


# IF I AM ASSASSINATED

**ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO**



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Sani H. Panhwar  
Member Sindh Council, PPP

# **IF I AM ASSASSINATED**

By

**ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO**

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By:

**Sani Hussain Panhwar**



# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN

*Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction*

*Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1978*

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Son of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto

District Jail Rawalpindi ..... Appellant

Versus

The State..... Respondent

The undersigned Appellant respectfully submits:

1. That during the pendency of the present Appeal and while it was being heard before this Honorable Court, the Government of Pakistan has come out with two White Papers, one on the alleged rigging of elections in March 1977, and the other on the alleged misuse of the news media during the tenure of my Government. Obviously the time for publicising the false, fabricated and malicious allegations contained in these two White Papers has been deliberately chosen and is a calculated attempt to prejudice man-kind against me and to prejudice the hearing of my case. The second White Paper on the media, which was issued on 28 August 1978, was in fact printed on 25 March 1978, as would appear from the printing date on the front page and the cover, on which another date was superimposed.

2. That I am confined in a death cell and have no access to the material needed for effectively refuting the false and scandalous allegations in these "White Papers." But nevertheless, with all my limitations, I have attempted a reply to the same in the following paragraphs to keep the record straight, and for such action as this Honorable Court deems fit in the interest of Justice.

# Introduction

## “More than My Life Is At Stake”

### Five Omens

Rao Abdur Rashid, a former Director of the Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan, has reported to the Supreme Court of Pakistan that Brigadier Abdul Naeem, a trusted member of the military group which rules Pakistan had the following conversation with him one day about Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, President and Prime Minister of Pakistan until he was deposed in a military *coup*, put into jail and sentenced to death:



Brigadier Abdul Naeem: “Do you think that the army can afford to see Mr. Bhutto back in power?”

Rao Abdur Rashid, a trusted Special Secretary to Bhutto, keeps a discreet silence.

Brigadier Naeem answers his own question and says:

“Obviously it can’t”.

Before departing, Brigadier Naeem advises Rao Abdur Rashid:

“Please cooperate with the army”.

This conversation sums up the dire threat that hangs on the head of Mr. Bhutto “in this narrow, dark, sinking death cell, where I am confined 22 or 23 hours every day.” This is how Bhutto describes what has been his residence for almost a year in the District Jail, Rawalpindi.

Bhutto has appealed to the Supreme Court against the death sentence passed on him by the Lahore High Court on an allegedly political murder under his instructions when he was in power. The Supreme Court has concluded the hearings and reserved judgment.

But the military government of Pakistan has kept up a barrage of propaganda against him to influence the Supreme Court, Bhutto alleges, while it considers his appeal. White Papers are being issued at regular intervals denouncing him and his record as President and Prime Minister.

Many doubts have been expressed, among others by a former US Attorney General, Mr. Ramsay Clark, about the quality of the Lahore trial. More about that in this introduction later. But here it is more urgent to ask: Is public opinion being prepared for Bhutto's execution if the Supreme Court confirms the death sentence? The answer is anyone's guess, but from the point of view of the condemned prisoner there are five ominous indications.

The first comes from Iran and is confirmed by Brigadier Naeem. If an Ayatollah Khomeini, exiled from his country for 15 years, sitting in a suburb of Paris a few thousand miles away from his country, using only the beams of his charisma to rekindle-passion among his followers, can bring about the downfall of such a powerful and entrenched monarch as the Shah of Iran. What could not Bhutto do to the military regime of President Zia if he got the chance?

This interpretation gain weight from the fact that according to the Teheran newspaper, *Kaihan*, President Zia had at one time agreed to let Bhutto go into exile if two heads of State guaranteed. That he would not re-enter politics for 10 years. But he went back on the idea after seeing what happened in Iran.

Bhutto has more charisma than any politician in Pakistan since Jinnah. This is what has given him his meteoric career. Only 20 years ago he was a little known playboy of Larkana. Scion of a famous family though he was, and vivacious of personality, brilliant of mind, he appeared to be destined only to be the star of a limited and feudal firmament. Then the eye of President Mirza fell on him, or to be more precise on his family connections, and at the age of 30 he became a minister. His intellectual flair, his Oxford degree in law and his years at the University of California earned him the coveted post of Foreign Minister, where he was later to initiate a policy of close relations with China.

But 10 years later, the magnet of his personality made contact with a restless student power which was then looking for a leader, and Bhutto broke out of the confines of family connections and presidential patronage. First he mobilized the country's youth to overthrow President Ayub, no less, and then steadily built up his mass appeal and made it the strongest power in Pakistan with the possible exception of the army's guns.

His brief imprisonment in 1968 for criticizing President Ayub only added to his political glamour. In the elections of 1970 and 1977, he proved that no one in West Pakistan could come anywhere near the voting power of his now famous

charisma. In Pakistan's second adult franchise elections two years ago; he proved again that he was the country's undisputed mass leader. Just as President Ayub made Bhutto's charisma shine by arresting him in 1968, so did General Zia by arresting him twice in 1977 and thus setting in motion a whole chain of events which has brought Pakistan to its present acute crisis and Bhutto to the footsteps of the gallows.

There are two versions about General Zia's reasons for the first arrest, but only one version for the second. After the elections in March 1977 there were bloody protests by the main opposition party, the Pakistan National Alliance, which had lost heavily to Bhutto's ruling Pakistan People's Party, too heavily for the margin of victory to be convincing though PPP's victory by a narrower margin was not in doubt.

Saudi Arabia, through its ambassador in Pakistan, began high-pressure mediation between the two sides, and was reported to be making good progress. But on July 4<sup>th</sup> one of the PNA negotiators said there was no progress, and the same night the army struck, leading to Bhutto's first arrest. Obviously, plans for the *coup* must have been ready long before they were carried out. Why was it planned then?

One version is that the scale of the rioting from April to June had convinced the Chief of the Army Staff that the army must step in to save the country. His plans were ready. The reported failure of the negotiations only triggered them off. The second Version is Bhutto's, according to which "a foreign power" was bent upon overthrowing him, and when it failed to get the PNA to defeat him in the elections, it struck through the army.

Shortly after taking over the country, General Zia announced he would hold elections in October because "Operation Fairplay," the code name by which the *coup* was carried out, was only meant to be a holding operation, he said, an exercise to help conduct fair elections. For this reason he released Bhutto. But in view of what followed his explanation does not hold water.

Much more likely is that General Zia had allowed himself to believe that in the preceding year or so Bhutto had made himself so unpopular that he could have won the elections in March only by rigging them, and with the army now ensuring fair play PPP would be defeated and Pakistan rescued from Bhutto's misrules. But General Zia was shocked to see that in spite of the misrule, the instant magic of Bhutto's appeal was still intact. Crowds flocked to Bhutto as they had never done before. Mass appeal was pitted against military power, and the military power responded in the only way it could. Charisma and all, Bhutto was put back into jail and elections postponed to a safer day.

On the other hand General Zia is probably the most uncharismatic head of state and head of government Pakistan has ever had, and what he lacks in charisma he does not make up, as some of his predecessors did, either by the record of his administration or by the backing of any political organization which has roots among the people. The army backs him still, but that does not draw popular affection towards him because the army has not recovered its image since 1973.

Therefore if he broke loose from prison one day, Bhutto would be ten times more potent against President Zia than the Ayatollah has been against the Shah, who at least had glamour if not charisma, at least had a vision to his credit if not wisdom, and a record of some performance in pursuit of the vision.

Bhutto alive would be a very dangerous man -- possibly free one day and probably in power the next day. If he came back to power the first thing he would want to do is to settle scores with his present tormentors, and General Zia will want to deny him that opportunity by any means he can. If General Zia is convinced, and he has every reason to be, that either it is his neck or Bhutto's, he will try to save his neck by breaking the other's when he can. Later it may be too late, because in the eyes of Bhutto, President Zia has already committed "high treason" punishable with death.

This is how the 1973 constitution promulgated by Bhutto describes the offence of any forcible attempt to upset that constitution and General Zia has certainly upset it by force. He has suspended the constitution and has tried to amend it by means, which are not provided in the constitution. This was an attempt, which the former President of Pakistan Chaudhary Fazl Elahi found so repugnant that he resigned.

The second omen comes from the nature of politics in Pakistan since the removal of Bhutto. Military governments and authoritarian governments generally, are by nature insensitive to public opinion; hence their tendency to ignore public reaction and to press ahead, regardless, with decisions which satisfy their technocratic criteria however well or ill-motivated they may be. The government of General Zia is no exception to this in spite of the politicians it has co-opted as very junior civilian partners.

In fact General Zia's government is in danger of being especially isolated from public opinion, or from mass opinion to be more exact, because of certain blunders committed by Bhutto himself. During the closing years of his power, Bhutto alienated the top elite in almost all walks of life in Pakistan—the army, the administration, the learned professions and business—by his arrogance and the sheer injustice of some of his actions, especially against a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. These are the very kinds of people the army leaders will

turn to, if at all they wish to put their biases against Bhutto to the test of a wider consultation. Bias will speak to resentment and will be instantly confirmed in its own wisdom.

Many people must be after Bhutto's blood in the circles in which the decision-makers of the military regime move; the circles in which Bhutto is adored are normally out of their hearing. This is precisely how General Zia had formed the misjudgment by which he ordered elections in 1977, and he might now be in danger of repeating the mistake. But while Bhutto might pay the price of his past actions now, the country might pay the price of mass anger soon afterwards.

The third omen is that President Zia is already doing what he can do at this stage to ensure that it will not be his neck, and that Bhutto will not simply languish somewhere in some Elba from where he can stage a Napoleonic comeback but will hang till he dies.

Some neighboring Islamic powers have a friendly interest in the future peace of Pakistan and a friendly interest in President Zia because he is posing the ideology of Islamic orthodoxy against the heretical ideology of socialism preached (though not practiced) by Bhutto. They have therefore advised President Zia not to execute the former President and thus set Pakistan ablaze and imperil his own future. They are reported to have offered to keep Bhutto indefinitely in prison in their own countries, out of harm's way.

President Zia has rejected the offers. He suspects, in the first place, that the country, which held Bhutto, would also hold a gun at President Zia's head; it could pull the trigger by releasing Bhutto. In the second place he feels he cannot trust the safety of prisons in countries in which thrones are not safe. There is no hard confirmation of these reports, but enough has flowed along the diplomatic grapevine to suggest that they are well founded.

The fourth serious omen against Bhutto is that to the extent that President Zia is showing concern for public opinion at all, he is showing by gagging Bhutto's defense as much as he can against the propaganda barrage, which is being conducted against him. The White Papers which are being issued by the government one after another are being given the widest possible publicity -- and as much abroad as at home, because in this matter President Zia is as much worried about reactions in other countries as in his own-while not only is Bhutto denied the chance to reply to them (in fact he is being held incommunicado), his supporters are also being arrested in large numbers and denied the opportunity of public contact.

The worst example of this one way flow is the first and the fattest of the White Papers and it is also the principal justification for this Introduction you are now reading and the book you are about to read.

As soon as Bhutto went to the Supreme Court in appeal against his death sentence, the Pakistan government published, and widely and intensively publicized, a voluminous White Paper of over a thousand pages, piling up what the government claimed was authentic evidence against him on some of the very charges which figured in his appeal.

Bhutto contends with some justification and much logic--contends in a statement he filed in the Supreme Court in the course of his appeal that the White Paper was issued, and issued in this manner, expressly with the purpose of prejudicing his trial. Bhutto also contends, again with some evidence that in this White Paper Yahya Bakhtiar has been made a special target, with a view to destroying his credibility in the eyes of the judges. Bakhtiar, an Attorney-General when Bhutto was in power, was his senior Defense Counsel in the Supreme Court hearings. A dent in the credibility of Bakhtiar would be worth a ton of evidence to the prosecution.

Since the appeal hearings were still going on when the first White Paper was issued and Bhutto was still in court, he took the opportunity of the hearing to rebut the White Paper at length in a 300 page statement, and the statement became one of the principal documents of his appeal. But the government blacked it out. It was not allowed to be reported in the press, a few newspapers which tried to report it came under pre-censorship and the government sealed a press in which Yahya Bakhtiar tried to print some copies.

But a copy of this statement, "written with the paper resting on my knees" says Bhutto, was smuggled out of the death cell. It is published here without any changes except some regrouping of the original sections into convenient chapter sizes and a few deletions to eliminate some obvious repetitions.

Four more White Papers were issued after the appeal hearings ended, and while the judges were exposed to all five of them as they ruminated on the appeal. Bhutto had an opportunity to offer his counter arguments only on one of them, while at the bar of public opinion he has not been allowed to rebut any one of the five. As the people of Pakistan decide how they should react to whatever happens to their former President and Prime Minister—and the only elected one they have ever had—they will know less about his side of the case than a reader of this book. Even the world press has seen only a few brief excerpts from his statement out of the mass of very revealing material that it contains.

The fifth and final omen is being enacted in Pakistan as these lines are written. The Supreme Court of Pakistan was expected, on good authority, to announce its verdict by the end of January. The expectation also was that if the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence, it would be quickly carried out; with only essential minimum time allowed for Bhutto to appeal for clemency if he wanted to do so (his daughter has denied that he will). Quick execution of the sentence is not merely true to military style; it is also called for by the exigencies of the situation and reinforced by the severity of Islamic justice, which Pakistan has been cultivating under President Zia.

As the deadline approached BBC reported “an uneasy calm” in Pakistan broken only by reports of further arrests of PPP leaders, actions against more of them in Martial Law courts, some explosions in various towns, troop dispositions and reports of resignations from the government by members who had once served under Bhutto. But the judgment has not been announced at the time of this writing, although the Supreme Court had earlier said the verdict would be out by the end of January. Why? The current line of speculation is that President Zia, aware of the turmoil which would ensue from the execution, has decided to wait till after an Islamic Ministers’ conference, due to be held in Pakistan in the middle of February, is out of the way.

But if this is the reason for persuading the Supreme Court to postpone the verdict, the postponement can only be for a brief period. Apart from other urgencies which are pressing upon Bhutto there is the urgency of President Zia’s own immediate future. He is due to retire from the army at the end of February, and he can shape his own future only in the light of how he shapes Bhutto’s. He may not wish to leave the decision to others nor may others wish to let him pass the buck to them.

Confirming this speculation is Bhutto’s own premonition, which he expressed in his statement, which the government blacked out. Referring to the government’s publicity campaign against him he says, “The object is to vitiate the climate of opinion against me, so that every one from the humblest clerk to the mightiest court may be driven to one conclusion. The onslaught has been gradually escalating from 5 July 1977 to 28 August 1978, but still the peak of the publicity will be reached when the judgment on my appeal is at hand. “At the time Bhutto wrote these words only two White Papers had been issued, the second on 28 August. Since then four more have been issued in quick succession. The fourth has been announced as the last (at least for the present). The peak has been reached. The judgment may not be far away.

## How Bhutto Fell

Much of the earlier part of Bhutto's statement is a reply to the specific charge against him that he rigged the general elections held in March 1977, and for the purpose drew up, at his home town of Larkana, in Sindh an elaborate plot which the prosecution describes as the "Larkana Plan."

Many details of this allegation, and Bhutto's counter-allegation against the army that it interfered in the elections and at times actively worked for the main opposition party, PNA, would make more sense to a reader in Pakistan than one outside; they require for their understanding an intimate knowledge of the intricacies of the domestic politics of Pakistan.

But even when seen from a distance they are an eloquent warning to all who care to heed it of what happens to the political, the democratic and the electoral process when too much power comes to vest in too few hands in the government and when the army forgets that managing the politics of the country is not its business.

But the main value of the document lies above and beyond these particular charges and counter-charges, and this value will live whether Bhutto lives or not and whether he rigged the elections or not. This value lies in the outpourings of a brilliant mind from his chamber of death, the most brilliant in Pakistan after Jinnah, and among the most brilliant anywhere in southern Asia.

As happens with such outpourings, Bhutto's statement rambles and rants and repeats itself. It overstates the case in some places, over-simplifies it in others, and Bhutto's judgment is often blurred by his Messiah-complex, his verbose conviction that he and he alone is the man born to deliver Pakistan, to free the masses from their tyrants. But what emerge in the end are outstanding political documents probably the most perceptive and most informative diagnosis of Pakistan. It is a document of great intensity and significance, as revealing of the man as of his times.

Whether it is good for Bhutto or not for the effectiveness of his defense on the specific charges against him it is good for students of the history of Pakistan, and even better for students of the political process in developing countries, that this former President and Prime Minister of Pakistan is not addressing the court in this statement. He is speaking to history from the platform of his own brilliant mind and his unique experience of one of the most interesting countries of the developing world.

Bhutto is conscious of this larger function of his statement, because he says, "Without the total sweep, this paper would have lacked political perception

and been unworthy of the author. The post-martial law developments in the sub-continent, the state of relation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the future of the nuclear reprocessing plant, the oscillation between alignment and non-alignment are poignantly pertinent to the destiny of Pakistan. Beyond the imperatives of being duty bound to present a picture in balance, it would have been a disservice to the reader to circumscribe the repast."

Pakistan is not only "one of the most interesting" but perhaps the most interesting country if you examine it from the standpoint of the one theme which is the most important in this book and of which Pakistan and Bhutto unfortunately for both of them, have the richest experience what happens to a country when its Generals begin to play politics and in the process make themselves the tools of foreign powers. Bhutto's life, which might be about to end as these lines are written, is proof of the theory which he develops very lucidly, that hegemony and what he calls *coup-gemony* are two sides of the same imperialist coin.

Bhutto contends that the Generals had begun to make their moves long before they struck in July 1977. Their plotting had started before the elections in March and the *coup* matured slowly as the result of a deal between the army and PNA, and between both of them and a "foreign power" (or powers). The deal at the "foreign" level was that the PNA would receive Rs 30 crores for winning the elections, and if it failed the army would be supported in a bid for a *coup*. In return the new rulers of Pakistan would drop the nuclear reprocessing plant which Bhutto had negotiated with France.

The deal at the local level was that the army would support the PNA's election campaign (and did support it in various ways according to Bhutto). If the election bid failed the army would take over and later invite PNA to join the government (but only as a very junior partner) to add a civilian flavor to the military government.

Bhutto's evidence to prove that a deal was made is sketchy and circumstantial and might not stand in court. But he is convincing in explaining that it is not fair to expect him to produce documentary evidence from his prolonged seclusion, first in prison and then in a death cell, and that Pakistan's national interests prevent him from disclosing all that he could even in his present circumstances especially the name of the foreign power concerned.

However it is less relevant to ask whether he is accurate than to ask whether he is sincere in denouncing the role of foreign influence and military power in the politics of Pakistan. His record is a mixed one in the respect. In his early days in the government Bhutto rendered fulsome homage to the best known of the military rulers of Pakistan. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and in one

statement in 1961 described Ayub as “more than a Lincoln .... more than a Lenin .... our Attaturk ... a Salahuddin.” There is reason to believe that four years later; in urging President Ayub to wage the 1965 war against India, he was content to leave the defense of East Pakistan to China; acceptance of hegemony cannot go much further.

Five years later, he was still willing to let this two-sided coin of hegemony and *coup-gemony* jingle in his pocket. It was with the help of army generals and with the evidence of foreign backing (which he himself vaunted) that he became President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1971.

In his first broadcast after he assumed office, he rightly boasted “.... I have been elected by the people,” because he had won the 1970 elections in the western wing, and when he said “I have not been capaciously thrust upon the people” he rightly implied that his two predecessors, Presidents Ayub and Yahya Khan, had been so thrust. But it was not this election that made him President in 1971, but that he was favoured by the USA and by two top military men, Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan, Chief of the Army General Staff (whom he promoted C-in-C as fast as he could) and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the Air Chief.

Before Bhutto left the UN debate on Bangladesh to rush back home, he knew of reports that air force planes had “buzzed” the palace of President Yahya Khan to make him step down, and before he arrived in Rawalpindi the generals knew that he had arrived via clearance meetings in Washington with President Nixon and the Secretary of State William Rogers. This is what accounts for the speed and smoothness with which he seized power: he drove into the Presidential palace on the forenoon of 20<sup>th</sup> December for a showdown meeting with Yahya Khan, and a couple of hours later drove out with the presidential flag flying on his car.

But Bhutto deserves more credit than any other Pakistan politician, with the exception only of the first President, (Governor-General) Mr. Jinnah, and the first Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan (who was, it should be noted, assassinated), for insisting that political power must rest with the people, not with the armed forces, and that only an independent foreign policy pays in the long run.

The first part of these beliefs he practiced with profit from the middle 1960s onwards, when he shook Ayub Khan’s power with student power and then became a superb mass leader to sweep two successive general elections. But he betrayed the belief when he refused to let Sheikh Mujib reap the benefit of his own electoral magic, and for this betrayal Pakistan paid a grievous price eight years ago. Sheikh Mujib suffered for it four years ago, and Bhutto might have to

pay a similar price sooner than this book reaches the readers hands. Pakistan's history, and the lives of two of its most charismatic leaders might have been very different but for this betrayal.

The second part of these beliefs about the value and importance of an independent foreign, Policy was being rapidly built into his foreign policy when he was deposed. In his appeal statement also he praises India's non-alignment and urges President Zia to pull out of CENTO. Bhutto may well be right when he says that this is part of the reason why his downfall was maneuvered at the "foreign" level of the deal. But he persists in the one aspect of Pakistan's foreign policy, implacable opposition to India, from which all aspects of its foreign policy had flowed in the past, including acceptance of hegemony and *coup-gemony*.

Whatever the record of Bhutto's actions, his diagnosis of the ills of Pakistan is instructive not only for him or for Pakistan but for all Third World countries which are trying to develop conventions of democratic politics. The allegations against Bhutto and his counter allegations prove equally well how the political system of Pakistan has been so corrupted by years of arbitrary rule, whether civil or military, that it has lost the constraints of all those conventions which in a political healthy society are the best safeguard against the tyrannical use of executive authority.

Probably the most useful part of Bhutto's statement for the leaders of the Third World is his brilliant analysis of the proclivity towards martial law in the political system of Pakistan. Bhutto understands Pakistan better than any other politician, dead or alive. Its proclivity towards martial law he understands even better, having been both its accomplice and victim at various times. This makes him especially qualified to give a warning to the developing world, which he gives with great eloquence, against *coup-gemony*, a phrase he has coined but of his acute political perceptions and verbal wit.

He places the danger of home made *coup-gemony*, alongside the danger of external hegemony, and while he roundly condemns both kinds of tyrannies upon the democratic and natural aspirations of the people, he condemns *coup-gemony* more because, as he says, *coup-gemony* is "the bridge upon which hegemony walks in." He analyses all the martial law regimes Pakistan has been through and he shows how each one of them was used by the foreign power which created it. The inevitable result was such emasculation of the political system of Pakistan, such draining away of its strength and values that the country broke up.

The eastern wing was subjected to the inhuman brutalities of the western military mind which had become so callous as to be able to boast that to rape a

Bengali woman was only “to purify Bengali blood” (Bhutto quotes an official report for this boasting). But no less disastrous is the tragedy inflicted upon the eastern wing by the martial law mentality. This has taken the form of convincing the patient that he can only live on the poison which the world knows is killing him.

President Zia seized power in “Operation Fairplay” on 5 July 1977, on the pretence that he had seized it only for the purpose of holding fair elections within 90 days. The army would do no more than to clear the ring and hold it only in order that the elections may become a fair contest. But then he changed his mind and said elections could be held only when it was clear that they would produce “a positive result”.

Since he has constituted himself to be the sole judge for deciding what would be regarded as “positive result,” and for deciding when elections could be counted upon to produce it, he alone can decide when they can be held at all. How the President will ensure that the results are positive when elections are held, if they are, passes understanding. But in waiting for the ripe moment General Zia has extended the original 90 days to six times as many.

But probably a simpler reason why elections have not been held is that President Zia does not and has never believed in them. His truer beliefs are effected in a remark of his for which Bhutto quotes him in his appeal statement. President Zia, who continues to be Chief of the Army Staff in addition to being President and Prime Minister, is quoted as having said, “*Whether it is or it is not constitutional, power in Pakistan will always be wielded by the man who sits in the chair of the Chief of the Army Staff.*” Since Bhutto does not agree with that, the General will not allow any elections, unless he is forced to, in which Bhutto or his supporters may have any chance of coming back to power. That would not be a “positive result.”

It is ironic that it was such a man whom Bhutto appointed as Chairman of a committee to investigate the first attempt by the armed forces, in 1973, to overthrow Bhutto’s presidency in a *coup* (just as it is ironic in retrospect that President Ayub sent Bhutto as his special envoy to Ankara to plead with the army generals who had overthrown Turkey’s Democratic Party government not to carry out the death sentences they had passed on Prime Minister Menderes, Foreign Minister Zorku, and Finance Minister Krepatkan; Bhutto failed and the executions were carried out). Whatever General Zia learnt as chairman of that inquiry committee he must have learnt very well.

## **The Army versus the people**

Military leaders do not hold elections unless they have to; nor will General

Zia. In the meantime martial law will continue to take its toll, and in telling so vividly how exactly it is doing that Bhutto has done a very great service. Scattered in the pages of Bhutto's statement there are excellent insights into how the cancer of militarism spread in Pakistan, from the "we are like the Prussians" complex of General Ayub, a foolishness which Bhutto describes with a sense of fun to the insatiable appetite of the army budget (to which Bhutto also pandered, as General Zia testifies with unintended irony), to the equally insatiable appetite of the military hierarchy for sheer power for the sake of power, and first the appetite of the top generals for political power and later the appetite of the colonels and majors for administrative power in every detail all the way down to local authority.



But the reader does not have to wade through the whole document for collecting the scattered gems of wisdom. The collective meaning of all of them has been brought into superb focus in a few pages about Baluchistan, the province which has been longer under military rule, sometimes both in name and fact, sometimes only in fact, than any other part of Pakistan. Here too Bhutto shares the blame for what he now condemns. But he reproduces a note by his Special Secretary, Rao Abdur Rashid, which is as it were an account of a demonstration on the scale of a laboratory model of what happens to politics, to the administration, to the whole society in fact, when all norms are crushed under the army heel.

Political irony assumes a new dimension in the exchange of allegations and counter allegations between the authors of the White Paper and Bhutto on the question of Baluchistan and on the X-ray Rao Abdur Rashid provides, combining political insights and the detached observation of an experienced administrator, about what is going on in that unfortunate province.

Rao Abdur Rashid describes, briefly but precisely, how the army was brought into Baluchistan in "sheer disgust," as a measure of "last resort." He explains how the induction of the army would have been justifiable only if it had remained "a quick, incisive, operation." He then explains, however, how it has become a "self-perpetuating operation," and how "the army's prolonged stay is causing adverse repercussions in many fields." To this the Special Secretary adds the observation that "unfortunately the army in this country has a long tradition of getting involved in the civil administration.



The White Paper acknowledges all that and then goes on to say "Despite Rao Rashid's justified reservations about the role of the army in civil affairs, it is a matter of record that Bhutto's regime did not follow a policy of gradual

withdrawal of the army in Baluchistan.” To this Bhutto retorts with a sense of horror. “This is adding insult to injury, he says. “On a number of occasions I pressed for a withdrawal plan, but on each occasion I was requested to extend the period for a few more months. That is the truth, the genuine and historical record, as opposed to the fable invented by this regime. Even now has the regime withdrawn the army from Baluchistan? Not only I but the people of Baluchistan would like to have an honest answer to this question.”

This may only be a case of the pot calling the kettle black, because Bhutto’s record in Baluchistan is not much better than the army’s. But even if Bhutto’s 300-page statement contained nothing more than his own and Rao Abdur Rashid’s analysis of what happened in Baluchistan, the statement would be a good addition to any library of political science. If the military rulers of Pakistan were wiser they would make the statement compulsory reading in every military school instead of suppressing it, because it provides an excellent case study of how an army damages itself, apart from damaging the political system, when it begins to dabble in politics, a task for which it has neither skill nor experience, nor aptitude and cannot acquire it except by neglecting its main function as a fighting force.


This deterioration of the army in Baluchistan has been brought out very well by Rao Abdur Rashid, while a major Baluch leader, Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, has demonstrated how the center’s authority in Baluchistan has been eroded by the endless presence of the army and the strong Baluch reaction against it. Bizenjo, who has been regarded as only a moderate leader of the Baluch resentment against Pakistan, is now demanding such powers of autonomy for Baluchistan that if they were conceded to all units-and they cannot be conceded to one unit and long denied to others-Pakistan would disappear before very long.

Bizenjo has spelt out his views in elaborate statements which are important for the future of that region. There is such cogent radicalism in them that one may well ask whether, in the wake of the revolution in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is about to be granted the historic Russian dream for entry into the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.

The lessons of Baluchistan are only magnified many times by Bhutto’s account of what happened in what was then East Pakistan, is happening, he says, in West Pakistan and can happen wherever in the Third World, military leaders try to do what military leaders have always tried to do in Pakistan. In another of his very perceptive observations, Bhutto says that encroaching on the civil service until it “would disappear ..... has been the steadfast policy of all martial law regimes, as part of an attempt at self-perpetuation at the cost of the unity and integrity of the country.”

Bhutto himself contributed to the break up of Pakistan in 1971 by refusing to allow Sheikh Mujibur Rehman enjoys the fruits of his electoral victory. But the intense resentment in what was then East Pakistan against the western wing, which made the explosion so devastating when it came, was provoked only by the needs of the army, a western army which ruthlessly suppressed the eastern wing. What exactly the army did will not be known until Pakistan releases the Hamoodur Rehman Report or someone leaks it out. But what Bhutto has already said shows how damaging the Report must be.

“Even now my open commentary upon the Hamoodur Rehman Report would irreparably damage the name of the armed forces,” he warns General Zia. He calls it “a severe indictment of the armed forces and the military hierarchy .... it is story of rape, plunder and loot.” From his prison, Bhutto has demanded that General Zia should not be allowed to tamper with the Report.



To this Indictment of what the army did in what was then East Pakistan, Bhutto adds the explicit warning that continued army rule is creating an even bigger crisis in what remains of Pakistan. “The crisis that Pakistan faces today is far graver and more catastrophic than the crisis of 1971.” Bhutto adds “that in 1971, the danger was of losing East Pakistan. In 1978, the danger is of losing all of what remains of Pakistan.” At one level there are judicial consequences of continued martial law, he says and at another level more dire consequences in terms of public order.

Continued suppression of the 1973 constitution, which is the only fundamental law Pakistan had when martial law set it aside, and the only one which had electoral sanction behind it, will mean that the constitution will lapse if it has not already done so. In that event Pakistan would be left standing only upon the Indian Independence Act of 1947. That infact would be no foundation at all, because the constituent units of Pakistan would then regain all the autonomy they had before Pakistan was born. Bizenjo’s dream would then replace Jinnah’s.

At the level of public order “Pakistan is much closer to a civil war than it was in the worst days of spring 1977,” says Bhutto making a reference to the riots after the elections in March 1977 because of which the army claims it had to step in. Bhutto warns General Zia “More than my life is at stake. Make no mistake about it, the future of Pakistan is at stake.”

Bhutto's most far-reaching warning however is reserved for those countries of the Third World, which, when they lose patience with the untidy and slow moving democratic process, turn to the temptations of authoritarian rule, only to discover later, that its advantages are imaginary or at best short-lived, but in the meantime, as in the case of Pakistan, yielding to the temptation becomes a habit.

I cannot think of any practising politician today who has shown the sweep of vision Bhutto shows in surveying military *coups* around the world, or has the intellectual penetration he shows in laying bare the roots of *coup-gemony* in Pakistan. But I can think of several practising politicians who could profit from four inter-connected warnings he gives to the Third World countries:

- “Military *coup d’etats* is the worst enemies of national unity.”
- If a *coup d’etat* becomes a permanent part of the political infrastructure, it means the falling of the last petal of the last withered rose, it means the end.”
- “The events of the last 20 years have made me arrive at the unambiguous conclusion that at present, the greatest threat to the unity and progress of the Third World is from *coup-gemony*.”
- *Coup-gemony* is the bridge over which hegemony walks to stalk our lands.”

Bhutto contrasts the politics of India and Pakistan in all of these respects, and he sums it all up in his own inimitable fashion:

If India has suffered from martial laws and military dictatorships on the pattern of Pakistan, India would have been in three or four separate pieces by this day. India is more heterogeneous than Pakistan but India has been kept in one piece by the noise and chaos of her democracy.”

Kept in one piece, and kept free, Bhutto might have added because it is democracy which allowed Indian nationalism to raise enough noise to scare off any intruder who tried to bring in the baggage of hegemony.

Is Bhutto sincere in all this, or is he only coining clever phrases? Is he opposing military rule out of democratic conviction or because that is the only challenge now left to his power? Why is he blaming “a foreign power” for his overthrow? Because it is true? Or because that is a handy dog to whip any day? If Bhutto lives long enough he will have to answer these questions with his actions, and if the answers are to be in his favour, his actions will have to be vastly better than in the past. But for the present he is raising the questions and others have to answer them.

The most troublesome question he asks, and in these very words is “what about the nuclear reprocessing plant?” How good is Bhutto’s claim that he was the victim of a conspiracy between a foreign power, by which he means the USA (though he hints at a Middle Easter, accomplice) on the one hand and on the other General Zia and PNA? And of course the ultimate question he asks it “What are the chances of my survival?” He does not quite put it that way because “it is an affront to my pride and vanity to speak of my own future.” But he says enough to suggest that he is asking for an intervention on his behalf by leaders in Pakistan and in other countries.

Bhutto says “I would not have suffered the fate I am suffering had it not been for internal betrayal.” What he means is:

- (i) That those who had decided to deny Pakistan the nuclear reprocessing plant (in brief the bomb) overthrew him because he would not give it up.
- (ii) That having overthrown him they had to imprison him because otherwise the people would put him back in power;
- (iii) That having overthrown him they want to hang him, or at otherwise he could be back in power one day;
- (vi) That external forces found it possible to do all this only because they found accomplices within Pakistan;
- (v) That the internal accomplices betrayed him because they were bribed to do so, PNA receiving money and the Chief of the Army Staff receiving satisfaction of his lust for power.

How good is the evidence behind this allegation? For an answer the allegation should be examined part by part, but in a brief summary I would say that the evidence is very good about the events, but not satisfactory about the motives behind them.

Bhutto is right in his explicit claim that he was able to negotiate an agreement with France which would have given Pakistan a nuclear reprocessing plant. He is also right in the claim which is implicit in his boasting; although he does not spell it out in so many words that with this plant Pakistan would have acquired the technical capability of producing the bomb because the plant is capable of producing weapons grade plutonium.

There is overwhelming, well authenticated and almost public evidence that the United States put very strong pressure upon both Bhutto and France not to go ahead with the agreement, and as a consequence of this pressure France tried to pressurize Pakistan, but only after Bhutto’s overthrow, to agree to

modify the plan in such a way that it would not be able to produce weapons grade plutonium.

There is also evidence that Bhutto was threatened that if he went ahead with acquiring the plant in its weapons grade form, he would be overthrown and might face worst consequences. There are two sources of evidence in support of the threat, apart from others that there might be. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Temple University, USA, says in an article published in *Asian Survey* (Summer, 1978) that during her research on the subject of this agreement, "one source" told her that the "out going American ambassador (in Islamabad) had gone so far as to tell Bhutto bluntly that if he did not back down he would no longer stay in power." It was after this exchange that the United States is alleged to have supported opposition candidates in the March 1977 elections and to have encouraged the street agitation that ensued.

Bhutto's own statement is the second source. In the course of the statement he gives a very vivid account, too vivid and convincing to be fake, how his own minister for production warned him of the peril to his office and personal safety if he persisted in acquiring the reprocessing plant.

Bhutto's evidence and Miss Tahir-Kheli's are indirect and incapable of independent verification. But both are supported by subsequent events. Bhutto lost his job and is in imminent danger of losing his life. France, after resisting American pressure for a time, proposed changes in the agreement which would make the plant incapable of producing weapons grade plutonium, and since the end of last summer France has been pressing these changes upon Pakistan with vigour. But there is neither any proof that if Bhutto had remained in power he would have been able to make Pakistan a nuclear weapon country, nor that the Generals conspired at all to scuttle the plant, or did so in return for American backing to their *coup*.

Bhutto's ambition to make Pakistan a nuclear weapon country is not open to doubt. There is direct evidence in his boasting. After India exploded a nuclear device at Pokharan in May 1974, he said if necessary Pakistan will "*eat grass to produce the bomb*." In his present statement also he boasts that if he had not been overthrown he would have put the Islamic civilization at par with the Hindu, Christian and Jewish civilizations by giving it "full nuclear capability." (Why he omitted reference to the Buddhist or Chinese civilization is best known to him.) There is also indirect evidence of his ambition for "full capability." Pakistan's nuclear programme, itself far in excess of the country's financial or general technological capability, would not have made commercial or technological sense at least for another decade or so. It would have made political sense but only as a means of making the bomb.

But even that would not have given Pakistan “full nuclear capability” in order to confer upon Pakistan the honour of making the first Islamic bomb. Bhutto admits as much by Implication. He says he had accepted very stringent safeguards on the plant. Within these safeguards Pakistan would not have been able to use an ounce of recovered plutonium for the minimum of experimental explosions without which you cannot get on to the making of a reliably usable bomb. Nor can you demonstrate, for bargaining purposes, that you have acquired the capability of making it. After the Pokharan explosion the world does not accept that a peaceful explosion is any different from a military explosion.

If Bhutto had staged one inspite of the safeguards it would have meant an immediate cut off of all foreign nuclear technology for Pakistan, and its nuclear programme would have come to a halt because Pakistan has not acquired, and will not be able to acquire for many years yet, self-sustaining nuclear technology. Nor has its economy the strength as yet to withstand the pressures of international displeasure. India also ran this risk by staging the Pokharan bang and is still paying a price for it. But at least when India took the risk its nuclear as well as general capability and economic strength were of a much higher order.

Therefore when Bhutto says that with the help of the reprocessing plant he would have closed the nuclear gap between India and Pakistan he can only mean that he could have matched the Pokharan explosion with one of his own though some 10 years or so behind India. But after that the gap between the two countries might have become even wider than it is today. In any competition without foreign assistance to either country, India’s advantages over Pakistan-financial, nuclear, technological-would have been greater than now. In fact, an explosion in Pakistan might have triggered off a greater effort by India than she is at present inclined to make in the nuclear field.

The irrationality of Bhutto’s nuclear ambition is the biggest question mark which hangs over his allegation that General Zia scuttled the reprocessing plant in return for foreign backing for his *coup*. In their public statements Pakistani leaders are continuing to press France to carry out the agreement. Similarly months after the *coup*, France continued to stand by the agreement in public, contradicting Bhutto’s claim that France went back on the agreement because an illegitimate government had replaced his own legitimate government in Pakistan. But it is not necessary to accept these statements at face value. Even if France and Pakistan had decided to scuttle the plant their leaders would have made statements of this kind while agreeing behind the scenes to let the plant lapse. The main reason for not accepting Bhutto’s allegation as proven is that General Zia could have had any one or more of three other reasons, each more honourable than a conspiracy, for not following the rash course set by Bhutto.

The first reason has been hinted at, but not elaborated, by the Pakistan Economist (21 October 1978) in an article very aptly entitled "Reprocessing Leaves One Cold." Its argument is that if Pakistan does at all wish to have a nuclear explosion capability it can follow other technologies, such as the uranium rather than the plutonium route, instead of colliding headlong with the safeguards which it has accepted. The second reason has been more forcefully expressed in the same article. It asks why "an already grass eating, hungry and naked people should be in such dire need of bomb that their entire destiny should be put at stake."

The third reason is purely military and might have had great appeal for General Zia. Being a soldier and not a scientist, he would much rather that Pakistan acquired those weapons which soldiers know and understand, and which add to the power status of soldiers, than those which massively divert resources to a weapon system which only scientists can use and which thus enhanced the status of the scientist in society.

Therefore as between on the one hand, acquiring the plant at the cost of the US supply of conventional weapons being cut off, and on the other hand getting an enhanced supply of such weapons (which Kissinger had specially promised if Pakistan abandoned the plant project), he would have preferred conventional weapons. These are also weapons which would be immediately available as against the distant and uncertain prospects of a full nuclear capability.

This may well have been the bribe, and a condition of getting it may well have been the overthrow of Bhutto by assisting the PNA's election bid if that would work or directly in a *coup* if that became necessary. This scenario substantiates the facts of Bhutto's allegation against General Zia but not his reading of General's motives. But once it was decided to overthrow Bhutto the other motives. But once it was decided to overthrow Bhutto the other steps imprisoning him, and either breaking or hanging him-were clearly dictated by the compulsions of Bhutto's continued electoral popularity.

## **What Lies Ahead?**

But whether Bhutto succeeds or not in proving the motives he attributes to General Zia, the General certainly does not succeed in justifying either the overthrow of Bhutto or what has been happening to him since then. The first White Paper tries to pin on Bhutto the allegation that he rigged the elections in March 1977. But it does not succeed. Bhutto does not succeed in proving that there was no rigging, or that he had no hand in such rigging as might have taken place. His explanation of how he came to sign the Larkana Plan is wholly unconvincing.

But Bhutto does succeed in proving, and the White Paper fails to disprove it, that he had a decisive majority support and even without my rigging would have won the election. He also succeeds in proving, and again the White Paper fails to disprove it, that such rigging as might have taken place could not have affected the result either way very much.

Clearly, therefore, what General Zia did was to depose a President and Prime Minister who had majority support among the people and in the National Assembly, and about the latter there is no dispute. The rioting which followed the elections was admittedly serious enough to make a soldier believe he should step in to save the country, especially a soldier predisposed towards intervening anyhow.

But even if it is not true, and Bhutto makes out a good case that it is true, that the army was party to the political unrest which it later cited as the reason for its intervention, the only extent to which the intervention could have been possibly justified was the limit General Zia announced at the outset. This limit was that the army would hold the arena for a very short period and only for holding impartial elections without worrying whether Bhutto would thus come back into power or not.

But the way martial law has been continued indefinitely makes it impossible to accept the General's announced intentions as honest. It also confirms Bhutto's suspicion that what the General means by "positive results," for which alone he is prepared to hold elections, is a result which would eliminate Bhutto. Since that is not going to happen for a long time yet, early elections can be ruled out and fair elections can be ruled out for even longer. The martial law authorities will not hold such elections however much that might further destabilize Pakistan's future political system.

So long as Bhutto lives fair elections will be avoided for fear that he will win them or others will win them in his name. But even after his death, if it comes through execution, they will not be held for fear that someone will win them in the name of his ghost. He or his ghost can equally set at naught the recent dissidence in his party, whether the dissidence was genuine or engineered from outside.

The next thing that happened to Bhutto after his overthrow was his "trial" in the Lahore High Court on the charge that in a conspiracy hatched by him two members of the Federal Security Force tried to kill a political opponent of his and succeeded in killing the opponent's father. Bhutto has said many blunt things about the fairness of the trial, and much of the time he boycotted it in protest. But it is not necessary to take his word for it. Facts speak up for him as well as the

former Attorney General of the USA, Mr. Ramsay Clark, who visited Pakistan during the Lahore trial and later published his assessment of it.

First off, he questions why two judges of the High Court who had some time earlier granted Bhutto's habeas corpus petition were excluded from the murder trial bench, and why on the other hand the Chief Justice had included himself in spite of a dispute he had with Bhutto when Bhutto was in power and the Chief Justice was superseded.

Secondly, after looking at the case he said he found the allegations against Bhutto to be "inherently improbable," the evidence of the chief witness to be "more than suspect," and the Chief Justice's prejudice against Bhutto to be "spread throughout his 145-page decision." After that it is difficult to disbelieve Bhutto's own description of how he was treated in court. Bhutto's treatment of his own opponents was probably worse. But that is a story which needs to be told separately

What lies ahead of Bhutto as he waits in his death cell "in which more than two persons cannot sit" according to his counsel, Mr. Bakhtiar? All the choices before him are grim, but the worst is the one which would be best from the point of view of the military rulers. However, there are no signs of its materializing.

The only thing which would let General Zia off the hook is a physical and moral collapse of Bhutto. In that case Bhutto's followers would not have the leader which a fit and free Bhutto can again become one day; nor would they have the rallying point and inspiration which a martyred Bhutto would be. The General can then have the "positive result" elections he wants. Or not hold them at all; the pressure upon him might be much less if all that is left of Bhutto is a deflated leader. Several political parties, including PNA, are demanding elections. But if the PPP got deflated along with Bhutto, the army's tasks of political management would become much easier.

Bhutto's own description of his condition is pathetic, and since this was probably written some months ago, and since lately there have been reports of a hunger strike by him, he might well be worse off today and more than ever in need of a quick response to the appeal he makes to foreign powers and to domestic leaders. But if the past is any guide, Bhutto is a man of some resilience and high motivation reinforced by courage. Such politicians, when embattled, can turn out to be very durable.

Bhutto's twin appeals also suggest that the olive branch he holds out to foreign powers is full of the sturdy thorns of his past convictions, and while appealing to domestic leaders for "negotiations between brothers" he still

denounces "the curse and stigma of martial law." Throughout his statement there are other passages too which show that his intellectual vigour and sharpness of mind are as great as before, possibly greater.

In looking forward to Bhutto's collapse, President Zia should also consider the case of another authoritarian President and another prisoner on the other side of Asia. In the Philippines President Marcos has been trying to break Aquino, whom he put into prison on a charge of conspiracy and murder. Aquino has held out for seven years already.

So what awaits Bhutto if he does not collapse? As things are--whether they will remain so is a point worth coming to a little later--visible possibilities are limited to two: early release through the gallows, and a long night of torment, with the dice loaded in favour of the former possibility. There is a series of other cases lined up against Bhutto, including another murder charge and one for rigging the elections. His trial in all of these can be expected to be as fair as his trial in the Lahore High Court was. The Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court is also the Chief Election Commissioner (a conjoining against which Bhutto protested in vain) and will no doubt have much to do with proving the rigging.

Therefore on the one hand Bhutto's chances of acquittal in the present murder case are dependent upon whether the Supreme Court sees it fit to go into the whole matter afresh does do so freely, and does not merely confine itself to questions of law. There is not much of a question of law involved here anyhow; if the man committed murder he will hang. The real question is what are the facts of complicity and whether the Lahore High Court read the facts with an impartial mind. On the other hand even in the unlikely event of his being acquitted in his case, he will be kept behind the bars in other cases.

If the Supreme Court confirms the death sentence and Bhutto does not ask for clemency, there will be nothing to prevent General Zia from granting it on his own and reducing the sentence to life imprisonment. In deciding whether to do so or not he will have to take into account the reactions of other countries. But unfortunately for Bhutto, diplomatic pressure will work both ways.

After the Lahore High Court judgement, a number of countries urged General Zia not to carry out the sentence. India observed a benign silence and will probably do so now as well. But China, the USA, the Soviet Union, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and a number of other countries advised mercy. The Soviet Union went further, and instead of sitting on the fence plunged into a fluid situation and described Bhutto as progressive and his successors as reactionaries. (Moscow's day of reaping a dividend on that investment might come.)

But since the Lahore High Court judgement, the events in Iran have intervened against Bhutto. In the first place, as discussed earlier, these events have underscored for General Zia how dangerous Bhutto can be so long as he remains alive. In the second place they have removed the Shah, whose advice would have had more force in Pakistan. And in the third, they have made Saudi Arabia reluctant to give any advice which would be unwelcome to President Zia; having lost a brother monarch on one flank, Saudi Arabia would not like to disturb an authoritarian brother on the other flank. Therefore General Zia will probably find himself free to set his course according to his own preferences, and these preferences will be guided by the value he attaches to his own neck.

