pakistan had to exert all their influence to make the Islamic Summit Conference a reality. The Conference was a turning point in the fortunes of Pakistan, a landmark in the history of Islamic states and a decisive factor in the political developments of the Middle East. It was a watershed in the realm of diplomacy.
Bangladesh

The master stroke came in the recognition of the Muslim state of Bangladesh through a collective decision of all the Muslim nations and not of Pakistan as an individual state. This was the stroke of genius. It left the obstructionists gasping for breath. It paralyzed the opposition of the vested interests. The fact that the Muslim states in unity invited Bangladesh to participate in the Islamic Summit Conference showed the wisdom of the policy of Mr. Bhutto to achieve reconciliation through recognition. Mujibur Reman came to Lahore. He participated in the Conference as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Before leaving Lahore, he promised the Prime Minister of Pakistan to drop his demand for the war trial of the Pakistani prisoners of war and to facilitate their release. He also invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit Bangladesh. When the visit of Mr. Bhutto to Dacca took place about 6 months later, the reception he got was so overwhelming and so magnificent that it is reported that even Mujibur Rehman felt envious. Much has happened since Mujibur Rehman came to Lahore in early 1974 to attend the Islamic Summit Conference and since Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Dacca. However, if the policy laid down by Mr. Bhutto had not been correct, the President of Bangladesh Gen. Zia-ur-Rehman would not have come in December 1977 as an honored and welcome guest. Before leaving Pakistan in his press conference, the President of Bangladesh pointedly went out of his way to show his appreciation of that policy by saying that the process of normalization began two years ago. If the policy of recognition had been wrong, relations could have been broken after July 1977. But that the policy was right and there was no alternative to it has been vindicated not only by the visit of the President of Bangladesh to Pakistan but also by the embrace he received when he was leaving Islamabad.
Arab Brothers

Pakistan’s relations with Libya also took a profound turn for the better during the tenure of Mr. Bhutto as President and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Relations between the two countries developed by leaps and bounds. Col. Gaddafi, the President of Libya and Prime Minister Bhutto became close friends. They cultivated a relationship of mutual respect and understanding. With Yasser Arafat also, Mr. Bhutto struck a cord of confidence and close friendship. He always spoke highly of Mr. Boumediene of Algeria. He praised the intelligence of King Hassan of Morocco. He showed the greatest reverence for King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. He maintained the same respect for King Khaled, the illustrious successor of King Faisal. He had developed a close and friendly association with Crown Prince Fahd, Prince Sultan and the young Princeton educated Foreign Minister of the Kingdom, Prince Saud Bin Faisal, the son of King Faisal. The leader with whom Mr. Bhutto was on the most intimate terms was Shaikh Zeid, the President of UAE and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. They had come to know each other when Mr. Bhutto was out of office and in the wilderness. Friendships developed in adverse circumstances outlive the high and low tide of power which is inherently transient for all mortals. Besides, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi is a warmhearted and a gracious man. It would have been unusual if the two leaders, akin in temperament, would not have hit it off so splendidly. Among the Musjim states and their leaders, Afghanistan is left out as it needs separate attention in a subsequent part of this article.
Diplomatic Versatility

It may well be asked that how is it that Mr. Bhutto could develop a close and friendly relationship with such diverse personalities like the Shahanshah of Iran and Col. Gaddafi of Libya, or King Hassan of Morocco and Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization or President Hafez Assad of Syria and King Khaled of Saudi Arabia. The fact that the Pakistani leader could get on well with all of them over a long period of time shows the measure of the man, his versatility and erudition, his diplomatic skill and his patriotism. He has explained it by saying that this was possible because he tried always to give his views honestly but as politely as possible and because he had a very clear perception of the movement of events. Also, because, according to him, he tried not to impose his views on others or press the point of a third party beyond a prescribed limit.
Fighting Colonialism

On the African continent, Mr. Bhutto supported vigorously the cause of de-Colonization. He made Pakistan a party to the process of dismantling the colonial structure, in fighting racism and in opposing exploitation. He opened diplomatic missions in Zaire and in Ethiopia. He took an uncompromising position against the obnoxious policies of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. He gave manifestation of tangible support to the freedom fighters of Africa. Similarly, in Latin America, he opened a mission in Mexico and Argentina. He supported common causes of the depressed world with dedication and devotion. He associated Pakistan, in opposition to hegemony in Latin America. He sent a number of high powered delegations to the Latin American countries to bring them and Pakistan closer.
Exploitation and the Third World

This then was the policy of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the subcontinent, in South East Asia and the Far East; in the Middle East and in Africa and Latin America. These are the countries of the impoverished Third World. What have they got in common when they differ in religion and in language, in culture and in climate, in colour and in structure? When they are unable to find an accommodation with the next door neighbor, how is it that their unity transcends Continents and oceans? They have their poverty in common. Their poverty and the causes of that poverty unites them. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting (OPEC) countries are no longer poor and still they form a part of this family. This is true because of their common colonial past. This is true because of their common exploitation. Despite the wealth of the OPEC countries, the cream of their wealth is being sapped away by the technologically advanced nations. The Third World needs to banish poverty and the causes of poverty. The Third World wants to liquidate and uproot exploitation. The Third World wants genuine stability and an equitable structure of peace. The Third World wants the end of patrons and an end to patronage. The Third World wants recognition not arising out of snobbery but stemming from sincerity. It wants to be heard not out of pity but in right. This is how the Third World is united despite the OPEC and the non-OPEC differences in wealth, despite the distances and the diversities.

The first positive step in the detection of real change lies in altering the present unjust international economic order. Without a radical change in this colonial structure, the Master and Servant relationship will not alter. The opulent industrial nations have been fiddling around with words and words for over a generation. They talk piously but they behave poisonously. Their fraud has to be broken. To break it the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, proposed a Summit Conference of the Third World leaders. He called for this Conference in order to herald a new international economic order based on justice and not on theft, on equity, not on plunder. This clarion call made in 1975 infuriated the opulent industrial nations, who saw in this Conference a Robin Hood of the poor and a preamble to the charter of change, from privilege to equality.
Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe Mr. Bhutto continued the policy he had laid down as Foreign Minister. He expanded contacts and association in all fields of State activities. New Missions were opened, delegations sent and received to promote trade and economic cooperation. Cultural exchanges were encouraged. As President, Mr. Bhutto completed the unfinished business of according recognition to the Democratic Republic of Germany. Ambassadors were exchanged and the two countries lost no time in opening the avenues of commercial and economic collaboration. Although relations improved with all the nations of Eastern Europe, the most noticeable strides were made in Pakistan’s relations with Romania. President Bhutto was deeply impressed by the gesture of President Ceaucescu to visit Pakistan as a sign of solidarity and of confidence in Pakistan’s ability to surmount its gravest crisis. Mr. Bhutto paid a return visit to Romania in 1975. At that time he was Prime Minister but President Ceaucescu broke protocol and came to the Bucharest Airport to receive the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto was given a very warm reception and the visit resulted in the further consolidation of relations between Romania and Pakistan. All round cooperation exists between the two countries. The agreements in the field of economic cooperation relate to joint ventures not only in the two countries, but also in third countries. Among the major projects is the expansion of the Karachi Oil Refinery in Karachi which was completed with Romanian assistance in January 1978.
Southern Europe

In Southern Europe, the Pakistani leader developed close relations with strategic Malta and opened a diplomatic mission in Greece. The Prime Minister of Greece Mr. Constantin Caramanlis a very close personal friend of Mr. Bhutto visited Pakistan in December 1976. In the Scandinavian countries, taking cognizance of the growing influx of Pakistanis to those Nordic lands and of their importance, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the first Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit Sweden. An Ambassador was sent to Denmark and it was decided to have a mission in Norway as well, Mr. Bhutto got on very well with Mr. Palme, the then Prime Minister of Sweden. They had a broad and intimate exchange of views on the world situation.
Britain

In the same fashion Mr. Bhutto gave a great deal of his attention to bring Pakistan closer to the states of Eastern Europe and Britain. Although Mr. Bhutto has given the reasons which influenced his decision to take Pakistan out of the Commonwealth, interested quarters have tried to criticise it on a number of obsolete and redundant grounds. Mr. Bhutto had advocated a graceful and painless withdrawal from the Commonwealth in his book “Myth of independence”, written about four years before the separation of East Pakistan. Being an ardent believer in the foreign policy of bilateralism, Mr. Bhutto thought it was in Pakistan’s interest to reduce the country’s multilateral commitments only to those essential ones and give them due attention. He regarded the Commonwealth to be a multilateral commitment of diminishing returns. In the “Myth of Independence” he called the Commonwealth a vestigial organ. He believed that Britain belonged to Europe and that the Commonwealth would eventually become a liability to Britain itself. He had also observed that the multilateral problems raised in the Commonwealth conferences were complicating on the one hand Pakistan’s growing bilateral relations with the African states and on the other, causing strains in the traditional relations between Pakistan and Britain. A machinery for solving the disputes of the members did not exist in the institutions. Still, the disputes were raised and discussed with passion and emotion in the Commonwealth conferences, the people of the member states accepted solutions from the collective wisdom of the Commonwealth leaders, but the solutions were not available. For this and allied reasons, Mr. Bhutto wanted an honorable exit for Pakistan, from a club that was originally Anglo-Saxon in character, but later became multiracial out of necessity. Despite the change in the colour of the Commonwealth, the necessity had sense for some time in the beginning while Britain retained her usual power in world affairs, but not afterwards. Mr. Bhutto thought it would be beneficial to Pakistan to concentrate on a straightforward bilateral relationship with each of the Commonwealth states, including of course Britain. It has been argued that Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth has affected the sizeable Pakistani community in the United Kingdom. Mr. Bhutto has rejected this superficial and erroneous criticism. In his view, the racial question is basically an economic question and secondarily one of prejudice. The Commonwealth as an institution, according to him, does not afford a protection to any of the non-white residents of Britain. Nor, according to him, a dyke against powellism. He has pointed out that the Bengalis and the Indians living in the United Kingdom face essentially the same problems as the Pakistanis despite the fact that both India and Bangladesh are members of the Commonwealth. Mr. Bhutto has observed that the future well being of his countrymen in the United Kingdom does not open on the Commonwealth but on the following factors:—
(i) The economic conditions of the United Kingdom.