More important are the consequences for Pakistan in either of the two cases, that is early execution or indefinite imprisonment. Here reliance can be placed only on sheer speculation, and I will indulge in that within the four corners of these possibilities: First, there will be an explosion of popular anger if Mr. Bhutto is executed. Second, President Zia will be able to control the explosion after a certain amount of bloodshed though the outside world will not hear of the full extent of the bloodshed; Third, however, the Zia regime will not last very long after it succeeds in quelling the protest. Fourth, when President Zia moves out, Bhutto's ghost will sit in his place. Or Bhutto getting life imprisonment, which is possible, or if they happen with such speed (which is unlikely) that the displacement of General Zia takes place before the execution of Bhutto can be carried out. When this cycle of events has been compiled, Pakistan will move into an entirely different orbit either because of or in inspite of the successor regime or regimes.

There is not much scope for elaborating on this limited speculation. Bhutto has predicted a "conflagration" if he is "assassinated through the gallows." There will be a large fire, but not an uncontrollable one. There are two reasons for saying this: First, the cupidity and arrogance with which Bhutto used his power towards the end of his presidency has alienated from him a large number of people and agencies of action which otherwise would have helped in stealing the opposition to General Zia. It is their opposition to Bhutto which emboldened General Zia to strike against Bhutto, and it is their support which will enable General Zia to put out the fire before it gets out of hand.

Second, the diversity of regional political interests in Pakistan will dissipate some of the conflagration. All interests will stoke the fire to some extent. But thereafter each will try to pull in its own way. In the short run this will be of help to General Zia.

But only in the short run. In the long run the political nature of the sub-continent, in praise of which Bhutto has written a political lyric, will assert itself in Pakistan also. In this it will be assisted by the following facts:

(i) The Pakistan army is largely a Punjabi army. The harder it strikes in the non-Punjabi provinces to put down disturbances the more it will provoke them in the long run.

(ii) The inspiration of Iran has made the whole region so much bolder, and the younger levels of protest, of which there are many hidden layers in Pakistan, have become especially difficult to suppress once they catch fire.

(iii) There is a sizable group of young officers in the army who found Bhutto more worth following than General Zia and whose radicalism leads them more in Bhutto's direction than in President Zia's.

This will mean first the discomfiture and the replacement of the regime of General Zia, possibly first by a group of senior generals who may decide that Zia has outlived his usefulness after disposing off Bhutto, but later more probably by a group of younger officers or by motley combinations of various political parties. If Bhutto is still alive when these transitions take place, that is if they take place in protest against even his life imprisonment, or in protest against confirmation of the death sentence but before it is carried out, then he will not be out of power for very long.

If he is dead by then, the successive transitions will gradually lead Pakistan towards the kind of politics developed by the more radical Arab countries, a brand of politics much closer to what Bhutto has spelt out in what should be called his testament. But, it is doubtful that Pakistan will move into this Iraqi-Syrian-Libyan orbit in one piece. Bhutto's fears in this respect will probably prove right when he is no longer there himself to disprove them.

But there is one question which defies all speculation. Why did Bhutto blow it all up when he had so much going for him? He had power, popularity, a highly educated understanding of what he could have done with them, and a very liberal upbringing to help him decide what his priorities should be. Why did he then behave as he did toward the end of his career (his life?); like a beleaguered, tribal chief might behave when he is in a rage, not like the civilized leader of a promising country should behave when he has no cloud on his horizon except a few of his own making.

If Bhutto had retained the loyalty of those who had served him well and not twisted every instrument of power that he could lay his hands on, no ambitious general could have dared throw him out because he had the one antidote to the cancer of martial law: he had the backing of the people. But after the way he behaved he became an object of such disbelief that even his testament, brilliant though it is and perhaps sincere-from his death cell a man looks on things with less feigning-it might yet remain an object of some scoffing.

If the answer to the question is that other leaders in other countries have also behaved like that and have blown up even bigger opportunities, then that only intensifies the question still further. Why have so many democratic leaders of the Third World thrown away the chances they had of building up institutions in their own lifetimes instead of destroying them in the fire of their own power? Nehru stands out as an exception. But why is he such a rare one?

But the purpose of this Introduction is not to raise philosophic questions. Even less is it to answer them. The purpose is only to bring together in one place the arguments which he scattered about in Bhutto's document, and to guide the reader through them. That done, the Introduction should end. What follows is the "repast" promised by Bhutto.

# 1. White Paper or White Lies?

The Junta has been in power for one year and twenty days (from 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977 to 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978, the date of the release of the White Paper). After being in power for 385 nights of terror, it has come out with this doom document of 1044 pages, which includes 342 annexures. The body of the White Paper contains 405 pages, the remaining pages being consumed by annexures, which are said to be State/Government documents. The body is mainly a disfigured summary of the annexures, with prejudicial comments and untenable deductions.

According to the White Paper, soon after the changeover on the 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, the Chief Martial Law Administrator appointed a Committee of Inquiry to probe into the conduct of the March elections, with the following members:

- (i) Brigadier Mir Abdul Naeem. Incidentally, Rao Adbur Rashid, former Director of the Intelligence Bureau, states in his affidavit submitted before the Supreme Court that he was asked by Brigadier Naeem, *“Do you think the Army can afford to see Mr. Bhutto back in power?”* Mr. Rashid kept a discreet silence, and so Brigadier Naeem answered his own question by saying, *“Obviously, it can’t.”* His parting advice to Rao Rashid was *“Please cooperate with Army.”* Obviously Brigadier Naeem knows on which side his bread is buttered.
- (ii) Mr. Abdul Aziz Khan, Secretary, Police Foundation.
- (iii) Mr. N. Humayun Khan, OSD, Election Commission.
- (iv) Lt. Colonel Muhammad Aslam Raja.

Inter alia, the Committee was charged with fixing responsibility for malpractices during the elections. The White Paper pays a compliment to the Committee for doing *“a fine job of work in a short time.”*

Although the White Paper names the members of the Committee, it does not say who headed it.

The White Paper states that: *“Essentially this. White Paper relies on documents signed/circulated by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Mr. Rafi Raza, overall election in charge for the People’s Party, Sardar Muhammad Hayat Tamman, Political Adviser to the former Prime Minister, officials of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Intelligence executives and the Provincial Chief Ministers/Chief Secretaries etc.”* (Para (ii) of the Introduction.)

According to the White Paper, "This is basically their story. The documents, all photostats, speak for themselves. Few comments are needed."

Actually, even before the usurpation of power on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, the Chief of Army Staff organized teams of military officers in each of the Provinces to conduct discreet inquiries into conduct of the March 1977 elections. This was reported to me in categorical terms by at least one Chief Minister.

I received similar reports from other sources. For instance, an Additional Secretary in the Federal Secretariat informed me that the journalist, Mr. I. H. Burney, one time Editor of the English weekly '*Outlook*', had been engaged by the General Headquarters to conduct a probe into the elections. A number of Members of the National Assembly complained to me that military officers were asking them all sorts of questions on the elections, as if they were conducting some kind of an inquiry. Some of the candidates and the Chief Minister of a province informed me that such inquiries were being carried out in a hush manner in many places.

In view of this information coming to me from diverse sources, I raised the question twice in high-powered meetings of some of my federal ministers in which the Chief of the Army Staff and the Corps Commanders participated. While the Corps Commanders remained silent, with visible discomfort, the Chief of the Army Staff muttered some vague and inaudible words denying the information, which had been given to me. I have discussed this in my affidavit filed in the Supreme Court in the Constitution Petition of Begum Nusrat Bhutto, challenging the imposition of Martial Law.

The point is that:

- (a) If Army probes and preliminary inquiries into the elections began soon after March 1977.
- (b) If the Committee of Inquiry was appointed "soon after the change over of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977."
- (c) If "the Committee did a fine job of work in a short time" and
- (d) If "Essentially, this White Paper relies on documents" obtained from Government records, so much so that the White Paper claims that the documents speak for themselves, that "this is basically their story" and that, "few comments are needed,"

Then why has the White Paper taken 385 long days to hit the public eye on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978, in the blaze of full publicity, with an Arabic translation? The substance of the White Paper was heralded on the night of 24<sup>th</sup> July 1978 on the radio and television for the tale to reach every home and every village of Pakistan with alacrity.

The timing is intriguing. I ask again, why NOW when all the material was available months and months earlier, especially when the *coup d'etat* of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977 was not explained nor sought to be justified on the charge of rigging the elections of March 1977 ? On the contrary, entirely different reasons were furnished.

The Prime Minister was praised. General Zia-ul-Haq himself said in his first Press conference on 14<sup>th</sup> July 1977, that I was a "very tenacious fighter and a great politician." a man with "a great sense of history." He called me a patriot and a brave man, for whom he had high regard.

The Chief Martial Law Administrator emphatically stated that the Prime Minister did not rig the elections of March 1977. He said that:

*He discounted the allegation that elections in all the constituencies had been rigged. He said that the Army had also the evidence that Mr. Bhutto was not responsible for the rigging. Moreover, it was wrong to say that the PPP victory was due to rigging. The Party would have won even if there was no rigging. (Pakistan Times, 14.7.77.)*

If there was any rigging, he said, it was purely on an individual basis.

The object of "Operation Fairplay" was to separate the two sides and to hold general elections within 90 days without apportioning blame or going into misdeeds (that was the responsibility of the electorate, the voter, and not of the armed forces). After his interview with Newsweek, BBC and UPI, it was reported that General Zia-ul-Haq said that I, as Prime Minister, "did sincerely attempt to reach an agreement with the opposition. In fact what Mr. Bhutto agrees to was probably the maximum that any politician could agree to." "My sole aim" he had said previously, "is to organize free and fair elections which will be held in October this year, .... I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule. The officers in the civil administration who have any apprehensions about their future, are hereby assured that no victimization will take place."

It has been seen that the deadlock in the PPP - PNA negotiations was given as the reason for the *coup*. In actual fact there was no deadlock. Agreement had been reached. The minor points raised by PNA were to be resolved the next day: the day of the *coup*, 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977.

But subsequently, when the tirade was unleashed, it was alleged that the PPP Government adopted dilatory tactics. The truth is that in less than two months, my government settled very complex and intricate problems covering the whole range of fresh elections, machinery for fresh elections, release of detainees, and other important administrative and policy questions, including

constitutional issues. This was done despite the impediments placed by the Chief of Army Staff on Baluchistan and the NAP trial.

In marked contrast, a year has gone by without the PNA agreeing to participate in his set-up.

As time passed other reasons were found for the illegal usurpation which, inter alia, were

- (i) threat of civil war
- (ii) enforcement of Islamic laws
- (iii) restoration of the economy
- (iv) need to ensure positive results, etc.

## Why Now?

I therefore repeat why has this document been released now, on 24<sup>th</sup> / 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978? The same material could have been published as early as January 1978. It might have been more relevant and topical at that time. Why now, especially when, as shown above, the *coup* was neither justified nor explained on account of rigging the elections of March 1977; and particularly:

- (a) When the elections of March 1977 have been outstripped by other major developments;
- (b) When the Junta's own elections of 18<sup>th</sup> October 1977, stand cancelled;
- (c) When the Junta adamantly refuses to announce a firm date for general elections, despite a universal demand for them;
- (d) When the Junta is moving away from basic democracy towards other allied anti-people policies;
- (e) When the Junta considers elections to be merely a means to attaining "positive" ends.

Why all this rumpus over the so-called rigged elections of March 1977, at this juncture, when the physician is not healing his own wounds? His dereliction is more serious than mine; his sin is graver than mine, if indeed, I committed any. How does the General exonerate himself for not holding elections at all? Does he demonstrate that he is a better man by imposing Martial Law, by suspending the Constitution, dissolving Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies, by canceling the elections of 18<sup>th</sup> October 1977, by refusing to give a firm date for elections, by breaking his solemn public commitments, and by imposing a total, albeit highly discriminatory, prohibitor on political activities including trade union movements?

He has made the charge but not provided a solution. His solution is more detrimental, more abominable and more reprehensible than his charge. "People in glass houses should not throw stones." The whole exercise is a "non sequitur"

In view of what I have said above, tenaciously I ask once again: what are the significance and the relevance of the timing of this White Paper with such fanfare and Gobbling publicity?

The answer is in fact very simple and straightforward.

The object is to prejudice the mind of the people of Pakistan against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to seek to generate hatred and resentment against him, to demolish his image. It is an additional link in the long chain of assiduous endeavors, which began covertly and overtly from 5<sup>th</sup> July 1997.

Although, from this standpoint, it is only one more link in the chain, yet the expectation of the Junta is that this vital piece would constitute the decisive link in the ugly chain of mud slinging and malignment. Hence the timing of the strike of this particular link of 1,400 pages of abuse is ominously significant.

The document relates to elections, but in order to demonstrate that the elections were not fair, an effort has been made to portray me as “a modern Machiavelli,” and an arch criminal. It is a malevolent indictment.

The timing can logically be gauged in the context of the hearing of my appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the death sentence. This is the exclusive aim of the publication of the White Paper at this juncture.

My appeal has reached a crucial phase in the defence or my innocence.

The so-called further retraction of Mian Muhammad Abbas, the heart patient, by cajolment and coercion in a death cell and outside, came on 10<sup>th</sup> July 1978.

As they say in a soldier’s language, “to reinforce success.” this White Paper of dead weight has been dropped into the scales of justice, fifteen days later, so to speak.

The White Paper is on “the conduct of the General Elections in March 1977” but the “object is to malign me venomously. As the subject matter pertains to “Elections”:

(a) Most of the documents, if not all of them, whether true or false, in the 342 annexures, relate to the March Elections, starting with the “Larkana Plan” in refreshing contrast to the “London Plan.”

(b) For this reason, Mr. M. Humayun Khan, OSD in the Election Commission, was one of the four members of the Committee of Inquiry. Actually, excluding the unnamed chairman, it turned out to be a three man

Committee, because Mr. Abdul Aziz Khan, Secretary, Police Foundation, the fourth member, according to the White Paper, “did not remain actively associated with the Committee for long.”

(c) Since the White Paper pertains to elections, it is essential for the Election Commission, past and present, to figure predominantly in the inquiry and in the findings. This is amply borne out by the composition of the Committee of Inquiry and by the material contained In the White Paper.

(d) Chapter II of the White Paper relates to the Charter and Constitutional functions of “The Election Commission” and to the responsibilities of the Chief Election Commissioner.

(e) The depositions or statements of the Secretary of the Election Commission, Mr. A. Z. Faruqi, appear frequently in the White Paper. Incidentally, he also happens to be a nephew of Mr. N. A. Faruqi, whose wife is the sister of Masood Mahmud’s wife. It is well known that Masood Mahmud is the principal approver in the murder case against me. According to my information, N. A. Faruqi acted as the go-between with the Martial Law Authorities and Masood Mahmud before he became an approver in the case. The relationship is all a bit too close for comfort.

(f) The statements given to the press, letters written to me, meetings with my ministers and officials, the decisions in the exercise of the special powers given to the Election Commission after the elections of March 1977, the complaints/petitions filed in the Election Commission, the narration of events relating to delimitations, electoral rolls and the alleged conversations with the Secretary to the Election Commission are among the multifarious references made directly to the then Chief Election Commissioner, Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan, throughout the White Paper. Indeed, the White Paper ends with his words.

But strangely enough, Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan’s own depositions or statements either before the Committee of Inquiry or before any other agency constituted for the production of this White Paper are conspicuous by their absence. Statements of importance attributed to Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan have come from the mouth of Mr. A. Z. Faruqi, the Secretary of the Election Commission. Mr. A. Z. Faruqi, being an Ahmadi (Lahori group), expressed his antagonism toward me and my Government without qualms from the moment the decision on Ahmadis was taken by the National Assembly of Pakistan in September 1974.

## 2. Misrepresentation

The compilers of the White Paper are clearly motivated by considerations other than the alleged rigging of elections. This is apparent by the following:



(a) There is a full and separate chapter on the alleged rigging of the election of my senior Defence Council, Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar the former Attorney General. It is Chapter IX and is entitled “The Case of Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar” starting at page 341 and ending at page 381. Out of the legion of ministers, both federal and provincial, out of all the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies and the Senate, comprising about a thousand individuals, a separate chapter of 40 pages is devoted exclusively to the individual who happens to be my principal Defence Council in the Supreme Court. If this is not stretching the long arm of coincidence, how else is it stretched?

(b) The document abounds with clumsy efforts at character assassination, having not the faintest bearing on elections or on election malpractices. These have been grafted into the White Paper to lay bare the now indisputable, world-acknowledged prejudice against me. An example is on pages 79 and 80; it relates to the appointment of the son of one of my advisers. The appointment has nothing to do with elections.

(c) At page 25 the White Paper states: “In a recorded TV speech he even swore in the name of God that he had nothing to do with election irregularities. It took four months of nation-wide agitation, considerable loss of human life and property and the imposition of Martial Law to unearth, inter alia, the original draft of the master blue-print for rigging and in the process establish the irreverent use of the name of God as a witness to the none too sacred game of politics.”

I will stand by that statement. I did not rig the elections. I am not responsible for the individuals who indulged in electoral malpractices in their individual capacity. The Election Commission, the Election Tribunals and the election laws, including writ jurisdiction of the Superior courts, provide the answer, relief and justice in all such cases. This has been the established position and practice in Pakistan, in the sub-continent and in all countries where democratic elections are held. I even gave the Election Commission extraordinary powers summarily to disqualify individuals. I also made provision so that an election petition could be disposed of within six months.

The White Paper admits on page 259 that there were altogether 57 complaints; knowing how defeated candidates take undue advantage of such wide-open opportunities as summary disqualification, it does not mean that each one of the complaints or petitions was genuine. Most of them would have been rejected by a competent tribunal.

After a while, I withdrew these extraordinary powers, because absurdly frivolous and fictitious complaints were being made. The power given to the Election Commission was challenged in the High Court for being inconsistent with constitutional provisions, which provided that an election could only be questioned before a tribunal set up under the Constitution, through an election petition; also because the Chief Election Commissioner refused to take a single complaint made against the PNA candidates by the PPP candidates in the matter of rigging of elections. More important, the PNA was not reciprocating this generous gesture by coming to the negotiating table.

Furthermore, an additional reason for withdrawing the extraordinary powers given to the Election Commission after the elections was because individuals aggrieved by the employment of these summary powers had filed writ petitions in the High Courts challenging the legality of the extraordinary jurisdiction.

The position was explained by the Federal Law Minister, S. M. Masud in the National Assembly. Commenting on the withdrawal of the extra legal powers conferred on the Election Commission, the Law Minister stated, *inter alia*:

Sir, as you are aware, this was a one sided procedure which was going on before the Chief Election Commissioner or the Election Tribunal. It was not that the other party was represented; even the returned candidate was not given opportunity to point out his case so as to enable him to say that the irregularities which were committed were not by him .... (page 401 of the White Paper).

The reference to my speech at page 25 of the White Paper and the comments thereon have been made for three main reasons:

(a) To mitigate and dilute the sharp public reactions to the plethora of broken pledges of the Chief Martial Law Administrator. He has broken each one of his solemn pledges to the people after reciting passages from the Holy Quran.

(b) To vindicate the judgement of the Lahore High Court that I am "a Muslim only in name." I may add here in parenthesis that although I have not broken a single pledge made to the people of Pakistan, after his speech of 25<sup>th</sup> June 1978, the Chief Martial Law Administrator has forgotten that he ever made a promise.

(c) The White Paper has drawn on a number of false hearsay statements of Mr. A. Z. Faruqui, the Ahmadi Secretary of the Election Commission, in order to prejudice the mind of the reader against me. One illustration of striking falsehood is to be found at page 150 of the White Paper. Mr. A. Z. Faruqui is purported to have been told by the then Chief Election Commissioner that, in a telephone conversation with him, I had expressed my annoyance and anger over the motivation campaign of the Election Commission. The passage reads:

Another instance, which I recall, was with regard to the publicity campaign, which the Election Commission was independently carrying on for motivating people for casting their votes correctly. Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan had informed me around the middle of February that the Prime Minister disliked our independent and non-partisan campaign. Mr. Jan said that he was not going to discontinue his publicity programme, but that it should be toned down. The action taken on the decision may be seen in the noting of the Commission (Annexure 134).

Subsequently, even this milder version of publicity annoyed Mr. Bhutto. On February 26, 1977, Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan telephoned me from Lahore that all publicity should be stopped forthwith. I was informed the same day by my Public Relations Officer that he had also received similar instructions on February 26 from Mr. Jan over the telephone from Lahore. In his conversation with me, Mr. Jan said that the Prime Minister had been telephoning him time and again to complain about our publicity. That very morning he had spoken to him angrily, saying "Do you want to destroy us with your publicity? You keep on referring to the Quaid-e-Azam and Iqbal."

This is an unmitigated and unadulterated lie. It is an uncouth attempt to create hatred against me in the minds of the people of Pakistan I am supposed to have made these absurd remarks to the then chief Election Commissioner on the open telephone at the height of the election campaign. He in turn reported this conversation to his secretary also on the telephone. Mr. Sajjad Ahmed Jan is alive and available in Pakistan. Why was he not summoned to state whether I made the aforesaid politically blasphemous remarks to him on the open telephone?

Besides, under which canon of politics would publicity to Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal destroy us? How could it destroy us? By what stretch of the imagination did we stand to suffer? There seems to be no limit to unscrupulousness. These are the last words of perfidy. My government had the honour of organizing and celebrating with great dignity the centenaries of the Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal. An elected and popular leader of Pakistan would always hold in reverence the pioneers and founders of our State. Only

usurpers and foreign stooges would be inclined to envy the popular sanction of political giants.

Moreover, page 223 of the White Paper shows that a person of my experience would not talk irresponsibly on the telephone. It says:

Mr. Bhutto agreed with every lawful/unlawful suggestion made in the note and marked it to Mr. Rafi Raza with the remarks:

“This is very important and urgent. Will you please get in touch with all concerned and give them clear directives on secraphone.”

This reference clearly shows that if I advise my ministers to be careful on the telephone, I would hardly follow the opposite rule for myself. I have seen too much of this world to utter suicidal words on the open telephone. I do not have to be told or reminded that speaking on the open telephone is like speaking in a public gathering.

Whether it is the murder trial at Lahore or in this White Paper, the telephone has been made the angel of death for me. It is the principal and the most reliable witness against me in the persecution. If a document cannot be fabricated, if an audacious witness cannot be collared to tell an outright lie, the device is “he told me on the telephone that I should drop the nuclear bomb.”

Only a Maulvi would get irked by the light-hearted remark I made to Mr. Rafi Raza on a “Mullah” to seize upon it as a personal affront. Page 114 of the White Paper reads as follows:

Mr. Bhutto marked it to Mr. Rafi Raza with the comments “Only an effort by a well wisher of ours. How much can we draw on it is another matter.” But he revised his opinion quickly after having read it. He amended his earlier note to Mr. Rafi Raza by adding, “I have read the text. It is written by a Mullah. I need not say more.” He twice underlined the word “Mullah” as per Annexure 117. That perhaps was the end of Mr. Ikram Azam’s attempt to gatecrash the policy-making echelons of the ruling party.

As stated, the White Paper contains 342 handpicked documents ferreted out of government records and files to present a one-sided picture. It indulges in willful misrepresentation and the documents it produces falsify its charges. Documents have been specially selected and doctored to implicate me. But even this unethical endeavour has been futile. They contradict each other.

They need to be read with other documents, but these documents telling the truth have been suppressed or destroyed. For instance, I sent a series of

directives to all concerned authorities to ensure that strict impartiality was observed in the elections, and I warned that malpractices would not be tolerated. Not one of those documents has been produced. All documents favourable to my Government have been burned.

The object of summarizing the annexures with malicious interpretations is not for the reader's convenience. The authors want to prejudice the reader with a perverse and twisted summary of controversial documents. If they speak for themselves, as the White Paper contends, these specially selected documents could have been left unmutated or, the distorted summaries, if needed at all, should have been made on the documents read as a whole. This has deliberately not been done. The double exercise has been undertaken to put a mask even on the handpicked annexures. In the language of the law, the blue pencil has been applied; in the language of justice, a travesty has been committed.

## Shadow of Civil War

This White Paper begins with a White Lie. In the very first paragraph it states:

Mr. Z. A. Bhutto was inducted into office as the President of Pakistan and the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator on December 20<sup>th</sup> 1971, and was removed from the post of prime Minister on July 5<sup>th</sup> 1977. Both events took place around midnight; one in the wake of a war and the other in the shadow of a civil war. In between he gave the country what even his sympathizers and admirers would concede was a "strong" government.

The *coup d'état* might have fired shot at midnight on 4<sup>th</sup> July 1977, in conformity with the conspiratorial nature of tommy gun *coup d'états*. But I was sworn in as the first civilian elected President of Pakistan on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1971 at approximately 11:30 a.m. in the President's House, Rawalpindi, in broad daylight. Ghulam Ishaque Khan, the *de facto* Prime Minister of this regime, participated in the ceremony as the Cabinet Secretary. Many others, including Yahya Khan were present. The same evening I addressed the nation as President of Pakistan.

As a consequence of the earlier *coup d'état* of March 1969, the country was under Martial Law and it was unavoidable for me to assume the additional charge of Chief Martial Law Administrator. I could not step into the vacuum created by the *coup d'état* of Yahya Khan. Under the law as it then prevailed, under the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Dosso's case, the Chief Martial Law Administrator was the only law creating factor.

As I was against the Martial Law myself, within four months of my taking over as President I enacted an interim constitution and withdrew Martial Law from the Country. Precisely for this reason we keep on warning that Martial Law is no law, that the Constitution should be restored at once. Whether the country is closer to civil war today or whether it was “under the shadow of a civil war” on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, will be decided in the annals of history.

By its anti-diluvium and effete actions this regime has pushed the class conflict to a point of no return. If the White Paper does not know how to say “*Bismillah*” and begins on an infidel’s note, it fails to convert to paganism. The beginning is symptomatic of the perjury that permeates throughout the document. You cannot start with petty lies and finish with sublime truth.

Another dishonest and misleading device followed is to put down all sundry views emanating from all quarters in such a way as to make the reader believe that the views and opinions are mine. Fortunately, sufficient contradictions have surfaced in this unethical methodology to dispel the impression. These views, assessments and recommendations, even those rejected outright by me have been projected with a slant with this aim in mind. I am not responsible for each and every thought and idea born in the minds of officials or non-officials of our fertile Indus valley. On the contrary, there are concrete instances in the White Paper showing that I shot down, there and then, a number of recommendations of my officials and readily agreed with my ministers to reject certain other recommendations.

Since this fat volume has been made fatter by pages and pages of diabolical distortions, a few instances need to be given to demolish the misrepresentations:

- On page 16, item (m) states: “All this done, elections may be announced leaving the shortest possible margin of time between the announcement of the elections and the holding of the ballot. This is essential because our democracy is yet in infancy and one would not like the country to be set on fire within too long an interval.” I did not agree with the recommendation although the ruling party had everything to gain from its acceptance. Instead, I instructed the Foreign Office to let me know the period of time given in India for national elections. Annexure 10 on A-20 of the White Paper furnishes the reply of the Foreign Office. The operative part of this annexure reads: “the average interval between the announcement and actual polling has been approximately 4 to 12 weeks.”

If a vast country like India could complete general elections within four to twelve weeks, a objection cannot be raised to the eight weeks of election time given by my government for the elections held in Pakistan in March

1977. In size and population, our country equals the province of Uttar Pradesh in India. If fair elections can be held within four weeks throughout the length and breadth of India, nobody can validly criticize the eight week period fixed for elections in Pakistan. The eight week campaign was so free and fair that it appeared as if all hell had been let loose.

- When it was suggested to me that I should go soft on tax defaulters and on the implementation of land reforms, I am said to have minuted: "Discuss with the Finance Minister on my behalf verbally but do not allow crooks to get away." This reference on page 18 of the White Paper shows that I politely declined the suggestion.
- Again, on page 20 it would be seen that when my Special Secretary agreed with the proposal of the Information Adviser to deny as far as possible the "hard core opposition" leaders the opportunity to appear on radio and television, the White Paper admits that: "Mr. Bhutto however, was generous, enough to concede that 'We will have to give the 'leaders' some time, some reasonable time'."

It may be pertinent to add here that the idea of surrogate candidates was put to my Special Secretary by the top leaders of the Muslim League, the same Muslim League that has become a surrogate of the Junta. They pursued it for many months until it was finally rejected by me. My party was not prepared to concede more than five to seven seats to the surrogates. They wanted 30 seats, but eventually came down to approximately 15. From the day of the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954 until today, this party of self-seekers has torn every principle in half.

- Since a serving military officer of the rank of a Major General is concerned, I will not comment in detail on the several references made "to him on his role in the election campaign. He is an efficient officer and a brave soldier. As one is ultimately answerable to God, it is my moral duty to exonerate this officer from any questionable involvement in the election campaign. Notwithstanding this, there is a reference in the White Paper, which requires to be noted to show that I responded with moral exactitude to accept valid objections.
- On page 222, the White Paper says, "Major-General Muhammad Imtiaz Ali, Military Secretary to the former Prime Minister, was looking for these vulnerable points." The connecting portion on page 223 states, "For once Mr. Rafi Raza had the good sense to reject the recommendation. He noted, 'spoken to the PM-not to be done as the methods are unacceptable. File'."

Quite clearly, Rafi Raza shot the proposals as being “unacceptable” and I agreed with him. This shows whether I was a dreaded dictator or the leader of a democratic team.

Furthermore Major-General Imtiaz Ali was not the architect of the proposal in question. It was the brain child of a Member of the National Assembly from Sialkot. My Military Secretary merely forwarded the proposal to me. In turn I forwarded it to the minister who found it to be “unacceptable.” A storm in a tea cup is being made out of it. Such is the modus operandi of the regime. Being blind to the gathering storm engulfing Pakistan, it still contents itself by counting butterflies.

- On page 71 it is stated that my Special Secretary, Rao Abdur Rashid, told me that the Governor of Baluchistan, the Khan of Kalat, “cannot be trusted with the conducting of elections,” especially as Governor’s rule prevailed in Baluchistan. The fact that the Khan of Kalat remained the Governor of Baluchistan right up to 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977 shows that I paid no attention to these observations.
- On the same page it is stated that my Special Secretary suggested that I should send Ghaus Baksh Raisani as an Ambassador. I did not accept the advice.

The White Paper devotes about four or five pages to the assessment of my Special Secretary on the involvement of the military in Baluchistan and on inducting military officers into the civil service. As the comprehensive note of Rao Abdur Rashid, dated 13<sup>th</sup> July 1976, on the subject is of due importance in evaluating the past and present conditions, I am taking the liberty of quoting the entire text of the White Paper as it appears on pages 72-75.

## **The Civil Military Problem**

Rao A. Rashid Khan sent a comprehensive note on July 13<sup>th</sup> 1976 to the former Prime Minister dealing with the presence of the army in Baluchistan in connection with the law and order problem. The full text of the note can be seen at Annexure 69-B. The contents of the note are summarized below:

The Special Secretary reported a “sliding down in the general situation” since his last visit two months ago. According to him, there had been two or three serious setbacks to the law and order front while bomb blasts had been more frequent. [The Special Secretary said]:

I found a deepening sense of demoralization and insecurity among the civil servants especially because a regular flow of all levels of army

officers is coming and blocking the promotions of local officials and causing resentment. And this brings me to the delicate aspect of civil and military relations and I should be forgiven for putting forth my observations faithfully.

In a backward province like Baluchistan, which has gone through repeated political upheavals, the efficiency, integrity and reliability of the civil servants, is generally low. There are complaints of corruption. Development is bogged down. If there is a serious breakdown of law and order, the law enforcing agencies are not found up to the mark in dealing with the situation. In sheer disgust the Army is brought in as a last resort. The Army action is justified for a quick, incisive operation but its prolonged role in dealing with internal situation has its limitations. In the long run it is counterproductive and its mission becomes self-perpetuating. Some such situation is developing in Baluchistan. The army's prolonged stay is causing adverse repercussions in many fields.

It is human nature that a person would not lift his finger if somebody else does the work for him. Civil administration in Baluchistan has also come to a state where they tend to pass the buck to the army and look up to it even for tasks, which, in the absence of outside help, they would have undertaken themselves. It has to be examined whether, if the civil administration is found lacking, the solution lies in making the army play an ever-increasing role in civil affairs or in beefing up the civil administration.

The Special Secretary makes the point that unfortunately the army in this country had a long tradition of getting involved in civil administration. Power had its own taste and in course of time the army officers especially in the middle ranks started relishing the power in the form of arrests, searches and interrogation, which gave them the feel of authority. They also developed contempt for the ways of the politicians and civil servants and a general impression in the army's circles "starts gaining ground" that everybody in the field of the civil administration and politics was incompetent and corrupt and only the army could deliver the goods. It was this feeling which had ushered in the first Martial Law.

Next, Rao Rashid validly asserted that in a democratic set-up the control of the Army "not only at the top but at all levels when involved in civil affairs should be that of the civilian Government. Except when there is a Martial Law, the army comes to the aid of civil power. It should not become an independent law enforcing agency .... However, in Baluchistan, the army seems to enjoy these powers independently. Being professionalists, they go about it in their own

fashion without any regard to political repercussions or public reaction. Harsh methods make the army unpopular.”

After dilating further upon the same subject and in the same vein, the Special Secretary advanced the view that, “for all intents and purposes it appears in Baluchistan that the army has taken over the field of development and is formulating all policies. It may be an extreme view but the adverse effects of prolonged army, presence are showing up.”

Based on the above analysis, Rao A. Rashid Khan submitted a number of recommendations including:

- (a) The civil administration should be brought to its toes and made to resume its proper and effective role.
- (b) The army should be divested of powers of arrest, house searches and keeping civilians in military custody even for a short period. The army should be used for static duties only.
- (c) The centre of administration should shift to the Civil Secretariat from the Corps Headquarters and to the offices.
- (d) The withdrawal of the army, which may be gradual, might lead to more incidents but the risk should be taken.
- (e) The withdrawal of the army to static duties shall go down well internally as well as externally. If the situation worsens or any area gets out of hand, the army is always there to come to the aid of civil power.
- (f) The impression amongst junior army officers that the army is a panacea for all ills, which had received a severe blow after the debacle in East Pakistan, is again gaining ground. It can be very infectious and cannot remain confined to one province. This infection may not be allowed to spread.

Mr. Z. A. Bhutto underlined most of the recommendations made by the Special Secretary but made no specific comments on the same. He, however, marked both the notes, sent together under a joint covering note by Rao A. Rashid Khan to Mr. Pirzada with the following remarks. “Please see both notes. Write your comments and then discuss after I have seen your comments.” Mr. Bhutto’s signatures bear the date August 24<sup>th</sup> 1976.

Despite Rao Rashid’s justified reservations about the role of the army in civil affairs, it is a matter of record that Mr. Bhutto’s regime did not follow a policy of gradual withdrawal of the army in Baluchistan. On the other hand, in the wake of nationwide upheaval in the post-election period, he imposed selective Martial Law in the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore and the

army was thus once again called out “in aid of civil power,” in areas other than Baluchistan as well.

The Special Secretary took up the points regarding the civil-military administrative complexities with the Chief Secretary, Baluchistan, who in his reply (Annexure 71), dated October 29<sup>th</sup> 1976, explained that the secondment of army officers was the result of the “poor performance of the civil officers of the development departments and the vacancies caused by their recent screening which took place for the first time in Baluchistan.” He further made the point:

“Some more army officers who are not members of the pool have also been selected for Baluchistan and their allocation to the administration, police etc. would be determined after they have completed their training. Although most of these officers again belong to Baluchistan, the civilians who had got accelerated promotions in the last few years and expected this process to continue, naturally have regarded this as a hurdle in their way. But the whole object is to strengthen both executive and development departments so that the policies of the Government could be fully implemented....

The civilian Government exercises its full discretion in respect of the Administration of the Provinces except in areas where army operations are being undertaken. There is the Provincial Co-ordination Committee, which meets from time to time to settle such administrative matters, which have relevance for these areas. This Committee is represented by the Corps Commander so far as Army is concerned and by Chief Secretary and other civilian officers so far as the civil administration is concerned.”

It is a devastating self-indictment of the regime. The White Paper offers a lame excuse for the insatiable appetite of the Generals to spread their tentacles throughout Baluchistan by stating that in spite of Rao Rashid’s reservations about the role of the army in civil affairs, “it is a matter of record that Mr. Bhutto’s did not follow a policy of gradual withdrawal of the army in Baluchistan.” This is adding insult to injury. On a number of occasions I pressed for a withdrawal plan but on each occasion I was requested to extend the period for a few more months. That is the truth, the genuine and historical record, as opposed to the fable invented by this regime.

Even now, after one year of absolute power in Pakistan, has the regime withdrawn the army from Baluchistan? Not only I, but also the people of Baluchistan would like to have an honest answer to this question. Furthermore, the indictment of army officers into the civil service and the consequences of that inducement on the morale of the civil service is a separate issue. This policy is being pursued with a vengeance by the military regime. At the present rate of

reckoning, within two years, the civil service as a civil service would disappear. It will become the other side of the coin.

This has been the steadfast policy of all Martial Law regimes, as part of an attempt at self-perpetuation at the cost of the unity and integrity of the country. An economic monopoly is not tolerated, and a political monopoly is tolerated even less; therefore total monopoly leads to total revolution.

Mr. Vaqar Ahmed, the Establishment and Cabinet Secretary, was erroneously thought by certain sections to be the most powerful bureaucrat in my government. My comments on one of the cases relating to screening of officials would indicate the extent of the spellbinding powers of the Establishment Secretary on my government:

Mr. Bhutto's minute on this petition reveals not his oft proclaimed concern for justice and fairplay but something quite different. He observed: "Alright. He can be spared. Left to the Establishment Secretary, I would fall flat on my face. He does not even take into account dire political necessities. What does he want? A political deadlock or a political tension for one or two or three individuals?" (p.77)

Incidentally, the petition in question was from a woman in distress who asked me for an interview on the grounds that she had been my nurse in the Combined Military Hospital, Rawalpindi in 1963, when I had an appendix operation. As I did not have the time, I marked it to my Secretary with the minute: "Please see her immediately and try to help her. Otherwise I will meet her, as she looked after me very well" (p.77). After due scrutiny and verification, her petition not to screen her husband was accepted on the recommendation of the secretariat. If my government screened officials, this regime howls blue murder. If my government does not screen officials, the reaction is the same.



Everyone knows that Mumtaz Ali Bhutto is my blood cousin. He has been confined in the Karachi Central Jail since the time we were both picked up in the dead of night at Larkana on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1977. He is known to be close to me. But despite his recommendation on a matter regarding the delimitation of Larkana, I refused to agree with him.

I accepted the advice of Begum Nusrat Bhutto not because the two concerned individuals were loyal to me but because I agreed with her that "they are very hard working and friends of the poor of the country." This is reported on page 49 of the White

Paper. This was my litmus test, the only guiding factor: who was the friend of the poor of our country and hard working. The friend of the poor is my friend and my brother. The enemy of the poor is my mortal enemy. This is my sole and imperishable criterion and yardstick. Everything else is of secondary importance.

During the “golden era” of Ayub Khan an earnest proposal was made to him by an eminent personality to declare a hereditary monarchy in Pakistan and to make himself the first monarch. Ayub Khan took the proposal seriously. He formed a two man Supreme Council of Nawab of Kalabagh and myself to examine it. We returned the proposal together with its blue-print to Ayub Khan within a week with the recommendations that he should forget it altogether. Ayub Khan’s observations were “Bhahtar Sallah.” He added, however, “it is not all that senseless.”



### 3. "Warfare," Rigging and Fraud

In dealing with elections, time and again the White Paper observes that I considered elections to be a kind of war against the opposition. Under the caption "*Do Die*" Plan on page 11 it states:

It was typical of Mr. Bhutto's style of administration that he envisaged the coming elections as some kind of a war against the Opposition. To quote: 'In short, it shall be a detailed Battle Plan of action, leaving nothing to chance. We have to mount campaign against the Enemy, starting from our points of strength and attacking the weak points of our opponents.' This war-like terminology occurs and reoccurs in the speeches made and operational plans prepared by Mr. Bhutto and his confidants.

In my speech in the National Assembly on 7 January 1977, while announcing the General Elections, I said, "I know the politicians like to avoid elections as much as Generals like to avoid wars, but the point is that political battles have to be fought, political elections have to be fought according to a time schedule. For wars there is no time schedule."

This part of my speech appears in the White Paper in the introduction on page (III). Only the unformed would misconstrue such metaphors, unless of course the purpose is to defame and to cause prejudice and hostility. Expressions like "do or die" and to "leave nothing to chance" are used to show determination and preparedness.

Recently, a Martial Law Administrator of a province stated that food production must be put on a "war footing." Does this mean that the General, who abandoned his military profession on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, for a political career, is itching for a war? All over the world, political leaders use such expressions of speech in statements to galvanize and to motivate the political processes. Politics is the finest art and the most creative profession.

There is no fear of a politician worthy of the name wanting to supplant the Generals by using militant expressions. The opposite is true, at least in Pakistan. In our country, during civilian rule the Generals praise democracy and swear allegiance to the Constitution. They display servile obedience to the political government with, however, the sole purpose of overturning their own government and assuming the political mantle. The present military regime should not embarrass itself by criticizing my militant phraseology or by spotlighting the analogy I have drawn between elections and war.

From the age of nine, I learnt a cardinal lesson from the elections of 1937 and that was to leave nothing to chance and never to be over-confident. This, however, in no way indicates that malpractices or rigging should take place. On the contrary, comprehensive preparation means that rigging and fraud are not contemplated. Just as war has its own rules and principles, so have elections. A good general leads his armies to victory with comprehensive planning and preparation. A general who plunges into war with defective, superficial or no plans at all will lead his armies to surrender 90,000 of his soldiers.

Army jargon has been used to make the military regime and its collaborators understand that the more they accuse me of thorough planning and preparations for elections, the more they exonerate me of rigging! It should be clear to the meanest intelligence and to the most unimaginative individual, that if I wanted to rig the elections, I would not have made model plans, collected a mountain of material and attended marathon meetings to be ready for elections. If I had rigging in mind, one or two meetings, one or two verbal orders would have been sufficient. The fact that charts, schemes and plans were piled on top of each other, control rooms established and networks of communication erected, goes to prove conclusively that my government and my party were preparing for "battle" to "fight" and not "rig" an election.

I repeat, why would I waste precious time on meetings lasting until dawn, if I intended to manipulate the polls? Evaluations were made and instructions given in order to anticipate issues which the opposition might raise. Strenuous election tours were planned and undertaken, provincial cells were created and the party was reorganized. Nothing was taken for granted. And yet all the strength at my command, everything was done to fight a clean and fair election.

*Reductio ad absurdum* indictments have been manufactured. But I am incapacitated in a death cell from tearing each and every point to pieces. However, even if I were a free man and had access to official records, I would have considered it below my dignity to fly at every fantasy in this fiction. In the best of conditions, some of the petty charges need to be ignored with contempt. For instance, I never used that super saloon, yet page after page has been devoted to it. The anti-climax comes when the White Paper states that I did not use it because I got intimidated by the threats of the Opposition! My country men do not expect me to answer such a ridiculous explanation.

As far as harassing the officials, let me give an example to prove violations were not committed. On pages 87 and 88 there is mention of the massive procession in Karachi. A sea of people was at Karachi airport to welcome me on my arrival to lead the procession. The Chief of the Army staff was identifiable in the crowd because he was in uniform. On account of the melee, I could not shake hands with him. He waved his hand enthusiastically with his now familiar smile.

Was he in the procession? It can be argued both ways. The answer will depend on who holds the stick. This is the moral of the White Paper.

My election campaign of 1970 was organized exactly on the same principles. The control room was the guest room at "Al Murtaza." The same plans, charts, the same cells and assessments were made and the same kind of tours were organized and undertaken. The same Rafi Razas, the Pirzadas and the Khars were given specific assignments. Because we entered that election fully prepared. We were able to confront and smash Yahya Khan's rigging. Because we went into that election "battle" ready, with our "war" plans, with a "do or die" spirit, we were able to overcome the crisis, the conspiracies and the murderous assaults at Sanghar.

We emerged victorious in 1970 despite the odds. The same indomitable spirit prevailed then as it did in 1977. In 1970 also, I left nothing to chance. I visited every nook and cranny of the country. I went to the *jhuggies* of sweepers. I went to the huts of the *kachi abadis*. I left my footprints everywhere. My voice reached every home. I went three times to one village alone. Since there was a lingering doubt in my mind because of a Pir's hereditary influence in that village, I went to it for the fourth time. On this occasion, in the presence of the villagers, the headman of the village told me: "*Saien mohja*, why do you put us to shame? Who else is worthy of our vote?" I was not the only person with tears in my eyes.



Here was a village forsaking its Pir for the first time in centuries for a sinful politician, nay, a criminal convicted to death. As our jeep left I could hear the sound of "*Jeeay Bhutto*" ringing in the distance until the vehicle was beyond the reach of sound. Perhaps I have embedded myself too deep in the hearts of the poor of this land for others to comprehend the phenomenon. It may sound a rotten cliché if I say that I am a household word in every home and under every roof that leaks in rain. I belong to the sweat and sorrow of this land. I have an eternal bond with the people that armies cannot break.

## Disqualification Tribunals

In one of his famous essays, Sir Francis Bacon asked; "What is truth?" I should now like to ask; "What is rigging?" The dictionary definition is clear; To rig, is "To manage or conduct fraudulently". In view of this I should like to ask

whether engineering a *coup* in the name of elections, promising virtually on the Holy Quran that an election would be held within 90 days and then canceling them only a matter of days after a solemn announcement had been made to the world in the General Assembly of the United Nations, is not fraudulence of the highest degree? Is it not fraudulence to deprive the people of the Constitution? Is it not management to state that elections can only be held when “positive results” are obtained, as General Zia-ul-Haq said in his speech to the nation on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1978? The ultimate piece of stage management is the formation of an election cell, which is nothing more than a perpetuation cell. The military regime is the biggest rigger by its duplicity and its malevolence.

A piece of satire further illustrates my point: in a conversation between two military dictators, one from Asia, the other from Africa, Field Marshal Aiz lu Odoh, asks General Saksah; “Tell me Big Brother, do you rig elections?” to which the General replies:

“Yes, of course, how else can I save the people?”

Field Marshal Odoh: “Well, I promise the fools an election; I swear; I forswear; no one knows the difference. It is the safest and neatest form of riggery.”

General Saksah: “Yes, there’s truth in what you say; but personally I sit on the fools so hard that they cannot open their mouths. In that way, I have their agreement. You see elections are only a means to an end, and rigging is only a means to a means.” (Recorded at the Conference of Keeping-them-under-Control.)

I am supposed to have given instructions that the PNA chief and the NDP chief should not be permitted to win at any price. Curiously, they both won in two constituencies with large majorities. Furthermore, statements of Chief Secretaries assert that neither I nor anyone else issued directives to manage the polls in a fraudulent manner. I repeat again what I said then, I did not want anything done on a single day, which I would have to regret for the next five years. Even the White Paper’s lame attack on the use of the bureaucracy in the conduct of the elections is no indication of rigging. I return again to the value of holding elections as opposed to the deception of *usurping power* in order to hold elections and then not doing so.

It does not ring true to say that elections will be held once the majority party has been obliterated or choked into silence. The *Disqualification Tribunals*, too are a form of rigging. Arbitrary disqualification without even the opportunity for legal defence counsel is merely one way of ensuring that likely opponents are out of the way before the day of reckoning comes. When all PPP

candidates are disqualified, does the military regime then think it will get “positive” results? Already over 100 have been disqualified.