(ii) The social integration of the immigrants.

(iii) The state of bilateral relations between Britain and Pakistan and, above all.

(iv) The position and influence of Pakistan in this region in the world.

During his visit to London in 1973, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had very detailed discussions with Mr. Edward Heath, the Prime Minister of United Kingdom. The President of Pakistan traced relations between Pakistan and Britain from 1947 onwards, and before that, between Britain and Muslim India from the time of the British conquest of the Sub-continent. A very good understanding arose.
Western Europe

With the nations of Western Europe, Mr. Bhutto promoted Pakistan’s relations with each one of them. However, his main attention was on the Federal Republic of Germany and France, the two principal states of Western Europe. He visited both countries on formal visits. Mr. Bhutto was invited by President Pompidou of France on an informal visit when he was in London.
How we got the Reprocessing Plant

President Pompidou knew the President of Pakistan as a friend. During his visit to Pakistan in 1964 as Prime Minister of France, the French President and the then Foreign Minister of France, Couve de Maurville were entertained by Mr. Bhutto the Foreign Minister of Pakistan at his 70 Clifton residence in Karachi. Instead of being a short visit it lasted for hours. The French Prime Minister even decided to hold his press conference at 70, Clifton in order to continue a conversation on Napoleon and French history after admiring the collection of hooks on France and Napoleon in Mr. Bhutto’s library. Nine years later, when the President of Pakistan went to Paris in response to the invitation, President Pompidou reminded him of that “wonderful” evening in Karachi. The President of France and the President of Pakistan held discussion after the official lunch in the President’s office. Apart from the interpreter, no other official from either side was present. The discussion covered a whole range. A close identity of views on major issues emerged. The atmosphere was conducive. It generated confidence. And President Bhutto being as able a diplomat as a politician did not lose the opportunity. Indeed be seized on it and made a request for a Reprocessing Plant. Completely taken aback by surprise President Pompidou tried to wriggle out of discussion on the subject but President Bhutto pinned him down with a volley of arguments in favour of the request. He left the office of the President of France only after he had extracted an agreement in principle to consider the request sympathetically. This is how the question of the Reprocessing Plant became the subject-matter of negotiations between France and Pakistan in the summer of 1973. The negotiations continued for three long years and the Agreement was signed in March 1976. In the meantime, President Pompidou died in 1975. Prime Minister Bhutto flew to Paris for the funeral wondering on the way, if the negotiations in the Reprocessing Plant would also be buried? It goes to credit of President Giscard d’Estaing that as a leader of a great country, as a statesman of integrity, he remained firm to the commitment of his predecessor. There were many pressures on the new French President to scuttle the negotiations. He refused to retreat. During the Prime Minister’s official visit to France in 1975, President Giscard d’Estaing assured Mr. Bhutto that the agreement would be concluded and it was concluded. Pakistan’s relations with France are of valuable import. These relations extend to all fields and have been crowned with the Reprocessing Plant Agreement. It is a unique relationship, cemented by many tests and trials. It finds its solid basis in the common outlook on China, Vietnam and hegemony.
Canada

Before discussing Pakistan’s relations with the Super Powers, a word on Canada is needed. Canada and Pakistan have had good relations for a long time. Canada has given our country sizeable assistance. The Nuclear Reactor at Karachi negotiated by Mr. Bhutto as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources and Atomic Energy, was built with Canadian assistance. Mr. Bhutto paid an official visit to Canada in February 1976. He and Mr. Pierre Trudeau had met before, but during this visit, they became close friends. Prime Minister Bhutto discovered in Mr. Trudeau a sensitive person, possessed of a high intellectual callibre.
Super Powers

Coming to the Super Powers, China, which modestly does not claim a Super Power status, is undoubtedly a power of that status in our estimation and in the estimation of others, and is of vital importance to Pakistan. However, since Sino-Pakistan relations have been discussed earlier we now turn to the Soviet Union. Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union have been uneasy from the beginning, but in 1971, the relations seemed wrecked. This was unfortunate for a number of reasons. In the first place, good politics have no place for bad terms with a neighbouring Super Power. Secondly, strenuous efforts had been made from 1960 to 1966 to improve relations with the Soviet Union. These efforts had achieved a measure of success. The animosity and the acrimony had disappeared. Contacts were steadily expanding in all spheres. Even after the departure of Mr. Bhutto from Government in 1966, President Ayub Khan maintained the tempo of improvement in Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union. As has been stated earlier, the collaboration extended to the military domain albeit very briefly in 1967. The wreckage took place in 1971—at the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 8, 1977. The acrimony unleashed by this alarming turn in the events outstripped the harangue of the Krushchev era during the U-2 episode.

When Mr. Bhutto became the President of Pakistan he ordered the new Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed to carry out a study of the events and the cause of this development. When President Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972, the reception was cold and the Moscow winter was not entirely responsible for it. The President of Pakistan had a series of meetings with the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and one very lengthy discussion with Secretary-General, Mr. Brezhnev. Although an exacting visit it was an overwhelming success. Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union were put back on the rails. Gradually, the relations began to improve. Aside from the political success of the visit, on the economic side, the agreement for the Karachi Steel Mill was finalized and concluded. The Steel Mill had been a dream long since 1950. The dream came true in 1972 and at present it is taking shape in steel. Other economic agreements on the repayment of loans and so forth were also concluded. Mr. Bhutto’s second visit to the Soviet Union was in October 1975, when he went as Prime Minister. In the interval between the two visits, the relations between the two countries improved increasingly. Except for the military field, relations were expanded in all other fields. The second visit took place in October but was much warmer than the previous visit. Marked by discussions in depth with Prime Minister Kosygin and a lengthy discourse with Secretary-General Brezhnev, it ended with a constructive communiqué. Among other subjects it referred to the peaceful solution of Pakistan-Afghanistan differences. In these prolonged discussions the principles of Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union and other States were discussed in order to leave no room for ambiguity or misunderstanding, Prime Minister Bhutto made it clear that the
guiding factors in his country’s foreign policy would be the principles of peaceful co-existence. He informed the Soviet leaders that Pakistan would work for genuine stability in the region. He went on to explain that the stability would neither be genuine nor lasting if it was based on the theory of discrimination or pre-eminence of any power, large or small. It also meant that the existing disputes would have to be resolved peacefully but with equity and justice. He made it equally clear that Pakistan would not involve herself in the ideological or other differences among the Super Powers. Finally, he informed the Soviet leaders that Pakistan’s relations with China were separate and independent of her relations with other States and that Pakistan would not subscribe to any decision which China might interpret as directed against her. In this respect, he concluded by stating that just as Pakistan did not expect the Soviet Union to improve her relations with Pakistan at the cost of her relations with other countries, it would not be reasonable to expect Pakistan to develop her bilateral relations with the Soviet Union at the cost of her relations with others. The Soviet leaders did not dispute this proposition. On the contrary they assured Prime Minister Bhutto that his enunciation of the basic position of Pakistan’s foreign policy was unimpeachable. Having cleared the basic issues, both sides agreed to give further fillip to their bilateral relations. And that is how Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union developed positively in the last six years. There is no mystery to it. There is no secret to it. Those who understand politics and foreign affairs will understand that in today’s world it is possible to have good and healthy relations with all the three Super Powers without alienating any of them. Of course this calls for the artful execution of bilateral relations, an adherence to basic principles and a comprehension of the flow of major events. It requires the knowledge of flash points and a sense of timing. Mr. Bhutto improved the country’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union neither at the cost of Pakistan’s relations with China nor indeed at the cost of Pakistan’s relations with the United States. In developing these relations he remained mindful not only of China and the United States, but also of some of the Muslim states enjoying good relations with Pakistan but not with the Soviet Union. He noted and accommodated all these essential considerations in improving Pakistan’s relations with that giant Super Power called the Soviet Union. To paraphrase his words, he said to a friend that achievement did not lie in repairing wrecked relations with one country by wrecking Pakistan’s relations with other friendly Nations. He said that any fool could do so without the slightest difficulty.

For Mr. Bhutto, the challenge lay in attaining the objective without sacrificing other fundamental interests of the country. He concluded his observations by saying that is why the task contained beauty in the result. Mr. Bhutto has not always agreed with the global policies of the Soviet Union but he has never doubted its strength. As Foreign Minister he respected it and as President and Prime Minister he reckoned with it. He often remarked that after the withdrawal
of British power from our region, any nation which took Soviet Power light-heartedly would do it at a gambler’s risk. This notwithstanding, as a matter of unalterable principle, Mr. Bhutto would not contemplate improving relations with this Super Power granting territorial basis to it on the soil of Pakistan or by taking any step that would be aimed at China or even other friendly countries. However, in fairness to the Soviet Union, the leaders of that country never asked for any bases on the territory of Pakistan from Mr. Bhutto. Nor did they press him to subscribe to the Asian Collective Security pact, once he made his position clear beyond doubt on his inability to subscribe to it. Yet the relations improved and he wanted to improve them further on these accepted terms. You would have to go to kot Lakhpat Jail in Lahore to find out how that could be done. Mr. Bhutto knows how it can be done. He has proved that again and again. Therefore, Pakistan-Soviet relations are in good shape once more and there is no need to ring an alarm bell anywhere as nobody will be alarmed by the way this has been achieved. It has been done according to the ethics of international relations without compromising the State’s internal interests or the State’s standing relations with other countries.
U.S.A.

When Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the President of Pakistan he was not unaware of the past difference that had arisen between him as Foreign Minister and successive American administrations over a series of major issues. But in the five intervening years the world had undergone quite a change:—

(i) Kissinger had made his famous secret visit to Peking in the summer of 1971 from the launching pad of Pakistan. What had been a fundamental obstacle in the relations between Pakistan and the United States from 1962-1970 suddenly disappeared. Strange are the ways of International diplomacy but it baffles only those who do not understand it.

(ii) It was apparent that the ghastly war in Vietnam was dwindling out and that the whole of Indo-China stood on the verge of change.

(iii) Non-alignment had lost its immoral reputation and had acquired respectability.

(iv) Cold war policies evaporated in the face of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(v) Co-operation and mutual understanding had improved relations between the two German States and between Eastern and Western Europe.

(vi) The differences between Pakistan and the United States over the Indonesian policy had disappeared with the removal of President Sukarno from the political scene of Indonesia.

(vii) The development of modern technology, perfecting the communications delivered by satellites, had made the need for bases like the Badaber, outside Peshawar, redundant.

(viii) The aims embargo imposed by the United States on Pakistan in 1965 on the one hand, and the massive inflow of arms to India from the Soviet Union and India’s rapid indigenous development of armaments on the other, had changed the military position between India and Pakistan. The creation of the state of Bangladesh on the map of the sub-continent was a new factor in the equation of the sub-continent.
(ix) No conflict or competing differences over the Indian Ocean policies vis-a-vis the Great Powers.

(x) The difference over the Middle East continued but the difference existed from the time of Israel’s creation and the United States did not consider Pakistan to make more than verbal noise in the determination of the crisis in the Middle East.

Mr. Bhutto assessed these changes with penetrating thought and analysis. He believed that with continuous optimism and sincere efforts, a creative relationship could be restored between Pakistan and the United States. Mr. Bhutto paid two official visits to the United States as President in 1973 and as Prime Minister in 1975. On the first visit he held constructive discussions with President Nixon and Secretary of States Dr. Henry Kissinger. On his second visit, he held equally valuable talks with President Ford and Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger. During the course of the second visit, the United States Government decided to lift the arms embargo imposed in 1965. Dr. Kissinger made a number of visits to Pakistan and developed a good understanding with Mr. Bhutto. Being a gee-politician, Dr. Kissinger understood better than many others, the strategic value of Pakistan, especially after the oil crisis. Relations between the two countries took significant forward strides after the Simla Agreement and the recognition of Bangladesh. The United States had an interest in Pakistan’s close relations with Iran. These relations came closer. The United States also saw with satisfaction the forward leap made by Pakistan in developing her relations with the Persian Gulf States and the other Arab States of the Middle East and North Africa. She noticed the improvement of Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union and with the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. She was already fully aware of Pakistan’s close relations with China. She saw the emerging status of Pakistan in the Third World. The relations were moving smoothly. U.S. economic and technical aid increased, Military sales were resumed and there was sympathetic understanding to Pakistan’s commodity and food requirements. The complex question of re-scheduling of loans was settled satisfactorily. What then happened to make things suddenly go wrong? The change appeared sudden to the naked eye but not so sudden to those who were more directly concerned with the affairs of State. Before the quadrupling of the oil prices, the United States blinked at the militant foreign policy of Pakistan towards the Middle East and the Third World generally. The United States swallowed the more than verbal support to the Arab States in the Ramazan War of 1973. She did not like it but did not allow it to come in the growing bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States. Although not enthusiastic about the Islamic Summit Conference of Lahore in 1974, the United States could not help being impressed by the solidarity the Islamic Nations demonstrated at the Summit. As a corollary, Pakistan’s stock rose in the estimation of the United
States. The United States found that, in a series of important international moves, Mr. Bhutto played a pivotal role. President Kim il Sung asked Mr. Bhutto to use his influence with the United States on the Korean question. Mr. Bhutto was approached to play a role in re-opening dialogue between Turkey and Greece. And PLO leader Yasar Arafat would fly to Larkana to consult the Pakistani leader. Washington felt impressed. And the hearts of our peoples burst with pride for our dynamic leader’s role as a world statesman. Pakistan’s international value especially in the Third World was on the ascendency. Pakistan’s ascendant role did not conflict with the global outlook of the United States. However, after the oil crisis and Mr. Bhutto’s attitude on the connected question of the new international economic order, the complexion changed. The unity of OPEC countries and the quadrupling of the oil prices shook the foundations of the United States and Western Europe. These opulent industrial nations managed to absorb the shock and the rise in the oil prices, but for the first time they saw the Third World presenting a real threat. The demand for a new international economic order was transformed overnight from a fictional story into an unpleasant reality. In the light of this change pregnant with dangerous possibilities, what the U. S. tolerated in the past as a militant posture demonstrating emotion and style, she now found difficult to swallow. Prime Minister Bhutto denounced the Paris conference on the new economic order as a dilatory devise. When he proposed instead a Summit conference of Third World leaders, the rich industrial nations didn’t like it. The United States or, rather, the bureaucrats of the State Department, began asking, “Is Pakistan getting too big for her boots”? “Is it not time to cut Pakistan down to size”? The State Department officials called Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington for a briefing. They informed him that Pakistan’s militant support to Third World issues in the United Nations was beginning to cause concern to the United States. The officials of the State Department got a suitable reply, but that is quite another matter. Pakistan’s position in the Middle East, in the frame work of these developments, began to acquire a different colour. Then came the Reprocessing Plant. That did it. The Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger flew into Lahore in August 1976 and demanded that Pakistan and/or France cancel, modify, or postpone the agreement. He was blunt enough to tell his friend Mr. Bhutto that in the failure to comply with the United States request “a horrible example would be made of you”. Enough was enough. The United States had tolerated the call for the Third World Summit Conference and the militant support of the Arab states but the Reprocessing Plant Agreement had crossed the toleration point. And so the decline took place in the relations between the United States and Pakistan. One day, the genesis of the spring agitation of 1977 and the events that followed it will become a part of accepted history. Some will say that the man from Larkana is paying a very heavy price for his patriotism and his principles. Others realize that Mr. Bhutto has become a legend in his life time: Bhuttoism has gone deep into the soul of the People of Pakistan. He is part of the aroma of the land.
But was it necessary for the United States to de-stabilize Pakistan? It was not like Chile, where it was a question of destabilizing a regime. Here, in this case, the de-stabilization of the Government of Mr. Bhutto meant the de-stabilization of Pakistan. Was it worth it? This is the question we would like to put to the experts of the State Department.

Let us take up the most excitable issue before the other two. The question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In taking it up we will not use the argument that the Reprocessing Plant is not being acquired for nuclear proliferation. Our line and our argument is different. We maintain that nuclear proliferation can be terminated only by political agreement at a universal, international level. It cannot be terminated by blocking technology. If one form of technology is blocked, another is discovered. If the nation has the infra-structure of science and the scientists, it will find a method commensurate with its capacity. We are still hearing disturbing reports about the Reprocessing Plant. It is possible that President Carter will be as successful in Pakistan as he was a failure in India in the Reprocessing Plant.

But the problem of non-proliferation will not be solved by cancelling, modifying or postponing the Agreement on the Plant. Essentially it is a political issue and not a technological issue. Only an international Agreement of the correct type can prevent Pakistan and other countries from going nuclear. We repeat, it is a political question and not one of technology.

In the same way, the economic yearning of the Third World for justice is only a matter of time. Men like Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto can hasten the process by the power of their intellect and dynamism, but the issue remains an essentially objective one. The inevitability of the attainment of this justice is ensured. The effort to defeat it will face defeat. The injustice has gone on for too long. For centuries the poor of the world have endured poverty. The time rings with the clarion call for change. The rich nations will have to share some of their fat to leave flesh on the bones of the poor.

As for the Middle-East, we agree that the Middle-East will never be the same again. There will either be a settlement basically favorable to Israel or it might lead to another Arab-Israel war or even the Third World War. The Middle East is in greater flux than ever before. To say that the Middle-East is at the cross-roads would be a very unimaginative cliché. However, it is on moments such as these, that men of courage and brilliance step into the breach and salvage a hopeless situation. There is no doubt in our mind, there are no doubts in the minds of those who have seen the diplomatic genius of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, that he would not have “reserved judgment” or called it “the great unknown”. With his
vitality and with his acknowledged ability, he would have strained every nerve to make a positive contribution. It is in such moments that our hearts cry out for men like him, men of destiny who are needed to grasp the situation and shape history.

As a Super Power, the United States needs nobody. As a Super Power the United States has an answer to every problem. So what we have said is sheer nonsense. We have been carried away by our sentiments—but have we really been that naive?
Our Closest Friends

This leads to the question of the man in the mandi—or in the market. With whom are Pakistan’s relations closest? Pakistan’s relations are closest with the country or countries with whom she shares a common interest. The degree of the relationship is determined by the degree of common interest. The degree might vary and change when the common interest changes. The index of this common interest is to be found in the quality of the bilateral relations of Pakistan with different states of the world—near and far, large and small. With this qualification which is fundamental, it can be said that during the stewardship of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan maintained good and correct relations with all the Three Super-Powers—China, United States and the Soviet Union. He was not responsible for the deterioration of relations with the United States. For a leader of the people can never compromise on a central national issue.
Commonwealth

During the visit of British Prime Minister Callaghan to Pakistan in January, 1978, some mandate-less leaders rejected by the people started saying that Pakistan should rejoin the Commonwealth. Callaghan condescendingly said that the nations of the Commonwealth would have to discuss the issue if Pakistan made an application.

Let us remember that Foreign Policy is made to suit the essential interest of States. It is based on the highest consideration of security and sovereignty. Of course, it has to take into account it’s economic and other interests including indeed, the interests of its immigrants living in other countries. However, the question of immigrants as such, cannot be a fundamental pillar of Foreign Policy. If such reasoning is accepted, immigrants would be weakening the foreign policy of Pakistan instead of strengthening the foreign policy made to protect basic indigenous interests of territorial integrity and security. It would be fatal to leave foreign policy in the hands of immigrants. Pakistan has immigrants not only in the United Kingdom but also in Europe and on the American continent. Our Country has immigrants in the Middle East and in South East Asia. Sizeable communities of the people of our country are spotted everywhere. We are proud of them. We value their contributions to the economy of Pakistan. Our foreign policy must make room for the protection of their legitimate interests. But we cannot ask them to make the nation’s foreign policy on the basis of the treatment they receive in foreign countries. They will be strong if our Country is strong and our foreign policy is strong. Our country will be strong if her honour and her vital internal interests are protected. The Jews of America and Europe are a source of strength to the foreign policy of Israel. The American Greeks have succeeded in imposing an arms embargo on Turkey to serve the interests of the Foreign Policy of Greece. This is the natural and obvious position. The immigrants gain strength in supporting the vital events of their country.