The preparation of fresh electoral rolls on the basis of a separate electorate is another facet of the fraud. Under the Constitution, the electoral rolls can only be revised annually. The number of seats for the National and Provincial Assemblies are being increased without going through the constitutional process. Furthermore, the change from the joint electorate to separate electorates is clearly contrary to the spirit and letter of the Constitution. But then the imposition of Martial Law as a supra constitutional measure was considered to be justified out of sheer necessity for the one and only reason of holding fresh elections under the existing Constitution. This manipulation of political power by people who consider themselves accountable only to God is blatant subversion of the will of the people. This is fraudulent conduct, this is rigging.

Another aspect of the deceit is to claim that the involvement of officials and the administration constitutes rigging. They can hardly be quarantined from the workings of an election. The officials and the administration have a heavy responsibility; they must ensure that law and order are maintained; no malpractices take place; the polls are conducted in an orderly fashion; women are not harassed at the polling stations; the candidates comply with the election rules relating to the elections and polling; there is no tampering with the ballot box; and there is no impersonation.

The list is not exhaustive. An election cannot be envisaged without officials and the administration. From this point of view it might have been considered in a good faith, that some officials should participate in the committees visualized in one of the schemes. However, on further consideration the suggestion was dropped and not enforced. The White Paper concedes this position on page 6 by quoting Rafi Raza’s written objection in the words “not official.” In the style of a tommy-gun dictatorship, “Much Ado” is being made over nothing.

The attack on me via the officials is also evident on page 61 *which states:*

Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, preparing his structural framework for the general elections right from 1974, had a special and designated role in mind for the administrative services. Even while he was a minister in the cabinet of the late President Ayub Khan and Secretary General of the latter’s Convention Muslim League, he is known to have favored the idea of enlisting senior district officials as members functionaries of the party.

My remarks, made in a restricted meeting at the Government House, Dacca, have been misconstrued and exploited by the coterie. The meeting was

presided over by President Ayub Khan and attended by no more than eight to ten ministers and officials including the Governors of the two provinces and the then Federal Law Secretary, Mr. Justice Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain.

It is wrong to state that I favored any such idea. I merely made an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the systems of government prevailing in Asia and the capacity of the different systems to meet the aspirations of the people and to maintain stability. It was a political survey of the Asian landscape. No doubt I painted a grim picture of the system prevailing in Pakistan and pointed out its inherent weaknesses. I did not make any specific proposal on the bureaucracy, or it's Big Brother, the armed forces. It would have been futile to make the attempt. Most of the other participants of that meeting are dead or in Bangladesh. Only the former Federal Law Secretary, the present Chief Election Commissioner and I survive to tell two tales in one city.

In so far as elections are concerned, the bone of contention was the province of Punjab. The PNA boycotted the elections in Baluchistan; their leaders were victorious in their stronghold, Karachi, and also in NWFP. To use terms of military significance, Punjab was the Panipat in the elections of 1977. He who carried the day at Panipat won the elections. Out of a total composition of 217 members in the National Assembly, members from the Punjab numbered 121.

The break-up of the Provincial Assemblies is Baluchistan 40, NWFP 80, Punjab 240, and Sindh 100. The combined membership of three Provincial Assemblies falls short of the membership of the remaining Assembly by twenty. The same position is reflected in the Federal Assembly. Therefore, if rigging were required, it was not needed in Malakand or in the Marri-Bugti ramparts, but in the open plains of the Punjab "in the full light of day." The Punjab has 66 per cent of the total population. Punjab was the pivotal province. If rigging cannot be established in Punjab, it means that there was no rigging. The PPP won a comfortable majority in this province, without rigging, as the White Paper itself demonstrates, albeit in only four of the 34 pages devoted to polling day.

If any rigging had been done, it seems hardly likely that the White Paper would only manage to produce evidence which exonerates me and my government. In these 4 pages, contradictory and irrelevant information is produced. It is significant that the statements of the two officials considered to be the most informative out of over 200 collected by the Enquiry Committee do not incriminate the PPP as having "a central plan or directive for universally rigging the polls."

The above statement was given by Mr. Naveed Asif, former Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur, at page 319 of the White Paper. He further says on page A-914; "I have tried to recollect to the best of my ability any occasion where

in the meetings with Commissioners DIC I may have been instructed to ignore any flagrant violation of law by PPP candidates or its supporters. I do not recollect any such instruction having been given to me either during the campaign or on Election Day."

At page A-919, he says "I did not receive any unauthorized ballot papers for use in the election in any constituency. No written complaint from any candidate was also received in this connection--I did not receive any complaint of any election bag having been tampered with nor did any election agent from any constituency or polling station ever make such a complaint verbally."

The other official is Mr. Muhammad Asghar Khan, Deputy Inspector-General of Police. It is worth noting that Mr. Asghar Khan is a witness in my trial for murder. In his affidavit before the Supreme Court, Rao Abdur Rahid, a former I. G. Police, Punjab, gives a most unfavorable report of Asghar Khan's conduct as a police officer after complaints of his "callous and unofficer-like behavior." In his statement, he does not talk about misdeeds on polling day. He has no factual proof and what he has said is denied by the Chief Secretary of the province, who as the White Paper says is the "key bureaucrat," the "open sesame" of rigging.

The Chief Secretary of the province of Punjab was a retired Brigadier. He was not a lateral entrant under my scheme of 1972. He had been badly injured in the war of 1965, and, if I am not mistaken, belonged to the famous Probyn's Horse, the apple of the Armoured Corps' eye. To reward the Brigadier for this valour and ability, he was taken into the civil service for good reasons. When Dr. Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan in the summer of 1971 for his secret mission to China, the Brigadier was selected to ensure that everything went smoothly. I did not know him, but made his acquaintance in the course of his duties about a month after I became the President of Pakistan.

Soon after the imposition of Martial Law in July 1977, he was appointed Ambassador to Sweden. (He had made a request for a foreign assignment after the death of his wife in tragic circumstances in February 1977; this request was readily granted by the Chief Martial Law Administrator to his brother officer from Probyn.) However, suddenly the appointment was mysteriously cancelled, despite the Brigadier's acknowledged ability and experience. An answer is perhaps provided in the White Paper, under the section-entitled "The Punjab Scene" which I shall quote without comment:

## The Punjab Scene

In the Punjab, which was the main battleground, apart from the Governor's letter, there are other pieces of evidence which directly point towards official interest and interference.

An important witness before the CMLA's Inquiry Committee was Brig. (Retd.) Muzaffar Malik who at the time of the elections was serving as Chief Secretary of the Punjab. Previously he held the key appointment of Secretary, Interior Ministry, at the Centre. A man with National Security and Intelligence background, he had the reputation of being a strong administrator with firm loyalties,

In his short and terse statement before the Inquiry Committee submitted on January 22, 1978, Brig. Malik made the following points (Annexure 227):

For the purpose of elections, the political machinery deployed to bring about coordination and harmony within the party consisted of various Ministers who were made incharge of Divisions/Districts. The Governor was responsible for Bahawalpur Division whereas the Chief Minister personally looked after affairs of Multan Division. Similarly, other ministers were given charge of two or more districts respectively according to their respective spheres of influence. To supplement this, tours were undertaken by the Prime Minister of all the principal places in the Punjab. The selection of such cities/towns was determined on the basis of their relative political importance and the recommendations made by the area political coordinators.

In order to arrive at a realistic picture of the number of seats that the PPP was likely to win, a few meetings were held at the level of Prime Minister as well as the Chief Minister. The Prime Minister's meetings were in the form of Cabinet meetings where Provinces were also represented both at the political as well as the administrative level. The Chief Minister's meetings were, however, attended by me, the Home Secretary, the Commissioners, the DIGs and a few members of the Chief Minister's staff.

At the Provincial level meetings, the *Divisional Officers were asked to give their assessments* about the success probability of various seats, including the so-called prestigious seats which implied those seats from where important personalities of the ruling party or the PNA were contesting. The basic idea was to elicit independent administrative assessment of the overall situation in order to enable a comparison with the political assessment.

'In the earlier stage the assessment figure given by the administration was to the tune of 80 (eighty) seats. In the Federal meeting attended by me, however, a figure of about 70 (seventy) seats was reported to the Prime Minister. At no stage before, during or subsequent to such meetings were any instructions received or issued by me asking the Commissioners to influence the polls in favor of the ruling party. It is my considered view that instances of rigging in certain constituencies of the Punjab were the acts of individual candidates who indulged in various types of malpractices. In this, they could have been helped by those local officials whose postings they had been able to arrange through the political channels.'

It would appear as such that Brig. Malik denied official interference at the higher level except for the purposes of assessment. As for the instances of rigging on the part of individual candidates, the blame was shifted to the "local officials." This is contrary to the testimony of a number of divisional and district officials as detailed in the next chapter, who have spoken of direct instructions from the former Chief Secretary (p. 249-250).

At page 287 the White Paper says; Brig. Muzzafar Malik admitted during his evidence that the 'Larkana plan' was shown to him by the then Chief Minister, Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi. He also confirmed the existence of a control room at Lahore which functioned with meticulous zeal. There also was Chief Minister's election cell. Similar cells and control rooms functioned at Quetta and Peshawar."

This is organization not rigging. The official kingpin of the province that mattered in the elections of March 1977, a retired army officer and a fellow officer from the elite Probyn Horse, categorically states that we did not rig the elections in the Punjab. The fraud is on their side, not ours.

## 4. The Election Commission

An excessive number of references appear in the White Paper in order to show that I tried to make the Chief Election Commissioner a puppet and the Election Commission my hand maiden. I shall spare the Chief Martial Law Administrator the embarrassment of a comparative balance sheet of the status of the Election Commission during the constitutional period and this tommy-gun martial law epoch.

The White Paper has taken an enigmatic position on the then Chief Election Commissioner, Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan. Obviously, as I have already pointed out the document has trimmed its sails to suit its convenience. It is not clear whether the regime considers the former Chief Election Commissioner to be a Momin and a collaborator or an accomplice to my alleged rigging of the elections. There are contradictions in the White Paper with regard to his role.

Before proceeding further, let me hastily clarify my own position. On page 37, the Secretary of the Election Commission, Mr. A. Z. Faruqui, departing for once from his usual practice of maligning me through "hearsay," is reported to have told the compilers of the White Paper that "at a Cabinet meeting held on May 7<sup>th</sup> 1975, in which he himself was present as Secretary of the Election Commission," after being apprised of the terms and conditions of future incumbents of the post of the Chief Election Commissioner, the Prime Minister observed, "I don't see why if this crook gets such favorable terms, his successor should not get them also" (page 38 of the White Paper).

I do not remember calling Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan a "crook" at this or any other Cabinet meeting. I was bound to be more careful. After all, he was the Chief Election Commissioner whom I was attempting to woo for my "nefarious schemes. Besides, he had succeeded in crowning a 'Caesar's wife' as "Melody queen" when Mark Antony had failed thrice to crown himself Caesar.

Apart from being on very friendly terms with my "energetic lieutenant Mr. Hafeez Pirzada." it must be remembered that the then Chief Election commissioner contemptuously and presumably with a clear conscience rejected the escalating demands of the opposition for his resignation. If he had failed or if he were indignant over my alleged rigging, he would have welcomed the opposition demand and resigned in protest, As rigging had not occurred and as he was not a "Crook" the then Chief Election Commissioner did not exploit the agitation to resign as a hero of the opposition. Instead, at a Press Conference on 12<sup>th</sup> March 1977, he described the opposition demand for his resignation as "political blackmail." This is what the White Paper states at Page 28:

The protests that erupted in the aftermath of the March 1977, general elections led to demands on the part of the opposition for the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner. The initial reaction of the Chief Election Commissioner was to ignore the clamor. At a press conference on March 12<sup>th</sup> 1977, he dismissed the demand for his resignation as political blackmail, and explained that his resignation under political pressure would amount to “judicial misconduct”. But the protests did not, subside, and within three months, the Chief Election Commissioner proceeded abroad on leave for medical treatment at government expense.

When I granted him a further extension of three years in January 1977, I was not unmindful of the pros and cons of that decision. I was on the horns of a dilemma. I knew that he was in close touch with the opposition and that he had intimate connection with a politician from Gujarat. I knew that he was masquerading as a bold warrior and assuring the opposition parties of his determination to remain “independent” on their side. He promised them repeatedly that he would resign the moment he smelt the slightest interference from my government. This is borne out by the supplementary statement of Mr. A. Z. Faruqui, the Secretary of the Election Commission at page 37 of the White Paper. He states that “Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan was frequently under great strain and often broached the idea of resigning.”

In these circumstances, if I had not given him a further extension while announcing the date for General Election in the National Assembly on 27<sup>th</sup> January 1977, there would have been uproar. If I had replaced him at that time by “a man from Larkana” in the same way the Chief Martial Law Administrator has appointed the present Chief Election Commissioner from “his home town” I would have come under strident criticism. I was “between the devil and the deep blue sea”. Therefore in order to inspire public confidence in the institution of the Election Commission as an independent body the extension was granted.

However as anticipated, I came under criticism not from the opposition but from my sympathizers and supporters. The opposition parties welcomed the extension. The only criticism which this regime could locate is from the Urdu journal *Al Fateh* of Karachi. It has further used its resourcefulness in a desperate attempt to make the criticism stick. On the page 27 the White Paper observes that the Pakistani Economist of Karachi reproduced the *Al Fateh* installments in its issue of 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1977. However, to fall back on *Al Fateh* after what has been done to this journal in the last eight months, is to pay a left-handed compliment to me by a right handed regime. If the then Chief Election Commissioner, the darling of the opposition, had not been extended, the regime would have found a host of articles and statements to incorporate in the White Paper decrying the injustice.

If the Chief Election Commissioner had been my puppet, he would not have said at his press conference on 12<sup>th</sup> March 1977, that he was satisfied that the Commission had given a “foolproof” machinery. But if gangsters, dacoits and hooligans wanted to put cracks in the machinery, what can the Commission do? These words which appear at page 42 of the White Paper are not the words of a pliable and helpless plaything. There were hooligans on both sides. One look at the present set up of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, would satisfy a casual observer that there are “gangsters, dacoits and hooligans” galore on the other side of the fence. Since the *coup*, quite a few of them have swollen the ranks of the regime. When the then Chief Election Commissioner made his gracious remarks, he must have had in mind the machine gun rattling politician, a wheeler dealer Chief Minister and Blue Beard Adversity has its redeeming features.

Where the extent of the damage caused by the “gangsters, dacoits and hooligans” on both sides, it was not of the magnitude to invite a Dracula’s *coup d’état*. The damage was so negligible that at a further press conference on 6<sup>th</sup> April 1977, the Chief Election Commissioner confidently promised “to clear up all this mess within six months”. This appears at page 259 of the White Paper.

If there had been official interference from my government with the Chief Election Commissioner before during or after the election, he would not have “promised” a BBC correspondent that he would “resign at the first hint of executive interference”. This interview was reproduced in Dawn of 6<sup>th</sup> April 1977 (Page 258 of the White Paper)

Even after the overthrow of my government, on his return to Pakistan on 28<sup>th</sup> November 1977, Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan did use strong words in a press interview, but he did not accuse me of rigging. Considering his shattered nerves, the harsh words can be condoned. The important factor is that he did not accuse me of official interference or pressure. I was in jail facing trial for murder. The regime gave a “*shahbash*” to anyone who attacked me. The former Chief Election Commissioner was not just anybody. This notwithstanding, a close reading of Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan’s press conference as reported in the White Paper on page 331 and in Annexure 321, shows that he pointed an accusing finger at candidates. The operative part of his press interview as reported reads.

Talking to APP on his return here from abroad after medical treatment, he said, that the defect, however, was not in the ground-rules prepared by the Election Commission nor was any effort spared to conduct the election fairly and honestly. The failure of the electoral process was by and large due to the candidates of the ruling party who exploited their position and the party machine and succeeded in hoaxing the officials in charge of the elections and thus destroying the sanctity of the ballot box he said.

I state without fear of contradiction that at no point in time, while I was President or Prime Minister and after that, ever since I have been in jail or in death cell has Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan, the former Chief Election Commissioner, accused Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or his government of:

- (a) Official interference;
- (b) Official pressure;
- (c) Official rigging;
- (d) Executive threats, coercion or intimidation.

It is strange that he has not been examined by the authors and compilers of this document on official rigging. All his statements or remarks have come in the form of "hearsay" from Mr. A. Z. Faruqui. Surely the obvious requirement would have been to examine and interrogate the Chief Election Commissioner of the day. If he could give a press conference on 28<sup>th</sup> November 1977, on his return to Pakistan, he could have appeared before the Committee of Inquiry established on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1977. If it examined 900 witnesses it goes without saying that the former Chief Election Commissioner, Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan, should have been among the first witnesses, if not the first witness to be examined. He should have been the principal approver. Perhaps his statement was recorded, but if so, why is it missing from this fat volume? If it was not recorded, why has the reason not been provided?

It is also curious that the Secretary to the Election commission was made to resume charge on 6<sup>th</sup> July 1977, one day after the imposition of Martial Law, as shown by his own statement on page 34 of the White Paper. Mr. A. Z. Faruqui had been a very obliging witness. He has spared no effort to damage me and my administration by resorting to lies and unethical methods. However, he has not condemned nor implicated the former Chief Election Commissioner. On the contrary he has tried to defend him and explain his limitations and difficulties. In defence of his former Chief, the Secretary to the Election Commission has stated that the poor soul "was frequently under great strain and often broached the idea of resigning." At pages 150 and 151 of the White Paper, Mr. A. Z. Faruqui has presented Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan as zealous patriot and a man of integrity.

Whereas Mr. Faruqui was reinstated one day after the *coup*, by virtue of Presidential Order No. 4, the Chief Election Commissioner Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan, ceased to hold office with immediate effect. This information is given on page 28 of the White Paper. Faruqui's reinstatement follows a pattern, but the knock-out blow of the boss he defends and praises does not fall into place. What is the conclusion? Is Sajjad Ahmad Jan a collaborator of the junta or a fellow conspirator to rigging? One way or the other, the position should have been made clear on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978, when the White Paper, the last word on

rigging, was released. Although it relies heavily on the previous statements and press conferences of the former Chief Election Commissioner, it makes the Secretary to the Election Commission speak for him and his name. There is no authoritative pronouncement of the man himself, the man who mattered most.

The missing link of Darwin has not been found. The absence of Sajjad Ahmad Jan's testimony becomes more baffling in the light of his purported comments on the White Paper to an APP representative in Lahore three days after the document was released. This dispatch of 28<sup>th</sup> July 1978 states that the former Chief Election Commissioner has now recovered from Sui gas poisoning. If this is correct, the compilers of the White Paper were under an obligation to record the statement of the key functionary. The gaping hole in the middle of this incomplete document should be filled. If the former Judge was indisposed when the witch-hunt began, his testimony could have been recorded after his recovery. Such would be the importance of his statement, that the release of the White Paper could have been delayed by a few weeks to include it as an Appendix. The reader will have to draw his own inescapable conclusions from this fatal lacuna.

## **The Present Chief.**

It is indeed a mockery for this regime to pontificate on the independent character of the Chief Election Commissioner when it has brazenly merged the office of the Chief Election Commissioner and the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, under the control of the man who is known to be after my blood. The Chief Election Commissioner's prejudice against me, is by now, accepted internationally. It is an axiomatic fact beyond reach of denial.

Against a background of much hostility, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain was pleased to hear my detention petition virtually "in camera" inside the prison walls of Lahore Jail. This was in January 1969. However, it was not he who released me from detention, but the government, which withdrew the detention order in view of the prevailing circumstances.

With the change in the situation, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain met me in the Punjab House in Rawalpindi soon after I became President of Pakistan. He gave blatant indication of his ambition, suggesting that at this critical juncture in the history of Pakistan the new President would need a trustworthy man in control of the judiciary. He was gravely dejected when his expectations were not met, when a few months later Sardar Muhammad Iqbal was appointed the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court by my government.

He did not conceal his anger. He displayed his resentment in many ways, both his official capacity and otherwise. In sheer desperation, he suggested to Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the former Governor and Chief Minister of the Punjab to

have me “shot through the head”. When, following the Constitutional Amendment, Mr. Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain was appointed the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, he interpreted this second supersession to be an intolerable insult to the extent that he gave vent to his pent up anger on the very first day of the murder trial, by pointedly referring to his supersession as “a hypothetical case.”

Earlier in the fall of 1975, he had an unpleasant and unmentionable altercation with Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, a senior Federal Minister. After his second supersession he did not seriously attend to his official functions, spending most of his time brooding away in his Chambers. On the slightest pretext he would fly off to Europe to sublimate. He was in Europe when the *coup d'état* of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, took place. He was summoned to Pakistan by the ringleaders of the *coup* to become a member of the inner circle. He responded to the invitation with the enthusiasm of a fanatic.

In anticipation of the meritorious services he was to render, he was immediately rewarded with the office of the Acting Chief Justice of Lahore High Court. He was confirmed as Chief Justice during the course of my trial for murder. Simultaneously with his appointment as Acting Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, he was appointed as Chief Election Commissioner. He baptized this appointment with a vicious attack on Pakistan People’s Party and my Government in an interview which was heard on radio and television.

From the time he took over the murder trial on 13<sup>th</sup> September 1977, ousting the Divisional Bench of Mr. Justice Samdani and Mr. Justice Mazhar ul Haq, who were already dealing with the same case, until the announcement of the judgment on 18<sup>th</sup> March 1978, the conduct and attitude of the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court has been a sordid saga. Since the salient excesses and abuses of his position as the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court form a part of my Memorandum of Appeal in the Supreme Court, I am not going to burden this narration with the story of his unique performance. Not being content with his judgment to hang me by the neck until I die, which words he uttered with such relish, he saw to it that I was transferred to death cell, a humiliation worse than death itself.

Now, to crown all, this “White Paper on the Conduct of the general Election in March 1977” has been released with aplomb on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978, at a time when my Defence Counsel was on his feet in the Court of the last resort. Before the Prosecution had even begun to speak on behalf of the regime, the regime has spoken directly through this document to condemn me. This is pincer movement aimed at outflanking and encircling the Defence.

A White Paper on elections comes squarely within the jurisdiction and competence of the Chief Election Commissioner. The other departments, however, play a supporting role. I shall make use of an analogy: the responsibility of the Chief Election Commissioner on all issues relating to elections is like the responsibility of a Supreme Commander on matters of war and peace. In the latter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the supporting ministry, just as the Ministry of Law is the supporting ministry to the Election Commission on the subject of elections. The counterpart of the Attorney General is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am making this observation not as an ignorant and convicted “murderer” but with the full knowledge of my administrative experience as a federal minister of eight years and as the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan for five and a half years.

Here and there, one can detect the various contributions of the compilers of the White Paper. One can see that many fingers have been put in the pie. The ludicrous “showing off” on an infinitesimal issue is one such instance. Page (iii) of the Introduction concludes with the following anti-climatic note:

A word of apology is called for in respect of the language errors which characterize the reproduction of evidence in this White Paper. Since it is mainly a compendium of documents, no attempt has been made to correct the grammar/syntax used. The evidence recorded by stenographers of dubious competence has also been left mostly untouched unless to make it at least intelligible. Political/Official functionaries seem biased in favor of using capital letters to emphasize their point. No attempt has therefore, been made to interfere with the text of their own versions.

On page 31, the White Paper states, “Mr. Bhutto was particularly annoyed on the constituency perhaps of Mirpur Khas in which Mr. Qaim Ali Shah was interested.” This statement is purported to be by Vaqar Ahmad, former Cabinet Secretary, but only a person totally ignorant of the elementary politics of Sindh would have cleared it for incorporation in the White Paper. Statements like these badly shake the credibility of the document. Qaim Ali Shah is from Khairpur in Upper Sindh He has nothing to do with Mirpurkhas in Lower Sindh Mr. Brohi, who is the brother-in-law of Qaim Ali Shah, should confirm this observation.

As a matter of fact, the White Paper itself admits that it does not reproduce all the evidence that this upright regime collected. In the Introduction on page (ii) it states:

It was neither feasible nor useful to reproduce the reports of the Committee in toto.....

Reliance has also been placed, although to the extent of only a couple of excerpts, on a report submitted by a Committee of Inquiry appointed to look into charges of abuse of power and misconduct on the part of Mr. Mohammad Khan Junejo, formerly Home Secretary to the Government of Sindh, now under suspension and detention. Since this report deals only incidentally with his role in the elections and is again a fairly bulky document, it has not been possible to include the whole report as an annexure.

The use of false, erroneous and incomplete material clearly is aimed at discrediting me. The passage under reference appears in the body of the White Paper.

About a month after the Election of March 1977, the Opposition raised a storm over each and every constituency. It wanted the elections to be annulled contending that rigging had taken place in every constituency. It was an untenable position. However, the opposition was placing its reliance on the agitations, not on merits. Its demands became more unreasonable and preposterous as the agitation reached a crescendo. But of all the constituencies in the country, the White Paper has selected only two to illustrate the scale of rigging.

One relates of Yahya Bakhtiar, former Attorney-General and my Defence Counsel. The other concerns a constituency in Abbotabad, which is merely an eye-wash to cover up the malice reserved exclusively for Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar. We can detect these tricks of the trade. The case of Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar is considered to be so scandalous that it has exclusive reference in Chapter IX, in addition to the treatment it receives in Chapter II. It is clear that the compilers of the White Paper have as much hatred for Yahya Bakhtiar as they have for me. This is why Barabus has been chosen in place of John the Baptist and his leader. Of all the most incredulous fables, the White Paper has focused its attention on a constituency in far away and remote Pishin District.

Pages 152 and 153 of the White Paper regarding the curtailment of liberties and facilities demanded by a Counsel and a "convict" need to be quoted to show that only an individual tormented by his guilt would go out of his way to make inapplicable comparisons:

Another directive was issued by Masood Nabi Nur to his Additional Secretary on May 3, 1977 (annexure 138). This flowed from a Cabinet decision taken at a meeting at Government House Lahore, on April 15<sup>th</sup> 1977. The relevant extract from the minutes of the Cabinet meeting reads as follows:

'The Prime Minister was pleased to observe that while the proposed agreement should be approved he wanted to raise another matter. Certain newspapers were publishing messages of people who had been jailed. When a person was sent to jail he was deprived of his liberty and the press could not publish his messages. The Ministry of Information should take action against these newspapers.'

The matter was further discussed at a meeting on May 2<sup>nd</sup> 1977, presided over by the former Prime Minister who was pleased to reiterate that direct and prompt action must be taken against the defaulters. The defaulters naturally meant newspapers which were publishing messages of the people who had already been jailed in connection with the PNA movement.

According to the directive under reference, the Prime Minister also instructed that, if necessary, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting should have in its panel a legal adviser to whom cases of this nature should be referred for advice, in addition to the formal advice which in any case had to be sought from the Law Division. (This may be compared to the facilities demanded by Mr. Bhutto and his Counsel since his conviction.)

On page 155 under the caption "The Squeeze" the author of the White Paper has elaborated on how I "squeezed" my Opponents. What is my squeeze? The Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting suggested certain administrative measure against a newspaper that was fanning the flames of agitation, calling for jihad against the *kafirs*, and stopping at nothing. This newspaper champions the cause of reactionaries obscurantists, bigots and chauvinists.

From the time of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, the newspaper had followed a dogmatic line of intolerance and discrimination. Its files bear witness that it mercilessly attacked and criticized on most untenable grounds, popular Prime Ministers-in particular the first and the second Prime Ministers-like the late Liaquat Ali Khan and the late Khawaja Nazimuddin. At the same time it praised and supported the discredited dictators like Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and the chief Martial Law Administrator Gen. Zia-ul-Haq.

During the spring troubles of 1977, it crossed all bounds. No holds were barred. The Rubicon was left far behind. The government would have failed in its duty to the people if it had provided fuel to this combustive organ, this stormy petrel. Despite the maximum provocation my government did not fabricate a false murder case against the editor, nor did it threaten to hang him

upside down. We did not flog journalists, nor did we steal the printing press of this newspaper, nor stop its publication for a single day. The great squeeze suggested by the minister for information and Broadcasting was.

(a) To stop all government advertisements. The recommendations were confined to government advertisements, and since this is the patronage of government it can be worth drawn by the government.

(b) To start an inquiry into the income-tax return of the editor. Nether harassment nor the imposition of false and punitive income-tax demands were suggested. It was perfectly legitimate for the government to conduct an open and legal inquiry into the lucrative business of this newspaper with a circulation of about 80, 000 copies a day.

(c) To ask the Government of the Punjab to make an inquiry into the property acquired by the editor. This recommendation is not objectionable.

(d) To tell all private concerns to stop sending advertisements to the paper. I did not repeat not agree with this recommendation. This can be verified by glancing at the advertisements published in this newspaper during the period in question.

(e) To ask all provinces, autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies to stop purchasing copies of this paper. This was such a childish recommendation that it would have hurt the minister if I had told him that he was being childish.

The White Paper says that I approved "this rather Draconian suggestion on April 26<sup>th</sup> 1977. "I leave it the people of Pakistan to judge whether this squeeze, even if implemented in full, is more Draconian than what the junta has done and is doing to the press and journalists of Pakistan. In making this evaluation, I ask them to ignore the persecution, victimization and forfeiture of my newspaper and the press. The illegal and forcible seizure of the People's Foundation together with the printing press and *Hilal-i-Pakistan* is theft. It requires the amputation of both hands of the regime according to its own standards. Let us leave those things aside. But I cannot leave aside the flogging of journalists. We cannot forget the closure of '*Al Fateh*' and '*Meyar*'. We cannot forget the summary punishments awarded to our comrades by military tribunals. As I write, journalists are being arrested by the regime. More of them have been on hunger strike in the last six months than the total number who went on hunger strike in the last 30 years.

At page 393 it is stated that "Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar's Chairmanship did not result in any soft corner in the heart of the Committee for the profession to which he belonged." This thoughtful compliment to Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, the then

Attorney General and Chairman of the Law and Order Committee appointed by me, could only have occurred to a well-wisher compiling this monstrous document. He is the only one who can peep into the hearts of individuals to pronounce his Draconian judgments. Since he is bent upon wreaking vengeance on Mr. Bakhtiar, he has sought to prejudice and alienate the legal fraternity from my Defence Counsel.

In the Epilogue at page 403 of the White Paper, it is stated “throughout his tenure in office, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto seemed to have been deeply conscious of his sense of history. He claimed not only to be student of history but also a maker of history.”

In the course of the secret proceedings of the Lahore trial, addressing me with a taunting smile and sarcasm, the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court observed: “You claim to be student of history and I am informed, you also claim to be a maker of history.”

## **Delimitation**

The White Paper makes a considerable fetish over the delimitation of constituencies. The purpose is to establish that I tailored the constituencies, especially that of Gujarat district. This is false. I am not a tailor-master to tailor constituencies. The Gujarat story has been told only to lionize a politician from that district and to show his invincible influence. I am not impressed. I have seen his influence, from the day he used to sit on bench in the corridor of the residence of a former Republican Party Minister in the West Pakistan Government. I know how he came begging to me and fell at my feet when an all-powerful Governor of West Pakistan saw through him and was determined to deal with his shenanigans. I defy the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, who also hails from Gujarat, to contradict me if I am wrong.

It is true that I was inundated by requests and petitions pertaining to delimitations both as Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party and as the Chief Executive. This is normal. Every time delimitation of constituencies is undertaken afresh, politicians knock at many doors. The Election Commission gets besieged by representations both in writing and in person. The question is whether I exercised undue influence or pressure on the Commission for the delimitation of constituencies?

Despite what the Secretary of the Commission says, I can categorically state that I did not show any unusual or abnormal interest in this matter. In fact, even he does not implicate me. He beats around the bush. He mentions the visits of the Deputy Commissioner of Larkana to the office of the Election Commission, he talks mysteriously and vaguely of emergency meetings where new proposals

were discussed. At the same time, he admits that he “could not discover the source from which these new proposals had come.” The long and the short of it is that this hostile individual does not accuse me of exercising undue or improper influence because he cannot.

I am not the least concerned or in any way responsible for the approaches of any party men or politicians of the opposition parties who approached the Chief Election Commissioner with their proposals. They are required to do that under the law and the Election Commission is required to give them a patient and just hearing. It is for the Election Commission to ensure that the legal procedures are followed by the individuals who approach the Commission in this regard.

The White Paper says at page 47 that “among the constituencies which were created under political pressure, a rural constituency was specially formed around Karachi to suit Mr. Hafeez Pirzada”. This is what A. Z. Faruqi, Secretary to the Election Commission says in his statement under Section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code in Islamabad on 30<sup>th</sup> March 1978 as recorded by Abdur Rehman Khan, Deputy Director, Federal Investigating Authority. Annexure 27 indicates on the margin at page A-86 “spare copy for Election Commission” in the handwriting of this Deputy Director of FIA. It is also signed by him.

Whether or not Mr. Hafeez Pirzada had a “very friendly relationship” with the former Chief Election Commissioner, as previously noted, carving out a rural constituency in a metropolis is not a practical proposition. It is not possible to transplant the County of Surrey into the heart of Piccadilly Circus. If a rural region does not exist in the circumference of a city, it cannot be created like a green belt around it. The fact of the matter is that Malir, from where Mr. Pirzada contested his election is a rural outskirts of Karachi. Malir has always been where it is located at present. Malir was not made to walk to Karachi from rural Sukkur. The allegation against Mr. Pirzada is therefore false.

On page 59 the White Paper states: “Mr. Bhutto was not satisfied with whatever had been accomplished in the matter of the delimitation of constituencies. On the margin of every constituency still falling short of his expectations he wrote his comments (Annexure 60) and instructed his Special Assistant who was also his Political Adviser to follow the “marginal instruction.” His comments are deeply instructive and afford more than a peep into his political style. For example, Mir Sundar Khan Sundrani had filed objections in respect of constituencies Nos. PS-11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 in Jacobabad district. Mr. Bhutto wrote; “DO NOT (twice underlined) support Sundrani’s proposal although he is officially in PPP.”

It is the legitimate function of political parties including the ruling party, to make every effort through proper channels to carry the Election Commission's delimitation proposals. This is what we did of legal right. Steadfastness of the ruling party to the principles of good government and the rule of law does not lie in requesting the Election Commission to accept in toto the proposals of the opposition parties as a penalty for being the ruling party. Both points of view are pressed before the Election Commission. The Election Commission takes a decision after hearing the ruling party, and the opposition parties. But it was the right of my party, albeit the ruling party, to get the same opportunity and treatment as the other parties to a fair and full hearing on delimitation of constituencies.

As to my remarks on the objections filed by Mir Sundar Khan Sundrani, here also the compilers betray their prejudice. A fair, impartial man would have given me credit for the remarks in question. He would have thought Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to be a fair minded Prime Minister for alerting his political adviser on the selfish proposals of his own party men. On the other hand, if I had instructed my Political Adviser to support my party men's proposals, the compilers would have accused me of favoritism and partisanship.

I am on cordial terms with Mir Sundar Khan Sundrani. Our families have very old connections. There are many Sundranis in my constituency. As a member of my party and on the personal side, there was every reason for me to support his proposals, but I had to decide on merits. Sundar Khan Sundrani did not have a *locus standi* in all those constituencies of Jacobabad district. His legitimate interest lay in one of the constituencies of that district. Furthermore, it is a matter of record and can be verified that at that particular time, there was considerable tension between Sundrani and his farmers and *haris*. I was naturally supporting his *haris*, the poor, and the downtrodden.

On the same page 59, the White Paper further states; "With regard to NA-157 and NA-158 in Nawabshah, Syed Zafar Ali Shah had filed objections which Mr. Bhutto rejected with a "do not support" remark. About the other constituencies he asked his Special Assistant to consult Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (Chief Minister), Mr. A. W. Katpar, the then President, P.P.P., Sindh or other party stalwarts who could be in the know about the local conditions." Mr. Bhutto had perused this note within 24 hours of its dispatch and marked the file back to Mr. Ramman on February 8<sup>th</sup> 1976. Action was duly initiated but this time it took longer to persuade the Election Commission to do the needful."

There is nothing wrong with the remark "do not support." It does not mean "oppose." But even if it did mean that it should be opposed, the decision would be objective because Syed Zafar Ali Shah is a member of PPP. A year ago I sent Zafar Ali Shah to the United Nations General Assembly. Once upon a time

he was madly in love with a beautiful Canadian. His fragile and charming personality reminds me of the finest flowers of the desert. Tears roll down my eyes as I write these lines. I have seen so much cruelty in the last one year that the memory of such soft spoken and tender souls evokes the strongest emotive feelings in me. Zafar Ali Shah son of Muhammad Ali Shah, grandson of Allahando Shah, great grandson of Nawab Shah of District Nawabshah is one such person. Once again this White Paper has tried to besmirch a friendship.

I now come to the delimitation of the district of Larkana. I was not affected by the delimitation of the district. I can win hands down from any part of this district howsoever it is delimited. If my friends and well-wishers were anxious to display their zeal by putting up different proposals, or if certain individuals were being "more royal than the king", as the saying goes, it does not mean that I was inspiring them to put forward conflicting and overlapping proposals. My correct attitude towards the independence of the Election Commission can be judged by the fact that the Deputy Commissioner of Larkana had to appear before the Commission on no less than four occasions.

At page 50, the White Paper states; "Mr. Khalid Ahmed, then Deputy Commissioner of the "home town" –Larkana–appeared before the Election Commission as many as four times for a redemarcation of the former Prime Minister's own constituency. He first appeared before the Commission on March 25<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> 1975 at Karachi. On April 10<sup>th</sup> 1975, he caught up with the Commission at Lahore and lastly on August 12<sup>th</sup> at Karachi.

If, for the delimitation of my "home town," the Deputy Commissioner of the district had to plead before the Commission for justice on no less than four occasions, in addition to the representations of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Katpar and others, it can be seen that the Chief Election Commissioner and his Commission did not operate under the shadow of my terror. If the Commission was so upish on the delimitations of a district from where I could get returned whatever the decisions, the attitude of the Chief Election Commissioner and his Commission on the remaining constituencies can be assessed and imagined without further comment.

At page 38 of the White Paper it is stated; "The second piece of evidence is Mr. Bhutto's marginal notes on an intelligence report in which it had been reported that Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan had developed social contacts with a certain foreign diplomat. Mr. Bhutto wrote hopefully on the margin, "Interesting Link. Can't we use it more to our advantage? Please discuss." In the Photostat copy of the report (Annexure 35) the name of the diplomat concerned has been deleted to avoid unnecessary complications."

How is the unnecessary complication avoided when the Annexure concerning it at page A-111 as Annexure 35 mentions that on 18<sup>th</sup> September, 1975, the Chief Election Commissioner contacted the “deleted” diplomat on the telephone and told him, *inter alia*, that “he would come to play tennis that very day.” In reply, the “deleted” diplomat, promised to meet him at the tennis courts. Once this much information is given, there is no point in deleting the name of the diplomat or the embassy, because the concerned Embassy would immediately know that the reference is to the diplomat of that embassy.

The date of the telephone conversation is mentioned. More than the date is the information that the meeting between the Chief Election Commissioner and the deleted diplomat would take place on 18<sup>th</sup> September at the tennis courts. There is only one tennis court in Islamabad and that is in the Islamabad Club. Even if there were more than one tennis court, the embassy would know which one it is. It is clear from the conversation that Sajjad Ahmad Jan did not play tennis every day or with every diplomat.

Besides, the White Paper describes the relationship as “social contacts.” What adverse inference can be drawn from my marginal note.” Can’t we use it more to our advantage? Please discuss.” “More to our advantage” does not necessarily mean more to my personal advantage or to that of the party. It might mean more to the country’s advantage. Such a thought would never enter the head of the compiler of this White Paper. He could not understand that the words “our advantage” means the advantage of Pakistan to him, our advantage means what it would mean to usurpers and personal regimes.

Let us take the uncharitable view, the view the permeates throughout the White Paper and put the worst interpretation on my marginal notes, and draw the conclusion that the Chief Election Commissioner was not in my pocket. He was out of my reach and that is why I was keen to catch the tennis balls at the tennis courts. From the information provided, if the embassy knows that the reference provided is to a diplomat of that embassy, there is no earthly reason why the people of Pakistan should be kept in the dark. It is in keeping with the character of such regimes to keep the people in the dark.

However, as national interest in this matter is not compromised, it is my duty to mention that this innocuous social contact was with the former Charged Affaires of the embassy of the USSR, Mr. Illarinov. A complication, if any, necessary or unnecessary, might arise by creating mystery around the matter and thereby arousing suspicion. If the regime is so careful and correct in its approach to foreign affairs, it should have deleted the entire reference. This tantalizing approach is more harmful. An anecdote will illustrate the need for foresight which the present regime lacks. When Mickey Mouse was getting married, his father advised him; “Mickey, if you are a man you should

consummate your marriage on the same day but if you are a mouse, you will do it on the following day." To which, Mickey replied; "Father, I am a dirty rat, I consummated it last night."

Leaders of the people are men and the governments they lead should be honorable. In our revolutionary times, with the earth shattering signs of a third world war on the horizon, there is no place for mice. Agha Shahi of Sukkur and Gadap and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of this regime should take note of this timely warning. He should better advise his uniformed regime that it is wrong to create misunderstandings with a super power over such a trivial matter as a tennis game.

Trivial though it was, this incident serves to show how the regime is putting malicious interpretations on my marginal notes. It tries to imply that the former Chief Election Commissioner was my puppet in this and other matters relating to delimitation. What the White Paper conveniently omits is the decision of the Chief Election Commissioner to increase a provincial seat of Karachi by reducing a seat of Larkana rather than that of any other district in the province of Sindh. A decision of this nature would not have been taken by a puppet of mine. In fact it was well known that the Chief Election Commissioner was more accessible and friendly to PNA politicians. They inundated the Election Commission with proposals on delimitations and many of them were preferred over those of the PPP. Not a word appears in the White Paper on the approaches and influences the PNA politicians had on the Chief Election Commissioner.

The White Paper is distressed by a letter the Chief Secretary of Sindh wrote to my Secretary on the "proposals of the Government of Sindh" on delimitations. There is nothing "curious" or unusual about it. The proposals were not the personal proposal of the Chief Secretary. He was forwarding the proposals of his government and the ruling party, to the Secretary of the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the ruling party. It was not an order. It merely forwarded proposals to my Secretary and not even to the Commission. Similarly, the Chief Minister of Baluchistan sent me the proposals of his provincial Government by a letter written from Quetta on 30<sup>th</sup> December 1975. This is on page 57 of the White Paper.

In fact, Mr. A. Z. Faruqi states that he advised my Political Adviser "to send his representative officially to the public hearing with regard to delimitation, so that the point of view of the Prime Minister's Secretariat could be formally considered by the Commission." Faruqi goes on to confess:

Mr. Tamman said that this was not possible as the Prime Minister would be gravely embarrassed if his representatives took up any position in public, since there were many factions within his own party and he did

not want to appear to favor any one of them. In any case, he said that I should not worry about the judges since they came to the government for very small favors. They would be managed.

This is at page 33. The Secretary to the Election Commission advised my Political Adviser to send an official representative to make proposals but my Political Adviser rejected the suggestions. This shows the extent to which my government was opposed to following wrong procedures. As for the derogatory remarks about the Judges, attributed to my Political Secretary, I can state categorically that these have been mischievously imported into the White Paper on this page and repeated on page 44 with the sole aim of prejudicing the Judges against me and my government.

Mr. Muhammad Hayat Tamman was my Political Adviser and a former Minister in the Government of West Pakistan. He is a cultivated and experienced person. He would never make such cheap remarks. He is a man of few words and could never make the sweeping and unbecoming remarks put in his mouth through a printing machine on two pages of the White Paper. Mr. Tamman's own experience indicates that this influential adviser of mine was unable to persuade the Election Commission on the delimitation of the Provincial constituencies of his district. At page 54 of the White Paper it is mentioned: "Mr. Muhammad Hayat Tamman, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, attempted to persuade the Commission to accept his proposal for the Provincial Assembly constituencies of Campbellpur which was, however, not agreed to by the Commission." This is in spite of the fact that he had been designated by me to remain in touch with the Election Commission.

The accusation that I tailor-made constituencies does not hold water. The little insert about the judges just referred to is particularly venomous. The authors want to leave nothing to chance. For this reason this reference is interested not once but twice, in case, busy as they are and fat as the document is, they would miss it if they happened to glance through the White Paper in haste. It is a crude attempt to arouse the indignation of the judges at a time when my life is in their hands, insofar as human beings have the power to decide

I should now like to turn to the present Chief Election Commissioner's role in the delimitation of constituencies and examine the independent role played by him. On August 6<sup>th</sup> 1978, the Pakistan Times reported, under the heading "E.C. finalizes enumeration programme," *inter alia* that:

The Election Commission in a meeting held in Rawalpindi finalized the tentative enumeration programme and the proposed delimitation of the constituencies. The meeting was held under the Chairmanship of the Chief Election Commissioner, Mr. Justice Maulvi Mushtaq. These

proposals will now go to the Federal Government for approval. The Government has already approved most of the necessary steps for the preparation of holding general elections.

If the Junta is to approve the tentative proposals of the Election Commission on delimitation of constituencies, it means that delimitation is being done by the Junta and not by the Election Commission. It reduces the Election Commission into a mere recommendatory body. Its function is to do the spade work for the Junta to arrive at its decision. According to the Pakistan Times of August 28, 1978, the PNA President has declared that, "it is for the new Cabinet now to oversee the Election Commission work and supervise it." This makes the Election Commission into a valet of the regime.

In view of this revelation, with what justification is the White Paper attacking the legitimate functions of the ruling party to put its proposals to the Election Commission? The Junta has reversed the process. It has subverted the relationship. Still the White Paper has the audacity to attack and criticize the legally permissible role of my government on the delimitation of constituencies.

## 5. The Government Machine

The White Paper has sought to create the impression that as the Chief Executive and the elected leader of my government, both provincial and federal, I should have sat idly by and exercised no authority over the bureaucracy. On the understanding of this norm, it tries to establish that I used to my advantage the bureaucracy, the Election Commission, the intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. It is a preposterous contention. It appears that the present self-imposed and self-appointed masters of Pakistan wanted the elected federal and provincial governments to abdicate their legitimate authority over the State apparatus. Were we expected to request the Opposition to run the government on our behalf?

As if this extraordinary conception were not enough, the Chief Martial Law Administrator observed at Quetta airport on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1978, that, "the bureaucracy was an institution which has its own function"! He pointed out that "as far as our system was concerned the bureaucracy had a definite role to play." He further said, "It cannot take sides, if it takes sides with a particular party, it is not the correct institution. The damage was done by Mr. Bhutto to the institution of bureaucracy. The civil servants are faceless. They are also selfless; they can't come out in the open and have a public meeting and therefore a civil servant who is not playing to the tune of a particular party or certain individual party or is trying to be neutral is not liked under the present context."

*(Pakistan Times 28 July 1978)*

I agree with him. The bureaucracy has a definite role to play under his martial law. The definite role is to fabricate false evidence against me, my family and my party stalwarts; to give false evidence in criminal cases and before Disqualification Tribunals. The bureaucrats are handsomely rewarded if they play this definite role. They are punished and marched off to jails if they refuse. Never before in the history of this country has the bureaucracy been ordered to play as loathsome a role as it is being forced to play today. The bureaucracy has ceased to be an institution. Civil servants are replaced and re-instated to satisfy the capricious whims of the regime. This is their neutrality.

Yes, there are the "faceless" ones in jail; but for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the chosen Brahmans have been nominated to become Advisers and Ministers. In the past some bureaucrats held high political offices, but they went through the elective process. One former bureaucrat became a Prime Minister, but he was elected as the leader of the House by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Another retired bureaucrat became the President of Pakistan but he

was also elected. At one time Vallabhbhai Patel or Morarji Desai or both were in the Indian Civil Service but they resigned and led the freedom struggle. Ayub Khan did not nominate bureaucrats to become Ministers in his Martial Law, or did Yahya Khan. I had two former bureaucrats in my government but both were elected to the Senate. For the first time in our history the present unrepresentative regime has selected and nominated bureaucrats as Advisers and Ministers. One of them has been a *de facto* Prime Minister since July 5<sup>th</sup> 1977. So much for the faceless, selfless and neutral bureaucrats who sit as Ministers and Advisers in this regime.