The decision to join or leave the Commonwealth must be taken in Islamabad and not in London or Toronto—since it is no longer “this British Commonwealth of Nations”. In taking this decision we have to consider Pakistan’s vital interests. The point of view of the immigrants must be considered with respect but whatever its weight, it cannot be the determining factor. The Indians and the West Indies are very much in the Commonwealth but they are still called “niggers” on the streets of London. On January, 1978 a British Judge gave a decision that there is nothing wrong in calling the coloured immigrants dirty names including nigger. The decision to leave the Commonwealth was a considered decision. It was not taken in pique. It was based on the pull of gravity. Does the centre of gravity of Pakistan lie in Asia or in Europe? If it lies in Asia,
can Pakistan bear the multilateral obligations of SEATO, CENTO and the Commonwealth all at once, and for all time? All these associations outside our continent and outside our reach do not stand completely separately. There is an inter-connection. One inter-connection leads to another.

When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went to London in June, 1973, he gave a detailed expose to the then British Prime Minister on his reason for leaving the Commonwealth. Mr. Bhutto concluded by saying that it would facilitate the development of bilateral relations between Britain and Pakistan. The President of Pakistan traced Muslim Indian relations with British from Clive’s Diwani to Partition and from the Partition to the separation of Past Pakistan in 1971. In this context, lie discussed the Commonwealth. After the talks, the then British Ambassador Sir Pumphery told Mr. Bhutto that his Prime Minister was deeply impressed by the erudition of the Vakisiani leader. There is, therefore, no point in getting excited merely because Mr. Callaghan, the Prime Minister of Britain, went to the Gaddafi Stadium and saw the cricket match without getting hit on the head. We were however more concerned about his wife Mrs. Callaghan. Thank heavens her presence did not amount to taking politics to the Cricket Match. But we have to admit that the British know how to play cricket.
Afghanistan

We return to our region to conclude the general survey with Afghanistan, the Muslim neighbor of Pakistan. So often we have heard the old story of Afghanistan being the only state in the United Nations to vote against the admission of Pakistan to the World body. We can recall the aggressiveness of the more recent speech of the Afghan leader delivered at the Islamic Summit of 1974. The ageing diplomats of yore remember the sacking of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul. Exasperated by the Bajour incursions of 1960, Ayub Khan broke relations with land-locked Afghanistan in 1961. When Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in January, 1963, he enthusiastically supported the mediation efforts of the Shahansh Ali of Iran to restore relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr. Bhutto went to Tehran and thrashed out an agreement with the Afghan leaders for the resumption of relations between their two countries. Yet, despite his persistent efforts, Foreign Minister Bhutto was unable to make a breakthrough in the relations between the two countries. However, he did succeed in maintaining a fairly healthy modus vivendi. And when Mr. Bhutto left Government, a slight deterioration became visible. After the publication of Ayub Khan’s book “Friends not Master” the deterioration was especially visible as the Afghan Government did not care for the references to it in the book. (It is interesting to note that “Friends not Master” caused some annoyance to Tehran as well). Nothing exciting happened in the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan during Yahya Khan’s rule of Pakistan.

A few days after he assumed the reigns of government, President Bhutto made an unscheduled and unannounced visit to Kabul. It was his first trip to a foreign country as President. Completely taken by surprise, King Zahir Shah rushed to the airport just in time to welcome President Bhutto. In their long and exclusive meeting, President Bhutto asked the Afghan King if his Government intended fishing in the muddled waters of War-torn Pakistan. President Bhutto said to the King that some personalities in that Country and some from Pakistan might advise him to “strike while the iron was hot”. Mr. Bhutto added that he did not expect the wise leaders of Afghanistan to heed to the short-sighted counsel based on defective calculations and false hypothesis. He assured the Afghan Monarch that, with the return of normal conditions in Pakistan, he would open a meaningful and sincere dialogue with the Afghan leaders to improve relations between the two Muslim Countries with a host of homogenous affinities. King Zahir Shah recognised the immense temporary difficulties that Pakistan faced. But with visionary foresight, he assured President Bhutto that Afghanistan did not intend taking a reckless step that might destroy for all times the prospects of good relations. Moreover, he welcomed the invitation for a constructive dialogue between the two countries, once conditions had stabilized in Pakistan. Satisfied
with his four hour visit to Kabul, President Bhutto returned to Pakistan. Back in Islamabad, he told his cousin Mumtaz Ali Bhutto that, in some respects, he gave more importance to Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan than to Pakistan’s relations with the much bigger India. He observed that in the mind of the common man the mosaic of Indo-Pakistan problems eventually boiled down to the Hindu-Muslim factor. In contrast, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan concerned two Muslim people with ethnic affinities, that the historical legacy of British Imperialism and the British-Afghan wars had made Pakistan-Afghanistan relations as complex, if not more complex than that of the colonial legacy in Indo-Pakistan relations. Thus, he felt obliged to take very measured steps in dealing with Afghanistan.
Bold Measures

President Bhutto’s first step was to concentrate on the all out development of the tribal territories. Bolder economic and political measures followed in the province of N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. Mr. Bhutto abolished the Sardari system and developed a network of communications. The reforms are well known and do not require detailed repetition in an article dealing with external affairs. However, some reference to internal political events is unavoidable as it has become linked to Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. Unfortunately, some leaders of the banned National Awami Party saw the separation of East Pakistan in December, 1971, as an opportunity to further divide Pakistan. The near chaos in residual Pakistan influenced their thoughts. Their most important and favorable consideration lay in the captivity of 90,000 personnel of the Armed Forces of Pakistan and in the pinning down of the bulk of the Pakistan Army on the border facing India from Kashmir to Sind. This section of the National Awami Party leadership felt that a better chance to strike would not come again for a very long time. Emboldened, they threatened to bring down the chains from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at Torkham to Attock. They boasted that soon they would be enjoying the grapes and water melons of Afghanistan. It is nothing but falsehood to believe that this section of the banned party cooperated in framing the Constitution of 1973. When the leaders of the parties in the National Assembly met in October to evolve the principles of the Constitution, the NAP President went away to London. On his return from London and Kabul, he denounced the unanimous principles. In the crucial Lahore Government House meeting, President Bhutto was prepared to consider additional concessions. However, the President of National Awami Party rejected the concessions and declared his opposition to the framework as a whole. When his consent came finally it came reluctantly. It came when he was isolated, outwitted and outflanked. For, the other faction of the defunct National Awami Party leadership did not take such a simple view of the internal conditions following the traumatic separation of East Pakistan. Complete conformity of outlook on the Baluchistan issue did not exist in the banned Party. For these reasons, the Baloch faction believed in limited cooperation with the federal Government. They wanted to consolidate their base in the newly created province of Baluchistan and decide later on the second phase of their aims. They adopted a more sophisticated and pragmatic view of the objective conditions. They feared that a premature call to arms would be detrimental to their “cause”. Moreover, they feared that the brunt of the consequences would fall on Baluchistan. For taking this sober view, Mr. Wall Khan called a leader of this group “the father of Negotiations” because Mr. Wali Khan wanted to settle the issue in the mountains.
The Insurgency

At about the same time, the monarchy of King Zahir Shah was overthrown in Afghanistan and a Republic established. Sardar Daoud became the first President of the new Republic. This change took place in July 1973. In his very first broadcast President Daoud declared that Afghanistan had a political dispute with only one Country in the World and that country was Pakistan. This declaration, and the emergence of President Daoud as the leader of Afghanistan, greatly encouraged the group in the banned National Awami Party that favored a quick solution based on the show of strength. Mr. Wali Khan paid a number of visits to Kabul. On his return to Pakistan he made a number of chauvinistic statements. He played on the sentiments of some of the hot-headed Baloch leaders. He exploited President Dauod’s declaration on the assumption of power and his past reputation as an extremist on Pakistan—Afghanistan problems, one thing lead to another. There were wheels within wheels. The forces of moderation could not prevail. Trouble started in Baluchistan. The provincial Government was dismissed. The Provincial Government of N.W.F.P. resigned. The young militants became more active. The speeches of the leaders became more virulent. The trouble in Baluchistan increased. It took the shape of a revolt. In N.W.F.P. the incidents of bomb blasts and sabotage became a routine matter. Television boosters became the target of attack—as did other installations. The Wapda Office in Lahore was blasted and an explosion took place in the General Post Office in Karachi. Sherpao, the senior Minister of N. W.F.P. senior status but young in years was blown to pieces while addressing students in Peshawar University. The situation rapidly began to resemble East Pakistan in the early phase of its troubles. It had to be checked. The completion of the notorious London Plan could not be permitted.

In this tense situation the National Assembly was summoned to an emergency session. It imposed a ban on the NAP. In compliance with the Constitution, a reference was made to the Supreme Court of Pakistan to confirm or reject the ban. The Supreme Court of Pakistan confirmed the ban on the NAP as an anti-national Party. Recently the former Chief justice of Pakistan, Mr. Hamood-ur-Rehman has observed that there was no pressure from Mr. Bhutto on the Supreme Court to give a verdict one way or the other.

After the session of the National Assembly Prime Minister Bhutto addressed some top leaders of his party. He told them that he was a political animal like them. As such, he fervently believed in making a thorough search for a political solution to a political problem. It was an axiomatic duty of a political leader to make every effort to find a solution to political problem. He told them that for over two years his political government had made every human effort to find a
political solution. Unfortunately, the search had been defied. Therefore, on occasions, a minimum of nonpolitical element had to be injected to facilitate solution compatible with national interest. He gave them many examples of how federations the world over had been saved by this amalgam. The insurgency had thrust this alternative to save Pakistan from further disintegration. Mr. Bhutto pledged to seize the first opportunity to return exclusively to the political approach once the back of the armed insurgency broke. The insurgency reached its heights in 1974, but by the middle of 1975, it began to decline. By the first part of 1977 it was nearly over. If today the problem of this province is 99% political, it had been made so by a determined approach. Moreover, if the problem of a province of the country is 99% political, the problems of the country are 100% political and the solution lies in political means.

The insurgency and its acceleration critically affected the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was more to it than the war of words heard on the radio of the two countries. It was most tragic. However, as soon as the signs of the worst period began to disappear, as soon as the insurgency came under control, Prime Minister Bhutto lost no time in returning to the path of political solution. He was waiting for an opportunity to establish contacts with President Daud. The opportunity came when, as a token of friendship, he sent relief assistance to Afghanistan during a national calamity in April 1976. Afghanistan got the message. Soon after this gesture President Daoud invited Mr. Bhutto to Kabul for discussion on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The Prime Minister of Pakistan immediately accepted the invitation. The dark clouds seemed about to lift.
Dialogue with Daoud

The meeting took place between the two leaders in Kabul in June, 1976. In the series of useful discussions, the President of Afghanistan proposed a step-by-step solution. The Prime Minister of Pakistan put forward the advantages of a simultaneous solution of the political difference between the two countries. The two leaders agreed to continue the dialogue in Pakistan. The joint communiqué, issued before the Prime Minister’s departure from Kabul, stated that the political difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan would be resolved on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence. Two months later, in August, 1976, President Daoud came to Pakistan to continue the discussions. Besides Islamabad, Prime Minister Bhutto took the Afghan President to Lahore and Murree. Lahore hosted a public reception for President Daoud in the Shalimar Gardens. Under the informal atmosphere of Murree, the talks continued. During the second round of negotiations held in Pakistan, the experts of the two countries held long sessions to hammer out an agreed draft for a final solution. At one stage it appeared that the agreement was virtually on the table but things did not turn out that way. Prime Minister Bhutto stuck to the line of action he had put forward in Kabul. He continued to impress on President Daoud the need for a simultaneous package agreement. The experts evolved a draft formula on that basis, but something went amiss. At Murree, the Afghan side returned to the step-by-step approach and made many suggestions in this connection. Nonetheless, when President Daoud left for Kabul, neither side felt pessimistic, so much so that on the day President Daoud left Islamabad the. Prime Minister of Pakistan ordered the Foreign Office to prepare the most comprehensive and objective document on the Afghan equation in the history of the sub-continent. He put a special team on the assignment and observed that he would be enquiring on the progress of the project once a month. He directed that the research be completed in six months. He also ordered that scholars could be sent to London and New Delhi to collect what might not be available in Pakistan. The dates of the Prime Minister’s visit to Kabul were tentatively viewed in the time span of October-November. Unfortunately the trouble in Dir caused by avaricious forests contractors came in the way of the tentative schedule. Therefore, the visit had to be after the March elections of 1977, sometime in the end of April. It could not take place in January 1977 due to the session of the Loi Jirga in Kabul during that month. What happened after March 1977 to make the visit for the conclusion of the negotiations impossible needs no mention. In the end of June, 1977 Prime Minister Bhutto went to Kabul from Tehran for a day, but it was an informal visit outside the scope of the negotiations that had begun with so much promise only a year earlier.
Package or Step-by-step

All is well that ends well. Nothing is more important than the future well being of Pakistan. To have this well being, it is essential to have good relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this connection, the Chief Martial Law Administrator visited Kabul a few months after he seized power in Pakistan. It is reported that he was satisfied with his discussions with President Daoud. It is not a shot in the dark to read the important decisions relating to the release of the former President of the defunct NAP and other top Baloch and N.W.F.P. leaders, the dissolution of Hyderabad Tribunal and the General Amnesty, as having some bearing on the General’s discussion with President Daoud in Kabul.

When they drove from Sukkur Central Jail to the Karachi Central Jail on the night of 17th September, 1977, the former Prime Minister and his cousin Mumtaz Ali Bhutto discussed some topics before they were separated. Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto asked why the former Prime Minister had insisted on a step-by-step approach with India during the Simla conference, while insisting with equal emphasis on a simultaneous package deal with Afghanistan. The former Prime Minister told Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto that there was a difference but he did not think it appropriate to mention every reason to show the difference. He did observe that as a matter of principle (exceptions apart) it was safer for a smaller country to have a step-by-step settlement of its dispute with a larger country and conversely, for a larger country to have simultaneous package settlement with a relatively smaller country. Such an approach, he felt was more relevant to the countries of the Third World with their almost chronic instability and fissiparous characteristics.
Building a Broken Country

A few miscellaneous items before the conclusion and a footnote, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the President of Pakistan when it was utterly isolated and rudderless. It did not have a Constitution; the vexatious problem of provincial autonomy remained unsolved. The Ahmadi problem had not been decided. This highly explosive religious issue had defied solution for ninety long years. It had caused fratricidal bloodshed on several occasions. And still it remained unresolved. At long last, the National Assembly found a unanimous settlement to the issue in September, 1974. The economy stood shattered. The captive market of East Pakistan was lost. The rupee needed drastic devaluation. Industrial production had come to a grinding halt. Labour was in an angry mood. In these anarchic conditions, this undeveloped and war shattered half of the original Pakistan found itself under the clouds of the international economic crisis. The worst economic crisis to emerge since the Second World War started in 1972. It continues to haunt the international community up to this day. The crisis began with galloping inflation. The prices of commodities and capital goods rose erratically and wildly. When inflation reached an apogee, the Western nations sought to combat it by restrictive economic measures. These measures brought in stagflation and later recession, more aptly called depression. In the middle of this dreadful see-saw between acute inflation and alarming recession, came the OPEC decision to quadruple oil prices. The energy crisis became the slogan of our times. The cumulative effect of the international disorder sent the economies of the underdeveloped countries like Pakistan, spinning into the air. The rich countries recovered from the shock by cornering the petrodollars, but no such windfall through the back door existed for the non-oil producing nations of the Third World. Their plans for investments were thrown over board; their hopes for socio-economic progress lay buried. Their balance of payments became an unmentionable embarrassment. Had it not been for Mr. Bhutto’s quick footed response to this international economic calamity, Pakistan would have burst at the seams.
The Falcon Flies

He immediately took his small Falcon to Iran, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf States. He made several visits to the OPEC countries. His travels, his contacts with the leaders of those countries and, above all, his integrated policies with them paid handsome dividends. The most generous and understanding were the Shahanshah of Iran, King Faisal and later King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, President Gaddafi of Libya and Sheikh Zeid, the President of the United Arab Emirates. The others also helped, but the significant contribution came from the leaders mentioned here. For instance, Kuwait and Qatar also helped. Going more into details the Consortium countries, the World Bank and the United States made their contributions. The economic assistance from China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were of importance. (In addition, China provided military assistance). However, had it not been for the generous assistance from Iran, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. or Abu Dhabi and Libya, Mr. Bhutto would not have been able to give his country a record Development and Defence budget for over five difficult years. It has been reported that defence equipment for the Armed Forces of Pakistan came to over a billion and a half dollars which was no mean achievement, but was spectacular in the context of the times. This notwithstanding, it would be incorrect to say that Pakistan escaped from the deleterious ramifications of the international economic crisis. But the mind balks with horror to think what would have happened without Mr. Bhutto’s quick and positive response.
Who gave a seer of blood

A positive response that brought fertilizer plants, a refinery, Port Qasim, self-sufficiency in wheat, roads, hospitals, educational institutes, nuclear reprocessing plant and, yes, let us not forget, the steel mill. Steel underpins the entire industrial infrastructure of a nation. Let us not forget that the political prisoner in Kot Lakhpat Jail made the momentous visit to the Soviet Union that resulted in the Steel Mill Agreement. An agreement which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto re-activated as President and Prime Minister, so much so that on a recent visit to the Steel Mill the Chief Martial Law Administrator exclaimed in admiration: “the progress on the project has warmed my heart. In fact I have gained a seer of blood today”. We do not have to remind General Zia that the only reason he gained a seer of blood is because Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave a seer of his blood to the cause of Steel Mill. General Zia should inspect the other development projects that the Peoples Government planned and financed. In every project there is the blood of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the blood of the poor People of Pakistan who responded to his call and worked hard to complete the projects. Each developmental project is an economic monument built with the blood and sweat of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his dedicated colleagues and the poor people of Pakistan. They gave their blood and they gave it willingly. And with their blood they re-infused the body politic of a shattered Pakistan so that their efforts rose like a bright shining star to blaze out its glory in the firmament. Despite the extremely generous assistance, the World picture was so terribly unpleasant that Pakistan could not keep out of it. Inflation hurt the Country. The Cotton and Textile economy was hit hard and the solid development was retarded by the fall in the value of money. Mr. Bhutto tried to soften the blow by increasing wages and by giving the working classes other substantial fringe benefits. Deficit financing which had always taken place, and is still taking place, had to be increased to meet the record expenditure on Defence and Development. During this time Pakistan wiped out the one million ton wheat deficit by increasing wheat production. Production also increased substantially in sugar and rice. Had it not been for two devastating floods interrupted by the worst draught in the Country’s history, agricultural production would have jumped up by leaps and bounds. These natural disasters and the untimely rains of 1976, played more havoc with cotton than with other crops. The mighty Tarbela Dam, meant to augment the flow of water during critical months, could not be commissioned for over two years due to extensive damages. The story would have been much different if Tarbela had got going by schedule. On top of the floods and the rains, the draught and Tarbela the worst international economic crises and the quadrupling of oil prices, came the earthquake in December 1974. Those who pull the chestnuts out of the fire know the heat of the fire and the value of the chestnuts better than those who stand by and watch or those who come later to criticize.
Conclusions

In this paper we have referred to Mr. Bhutto as President and Prime Minister interchangeably. This is because the events have been narrated in their subject order. To clear the position, it is being mentioned that Mr. Bhutto became the first elected President of Pakistan on 20th December, 1971. He held the position of Head of State until 14th August, 1973. On the 14th of August 1973, when the first democratic and unanimous Constitution of Pakistan was enacted, Mr. Bhutto became the first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan on the same day. He ordered elections a year before schedule and won them on March 7th of 1977. He was re-elected Prime Minister soon thereafter. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attached such great importance to Foreign Affairs and to the technique of its execution that in addition to the onerous responsibilities of President or, later, Prime Minister, he retained under his personal command the portfolio of Foreign Affairs lie was also in-charge of Atomic Energy. He shed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in March 1977, after the General Elections. However, he kept Atomic Energy under his charge until 5th July, 1977. On the morning of 5th July, 1977 a day after the celebrations of the American Independence Day, a coup d’état took place in Pakistan. The man from Larkana who became the youngest Federal Minister in the sub-continent at the age of thirty and the youngest elected President and the Prime Minister in the sub-continent is at present in Kot Lakhpat Jail in Lahore facing heinous charges from murder to the import of mineral water.
Vertical and Horizontal Polarization

What are the conclusions? Who can dare to draw conclusions from the present international situation marked by enigmatic uncertainties? Yet, men of vision owe it to their people to pierce the putrid portrait of international politics. In the summer of 1977, while addressing the National Assembly of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto observed that Pakistan had to face the horizontal polarization of provincialism and the vertical polarization of the class struggle. In a far more complex sense, this is true of the wider world canvass. On the political level there exists the horizontal East West polarization on the North-South level between the rich and poor nations. The irreconcilable contradictions lie in the diametrically conflicting objectives, both horizontally and vertically.