However, quite apart from the inherent contradictions and anomalies, a higher principle of general importance requires consideration. In discussing this general principle, I am not taking into account the system prevailing in one party state. In such a system the services are a part and parcel of the ruling party. I have in mind the multi-party democratic system. In the multi-party system also, a watertight segregation is impracticable. In the United States of America, the top administrative posts are filled by the party in power. To enable the transition from one Administration to another the American system provides a period of about eight weeks after the elections to effect the enormous changes. In the parliamentary system also, the civil services and the other services are not islands unto themselves, running parallel governments.

In the United Kingdom, the model for us natives, radical changes have taken place. At present, the British system has the institution of Special Advisers. The institution is expanding. During the tenure of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the convention was not to permit more than two Special Advisers for every Cabinet Minister. The Labour Government of the present Prime Minister of Britain, Mr. James Callaghan is considering further improvements in the institution of Special Advisers.

The Armitage Committee on the political activities of Civil Servants accepted the view that Special Advisers should be subject to separate rules issued by the Prime Minister. This institution of Special Advisers has created a comprehensive political network. In June 1974, thirty eight Special Advisers functioned in the British Government. There is talk of increasing the number to around one hundred. They are classified as "Temporary Civil Servants." Whatever the rules might say to the contrary, Special Advisers engage themselves in normal political activities. There is little doubt that the Special Advisers who are "temporary Civil Servants." but who engage in political activities have come to stay in an institutional form in the British Government. This is the position of the faceless, neutral civil servant in the parliamentary democracy of Britain.

The myth of the segregated, neutral civil servant was needed by colonialism. The Imperial power had created a cast iron framework of civil-servants to be unavailable and hence faceless, to the natives; to be neutral in the feuds of the natives and in dealing with the neutrality was tilted from time to time, in favor of one faction or the other to serve the ends of the Raj. This neutrality and facelessness, fraudulent as it was, did not apply to the Imperial Masters. When it came to protecting the interests of Raj, the Indian Civil Service and the other permanent Services played a selfish, fateful and partisan role as the mainstay of the Raj. I am not advocating a One Party System nor offering an apology for the equation of my government with the services. I am briefly clarifying the existing realities of relations between the ruling party and the civil services in contemporary times.

With this background, allow me to quote the White Paper in my support: At page 69 it is stated that Rao Rashid suggested to me that “The Ministers or Chief Ministers have very little time to devote to party matters. Perhaps some of them can be divested of their portfolios to do the party work exclusively.” If the Party and the Government had lost all distinction and separate identities, this “Kamaraj Plan” would not have been put up to me by Rao Rashid as a possible solution to the problems of the Party.

I draw upon another reference in the White Paper which shows my fair-mindedness and my impartiality as a national leader above party prejudices, that I did not blindly follow the party interest—right or wrong. The reference is at page 172:

The party workers, however, greatly resented the association of bureaucrats with arrangements for the finalization of the part set up. But Mr. Bhutto explained to them to them in confidential sessions that ever since his coming to power, he had been persistently hearing complaints that workers of the PPP were, at all levels, terrorizing the bureaucracy, misusing their party position and making money. In his view it was only proper, therefore, that not only the bureaucrats but notable non-party men of the area should also be given a chance to express their views on the antecedents of the proposed office-bearers.

I associated civil servants with my personal staff not to get the civil service merged into the party but to get impartial and disinterested advice on the complaints of the public. The White Paper does not deny this. At page 170 it shows that I gave instinctive preference to the view of politicians over that of bureaucrats: “The OSD’s had in the meantime forwarded their own lists which obviously had little value in view of the recommendations of Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Mr. Jatoi, Mr. Katpar and other stalwarts of PPP.”

If I had taken a blind partisan position at the cost of the masses, I would have let down the masses and their cause. If I had ignored the reasonable interests of the ruling party, the counter revolution of the reactionaries headed by the Chief Martial Law Administrator might have swallowed up the State machinery earlier. I am suffering this ordeal partly because I sought an honorable and equitable *via media* of conflicting interests in order to harmonize our disjointed structure.

It seems that the lesson of this *coup d'état* is that a *via media*, a *modus vivendi*, a compromise, is a Utopian dream. The *coup d'état* demonstrates that the class struggle is irreconcilable and that it must result in the victory of one class over the other. Obviously, whatever the temporary setbacks, the struggle can lead only to the victory of one class. This is their writing on the wall. It bears their signature.

It is a farce to get cold feet over the analytical observations made by my son, Mir Ghulam Murtaza in London. The over-reaction of the reactionaries was a manifestation of their nervousness and guilt. One reactionary Urdu newspaper wants to remind him that as he has a father, Kasuri also had a father. Kasuri has enjoyed the festivity of *holi* with the blood of his father in Los Angeles, New York and Paris at State expense. My sons will not be my sons if they do not drink the blood of those who dare to shed my blood. This is the qualitative difference. Who are my sons? My sons are the masses--Mir Ghulam Murtaza and Shah Nawaz have been taught from birth to be their servants.

## The Intelligence Agencies

The White Paper demonstrates its piety with crocodile tears on the role of the intelligence agencies of the State as a "political arm" of the government of Pakistan People's Party. On page 195 it registers its concern in the following words:

The role of the intelligence agencies of the State as a political arm of the PPP regime, particularly in relation to the general elections, raises many disconcerting questions. When politics permeates such sensitive institutions as the Intelligence Bureau or the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, it naturally defects them from their prime concern with the State's external and internal security. Political bias against dissenting political parties which are a very necessary component of a democratic society also tends to complicate and distort the task of State security.

In further support, at page 197 the White Paper quotes the submissions of A. K. Brohi in the Supreme Court during the hearing of the petition of Begum Nusrat Bhutto. This is what Brohi said:

“The Intelligence Bureau was used throughout this period as an instrument designed exclusively for the personal and political use of Mr. Bhutto.”

Again, there is another reference to the same petition. It occurs on page 181:

Mr. Bhutto gave a similar directive to the Director of Intelligence Bureau. Mr. A. K. Brohi, arguing for the Federation in the detention case of Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, stated, before the Supreme Court:

(a) When the Director of the Intelligence Bureau put up a report to Mr. Bhutto on April, 1976, pointing out the possibility of the opposition parties cooperating with each other, Mr. Bhutto issued the following directions:

Please keep a very close watch. They must not be allowed to come together. It is a matter of principle and not fear. It is your job to keep them apart. I was told that Mr. Rauf Tahir had made a lot of money. When Ghulam Mustafa Khar made him incharge of the Punjab Ghee Board. Why cannot a probe be made.

(b) When a report was made by the Chief Security Officer to the Prime Minister on 5<sup>th</sup> May 1976, about efforts for a merger between the opposition parties, Mr. Bhutto passed the following order:

You cannot permit them to unite. This is your supreme mandate.

On the other hand, the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence Lt-Gen. G. Jilani who allowed himself and his military intelligence to be exploited and misused by me for five and a half years “exclusively for the personal and political use”, according to page 66 of the White Paper and in a report submitted to my government, had observed:

There is no alternative leadership of his (Mr. Bhutto’s) standing and stature, or near his standing and stature, available in the field.

Mr. Bhutto is the only leader with an international standing and image, who has profound knowledge and experience of the interplays of international power politics. He has done a yeoman’s service to Pakistan. He is the symbol of Pakistan’s stability and integrity.

Lt-Gen. Jilani was Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence before I became President of Pakistan on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1971. He remained in this sensitive post upto 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977. Some months after the *coup*, he was made Secretary of Defence. At present he is still holding this equally important post. If

he was in disgrace or, if the regime of his fellow generals considered him to be a supine flatterer of mine, he would have departed from the scene like the many others who were removed on 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1977 or soon thereafter. Except for Lt-Gen. Jilani, all the officials in charge of Intelligence at the federal level were arrested on the night of the *coup*, or within a month of it.

Subject to correction, Rao Abdul Rashid, my Special Secretary was arrested on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, so were Masood Mahmood, Director General Federal Security Force, Shaikh Akram, former Director, Intelligence Bureau. I believe Saeed Ahmad, the Chief Security Officer, was arrested between the middle of July and the beginning of August 1977. Afzal Saeed, my secretary, was arrested in the beginning or middle of August. The former Secretary of the Interior, Fazal Haque was immediately dismissed from Service. The then Interior Secretary, M.A.K. Chaudhry being the brother of the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, was spared the honor. His farewell to arms coincided with the exit of his brother from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

The Chief of Military Intelligence, Lt-Gen. Jilani, was not touched. On the contrary, he remained comfortably where he was and later was sent to the Defence Ministry as its Secretary. Being my main Intelligence Officer for over five year, he was privy to a number of my thoughts. Some of the sensitive subjects I discussed with him in the event of my re-election as Prime Minister of Pakistan were:

(a) The complete reorganization of the federal structure both political and administrative.

(b) The merger of the Central Intelligence Agencies into one integrated intelligence Department divided into two categories:

- (i) Internal
- (ii) External

(c) Reforms.

Lt-Gen. Jilani had animated and stimulating discussions with me on my future plans. If the Junta is really so agitated by the manner in which I used the Intelligence Agencies, Lt-General Jilani, Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence, should have been target number one of his fellow generals.

The Chief Martial Law Administrator never tires of defaming me. He has called me a murderer, a modern Machiavelli. He has accused me of ruining the economy. He claims that on account of me, the country was under the shadow of civil war. He traveled to a number of Muslim countries and to China with State files and documents to convince the leaders of those countries that I was a

murderer and a terrible person. In marked contrast, a few months before the *coup*, Lt-Gen. Jilani had expressed in writing, and I repeat the text:

*There is no alternative leadership of his (Mr. Bhutto's) standing and stature, or near his standing and stature, available in the field.*

*Mr. Bhutto is the only leader with an international standing and image, who has profound knowledge and experience of the interplays of international power politics. He has done a yeoman's service to Pakistan. He is the symbol of Pakistan's stability and integrity.*

When the miserable citizens of this country have been lashed, whipped and given rigorous imprisonments for saying "Jeeyay Bhutto," when women have been *lathi* charged, tear gassed and marched off to jails for praying for me at the shrines of saints, it is difficult to understand how the former Military Chief of Intelligence, who sent such flattering reports on the indispensability of my leadership, retains an important position in the Junta's set up.

This question must be considered in conjunction with Lt-General Jilani's successful effort at influencing me to consider the then Major-General Zia-ul-Haq for the post of Chief of Staff of the Army in supersession of about six Generals. This is only a fraction of the story. But even with this minimal disclosure, I would like to ask who exploited whom? Did the Military Intelligence Chief and his Chief of Staff exploit me or I exploited them?

Recently I read a book by H. R. Haldeman entitled "The Ends of Power." I may be forgiven for making a comparison with a super power. However, as this is not the only comparison I intend to make, I preface my remarks with a modest apology. Haldeman was the Rafi Raza of President Richard Nixon, In "The Ends of Power," Haldeman believes that C.I.A. is not above suspicion in the ultimate ouster of President Nixon; although the original intention might have been to cripple him. On page 27 of his book, Haldeman says, "This time the C.I.A. was ready. In fact, it was more than into what I now believe was a trap."

The following quotations would establish that the comparison is not off the mark. The similarity is so strictly close that it has stunned me:

(a) Nixon was not only demanding the resignation of Cabinet members, presumably to place stronger men in their palace (four of them, in fact, would be reappointed), he was about to initiate a dramatic, even revolutionary, new structure of government."

(b) In the middle of his first term Nixon had introduced a reorganization bill to accomplish that revolution. It was hastily rejected by a nervous Congress. Talk of power accruing it a small handful of White House sides'

filled Congressional halls with fear; even more so when Nixon angrily said that he would accomplish the reorganization by executive order and to hell with Congress-if he won the election.

He won. And he did.

Re-organization is the secret story of Watergate.

(c) Nixon agreed. I'll suggest that we're going to have a house cleaning. It's time for a new team. Period: I'm going to say we didn't do it when we came in before, but now we have a mandate. And one of the mandates is to do the cleaning up that we didn't do in '68."

(d) In January 1973, the U.S. News and World Report: *Behind Nixon's Re-organization*

They're calling it a 'managerial revolution' — the way the President is shuffling jobs and duties. His goal: Get Government operating the way he wants it. Behind the continuing shake-up in top administration jobs is this —

'Richard Nixon, in his second term as President, is determined to assert more effective control and policy direction over the massive Federal bureaucracy. The President is doing this, in part, by placing trusted White House lieutenants-trained for four years in the Nixon way of doing things—in key positions in the operating departments'.

That article appeared on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1973. A few weeks later, after months of 'Post' and 'Times' news stories about Watergate, the Gallup Poll reported that Nixon's popularity (or approval rating) reached an all time high.

The Watergate break-in and the associated revelations of Woodward and Bernstein, had failed to ignite the public. And now Nixon, a President more feared by Democrats and the bureaucracy than any President in this century, was at the peak of his power with control of the government tightly in his hands.

What would happen if Nixon's re-organization went through, and Nixon remained in office? Washington insiders shuddered. Not only would he tightly control all reins of the government through eight top officers in the White House; he would plant his own 'agents' in key positions in every agency of the government.

It was too much for those who feared Nixon. Then suddenly like a ripe plum dropping from a tree, Watergate split wide open in late January 1973.

A reprieve Nixon could be deflected, perhaps even crippled. At the worst he could be thrown on the defensive, unable to pursue his plan to grip the government in a way that had never been done before.

(e) There are four major power blocks in Washington: they are beginning with the most important:

1. Press
2. The Bureaucracy
3. The Congress
4. The Intelligence Community

Each of them was under threat by the President in January 1973, who was at the height of his popularity with the American people. Each of them reacted with special ferocity because that President was Richard Nixon. And in the months of January, February and March of 1974, they would mount a war on the White House.

I am not trying to equate myself with the President of the United States, nor my under-developed country with a super power. If Washington has four major power blocks, Islamabad also has four major power blocks:

- (a) The Military
- (b) The Bureaucracy
- (c) Big Business
- (d) The Politicians

I was at the height of my popularity with the masses when the conspiracy started against me. Initially, the PNA movement had failed to ignite the public. I was to embark on a massive reorganization and reform programme on the strength of my fresh mandate after the elections of March, 1977. This was known to what Haldeman calls, "the Intelligence Community". There was a "Deep Throat" in my administration who was providing "inside information" to an Urdu newspaper during the critical months of the upheaval. This is how I used the Intelligence Agencies for personal and political ends. There is a touch of irony throughout the White Paper but this is where it touches a very sore point.

How did Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan use the intelligence, Yahya Khan used to the hilt the intelligence agencies for political purposes to divide the politicians and to influence the elections of 1970. I should know because, at that time, I was at the receiving end. My party was subjected to enormous pressures by the intelligence agencies. After the elections of 1970 and until the collapse of Yahya Khan's Martial Law, the intelligence agencies both civil and military, tried to penetrate into my party to influence and contaminate the elected representatives.

Before leaving for London in January 1972 Mujib-ur-Rehman told me that he wanted to lay his hands on five persons from West Pakistan and hang them in Paltan Maidan. Out of the five, two belonged to the civil and military intelligence. Mujib-ur-Rehman gave me an elaborate account of their mischief in

the political field. I told him that our experience was not dissimilar. Ayub Khan also used the intelligence agencies for political purposes to the hilt. He tried to break DAC through the civil and military intelligence. He tried to prevent my party from getting off the ground through the intelligence agencies. He tried to sabotage our foundation meetings on 30<sup>th</sup> November and 1<sup>st</sup> December 1967, and it was through the intelligence agencies that he tried to stop my movement against his regime. I shall cite only three instances to illustrate Ayub Khan's exemplary use of the intelligence agencies.

(a) When the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 started, our Military Intelligence was not able to locate the whereabouts of the Indian Armoured Division. Ayub Khan was furious. He summoned the Director General Inter-Service Intelligence, to his office in Rawalpindi. Brigadier Riaz Hussain, later General Riaz Hussain, the Governor of Baluchistan in Yahya Khan's regime, was the Director General. As Foreign Minister, I was present.

Ayub Khan gave hell to Riaz Hussain. He told him that Military Intelligence had let down the country. I told Brigadier Riaz Hussain that the Armoured Division of India was not a needle in a haystack. With an injured tone of voice, President Ayub Khan said "It is a monster and not a needle!" He kept pressing Brigadier Riaz Hussain to explain to him what had gone wrong with the Intelligence Service. With a quivering voice, Brigadier Riaz Hussain replied, Sir, from June 1964, Military Intelligence has, been given political assignments on elections and post-election repercussions." A couple of days later, we located Indian Armoured Division by chance and not due to the work of the intelligence agencies. An Indian dispatch rider was shot by a Mujjahid in Jammu. From the papers recovered from the rider, much to our relief we got the information we required.

(b) On the specific instructions of Ayub Khan the intelligence agencies blocked General Azam's candidature as a Presidential rival in 1964.

(c) In the beginning of November, 1964, a very close friend of mine and a prominent politician of East Pakistan came to see me at my residence at 70, Clifton, Karachi. He was a leading figure of COP. After dinner and shortly before leaving, he made his small eyes smaller, and told me that a former Prime Minister of Pakistan would explode a bombshell in a month's time that would send Ayub Khan and all of us flying into the air.

I tried to play down his remarks as a prank. He then told me: "Look here my friend. I do not know the details but it has something to do with a telegram Ayub Khan sent from Washington to the then Prime Minister of Pakistan on President Nasser." (At that time Ayub Khan was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.) When I returned to Rawalpindi, I mentioned the talk to President Ayub

Khan. He started to reflect. For a moment he gazed at the ceiling picked up the scissors on his desk and told me, "But that was long ago and I do not exactly remember what I wrote," He then added: "It was a no-circulation telegram." He further mentioned that he had burnt the Embassy copy in our Chancery in Washington and, on his return to Pakistan; he had seen to it that the Foreign Office copy and the other two copies were also destroyed.

I told him that apparently the old man took the cypher telegram with him when he ceased to be Prime Minister. I further suggested to Ayub Khan that if he remembered what he had done with the copies of the cypher message, he should try to recollect what he wrote. He told me that it was more important to get the telegram.

He buzzed the inter-connector and said to his Military Secretary, "Nawazish, please ask the DIB and the DG, ISI to come over immediately." Within half an hour both were in the office of the President. Ayub Khan narrated to them what I had told him and also what he had told me. After that, he leaned forward and told them: "Gentlemen, I want that bloody telegram, even if it costs all the gold in Fort Knox."

Within about 20 days I was asked by the ADC to the President to see Ayub Khan at once. When I went into his office, a beaming Ayub Khan waved the cypher telegram in the air and handed it to me. After reading it, I told him, "Mr. President, my fingers are burning. Please burn this document at once." Ayub Khan had given up smoking. I smoked cigars but never carried matches or a lighter. I put my hand in silver cigarette box on the desk and politely handed the matches to Ayub Khan for him to perform the ritual. It was an excellent political job done by an intelligence agency. But it was for the person of the President and for his stakes in an election

I can go on, but the point has been made. The intelligence agencies of my times did not perform the skullduggery they did for the Martial Law dictators. We know what these agencies are doing at present. All will be revealed with the passage of time.

## **The Image Makers**

Having dealt in broad outlines with the principal aim of the release of the White Paper at this point of time, its authorship, the Election Commissioner and the Election Commission, past and present, the difference between planning and preparing for an election and rigging or manipulating it as a policy of government, the relationship between the ruling party and officialdom and the utilization of the ministries and departments under the jurisdiction of

government, I shall now deal with some of the officials who figure prominently in the White Paper.

Much space in the White Paper has been consumed by the so-called "Image-Makers" of mine. Since my image is engraved in the hearts of the toiling masses, it would be superfluous to pay any attention to this particular canard. Recalling the role of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and its high and mighty officials in building the image of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, the father of Martial Law, during his "golden era" and "decade of reforms," I shall abstain from discussing this subject.

The officials worthy of note are:

- (a) Mr. Vaqar Ahmed, Establishment and Cabinet Secretary,
- (b) Mr. Muhammad Hayat Tamman, Political Adviser;
- (c) Mr. Afzal Saeed, Secretary to the Prime Minister;
- (d) Mr. Rao Abdur Rashid Khan, Special Secretary.

Not being a bureaucratic or a military politician, my unalterable political principle has been to rely on the advice of politicians for my political decisions. I have welcomed advice from all quarters, but my political judgments have been based on the advice of my political comrades. I mentioned this when talking about the bureaucracy. I am a man of the masses. I am a creation of the people. As such, it is inconceivable for me to become politically dependent on bureaucrats. It is against the grain of my temperament and repugnant to my political philosophy. The only test for me is the people, and this test is met by political and not by bureaucratic means.

Mr. Vaqar Ahmad did hold a key post in my administration. I met him a few weeks before his appointment in 1974, I had not met him in the intervening ten years. Soon after Mr. Hanif Ramay became the Chief Minister of Punjab, he urged me to grant an interview to a well known scholar. When the gentleman met me the only subject he raised was to request me to utilize the experience and ability of Mr. Tamman in the province of Punjab. I said that I would examine his recommendation.

When Mr. Ramay met me later that day, I told him that he could have approached me directly to request Mr. Tamman's appointment as his Adviser in the province. He showed complete surprise, stating that he did not favor Mr. Tamman's appointment in the province. Obviously, I had misunderstood, but this did not prevent me from keeping my commitment to Mr. Ramay's friend by appointing Mr. Tamman in my Secretariat. This is how Mr. Muhammad Hayat Tamman, a non-PPP retired politician from district Campbellpur became my Political Adviser. It had nothing to do with the so-called "Model Plan of Larkana" in far away Sindh.

Rao Abdur Rashid was Inspector General of Police in the province of Punjab. When Sadiq Hussain Qureshi became the Chief Minister of Punjab after settling down, he wanted "his man" to become the Inspector-General of Police of the province. In these circumstances, I appointed Rao Abdur Rashid, Special Secretary, more to accommodate the wishes of the Chief Minister of Punjab than to place a Svengali in my Secretariat. If he wrote candid notes, it did not mean that he had become my Principal Adviser as the White Paper endeavors to suggest. I encouraged officials and ministers who were in regular contact with me to be forthright in expressing their views. The White Paper goes out of its way to create the impression that Rao Abdur Rashid acquired a dominant influence in the formulation of my policies, which is untrue.

At page 17 the White Paper states: "The note was forwarded by the former Prime Minister to his Special Secretary, Rao A. Rashid Khan, who had emerged as a powerful figure dealing with security and election affairs." At page 36 the White Paper states: "Rao A. Rashid Khan, Special Secretary to the former Prime carried out a tour of all the provinces and submitted a detailed report to Mr. Bhutto on May 13, 1976."

At page 69 the White Paper states: "Rao A. Rashid in fact became so powerful that he commented rather freely on the performance of the central ministers including senior ones like Sheikh Rashid and Malik Meraj Kahlid, party stalwarts like Dr. Mubashir Hassan, provincial chief ministers and provincial ministers. Most of the times his remarks were uncomplimentary as per Annexure 31. His suggestions and recommendations were generally acted upon by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto as the latter's numerous marginal notes; either cited already or to be cited in the succeeding chapter, would tend to show."

This is an attempt at "over-killing." I have pointed out in the course of this rejoinder that I rejected many of the recommendations of Rao Rashid. The White Paper even confirms this. Rao Rashid did not attend a single important political meeting of my inner council. Mr. Muhammad Hayat Tamman attended one or two of these meetings, but after that he was also excluded because a member of the Central Committee of the party and a Cabinet minister raised objections to the participation of even Mr. Tamman, who was more like a politician than a bureaucrat like Rao Rashid. Neither my convictions nor the ethics of Pakistan People's Party would permit me to make a professional bureaucrat so powerful as to tower above my political comrades. A "legalistic" approach has been taken by the author of this White Paper to project this impression. The motive is not without "mens rea." The overkill has a purpose:

(1) While in the detention and custody of Martial Law "gladiators," Rao Rashid refused point blank to implicate me in false cases. After months of

vigorous but unsuccessful efforts, the captors dismissed him from service and released him.

(2) On his release from detention, he filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court giving the details of the cocktail of threats and inducements administered to him in order for him to implicate me by hook or crook in false cases, including, I believe, election rigging.

(3) Soon after he filed this now historic affidavit in the Supreme Court, he was re-arrested and his wife was put under house arrest.

(4) He made a critical analysis of the prolonged presence of the army in Baluchistan, which I have already quoted in this rejoinder and which appears at pages 72-5 of the White Paper. His "comprehensive note" of July 13<sup>th</sup> 1976, appears as Annexure 69-B.

(5) Rao Rashid agreed with the views of the Chief Secretary of Baluchistan, Syed Munir Hussain who, in his letter of 29<sup>th</sup> October 1976, addressed to Rao Rashid stated inter alia:

"There is no doubt that there is resentment amongst the local civil officers in Baluchistan against the induction of army officers in government departments." Actually the subject of civil-military relations and in particular, the secondment of army officers in Baluchistan, was initiated by Rao Rashid on 12<sup>th</sup> June, 1976. When Nasrum Minallah, who succeeded Syed Munir Hussain as Chief Secretary of Baluchistan, raised this subject and that of the curtailment of the role of the army in the province in a restricted conference in Quetta, there was consternation among the Generals who attended that conference. He paid for those remarks by being thrown out from the post of Chief Secretary of Baluchistan soon after the imposition of Martial Law.

(6) The remarks of Rao Rashid quoted on page 23 of the White Paper have touched a raw nerve. He states that "the only credit the army can take in this country is for holding the first and only fair election" and that "the army officers still talk about it with pride."

Rao Rashid does not give credit to the army for its military performance. Howsoever commendable the army's role in holding fair elections may be, this function is exclusively a civil function and not a military feat. It will not go down in the military annals. It is like saying that the only credit that the Red Army can take is to have organized a successful mass inoculation campaign in the Soviet Union, or that the only credit the People's Liberation Army can take is to have killed all the mosquitoes in China. Manning the polling stations does not warm the blood of warriors.

What has made the comment unpalatable is that, as a result of this Martial Law in future the army will not be able to take even this much credit. Due to partisan policies of this Martial Law, the army has surrendered its pretence of

neutrality. If it cannot take even this one and only limited credit, it cannot justify its existence by holding its own people in bondage. Therefore, the ulterior motive of projecting Rao Abdur Rashid Khan as my closest adviser and confidant is to neutralize or minimize the ring of truth in the words of his affidavit, to discredit him. He has to be punished for the affidavit and for not co-operating in involving me in criminal litigations, to take revenge for his views on the protracted presence of the army in Baluchistan, for his criticism of the induction of army officers in the civil service and for saying that the one and only credit the army can take is to have held fair elections in the good old past. For him to go through what I am facing, he has to be projected as the second most powerful man in my government. This is the *raison d'être*.

## 6. The “Larkana-Plan”

I intend to deal swiftly with what the White Paper calls the “Model Election Plan.” Anyone familiar with my method of work, language and style would instantly see that I did not prepare this clumsily drafted plan. I lay down broad outlines of principles. My comrades make the plans on the basis of my guidelines. My Secretary, Mr. Afzal Saeed, would have known if I had drafted the plan. According to the White Paper, it runs to 79 foolscap typed pages and has four types of proformas. He could not have remained ignorant of such a major undertaking of the Prime Minister, and at page 160 he is quoted as having said: *“I have no knowledge as to who had prepared this plan.”*

He dealt with all my papers. He is supposed to have taken funds on my behalf from a foreign head of state. He signed cheques. He traveled with me wherever I went, but he did not know that I was busy preparing a model plan for the elections of Pakistan. This so-called “Larkana Plan” was prepared by a devoted follower. He came to “Al Murtaza” bubbling with enthusiasm, telling me that he had worked 12 hours a day on it. He thought it was a masterpiece. When I put it aside without looking at it, he was visibly hurt. Speaking with emotion, he said that he worked like a slave on it but I did not as much as spit at it. This is what he said in Sindhi. He is a sensitive and highly-strung person. It was obvious I had upset him, perhaps hurt him, and that in the presence of others, which made me feel worse. I wanted to make some spontaneous gesture to put balm on his injured feeling. I picked up his masterpiece and signed it. After signing it, I told him that it was not his plan but my plan. He was thrilled. The person is alive and there were also a number of other persons present when this happened.

I never saw the plan again, neither on that day nor on any day thereafter. The covering note of 11<sup>th</sup> April 1976, and the second note of 12<sup>th</sup> April 1976, was written to dispose of the plan and the additional material sent by my friend when he returned to his house. Perhaps he had forgotten to bring it with the original papers. Those who have worked with me know that I did my file work without undue delay. It was not my practice to retire until I had completed my workload of the day. Sometimes this habit took me into the early hours of the following day. The irony of this hoax is that the famous plan and its supplement were among the few documents I forwarded without bothering to read.

When would I have the time to sit down to write proformas? Even if I did have the time, I would not insult myself by writing proformas, stating name and father’s name; caste; religion; age up to September 1976, etc. Casually, I marked it for the attention of Mr. Rafi Raza, who was receiving a legion of similar

proposals. If this so-called Model Plan had been mine, I would not have chosen the Warah-Dokri constituency as a basis, but the Larkana-Ratodero constituency or the Mirokhan-Shahdadkot constituency from where my family members and I contest the elections. I know these two constituencies like the back of my hand, especially the Larkana-Ratodero constituency. I would not have chosen the one constituency with which I was the least familiar among the three constituencies of district Larkana.

Secondly, if this had been my Model Plan, it would have been implemented somewhere or other. It was not implemented anywhere. It was filed among the election papers for no further action. It is absurd to say that it became the basis for elections in the whole of Pakistan. If that were the position, why are the fictitious tales of my Military Secretary flying to Abbotabad to interfere and many other solo exercises mentioned? I repeat, I never saw this plan, nor called for it, and never relied upon it. I had forgotten all about it.

When I heard of the “Larkana Plan” for the first time in a television newscast, while undergoing the trial at Kot Lakhpat jail, my initial reaction was that, as usual the regime was being childish, trying to find a counterpart of the London Plan in the form of a political stick. It made sense in the context of the then recent release of the president of NAP. He was barnstorming in the Punjab in those days, abusing and attacking me with gusto. He was getting Hollywood publicity. I was rather amused by the parallel between the London Plan and the Larkana Plan. When I saw the White Paper, on reading the contents, the events returned to my mind.

The sentimentalist that I am, I put my signature on a piece of paper to atone for the insult I caused to a close friend. At the time, I could hardly have imagined that a well-meaning gesture would lead to this gimmick. Who could imagine then that a special breed of bloodhounds would be let loose to scent the blood? For the sake of argument, even if I did accept the so-called Larkana Plan to be mine and commended it for consideration and scrutiny, does it mean that I committed rigging or that any of its “illegal or improper” features became the official policy for my government to act upon?

Having dealt with “plans” model and manipulated I come to “assessment” exercises. No more than common sense is required to understand that systematic and periodical reviews and assessments would not have been carried out if the object were to defraud the electorate. There are crosscurrents, which contradict each other. As Sherlock Holmes would say, “elementary my dear Watson.” What can I do if this Watson’s pernicious prejudice does not permit him to see the obvious?

The White Paper mentions that Rafi Raza held two meetings on election

matters and sent me a note on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1976. The note has been reproduced in its entirety as Annexure 17 on page A-58. This note indicates nothing beyond a thorough exercise to propose and plan for the elections. It mentions “the likely election issues, both positive and negative,” discussed in the two meetings. Anticipating the many likely issues that might get kicked around in our brand of elections, the note mentioned “normalization with India, including compromise on Kashmir.” Again, giving the most uncharitable interpretation to anything having to do with me, the author of the White Paper has seized upon this innocent passage of one line as something being rotten in the State of Denmark. On page 107 of the White Paper an attempt has been made to sow suspicion on a Kashmir compromise. With warped delight the White Paper says; “An important thing to note about the issues discussed is the normalization of relations with India, including a compromise on Kashmir’.”

In order to emphasize my perfidy, the words “including a compromise on Kashmir” have been put in italics. Rafi Raza’s note does not say that my government has compromised Pakistan’s Position on Kashmir and that the position would attack it on that basis. All kinds of false and absurd allegations are made by the opposition in an election campaign. When I came back from Simla with laudable accomplishments, the opposition accused me of “a sell out”. When I returned from the United States with the ten year old arms embargo lifted instead of complimenting me, the opposition made the false charge that I had granted a base to the United States in Baluchistan. When I increased the military and economic collaboration with Iran and the Shahinshah of Iran provided aid of one billion dollars in addition to the joint industrial projects, the opposition told the lie that a bogus secret agreement had been made with Iran on oil concession in Pakistan.

Knowing the mentality of the opposition, my Government was merely anticipating the lies the opposition would try to spin from its fertile imagination during the elections. The favorite one is always on Kashmir. Hence, it was no more than an exercise to anticipate election issues-true and false, positive and negative. Indeed, subsequent events have more than shown that my government remained unflinchingly committed to the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The Chief Martial Law Administrator is the one who is on heat to make a compromise. To pave the way for it, he is trying to condition the people on falsehoods like the non-existent “secret clause” On Kashmir.

Conveniently, the White Paper is silent on the likely election issue raised in the note on the trial of Yahya Khan. At page 63 it says that my Advisers anticipated that “There is going to be a strong demand inside the Assembly and outside that Yahya Khan and others should be brought to trial.” The White Paper does not draw an adverse deduction from the demand for Yahya Khan’s trial.

The regime has a soft spot for the disgraced predecessor of the present Chief Martial Law Administrator and intends to misuse him against me. So not a word of criticism appears on this topical issue.

Pages 109-113 of the White Paper discuss the subject of "Public Opinion Polls." If public opinion polls fall under the category of an election malpractice, then the United States of America is the worst culprit and defaulter of democracy. The close runners-up would be Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and all other democracies. In that event, only brothers Zia and Mobutu would be the democrats. These brothers, and others like them, do not have to take gallop polls. They are here on a divine mission. They gallop over bodies of people. They do not need polls to count the heads of the people.

In the spirit of preparing for the worst and hoping for the best, Rao Abdur Rashid submitted a note to me on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1976, on "Main Election issues to be faced by the Government Party."

When I instructed Rao Abdur Rashid to prepare a note anticipating the likely issues the opposition might throw up in the elections, I told him to give me the darkest possible picture. I told him I wanted to read a note that would put me on the alert and not make me feel complacent. But with all the pessimism collected in one note, the conclusion reads: "The Government, however, should have no difficulty in countering all such allegations in the realm of foreign policy, the ruling party can claim more feathers in her cap than all the previous regimes together. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Pakistan has gained the position of one of the leaders of the Third World, starting from that of a defeated nation in 1971. The holding of the Islamic Summit, which will go down in the history of Islam as landmark is a glorious achievement without parallel. The bold decision to quit the Commonwealth, establishing relations with North Korea and Vietnam, the Prime Minister's tours of various countries, lifting of embargo on arms supply by the U.S., striking a balance in relationship with Big Powers through bilateralism, getting the oil rich states to invest in Pakistan industries, are some of the most remarkable events. In case of India too, the return of 95,000 P.O.W.s, the regaining of territories occupied in war, opening up a new relationship with Bangladesh and supporting her on the question of Farraka can be quoted as measures of non-submission to Indian pressure in spite of being without any cards in hand on Simla Conference Table!"

(Page 122 of the White Paper)

During the elections, when it came to filth, and abuse, vulgarity and meanness, the PNA would not find a peer anywhere in the world to match it in degeneracy and decadence. The PNA, preaching Nizam-i-Mustafa, painted the darkest picture of moral depravity and of shameless slander.

In the range of assessments and plans, the White Paper has taken exception to the following among others:

- (a) Proposals and suggestions sent from the general public, from individuals unknown to me,
- (b) Proposals and suggestions sent by individuals known to me but not at my behest,
- (c) Proposals and suggestions sent by Party leaders and workers,
- (d) Complaints of Party leaders, Ministers and Party workers,
- (e) "New ideas" sent by journalists.
- (f) My tours as Prime Minister of Pakistan within the country,'
- (g) Celebration of Peasants week, Labour week, Students week, Women's week and other weeks including Minorities week.
- (h) Mass Gymnastic Display: I considered it to be a major achievement of my government. The young participants were not eligible to vote.
- (i) Ballet: if I were not writing this ballet from Rawalpindi jail I would have broken down with laughter. The White Paper wants to leave nothing to chance. It is a "do or die" affair, which includes a ballet in its Battle Plan against the enemy.
- (j) Opinions of "Outside observers."
- (k) Preparation of the Election Manifesto.

These and other ridiculous charges have been made in the White Paper to nail me for election malpractices.

An adverse inference is sought to be drawn from the assessments undertaken from time to time on the results of the election. The last one was made in Lahore on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1977, three days before the polling date. Actually, it was 5<sup>th</sup> March 1977. The meeting started at 2.15 a.m. on my return from a magnificent procession and public meeting in Lahore.

The White Paper seems to think that the assessment or estimation of individuals can be right or wrong in their assessments. In the Presidential elections of the United States in 1948, almost everyone thought that Thomas H. Dewey, the Republican candidate and Governor of New York, would easily defeat President Harry S. Truman. President Truman won the elections in "Give 'em hell" hard-hitting campaign, in which he threatened to recall the 80<sup>th</sup> Congress.

So confident were the counter parts of the American PNA about Dewey's victory that the Chicago Tribune headlined its issue of similar prejudices, the author of the White Paper wants to deny me the fruits of my victory by saying that the party secured more seats than those estimated by the Chief Secretary of

the Punjab, the Secretary-General of the Pakistan People's Party and others. This is carrying prejudice to obscurity.

However, the crucial admission of the victory of my Party is contained on page 207 of the White Paper. This is the operative part:

It will be seen that the final results are an improvement upon the unsigned assessment as well as upon the joint DIB/ISI assessment of March 4, 1977 (Annexure 187) which gave a total of 122 seats to PPP including those discussed in the 'remarks column. Against Punjab, this column carried recommendations, this being the most important province, nothing should be left to chance.' The joint assessment was sent under a covering note duly signed by the Director, Intelligence Bureau.

The joint DIB/ISI assessment report of the results made on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1977, only three days before the polls is reproduced as Annexure 187 at Page A-516, dated 4<sup>th</sup> March 1977, states "As directed, a *fresh conservative* assessment of the General Elections to the National Assembly, scheduled for March 7, 1977, is submitted for the kind information of the Prime Minister." Paragraph three of this report states "The overall Province-wise estimate, *as of today*, is placed opposite at Annexure A'.

In reproducing extracts of this vital joint report in the body of the White Paper, the words "*a fresh conservative assessment*," although underlined by the authors have been omitted. Also, there is no mention of Paragraph three of the joint report in the body of the White Paper. "*As of Today*," underlined by the authors, is omitted.

This is how the White Paper distorts and twists the Annexures in the body of the document. Obviously it is done with maladroitness intentions. It wants the public to miss out the material, which exonerates me and my government.

The joint DIB/ISI Report read as a whole shows that the estimate was "*conservative*" and "*as of today*." The words "*as of today*" are as important as the word "*conservative*," because after 26<sup>th</sup> February 1977, the position of my Party was improving hour by hour. There was a complete swing in favor of the ruling party. Knowing this, the Joint Report stated "*as of today*" and underlined it.

The White Paper says "it will be seen that the final results are an improvement upon the joint DIB/ISI assessment of March, 4<sup>th</sup> 1977 which gave a total of 122 seats to the PPP." It conveniently fails to mention that firstly, it is an assessment. The actual results can be better or worse. Secondly, it deliberately fails to mention that the Joint report has qualified the assessment as being a "*conservative*" assessment. Thirdly, being aware of the sharp and continuing

swing towards PPP, the White Paper intentionally omits the words “as of today.” This one example of tailoring of documents sufficient to show how deep is the mala fides. This will give the reader a glimpse what must have been done to the other documents in federal and Provincial Secretariats. The more important factor is that the Chief Military Intelligence, Lt-Gen. G. Jilani, whose military personnel prepared this report, absolves my government of election Practices. This in turn means that the army absolves my government of election frauds. The position of my party, my government and my person has been vindicated by this Joint Report of DIB/ISI, which, in reality, is the testimony of the armed forces.

This authentic document shows that the Chief of Military Intelligence was of the firm opinion that my government would secure a comfortable majority in the election. It was his conservative estimate that my party would capture 122 seats in the National Assembly. He further believed that the situation was becoming more and more favorable to my party. This means that the armed forces were fully in the picture, that the Generals knew that my party was sinning the elections in a clean contest. In these circumstances, the only other inference that can be drawn from this report is that the Generals collaborated with my government to manipulate the election results.

## **A Clean, Fair Fight**

I have shown how, in its desperate venture to establish rigging the bulkily White Paper brazenly doctors documents. It suppresses and destroys all the evidence, oral and written, which demonstrates my innocence. As I have said, I sent numerous written directives to high officials and to my ministers in the federal and provincial ministers, warning them in the sternest terms against any form of malpractice. I clearly recall a letter, which I sent on 9<sup>th</sup> September 1976, to all the Chief Ministers in which I said: “I have promised fair elections to the people. We must prepare for them like a battle.” I administered the same warning in the many conferences called at the federal and provincial levels to discuss elections. Ministers and officials attended these conferences.

One Chief Minister asked me why I kept repeating again and again that the elections will have to be conducted in a fair manner I told him that I had to remember and remind my administration of the past history of elections and also because I did not want to rely on his advice for matters relating to the services, but not for politics, nor elections.

Mr. Afzal Saeed has been mentioned in the White Paper in connection with party funds and also with the alleged financial contribution of an unnamed Head of State. I will deal with Mr. Afzal Saeed in this respect when I come to that subject. At this juncture, should like to emphasize that the credibility and veracity of this official has been destroyed by the White Paper itself.

For instance on page 77 it states: "But Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan ever alert to the dominant mood of Mr. Bhutto prepared the case the requisite stance." Again on page 218 it states: "Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan was, however, discrete enough to note, the next day, that the enquiries had confirmed the points relating to the role of Mr. Ali Hassan Manghi. He made no reference to Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto."

Taking into account the detention of Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan in early or mid-August 1977, and his subsequent house arrest after many months of detention, it would not be unfair to say that, as the White Paper confirms that Afzal Saeed Khan was "discrete," he clearly thought "discretion to be the better part of valour whilst he was in the iron hands of Martial Law torment. If this official was "alert to the dominant moods" of a civilian Prime Minister, it would not be unreasonable to expect that he would be in alert to the predominant moods of a military dictator who has made no secret of his hatred for me.

It is also necessary to mention that Mr. Afzal Saeed's wife is the niece of Maulana Maudoodi. This was pointed out to me when I was considering appointing him as my Secretary. I rejected the objection of the relationship on the grounds that I had nothing to hide. Now, Maudoodi's and his party's affiliations with the Chief Martial Law Administrator are well known. The White Paper condemns Afzal Saeed's integrity and it impugns his character. It has portrayed him as a weakling incapable of resisting dominant moods. The dominant mood of Martial Law knows no elaboration when it comes to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his family and his party. Afzal Saeed has been described in such a way as to make his testimony unworthy of consideration or credibility, yet it wants the reader to believe what he has to say against me. I shall elaborate on him later. Suffice it to say, in words that Yahya Bakhtiar would use, that Afzal Saeed goes down the drain, condemned not by me but by those who want him to be believed.

Muhammad Hayat Tamman was known to me casually when he was Railway Minister in the Government of West Pakistan. Until Generals to grab power on the excuse of unfair elections, I told him that the Army had exercised political power for over twelve years or more. The army hierarchy had enjoyed the privilege of political power to such an extent that, even after the debacle of East Pakistan within a year, some of the senior officers were plotting a *coup d'état*.

I told him that they could forget East Pakistan so easily and plan a *coup* for 1973; they must be itching for an opportunity to leave the barracks and come to Government houses. I further told him that the earlier *coup d'état* had served one half of the country. Another would complete the job. For this reason I was anxious not to give them the faintest opportunity to play fucks and drakes for the third time.

When I summoned all the Commissioners of Punjab to Lahore on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1977, I made it clear to them that the best way they could serve my government and the country was to make certain that the elections were fair and impartial. I remember telling them not to “kill me with kindness.” I told them bluntly that if they permitted malpractices, my party might get few more seats but it would be a Pyrrhic victory. The army would step in. I went to the extent of warning the party workers on the same lines. My attitude is reflected in the White Paper on page 112. “I am not thinking of my elections, I am thinking of the requirements of modern governments.”

I do not have to dilate on these remarks. The more modern the government, the more advanced the country, the less are the prospects of rigging.

During the trial at Lahore on two or three occasions, the Public Prosecutor wrongly alleged in the Court that since April 1977, that is, three months before the *coup d'état*, I was busy removing incriminating documents from my Secretariat. If I had really undertaken such an exercise, I would have removed all the incriminating documents relating to the elections before taking a document or any other subject. Since I always apprehended that the army would use an election campaign and its aftermath to intervene, documents relating to elections would have taken precedence over all other documents.

Secondly, I could not have done this kind of work personally. The nature of the work entailed setting up teams at the federal level and at the level of all the four provinces to break down the mountain of papers accumulated over the years. I need go no further, as on pages (i) and (ii) of the Introduction, the White Paper ungracefully and grudgingly states:

The documents have been painstaking assembled from a wide variety of sources. Attempts were, of course, made by those closely associated with Mr. Bhutto's administration to suppress or destroy part and the evidence/documents. But in a strange way Mr. Bhutto seemed to believe in his own in-dispensability and success. He and his associates therefore were not afraid of reducing things to writing. They left behind a record which is more or less complete and leaves nothing to conjecture.

This is a lame explanation. Let us agree with the complex ridden authors of the White Paper that I believed in my “own in-dispensability and success.” But even so, in the beginning of April 1977 I should also have considered it indispensable to destroy documents that would implicate me in election malpractice. As the White Paper confesses, this was not done. It was not done not due to the mystical explanation it offers. It was not done because we had no reason to feel guilty. This is why I “and my associates” were not afraid of

reducing things to writing. Even a Muslim in name is Muslim enough to know that a man is mortal. We reduced things to writing because our intentions were honorable, because we were doing no wrong to conceal that wrong.

There is further material in the White Paper to show that rigging was not done.

(a) Appearing before the Inquiry Committee, the former Chief Secretary of NWFP, Syed Munir Husain has stated, inter alia, as reported on page 183:

It is correct that a meeting was called in Rawalpindi around the middle of February 1977, which was presided over by the former Prime Minister. Apart from some federal ministers, it was attended by the four Chief Ministers, the four Chief Secretaries and some members of the Prime Minister's staff. The IG's also attended but they were called later on. The subjects that came up for discussion were assessment of the prospects of party candidates in the forthcoming elections, and general situation pertaining to law and order. The Chief Minister NWFP gave his assessment and was of the view that the party would be able to get round about 15/16 National seats out of a total of 26. When I was asked to comment, I expressed the view that this was an optimistic figure and the party would not be able to get this number of seats. Thereafter I left the conference as it was the turn of other Provinces.

If my Government intended to rig, the Chief Secretary of the province would not have expressed any such views. He would have sat silently smiling away at the other suckers. But he gave expression to his views as he had not been instructed to indulge in malpractice.

(b) On pages 195 and 197, my note of 5<sup>th</sup> April 1976, written from Quetta, has been reproduced to give a "Better insight into the working of Mr. Bhutto's mind in regard to his political friends and foes."

A part of that note is being quoted by me to show that whatever else was in my mind, rigging was not. Otherwise, I would not have been disturbed by the twin beds on which Qayyum Khan was trying to sleep, at that particular time.