On the one side we see many regions of the Word moving towards greater stability and security, and on the other side, a movement towards concentrated violence, erupting more frequently and on a larger and organized scale in the form of terrorism and guerilla warfare. This growing form of violence transcends national frontiers and continents. It is determined to bloody the status quo and tear wide apart traditional concepts. The conflict between order and disorder, between traditional stability and unconventional anarchy, is sharpening.
Strength Links Ancient and Modern Rome

Under the same blue sky, the stars twinkle at the circus below and watch in action the sparks of the contradictions between equity and apartheid, colonialism and independence, democracy and dictatorship, wealth and poverty, emancipation and slavery, technology and ignorance, science and superstition, stability and chaos, power and weakness, revolution and submission. The list is as long as an endless river. In detente, conflict and cooperation co-exist. It contains competition and freeze. Talks on SALT II are making progress side by side with the talk on the development of the neutron bomb. While proliferation is multiplying within the Nuclear States, hell is let loose on further proliferation outside the nuclear aristocracy. There is a quest for inter-dependence contrasted by trade restrictions and tariff barriers. Efforts for integration are matched by subversion for disintegration. The economic crisis has become so critical that the United States of America is engaged in a trade war with Japan, her closest ally in Asia. Sanctions are applied against South Africa while the misery and torture of the Black majority gets more vicious. Not far from the pulpit from which Human Rights are preached with eloquence, tin pot military dictators in South America indulge in the orgy of de-humanizing the individual. While most of the human race exists on squalor and want, a tiny fraction of same race lives in unimaginable splendour. Each part of this mother earth is put in different capsules to provide a system to an unsystematic scramble. The dominant forces guiding the destinies of Man are Religion, Socialism, Freedom and Nationalism. Those who understand the inter-play of these powerful forces, their points of reconciliation and their points of conflict understand the music of the circus. In the last analysis, no matter how much it is denied, strength remains the constant link between ancient Rome and Modern Rome.
The Struggle between Rich and Poor

Will there be a pax Romana? Or would it be more honest to ask if pax Romana ever disappeared? Is that why the Chinese keep digging tunnels and storing grain and warning against hegemony? In the past, the irreconcilable contradictions were resolved by wars. The question is to find an equitable solution to the requirements of an exploding population within the availability of diminishing resources. The endeavor is to equitably divide the resources of the World with the increasing aspirations of humanity as a whole. This is what the great leaders of the world preach. This is why the United Nations is called an instrument of peace. This is the message of each ideology. But what is being done in reality behind the curtain of diplomacy and its good manners? Behind the curtain, an intense struggle is taking place to capture the diminishing resource of the earth. The oil crisis is only a facet of it. In the name of cooperation the big brothers are eating the little brothers everywhere. In the name of peace and goodwill, the most ruthless struggle for world domination is marching forward with martial music. Will this struggle lead to the Third World War? Any one blessed with an iota of sense will emphatically reject the thought of a war not to end wars, but to end the World. Memory recalls the same arguments being put forward before the Second World War. Still it took place and the World is very much alive and kicking. Some simpletons continue to believe that the First World War erupted through the accident of a stray bullet. The Third World War might be engineered in the same fashion. What is wrong with the World blowing up by accident to those who believe that it came into existence by accident? And those who set the world on fire will give a lofty and pious principle for doing it as has happened in the past. No nation, or group of nations, will ever admit that the nuclear button will be pressed into service for the selfish reason of world control or what might be left of it after the holocaust.
Third World War

What are the likely pious causes for these impious ambitions? The causes can be many, and many more can be formed. However, the ostensible causes, classical in character and constant in emphasis, since the end of the last war are:—

(i) Central Europe

(ii) Middle East.

The third cause may well be the collapse of the existing international economic system. This third factor is closest to the real cause. Even manipulated mischief in Asia might be used as a pretext.

Is an “accidental” Third World War inevitable? If it is inevitable, the mini wars might be condemned officially but not discouraged. On the contrary, the vistas of mini wars might open wider to provide the pretext for the big bang. Many a Trojan Horse can be found for the Purpose. It depends on the circumstances. On occasions it might seem expedient to halt the little wars to show moral virtue as a prelude for the final assault. Many a war game might be played before the actual war. Part of the game is the political imperative to give the impression of working for lasting peace on earth. If it is not a political necessity, why are the Nuclear States not prepared to destroy all nuclear weapons and give a pledge to implement genuine disarmament? They talk passionately of peace but prepare frantically for war.

On the 2nd of January 1978, General Alexander Haig, NATO’s supreme commander in Europe gave a lengthy interview of considerable significance on the eve of President Carter’s visit to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In this interview, General Haig urged NATO to adjust its strategy for Third World Threats. Three answers of the General to the questions put to him by the senior correspondent of Newsweek are re-produced as being relevant to the argument advanced in this article:—

(i) “Myopic concentration on the Central European front at expense of equal concern about what happens on our flanks could be self-deluding. As long as we maintain a viable deterrent, the likelihood of conflict in the short term will be the outgrowth of situations on our flanks or on the periphery as the Soviet Union exploit targets of opportunity. And these situations will carry the implications of major confrontation. I believe that we must be armed with regional military capabilities which could be employed as deterrent forces to
prevent the escalation of Third World dynamics into major conflict. And this can best be accomplished by a clear demonstration that the Western World’s vital interests are at stake. There is no substitute for in-place ready forces. An allied military presence must be viewed in a global context. This does not mean that I am belittling the Central European region. But our essential role in Europe is political and psychological which gives the Western allies a measure of confidence and enhances their ability to work together as we attempt to deal with the peripheral crises that are bound to come.

(ii) The Horn of Africa is indicative of the contradictions that can emerge from the Third World dynamics. Two nations equipped by the Soviet Union going for each other’s jugulars. I am not espousing an interventionist doctrine. But rather a policy that seeks a concerted assessment and that, whatever policies are decided, actually evolve from a conscious decision-not a fait accompli by default.

(iii) I believe that uninhibited provision of arms by the Soviet Union throughout Africa today is not consistent with the objectives that serve Western interest. It is certainly not consistent with Moscow’s stated policy of improving East West relations”.

Apart from a little war in the Third World being a precursor to the global catastrophe, we should examine the less probable possibility of a straightforward conflict between the Super powers. A “no nonsense” direct hit without pretences. Although such an approach contains the element of maximum surprise and its concomitant, mobility, it is less likely to be pressed into service in preference to the first option. A one phase encounter instead of a two phase encounter has some advantages but the disadvantages are far greater.

If the Soviet Union and United States combine to destroy China, the awesome conflict will not result in the division of the World’s resources between the Soviet Union and the United States. It would only make the United States more vulnerable to her own doom aid the doom of Western Europe. There is little or no incentive for China to join hands with the United States to destroy the Soviet Union. Within a generation China expects to get her legit late place without going through such destructive conflagration. Would the Soviet Union and China combine to destroy Western Europe and United States and thereby liquidate eternal Rome and with it the iniquitous economic structure of the world? This is the most complex and intriguing question. It is not good politics to dilate on the remotest possibility, especially when China and the Soviet Union are
divided by an ideological quarrel on the political plane. There exists, in addition, a vast territorial dispute between the two giants. At present, it is argued that China’s undivided attention is on exposing the Soviet Union’s hegemonic and that the Soviet Union is equally pre-occupied with attempts to isolate China. In such a situation the combination of the two socialist titans does not appear conceivable in the remaining years of the Twentieth century.

For a variety of reasons, a direct head on collusion between the Super Powers, in combination or severance, seems much less likely, than exploitation of little wars in the Third World. Central Europe might still be responsible for an international conflagration but with the non-belligerent policies of Eastern and Western Europe, this possibility has receded. Europe has changed fundamentally since the Second World War. The essential causes of inter-European friction have largely been removed, if not remedied. Whatever remains of the sensitive issues have been put into animated suspension. But nobody can under-estimate the key geo-political and economic value of Central Europe. The struggle for its control has caused many wars, including the last two great wars. With all the tranquilization, it still retains in its body-politic the germs of the Third World War. Who knows, a time bomb with an atomic warhead might be kept hidden somewhere in the Black Forests. However, the strategic and industrial value of Central Europe notwithstanding, the first flames of the fire might be seen in a continent other than Europe.
Proxy War

The Third World, for a number of reasons, appears the most plausible theatre. It might take place in Latin America, but Latin America is too close geographically to the United States. It might be in Asia? Due to the improvement of relations between China and Japan, the clash between those two mighty powers of Asia has receded. The sub-continent today is not that kind of a hunting ground. Of course a great deal of publicity has been given to the border fighting between Cambodia and Vietnam. Most of the reports emanate from inspired sources in Bangkok or Hong Kong, the two well known countries of foreign intelligence. Some reports say that the fighting is furious and has been going on for over four months. Others mention that the fighting is confined to what is called “The Parrots Beak” area but that the object is to capture the Cambodian capital of Phnom penh and topple the Khmer Rouge. The exciting part of this conflict lies in the theory floated on it being a war by proxy. It might be pertinent at this juncture to repudiate the motion that the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam has been a war by proxy. There is a historical basis for the conflict which pre-dates the era of colonialism. The legacy of French colonialism further complicated this historical factor. Both the elements re-emerged after the attainment of independence by Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975. All the fuel needed for a border war already existed ready to burst into flames without the help or encouragement of anyone else. Besides, no evidence supports the inference that this is the first case of a proxy war between the Soviet Union and China.

The conflict on the Horn of Africa seems a more plausible candidate for a war by proxy. In fact any place in Africa can he picked up for the purpose. For that matter, any place or places in the rest of the world, including Central Europe, can be picked up if the situation becomes desperate. With this qualification, Africa might be tied to another mini war, but at the moment, it is being used as a testing ground and not as a launching pad. This leaves the Near East and the Middle-East. In the Near-East, or southern Mediterranean, Greece-Turkish dispute, either on its own or over-lapping into another conflict, cannot be totally ruled out as a Trojan Horse. Its proximity to the Middle East and Africa, and its strategic importance, makes it a good pawn in the test match. This leaves the Middle East, and it is the Middle East that calls for attention and for intense anxiety. Its strategic value is un-debatable. Its possession of oil has turned it into an oasis for thirsty bandits with big bellies. It contains more than one point of potential conflict. The spark lit on the oil field of the Middle East can rapidly spread far and wide into Asia, Africa, Southern Mediterranean and Europe. Its internal structure can be easily aroused and exploited. If a Trojan Horse has to be found, there is no better place to find it than in the deserts of Arabia. Many war games
have been planned for this sensitive and volatile region. Its control is of primordial importance. A war for its resources is a war for survival and supremacy. This partially explains the latest developments in the Middle East. After thirty years of suffering and after four wars an honorable settlement between the Arab nations and Israel appeared on the horizon in the form of a Geneva conference under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union. As the pace of events moved smoothly and logically towards Geneva for a comprehensive settlement based on justice, the objective was put in jeopardy.
Sadat’s Sand Prints

President Sadat made his dramatic journey to Jerusalem unexpectedly only a few months before Geneva. The visit was like a cat among the pigeons. It divided the Arab States more bitterly than ever before. It put Geneva out of the map of peace. Miracles are still possible and more in Jerusalem than anywhere else. Will the foot-prints left behind by Sadat in the sands of Jerusalem lead to a miracle or will it be the precursor of the Third World War? In this connection it must also be noted that since the Energy Crisis burst in 1973, as a safety measure, in addition to the Arab-Israel dispute, the ground seems to have been prepared for inter-Arab disputes as well. The Middle East has to be kept as a power-keg, a volcano for war, the tinder box to light the spark for the bigger and brighter glow. In addition to the recent setback to the comprehensive peace between the Arab States and Israel, the other likely tricks in the circus include:—

(i) Division within PLO.
(ii) Renewal of Civil War in Lebanon.
(iii) The blackmail to overthrow regimes.
(iv) Conflict over the hegemony of the Persian Gulf.
(v) Disintegration of the federation of U. A. E.
(vi) The Sahara dispute.
(viii) The Horn of Africa conflict.

This means that aside from the Arab-Israeli conflict, many buttons are available to press in the Middle East to protect the established interest, and if need arises, to blow the dumps.
The International Economic Structure

The collapse of the international economic structure is another likely cause. Actually this is the other side of the same coin. It is the same song in another tune. Control of the world economic resources entails the preservation of the existing economic structure of the World. With the loss of the cheap and captive marks of the former colonies, the affluence of the privileged nations continued to soar through the mechanism of neo-colonialism and the full exploitation of the remaining colonies. Simultaneously, the struggle of the masses of the Third World under its genuine leaders intensified. The last decade has witnessed many a setback, but the struggle has not abated. Neo-colonialism and its questionable methods have been made to retreat. The turning point came in 1973 when OPEC unity forced the industrial nations to pay a fair price for oil. This appeared to open the path leading to the end of the fluctuation of prices of raw materials. If oil could fetch a fairer price, gradually other commodities would also follow suit. If one success followed another, the terms of trade could turn in favour of the Third World for the first time since the pyramids were built. The rich nations raised a howl. Blackmail and arm twisting of the crudest nature was applied unabashedly to siphon the petro-dollars into the Western economy. The worst economic crisis hit the West and affected the rest of the world. In May 1977 the seven leading industrial nations net in London and agreed to work together to strengthen their economies by foster expansion. Nothing has come of it. On the contrary, growth has slowed down. Instead of demonstrating unity to fulfill the promise of the London Summit, a trade war has broken out between the United States and Japan. The same friction might develop between the Federal Republic of Germany and the other economic giants of the Western family (including Japan). Unemployment is growing increasingly. Most of the remedial measures have failed. Stubbornly, the situation refuses to improve. As the exploitation of the Third World appears to diminish, the economic crisis of the rich nations gets worse. However, the exploitation of the Third World has not diminished. The rich nations refuse to shed an inch of their privileges. The poor nations demand a more equitable distribution of wealth. How will the stalemate be broken? Coup d'états to install puppet governments in the Third World is not the solution. The generation of hope through good sounding pronouncements and a series of the international and regional conferences to do “something” has a limit. The limit has been crossed. Giving loans on better terms, and even grants to the Third World as a substitute to an equitable economic order is like throwing a bone to a starving dog. How long will the Third World remain the dog in the circus? The so-called lions in the act are refusing to share the meat. They say the lion must get the lion’s share. Does this mean that a peaceful solution is not on the deck, that war is inevitable?
Wars need not be inevitable, especially a war that might wipe out the human race. Even if the human race survives a global nuclear war and starts afresh all over again, will such colossal decimation be commensurate with the aims of those unleashing it?

How can such a catastrophe be averted? It can be averted if the resources of the World are equitably distributed for the relatively even development of all nations. The exploitation and plunder must stop. The present international economic structure must be changed to allow minimum privilege to co-exist with in poverty in place of minimum privilege with maximum poverty. All forms of exploitation and discrimination must end. The caesarean thrust to capture the resources of the world and to dominate it through the strength of technology and economic monopoly stands in complete conflict with the aspirations of the teeming masses of the Third World. Either the Caesars of the World will have to submit to the will of the masses or the masses will have to submit to their domination. The conflict will culminate in one result or the other, otherwise war might become inevitable.
An honest effort has been made to analyze the national and international situation in depth and in perception. Being a modest attempt it is subject to faults and errors. It is certainly not meant as a prototype of George Orwells’ 1984. However, courage has been taken to write the truth. It is a courage of conviction. Bold predictions have been made in good faith. The past has been scrutinized not to aggrandize a man but to recount his services to Pakistan without exaggeration and with integrity. The critic might ask, was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto a magic man? The answer is an immediate and emphatic No. However, with the same curiosity may we ask if Lenin or Chouen-Lai, or de-Gaulle (to name only three leaders) were magic-men? Again the answer is No. There is no doubt that throughout history, God-inspired men have appeared on the political scene to shape the destiny of their people. They come like shooting stars. They wade across the horizon and leave their mark on generations to come. They are possessed of what we in Pakistan call “Khudadad Salahyat” (God given qualities). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is one such man. He arrested his country’s ugly distortions in the internal field by massive reforms. He corrected his country’s monstrous contortions in the external field by bilateralism.
A Peep into Sino-Pakistan Relations

Many centuries ago the wise Chinese built the Great Wall to protect their Country from the invasion of Mongols and other unwelcome foreigners. In our times, symbolically speaking, this ‘Great Divide” kept Pakistan separated from 1949 to 1962. In terms of time, for over thirteen years, and in terms of events, from the victory of the Peoples Liberation Army led by Mao Tse-tung to the Sino-Indian border conflict.

True enough, Pakistan recognised the New Order in China in January 1950 along with the United Kingdom and some other Commonwealth countries. In those early days of our independence, British influence was all pervasive in our Foreign Affairs. We know that the Prime Minister of China paid a formal visit to Pakistan in 1955 and the visit was reciprocated a year later by the Prime Minister of Pakistan’s visit to China. It is also known that warm pleasantries were exchanged at the Bandung Conference. This much is also known and admitted that in the beginning, for a few years, Pakistan supported the claim of the legitimate Government of China to represent that country in the United Nations. These are known and admitted facts.

What is not equally well known is the negative side of the coin. In the same 1950s, while recognizing the new government of China, Pakistan agreed to send a military contingent to Korea in support of the so-called United Nations war against the Democratic Peoples Government of Korea and China. The decision was reversed in the nick of time due to the influence of an enlightened section of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Soon after his official visit to China in 1956, Mr. Suhrawardy went to the United States on an official visit to that country. During the course of his visit to the United States, the Prime Minister of Pakistan made some important and controversial pronouncements which caused surprise and annoyance in Peking. The impact of those remarks was so serious that the Chinese leaders, including Chairman Mao Tse-tung kept reverting to them in different tones right up to 1965. The vote in the United Nations was changed into a negative one without a blink. The round about staggered even some of the Nordic NATO countries. In 1959, Ayub Khan offered joint defence to India against the “danger from the North”. Neither Sri Lanka nor Mauritius are north of India and Pakistan. No elaboration was needed to understand that “danger from the Soviet Union and China”. At that time, the Sino-Soviet differences had not burst into the open. It was the good fortune of Pakistan that Pandit Nehru contemptuously rejected the proposal when Ayub Khan took it to him at the Palam airport in New Delhi. As for the Bandung Conference, despite all the diplomatic pleasantries, it was no secret that Pakistan participated at that Conference on the assurance that Western interests would be protected.
Later, in 1959, the first border clash occurred in Ladakh between India and China. Ayub Khan initially reacted by saying that the clash in Ladakh did not concern Pakistan. At that time, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was in New York leading Pakistan’s delegation to the United Nations. On noting Ayub Khan’s reaction he immediately wrote to the then Foreign Minster Manzoor Qadir to explain how the conflict in question did concern Pakistan. Thereupon Ayub Khan corrected the earlier statement with a clarification. In 1961, during the rising struggles in Indo-China, in the fashion of the Korean example of 1950, Ayub Khan agreed to dispatch a Brigade to Laos as Pakistan’s contribution to resist the common menace of Revolution. The Brigade chosen for this dubious task was brought to Karachi. On this omission, as there was neither a Constituent Assembly nor a National Assembly, it fell on the shoulders of Mr. Bhutto to persuade Ayub Khan to keep away from a dangerous involvement that would alienate Pakistan from the powerful neighbours in the North.