Please treat this note most confidentially while passing on instructions to your officials and subordinates. I have mentioned the names of two Federal Ministers only to be on the safe side. We do not intend to dislocate the present arrangement. We want them to remain with us up to the elections and even after the elections if we win, but judging from some of their recent activities it would be prudent to be prepared for all

eventualities. No initiative will be taken from our side for such an unwise rupture. However, if “our friends” get misguided by the opposition and fall into their trap, we will not be responsible for the damage to them and to their interest, (page 197)

This note shows that I had not assumed we would win the elections. I have said in it “if we win.” I would not have used such words if I had different ideas on elections. There is nothing improper in taking precautionary measures in the event of a somersault by the Muslim League Ministers in Cabinet. They were playing tricks and misbehaving. My attitude was exemplary. I stated that despite their maneuvers. I would retain them in my Government even after winning the elections provided they did not do the Jagjivan Ram on me. It is said: “Politics makes strange bed fellows.” I could not permit the dream of Qayyum Khan’s life to come true by allowing him to share the same bed with a Sindhi Pir and a Sindhi Wadera, that is, with the President of the Muslim League and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This gives a good insight into my mind in regard to my political friends and foes, but catches the author of the White Paper coming to an honest conclusion!

(c) Also on page 197 it is stated: “When Mr. Rao Rashid Khan recommended to the Prime Minister on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1976, that the Intelligence Bureau should be asked to concentrate on the problems of the People’s Party’s likely candidates in each constituency so that the best candidates from the Party point of view could be chosen and time and money saved, Mr. Bhutto passed the following order; I agree with your recommendation. It should be limited to what has been stated in the last paragraph

If we had rigging in mind, we would not have made the tedious search of finding the fittest candidate to contest the elections. We would have chosen not the best but the most submissive ones. As for the propriety of the Intelligence Bureau assisting in the matter, I have already dealt separately with the intelligence agencies in the past and at present.

(d) Our anxiety to find the most suitable candidates to give a clean fight in a fair election is also shown on page 205: “Under ‘Operation Victory’, data was collected about the probable candidates of the PPP to assess their suitability for the award of party tickets in the election.”

(e) The White Paper further states at page 205: “The intelligence agencies continued to carry out their ‘election assessment’ exercises till the very eve of the elections. Annexures 187 and 200 are the copies of the covering notes dated February 19 and March 4, 1977, respectively, which were sent

along with detailed assessment reports, covering every constituency, to the then Prime Minister by the Director, Intelligence Bureau. A summary of the assessments was also attached, which is shown at Annexures 187-A and 200-A.”

These continuous exercises would not have been necessary or carried out if the policy was to rig. Pages 205, 206, 207 and 208 of the White Paper indicate that objective and honest assessments were sought and given. This shows that objective and honest assessments were sought and given. This shows that there was no thought of malpractices either in the mind of the ruling party or the administration.

(f) In Chapter X, entitled “The Aftermath,” at page 382, in its own words the White Paper conclusively shows that rigging was not my crime, that it was not my policy. What is at issue is not whether a meeting was held or whether what was stated in the meeting, if held, is correct. Rigging as a policy of my government is at stake. This is what the White Paper report:

The People’s Part’s clean sweep at the polls on March 7<sup>th</sup> stunned its opponents and a vast section of the people generally. Even Mr. Bhutto’s own reaction was not without an element of surprise. He had organized the formidable machinery at his disposal for a landslide victory; what he got was something even more massive which, he could see, vitiated the credibility of the result. The opposition’s successful boycott of the provincial elections on March 10<sup>th</sup> darkened the shadow of doubt. Three days later Mr. Bhutto addressed a high level conference at the Prime Minister’s House which was attended among other by all the Divisional Commissioners. There, according to the findings of an inquest by the present administration, he distressfully opened his discourse thus: ‘Why have you done this to me?’ Meaning that the civil administration had over-played its’ hand.

If I had been the captain of the crime, I would not have distressfully opened the discourse with the words “why have you done this to me?” This shows beyond all doubt that, if there had been rigging, it was on an individual level and that I felt a distressing sense of betrayal over the malpractices at that level. I felt that their selfishness and myopia had been a blot on the “formidable machinery” I had organized for a fair and impartial election. Their individual follies had marred my strenuous efforts. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn. If there is anyone who can claim exoneration from this passage of the White Paper, it is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The White Paper taunts me by saying on page (iii) of the Introduction that, while announcing General Elections on 7<sup>th</sup> January 1977, I said in my speech: "I hope that the coming election will be a clean and a fair election, but my promise alone is not enough. Other parties should reciprocate this desire and policy. The other side must also demonstrate that it knows what it means to have a clean and a fair election. I can assure you that we have the administrative ability to have a clean and a fair election."

After quoting this part of my speech, the White Paper puts the question: "How clean and fair were the elections? What store could have been put on the words of Mr. Z. A. Bhutto as they were solemnly uttered before the National Assembly on January 7<sup>th</sup> 1977? The following pages attempt an answer to this intriguing question."

Curiously, the White Paper itself admits the bona fides of my intentions. It has reproduced a note from Rao Rashid which I endorsed. This note is as follows: "A majority of candidates in the Punjab are under the impression that now that they have been given the PPP ticket it is for the administration to see them through. The candidates have to be shaken out of complacency."

Another conformation of my directives is given in a letter written to me by Governor Abbasi, which was as follows: "I have called a meeting of the Heads of Departments of the Division (Multan) and shall make it quite clear to them that they and their subordinate staff are expected to remain cent per cent neutral in keeping with the prime Minister's directive that the elections are above all, to be conducted in a fair manner."

I have already quoted General Zia's remarks on the conduct of the elections immediately after the *coup*. I must emphasize again that he said: "The army also had evidence that Mr. Bhutto was not responsible for the rigging."

I am clearly vindicated on the accusation of rigging. I shall deal with the reciprocity which I so fervently asked for in the National Assembly when I come to talk of the opposition, which feature the White Paper so dexterously avoids. We contested an election as clean and fair as any election East of Suez.

There were many reasons for me to have a fair election, and I confess, all of them were not altruistic. I know that:

- (a) The opposition was divided and incompetent.
- (b) My Government had a remarkable record of achievements.
- (c) The masses were with me and my Party, especially the eighty per cent of the rural population.

(d) I wanted to give the history of Pakistan an unprecedented turn for the better and establish civilian supremacy.

(e) I did not want to go down in history “as a rigger of elections” or as a “manipulator of elections” like most of my predecessors.

(f) However, the most important and over-riding reason was not to provide the slightest pretext or opportunity to the Generals, hungry for power, to intervene and finish the job begun by their unworthy predecessor, Yahya Khan. This lingering fear of mine is expressed in guarded language, and is mentioned in the White Paper at page 390:

The Prime Minister was pleased to observe as follows: “In the meeting the day before, it was felt that no concession should be given to PNA and they should be asked to stick to the accord arrived at. The consequences of deadlock however had to be considered. There were important questions like the country’s image, stability and future to be taken into account. If the accorded not go through, the PNA would start agitation. Even if it was assumed that the agitation could be controlled and law and order restored, at some stage negotiations would have to be restarted. Mere control of the situation in law and order terms would not solve the problem. Another important factor was that though the armed forces had stood by the government, if there was another agitation they would be put to a severe strain.”

These were observations made in a Cabinet meeting. I could not be expected to tell my Ministers that some ambitious fools among them had opened the vista for the other ambitious self-opinionated chocolate Caesars to seize power to bring about a Byzantine burial.

## 7. Rigged or Fair?

Quite apart from failing to prove that my government rigged the elections, quite independent of failing to damage my position, the hazard of throwing 342 State documents into the market, makes a mockery of the law on the secrecy of official documents. I never put a single official document on public display without following the prescribed channels. To give an example, when, as Prime Minister, I was writing on "Bilateralism" in foreign policy, my Special Assistant wrote an official letter to the Foreign Secretary on 14<sup>th</sup> October 1976, requesting the permission of the Foreign Office for the Prime Minister of Pakistan to publish certain Foreign Office documents. On 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1976, the Foreign Secretary replied stating "We concur with your evaluation and agree to the publication of the documents mentioned in the list enclosed with your letter."

There is frequent mention of "prestigious seats" in the White Paper. The object of the repeated references comes out on page 342. In dealing with the case of Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, it says "prestigious seat" when decoded, meant that it had to be won at all costs. Obviously, the present martial law authorities decoded it. Nobody else could have the resources or the imagination to reach such a preposterous finding. The words "prestigious seats" are a part of the ordinary jargon of elections.

Every time the regime makes an assault on the elections of March 1977, it mentions the Commissioner of Hazara Division. He is quoted on the "Personality Cult" on pages 65 and 66, on "Rigging" at Pages 245 to 249, and again on pages 253 to 257. He seems to be a Special favorite. He was quoted in the constitution petition of Begum Nusrat Bhutto in the Supreme Court. I dealt with his Marcopolo voyage in the affidavit I filed as a rejoinder. The report of the commissioner of Hazara dated 21<sup>st</sup> September 1977 is full of contradictions and has no value in law. It is such a belated report that the Commissioner himself admits on the first page of the report that: "Since a long time has elapsed, therefore it may not be possible to pinpoint exactly what each individual V.I.P. directed the officers to do"

The Commissioner claims to be a gentle man, a respecter of law have and a man of conscience. If he possessed any of these qualities, it was his duty to submit a report in writing to his Chief Minister giving the details of the meeting to clear his position. Why did the Commissioner keep his Chief Minister in the dark all these days and months? Why has he come out only on the 21<sup>st</sup> September 1977, with so-called revelations when he was duty bound to make them known to his own Provincial Chief Executive on the 5<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> March 1977?

He has waited all these months to feel the prick of his conscience. But his report has no value and proves nothing which can be termed as legal proof. It states that the officials discussed the political situation. What was the harm in discussing the political situation? The political situation in March was surcharged and it was the subject of discussion everywhere. The belated and inspired report states that the officials gave their evaluation of my leadership. There is nothing wrong in giving such an evaluation. As a matter of fact, the evaluation given by them is strikingly similar to the evaluation given by the Chief Martial Law Administrator about my leadership and “in-dispensability” to Pakistan during the days when I was Prime Minister and even after that to the ‘Kayhan International’ of Tehran.

If any of the officials made forecasts about the result of the elections, it does not burden them with the blame of a crime. Everyone was making forecasts in those days, including the Chief Martial Law Administrator. If I felt strongly about the defeat of Asghar Khan and Gohar Ayub and sent my top officials to Abbottabad to ensure that they “do not win their seats under any circumstances” how then did both of them get elected? If I could maneuver the rigging of elections on a massive scale, on a national scale, how is it that I could not get the necessary results in a remote corner of the country, especially when I deputed my Military Secretary and my Political Adviser to go all the way to Abbottabad to guarantee the defeat of Asghar Khan and Gohar Ayub “under any circumstances”? Moreover, if my officials were sent with specific instructions to rig the elections in NWFP and in Hazara Division, it was not possible for them to flout my orders and readily agree with the Commissioner of Hazara the moment he raised some superficial objections. I do not intend wasting any more time on this fabricated tale of a favorite.

In addition to the whole chapter on Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar alone, a part of Chapter VII, that is from pages 245 to 252 deals with individual cases, as does chapter VII. I do not have the facilities in this death cell to deal separately with every individual case. I am not concerned or involved in the malpractices committed by individuals in their individual capacities. It is not my culpability. The election laws and election tribunals provide the remedy so the aggrieved parties. Writ jurisdiction is also available to them. On the contrary, in good faith I armed the Election Commission with *suo moto* powers to expeditiously decide the complaints. The reasons for subsequently withdrawing these extra-ordinary powers have been stated.

However, in order to discharge my moral obligations and by way of random sample, I will briefly touch upon four individual cases, those of:

(a) Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, Attorney General of Pakistan.

- (b) Mr. Mumtaz Ali Khan Bhutto, Federal Minister, of Larkana district.
- (c) Mr. Ghaibi Khan Ahmad Sultan Chandio, of Larkana district.
- (d) Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Ghaibi Khan Chandio and Mumtaz Ali Bhutto have not been honored by references in the section under the sub-title. "The Unopposed Elections." It would be naive to draw the inference that in these two cases at least the regime has been gracious enough to concede that both of them were elected unopposed without malpractices. It would be fatal to credit the present martial law authorities with anything like this much fidelity to truth. Perhaps I have missed the references. In a different context, Ghaibi Khan Chandio has not been spared. In addition context, Ghaibi Khan Chandio has not been spared. In addition, as Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and Ghaibi Khan Chandio belong to the "Model town" with a "Model plan" and were returned unopposed, I will deal with their cases.

In taking up these four cases, I am not prejudiced by the gross iniquities and incongruities mentioned in the White Paper. Most of them I have already exposed.

The White Paper- has failed to prove that my government or I, as Prime Minister of Pakistan, indulged in malpractices in the Elections of March 1977; it provides no evidence to implicate me personally in ordering rigging or in taking part in election malpractices.

The evidence of the Chief Election Commission, Mr. Sajjad Ahmed Jan has not been taken, although he is the key and indispensable witness. All references to him are "hearsay" given by the Secretary to the Election Commission, Mr. A. Z. Faruqui who has given false and malicious evidence out of known bias. Mr. Faruqui is a nephew of N. A. Faruqui, whose wife is the sister of Masood Mahmud's wife, himself being the principal approver in the murder trial at Lahore.

The White Paper contradicts itself. It is studded with self-evident and patent lies, which is political suicide. All documents used are highly selective and tailor made to suit the allegations. It is a quirk of fate that the White Paper actually exonerates me and vindicates my position.

In their statements, the Chief Secretaries of Punjab, Baluchistan and NWFP clear me of rigging. Some statements are more positive than others, but those of all the three Chief Secretaries are in my favor. Without the connivance or participation of a Chief Secretary it is almost impossible to manipulate elections on a provincial basis. The fourth Chief Secretary, from Sindh, has not been mentioned in this connection. His statement has been omitted because he would have accused the PNA of massive, violent and organized rigging in the province

of Sindh. Needless to say, the massive rigging of the PNA finds no mention in this jaundiced document.

DIB/ISI has cleared me of rigging as per their joint report of 4<sup>th</sup> March 1977. This means that the armed forces as an institution have not implicated me. Furthermore, the numerous public statements of the Chief Martial Law Administrator soon after his *coup d'état* categorically clear me of rigging and malpractices; however these have not been mentioned in the White Paper.

The depositions of the Commissioners of Punjab, who were specifically and unambiguously ordered by me in Lahore on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1977, not to permit rigging or malpractices, do not appear in the White Paper. Nor do those of the Inspectors-General of Police and other key officials like the Interior Secretary. The statements of the Home Secretary of Sindh and of my Secretary, Mr. Afzal Saeed, have been taken during the course of their detention by the gladiators of Martial Law. I believe the Home Secretary of Sindh is still under detention and that Mr. Afzal Saeed has been removed from detention and put under house arrest.

The White Paper is a one-sided, false and fabricated account, compiled and released on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978, with one purpose only: to spread prejudice and resentment against me while my appeal against the death sentence is being heard in the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

I conclude this explanatory submission with the last passage of Chapter VII entitled "The Strategy." It quotes the statement of M. Vaqar Ahmad, the former Cabinet Secretary, made on 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1978, and is at page 251 of the White Paper. It states:

*I was also informed by Mr. Akram Shaikh that on the day of election Mr. Bhutto was in the control room and about 12 o'clock he got panicky and said that PPP was losing .... It appears that at that time certain instructions went to at least Chief Secretary, Punjab, which resulted in large scale rigging. At this stage I can only recollect those matters but I may be able to throw light on certain other developments if they are brought to my notice or I can later on otherwise recollect.*

I walked from the Prime Minister's residence to the famous control room in my Secretariat in the company of my Air Force ADC, Khalid Haroon on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1977 at about 4:30 in the afternoon. Rafi Raza and General Tikka Khan joined me about half an hour later. We had tea and more tea until the results started to come on the television. By midnight, that is by "about 12 o'clock" there was not the slightest cause for me to get "panicky" and to say "that PPP was losing." By 12 o'clock it was quite apparent that the PPP was winning by a huge

landslide. This can be verified from the radio and television tapes and films and by other documentary evidence.

But even if this lie were true, by which satellite would the Chief Secretary of Punjab have communicated my last minute instructions to every Returning Office in the province to reverse the results? The Chief Secretary of Punjab has not made this allegation nor has Shaikh Akram. Again the hearsay rule has been applied. The compilers of the White Paper should have tried to verify these blatant lies. They have done incalculable disservice to their masters by being so recklessly stupid. By 12 o'clock the whole world knew that PPP was winning by a colossal landslide. Only I got panicky and thought that PPP was losing. This is the 12<sup>th</sup> hour of madness. Lies have accumulated to write a treatise on how to lie licentiously.

With this closing note on the White Lie, I shall turn to the four individual cases.

A full chapter covering over forty pages has been devoted to Yahya Bakhtiar, my senior Defense Counsel in the appeal in the Supreme Court against the death sentence. The White Paper says at page 341:

*“Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar’s case is a very special one. Not only because it was one of the most bitterly contested seats in the country as a whole but also because Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar was serving at the time as the Attorney-General of Pakistan and, as such, could be construed as the custodian of the rule of law.”*

Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar’s case is a very special one. There are no two ways about it however; the reasons for it being a very special case are different from those given in the White Paper.

During the course of my appeal in the Supreme Court, while Mr. Bakhtiar has been on his feet torn over two months presenting the argument for the defense, he has been interrogated by an official of the Federal Investigating Agency in connection with criminal proceedings instituted against him for election malpractices, alleged to have been committed in March 1977. However, the case against him came up on 25<sup>th</sup> March 1978 after he had appealed to friendly countries to use their influence with the regime, of Pakistan on 18<sup>th</sup> March 1978, when the death sentence was awarded to me by the Lahore High Court. He has had to apply for bail before arrest.

On top of these bayonet pricks, comes the White Paper, to single him out as a very special case. The aim is to destroy his image, to damage his credibility and character, to belittle him in the eyes of the people and to make the judiciary and the Bar hostile towards him; to tell him to forget about Masood Mahmood

and Ghulam Hussain and others because “charity begins at home.” The aim is to embarrass him, to rattle him and upset him while he is arguing my appeal. In a single sweep, the falcon wants to carry the client in one talon and his counsel in the other.

## Smell of Revenge

Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar was known to the Quaid-e-Azam. I do not think any of the old stalwarts at the Quaid-e-Azam would contradict me if I were to say that the Quaid-e-Azam was very fond of him. Miss Fatima Jinnah had implicit trust in him. I have known him for over twenty years but he remained in the Council Muslim League from the inception. He left the Muslim League and joined Pakistan People’s Party in October 1974, after the last vestiges of the original Muslim League had become extinct. He is a man of stubborn principles.

As Attorney-General of Pakistan he rendered yeoman service to Pakistan in successfully piloting the sensitive Ahmadi issue in Parliament. He successfully represented Pakistan in the International Court of Justice on disputes with India on over flights of Pakistan planes to East Pakistan and over the return of Pakistan’s prisoners of war detained in India. He appeared for the State in the Supreme Court reference on NAP and other important cases and is now being punished for his patriotism. He convened three impressive and useful conferences of jurists which were attended by many distinguished foreign jurists. He left his high office with a clean and straight record. He did not behave like a worm or a spider. He was the custodian of the rule of law like a Roman Guard in system of the rule of law upheld constitutionally.

He appeared in Parliament and was answerable to it. He did not tip toe on high heels to get conspiratorial consents for the furtherance of petty intrigues. He acted with dignified independence under a general discipline of democracy. During the turmoil’s of spring 1977, on his own initiative, he presented the Yahya Bakhtiar formula. I accepted it in good faith as good advice from a good man.

The office of Attorney General during Martial Law is a slap on the face of law. There is no room for an Attorney General in a system without Law. The White Paper says that the Attorney General is considered to be the custodian of the rule of law. Under Martial Law, the Attorney General has to tell the Supreme Court that the Constitution has been abrogated or suspended by his masters, that all laws have been subordinated to Martial Law. He has to say, that necessity required the people of Pakistan to eat pig’s meat.

During; the necessity of the Second World War, the British people lived on fish and chips but Parliament did not close, London became a rabble with the

deafening sounds of the V 2. Despite the clash of arms Lord Atkin had the courage to dissent on the curtailment of liberty in *Liversidge vs. Anderson*. In Pakistan, the Attorney General of the Junta comes to the Supreme Court to plead for the supremacy of a *coup d'état* over the Constitution and or the supremacy of the rule of the General over the rule of law.

This is the difference between the two Attorney Generals and their role in being the custodians of the rule of law. This regime excels in putting forward its most vulnerable points as its strongest arguments. The authors of the White Paper should have remained on the ground and not given vent to their hatred for Yahya Bakhtiar by ascribing lofty reasons. Revenge can be smell from a distance.

There is the smell of revenge in the case of the Yahya Bakhtiar and for that reason alone, it is a very special case

On page 342, the White Paper says: "The seat acquired some international overtones." The sarcasm of cynicism contained in this remarks will not be lost on anyone remotely familiar with the politics of this border district. The same tribes like the Achakzais and Kakars are lacerated by the border. From the time of the British-Afghan wars until President Daoud Khan's government ceased its hostile activities in June 1976, Chaman and Pishin have been very sensitive regions. Even now they retain their sensitivity. Most of the political troubles in the past have come through these routes. No inhabitant of Baluchistan, whether Baluch or Pakhtoon, would disbelieve, as the White Paper chooses to infer, that "some interference from across the border is quite possible." Only the compilers of the White Paper, who do not know anything about Baluchistan, would try to use this statement against Yahya Bakhtiar or my Federal or Provincial governments.

The White Paper says "Mr. Ghazi Khan who was specially shifted from Panjgur to Chaman, ostensibly to look after the law and order situation and especially so in the tribal area" was actually shifted to Chaman to assist Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar in his election. The White Paper quotes Mr. Ghazi Khan's statement on page 343 in which he has stated that he was sent to Chaman by the Chief Secretary of Baluchistan to help Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar. The Chief Secretary of Baluchistan denies it. Mr. Nayyar Agha, the former Assistant Commissioner, Chaman, has stated: "Mr. Ghzai Khan would not succeed because of the inherent character of tribalism and the social system prevalent in that area."

Whatever the intentions of the Chief Secretary of Baluchistan or the analysis of the former Assistant Commissioner of Chaman, the gravemen of the statement of Mr. Ghazi Khan closes the controversy. Mr. Ghazi Khan says: "I did not dare to touch the idea of Chief Secretary I was sure that instead of any fruitful result, it would result in creation of a serious law and order situation." This statement ends the matter. The desire of the Chief Secretary, which the

Chief Secretary energetically denies, was not carried out. The explanation given for not carrying it out is not material. Mr. Ghazi Khan has himself said on page 343 that he did not “dare to touch the idea of helping the Government Candidate.” The remaining part about the desire can go into “Playboy” magazine.

The White Paper admits that there was a “charged atmosphere prevailing in the Constituency.” On pages 343 it quotes the former Chief Secretary of Baluchistan, Mr. Nasrum Minallah, who has said:

*Of the three constituencies where elections were to be held on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March, only Pishin was a potential trouble spot, with a lot of tension around. The Pakhtoonkhwa party had concentrated its major force in Pishin in support of their chief, Mr. Mahmood Khan Achakzai. There were reports to the effect that they would try to force their way in places where they were strong. PPP had also put in its maximum effort in Pishin in support of the Attorney General. The Commissioner and the D.C. asked for the presence of maximum force that could be made available. This was arranged by deploying the police, Baluchistan Constabulary and Frontier Corps. Army assistance was also obtained. In addition the administration was further strengthened by detailing some officers from other districts to work for this period in Pishin to assist the D.C. These officers were selected at the instance of the D.C. and the Commissioner. It was purely an administrative exercise and there was no political motive behind it.*

If this statement of the former Chief Secretary is to be believed on the charged atmosphere, it must also be believed on the transfer being administrative and not political in intent and purpose.

Reference has been made to Saeed Ahmad Khan, at that time OSD, Hyderabad Tribunal. I told Saeed Ahmad very clearly to keep out of political matters and attend to the Hyderabad trial as an OSD. I would therefore hardly entrust him with an election assignment in a “sensitive and prestigious seat.” Saeed Ahmad had been in the custody of Martial Law and has given evidence against me in the Kasuri case. Quoting him or referring to him does not carry weight.

Mr. Afzal Luni, formerly Deputy Commissioner, Quetta, and according to the White Paper “a key witness in the whole drama” is quoted extensively. Mr. Luni says that he was directed by his Chief Secretary and Commissioner to remember the importance of the seat. This might be so but both the Chief Secretary and the Commissioner exculpate themselves. Furthermore, at page 390, the chief secretary states that Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar “had his reservations About Mr. Luni, alleging that he had Pakhtoonkhwa leaning.”

At page 351, the then Assistant Commissioner, Chaman, states that Mr. Ghazi Khan “did nothing for Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar.” This corroborates the statement of Ghazi Khan. The then Assistant Commissioner of Chaman also states “It was in Chaman that Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar got very few votes and it was again there that polling stations were taken over by people opposed to Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar.”

The White Paper draws adverse inferences from the announcement of the results sometimes on the ground that the announcement came too soon and sometimes that it came late. In this case, it draws an adverse inference from the late announcement on 8<sup>th</sup> March 1977, choosing to forget the remoteness of the constituency, the backwardness of the region and the lack of adequate communication facilities.

The White Paper says at page 351: “It has to be noted that Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar thus gained the seat by a very narrow majority of only 1,489 votes.” This is an acknowledgement of the fairness of the elections. If my government had turned heaven and earth to win this seat the margin of victory would not have been this narrow. Again, the White Paper tries to draw a negative inference by saying that “the numbers of votes declared invalid was as high as 10,993.” This is mainly due to two reasons, firstly in many parts of the constituency, law and order broke down; and secondly, the PNA having boycotted elections in Baluchistan, its voters double stamped the ballot papers in some constituencies like Pishin and Quetta to register their protest and avoid impersonation of their voters. The constituency is in a very backward part of the country, where people are apt to make mistakes in marking ballot papers. The tribal regions are not heavily populated urban centers where PNA made the same voter cast fifteen to twenty votes on an average.

At page 354, Mr. Luni, the Deputy Commissioner and Returning officer, says that on the morning of 7<sup>th</sup> March 1977, the Chief Secretary visited Pishin and directed him to “do something in favor of the PPP candidate.” Earlier, on the same page, he shows how he did “something in favor of the PPP candidate” by stating “I had been receiving reports from the Assistant Commissioner of Chaman, Mr. Nayyar Agha, that the supporters of Mr. Mahmood Khan Achakzai had created a fuss at some of the polling stations at Chaman, by throwing out the polling staff and illegally casting votes in favor of Mahmood Achakzai.”

This is more than a fuss. This means taking over the authority from the officials. It means aggression and abuse of the sanctity of the vote through violent means. Surely, the boot is on the other leg Mr. Luni further states on page 355, that at one polling station he called the persons standing outside and asked them to cast votes in favored of Yahya Bakhtiar. He also adds that they “were all supporters of PPP.” He could not have expected PPP supporters to vote for Mr.

Achakzai. It was pointless telling them to vote for the candidate for whom they had come to vote.

The evidence of Islam Bahadur Khan, the Commissioner of Quetta, on pages 355 and 356, the concluding paragraph at page 356 states: "From the above facts it appears that the supporters of Pakhtoonkhwa NAP as well as the supporters of independent candidates deliberately created a serious law and order situation in order to make the law enforcing agencies completely ineffective. In Chaman area at least 9 to 10 polling stations were taken over by the supporters of Pakhtoonkhwa NAP. The polling staff and election agent of the PPP were manhandled and thrown out. Similarly in Qilla Abdullah, Karbala and Pir Alizai and Barshore areas the local administration had to face a serious law and order situation."

This shows that Chapter IX of the White Paper should have been called "The case of Mr. Mahmood Khan Achakzai" and not "The case of Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar" because Mr. Achakzai and not Mr. Bakhtiar committed the irregularities and took command of the situation to his full advantage. The Chief Secretary of Baluchistan also confirms this position on page 356 by stating: "On reaching Pishin I was informed by the Deputy Commissioner that some polling stations in Chaman have been taken over by Pakhtoonkhwa workers forcibly."

If the White Paper is to be believed, the FIA official should have prosecuted Mr. Achakzai and not Mr. Bakhtiar. Mr. Achakzai should have had to apply for bail before being arrested.

At the bottom of page 357 and on page 358, the former Chief Secretary's remarks are noteworthy: "It is wrong to say that the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Luni, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Ghazi Khan, or any other officer was at any stage instructed by me to help the PPP candidate. My contact with the administration was generally through the Commissioner. Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar had been complaining constantly against officers generally, alleging that they were mostly Pakhtoonkhwa-oriented. He specially complained against Additional Commissioner, Pishin, Mr. Azam Khan, and A.D.V.G., Mr. Izzat Aziz Kurd. He also alleged that most of the presiding officer and polling staff were pro-Pakhtoonkhwa. The way Polling stations were taken over in Chaman and some other places speaks of the doubtful role of the presiding officer there. Mr. Bakhtiar's fears were not completely unfounded."

The Chief Secretary not only denies flatly that he instructed any of the officers mentioned to help the PPP candidate, he goes further and states, that "Mr. Bakhtiar's fears" that the officers and the polling staff were mostly Pakhtoonkhwa-oriented "were not completely unfounded." The Chief Secretary confirms Mr. Bakhtiar's fears on the partiality of the polling officers and polling

staff and that of his own officials towards the Pakhtoonkhwa candidate. He defends the neutrality and impartiality of his own role to such an extent that he only categorically denies giving any instructions to his subordinate officials to interfere on behalf of Yahya Bakhtiar, but on page 358 he goes even further by stating:

*Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar did contact me occasionally but in view of a background he could not trust me .... It placed me in a fortunate situation in which Mr. Bakhtiar could not make any demands on me as would embarrass him. But it is obvious that he had his way with other officers.*

If the “prestigious” seat of Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar with “international overtones” was one of the most important seats calling for a special visit by me to Pishin, if, for personal and political reasons, national and international reasons, Yahya Bakhtiar had to get returned, I would not have posted a Chief Secretary to Baluchistan who was not trusted by Yahya Bakhtiar, my most powerful comrade in Baluchistan. According to the Chief Secretary the distrust was deep enough for the former Attorney-General to be unable to “make any demands” on the Chief Secretary “as would embarrass him.” This closes the matter.

Rigging on the scale alleged, but even otherwise, is virtually impossible without the cooperation of the Chief Secretary, the key official of the Province. The Chief Secretary makes confident assertions of his impartiality: He states that he was distrusted and that, in the circumstances, the question of relying on him or counting on him to permit malpractices simply does not arise. The statements are not nebulous or equivocal. They firmly repel the suggestion that he had a hand in the alleged rigging in this constituency.

Correspondingly, if my Government was contemplating amateur antics in this prestigious seat, I would not have appointed Mr. Nasrum Minallah as the Chief Secretary of Baluchistan a months before the elections. On page 390, Mr. Nasrum Minallah states that Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar was one of the only two PPP politicians from Baluchistan “who never lost favor with the Prime Minister.” If the most influential politician of the PPP in Baluchistan and the former Attorney-General exercised more influence on me than any other politician from that Province, he could have easily prevailed upon me not to sent a Chief Secretary to Baluchistan whom he did not trust. Relations between Mr. Bakhtiar and the Chief Secretary were somewhat strained, but since my Government did not intend to use the Chief Secretary for election malpractices or for any other unsavory purpose, it made not the slightest difference if Mr. Bakhtiar was not on friendly terms with the Chief Secretary.

## Pakhtoonkhwa

On page 358 it is reported that the Chief Secretary stated that "It is obvious that he (Yahya Bakhtiar) had his way with other officers." Again on 372, Mr. Nasrum Minallah states that "Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar's election was a sad story. Junior officials who have done rigging must have done so much under extreme pressure and strain from no other quarter than the Attorney General himself." But earlier, at page 358, the Nasrum Minallah states that the fears of Yahya Bakhtiar on the bias of the subordinate officials and polling staff in favor of Pakhtoonkhwa "were not completely unfounded." The Pakhtoonkhwa workers could not have taken command of this situation without the connivance of the local officials. Without their backing, it was not only impossible but unthinkable. But the Pakhtoonkhwa workers and supporters of Mr. Achakzai had assumed enough control of many polling stations. That is what the Chief Secretary says on page 358: "After seeing all the mess that had taken place in Chaman, Prakhi and Urak, I did lose temper at the D.C. and ask him to ensure that it had not happened in other areas, particularly Barshore."

In the course of the same statement, on page 358, the Chief Secretary describes how the Pakhtoonkhwa hordes were not prevented from defying the law by stating "It was about midnight when the Commissioner informed me that the D.C. had returned and he was in a bad way, having been forcibly held up by a crowd and even beaten by them." On the same page, Mr. Muhammad Azam, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Pishin, states "On the day of the polls" the Chief Secretary directed him at Pishin Rest House to "take charge of as (many) polling stations as possible and stamp the ballot papers in favor of Yahya Bakhtiar." Mr. Muhammad Azam further states "but I replied back, 'No, Sir, this is not possible'."

A strange picture emerges. The Chief Secretary denies involvement, and puts the blame on his subordinates. His subordinates claim that they defied his orders to interfere and those that tried to maintain law and order were beaten up by Achakzai's supporters. This is how one of the most prestigious seats with international overtones was integrated into the Model Plan of Larkana.

The Commissioner of Quetta, Islam Bahadur Khan, is quoted frequently. At page 355 he states that both candidates were resourceful and influential enough to have "the capabilities to create a serious law and order situation in order to win the elections." Although he credits both candidates with equal capabilities, at page 362 he says "after the polling was over Yahya Bakhtiar also contacted me on the telephone and wanted to know the results. On the basis of the available information I told him that his position is very weak."

How had Yahya Bakhtiar's position suddenly become "very weak"? The explanation is available from the same statement of the Commissioner of Quetta, for he goes on to state at page 362 "Meanwhile, the supporters of NAP Pakhtoonkhwa had completely 'gheraoed' the Pishin Rest House where I along with election staff was staying. The law enforcing agencies, including A.C. Pishin, were ineffective to remove Pakhtoonkhwa NAP"

If the situation had turned against the candidate of the ruling party, as alleged by the Commissioner, it was due to the vandalism and pandemonium of the opposition. The telephone calls and instructions, if at all given, although I do not believe this to be true, were being given by the Attorney General to the Commissioner for the restoration of law and order and not for tampering with the ballot boxes in the hands of the Pakhtoonkhwa. The fact that the administration had been made ineffective, or had made itself ineffective, is admitted by the Chief Secretary at page 364 of the White Paper:

PPP leadership in the province, Yahya Bakhtiar and his agents were already howling loudly that their polling agents were beaten up and driven away by Pakhtoonkhwa workers in a number of polling stations and the administration had done nothing to protect them. Mr. Raisani, the Provincial President of the PPP, when he met me in Pishin Rest House on the 7<sup>th</sup> afternoon, said 'it seems as if it is Pakhtoonkhwa Government and not a PPP Government after what I have seen of the administration Pishin not even bothering to interfere when Pakhtoonkhwa workers were forcibly taking over the polling station'. I told him that administration had tried its best to maintain order and it had to be fair whether it is PPP Government or Pakhtoonkhwa Government.

The Chief Secretary boldly told Mr. Raisani, the Senior Minister and former Governor of Baluchistan, that the Administration had tried its best to maintain order and it had to be fair. In a supplementary statement, the Chief Secretary states at page 367:

The only seat where rigging took place was Pishin and it took place as stated earlier in a big way. But even in this seat major rigging has taken place after the election was over. Before that whatever had happened showed that the Administration had acted in many ways against the interests of Yahya Bakhtiar. The takeover of a number of polling stations by people opposed to PPP candidate could not be forcible in all cases as was given out. At a number of places probably the polling staff played the game of Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar's opponents. I came back after my visit to Pishin on election day convinced a lot of what Yahya Bakhtiar had been saying about Pakhtoonkhwa leanings of junior officers was not entirely baseless.

Here we have the word of Chief Secretary on the support that Achakzai rather than Bakhtiar received from the local administration. It must also be noted that his admission has been made in a supplementary statement. There are many supplementary statements of officials in the White Paper. Not being satisfied with the original statements taken under coercion, further coercion had to be applied to get what have been euphemistically described as “supplementary statements.” For this reason, most of the supplementary statements appear to be more incriminating. In the statement under reference, the Chief Secretary has been made to come out with more reference, the Chief Secretary has been made to come to with more information, but being intelligent, he has tried to put a dash of truth in it.

Page 367 shows that the Commissioner of Quetta could not have had much love for Pakistan People’s Party or its federal and provincial governments. The White Paper says that he had a clean record. He had this fine record:

As D.C., D.I. Khan, he found himself on the wrong side of late Mr. Sherpao because he could not oblige local PPP workers and also because his real brother in Swabi, an ardent Jamat-e-Islami worker, was naturally working against PPP. The only ruling politician with whom he struck a good equation was the then Chief Minister of NWFP, Mufti Mahmood.

This explains why this chapter is full of Islam Bahadur Khan. Naturally he was as much against the PPP as the PPP workers were against his real brother in Swabi. The difference was that as Commissioner, Islam Bahadur Khan could do harm to PPP and its government whereas the PPP workers could do no harm to his real brother. The fact that with this background available to me, I consented to the posting of a man like Islam Bahadur as Commissioner, Quetta Division, shows my impartiality as an administrator. However, with all the lies and distortions uttered by this man, he has also been compelled to state at page 373:

From the above facts it is clear that all the candidates tried to intimidate the voters as well as the public servants. The NAP Pakhtoonkhwa and other independent candidates rigged the election by use of brutal force while Yahya Bakhtiar used his powerful and effective official position as he happened to be a very strong Attorney-General of Pakistan.

Funnily enough, the same methods have been used to prove rigging in the election of Yahya Bakhtiar as were employed in the trial against me in the Lahore High Court. The prosecution witnesses and evidence common in both “cases” are:

- (i) Mr. Telephone
- (ii) Hearsay evidence, and,
- (iii) Bureaucrats.

There are other common features as well as but these are apparent even to a layman like myself. The officials have been cajoled and intimidated. They have given supplementary statements like approver Ghulam Hussain gave a supplementary statement from Kot Lakhpat jail. They have accused each other to exculpate -themselves. Masood Mahmood throws the responsibility on his subordinates and they, in turn, try to throw it on him. The same has happened in this case. The Chief Secretary denies any involvement in the rigging. His subordinates say that he ordered them to help Yahya Bakhtiar but they told him "No, Sir, this is not possible."

This brings me to the three unopposed returns in Larkana district. First, Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.

As it appears that the White Paper is silent on his unopposed election, I will make only two brief comments. It is my considered opinion that, barring a few seats in Karachi and Hyderabad and perhaps one seat in rural Sindh, as a PPP candidate and with my support Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto can sweep the polls in the rest of the province of Sindh. The seat from which he was elected unopposed covers half the territory from which his father Nabi Baksh Khan Bhutto contested as an independent candidate in 1945-46. He defeated Kazi Fazlullah, the Muslim League candidate.

Next, Mr. Ahmad Sultan Chandio. In my speech in the National Assembly on 28<sup>th</sup> March 1977, I did say and I quote the White Paper at pages 9 and 10 to confirm:

*..... I would say again that if I were asked what has been the most important achievement of the Pakistan People's Party, I would say that in my opinion it has been the massive transformation in the thinking of people, a qualitative change in their outlook. This, let me repeat, has been the most rewarding aspect of the People's Party's struggle.*

*Here in this chamber today sit many who represent their constituencies. Among them is a gentleman from my district who was the biggest Jagirdar not only in Pakistan but also in the Subcontinent of India and Pakistan. He was a big feudal chief. Being his neighbor, I have seen his former jagir. When I was young I saw how he met his tenants and I know how his illustrious forefathers and ancestors met theirs. Last year, I went there during the floods and saw such a transformation in those very-people that for a moment I forgot about the floods. This was in Ghaibi Dero. As a young boy I had seen the people there crawl humbly and remain on bended knees till their feudal master would signal with this little finger for them to get up. And today they would sit with the Prime Minister of their country and with their former feudal chief, whom they still*

*regard as their spiritual leader, and talk to them as equals.*

*I feel so much elated to see this happen. It is this phenomenon that some people fail to realize. One has to see it oneself to appreciate the kind of transformation that has occurred.*

*I do not think the Honorable Member will contradict me here or outside. I have cited him as an example because he was once the biggest Jagirdar in the whole of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and a very powerful tribal Chief. Hardly a decade ago I saw on his lands the attitude, the outlook and the behavior of his people. And, last year, when I went there I saw complete change as if they were a different people; their mentality was different; they seemed to have broken their shackles, cast off the mantle of servility they wore for centuries. This, indeed, is the crux of the Pakistan People's Party's struggle and explains why the Party received a sweeping mandate in the recent elections.*

I maintain this position. As Chairman of Pakistan People's Party, I am proud of the transformation that my government brought about in the structure of our feudal society. It is a singular tribute to my party and will be recognized as such by the coming generations.

However, the White Paper seeks to contradict me on the antecedents of the unopposed candidate Sultan Ahmed Chandio. It states on page 10:

*Incidentally, Mr. Ahmed Sultan Chandio emerges in different light in a press release of the Martial Law Headquarters, Karachi, dated October 13<sup>th</sup> 1977, which was published in the newspaper the next day. The press release said:*

*"Sardar Ahmed Sultan Chandio and Iqbal Fazal were tried by a Special Military Court at Karachi recently. Both were found guilty of committing forgery and cheating. The court has sentenced Sardar Ahmed Sultan Chandio to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.5 lacs or in default to undergo additional R.I. for 6 months. Iqbal Fazal has been awarded 4 years R.I. and a fine of Rs.5 lacs. In case of default he will have to undergo R.I. for another one year." Both were running a travel agency which issued false passports and even forged visas. Their business was a roaring success – till it was detected.*

## **The Chandio Chief**

Let the record speak for itself. It can be verified from the records of the Government of Sindh, the Government of Pakistan and from the records of undivided India in the possession of the Government of India at New Delhi that the Jagir of the Chandios was the largest jagir in the whole of the subcontinent. The information is also contained in Volumes I and II of "The History of Land

Alienation in Sindh." I think it also appears in Richard Burton's famous book "The Races and Tribes of Sindh." The Revenue records are available.

The Chandio Jagir covered a contiguous territory in the districts of Larkana and Dadu and ran into hundreds of thousands of acres, into miles and miles. The Chandio tribe is one of the biggest tribes in Sindh. There are also extensive habitations of Chandios in Baluchistan and Punjab. For centuries the Chief of Chandios has been called Ghaibi Khan. The Chandio Chief is a genuine Baluch Nawab like Nawab Muhammad Khan Bugti and Nawab Khan Baksh Khan Marri. He is a true Nawab, whose son has the right to be called Nawab or Nawabzada. Nawab Ghaibi Khan Ali Nawaz Khan Chandio, the grandfather of Nawab Ghaibi Khan Sultan Ahmed Khan Chandio, was the fourth and the last of the Knights of Sindh during the hundred years of British rule over Sindh. The title of knighthood was conferred on him in 1946.

Within a week of my detention in Murree, Air Marshal Noor Khan came to see me. During the talk, he hinted of the coming events. He told me that he was looking into the travel agency of Sultan Ahmed Chandio, but there was nothing to worry about. He said that he would call Sultan Ahmed Chandio and tell him to control his subordinates. I got the hint. A man like Noor Khan would know that Sultan Ahmed Chandio is a very close friend of mine. I told him that Chandio was a brave man and that he would courageously face victimization. Chandio has been victimized for self-evident reasons. He was called twice by the Martial Law Authorities in August 1977, and told in plain words that he will get it in the neck if he did not break his relations with me. He got it in the neck. The White Paper has proudly published the unabashed victimization on page 10. It is yet another compliment to my radical land reforms that the largest jagirdar in the subcontinent was the first among Chiefs of Chandios to start earning a living by working as an ordinary citizen. Until the advent of the British, Larkana was called Chandika. The foreign masters changed the name of the district just like our internal masters have changed the name of Karachi Steel Mills and the Cultural Complex at Islamabad.

And finally, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This brings me to my own unopposed election. Willingly, and with pleasure I would have gone into my election with a detailed historical background. I could trace the history of elections in Larkana district and in the province of Sindh from the time when the first Englishman was nominated to represent Sindh; follow it up with the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, mention the elections of my father to the Imperial Council at the age of 32 as the sole representative of the Muslims of Sindh. I could trace the history of elections in Sindh from that period upto the time when, as Chief Adviser to the Government of Sindh, he "lost" an election for the first time in his life in April 1937, like his

son did forty years later in March 1977, as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. I would have derived considerable personal satisfaction in the chronicle.

However, I have to consider the sentiments of the people of Larkana. I know for certain that they would feel insulted if I wasted my time in trying to prove that they would have voted for me. I met Jan Muhammad Abbasi in 1962 when I was returned unopposed as the only representative of Larkana district to the National Assembly of Pakistan. In those days he was spare wheel of my cousin, Pir Bukhsh Bhutto, attached to his apron strings. There is one election where there is no need to rig and that is my election. There is one candidate against whom there is no need to rig and that is Jan Muhammad Abbasi.

Scrutinizing the chain of thought of the White Paper on the individual cases, it is quite clear that the author knows nothing about the conditions of Baluchistan, NWFP and Sindh. If he had any familiarity with the conditions of Baluchistan he would not have belittled the international significance of Pishin and Chaman. If he had the faintest knowledge of the conditions and personalities of Sindh, he would not have ridiculed the chieftain of the Chandios.

The White Paper contends that I started planning for the elections in 1974, if not earlier, and that I drew up Model Plans, "organized formidable machinery," and left no stone unturned. But why did I take all these meticulous precautions? There is no quarrel if the aim is to show my temperament and method of work. I admit that I strive for perfection, or try to be thorough. However, this very characteristic would negate the charge of rigging. Rigging is the antithesis of planning and preparation. Quite aside from the inherent risks of rigging, which I kept registering in my written directives and in my exposes in conferences, the need to rig did not arise.

The opposition comprised a motley lot; a strange mixture of odd creatures. It was a genuine example of zero, plus zero equals zero. The only strength of the opposition lay in the zeros of the millions of foreign currency. As for the superficial unity of this heterogeneous band of political gypsies, the White Paper acknowledges that I anticipated it long before the elections. It was according to the pattern of our politics. There were precedents. I therefore do not take credit for extraordinary vision, for observing in a note to Rao Rashid on 15<sup>th</sup> May 1976:

The opposition both within the UDF and outside is getting more coherent. It is trying to reconcile and diminish its contradictions. As time passes it will intensify this effort and as the elections come closer there will be greater compulsion for the diverse political elements to make compromises in the interest of unity.

What are we doing to prevent this potential unity and to decrease the chances of coherence by enlarging the scope of their contradictions? We should be on the move, we should have our plans ready, and we should be watching every step they take. Our counter-moves should be ready, as soon as they have made the moves. We should break them both individually and collectively. We should use diverse methods and means to create chaos in their ranks, to make them suspicious of one another, to make them despise each other. We have no machinery for it. We merely content ourselves with sending me consolation reports trying to minimize the progress achieved by the opposition in its stage-by-stage movement towards greater unity. The opposition is to meet again at the end of this month in Lahore for the second time in a month. Have we any plans ready for that meeting? Are we in touch with any one of them to sidetrack them or to get them off the rails? I doubt very much.