In 1962, the more serious clash took place between India and China in Nefa. The conflict shook the sub-continent. It had electrifying global repercussions. The non-aligned nations tried to repair the damage by convening a conference in Colombo. The United States and the Western nations lost no time in coming out in support of India. As the Chinese came rolling down the hills, the Indians withdrew a sizeable bulk of their forces from Kashmir to join the besieged Indian Army in the East. While Kashmir lay open and exposed like an abandoned orphan, the power of taking historic decision in Pakistan had come to a stands ill. Suddenly and without notice, Ayub Khan disappeared to Gilgit at the height of crisis. His Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, was bed-ridden with a heart attack. In those days, Gilgit was more inaccessible than it is today. Ayub Khan decided to return to Rawalpindi as suddenly as he left the Capital. It was about four days before the Chinese declared a unilateral cease fire. He was told that the American Ambassador was going mad to hand him an important personal message from President Kennedy. So much so that inability to meet the President of Pakistan was making wonder if Ayub Khan had fallen a victim to a coup d’etat. This and other important information relating to the military situation was brought to his attention. He was also told that some of his Generals were becoming restive. After the briefing, Ayub Khan instructed Mr. Bhutto to coordinate the important activities as his civilian Chief of Staff, as he put it. There was a great deal to coordinate but the time for taking historical decisions had slipped away.

After the ceasefire, Mr. Averril Harriman, representing President Kennedy, and Mr. Duncan Sandys representing Prime Minister Macmillan, descended on the sub-continent. The Western leaders prevailed upon Pandit Nehru to open negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir. In return Ayub Khan agreed not to do
anything that would be an encouragement to China. Swaran Singh represented India on the eye wash negotiations on Kashmir. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto represented Pakistan. Mr. I3hutto and the then Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Mr. Dehlavi took a great deal of time to convince Ayub Khan that the Kashmir talks were initiated to enable India to regain a modicum of balance and a measure of shattered confidence. As a consequence, they urged that a meaningful chapter should be opened with China based on genuine friendship and trust. The reluctant Ayub Khan slowly began to recognize the wisdom of this analysis as the Kashmir talks floundered because the Western nations moved towards all out and unconditional support to India. As time passed and the Western strategy became more visible, Ayub Khan felt bitterly cheated. Otherwise the man who had illusions of the “danger from the North”, who did not put the abandoned sovereign of Kashmir in the pocket of Pakistan to satisfy Western interests, would not have approved the opening of the new chapter of Pakistan’s relations with China. Even after the consent, his heart remained with the Wes He had many second thoughts on the new policy.

As Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto lost no time to develop and consolidate the relationship. First came the Boundary Agreement which he concluded with China in March 1963 in Peking. This basic agreement was followed by a multitude of agreements and frequent exchange of visits between the top leaders of the two countries. The agreements led to collaboration in the military and economic sphere. The relationship extended to culture and communications, to science and education. The frequent exchange of visits at the highest levels led to closer political understanding. Within two eventful years the two countries became so close that in the Endo-Pakistan war of 1965, the Chinese government gave an ultimatum to India.

Each step in the consolidation was fiercely resented by the United States and the powerful pro-Western lobby in Pakistan. Nehru had called Pakistan: America’s most allied ally. Other critics like President Nasser described Pakistan as a virtual colony of the United States during the Suez Crisis of 1956. He refused to meet the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the ground that it was unnecessary in view of his direct contacts with the American President. The economy of Pakistan was heavily dependent on the United States for Wheat aid. As a member of CENTO and SEATO and the bilateral military agreements, Pakistan was about entirely dependent upon the United States in the military field. There were American bases in Pakistan, the most notorious being the one outside Peshawar. Inside the Country, big business was very powerful in fashioning Pakistan’s policies. The brown sahibs in the bureaucracy were passionately devoted to a Western oriented Pakistan. The politicians, apart from a few exceptions like Bhashani and Mian Iftikharuddin, were staunchly committed to the West. American influence developed tediously in the military elite. This all
pervasive hold was capped by the Maulanas interpretation of the ideological justification for Pakistan’s splendid attachment to the West. The position was so one-sided, so completely tilted to the West, so utterly one dimensional that Pakistan avoided all forms of worthwhile contact with China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Churchill coined the famous expression “Iron Curtain” to describe the division between the West and East. We are not the bright ones to coin expressions which would become household expressions. We will use household words to describe the position. Pakistan put a burqa on the Socialist States of China, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for well over a decade that was so creative in shaping productive equations on the international scene.

The causes for the barren policy are many. Its roots lay wide and deep. This is not the place to dissect them. The object of giving this brief background is to show that there was a fortress of prejudice that had to be demolished in reaching the present level of friendship between China and Pakistan, a friendship which its principal craftsman Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has described as being taller than Karakorums and deeper than the oceans. In short, it was far being in love at first sight. China was the chief target of the United States foreign policy from the time of the Korean War in 1950 until Kissinger’s visit to Peking in 1971. Twenty-one years is a long time. The United States drove hard its awesome power to isolate China and keep it out of the United Nations. Inside Pakistan there were too many natural and unnatural opponents of the China policy to single out one or two or to mention some of the unethical efforts made to frustrate it. On one occasion the present Secretary General in the Foreign Office enquired from his Foreign Minister, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, why he had set such a rapid tempo in developing the relationship in the face of the formidable internal and external pressures working in the opposite direction. Mr. Bhutto told the then Additional Foreign Secretary that precisely because of the formidable opposition, it was imperative to crystallize the relationship to such a point that nobody would dare to disturb it. The Foreign Minister went on to explain that the relationship should be placed soon on a pedestal beyond the reach of internal or external ravagers. “Wah Saien” exclaimed the Additional Foreign Secretary in a show of admiration. This is exactly how Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto elevated the relations between China and Pakistan when he left the Foreign Office in June 1966.

However, the pitfalls were many. The struggle for the attainment of this aim was fascinating in the display of skill. It is beyond the scope of this piece to mention how and when the swords were crossed. The duel was not just with one country or one President; the test was not with just one Client State or one Prime Minister. In America alone, the encounters were with President Kennedy and President Johnson. President Johnson was a class unto himself when it came to bluff and bluster. In Western Europe, aside from Chancellor Adenaur and President Charles de Gaulle, all the others had to be reckoned with in a variety of
ways. It needed agility, tact and brilliance to face such a galaxy of adversaries. During the abortive Afro-Asian Conference of 1965, Wilson was ruthlessly difficult. The raging threats of President Johnson and his envoys required political nerve and conviction. The gravest crisis came at Tashkent when the interest of the United States, the Soviet Union and India coincided to damage Pakistan’s relations with China. Mr. Bhutto chose to make himself a casualty to save Pakistan’s relations with China.

When he left the Foreign Office, as Chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party, he continued to advocate vigorously the value of Sino-Pakistan relations. He spoke with eloquence on it and took the themes into the hearts of the people of Pakistan. He wrote books on the subject like the “Myth of Independence”. He arranged the visit of Princess Ashraf Pahlavi to China when he did not hold any official position. He was requested to go to Peking during the dark days of November 1971 when he was not in government. Whether in office or out of office, Mr. Bhutto’s finger prints are embossed on this policy and its achievement for two decades. Almost every major economic and military assistance and project from China has been negotiated by him. The Karakorum Highway would not have materialized without his tenacious efforts.

After becoming the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto gave further depth to the relationship. He made three very important visits to China from 1972 to 1976. During his last visit, Mr. Bhutto met Chairman Mao Tse-tung. He was the last foreign leader to meet the Chairman. After that meeting, it was officially announced by the Government of China that thereafter Chairman Mao Tse-tung would no longer meet any foreign leader. This was a great and unique tribute to Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and to Pakistan. The other relates to an achievement which, according to Mr. Bhutto, surpasses all his previous achievements, and which in the fullness of time, will earn him the eternal appreciation of the present and future generations of Pakistan.

Today, the relations between China and Pakistan are indestructible. Twenty years ago a political and psychological wall stood between the two countries. It was a great wall. There was antipathy and opposition, prejudice and fear. It is more difficult to break symbolic walls than walls of brick and mortar. The present relationship on the people to people level did not grow in thin air. If, on the Chinese side, Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou-en-Lai were instrumental in forging this model relationship, surely there must have been a principal figure from this side to make the reciprocal contribution. Chairman Mao Tsetung was all powerful. There were no insurmountable external or internal hurdles in his way to order the Chinese contribution to the relationship. On the other hand, there were, seemingly, tremendous internal and external forces working in Pakistan against the China Policy. These powers did not
evaporate by the touch of a magic wand. Some powerful and determined individual or individuals had to encounter the fierce opposition and overcome it. Some leader or leaders of the people had to struggle and sacrifice to build this people to people relationship from this side of that wall. Without a doubt that individual, that leader of the people is none other than Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. For twenty long years of association with the leadership of China, he has been the most articulate and immaculate spokesman of Pakistan. He did not build one bridge but many bridges between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Peoples Republic of China. His achievements, beginning with the Boundary Agreement in 1963 to what he calls his singular achievement, are peerless. Without a doubt, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has been the innovator and the Chief Craftsman of this people to people relationship from the side of Pakistan. His mark is stamped on every major contribution in the development of this relationship. These are historical facts. A leader who opposes all forms of hegemony, a leader who is the quiet essence of the true spirit of the Third World can do nothing to wreck a monument he has built with his bleeding hands. We are grateful to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and to Premier Chou-En-Lai for ordering this relationship from that side. It should be recognised with the force of the same logic that there was a leader of Pakistan who played an illustrious role in putting the relationship on the pedestal of an unbreakable people to people bond, to a pedestal beyond the reach of ravagers. “Wah Saien”.

Now this relationship is so firmly rooted that it does not need the toil and sacrifice of an individual. The path is smooth. All the internal and external hurdles have been cleared. The walls of opposition have crumbled. We are glad to hear that General Zia was impressed by his visit to that great Socialist State. We are glad to hear that his visit to that colossus in North was successful beyond his expectations. We are sure that as General Zia stood on the Great Wall his mind must have turned to that brave man in Kot Lakhpat Jail who had made it all possible.