I have quoted the note in full because the White Paper has quoted it in full on pages 178 and 179. I foresaw the development. I was waiting for it. The note suggests that the incompatibles should, as far as possible, be kept incompatible, that a magician from outer space should not descent on Pakistan to tie together the tails of nine wild cats. I suggested the use of the rules of the game. The game is not new. The same has been played in politics from the time of the Greek city-states. The same game is still played.

I did not suggest that in view of the likelihood of their unity, my Government had no alternative but to indulge in malpractices and rigging. On the contrary, I gave another timely warning against rigging. It was an order to get prepared to contest the elections against a combined Opposition. What did surprise me and what I had not foreseen were the forces arrayed behind the Opposition. These forces began together from middle of December 1976.

Reports on the hidden hands began to come to me in the beginning of January 1977. In the same month, Rafi Raza had a four and a half hour interview with me. He told me that PNA was coming into being, he told me who would be the President of PNA and who would be the other office bearers. He gave me the reasons for the design, the strategy and the aim. At the end of his exposition, he told me that I had three alternatives:

- (a) Forget the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant and the imminent unity of the Opposition will not materialize.
- (b) Postpone the elections, or,
- (c) Face very grave consequences.

He kept emphasizing that I should not press him to reveal his sources but that he was speaking with full knowledge of what was taking place. I asked him to make his suggestion. He advised me to forget the Reprocessing Plant. He also

informed me that during elections, the opposition would not make an issue of the Reprocessing Plant. Only now and then they would mention nuclear power plants in order to hoodwink the people; hoping that the public would not know the difference between nuclear power plants and a nuclear reprocessing plant. Rafi Raza warned me that the people around me, those who were making emotional noises and advising me not to budge an inch, would not be found when the curtain fell.

We continued our discussion over dinner. Afterwards, I thanked him for the valuable information and advice. However, I told him it was too late to postpone the elections, or to drop the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant. I further told him that we would win the elections fair and square; but if we did not, then the Opposition was welcome to drop, ditch or modify the Reprocessing Plant Agreement. Rafi Raza said that he had no doubt that we would win the elections in a fair context, but that he had considerable doubt if we would be allowed to reap the benefits of the victory. As he would not expand, I remarked, "All right, we will lose the elections or not be allowed to eat fruits of our victory." Looking through his thick horn rimmed spectacles, and using his hand as a comb to straighten his side parting and the back of his hair, ominously, Rafi Raza said: "But Sir, I am trying to tell you that more than an election or an office is at stake." I replied cryptically, "I got your point and you got my answer."

Before leaving, he asked my permission for a question. I said "Most certainly. " Thereupon he asked, "Why are you doing all this? What makes you take such big chances with yourself and your family? I told him that I was doing it to build an egalitarian society, to make my country strong and modern, to bring happiness to people who had no idea what the world meant. I told him that tears will always be shed but I wanted less tears to be shed and less bitterly.

My doctor, Naseer Shaikh, came to see me after the departure of my Minister for Production. He informed me that he met Rafi Raza in the ADC's room. The doctor, an observant man, remarked that he looked nervous and worried. He said, "Sir, he was as white as a ghost." Naseer Shaikh asked me if I had been harsh with him. I was in a reflective mood; "No," I replied, "I was not harsh with him. The subject we discussed was harsh.

The formation of the PNA did not come as a surprise. I was expecting it on account of past precedents. Rafi Raza showed me its blueprint and also dynamite with which to explode it. The difference was that the unity of the Junto Front, of CCF and DAC was "*desi*" work. The unity of PNA was not a "*desi*" conspiracy. Rafi Raza was the first person to describe its foreign colors to me. The White Paper says at page 384 that, while addressing a joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1977, I said: "This is not a *desi* (indigenous) conspiracy, this is an international conspiracy .... a huge colossal

conspiracy against the Islamic state of Pakistan." I was dead right. The subsequent events have been more deadly. They have hit the nail on the head.

The primary responsibility, if not the exclusive responsibility, for dislocating and destroying Pakistan's nuclear programme for peaceful purposes undeniably fall on the PNA and the Junta. For this reason, both the actors in the play are joining hands openly. Foreign Governments will follow their own policies. Only we, in Pakistan, have regimes which follow the policies of foreign governments. The more they talk of self-reliance, the more reliant they become; the more they talk of non-interference the more they allow interference; the more they talk of independence, the more dependent they become.

The document released on 25 July 1978, is entitled "White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977." The elections were keenly contested by PPP and PNA. Both sides accused each other of violence and malpractices. Both sides fought a bitterly contested election. There is no criticism of PNA in the White Paper. Instead it offers apologies for the PNA. It mentions the unity of the Opposition. It defies me to prove that PNA received funds from outside. It criticizes me for not being fair to PNA. The non-appearance of the PNA in the White Paper merits consideration, in view of the lame excuse given in the Pakistan Times of 12<sup>th</sup> August 1978. Clearly the regime has felt a few pricks of conscience at the blatant one-sided volume of wastage it has produced. It has therefore obliged some lackey of a journalist to write a preposterous face-saver, which says the White Paper "is a probe restricted to the conduct of the elections and it should be apparent to the meanest intelligence that the polls were not conducted by the PNA."

For this reason, the article says, PNA has not been included in the White Paper. No greater indictment of its bias, its partiality and its favoritism could have been shown. The PNA did not conduct the polls, but nor did the PPP. They were conducted by the Election Commission, to whom numerous complaints could be and were made. It is quite happy to deal with the PPP's alleged rigging of the polls, but it remains benevolently silent on the activities of the PNA. Just as the PPP conducted an election campaign, so did the PNA, and by virtue of this, its misdeeds should have been included in the White Paper.

Truthfully, the explanation given is not apparent to the meanest of mean intelligence. The void cannot be filled by fallacious ex-post facto explanations. By this hollow attempt to cover up for the mistakes that have been made, the fraud of the White Paper is thoroughly exposed. Even a cursory inclusion might have been a minimal face-saver. It might have covered up the cracks and gaping holes of deceit. I will not accept this fatuous excuse. Only an idiot could be so blind. It would have been more accurate if the regime had come out brazenly and called the document a "White Paper on the Conduct of PPP in the General Elections in

March 1977.” It has clearly selected only my government and my party for attack. Not one of the 342 documents relates to PNA’s election activities. Not one instance is given of the brutal rigging done by PNA in Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas, Sukkur, Rahimyar Khan, Multan Sahiwal, Lahore, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Gujarat, Gujranwala, Quetta, Pishin, Mardan, Dera Ismail Khan and a host of other places. Not one PNA document is cited, not even the one that called upon the armed forces to revolt.

In fact the White Paper is hoist by its own petard. In trying to make out a case against Yahya Bakhtiar, it makes out a case against Mahmood Achakzai. The same is true of all the other cases. The interest of the ruling party is not served by creating chaos and violence. The interest of the ruling party is damaged by the forcible occupation of polling stations and by *gheraos*. PNA played havoc in taking over polling stations and in fanning violence. The Pishin election is only a sample of the violence and high-handedness of PNA.

In dealing with the action of PNA, which I intend to do even though the White Paper does not appear to think they merit attention, I repeat the earnest request I made in January 1977 in the National Assembly, which I have already quoted: “I hope that the coming election will be a clean and a fair election, but my promise alone is not enough. Other parties should reciprocate this desire and policy. The other side must also demonstrate that it knows what it means to have a clean and a fair election.” [Page (iii) of the Introduction.]

I pleaded for reciprocation in the larger national interest. Here I quote only a few examples of PNA reciprocity:

(a) Mr. Asghar Khan, on a number of occasions, claimed long before the elections that the Opposition had already won them, and only a formality remained to be performed on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1977. He said that PNA would not accept any decision of the elections announced over the radio which were contrary to the facts of a PNA victory. What clearer indication can there be that PNA had no intention of fighting a fair election?

(b) In order to paralyze the country, the leaders of PNA called a General Strike a week before the General Elections. Disorder was widespread. The burning of two buses was enough to halt traffic completely in Karachi. People were intimidated by PNA supporters. They also attacked the property of PPP candidates in order to obstruct their campaign. PNA workers did their best to break up PPP meetings by causing disturbances and burning PPP flags. A procession of PPP lady workers was abused in the filthiest language. In the Punjab violent attacks were made at Gujranwala, Daska and Sialkot.

(c) PNA went mad .... I received a copy of the complaint sent to the Chief Election Commissioner by the Federal Education Minister, Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, on the situation in Karachi. He described how PNA had “openly resorted to hooliganism, vandalism, violence” and used “abusive and provocative language” against PPP. They had launched a vicious campaign involving numerous violations of election laws.

(d) On the Election Day itself, 7<sup>th</sup> March 1977, apart from the massive rigging which PNA did, there were further acts of hooliganism. They went to town in Karachi. There were armed attacks at various polling stations which served the purpose of frightening away women voters. Two PPP workers died of gunshot wounds and eight other were hospitalized. PPP election offices were burnt down in Malir Extension Colony, Korangi, PIB Colony and Liaqtabad.

(e) PNA agitation after the election followed a similar pattern. Not content with trying to create havoc before the elections, they would not abide by the fruits of their labors. They went mad, absolutely berserk, as the American would say. Ironically, the wives of both sons of the Chief Election Commissioner, Asif Sajjad and Wasim Sajjad, led processions in protest of the election result.

These examples are only a token of their misbehavior. Notwithstanding the grave provocations, my government did not reciprocate in kind. We did not go berserk.

The “desire and policy” of the opposition parties was not to contest a clean and a fair election. It is this glaring fact which is apparent to those of the meanest intelligence. The omission of PNA’s commissions is conspicuous in the White Paper. It is so one-sided as to close even the other eye of Lord Nelson. Double standards have been applied by this regime in double dosage.

## 8. The Inner Cancer

In applying one law for its favorites and another law for those against whom it harbors hatred, the regime has shaken the confidence and morale of the people. The common man has lost faith in the system. The causes are many. The deterioration did not start on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977. It started when the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was dissolved in October 1954 and the Federal Court of Pakistan upheld the dissolution on the nebulous maxim of "*Salus populi supreme lex*".

The second jolt was felt in the illegal and bizarre implementation of the one Unit. The third traumatic setback came in October 1958, when the Constitution of 1956 was casually cast aside to impose Martial Law. On the misinterpretation of Hans Kelsen's "Pure Theory of Law," Martial Law was upheld Ayub Khan dotted the country with summary military courts. The Summary Military Courts were going to punish "the high and mighty" and give speedy justice to the common man within a month of the functioning of the summary military courts, President Ayub Khan held a special meeting of his Cabinet at Karachi and decided to wind them up at once. The Governor of West Pakistan, Akhtar Hussain and the Governor of East Pakistan Zakir Hussain, concurred with the decision.

In the Cabinet, General Burki opposed the decision as a dilution of the Martial Law. Manzoor Kadir explained at length what was happening and why it had become imperative to wind up the summary military courts. After he had finished his scholarly presentation, he turned to General Burki and said in his cultivated Cambridge accent "General, the choice is between the dilution of Martial Law and the degeneration of the Pakistan Army." The summary military courts were wound up.

The shock to follow was the imposition of the second Martial Law by General Yahya Khan. The summary military courts started buzzing once again. Within less than six months, even an indolent individual like Yahya Khan was disturbed by the reports on the operation of these courts. General Pirzada, the man who ran the Administration of General Yahya Khan, thought that the answer partially lay in the quick rotation of the tribunals. General Pirzada's formula only quickened the pace of degeneration.

This country has now been hit by a third Martial Law. This third Martial Law carried with it the cancerous legacies of the previous Martial Laws. In addition, it has developed a gangrene of its own. What were three years for Ayub Khan became three months for Yahya Khan. And what were three months for Yahya Khan have become three weeks for Zia-ul-Haq. This is so because the

movement of events accelerates progressively with the passage of time, with greater awakening of the masses. The people are not going to lump in 1978 what they lumped in 1958.

One of the fundamental realities of 1978 is that the people have realized that Martial Law is not law. A regime not established by law is devoid of the attribute to dispense law. A regime which puts in a bunker the highest law in the land does not have the moral authority to say that nobody is above the law. I do not want to escape from the law. I do not want anyone to escape from the law. But I definitely want to escape from the lawlessness of Martial Law. I want the whole nation and every citizen to escape from this lawlessness. My struggle for the restoration of the Rule of Law shows that I do not want anybody to escape from the majesty of law.

Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan were honest enough to admit that Martial Law was an expedient but not a law. The sanction of force stands behind the medley of personal orders and regulations of Martial Law. The sanction of the people's consent stands behind the hierarchy of laws. In one situation, the population is regimented into acquiescence. In the other, the population voluntarily establishes a contract with Parliament. In one situation, the relationship is based on how far the bayonet reaches from the centre of power to the centre of population. In the other, how far the voice travels between the governing and the governed. For this reason, one is called a regime and the other, a government. Martial Law rests on the sanction of force, and not on the sanction of law.

A regime that can suspend or abrogate the constitution and run the country on its whims and caprice should be ashamed of bringing on its lips the word 'law'. It is like prescribing a punishment for adultery after raping the country. It is like saying that the Holy Quran is suspended but nobody can escape from the Hades. Another embarrassing exposure will come when the President of Pakistan is replaced by the Junta. In view of the Inaugural speech of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, on President Fazal Elahi remaining a symbol of the continuity of the Constitution, someone like Graham Greene will have to write the legal fiction for this one. Unfortunately, Agatha Christie died recently. I doubt however if she could have solved this murder.

What makes the regime's sanctimonious declarations on nobody escaping from the law more obnoxious is the repulsive discrimination. The clutches of the law exist only for Pakistan People's Party and its leadership. Even in this selectiveness the notorious elements of the Pakistan People's Party, individuals who were a disgrace to the party, have been exempted from the 'Law', from the farce of accountability and the rest of the hocus pocus merely because they have prostrated themselves before the Caliph of Martial Law.

The only political party that falls under the shadow of 'law', is the Pakistan People's Party, the only political leadership which cannot escape the 'law' is the leadership of Pakistan People's Party. Everyone else is exempt. Everyone else gets off scot-free. So exempt are they that thirty years after the departure of the British, justice had to be invoked all over again from the British to catch up with one of them in far away London. The Disqualification Tribunals exist only for the Pakistan People's Party and its leadership, as does the guillotine of that much abused word 'accountability'. This is like the robbers of a bank robbery verifying the bank statements of those whom they have looted and sparing those who provided them the means to execute the robbery.

PNA has done no rigging as the white paper shows. PNA is like a snow white swan in 'Swan Lake', the delicate, little innocent thing who can do no wrong. Now, can any law apply to such an immaculate exception, the partner in the real crime? The law of absolute Martial Law is limited to PPP' and its leaders. The punishment of the law are restricted and reserved for PPP and its leaders only. Only PPP and its leaders are not above the gallows and the lashes, the jails, the fines, the confiscations and disqualifications. Only the PPP and its leaders cannot be exempted from this variety of law. Herein lies the definition of the lawlessness of Martial Law. I cannot be exempted from the law because the law of the land cannot differentiate between the high and the mighty and the common man. I am a mendicant of the masses. The high and mighty of PNA are the ones who have been exempted. This regime has shown a differentiation between the common man like the PPP worker and its Chairman and the high and mighty like the PNA 'Seth' and its leaders.

I too was going to dissolve the Hyderabad Tribunal in April 1977, but for a fundamental political quid pro quo from Afghanistan which had no direct relevance to the merits of the legal issues before the Tribunal. But on what consideration has the regime unilaterally disbanded the Tribunal? The question has become more relevant in view of the recent statement of Attaullah Khan Mengal, in which he has said that the Baluch leaders have complied with their part of the agreement but that the regime has not. It is not surprising for this regime to break its pledges and agreements, but the nation is entitled to know the contents of this agreement.

Its disclosure is inherently important not only to follow the mystery but to evaluate the future of Pakistan's fragile unity. It might well be that the high and mighty were freed because they were twice horn Sardars and Khan of Khans above the law and not a common man like Z. A. Bhutto. This former President and Prime Minister of Pakistan is such a common man that whereas the confessing co-accused and convicts are having a fiesta in the District Jail of Rawalpindi, meeting their relations for hours on end seven to eight times a week,

my wife and daughter have to keep complaining and protesting in order to see me barely once a week.

While we are discussing the high and the mighty, it would not be out of place to ask what happened to the high and mighty who left the dying founder of Pakistan lying helplessly in the heat for three hours in a broken down ambulance at Mauripur? Why was the book written by his physician Colonel Ellahi Bakhsh proscribed? What happened to the high and mighty who plotted the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan in broad daylight at a public meeting in Rawalpindi? Why was the police officer who shot the assassin promoted? He was rewarded with a promotion because dead men tell no tales.

I would also like to know why the Generals who now form the Junta were ever so disturbed when Mujib-ur-Rehman sought to take accountability by threatening war trials in Dacca? Why were they so anxious that those trials should not be held? If it is argued that the junta is not responsible for past lapses and that, the Junta is taking accountability precisely because great wrongs were done in the past, a number of valid questions arise:

- (a) What mandate or authority does the Junta have for taking accountability?
- (b) Why is the accountability totally one sided and patently discriminatory?
- (c) Is it legal accountability to set up military tribunals in which those hauled before them cannot be defended by lawyers?

The regime is not taking accountability. This regime has no right to take accountability. Illegal and discriminatory punishment is not accountability. It is the most primitive form of revenge and vindictiveness.

If this commoner from the village of Garhi Khudah Baksh Bhutto is the first criminal in the history of Pakistan, he does not fear accountability. But he demands genuine accountability at the hands of the people and not at the hands of those who have proudly torn into tiny pieces the highest law of the land. In my speech to the nation on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1971, as the elected President of Pakistan, I was the first Head of State and head of Government to say that there should be accountability. But the accountability had to be to the people and to Parliament, not to a coterie of usurpers from the barracks bent upon perpetuating injustice and crime under the cover of accountability.

## The Army in Politics

I know return to the all important subject of civil military relations I do not intend to trace the history of this relationship since Independence. Nor do I intend to repeat what I stated in my affidavits in the Supreme Court in the Constitution Petition challenging Martial Law. I do not want to repeat what I stated in my still censored Affidavit in the Lahore High Court filed in relation to my detention under Martial Law Order Number 12. Nor do I want to mention the subsequent events which have borne out my apprehensions.

All the three full fledged Martial Laws stand before the people like a mirror. Being heavily made up with cosmetics, the people could not clearly see the face of the first Martial Law. The Elizabeth Arden 'make up' of the second Martial Law was washed away in the Brahmaputra. The wig and the false teeth of the present Martial Law have been removed and behold, the people see the reflection in the mirror in all its nakedness. As we stand at the precipice there is little lime left for arguments. Events are moving very fast. There is little time to lose if time has not already been lost. Anyone who cannot fathom the moral and spiritual division is living in a fool's paradise. I will cut short the arguments on pluralism and singularism, on secularism and theocracy, on democracy and dictatorship.

As my starting point, I will take the remarks made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator at the Quetta airport on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1978. General Zia-ul-Haq observed that Mr. Bhutto had said that there were three forces in the country, that is the Awami League, PPP and the Army, and Mr. Bhutto had tried his level best to eliminate the two and get on with one. I admit the first part of the remark and still hold to it as being the objective reality that emerged from the Elections of 1970. The Awami League in East Pakistan and PPP in West Pakistan emerged as the two dominant political forces in Pakistan. The third was the Army. The army began openly to take shape as a political force in 1954. Since that time its role has kept expanding, not diminishing. In 1969, in the form of Martial Law, the army was the Government of Pakistan. The Elections of December 1970 were held under a Legal Framework Order provided by the army. The Army was in politics up to its neck. It was an unpleasant and disconcerting reality, but unpleasant or pleasant, it was the reality.

There were three political forces-the Awami League, PPP and the Army. The Awami League and PPP had every right to be in politics. The army was in the middle of the political Field as an interloper and a trespasser. The second part of the General's remarks is unintelligible and a trespasser. The second part of the General's remarks is unintelligible and self-contradictory. By now we have got used to his pearls of wisdom. How did I try to eliminate the two and get on with

one? Is he bracketing the army with the Awami League? If that is the influence there was nothing to prevent the army from accepting the Six Points of the Awami League. If after my five and a half years of meritorious service to the armed forces of Pakistan, the Chief of Army Staff rewards me with the compliment that I tried my level best to eliminate the army, I can only repeat that it is very difficult to forgive kindness.

Did I try my level best to destroy the army by bringing back with honor 90,000 prisoners of war? Did General Zia-ul-Haq have the ten-year old American arms embargo lifted, did he get the weapons from China, did he invest over one and a half billion dollars on armaments, and did he modernize the navy, give fighter planes to the air force and missiles to the three services? Did he reorganize the defence services and establish the Ministry of Defence Production? Did he embark on defence collaboration with Muslim States? Did he conclude the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Agreement although he called it "my plant" in an interview with a correspondent of the Washington Post? If I tried my level best to eliminate the army, why did he serve under me for the five and a half years, and why did he accept the office of the Chief of Staff?

General Zia says that he discovered my alleged rigging after he usurped power, that he could not have made this discovery before the usurpation. If the rigging was as massive and as total as the White Paper contends, surely he could have come to this conclusion before usurping power? But let us not pursue this subject in the elucidation of this submission. Elections are a political exercise and the General can be forgiven for his lack of knowledge. But if I had been trying my level best to destroy the army from the days of Yahya Khan, this is a fairly long time for a soldier to see through the game. Why then did General Zia-ul-Haq pay me the most eloquent tributes as the savior of Pakistan, as the builder of the armed forces of Pakistan? At Quetta, in April 1976 at a dinner given in my honor at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, General Zia said, and these are his very words:

*Those of us who are aware of the facts and figures are quite certain that the amount of attention which the Pakistan army received since till to date has no parallel in the history of Pakistan army prior to 1971.*

*With all this Sir, I personally and on behalf of the army have nothing tangible to offer as yet. All I can say is that perhaps one day, by the Grace of God, while you are still present, this Pakistan army can show that all the attention and affection that it received from you did not go waste.*

He concluded this eulogy with this glowing finale:

*I am saying this in very simple and humble words from the bottom of my heart that we thank you, Sir, for all that you are doing and what you have done for us in particular.*

He paid me glowing tributes such as this both before and after becoming Chief of the Army Staff. Indeed, as I have already illustrated, even immediately after the imposition of Martial Law he praised me to the skies.

He was responsible for the proposal for me to become the Colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps. The speech he delivered at the Investiture Ceremony in Kharian was wholesome in its praise. If actually I was the enemy of the army and was hell bent on destroying it, a soldier of Islam could not have remained in the dark about my evil designs. Nor would a Momin have praised me repeatedly and lavishly as an outstanding Supreme Commander, if he knew that I was destroying the army.

It must be clearly understood that the sub-continent is not Latin America. The historical tradition of Latin America, except for the brief experiment with monarchies in Mexico and Brazil, has been one of transition from cruel colonial dictatorship, chiefly of Spain and Portugal, to indigenous military *coup d'états*. Mexico and Cuba have had revolutions. Chile has a strong democratic tradition. Otherwise, by and large, the process has been to transfer power from external colonialism to internal colonialism.

The sub-continent is not Africa. There also, with the exceptions of the established monarchies, the transition mainly has been from the colonial dictatorships of Britain, France and Portugal to internal military dictatorships. With the exception of countries like Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia, those African leaders who led their nations to independence like Nkrumah, have been overthrown by military *coup d'états*, just like President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown in Latin American. A revolution of heroic dimensions took place in Algeria. The Middle East either has established monarchies or revolutionary governments. The chaos created by the chronic *coup d'états* in Syria and Iraq ended with the Party control of the two antagonistic factions of the radical Ba'ath Party.

Again, exceptions apart, relative stability in the Third World has come through:

- (a) Established monarchies
- (b) Revolutionary nationalist movements
- (c) Socialist revolutions
- (d) Parliamentary democracies.

Wherever *coup d'états* have become the order of the day, the result has been either secession or a socialist revolution or both. The secession of East Pakistan is a case in point. The recent revolution in Afghanistan is another. It was far easier for a socialist or progressive revolution to overturn the *coup d'état* of Daoud Khan than the established monarchy of Zahir Shah.

For a number of reasons, the sub-continent falls into a class by itself. It has in its bloodstream ancient democratic institutions like the *panchayat*. Secondly the sub-continent is a vast land mass with an enormous population. Thirdly, people's uprisings and movements have taken place in the sub-continent from the time of Ashoka. Fourthly, recognizing these and other related factors of a basic nature, after the War of Independence in 1857, the British conceded successive installments of democracy to the people of India. The process of democratization continued for ninety years until total independence was achieved in 1947.

## **Internal Hegemony**

For over three decades civilian leaders like the Quaid-e-Azam, and Gandhi led the masses of the subcontinent in intensive struggle for independence and freedom. Without political consciousness, without political awakening, agitations against the salt tax, the Khilafat movement. Quit India and Direct Action would not have been possible, and without those convulsions the pillars of British Raj would not have collapsed. Nowhere in Latin America or Africa or in the Middle East, has the lesson in mass awakening been so long and as persistent as it has been in the sub continent. The people of the sub continent, both the Muslims and the Hindus, aroused and inspired by their civilian leaders, struggled and sacrificed not to merely hoist two new flags but to get the fruits of freedom and democracy.

Nowadays we are told ever so often that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. This is true, but who created Pakistan? The Muslim masses galvanized under the civilian leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam and not under a coterie of generals, created Pakistan. This country came into being by massive movement of the Muslim masses and not through a midnight *coup d'état*. The Muslim population and not the military generals created Pakistan. The country was created by the people and its independence can be sustained only by the people through their chosen leaders. Only those who created Pakistan in the name of Islam can order their chosen representatives how to ordain that name. A usurper or a coterie carries no mandate to fulfill the task. Nor has the usurper or his coterie been empowered by the people to determine whether this State is being administered in the name of Islam. The interpretation has to be done collectively in Parliament and not by an individual or a gang with guns in their hands. The name of Islam does not come out of a barrel of a gun.

I entirely agree that the people of Pakistan will not tolerate foreign hegemony. On the basis of the self-same logic, the people of Pakistan would never agree to an internal hegemony. The two hegemonies complement each other. If our people meekly submit to internal hegemony, a priori, they will have to submit to external hegemony. This is so because the strength and power of external hegemony is far greater than that of internal hegemony. If the people are too terrified to resist the weaker force, it is not possible for them to resist the stronger force. The acceptance of or acquiescence in internal hegemony means submission to external hegemony. The people of this country will not tolerate either. They will rise against both hegemonies.

Pakistan has been created in the name of Islam by the people. This is accepted. But Islam does not exist in Pakistan alone. Islam is the final message of God Almighty to the whole world and not only to the people of Pakistan. The Holy Quran states that God is "Rabil-al-a-Meen" the Creator of the Universe and of both the Worlds. Islam expands throughout the world. Muslim nations adorn the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. Recently, on a visit to Saudi Arabia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator declared that, by virtue of it being the spiritual centre of Islam, Saudi Arabia was entitled to the leadership of the Muslim world. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia is the spiritual centre of Islam, but do such controversies rages in Saudi Arabia as have been provoked by this regime in Pakistan? They do not. Under the enlightened leadership of the Saudi royal family led by King Khalid, the Kingdom is marching forward without dramatics. The people of Pakistan and their chosen leaders are Muslims irrespective of what the stooges of the regime might like to say. The true Muslim is not the one who submits to the *coup d'état*, but he is the one who fights like a mujjahid for the political and economic rights of the oppressed masses.

In the past, the struggle was carried out on the battlefields: today it is fought in Parliament. In the winter of 1960 or 1961 Von Brentano, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, visited Rawalpindi Manzoor Kadir, the then Foreign Minister and I were asked to attend the meeting he was to have with President Ayub Khan. A substantial identity of views emerged during the discussions. The parting words of President Ayub Khan were that Pakistan had, indeed, the same traditions as Prussia. Von Brentano, a German aristocrat of Italian origins and perhaps not entirely familiar with the common traits and traditions of the two countries remarked "this information is interesting." I heard President Ayub Khan made the same comments in Bonn to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and to Foreign Minister Schroeder. In Lahore he repeated these remarks to the Minister for Economic Co-operation with Overseas Countries, Mr. Walter Scheele, now the President of the Republic of Germany. Ayub Khan was not an ordinary person. He had been the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army for nine to ten years. Later, he was the President of Pakistan for over ten

years. What made Ayub Khan think that the comparison was so close that he repealed it to successive German leaders?

Having got rid of “the menace” of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Emperors and Kings of Europe gathered in Vienna, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to settle on a treaty for peace and stability in Europe. It was the age of the aristocrats. They had staged a recovery from the French Revolution of 1789, defeated Napoleon at Waterloo. With their confidence regained in the belief that history had chosen the blue blood of Europe to be its eternal rulers, they framed the status quo. Prince Metternich of Austria was the moving spirit. Despite Talleyrand’s genius to extract the best terms for France, in collaboration with Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, Metternich imposed the New Order of Europe in a majestic ceremony in September 1815.

The Congress of Vienna had concluded the Treaty of Vienna, which was to ensure that the King was the State; a land in which nobility has special privileges and riches; a medley of autocracy and feudalism, with a sprinkling of nascent capitalism, in which the people came last and were suppressed by the two tiers of the nobility and the clergy. On September 26, 1815 Russia, Prussia and Austria signed the Holy Alliance. But within fifteen years the people were on the march again. By 1848 almost all the nations of Central Europe were in revolt. Revolution was in the air Leaders like Mazzini and Louis Kossuth had emerged to lead and inspire the people. The status quo, evolved with such care at Vienna, was shaken to the ground. Its architect, Prince Metternich fled to London. Later, Benjamin Disraeli was to tell his wife and his mistress that Metternich was “a bore.”

Engulfed by the revolutions of Europe, the Prussian Junkers expanded their standing army. In due course, the Prussian Army had expanded beyond the resources of Prussia. It was evident that the size and capacity of Prussia would not be able to bear the burden for long. The situation became so untenable, that it was said: “Prussia is an army with a country and not a country with an army.” The Prussia Junkers were well aware of the consequences. Three choices stood before them. Either:

- (a) Prussia had to expand to become the pivot of the German fatherland;
- or
- (b) The large standing army had to be reduced; or
- (c) Prussia would collapse under the weight of the large standing army.

Prussia resolved the problem through three wars of expansion. The first war was fought against Denmark in 1864, the second against Austria in 1866 and the third against France in 1870-71. The wars were planned by Prince Otto von Bismark and executed with dazzling brilliance by General von Moltke. After the

war against France, the process of the unification of Germany stood completed. Through her army, Prussia had more than resolved her military budget problems. On 18<sup>th</sup> January 1871, a proud Bismark, flanked by General von Moltke and other politicians and generals declared in an impressive ceremony, “*ein Reich, ein Kaiser*. The work is done.”

Pakistan, like Prussia has a large standing army. Three wars have been fought by Pakistan. Pakistan’s three wars took place approximately eighty years later, in 1948 in 1965 and in 1971. The ceremony in which General Tiger Niazi Participated at the Dacca Race Course on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1971, came a century after the ceremony in which General von Moltke participated.

Civilization means civilian supremacy. Military *coup d'états* are a disaster. Even in the Pakistan of Europe, Adolf Hitler did not seize power through a *coup d'état*. He won a “rigged” election. Just as Yahya when hesitated to transfer power to the elected leaders, Chancellor Hindenburg hesitated to accept the election results in Germany. He transferred power to Adolf Hitler and the Nationalist Socialist Party only after Baron Von Pappen assured the ailing Chancellor that he would handle Hitler. Mustafa Kamal Pasha came to power in Turkey through revolution and by virtue of glorious victories against the Greeks, supported by France and Britain. In Iran, Raza Shah led a movement to preserve the threatened unity of the Iranian nation.

In fact, strictly speaking, the only military *coup d'état* that brought glory to its people was that of Napoleon Bonaparte. But Napoleon was a giant. There was no man more complete than him. His military brilliancy was only facet of his many-sided genius. His Napoleonic Code remains the basic law of many countries. Napoleon was an outstanding administrator, a scholar and a romanticist. In my opinion, his prose was superior to that of Charles de Gaulle. However, even this military dictator with his undoubted genius, took France to agony of Waterloo.

Those were different times. There is historical continuity and yet each epoch has to be judged in its own time and space. In the world of today, we have to draw lessons from contemporary developments without ignoring the west. With the knowledge of our own experience, we must evaluate where we stand. In this perspective, it can be said that our nation is drowning and in the hands of those who cannot swim. We have the results of our three *coup d'états*.

The signature tune to the overthrow of every civilian government in Pakistan by Martial Law has been entitled “Civil War”. However, this eye wash does not wash when an abortive *coup d'état* is frustrated. In 1951, the government of Liaquat Ali Khan suppressed the attempted *coup d'état* of Major Gen. Muhammad Akbar Khan, the Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army. Prime

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan condemned the attempted military takeover in the strongest of terms. He called the conspirators the “enemies” of Pakistan and the “enemies” of democracy. He warned the generals to keep away from politics for the Welfare of Pakistan and its unity. He described the *coup* leaders as selfish individuals. This *coup d'état* was crushed and a civil war did not follow. If, on the other hand, the conspirators had succeeded, they would have called themselves saviors of Pakistan who had reluctantly stepped in to save the country from a civil war.

Towards the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973, barely a year after a traumatic civil war had ended with the separation of East Pakistan, another *coup d'état* was being organized. All tin pot *coup d'états* are personal in character but this plot was an intensely personal one. General Tikka Khan, the Chief of the Army Staff, showed me a chart of the relationships and remarked that the attempted *coup* was from the “family corps.” Some senior officers and a number of junior officers related and friendly to a politician, who was formerly in the armed forces, were the instigators. The comedy in this would be *coup* is that the conspirators wasted half the time in trying to find the ostensible justification for their putsch and that the statement of that politician led the intelligence agencies to the hide-out. The conspirators were tried by their own peers. General Zia-ul-Haq was the Presiding officer of the Court.

The 1951 attempt was called the Hyderabad Conspiracy case. The 1973 one was called the Attock Conspiracy case. When the trial concluded, I summoned General Zia to Rawalpindi for his impressions. He gave me a detailed account of his evaluation of the causes and impulses behind the plot. After hearing him patiently I was struck by the personal and selfish factor that aroused the conspirators. Not a trace, not even the pretence of an objective motivation was available in the cause of that attempt. What made it more melancholy was that it came so soon after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. This meant that the historical tragedies arising out of military rule meant nothing to power blind individuals. The flow of blood was like water down a duck’s back. The blunders of military regimes, both internal and external, were not eye openers. The pollution of the armed forces by its involvement in politics had not conveyed any message. The catastrophe of East Pakistan and the surrender of 90,000 prisoners of war did not teach a single elementary lesson.

Pakistan was established on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1947, as an Islamic Federal Democratic state. As I have said, the first military *coup d'état* of General Muhammad Akbar Khan was attempted in 1951, three years after the creation of Pakistan. The second quasi-military *coup* came in October 1954, when Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the sovereign Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. This illegal and unconstitutional action would not have come to fruition without the full backing of General Ayub Khan, the Commander-In-Chief of the Pakistan

Army. Without this vital support, Ghulam Muhammad would not have dared. The third quasi-military *coup d'état* came in October 1955, when, in total violation of the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, provincial autonomy was abolished and One-Unit foisted on West Pakistan by the same culprits using the same force that brought the demise of the Constituent Assembly a year earlier.

In October 1958, came the hard stuff: the military *coup d'état* of General Ayub Khan. In March 1969 came the military *coup d'état* of General Yahya Khan. In March 1973, the Brigadiers military *coup d'état* was scotched. On 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, came the existing military *coup d'état*. This means that in thirty years of the existence of Pakistan there have been:

- (a) Two attempted military *coup d'états*
- (b) Two quasi-military *coup d'états*
- (c) Three full-fledged military *coup d'états*

Excluding the minor efforts to stop civil war like the martial law of General Azam Khan in Lahore in 1953 during the anti-Ahmedi agitation, there have been seven major efforts to stop civil war in Pakistan in the last thirty years. It sounds very strange and ironical that the Muslims, who unitedly struggled for Pakistan against British imperialism and Hindu domination and achieved Pakistan in a miraculous demonstration of unity, should be on the verge of civil war every time the autumn leaves begin to fall. The appetite for aggrandizement, the unquenchable thirst for naked power can become a habit-forming drug. It can bring hallucinations of civil war.

## 9. The External Crisis

Let us compare the *coup d'états* Pakistan has had with those of the same class in Africa. The subject is sensitive and only two examples of Asia and one among the many of Africa are being given. In Asia, the successive military *coup d'états* in Thailand has intensified the secessionist movement in that country. Had it not been for the bond of unity provided by the Thai monarchy, the country would have been dismembered by now. In the Philippines, the Martial Law, albeit led by a civilian president, has accentuated the secessionist movement in Mindanao. In sharp contrast the fragile and newly created unity of Malaysia, built on the sunken sands of Duncan Sandys, is showing unexpected resilience. It is due to democracy. Let us take India, our "great and dear" neighbor. If India had suffered from martial laws and military dictatorships, on the pattern of Pakistan, India would have been three or four separate pieces by this day. India is more heterogeneous than Pakistan. But India has been kept in one piece by the noise and chaos of her democracy. Only the example of the most recent *coup d'état* in Africa is being cited. If the military *coup* recently witnessed in Mauritania is of the category under consideration, it would inevitably lead to the dismemberment of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania; the second Islamic Republic to face dismemberment.

The issues involved are very grave. But instead the present military regime passes its time producing White Papers which, in fact, are waste paper and should be treated as such. For, God's sake let us address ourselves to the dire national problems. Apart from the earlier retrograde measures taken by this regime, the suspension of Martial Law Regulation 115 promulgated by me to transfer land to the peasants of Baluchistan is pregnant with harm.

Suspension of this reform until the settlement of land survey is completed means its annulment. The former Sardars of Baluchistan are not with you; by annulling a basic reform like this one, you want to lose the peasantry of Baluchistan as well. Even the well cooked "*Sajji*" of Baluchistan is not a better recipe for secession.

This is not the only unpopular measure taken by this martial law regime, which has no mandate from the four provinces of Pakistan. It is only natural that when they feel no sense of participation and there is a political wilderness, national unity is eroded and secessionist tendencies are nurtured. This tendency has implications in the field of foreign affairs. In the sphere of international affairs, duty drives me to put questions which are disconcerting to national interest:

## **(a) Pakistan-Afghanistan relations**

The policy of blowing hot and cold on Afghanistan will not pay. The complicated web erected by a legacy of three hundred years of history or more, cannot be swept away by lifting the hand of President Daoud at the Shalimar Gardens or by attending receptions at the Afghan Embassy. There is much more to it. The coming developments are linked with two major events. One is the unilateral and unconditional decision on the Hyderabad Tribunal. The other is the revolution in Afghanistan. The regime has not gained much credibility with the new Government in Afghanistan. It has been forced to fall back on the achievements of my government to halt the inevitable exacerbation.

After an exacting period marked by tensions and troubles, in the first week of June 1976, the former President of Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammed Daoud invited me to Kabul to discuss and settle what the Afghan call the only political difference between Pakistan Afghanistan. The upshot of the intense discussions in Kabul was that the Afghan side sought the release of NAP leaders being tried by the Special Tribunal at Hyderabad before it would reciprocate by recognizing the Durrand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On my part, I insisted that both actions be taken simultaneously in the form of a package agreement.

Although the talks were inconclusive, it was decided that the former President of Afghanistan would visit Pakistan to continue the negotiation. In the meantime, a historic joint-communiqué, based on the Bandung principles of peaceful co-existence, was issued at the conclusion of the Kabul visit. When President Daoud and his delegation arrived in Pakistan in August 1976, the threads of the Kabul discussion were picked up in the talks in Rawalpindi. After the first round, the delegations of Pakistan and Afghanistan were instructed by their respective leaders to get together to work out a formula for the simultaneous package agreement. From Rawalpindi, the two leaders and their delegations went to Lahore. While President Daoud was given a warm welcome in the Shalimar Gardens, the delegations of both sides were burning the midnight oil to thrash out a written formula. This was finally reached. It called for the recognition by Afghanistan of the Durrand Line as the international frontier and simultaneously, Pakistan would release the NAP leaders and declare a general amnesty. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, at that time, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, brought the written formula to the Government House of Lahore for my final approval. I studied the formula and said, "I am satisfied." So was President Daoud. There was to be a formal ceremony for signing the agreement in Kabul. Subsequent events prevented the Kabul visit from taking place.

President Daoud came again to Pakistan in early March 1978, but this time, with an air of supreme confidence. It was a different Pakistan from the one he had visited in August 1976. The pendulum had swung in his favor. Eager to enlist the support of Wali Khan in an effort to grasp at any straw to confront me and the PPP, the military regime released Wali Khan and the others without the corresponding reciprocity. The “political difference” remained. This new situation arms the Baluch and Pakhtoon leaders to exploit the unresolved difference to their advantage. The irony is that the military regime forsook the draft agreement for a foundered aim. NAP will not co-operate with the Junta. It would entail the political suicide of their veteran leaders.

General Zia-ul-Haq had two meetings with President Daoud, one in Kabul and the other in Pakistan. Having squandered the opportunities of converting the draft agreement into a formal treaty before the overthrow of President Daoud, the military regime has been put into a quandary by the revolution in Afghanistan. It has been forced to make amends for its maladroit reactions to the convulsions in Afghanistan. It took an unnecessarily long time to recognize the present government. Unwisely, it permitted attacks on the Afghan revolution to appear in the controlled press and also the hostile statements of its stooges in PNA. Due to its lack of vision, it failed to see the difference and the impact between its *coup d'état* and the revolution in Afghanistan.

Although the revolution was spearheaded by the armed forces, the government is controlled by civilian party leaders who know the art of politics. The present Afghan government will not lose sight of its political capital arising out of the mistake and the weaknesses prevailing in Pakistan. The bird called quid pro quo has flown out of the cage. The military regime talks tough one day and soft the next day. This is to be expected because it is operating without a mooring. At this rate, the repercussions are bound to spill over into Iran and India. Just as there are Muslims in Iran and India. Wrong and faulty steps accompanied by defective judgment will turn the light music of the Horn of Africa into a symphony.

The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are back to the starting point. This is all the more tragic as the chapter of strained relations was about to be concluded. When the General went to Kabul, he was even more of a novice in foreign affairs and in the art of statecraft than he is today. The professionals stood aside and let him enter into a diplomatic duel with the wily Afghan diplomat. It was a predictable conclusion.

Fate has a sadistic way of playing its own pranks. Before leaving for Kabul in June 1976, at a conference at Peshawar which I had summoned to get the views of leading members of my government on Pakistan's future relations with Afghanistan, the Chief of Army Staff said that he would not like to take the

valuable time of the conference as a “little knowledge is a dangerous thing.” He finished his short and modest intervention by saying that he knew that Pakistan’s interest in the coming negotiations with Afghanistan could not be in better hands than mine. Yes, indeed, a “little knowledge is dangerous thing” but who believes in Shakespeare?”

## **(b) Indo-Pakistan Relations**

Many questions are relevant. I would like to ask why India was called “a dear and great neighbor” at the banquet given in honor of the Prime Minister of Britain. Or, why has General Zia adopted the phrase “give and take” with regard to solving the problem of Kashmir in a compromising manner? How is the hegemony of India opposed by the agreement on Salal dam, and the Rajasthan Canal? The Rajasthan Canal is a multipurpose project. In addition to being an irrigation project, it is a military fortification which puts into insignificance the fortifications of Pakistan, including the BRP Canal. The Rajasthan Canal is a modern Maginot Line. If for four years my government could successfully persuade the government of Iran not to give India a loan for this project, this regime could have done the same if it had taken the matter seriously.

The most important problem facing India and Pakistan is the problem of Kashmir. Significant steps were taken at Simla. Therefore, with what Machiavellian purpose was the canard on a false “secret clause” on Kashmir touted by the controlled press and by some unscrupulous journalists working for the regime in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting? The regime knows that no such secret clause exists. Still, it encouraged the circulation of this falsehood. The object is clear. It is to pave the way for capitulation by firing the gun from my shoulder. If the Simla Agreement had contained a secret clause on Kashmir, it would have been made public long ago. Indira Gandhi would have revealed it during her election campaign. The Janata Government would have released it on coming into power. If a secret clause existed, why then did the military regime not disclose it after the *coup* of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977?

A barrage of fantastic yarns was told at that time and immediately thereafter. Why then were that shy to tell this none? Even Mr. Vajpai, when he came to Pakistan in February 1978 did not make any such bogus disclosures. Instead of making vague statements, he could have produced the text of the secret agreement and declared emphatically, “Sorry, gentlemen, but both India and Pakistan are bound by our former governments’ secret clause, which I produce before you and the world to accept.” Mr. Vajpai said nothing of the kind. He did not even give a hint of such a clause, simply because there is none. On the contrary, he laid stress on the Simla Agreement as it exists and has

existed and continues to exist in the shape it was openly arrived at in June 1972. There is nothing neither more nor less to it.

The propagation of this canard has been used to make two main points. First, that according to the non-existent “secret understanding” the Kashmir dispute cannot be taken to the United Nations. Secondly, that the term “cease-fire line” was changed to the line of control in the Simla Agreement to prevent Pakistan from taking the dispute to the United Nations. The Kashmir dispute has been before the United Nations for the past thirty years; still the problem has remained unsolved. The PPP Government therefore wanted to exhaust the bilateral avenues fully before returning to the United Nations. This conformed to the PPP outlook on the efficacy of the principle of bilateralism.

The Kashmir dispute is still on the United Nations agenda. It would have been withdrawn if the Simla Agreement had closed the door on the United Nations recourse. The fact that the Kashmir dispute was maintained by the PPP government on the United Nations agenda burst the balloon of falsehood floated by the capitulationists. The United Nations is still guarding the disputed line. It is short of funds. These UN troops would have been withdrawn at once if the Simla Agreement had precluded the UN from the Kashmir dispute. During the PPP government’s time, the Indian government did not dare to request the United Nations to remove the UN troops from the disputed line. In the winter of 1976, the Defence Minister of Denmark visited the Danish contingent of the UN forces at Kashmir on both sides.

However, only recently it has been reported by a spokesman of the Indian Home General Zia visits India, the Indian Foreign Ministry, that when Ministry and Significantly not the Indians will ask for the withdrawal of the UN Observers. The Indian Home Ministry spokesman said that the withdrawal of UN troops would be asked for in the light of “growing relations. “As far as the difference between “cease-fire” and “control” line is concerned, both mean the same thing. The Cease-fire Line is a line of control and the line of control is Cease-fire line. They are interchangeable terms. Objection was not raised in changing the term from cease-fire line to line of control. For more than 25 years, the term Cease-fire Line has been used with such frequency and persistence, that it has virtually lost all significance. By changing the terms to a Line of Control, “the disputed character of the line was made conspicuous and given a dynamic impetus. It is a dereliction of the basic duty of the nation to guide and prompt the Indians through the controlled press of Pakistan to interpret the nomenclature which is in fact favorable to Pakistan as being favorable to India.

The “growing relations “between India and Pakistan have “grown” ever since 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977: They have grown with:

- (i) Mr. Vajpai's visit to Pakistan;
- (ii) Mr. Agha Shahi's visit to India;
- (iii) Salal Dam Agreement;
- (iv) Trade missions, transit negotiations;
- (v) Cultural and sports missions, etc.

After seeing off the Vice-President of Libya on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1978, in an informal talk with newsmen at the Rawalpindi airport, the Chief Martial Law Administrator applauded the remarks of the Libyan Vice-President that the good relations between the two countries were not due to personalities. In the next breath, when his attention was drawn to the objection raised by the Foreign Minister of India on the Karakoram Highway, the General inducted the element of personalities in Inter-State relations by stating that personally, he had a great regard for Mr. Vajpai and that, for the present, he would make no comment.

The great personal regard the Chief Martial Law Administrator has for the rabid Jan Sanghi leader could not have developed at first sight when they met for two days only at Islamabad last February. Generally a great personal regard develops over a period of time. It is not a secret that over a period of time, Atal Bihari Vajpai has been their enemy number one. The communal objectives of his party, reiterated umpteen times by Mr. Vajpai, are to restore Hindu hegemony and supremacy in the sub-continent. His career in public life has been marked by an intense hatred for the Muslims.

The Chief Martial Law Administrator is the master of his own wisdom. But if the remarks of the Libyan Vice-President were quoted with approval, there was no reason for introducing the personal factor in answer to the important question on the Karakoram Highway. Without demur, the Chief Martial Law Administrator should have seized the opportunity to declare that India has no locus standi in the matter. When it comes to a supreme national interest, like the strategic Karakoram Highway, the Chief Martial Law Administrator lumps the crude and insulting interference of India, by saying that he would make no comment beyond expressing his great regard for Mr. Vajpai. When it comes to the prevention of my assassination, he raves and rants on what he erroneously describes as foreign interference.

Ever since the inauguration of the Karakoram Highway, for the last two months, India has been screaming loud protests over the "illegal" construction of this Highway. It was suggested in the Lok Sabha that in view of the construction of the highway, the Indian Foreign Minister should cancel his visit to China, scheduled for October this year. The Indian Foreign Minister assured the members of the Lok Sabha that during his visit to China he would definitely take up with the Chinese Government the "illegal" construction of the Highway,

linking Pakistan with China through the illegally occupied part of India's Kashmir by Pakistan.

The Prime Minister of India also expressed his objection on similar grounds when he recently visited Srinagar and said that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India, and that was all there was to it. However, when at last, when there is an opportunity for the Chief Martial Law Administrator to remove all misgivings and tell the people that Pakistan would never countenance Indian interference and hegemony, he comes out with a limpid remark betraying trepidation. The dispute between India and Pakistan will not be dissolved by a dance.

### **(c) Non-Aligned Conference**

Were all the implications full assessed before deciding to attend the Preparatory Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations at Belgrade? An insult was inflicted on Pakistan by attending that Conference as a second class citizen in the comity of non aligned nations. Anticipating these complications, my government did not accept the offer of many friendly non-aligned countries to sponsor Pakistan's participation at the Non-Aligned Conference at Colombo in August 1976. When I visited Sri Lanka in January 1976, Prime Minister Bandaranaike enquired why I was reluctant to attend the conference when so many of Pakistan's non aligned friends were keen to see Pakistan participate as an "Observer". I told Madame Bandaranaike that even if invited to attend the Non Aligned Conference in August 1976, Pakistan would politely declined the invitation because Pakistan is an aligned state.

Pakistan is aligned by virtue of CENTO. Recently, for the first time in the history of CENTO, Pakistan participated in a military exercise of CENTO outside the territorial jurisdiction and responsibility of CENTO. The military exercise took place in Scotland, in NATO territory. How puzzling it is for Pakistan to strengthen her aligned status by linking NATO and CENTO through military exercises never undertaken before, and simultaneously wanting to participate as a mere Observer in the Non-Aligned Conference in July 1978. This is an elementary contradiction hard to fathom.

The examples of Yugoslavia and Romania attending the Non Aligned Conference as Observers cannot be furnished as a justification for Pakistan to follow suit. Yugoslavia and Romania do not have territorial disputes with a single non aligned nation. Pakistan has serious disputes with two important and influential non aligned states. Both these neighbors of Pakistan attend the Non-Aligned Conference not as Observers at the tender mercy of others but as founder members. By attending the conference as an Observer, Pakistan put herself into a nutcracker. She has placed herself with the disadvantages of

inequality of status. Our two neighbors were on home ground and among legitimate members of the family. Such problems do not apply to Yugoslavia or Romania. They can safely attend as Observers. They are European countries, giving aid or assistance to most of the non aligned countries. They belong to an entirely different category. Their parallel does not hold good for Pakistan.

But more important, Yugoslavia and Romania have no objection to India gate crashing in to an Islamic Summit Conference. It will be recalled that India almost gate crashed into the first Islamic Conference held at Rabat, Morocco. As her reasons for attending the Islamic Summit Conference, India pointed out her 70,000,000 Muslim population. The feeling was that by attending the Islamic Summit Conference, a big country like India would get closer to the Arab/Muslim cause and further from Israel. Whatever the compulsions, India almost got entry into the first Islamic Summit Conference, although "secular India" is a "Hindu State". If aligned Pakistan can attend a non aligned conference, would Pakistan be able to prevent Hindu India from attending the next Islamic summit conference? Once the basic criterion of this nature is compromised, there is no limit to its scope.

Each state is the captive to her own history. Just as the examples of Yugoslavia and Romania do not apply, nor do those of Portugal and Turkey. Portugal is not involved any more in the disputes of the non aligned states. She would not have sought participation if she still held Goa in dispute or had not vacated Angola and Mozambique. The history of Turkey is far too glorious to come under suspicion. India has consented to Pakistan's second class participation in the conference to embarrass Pakistan and to set a precedent for her own participation in the next Islamic Summit. She has killed two birds with one stone.

The basic postulation of the Quaid-e-Azam was that the Indian National Congress was incapable of representing the Muslim cause. The Quaid dubbed Congress Muslims as Quisling. Gandhi refused to accept the Quaid's thesis. He opposed it vigorously. Many a deadlock arose over this basic difference. Finally, after a bitter struggle, the view of the Quaid-e-Azam prevailed through the creation of Pakistan. Hence, according to the Two Nation Theory, India is incapable of representing the genuine aspirations of Muslims.

When General Yahya Khan, the then Chief Martial Law Administrator belatedly recognized the monstrosity of his mistake at Rabat by almost agreeing to the presence of India at the First Islamic Summit Conference, he shut himself up in the Guest House. With eyes full of tears, he begged the Shahinshah of Iran, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hassan of Morocco to rescue him. The other distinguished members of Pakistan delegation chose to drown their sorrows in a night club. The Ambassador of Pakistan to Morocco, Akbar Tayabji

was the host. His guests included Agha Shahi and Major General Omar, the major domo of Yahya Khan. At the night club, General Omar jokingly introduced Agha Shahi as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Shahi told General Omar not to joke like that. Seven years later, that is not the only joke which has come true.

It is not honorable to travel on false documents, or to enter an International Conference on a fake passport. It is not necessary to enter every place through the back door. If non alignment is all that important, if we are so anxious to show our identity to an independent foreign policy, the honorable course is to renounce CENTO, become a truly non aligned state and attend the Non-Aligned Conference as a full participant through the front door and with head held high. The "to be or not to be," the neither fish nor flesh, the "*Katchi Abadi*" participation has caught us in the middle of the storm, despised by the nonaligned, distrusted by the aligned and devalued by the Socialist states.

#### **(d) The Nuclear Reprocessing Plant**

After three years of intense negotiations, the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Agreement was signed between France and Pakistan in March 1976. France was fully satisfied on the safeguards. The Agreement was concluded between my government on behalf of Pakistan and the government of President Giscard d'Estaing on behalf of France, The International Atomic Energy Commission at Vienna confirmed the Agreement. The United States representative on the Commission voted in favor of confirmation. The necessary confirmation and approval by the International Atomic Energy Commission would not have come if the Commission was not completely satisfied with the safeguards. In August 1976, I rejected the counter proposals of the United States. At that time, the French Government expressed its indignation over American interference. A consistent position was taken by France on the original Agreement until 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977.

After tantalizing the people of Pakistan for fourteen months and keeping the armed forces on tenterhooks, at last General Zia had to mention in his press conference in Rawalpindi on 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1978, that he had received a very polite letter from the President of France but it did not serve the purpose. He added ominously that France wanted modifications in the contract through negotiations. So that is it.

The President of France has offered a face saver but has not saved the plutonium separating capacity of the plant. This means the end of the saga. In changing its position, the French Government has evoked the doctrine of "*Rebus sic Stantibus*". The French Government concluded the agreement with a civilian and constitutional government, not with a military and dictatorial regime. The agreement was concluded with an elected Prime Minister of international stature

who had earned the respect and confidence of three successive Presidents of France De Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, and not with an incredible Chief Martial Law Administrator who keeps breaking his promises to his own people. The awesome implications of these developments were not weighed when there was a rush to join in the conspiracy to overthrow my government. At that time, the typical "*Baad mein dekha jaye ga*" (we will see later) attitude prevailed. But this issue of the nation's life and death did not deserve such flippant and callous approach. It must never be forgotten that politics carries its own dynamics. Now that the water carriers in the safari have come face to face with the super power *shikaris*, they have got hoist by their own petard.

What does the regime propose to do to meet the threat of this qualitative change? More foreign aid? Now that it is officially admitted that the nuclear reprocessing plant is lost, with or without foreign aid, Pakistan would have to unquestionably move towards steeper dependence and alien reliance. It will be more at the mercy of those who are professionals in the art of nuclear blackmail. India is getting uranium from the United States despite the stiff letter President Carter threatened to send to the Indian Prime Minister after his talks with Morarji Desai in New Delhi. The stiff letter means nothing to the Indian Prime Minister as long as he gets the uranium from the United States for India to explode more nuclear devices.

General Zia, in contrast, is thrilled by the "very polite letter" from President Giscard d'Estaing in which he has been told that the agreement will have to be re negotiated to deny Pakistan the promised nuclear capability. The French are a very cultured people. They stopped hanging their political leaders two hundred years ago. It was but natural that in making a volte face on such a basic agreement, the French President had to select the politest words from the vocabulary of the rich French language to inform General Zia of the sad demise of the pretty plant. The politest of letter cannot match the pain and the punishment. But riddled by complexes, General Zia had to add insult to injury by saying that it is a "very polite letter". What a fall, my countrymen! What a shattering blow to the dream of a lifetime.

I have been actively associated with the nuclear programme of Pakistan from October 1958 to July 1977, a Span of nineteen years. I was concerned directly with the subject as Foreign Minister, as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources and as Minister in Charge of Atomic Energy. When I took charge of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, it was no more than a signboard of an office. It was only a name. Assiduously and with granite determination, I put my entire vitality behind the task of acquiring nuclear capability for my country.

I sent hundreds of young men to Europe and North America for training in nuclear- science. I commissioned Edward Stone to build PINSTECH and laid its foundation stone in the then wilderness of Islamabad. I negotiated the agreement for the 5-MW research reactor located in PINSTECH. In the teeth of opposition from Finance Minister Shoaib and Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission, Said Hassan, I negotiated with success to obtain from Canada the 137 MW Karachi nuclear power plant and performed its opening ceremony. Towards the middle of 1976, I gave approval for the Chashma nuclear power plant. And of course, I negotiated and concluded the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Agreement with France in 1976.

Due to my singular efforts, Pakistan acquired the infrastructure and the potential of nuclear capability. It was not a simple task to catch up the lost time in a poor and underdeveloped country like ours. When I assumed charge of atomic energy, Pakistan was about twenty years behind India's programme. When I ceased to be Prime Minister, I believe, that at the most, Pakistan was five to six years behind India. If the internal opposition to the nuclear programme had not come from the beginning from certain powerful ministers and bureaucrats, I could have further narrowed the gap. A country does not have to be merely wealthy to possess nuclear capability. If that were the only requirement, every OPEC country would have nuclear capability. The essential pre-requisite is the infrastructure.

For this reason, I gave the highest priority to train thousands of nuclear scientists in foreign countries. Now we have the brainpower, we have the nuclear power plant in Karachi. All we needed was the nuclear reprocessing plant. Arrangements for the heavy water, the uranium and the fuel fabricating plant had been made. We were on the threshold of full nuclear capability when I left the Government to come to this death cell. We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State for the United States, has a brilliant mind. He told me that I should not insult the intelligence of the United States by saying that Pakistan needed the reprocessing plant for her energy needs. In reply, I told him that I will not insult the intelligence of the United States by discussing the energy needs of Pakistan, but in the same token, he should not discuss the plant at all. The General got the lemon – "limbo" – from the President of France. Pakistan got the "ladu". PNA got the "halva." I got the death sentence. What difference does my life make now when I can imagine eighty million of my countrymen standing under the nuclear cloud of a defenseless sky?

The universal demand of the hour is that the regime should come out with a three volume White Paper on this issue of the Nation's life and death. No other problem is exercising the minds of the people more than this supreme question. It is about time the regime straightened out its priorities. I did not rig the elections, but is rigging an election worse than losing nuclear capability? The sovereignty and security of the State have been mounted on the gallows. The gallows that are loved and cherished for personal vengeance are ready for the neck of the nation. The issue, being of paramount importance, the White paper should be sub-divided into three parts, containing as annexures all official documents of any relevance to the subject.

Volume I. Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear capability.

Volume I. The conspiracy against the effort of Pakistan to acquire nuclear capability.

Volume III. The success of the conspiracy and its consequences.

All the three volumes should be documented fully with official documents, notes and memoranda as annexures on the precedent of the White Paper Volume I released on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978 and Volume II released on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1978. What a wondrous achievement the regime has made to give vent to hatred! But surely personal hatred and envy do not have to the extent of causing fundamental and irrevocable harm to national interest merely to deny me the honor of having been a faithful and diligent servant of the State?

National interests are not served by the advancement of personal amour proper. I have always tried to serve the supreme national interest. I took pains to uphold the prestige and reputation of the armed forces. Even now, ray open commentary upon the Hamoodur Rehman Report would irreparably damage the name of the armed forces. Therefore, despite the gravest provocation and inhuman treatment, I will refrain. There are two significant references to the Hamoodur Report in the White Paper, which show how another effort is being made to turn virtue into vice.

All the senior military officers who had access to the Hamoodur Rehman Report were of the unanimous view that the report should not be published. Whenever I held a meeting to consider the publication of the report, each one of the senior officers of the armed forces vehemently opposed the idea. In deference to their wishes, and out of respect for the army, I did not release the report despite the enormous pressure from the public and the opposition parties. I took the cruel and unkind brunt of the vicious attacks to protect the honor and the name of the armed forces and this is how I am being repaid for it. The military regime has been in power for a year and a month. It has released all sorts of filth and lies to malign me with the object of turning the people against me. The

regime would have jumped the gun to release the Hamoodur Rehman Report if its nefarious purpose of maligning me had been served by it.

The military regime is not releasing the report because it is a severe indictment of the armed forces and the military hierarchy. In a press conference in Lahore about four months ago, the Chief Martial Law Administrator tried to play down the substance of the Report. He said that he had read it and there was nothing important in it. According to his yardstick, only those things are important which might damage me. Nothing else is important to him. The report is important. It is a story of rape, plunder and loot. If, in those days, lashing were a punishment for rape and cutting off hands for theft, I would shudder to think of the number of handless persons. Since “purifying the blood of Bengalis” is not rape, the President of Pakistan could have exercised his powers of mercy.

The report exposes the macabre conspiracy of Yahya Khan and his clique. The map of Bengal had to be painted red. What a colorful directive from a General whose skin I saved with honor but whom nevertheless went to London to influence Jam Sadiq Ali to become an Approver in false murder case against me. The passage in the White Paper on page 106 shows that, due to the clamor, I was reflecting on the demand but that I was requested to consider further the tentative decision to release the item. The passage in the White Paper is in italics and it reads.

In the discussion, it was concluded that any formal exposition of the 1971 War, and events preceding it outside Hamoodur Rehman’s report, would raise new issues, accelerate and encourage the demand for the publication of Hamoodur Rehman’s report and would be counterproductive. It was decided to request the Prime Minister to reconsider this item.

On page 107, the White Paper states: “Mr. Bhutto agreed with the line of action suggested with a cryptic ‘It can be omitted’”. This clearly shows that in a conflict of interest, I chose to sacrifice our political interests to safeguard the reputation and honor of the armed forces. I am receiving a wonderful token of gratitude. Instead of being beholden to me, a sadistic effort has been made to turn the tables on me. This is the meaning of “*Idhar Hum Udhar tum,*” an expression I did not use in that distorted form; but it has come out to be true. There, the Bengalis were given hell and here we are being given hell. Over there the Bengali politicians were not fit to rule. Over here we are not fit to rule. Democracy was unworkable in Bengal. Democracy is unworkable here. Over there, the masses had to be exploited by Big Business and over here our masses have to be exploited by Big Business. Over there, the Bengalis had to get the *danda* and over here we have to get the *danda*. “*Idhar hum udhar tum.*”

The Chief Martial Law Administrator quoted me at the Quetta Airport on my analysis of the three forces that had emerged on the political scene as a consequence of the election of December 1970. I have commented on this matter earlier. It would have been more germane to the present crisis, if the Chief Martial Law Administrator had taken the trouble to quote me on the unambivalent warnings I gave at that time on the continuation of the army's role in the politics of Pakistan. General Zia-ul-Haq should have added that Mr. Bhutto also said;

*The inescapable conclusion is that the people must participate in government. With military operations continuing in the East Wing, with India on the point of going to war, with mounting frustration in the West Wing, the present military regime cannot continue its military bureaucratic rule and hope to overcome the crisis. Only a genuine representative government, having the confidence and support of the people, can succeed. For this reason, the People's Party believes that, representing the people, it is not only its right but its duty to call for an early transfer of power to the elected representatives. If there is delay in the transition from military rule, the country may well reach the point of no return within a matter of months (The Great Tragedy).*

The General should have further stated that on 29<sup>th</sup> September 1971, Mr. Bhutto stated that:

*It is our considered opinion that if democracy is not restored before the end of the year, it will be too late to salvage and save Pakistan. Let me now put everyone on notice that the present regime cannot cope with the mess. O' my people! Let this long night of terror and uncertainty come to an end. The rule of the Generals must end and the people of Pakistan must take their destiny in their own hands.*

The Chief Martial Law Administrator should have still further stated that Mr. Bhutto said:

*We have inherited a terrible legacy of unforgivable mistakes. We have become answerable for the sins of the Old Guard. Superficial minds without an elementary knowledge of politics, without any sense of history, have made fundamental political decisions which have brought Pakistan perilously close to ruin. (The Great Tragedy).*

These were the unpleasant realities of 1970-71 that I articulated with foresight. As the elected leader, it was my duty to warn the people of Pakistan of the coming doom. The junta of Yahya Khan paid no heed to my repeated warnings. The doom came.

Eight years have gone by and today an altogether different situation prevails. The crisis is deeper and more serious than the crisis of 1970-71. In 1970

the danger was of losing East Pakistan. In 1978, the danger is of losing all of what remains of Pakistan. In 1970 there were three political forces on the scene. In 1978 there are only two political forces on the scene – the People and the Army. The cushions of 1970 have vanished. The gulf between the People and the Army is widening. The question is plain. Who is to be in charge of Pakistan – the People or the Army? Who is to order the life of our, society– Parliament or the Generals? Will the people decide their own future or not?

The conditions are inexorably leading towards the final confrontation. The outcome can be appalling in the extreme. Spain had such a conflict. More than forty years have passed but the memory of that period haunts the mind of the Spanish people like a living nightmare. Spain is still crippled by its grievous injuries. Earlier Islam was uprooted from Spain not due to Ferdinand and Isabella, as Western historians try to establish. Islam saw its Granada due to the treachery and envy of Muslim Damascus towards Muslim Cordova. Spain presents two warnings to Pakistan -one is of a deadly confrontation between the People and the Army, and the other is the danger of the liquidation of this Islamic State. The Spanish say “Todo por la Patria.” The Pakistanis say “Pakistan Zindabad”. Pasque is the Baluchistan of Spain, and Andalucia is the Sindh of Spain.

Catholicism was the answer to all problems in Spain. Pakistan also has the answer to all the problems. Gandhi once observed that if Islam is uprooted from the subcontinent, it will flourish elsewhere, but if Hinduism is uprooted from the subcontinent, it would be the end of Hinduism. The meaning of the remark was that if Hinduism had to be protected at the cost of uprooting Islam from the subcontinent, there was a justification for it. Is it the aim to prove that, Gandhi, indeed, was a Mahatma?

Only recently, Muslims have been slaughtered in four or five towns of Shaikh Abdullah’s Kashmir. The General should not rest on his follies and false vanity. He should know that the choice is quickly getting limited to one between a Granada or a new Kerbella. I am the only person in Pakistan who can stop this confrontation. It would be a sweet death to die in such an Endeavour. I would consider it a signal honor to lay down my life in the battle to prevent the final catastrophe. I will address myself to this Herculean task with an all-consuming energy.

I was born to make a nation, to serve a people, to overcome an impending doom. I was not born to wither away in a death cell and to mount the gallows to fulfill the vindictive lust of an ungrateful and treacherous man. I was not born to be humiliated and insulted by a barbaric and spiteful clique. I was born to bring emancipation to the people and honor them with a self respecting destiny. Sooner or later for every people there comes a day to storm the Bastille. The people of France charged on this symbol of hatred on 14<sup>th</sup> July 1789. The people

of Pakistan are bound to have their day of Bastille if not in 1978 in 1989. The day is coming and nobody has yet been born to stop its advent. I am the only person to reverse the march towards self annihilation. I have the confidence of the people and I love my land too much to lose the respect I have for the Armed forces as an Institution. The time is at hand. The time for playing marbles is over. I say again, the solution, although fading, is still in sight:

- (a) The country wants the Constitution
- (b) The Nation wants Democracy
- (c) The People want Parliament
- (d) The Provinces want Autonomy
- (e) The Proletariat and the Peasantry want the Pakistan People's Party.

Do you understand? This is what the People want. Stop trying to be a Mehdi .....

## 10. Death Knell

While giving an interview to the Chief Executive, the Chief Martial Law Administrator confided that by democracy he did not mean the Westminster type but one suited to local conditions such as the “very good experiment with Basic Democracy.” But how good was the experiment? To pacify the urge of participation of the firebrand Bengalis the British introduced a sort of basic democracy system in Bengal decades ago. Mr. Manzoor Kadir, the Foreign Minister in Ayub Khan’s regime, picked it up and, with modifications, advised President Ayub to launch it as a panacea for the political malaise of Pakistan.

Ayub Khan was attracted by the scheme. Gradually, he became enthused with the idea. Basic Democracies was the final solution. In it he found a manageable civilian power base, a wider constituency than his own small and slippery constituency of the GHQ. Hooked to the bureaucracy and glued to organized corruption, the scheme looked like a built-in-machine for self-perpetuation. A day after the outlines of the New Order was announced to the nation, Ayub Khan, General Burki and I went to Khangarh for partridge shoot. Our host had cultivated a close friendship with Ayub Khan from the early days of his appointment as Commander-In-Chief of the Pakistan Army. He was an uneducated tribal chief and a zamindar.

During the lunch Ayub Khan asked our host if he had heard of the new system. The zamindar said that he had heard the broad outlines on the radio. President Ayub Khan then asked, “What do you think of it?” The zamindar had no idea of Ayub Khan’s intense captivation by the scheme. His response was, “Let’s hope it will work, *Jenab*.” Ayub Khan was surprised at his reply. “But why are you doubtful?” he asked. The illiterate zamindar made the following points:

- (a) People have exercised the right of adult franchise for over twenty years. The curtailment or abolition of adult franchise by the new system will cause resentment.
- (b) The bureaucracy would become more powerful, more arrogant and more unsympathetic towards the public.
- (c) The bureaucrats and the basic democrats would join hands to fleece the general public.
- (d) By and large the members elected from a tiny constituency would be the “*badmash*” type of individuals.
- (e) Since the constituency would be very small, rivalries and feuds would erupt between “father and son” and “brother and brother” for membership and thereby carry the heat of personal ambition and

vendetta into every hut in every village.

- (f) It would create a class of petty Brahmins and the public would resent the emergence of these Brahmins.
- (g) It would corrupt the political life of the country.

I had not heard a better expose or a more lucid analysis of Basic Democracies from my colleagues in the government. It was remarkable that, having heard only once the broad outlines of the scheme on the radio, this uneducated zamindar was able to dart out cogent reasons with devastating ease.

The other zamindars sitting in the *shamiana* noticed Ayub Khan's facial expression settle into unhappy lines. Ayub Khan was distressed. On the way back to Karachi he told me that a man of Ali Gohar's limited vision could not be expected to comprehend the benefits of the new system. Six months later the zamindar died of cirrhosis of the liver. On my return to Karachi, I informed Ayub Khan that I had gone to Khangarh to offer condolences to the family of the Sardar. Ayub Khan remarked that he was very sorry to learn of the death of his very close friend. He added, "The trouble with him was that he drank too much." After a moment's a silence, he added, "Probably he was drunk that morning when he criticized the Basic Democracies system. "

Ten years later Ayub Khan discovered that it was he who had become intoxicated with the Basic Democracies system. At his Round Table Conference, Ayub Khan was forced to admit that the Basic Democracies system had failed. If the system was unacceptable in 1953 and was overturned by the people in 1969, no white-washed version of this discredited vestigial organ will be acceptable to the people in 1978.

The Junta has maintained that the people of Pakistan are "emotional" and "illiterate." The trouble is that there are two worlds in Pakistan-the world of the Masses and the world of the Masters. There is the people's image of themselves and there is the arrogant coterie's image of the people. We trust the people and their wisdom implicitly. We do not think that the people are children who can be led by a Pied Piper or that they are lambs driven into the slaughter house.

I am not a master of Urdu oratory. Men like Attaullah Shah Bukhari were the masters. Stirred and emotionally excited by the speeches of Bukhari, the people still did not vote for him or for orators like him. But they heard my poor and broken Urdu and because they are poor and broken, they reposed blind confidence in me. I have never betrayed and will not betray that confidence in me. I have never betrayed and will not betray that confidence even now, as I sit in the shadow of the valley of death. The time honored verdict of ascertaining the validity of this assertion is available if there is a scintilla of doubt. Let the people voice the verdict through the vote. Let the people indicate through the mark on

the ballot paper if I have betrayed them or taken them to the hitherto unknown heights of self-respect and recognition.

The purpose of holding an election is vitiated if the result is to be guaranteed beforehand. No political party can guarantee "positive results". Positive results of the Junta's taste means positive rigging to their taste. Every illegal stratagem has been employed for the past fourteen months to eliminate the Pakistan People's Party in order to pave the road for "positive results." Now, with great pomp and ceremony, a Civilian Cabinet has been set up like a puppet show and a year for elections has been announced. They are to be held in October 1979. I am not fooled. The People are not fooled. These changes are no changes at all. The Chief Martial Law Administrator still runs the show. It is still a military regime. It is still Martial Law. The Constitution has been violated. It has been torn to shreds. The date of October 1979 is too vague. It comes too late. There is no assurance to the people and no guarantee that their rights and liberties will be restored. In actual fact, the Chief Martial Law Administrator has merely shielded himself behind garbage of more hollow promises.

The doctrine of necessity has already gone overboard. The Supreme Court Judgment in Begum Nusrat's petition has long since been cast to the winds. The Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of necessity on the grounds that the regime would hold elections with dispatch as solemnly promised. Early elections constituted the pre-condition to the recognitions of the doctrine of necessity. The military regime has had no shame in declaring, "The next election will be fought by the various political parties without intervention, providing that they assure me and the nation that an election will bring positive results." This weak feeble gesture does not hold water. Making an "effort" to hold polls once "conditions" have been "created" is nothing more than another effort to dupe the people. In reality, the Chief Martial Law Administrator fears elections. He talks about "positive results" and clearing the economic mess in order to procrastinate. Defeat and failure represent these conditions.

The economic mess has been created by the Junta Chief and his anti-deluvian and obsolete policies. He and his regime cannot clear the economic mess, as he and his collaborators are the fountain heads of the mess that has accumulated in the past year. This is not the first time that the Chief Martial Law Administrator has laid down preconditions. Last time, he talked about firstly, clearing the economic mess and secondly, the assurance of positive results. Now, he has merely used different words to disguise his deceit. Without going into the absurdities of the preconditions he sets, it is more pertinent to note that a positive legal and constitutional consequence flow from his decision to flout the essential stipulation in the Supreme Court judgment. Who is going to take cognizance of this flagrant violator of the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court Judgment? Who can take notice of a man who has said, "Whether it is or isn't

constitutional, power in Pakistan will always be wielded by the man who sits in the chair of the Chief of the Army Staff." If this is a formal declaration of the army's permanent role in the politics of Pakistan, it means that the formal seal has already been affixed. Neither a democratic system nor a non-democratic system can brook such participation.

In one system the ascendancy is of the civilian elected government and, in the other, is the ascendancy of the party. In both systems the armed forces are subordinate to the civilian government and under its control and direction. If the sovereignty and the unity of a country is not safe in the supreme hands of the people and their elected representatives, it cannot be safe in any other hands. It is an insult to the people and their patriotism to impose a non-elected, salaried watchdog as the sentinel of national unity. This would be the death knell to national unity.

Certainly armies are ordered to suppress rebellions, insurgencies and revolts. But a temporary exigency cannot be converted into a permanent feature of national life. Parallel and competing sources of power would be a paradise for intrigues and plots. It would undermine and undercut authority. External colonialism foisted on our people diarchy. Internal colonialism is following suit with a vengeance. A supra-authority cannot be created above the supreme and sovereign parliament on a flimsy pretext. Two sovereigns cannot coexist under one sovereignty. Such a situation provides no place for politics and, if there is no place for politics, there is no place left for polity.

I have seen the writing on the wall. I warned of it in October 1977. I told the Supreme Court in the constitutional writ petition that if the constitution were to be held in abeyance beyond the briefest period, the argument might arise that the autonomy of the four provinces voluntarily surrendered by them under the constitution possible by fixing an assured time limit for elections. When one of the justices asked whether I was suggesting a time limit to Martial Law, I replied by saying, "Exactly. Your Lordship had understood exactly what I am driving at." This is a far cry from saying that I told the Supreme Court that regions could secede from the Federation if they so chose. There is a fundamental difference between this mischievous attribution and what I actually stated in the Supreme Court on the implications of the indefinite suspension of the Grand Norm.

This submission applies with equal force to amendments in the constitution of 1973. If the inordinate delay in restoring the constitution is coupled with arbitrary amendments, especially on fundamental settled issues like the electorate, it will be very difficult to maintain a straight face and say that the constitution of 1973 is still alive. In that position, all options will be re-opened de novo, including whether autonomy is to be "fullest," "total" or less than fullest or less than total. These fundamental and grave issues on Pakistan's future

existence will have to be settled by consensus of the new elected representatives in a free and fair election held without delay. The extent of autonomy is naturally determined through a consensus arrived at by the newly elected representatives.

I am not saying that the constitution of 1973 is dead. This will depend on how much longer it is going to be kept in animated suspension, and whether it is going to be subjected to amendments. If free and fair elections are not held very soon and if the constitution is amended, in that case it will be an illusion to think that the constitution of 1973 is still the supreme law of the land. The only prerequisites for an election are that they should be free and fair, not that they should be lumped together with the economy and Nizam-i-Mustafa.

A *coup d'état* is an unpleasant experience. It leaves behind a dreadful legacy. Pakistan, the land of the pure, has become coupistan. If a *coup d'état* becomes a permanent part of the political infrastructure, it means the falling of the last petal of the last withered rose. It means the end. Many nations have existed from time immemorial. Even the eternal nations cannot risk this type of adventure, or misadventure. States which were liberated after the two world wars cannot take a gamble of this nature with their unity.

New states have been created out of existing States by the will of the people. Without the struggle of the people and without their sacrifices, this category of new States would not have come into existence. And if they cannot be trusted to maintain the unity of their own creation, the *raison d'être* of the struggle and the sacrifice disappears. It becomes archaic if the custodian of its survival is the chair of the Chief of the Army Staff. A permanent role for the army in the politics of Pakistan was not envisaged by the Quaid-e-Azam. The very thought was abhorrent to him. He advised the cadets at Kakul to be loyal to the Government and faithful to the constitution in letter and in spirit. I was not aware of this speech of the Quaid-e-Azam. The day before my departure for a short tour of the Middle East at the end of June 1977, the Chief of the Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq drew my attention to this speech while he drove with me from the airport to my residence in Karachi. He said that for him, loyalty to my government was a clear and firm duty laid down by the Quaid-e-Azam.

What nervous compulsions lie behind the anachronistic changes? What morbid motives cause these about turns? What confused complexes prompt these utterances? The nostalgia for the "golden era" of Ayub Khan, the admiration for basic democracies, the yearning for election results that are positive in the eye of the beholder, the suicidal thought of a permanent role for the army in the politics of Pakistan are notions which can cross the minds of those who stand outside the gate of history. Such ideas can appeal only to a fossilized mind, to a conservative mind wanting to drag Pakistan into the backwardness of the past. If a return to the past is not possible, the maximum the

regime is willing to concede is the permanent institutionalization of the status quo. The debilitating dream of a permanent status quo is the symptom of a society which has come to the end of its growth. Horace observed that man is "born under the malignant influence of change." In my opinion, change need not be malignant provided it is brought about by the genius of the people and not by malignant minds overcome by megalomania.

## **Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right**

This regime adopts weird logic to defend itself. To justify its brutalities, to uphold the rationale for its Martial Law, it keeps referring to the state of emergency which existed in the country during my tenure of office. The logic is that if the elected government could have a state of emergency, the Junta is entitled to suspend the whole constitution. Because my government constituted Special Tribunals during the emergency, the Junta is justified in going to the other extreme by setting up Summary Military Courts, other Summary Courts, Special Tribunals and Disqualification Tribunals. Because my Government amended the constitution by the due process of law, the Chief of the Army Staff is authorized single handedly to amend the constitution. Because my Minister for Information and Broadcasting suggested some innocuous administrative measures against a newspaper, the Junta is justified to whip, flog and imprison journalists. It is entitled to close down newspapers and journals, and confiscate printing presses.

Because my Government sought to collect taxes from notorious tax dodgers, the Junta thinks it is entitled to confiscate properties and harass the Pakistan People's Party leaders and workers by milking them monetarily. Because my Government is alleged to have rigged elections, the Junta thinks it is entitled to postpone elections until it suits them. Its past record in this respect does not bode well for the future. On the eve of the election campaign, it arrested me and the top leaders of my party. This reduced the election to a mockery. Even so, in spite of the arrests, the Pakistan People's Party drew huge crowds to its meeting and there was every indication that the PPP would sweep into power once more. In view of this, the elections were hastily called off by the military regime. The Junta claims that I rigged the elections. Its own behavior has been comparatively worse.

Allegedly, my government was partisan towards its own party. Therefore, the Junta thinks it is justified in merging the identity of the PNA with its own identity. There is nothing left in the PNA. There is a Mexican saying which is appropriate: "those who sleep with dogs wake up with fleas." Because my government put its party's proposals on delimitation of constituencies according to legal procedures to the Election Commission, the Junta believes it is justified in

converting and relegating the Election Commission to a recommendatory rubber stamp. Because my government gave an extension to the former Chief Election Commissioner, the Junta believes that the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court should also be the Chief Election Commissioner. Because my government contemplated to resolve a grave national crisis through a referendum, this regime thinks that it should hold local bodies elections before other elections. In this spirit the White Paper says, "Throughout his tenure in office, a state of emergency remained operative in the country and was not lifted even during the general elections."

At least I held the general elections in a free and fair manner. The Chief Martial Law Administrator's tantalizing attempts to make the people believe that he will hold elections merely make the situation worse. This is a new stunt to save face, but it is merely part of the same act which has been going on ever since 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977. On the day he usurped power, he made a solemn pledge to the nation to hold elections within ninety days. On 28<sup>th</sup> September 1977, his chief spokesman to the United Nations General Assembly informed the General Assembly that elections in Pakistan would be held as scheduled on 18<sup>th</sup> October 1977 and that power would be transferred to the chosen representatives of the people. Only three days later this pledge was broken and the elections were abruptly called off.

If I committed a sin in holding elections while a state of emergency prevailed, does it mean that Martial law will be lifted if and when elections are held? Martial Law is the extremist form of emergency. If the cover of emergency is incompatible with elections, it is more irreconcilable for Martial Law to co-exist with elections. If this anomaly or incongruity is pointed out, the Junta reverts to its perverse logic. Its sycophants say that I cannot make the demand for elections because I imposed Martial law in three cities of Pakistan during the agitation or that, in addition to being sworn in as the President of Pakistan on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1971, I also became the Chief Martial Law Administrator. I have already explained that, having abrogated the Constitution of 1962, Yahya Khan had created a void. Until it was filled by the temporary constitution of April 1972 I had to inherit the responsibilities according to the grim realities of the time. Insofar as the temporary Martial Law imposed in the three cities of Pakistan at the height of the disturbances is concerned, there is a world of difference between a Martial Law under the Constitution and a Duke of Wellington's Martial Law.

When the people are demanding that the ban on political activities should be completely lifted, reference is made to the use of Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code by my government. There is no answer to this kind of devastating logic. It leaves every one speechless. On page 384 under the caption "No End to Emergency" the White Paper states, "However, in spite of the

confidence with which he spoke about Pakistan's perfect, relationship with the outside world, and in spite of the fact that the new Government in India had just lifted the external emergency, he refused to end the state of emergency in Pakistan, which he was using so effectively to suppress opposition and dissent." What I had said (about the emergency) was that I was prepared to consider the question of lifting it after India had lifted her external emergency; but I did not say that it would automatically be lifted the moment India lifted hers. India had a war only with Pakistan, but our relations were at times strained or soured with others also. We were dismembered and, apart from that, we had some grave and serious misunderstandings with Afghanistan as well. But more than that there were other factors such as internal commotion. The White Paper indulges in half-truths with a professional flair. Protest in India was not over external emergency but over the internal emergency. As for Afghanistan's differences with Pakistan, the White Paper has spoken too soon to belittle this factor. Instead of concentrating on serious issues, the regime is more interested in scandal and mudslinging.

On pages 167 and 168 of the White Paper, there is a juicy reference to Mussamat Rani. What have I to do with Rani? The Generals were more interested in her. She is General Rani. She is the Rani of Gujarat like the Rani of Jhansi. She was introduced to me by General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in February 1971. I did not meet her during the five and a half years of my stewardship of Pakistan. She wrote many letters imploring me to grant her an interview for five minutes. In these circumstances, I directed my OSD for Punjab to find out what she wanted. General Rani has excellent connections with the new team of the Chief Martial Law Administrator. His spotlessly clean Minister for Manpower from Gujarat used the full power of General Rani during the "silver era" of General Yahya Khan. Let us stop talking of pots and pans, of Ranis and Rajas. It does not serve any purpose in taking shelter behind my "wrongs" by indulging in more serious wrongs. The Junta had come to right the wrongs, to restore democracy, not to perpetuate dictatorship. The Junta had usurped power from the elected representatives of the people with excuse of handing it back to the people, not to make a ball of fire out of it for its own glow and glory.

There was a state of Emergency during my tenure because of the dire compulsion of events. The nation was asundered. The country lay shattered in pieces. There was no constitution. The currency had to be devalued. Five thousand square miles of our territory was under the occupation of the Indian Army. Ninety thousand prisoners of war were in the custody of India. Mujib-ur-Rehman was threatening war trials. There was the question of the recognition of Bangladesh. There were police strikes, labor strikes and even strikes in jails. There were the days of "Jalleo" and "Gherao". The worst international economic

and monetary crisis came at that time. The prices of oil were quadrupled. The ninety year old Ahmedi problem had to be resolved. The language controversy in Sindh had to be settled. The economy had to be rehabilitated. The insurgency in Baluchistan had to be faced. The bomb blasts in NWFP had to be tackled. The threats of the Daoud Government required attention. An earthquake shook the northern regions. There were two severe floods and the devastation caused by rains. The Indus, Ravi and the Jhelum were in spate. The land was a sheet of water. Tarbella was subjected to a structural re-examination.

These were some of the major problems which hit the country one after the other in rapid succession. My Government made the nation walk out of the jaws of death. We faced and overcame gargantuan problems with the power of the people. We brought confidence in the place of chaos, and stability from the shambles of dismemberment. One mini-flood which is not even a mini flood has put this regime in a quandary. If it had had a quarter of the problems my government inherited from an earlier Martial law, this regime would have disintegrated into thin air. For some months it enjoyed a veritable feast because of the salutary conditions created by our labors. The time has come to desist from drawing false and odious comparisons. If the emergency was bad, Martial law is much worse. The regime should look to the future and count the chickens coming home to roost. Our sins are no longer on the agenda. The diary of the Junta is being written from the moment of that midsummer's midnight.

Corrupt practices in elections under the shadow of the state of emergency bring us to corruption, the root of all evils. Before entering the Garden of Eden, it is necessary to say at the doorstep, that the tree will be known by its fruits after proudly informing the nation that the Advisor for Shipping and now Minister for Shipping was given the contract to import the bulk of imported wheat, "love's last word is spoken." Here you have an inexcusable violation of propriety. A shipping magnate with no genuine roots in the country was thrust on the nation as Advisor for Shipping. He is given a contract by the regime which he is serving as an Advisor, to use his Company's ships, to bring wheat to Pakistan. An Adviser on Shipping, himself a shipping tycoon, is given a virtual monopoly to import hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat.

To say that the Shipping Tycoon-cum-Adviser or Minister got the contract because his was the lowest tender is a story for the larks. The truth is that it is the lowest fall in corruption. It has been proudly acknowledged, as if it were a rare feat, that he managed the transportation, while, infact, in the process our country had to provide the sum of five million dollars as additional profit to this Shipping Minister over and above the rates which Pakistan would have to pay if proper tenders had been called. As it is, the wheat situation is bad enough. If such a situation had developed under an elected government, the opposition parties would have stopped at nothing less than seeing a dozen or so heads roll.

But no, a magnate with a doubtful nationality makes a profit out of the country. And what do we see on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978, only to be reinforced on 27<sup>th</sup> August 1973? To the dismay and bewilderment of the people, we see the Cleopatra of corruption take a seat in the circus. This Cleopatra is not the Queen of the Nile, but the lily from the *nulla* of Gujarat. With this Cleopatra of Corruption seated besides this there is paradise on earth, and moon.

Needless to say, the White Paper fails to incriminate me at all with regard to corruption. At page 18 it quotes Rao Rashid as saying: "The weakest point of the Government's working has been the absence of action in curbing political corruption which has made the public believe that the government tends to condone such corruption. There is, therefore, need to take drastic action in certain cases of flagrant corruption by the politicians in each province. Prime Minister might like to address the four Chief Ministers to select a few cases and take immediate and effective action to dispel this impression." The White Paper recognizes that I took prompt action in all such matters for it states in its own words on the same page: "Mr. Bhutto's approval in such matters was never lacking."

These references show that we never hesitated in discussing our weakest points in order to remedy them. We did not penalize unpleasant revelations with Martial Law punishments. It also shows that when it came to corruption, I did not want to spare anyone. I immediately referred the complaints to the competent investigating authorities including the now infamous FIA. In my time the FIA had to follow the law. It did not have the license of Martial Law to torture witnesses to give false evidence. Under Martial Law it is possible to sentence a citizen to rigorous imprisonment in a matter of minutes without adhering to Law. It is possible to award the punishment of lashes within less than an hour of the arrest. We did not have these marvelous martial laws, and thank God for it. We had to follow the legal procedures. Bails were given before arrest even before the registration of a case. Bails were given which prevented the arrest of the applicant not only in the case in which he sought bail but in all future cases that might be contemplated against him, whether cognizable or non-cognizable.

As the Chief of the Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq was obsessed with the notion of arresting a politician from Karachi along with his son. According to him, the Rangers had one hundred percent proof of his smuggling activities. He was given the permission but in about a week's time, the law intervened to release his catch. When I met him in Rawalpindi on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1977, he would have no problem in punishing the man. True, under Martial Law there is no problem in punishing anyone. Everything can be over before you can count three. Within the parameters of civilized laws, I did not exempt any individual.

But I could not ride rough shod over the constitutional protections and the laws of Pakistan to satisfy illegally an insatiable appetite for victimization.

At page 214, the White Paper states: “Ministers of the Bhutto Cabinet as well as supporters of the party seemed to have been well soaked in money, according to the record left behind by the regime itself. By way of illustration only a portion of the papers relating to Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, at that time Minister for Communications with Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, first serving as Minister for Education and later as Minister for finance, are cited here to throw some light on the colossal under-cover money transactions which had taken place during the period under review.”

On the same page the White Paper is forced to admit: “An enquiry was ordered by the former Prime Minister on May 17<sup>th</sup> 1976.” The enquiry was conducted by the FIA. Contrary to the impression which the White Paper seeks to convey, I was positively advised that sufficient evidence was not available for further action. This White Paper is compelled to admit at page 218, albeit in a distorted manner. Again when a private individual unknown to me sent two letter making wild allegations against Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto. I immediately ordered the Director, Intelligence Bureau, and the Federal Investigating Agency “to get into the act.” The man was unknown. I could have filed or torn up his letters. But what did I do? I asked not one but two investigating agencies “to get in to the act. This is recorded at page 218 of the White Paper. The Director, Intelligence Bureau, told me that the individual concerned harbored a grudge against Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto because he had not obliged him in some matter.

The reference to Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada relates to a report submitted by Mohammad Irfan, Deputy Inspector General of Police Special and Criminal Branch. Government of Sindh. An enquiry into the same matter was conducted by the FIA as well. It concerns a contract for the supply of limestone to the National Cement Factory of Karachi. A Provincial and federal investigating authority got engrossed in finding out how “at least seven trucks” were purchased by a self-made individual on unsecured bank loans. The FIA report dated 1<sup>st</sup> January 1977 is summarized on pages 219 and 220 of the White Paper. It states that I discussed the report with General Tikka Khan, my Special Assistant for National Security, but that, I did not seem to take any action. On the basis of the information provided to me in the report, what action could be taken? The information was:

- (a) Suleman Brohi was a onetime laborer but now a prosperous contractor. He was what we in the sub continent call “a self-made man”.
- (b) He had secured some trucks, not more than 14 at the most, through unsecured loans.

- (c) Brohi lives in great style.
- (d) Abdul Hafeez Pirzada intervened to secure the loans for him.
- (e) It is generally known that Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada is a business partner of Suleman Brohi.

This is the gist of the report.

A number of points may be made:

(a) There are many "self-made men." In the province which has been selected for the treatment on corruption and is under discussion, Sir Abdullah Haroon is the most famous self-made man. This does not mean that the Quaid-e-Azam should be misunderstood for being a friend of Sir Abdullah Haroon.

(b) The report says that Brohi lived in great style and made a lot of money in his business. The loans, therefore, secured or unsecured, through the intervention of Mr. Pirzada or without it were safe and recoverable. If Mr. Pirzada did recommend the loans, he did not recommend them for a bankrupt person.

(c) What had to be determined to warrant action against Mr. Pirzada was the proof that he was a business partner of Brohi. None of the investigating agencies could furnish any such proof. I discussed the matter at length with General Tikka Khan. In the absence of an iota of proof, I could not disgrace a Federal Minister. If we were to take action on words like "generally known," not a single person who wears a watch or has a modest roof over his head could escape from suspicion. Which person in his right mind would expect me to take action against an individual on the basis of the information contained in this report?

I could not hang the political careers and reputations of important public men on gossip and rumor. It was the duty of the investigating agencies to provide me with some proof of the partnership. The regime, after a year of its puritanical rule, should hear the rumors relating to corruption of its stalwarts. All this fulmination is made over seven or fourteen trucks, at a time when the Chief Martial Law Administrator says that he has given his Shipping Adviser, a shipping tycoon, the virtual monopoly to import hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat in his ships.

The third case at pages 229 to 234, refers to the so-called "million dollar election fund." This is a false and baseless story. Insofar as I could verify, it was kite-flying. The White Paper states on pages 229: "The complaint was obviously signed under assumed names. Normally such complaints are not entertained."

The White Paper confesses that the complaint was signed under assumed names and that normally such complaints are not entertained. According to

established procedure such complaints are required to be filed. The correct course was to file the complaint or to destroy it. I did not do any such thing. Contrary to the prescribed rules, I sent it to the concerned Minister with the following minute: "This is very serious. I want a thorough inquiry. The guilty will have to be fully punished." (page 230)

Uncharitably, as is the strain of the White Paper, it says again, at page 230: "There is an element of pre-judgment in this remark. How and why Mr. Bhutto came to this conclusion without an inquiry is not known."

I am criticized if I do not take action against a Minister for lack of proof, and I am criticized if I threaten to punish fully the guilty person. Naturally, the threat assumes that it would be enforced only if the charges are proved. There is, therefore, no pre-judgment in my remark. The White Paper also admits on the same page: "that a very voluminous and often contradictory record was accumulated during the course of the inquiry which was conducted on parallel lines by the BIM itself and by FIA, the latter under orders of Mr. ZA Bhutto."

On a complaint that I could legally have filed as the White Paper acknowledges, I wrote a stiff minute to the concerned Minister and also asked FIA to investigate. On 9<sup>th</sup> December 1976, the Minister for Production, Mr. Rafi Raza, sent me a detailed Annexure 248, there was nothing that could be done. No such fund existed. Not a single penny of contribution was made for the elections as alleged. The two inquiries speak for themselves. Even the Pakistani Ambassador in Japan was approached by FIA. He is welcome to come forward to say if these scandalous and reckless allegations have a grain of truth in them.

The intention to link Rafi Raza with a bogus election fund is apparent on the face of it. He is being roped in because he was said to be in charge of the election campaign. Rafi Raza is a competent Barrister-at-Law and he can defend himself. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada is an outstanding Barrister-at-Law and he can protect his interests. He is facing a so-called Disqualification Tribunal at the moment. Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto is a prince and the son of a prince. He is a Barrister-at-Law and should be able to defend his reputation.

I am more concerned with principles. In this respect, the White Paper says "Ministers of the Bhutto Cabinet as well as supporters of the party seemed to have been well soaked in money, according to the record left behind by the regime itself. By way of illustration only a portion of the papers relating to Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, at that time Minister for Communications, and Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, first serving as Minister for Education and later as Minister for Finance are cited here...." (Page 214 of the, White Paper). It is amusing to be told that my Government consisted of idiots who left behind a record to show that they were soaked in money.

This statement contradicts altogether what the Chief Martial law Administrator stated at his press conference in Rawalpindi on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1971. In answer to an inspired question by the Editor of Daily Jung on the irritation of the public with the slow pace of accountability, General Zia-ul-Haq said that we were intelligent persons and not the types who would leave behind incriminating evidence for Zia-ul-Haq to pick up.

There were about thirty or more Ministers, Special Assistants and Advisors in the Federal Government. Since 1971, the provincial governments in Sindh and in Punjab were of our party. From the spring of 1973, Pakistan People's Party was in power in Baluchistan and the NWFP as well. This means that the PPP was in power at the Centre and in all the four provinces for a number of years. Every provincial government had many ministers and advisers. The party had countless supporters throughout the country. In view of what the White Paper states about members of my cabinet being well soaked in money, I wonder if it is fortuitous to pick on Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada? I ask this question with justifiable indignation. Every example from the death of a President and a Prime Minister to setting examples of corrupt politicians has to come from one province.

When the Chief Martial law Administrator met me in Murree in July 1977, and then when we met a month later in Rawalpindi, he spoke scathingly against the stinking corruption of one of the ministers. He has been excluded because he has become a quisling collaborator of the Junta. But if a legion of individuals were soaked in money, why pick only these two Sinners as illustrations? I am not at all surprised. On the contrary, to make one province the hub of the examples of the total vices of Pakistan is perfectly understandable in the logic of *coup-gemony*. Now I understand the meaning of the telegram sent by Sir Charles Napier to Queen Victoria after the Battle of Miani. He sent the cryptic message "I have Sined." In asking this question, I am taking into account the affidavits filed by Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Rao Abdur Rashid in the Supreme Court in my Appeal. Rao Rashid states, inter alia, that Brigadier Naeem told him in Abbottabad, "that the trouble has been that the largest province, *i.e.* Punjab, has always been denied its share of power, and the army would ensure that Punjab got its proper share in ruling the country."

This same Brigadier Naeem conducted the Inquiry into the elections of 1977. His committee examined about 900 witnesses. The White Paper compliments him for doing a fine job or work in such a short time. Obviously, he did not have time to interview the principal witness, who is available, accessible and traceable. The 1,044 pages of the finding of the White Paper lack his direct evidence. This bulky document is based on the finding of the Inquiry Committee of Brigadier Naeem, whose predilection against the minority provinces is apparent.

I have many more cogent questions to ask. The time for those questions will come. If I am assassinated through the gallows, these questions will nevertheless be put very loudly because of “the record left behind by the regime itself.” Until the answers come, there will be turmoil and turbulence, conflict and conflagration. In drawing attention to these documentary landmarks, I am not preaching provincialism. I am exposing and condemning provincialism.

## 11. Foreign Hand

Proceeding on the premises of the White Paper, the subject of party funds should follow that of corruption. In dealing with party funds, the White Paper had cast aspersions on me and the PPP government. It has not hesitated to falsely implicate a foreign head of state. It has put a number of bank statements of our accounts in the annexures. It has not spared us from defamation and innuendo. Elections do require funds. Money is to an election what gasoline is to an automobile. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress were given financial assistance from Indian industrialists such as Birla, Dalmia and Tata. When independence drew nearer, the Maharajas also made contributions to the Congress coffers. The Muslim League movement was given financial lubrication by the Ispahanis, Raja Saheb of Mahmoodabad and some others. When partition came closer, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawab of Junagrah and the Nawab of Bhopal among others, played their part. During the elections of 1965, Ayub Khan squeezed and milked the industrialists for contributions. He even took liberal financial assistance from foreign firms operating in Pakistan especially from the foreign oil companies.

According to reliable reports, recently, the regime handed the funds of the original Muslim League to the surrogate Muslim League. There was about Rs. 2 crores (20 million) when the funds were seized under the Martial Law of 1958. Now with the accumulated compound interest, it must be a huge amount. This huge sum of money did not fall over the roof top of an ugly house in Gujarat during the recent rains. The only political party of any significance which does not need funds for elections or for its organization is the Jamaat-e-Islami. This party lives on "*kurbani khals*". It needs no money. The cheque that Maudoodi received from abroad during the elections, a photostat of which was published in the newspapers, was for distributing halva. The White Paper seems to suggest that while we flew in aircrafts. PNA used donkey carts While PPP used trains and buses, the PNA used bullock carts or stamped it out on foot; while funds were needed and used by PPP, the PNA campaign was self-generating. We did use funds but not foreign funds. PNA also used funds but the funds were foreign funds. Only recently, PNA politicians have accused each other of misappropriating funds. A member of the Muslim League has alleged that during the PNA movement. Asghar Khan was given lakhs of rupees, which he has since not repaid to the chagrin of PNA.

It is reported that PNA movement to topple my government was the best financed campaign in the history of the subcontinent. Activists and processionists were given daily wages, transport facilities, entertainment allowances. There was also generous compensation for those injured or killed in

clashes. The motor cycles and bicycles we gave to our poor and deserving workers were from our party funds. These motor cycles and bicycles have been illegally confiscated because this reactionary set-up cannot tolerate to see the common man, the poor and down-trodden man, have this much of a facility from his party.

As far as I can gather from my quick reading of the White paper, there are approximately four important references to PNA in respect of funds. On pages 237, 238 and 239 the White Paper says and I will quote in full:

“How the PNA fought the general elections or raised the necessary funds is not the subject matter of this White Paper, which is basically confined to the conduct of the general elections a task shared by the ruling party and the Election Commission. Mr. Bhutto however did express his opinion on the source of PNA funds. In fairness to him, this must be put on record.

“Addressing the joint session of the National Assemble and the Senate on April 28<sup>th</sup> 1977 he observed: Is it a secret that in the past few months, foreign currency has flooded Pakistan; so much of it has come that I can find no parallel for this influx. The rate of the dollar in Karachi, as a result, has gone down to seven rupees, to six rupees. The money is being used to bribe people to do various things; they are being bribed to go to jail, they are being bribed to give *azaans* (the Muslim call to prayer), many postmen, milkmen and meter-readers are being bribed to distribute anti-PPP literature. Dollars have been dished about. My party members have been bringing this to my notice. But I did not rush out to protest.”

“Another reference in the official papers to the dollar influx is to be found in the minutes of the daily meetings of the then Information Minister, Mr. Tahir Mohammad Khan, with media chiefs. The minutes of the meeting held on April 27<sup>th</sup> 1977, refer to a directive to PPP to circulate a news story that the dollar was selling at a cheaper rate at Quetta and Peshawar. The idea perhaps was to prepare the ground for Mr. Bhutto’s charge. The charge was leveled but Mr. Bhutto preferred to cite the Karachi market.”

In the oath-taking speech in the newly elected National Assembly on March 28<sup>th</sup> 1977, Mr. Bhutto, however, had spoken in a slightly different vein. In that speech, he had said: I shall, if provoked, and if the context is relevant, quote chapter and verse to show how they claimed in their inner council that their strength, resources and finances came from far beyond the oceans. Was it right for the Opposition members to behave so irresponsibly as to claim that they were bound to win in the election because their resources came from far beyond the frontiers of Pakistan? I would not like to believe the claims made by the

opposition in this regard; they seem to be frivolous, immature and irresponsible, because, as you know, our relations with all countries of the world are excellent.

“From the PPP platform in subsequent speeches the charge continued to reverberate that PNA had received foreign assistance. The figure of Rs. 25 crore was mentioned. It was even suggested that the Pakistan currency had disappeared from the Gulf market. If it did, it might have had something to do, apart from the doings of PNA, with the travels of Agha Hasan Abadi, loaded as he used to be with bagfuls of money. Mr. Bhutto, for his part, never quoted the promised chapter and verse to stick the charge on PNA. He never produced any other evidence while he remained in power, or afterwards. Although original letters are being produced before the Supreme Court by his lawyers, no documents pertaining to the foreign funds, allegedly received by PNA, have so far come to light. The records retrieved from the Prime Minister’s Secretariat do contain references to internal financing of PNA. A source report (Annexure 259) sent by Rao Rashid to former Prime Minister, vide his letter (Annexure 260) dated April 12, stated.

“Among those who have contributed large sums of money to the PNA fund in Lahore are: Manno Shahzada, Nasim Sehgal, Fazal Din and Sons, Shiekh Salim Ali (of Din Taxis). The largest contribution to PNA agitation fund is reported to have been made by the Gujranwala traders—Among the several persons named was one ‘Haji black’ whose nephew Aziz Ansari (now in jail on charges of attempt to murder and other offences) was politically most active. He should not be released as long as the agitation continues.

The Income Tax Department, the Excise and Taxation Department, etc. may be asked to take care of these industrialists so that they be engaged elsewhere and cease taking interest in the agitation. The Commerce Ministry may also be asked to blacklist, these persons for the time being and not to issue any import-export license to them until the agitation ends, so that they may give more attention to their business problems and less to the political agitation.

Please note the industrialists and the others in the vested interests not only in Lahore but everywhere.

The fourth reference is on page 383 under the Chapter “The Aftermath.” It is a repetition of the main points made on pages 237, 238 and 239. Nevertheless it is worth reproducing if only to show the regime’s anxiety to protect PNA.

Another line of attack which the government took against the (PNA) movement as soon as it had begun to assume a serious aspect was that it was being inspired and Financed by powerful foreign forces interested in the

liquidation of the 'revolutionary' regime. The charge that vast foreign funds were flowing into Pakistan has been discussed in a previous chapter: it appears to have had no basis in fact. Nor is there any evidence to prove any other kind of foreign involvement in the agitation. It was for the then ruling party to have published the evidence. This was not done.

It is interesting that, while grave signals of a foreign hand behind the movement, had begun to figure in the official propaganda early in the day. Mr. Bhutto himself took a rather tortuous line at first. On March 28<sup>th</sup> 1977, he made the starting allegation that, during the election campaign, PNA had claimed that they were bound to win because their resources came from abroad. He of course cited no evidence, but alleged that the claim had been spelt out in an 'inner council' of the Opposition and even threatened to disclose the source of his information, a threat that never materialized.

This is an outright, unabashed apology for PNA. Why is the military regime defending PNA in a manner as if the two are one and the same? Much water has flown under the Sukkur Barrage since the inaugural speech of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, for anyone to ask about "Operation Fairplay." Since February 1977, PNA and the Chief Martial Law Administrator have been in league with each other. The agitation was a common affair, Jawans dressed in civilian clothes or in muftis were sent to PNA demonstrations to swell the crowds and incite public provocation.

The spectacular defiance of orders by the three Brigadiers of the Fourth Corps at Lahore during the agitation was pre-arranged. Even at the time of the so-called defiance, the Brigadiers were not court-martialled. They were not even dismissed from Service. They were transferred to Rawalpindi, given a pat for their role in the game and told to remain out of sight. By now they must have been promoted or rewarded in some other way. Junior officers were ordered to heckle Mr. Aziz Ahmed, the Foreign Minister, when he addressed them in Karachi. The story of the resignation of General Iqbal was a ruse. The Chief Martial Law Administrator admitted in his speech on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, that the Martial Law in the three cities was a "*langra lulla*" (lame) Martial Law. The Sanghar episode was preplanned with the connivance of the Chief of the Army Staff.

PNA re-opened the negotiations under orders from the Chief of the Army Staff. The mutuality of interest is of a continuing nature. The White Paper is obliged to defend PNA. In defending PNA, it is defending the regime. What is the mutuality of interest and how did it turn into wedlock? The Chief of the Army Staff has been an admirer and a follower of Maudoodi and Jamaat-i-Islami for a long time. He is a relative of his caste fellow and fellow Jullundarite, Mian

Tufail Mohammad, Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami. Both are intensely reactionary in their outlook.

These common factors are known but a selfish man who is inherently a time-sever, would not enter in a twin conspiracy for only this much of common interest. He was sitting well saddled as the Chief of the Army Staff. He had been given accelerated promotions and did not have reason to be ungrateful to my government. The cause for joining and executing two conspiracies against his own government had to be based on more substantial considerations than a mere relationship with Main Tufail Mohammad or admiration for Maudoodi. This is where the interconnecting hand from behind puts them in the same boat to make a common journey. This partly explains why the White Paper is ever so anxious to repel the foreign involvement and to take up cudgels on behalf of PNA.

If the Chief of the Army Staff were not so mixed up with the sordid affair, he would not show the concern of partisan with PNA's foreign involvement. The White Paper seeks assiduously to deny the charges leveled against PNA. It goes out of its way to defend PNA's innocence. It defies me to substantiate the charges. The document preposterously contends, "How the PNA fought the general elections or raised the necessary funds is not the subject matter of this White Paper, which is basically confined to the conduct of the general elections-a task shared by the ruling Party and the Election Commission." (page 237).

This is an untenable contention. The elections were an interlocked contest between the PNA and PPP. Elections would have been called by some other name if the subject matter of elections is basically confined to a task shared by the ruling party and the Election Commission. The task of elections is shared by the ruling party and the party or parties in the opposition. The Election Commission is only a referee. It does not have a share in the task. It is supposed to be the impartial observer outside the arena.

If "how PNA fought the general elections or raised the necessary funds is not the subject matter of this White Paper," in that event, the White Paper cannot deal with the subject matter of how PPP fought the general elections or raised the necessary funds. If the activities and conduct of PNA in the elections are outside the scope of the White Paper, the activities and conduct of PPP in the elections cannot come within the ambit of the White Paper merely because it was the ruling party. Both the ruling party and the PNA opposition were parties to the elections. The conduct of the general elections was shared by both parties. There would not have been an election if the opposition had boycotted it. The conduct of the general elections arises from the contest. The activities of both sides are equally relevant. The election was not between the ruling party and the Election Commission with the PNA being an idle spectator. In any discussion pertaining

to the conduct of the general elections, both the ruling party and the opposition party or parties are equally concerned.

My speech in Parliament on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1977, does mention the sudden rise in the rate of the rupee. What I stated on the floor of Parliament was correct and even today, I do not deviate from it one jot. I also confirm that the information provided by Tahir Mohammad Khan on the rising rate of the rupee in Quetta and Peshawar is true. The author of the White Paper, as we know, has no sense of imagination. The extracts from my speech in the National Assembly on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1977 have been quoted on pages 237 and 238 to show that I myself cleared the opposition of receiving foreign assistance. Anyone reading these extracts and endowed with a modicum of imagination and sense of humor, would be able to tell that I was using diplomatic language, that I was speaking “tongue in cheek” as the saying goes, that I was inviting my audience and the public at large to read between the lines.

The heavy dose of sarcasm was contained in the concluding words, “As you know our relations with all countries of the world are excellent.” Since our relations with some countries are barely normal, I advisedly said that in view of our excellent relations with all countries of the world, PNA was making an empty boast about its foreign support. These double-edged words were carefully chosen to confirm the PNA boasts and to condemn foreign interference without causing deleterious repercussions. I was the responsible Prime Minister of my country and answerable to the people. I was speaking in the National Assembly of Pakistan. I had to kill the snake and also spare the stick. I could not speak irresponsibly by abusing the opposition and openly attacking powerful foreign nations in the very first revelation on this sensitive subject. The case against a foreign power has to be built brick by brick.

In defence of PNA, the White Paper has mentioned that the sources of funds for PNA were internal and not external. It has mentioned the reports I received on the industrialists of Lahore who were financing PNA. The politicians of PNA are not the type of persons who would spare a penny. They did take money from industrialists, traders and those affected by the nationalization of the processing factories. However, the internal contributions bore no comparison to the colossal funds that came from outside.

The evidence on the comparatively insignificant contributions made by the vested interests of Pakistan to PNA does not mean that PNA did not take colossal funds from outside sources.

The White Paper is desperately endeavoring to provoke me into a precipitate reaction. It says, “Mr. Bhutto, for his part, never quoted, the promised ‘chapter and verse’ to stick the charge on PNA. He never produced any other

evidence while he remained in power, or afterwards.” The Junta is a babe in the woods in diplomacy and in the ethics of running an administration. The Chief Martial Law Administrator has no comprehension of the need to guard official documents. This is quite evident from the way in which official papers have been tossed about in the White Paper. It is more evident from the manner in which he carried files to foreign countries. Pakistan is going to pay a very heavy price in future for these unprecedented follies. I am afraid I cannot play gin rummy or poker with State documents. Now that the Chief Martial Law Administrator has set the extraordinary precedent, we will have to follow it but even so not as gamblers and adventurers. National interest prevents me from taking the same leap as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.

The White Paper quotes my speech in the National Assembly on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1977 and the last sentence is:

Dollars have been dished about. My party members have been bringing this to my notice. But I did not rush out to protest.

This shows my attitude. If I did not rush out to protest when I was the Prime Minister of the country and under very great provocation, I am not going to do it from a death cell when all those events have faded into the past. I am not going to oblige the regime to attack foreign powers all over again. The whole story is known. More and more is coming out. I have done my duty I put the nation officially on notice on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1977, from no less a platform than the National Assembly of Pakistan. I repeated the warnings in subsequent political speeches and in the courts of law. I cannot fight the battles of Pakistan from a death cell.

## Coup-gemony

The events of the last twenty years have made me arrive at the unambiguous conclusion that, at present, the greatest threat to the unity and progress of the Third World is from *coup-gemony*. The era of colonialism is all but dead. Only a few places remain where colonialism has still to be buried. In those places also, the burial is at hand. The Third World has to guard against hegemony, but the best way to guard against hegemony is to prevent *coup-gemony*. The biggest link of external colonialism is internal colonialism, which means that hegemony cannot thrive in our lands without the collaboration of *coup-gemony*. Military *coup d'états* is the worst enemies of national unity. *Coup d'états* divides and debases a free people. If there was any doubt on the subject, the events in Pakistan have shown that the people of the Third World have to primarily guard against the internal enemy, if foreign domination or hegemony is to be resisted. *Coup-gemony* is the bridge over which hegemony walks to stalk our lands.

PNA was not supported by foreign elements out of love. An understanding was reached. The understanding was that PNA would be helped and supported financially and politically to overthrow my government by an inspired agitation. In the first instance, the army would take over. The ground would be cleared and the obstacles removed. After the consolidation, it would be expected that the reason for the overthrow of my government would be fulfilled. These terms and conditions were settled finally in February, 1977.

The protests over the American decision to halt aid until the question of the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant is settled, is neither an unexpected nor a new development. It was an integral part of the *coup d'état* of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977. PNA is expected to fulfill its part of the bargain. The dance of diplomatic words, the strong statements and editorials of the poodle press are a stunt to befool the people. The PNA thinks that it has succeeded in fooling the people before and that it can fool them again. The shouting being done at the moment is only shadow-boxing. It is what they call a dress rehearsal. If they were indignant over the announcement, then they would have taken some positive counter-action. Concrete steps are required to mobilize the people in order to face the challenge. PNA and its masters are not seriously concerned. They are indulging in their usual verbosity.

If the Junta thinks that non-alignment is more important than alignment and sends its representative to Belgrade to attend the Non-Aligned Conference, it should not have the slightest difficulty in leaving CENTO as a reaction to the pressure on the nuclear plant. The people are expecting concrete action. But instead, there will be talk and more talk. Why should the United States be blamed for pursuing her global politics? Those among us who act on the basis of greed and hunger are answerable to the people of Pakistan before the others are taken to task. If PNA was more concerned about the Nation's interest and the Welfare of the people of Pakistan, it would not have taken Rs.25 crores (250 million) during the elections and Rs. 5 crores (50 million rupees) after the elections to topple my government and in exchange compromise vital interest of Pakistan.

The other side, having fulfilled its part of the terms of the agreement, feels that sufficient time has been given to PNA to fulfill its part of the agreement. Fuming and fussing, shouting and screaming will be construed as a deceptive device to hoodwink our people. This sort of hullabaloo will be tolerated for a reasonable period of time, but any fundamental change in policy would be regarded as a violation of the final tripartite agreement arrived at in February 1977. A price was paid. It was paid for a consideration.

The protracted negotiations with PNA to join the set-up officially are an integral component of the plan. The fuss over the farcical five point demand is

stage-managed in order to depict the ostensible “independence” of PNA. Everyone cannot be taken into full confidence in executing conspiracies of this magnitude. In such operations; the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing. The full plan, a closely guarded secret, was disclosed only to a chosen few. The general aim might well have been shared with a larger element, but in a conversational spirit, on the grid of common interests and identity of views. In this conspiracy, only one party and one politician of that party was taken into complete confidence. Only he was told everything.

The Khaksars were not brought into the picture. They were harpooned on the slogan of Nizam-i-Mustafa. The real plan was not disclosed to NDP in its entirety. The one and only channel of contact and communication on the total scope of the conspiracy was Jamaat-i-Islami, and Mian Tufail Mohammad was the link. The others had lesser and varying knowledge of the plot. It varied from person to person and from party to party. For this reasons, Mian Tufail Mohammad, a professional “agent provocateur,” is now belatedly criticizing the United States. This is done to confuse our “simple-minded people.” The people have not forgotten that PNA sparked off violence on polling day in big cities like Karachi, Hyderabad and Multan. Everyone remembers how polling stations were burnt, attacked and invaded by PNA mercenaries and urchins. The threats of PNA leaders taking over the government even before the announcement of the results still echo in the minds of the people. If such activities are outside the scope of a finding on elections, I should like to be educated on the meaning of elections. The Junta is obliged to defend PNA and PNA is obliged to defend the Junta.

In the fourth reference to foreign involvement at page 383 of the White Paper, it is stated, *inter alia*: “The charge that vast foreign funds were flowing into Pakistan has been discussed in a previous chapter: it appears to have had no basis in fact. Nor is there any evidence to prove any other kind of foreign involvement in the agitation. “Why is the Junta over-anxious to clean the laundry of PNA? I did not accuse the Generals of receiving foreign funds. I accused PNA. But the regime is defending PNA, as if it were defending itself. It sponsors the alleged innocence of PNA as if it were proving its own innocence. It is behaving as if the Junta can be cleared only if PNA is cleared. Hence, the charge that PNA received vast foreign funds “appears to have had no basis in fact.” Hence, “nor is there any evidence to prove any other kind of foreign involvement in the agitation.” I reiterate that despite the provocation and indeed, the challenge thrown to me by the White Paper, I am not going to touch the details of that period. This is hardly the place from where I can add anything more to the existing record.

When I came to Rawalpindi in August 1977, I asked Mr. Aziz Ahmed to give me a copy of the fifty page document prepared by the Foreign Officer,

quoting “chapter and verse” on the extent of foreign involvement. He told me that he had handed over the only copy he had to Mr. Ghulam Ishaque Khan, the then Secretary-General-in-Chief. With misconceived relief, the White paper says that evidence does not exist to prove any kind of foreign involvement in the agitation. Putting aside every other material, Operation “Wheel Jam” could not have materialized all on its own.

Under foreign supervision Operation “Wheel Jam” was organized by the army during the Martial Law of 1958. It was a top secret project of the army. The training was given at Charrat. The object of the operation was to immobilize a government through “Wheel Jam.” When there were wheel jams in Karachi, the Chief of Staff of the Army was patently upset when I told him that I knew about the old project of the Army called Operation “Wheel Jam.” I said to him that the use of the same code made it an unpleasant coincidence. The Chief of the Army Staff was tongue-tied.

He muttered something about many retired army officers being in PNA.

Although my speech of 28<sup>th</sup> April 1977 is quoted in the White Paper to point out that “I do not rush out to protest.” still the White Paper goads me to come out with “chapter and verse” on foreign involvement. It says “He never produced any evidence while he remained in power.” (page 238).

Within permissible limits, I have been circumspect. I do not treat official documents like a pack of playing cards or worse. I had to act with responsibility and reticence. More information is being pushed to the surface by the objective evolution of events, and the subjective contradictions within PNA and inside the Junta; Just like all PNA politicians were not told the inner story, most of the Generals were not taken into confidence on the depth of the plot. Within this one long year, the Chief Martial Law Administrator has tried to destroy all the incriminating evidence.

Only one politician was given the foreign funds, and that was Mian Tufail Mohammad of Jamaat-i-Islami. How he distributed those vast sums, to which he distributed the money is a matter between him and the other components of PNA. Soon after the *coup d'état*, Mian Tufail Mohammed advised the Chief Martial Law Administrator to destroy the incriminating evidence. On 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1977, I was informed in Murree that a heap of documents on the subject were burnt on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1977. I dare say that in the 385 days that have preceded the release of this White Paper many more bonfires have taken place. Confident in the belief that it has destroyed every vestige of evidence on the subject, the White Paper challenges me to produce, from a death cell, “chapter and verse” on Mian Tufail Mohammad’s perfidious participation in the plot.

I repeat, whatever is happening is play acting. Whatever has happened has happened, according to a planned agreement. One side has kept its bargain and delivered the goods. It gave the other side a year to fulfill its terms of the agreement. The other side is dragging its feet. It is making lame excuses and appealing for an extension of time. Outright dictatorship of the whip and the lash was not sufficient to intimidate the people into total submission. The open marriage with PNA might present the opportunity for the promised change. Sovereign interests are not always served by strong statements only. Sacrifices and not semantics are required to safeguard sovereign interests. Sacrifices are made by the people provided they can be mobilized. They cannot be motivated into making sacrifices by an unrepresentative coterie. The people will only follow the leaders they trust. The rest is eyewash.

From time immemorial, in inter-State diplomacy the effective answer to pressure lies in counter-pressure. Having lashed the spirit out of them, this regime cannot stir them to heroic heights. Without the counter-pressure of the people the battle is lost. The rest of the stuff is a hoax. The Chief Martial Law Administrator and PNA leaders have picked up the joint theme that the stoppage of aid could create a sense of self-reliance and be a blessing in disguise. The line is a hypocritical attempt to deceive the people. The issue at stake is not the stoppage of economic aid, but the reprocessing plant. I have already mentioned the implications for Pakistan if the nuclear reprocessing plant is either modified or dropped, as it appears it has been.

The nation might itself expect some historic decisions. The Chief of Army Staff has broken a series of solemn promises to his people. It is about time he broke a solemn promise with a foreign power and, for once, went back on his commitment for the sake of Pakistan and not for his own sake. If the Junta is really incensed by the pressure on the nuclear reprocessing plant, the least it could do to demonstrate national resentment is to leave CENTO. The people might then begin to take the General a little more seriously. Either before or after *Meghrif* prayers, he should go on the television to take the Nation into confidence on the foreign pressures, seek national unity and, as a token of his regime's earnestness, announce Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO, as a first measure in resisting foreign pressure. He should make this announcement without dramatics because the people are fed up to the teeth with his stunts.

Quite independent of the fundamental question of the nuclear reprocessing plant, and the consequences arising out of it, in the last one year Pakistan has moved further in the direction of critical dependence. The country has been brought to the position of importing two million tons of wheat. This is a fine way to become self-reliant. This is the best period of the year for wheat and yet the prices of wheat have soared to eighty rupees or more per maund. Wait until the lean months come.

Not taking into consideration the approximate billion spent on the armed forces in addition to Chinese assistance, ninety per cent of the total foreign exchange earnings through exports will be spent only on wheat, edible oil and petroleum-lubricants-oil. The expenditure on these three items alone will amount to 1,130 million dollars. This does not include debt servicing, and other essential imports will conservatively account for 2.5 billion dollars. If, by conservative estimates, the total imports during the current year cannot be less than 3.5 billion dollars, the trade deficit will be no less than 2.1 billion dollars, provided the present cotton crop has not been severely damaged by the recent rains. It is an outrageous situation. The begging bowl will have to be stretched from Continent to Continent. The foreign 'Head of State' (name deleted) will have to be approached. He will say, please remember your earlier promise and drop the pant-Pant did I hear? Oh I mean the plant.

I have fought many of Pakistan's battles. Let me see how this one is fought without me. I cannot fight a battle from behind bars. Besides, it is too late. The game is over. It was over when the PNA sold its soul. I would not have suffered the fate I am suffering had it not been for internal betrayal. I do not blame any outside power. The vested interests of the country have repaid me for upholding the honor of Pakistan. I am obliged to the masses for their sympathy and support. I am honored by the concern the leaders of the world have shown for my leadership. I have vision enough to begin anew without any rancor for the past. I am aware of the importance of global politics. This is the moment for me to thank those world leaders and their countries for the solicitude shown towards me. In so doing, they have paid a tribute to the people of Pakistan. They know how much my destiny is interwoven with the destiny of Pakistan. Unlike the stooges of the regime, I will not single out one leader or one country for the expression of my warm appreciation, the appreciation of my family, my party and my countrymen. Placed as I am, it is an affront to my pride and vanity to speak more on my future. However, I have decided to share a secret of my heart with my countrymen.

Since my youth, I have been a fierce and unremitting fighter against British imperialism. I went to Cathedral and John Connon High School in Bombay. It was one of the best English schools in the sub-continent. Even then, as a school boy, I was in deep trouble for my political activities, especially during the "Quit India" movement and "Direct Action Day." But much earlier, in 1935, when I was seven years old, my father, who was then a minister in the Government of Bombay, was invited to tea with his three sons by Lord Braborne, the Governor of Bombay. On being introduced to my eldest brother, Imdad Ali, who was then twenty one years of age, Lord Braborne remarked "What a handsome young man." Being a cultivated and polished aristocrat, Imdad Ali

said in reply. "I am all the more flattered, Sir, because the compliment comes from our handsome Governor."

With my meek voice, I spoke out of turn and said. "His Excellency, the Governor, is handsome because he has been fed on the blood of our beautiful country." Lord Braborne was taken aback. For a split second he looked at me in astonishment, and then pointing his finger at me, smiling, he turned to my father and said, "And in him, Sir Shah Nawaz, you have the poet and the revolutionary." And that is what I have been all these years—"a poet and a revolutionary" And that is how I shall remain until the last breath is gone from my body. I continued the fight at Berkeley by spear heading every anti-colonial cause and by giving militant backing to every colored cause in the United States. In England, I had the honor of being at Christ Church, Oxford, and later at Lincoln's Inn. Both at Oxford and in London I was in the vanguard of anti-colonial causes.

As a Minister in the Government of Pakistan, I stridently denounced colonialism from every platform with tireless vitality, passion and conviction. I had heated arguments with every British Prime Minister from Macmillan to Edward Heath. As President of Pakistan I severed Pakistan's relations from the Commonwealth. As Prime Minister of Pakistan, I demanded the return of the Koh-i-Noor from the British Crown Jewels. From the age of seven to fifty is not a short period. When I was asked by my father on our return from the Governor's tea. "Saien, what was the need of that remark?" It was enough to release my tension, I put both my hands on my face and sobbingly, almost shouted hysterically in Sindhi, "*Eiho asa jo mulk ahe, Eiho asa jo mulk ahe, Eiho asa jo mulk ahe*"-- "This is our country, this is our country, this is our country. I have considered every country under the yoke of colonialism as if it were my country.

The British Empire is gone. Now the potent menace to the Third World lies in *coup-gemony*. The objective reasons for my long and bitter confrontation with the British have faded away by the inflow of revolutionary changes. I have been deeply moved by the honorable shelter given by the British governments and the British people to my three children and my comrades. I crossed swords with British leaders and governments to assert the intellectual and moral equality of Asia. I have done this with glory to the Asian people. My battle of Britain is over.

If the raising of the funds by PNA cannot be the subject matter of a White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections, it follows *ipso facto* that the raising of funds by PPP cannot be the subject matter of White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections. By now, everyone from a courtier to a clown knows that there is one law for PPP and another standard for PNA. The White Paper devotes page and page to the funds of PPP, but it does not furnish any proof to establish

impropriety on our part. PPP did not receive foreign financial support. The wealth of PPP is the people. This wealth is inexhaustible, and it cannot be taken away from the people. If tomorrow I make an appeal for funds, the millions of tormented souls will gladly come forward to share their last penny with me. This is the power of my party. I am not a clerk or an auditor to answer all the trifling material mentioned in the, White Paper. The documents have been doctored. Fantasy and fiction have been employed with extravagance at the cost of truth and facts.

The material allegation relates to the 2 to 3 crores (20 to 30 million rupees) from an unnamed Head of State over a period of two years or so. This statement has purportedly come from my Secretary, Mr. Afzal Saeed. Furthermore, Afzal Saeed is reported to have said that the amount in question was delivered to him by Agha Hasan Abedi, the former Managing Director or Chairman of the United Bank of Pakistan. It is only the word of Mr. Afzal Saeed. According to newspaper reports, Agha Hasan Abedi has denied his involvement.

In a supplementary statement made on 26<sup>th</sup> September 1977, Mr. Afzal Saeed is reported to have stated as follows:

Mr. Agha Hasan Abedi used to bring cash in rupees for payment to Mr. Bhutto, saying that it was sent by (a foreign Head of State) for election purposes to the Prime Minister and asked me to pass it on to him. I immediately used to deliver the amount to the P.M. This was over a period of two years or so and the amount used to be a few lacs each time. The money which passed through me comes to Rs 2 to 3 crores. I was told that this was for election purposes.

Before discussing the statement of Mr. Afzal Saeed, let us take up the persons involved. Mr. Agha Hasan Abedi has denied the allegation. It should also be known that my government nationalized the private banks in Pakistan, including the United Bank of Mr. Agha Hasan Abedi, one of the most prominent and prosperous private banks. This was hardly the way to endear a top banker. My government confiscated the passport of Agha Hasan Abedi and did not permit him to leave Pakistan until the investigations in the affairs of his bank had been completed and he had been cleared.

The foreign Head of State has not been named. If I had received funds from a friendly foreign Head of State and if the foreign Head of State was identifiable from the material provided in the White Paper, I would not have hesitated to mention his name and his country. If the foreign Head of State could infer that the material provided in the White Paper leaves no doubt that it refers to him, he would not take it amiss if I mentioned him and his country to repel the false charge. Unlike the reference to a foreign diplomat who played tennis with

the former Chief Election Commissioner and was identifiable both by his Embassy and by me, the current reference does not provide any such clue. Not having received any contribution from a foreign Head of State or Head of Government, I cannot hazard a shot in the dark. Mr. Agha Hasan Abedi would have been the link if Mr. Abedi had links in one country or with one Head of State. Agha Hasan Abedi has expanding and far flung business interests in many countries. He has business and banking interests in Abu Dhabi, in Dubai and in the other components of the UAE federation. His business interests are in Kuwait, in Iran and in Saudi Arabia. Abedi can be a link in any of these countries. The Heads of State and Heads of Government of all these countries were on very friendly terms with me. Who could it be? I wonder whom the regime wants to involve through the statement of Afzal Saeed merely to find a safety valve for Mian Tufail Mohammed. This is typical of the regime. This is how its mind works.

The regime thinks that Tufail Mohammed's guilt can be washed away or mitigated if I am falsely charged with the same misdemeanor. But he is a guilty man; he plotted against his country.

I am an innocent man; I tried to serve the supreme and sovereign interest of my country. Even if I had taken the alleged contribution, my wrong would not match the wrong of Mian Tufail Mohammed. However I did not get the alleged contribution. The mystery is not solved by naming Agha Hasan Abedi. In the first place he has denied it. With Abedi's denial, with my ignorance about the contribution, with Abedi's business interests not restricted to one foreign country, which foreign Head of State does the regime want to implicate, for reasons best known to itself? The Shahinshah of Iran, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, President Gaddafi of Libya, Shaikh Zaid, the President of UAE, the Amir of Kuwait, the Ruler of Dubai?-Which Muslim sovereign or President has been chosen for this singular honor at the cost of the country and the reputation of its former President and Prime Minister? Which fraternal Muslim Head of State's reputation is to be sacrificed at the altar of the regime's vendetta against me? Even Pakistan's foreign relations with friendly and brotherly Muslim Heads of State are not spared by the tin gods who hold Pakistan's interests at ransom.

Perhaps the object is to ensnare a European Head of State of the American Head of State. Abedi has banking interests in Western Europe and America as well. He is the Head of the Bank of Commerce and Credit International. The BCCI is registered in Luxembourg. This international bank has close connections with Bert Lance, the former U.S. Budget Director, a very close friend of President Carter from Georgia. Who can tell, in this strange world, Mian Tufail Mohammed and I might have received foreign funds from the same Head of State through the same Mr. Agha Hasan Abedi! After all, my Secretary, Mr. Afzal

Saeed, is closely related to Maudoodi. A lady-made link existed from the Prime Minister's House to Icchra.

Afzal Saeed was taken into detention in August, 1977; he was in the exclusive control of the Martial Law jackboots and the F.I.A. for months on end. His infamous supplementary statement was taken on 26<sup>th</sup> September 1977, while he was under detention. I have already mentioned that a supplementary statement in the context of the White Paper means an improvement on the previous statement under further threats and coercion. Mr. Afzal Saeed should have made this important and sensational disclosure in his first statement on 22<sup>nd</sup> September, 1977, and at the first opportunity. He did not do it on the first occasion perhaps because he was not coerced at the start. He made the fake disclosure in the supplementary statement under duress.

### **“Bakhtiyar Formula”**

This is how there is only the word of Mr. Afzal Saeed. However, the White Paper itself has condemned the integrity and character of Mr. Afzal Saeed. It has warned the reader to beware. After destroying his character and credibility in its own document, the regime, expects the people to believe the solitary and supplementary statement of Mr. Afzal Saeed made in detention and under duress. The irony lies in the condemnation of Mr. Afzal Saeed in his capacity, as my Secretary. The White Paper warns the reader to beware of this man. It describes him as a weakling, a pliable bureaucrat who trims his sails according to the mood of the master. On page 25, the White Paper states “The level of subservience to which even senior permanent civil servants had been deliberately reduced is best described by his Secretary Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan” who in reply to a charge sheet stated on September 22<sup>nd</sup> 1977.”

The White Paper admits that Mr. Afzal Saeed was charge-sheeted. This means he was not under mere detention hut under the additional peril of a charge sheet. The White Paper is of the opinion that a senior permanent civil servant of the status of Mr. Afzal Saeed allowed himself to be reduced to a deplorable level of subservience. The same senior and permanent civil servant can become equally servile and subservient to a Martial Law master as well: actually, even more so, for reasons which need no elaboration. The While Paper quotes Mr. Afzal Saeed as having said in his statement of 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1977, “The ex-Prime Minister would not tolerate any disobedience or disregard of his orders or instructions. He would not take a ‘no’ from anybody”.

This admission brings out Mr. Afzal Saeed in very poor light. It shows him to be a soft, timid person. Elsewhere, the White Paper mentions how calmly I took the sharp criticism contained in the notes from Rao Rashid and Mohammed Hayat Tammon: How I immediately accepted the cryptic

“unacceptable” from Rafi Raza. If other permanent civil servants could argue with me and take different positions, express their views fearlessly, only a very weak and timid bureaucrat would state what Mr. Afzal Saeed is alleged to have stated. At a very critical moment, without consulting me, the former Attorney-General presented what was called the “Yahya Bakhtiar formula.” If I had not given them sufficient latitude and freedom of action, Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar would not have taken such a bold initiative and still continued to retain my confidence. The White Paper also refers to the Publicity Committee which, in its meeting, decided to request me to reconsider the decision to release the Hamoodur Rehman Report. This shows that only a timid and meek bureaucrat like Mr. Afzal Saeed would indulge in self-condemnation. Such men become the victims of their cowardice.

As I have already proved, at page 77 the White Paper says. “Mr. Afzal Saeed, ever alert to the dominant moods of Mr. Bhutto, prepared the case in the requisite stance.” Here again, the White Paper does not speak highly of Mr. Afzal Saeed’s character. It has already shown him to be a weakling. Now it expresses the opinion that he is devoid of integrity, that he did not express his opinions honestly. He was ever alert to my dominant moods because I was the Chief Executive. At present, he will be more sensitive to the moods, dominant or otherwise, of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, who has put him under detention and charge-sheeted him.

At page 218, the White Paper says. “Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan was, however, discreet enough to note, the next day, that the enquiries had confirmed the points relating to the role of Mr. Ali Hassan Mangi. He made no reference to Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.” This shows that the White Paper regards Mr. Afzal Saeed to be a chicken-hearted liar. The poor man has been really stigmatized by the White Paper. His timidity has been exposed. He has been made to appear as a man without integrity, an opportunist, a time-server and a dishonest official. Still, the same White Paper, after destroying his credibility and veracity, wants the charge-sheeted Mr. Afzal Saeed to be believed in what he alone, as a solitary exception, deposes against me in his supplementary statement while under detention of Martial Law. The assertion is inherently defective and suffers from basic infirmities.

Secondly, if the amount was delivered to me over a period of two years or so, then my two charges that the value of the rupee had risen during the elections and that the rupee had disappeared from certain foreign countries rightly applied to the Rs 30 crores (300 million) given to PNA within the months of February and May, 1977. The value of the rupee would not be affected in the least if two or three crores were allegedly delivered over a period of two years or so. Nor would the rupee disappear from certain foreign markets over a disbursement spread over two years or so. The value of the rupee would rise and

the rupee would disappear from certain foreign markets only if very large sums of foreign currency were suddenly injected into Pakistan within a short period of time.

Thinking that it has made a kill, at page 238 the White Paper states with a taste of triumph, that: "From the PPP platform in subsequent speeches the charge continued to reverberate that PNA had received foreign assistance. The figure of Rs 25 crore was mentioned. It was even suggested that the Pakistan currency had disappeared from the Gulf market. If it did, it might have had something to do, apart from the doings of PNA, with the travels of Agha Hassan Abedi, loaded as he used to be with bagfuls of money."

If Afzal Saeed's solitary word is to be believed that the 2 or 3 crores were transferred over a period of two years or so, with a few lacs being delivered each time, then Pakistan's currency could not possibly disappear from any foreign market, nor would the value of the rupee rise due to the alleged leisurely travels of Agha Hasan Abedi. Afzal Saeed's allegation does not have any connection with the twin consequences. Any ordinary businessman or trader would be able to verify that only a huge injection of foreign currency in a limited span of time would affect the rupee the way it was affected in the spring of 1977. It was due to the Rs 30 crores given to Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jamaat-i-Islami within a period of three to four months. Inferentially, Mr. Afzal Saeed supports the charge I made with the full sense of responsibility of my high elective office in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1977.

If the amount delivered was a few lacs at a time over two years or so Mr. Afzal Saeed should have known the exact amount handed over to him on each occasion. He cannot now say in a cavalier fashion that it came to 2 to 3 crores. There is a great difference between 2 crores and 3 crores. A crore of rupees (ten million) is not waste paper that Mr. Afzal Saeed does not remember. It was hard cash. Nobody can treat that kind of money with the casualness shown in his statement about the precise amount. This is truer and more natural if the money came over a period of two years or so and only a few lacs at a time were given on each occasion. The man bringing the money would ask for verbal confirmation. Alternatively, Mr. Afzal Saeed would request me to count the amount to ensure that it has been properly delivered. The amount being a few lacs at a time, would not take long to count for Afzal Saeed or for me or for both of us. By saying rather casually and light heartedly that its contribution came to 2 to 3 crores. Mr. Afzal Saeed's lies give the serious allegation a frivolous look. Hard-boiled international bankers like Agha Hasan Abedi, acting on behalf of a foreign Head of State, do not operate haphazardly in delicate transactions of this nature.

The White Paper is even more casual about the exact figure because it states at page 236, "To sum up, about two or three crores of rupees were brought

in by Agha Hasan Abedi.” Only a party which gets 30 crores in three months can be this casual or careless about the difference of one out of 3 crores. But a party receiving a minimum of one crore and a maximum of three crores would take the shortfall of one crore very seriously.

Mr. Afzal Saeed states that he was told that it was for election purposes. In other words Mr. Afzal Saeed did not know the purpose for which, according to the White Paper, the money was delivered to him. He was only told that the amount was for elections, but he does not know for certain if that was the real purpose. How can this part of the statement he believed when the White Paper states at page 240, “Both Mr. Dilawar Hasan and Mr. S. M. Yunus have denied that they were dealing with party funds. In that case, why did Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan ask Dilawar Hasan to put up a cheque? There is no satisfactory answer to this question.”

Again at page 241 the White Paper states that, “The Important point to be noted about all these transactions is that the party funds and the State funds were so intermeshed with each other that no clear cut distinction remained between the two. Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan was wholly involved in party affairs and party funds. Even his subordinates, though they deny their involvement, were maintaining loose sheets of party payments.

“According to their own statements Mr. Dilawar Hasan and Mr. S. M. Yunus were maintaining the accounts of the secret service funds, the Welfare Fund, the Relief Fund, the Z. A. Bhutto Trust Fund, the Peoples Foundation Trust Fund and the Pakistan Relief Fund.”

If Joint Secretaries and Section officers under the Secretary Mr. Afzal Saeed, were dealing with party funds and, according to the White Paper, Mr. Afzal Saeed “was wholly involved in party affairs and party funds,” how is it that he did not know whether the 2 to 3 crores given for the elections were really for the elections or not? The conclusion is that he is telling a lie. If the White Paper disbelieves him by saying that he “was wholly involved in party affairs and party funds,” others cannot be expected to believe him. His whole statement is false on the face of it. It has been extorted under duress. He was charge-sheeted and in detention when he made this supplementary statement on 26<sup>th</sup> September 1977. In his original statement of 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1977, which was made only four days before the supplementary statement, he did not spin such yarns. Pressure must have been put on him additionally through Maudoodi and Mian Tufail Mohammad, who had more than a personal stake in tarnishing me.

Three main statements of Mr. Afzal Saeed appear in the White Paper: (a) On 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1977, in reply to a charge-sheet. The reply does not mention party funds. To the best of my knowledge, the White Paper does not carry the

whole statement. The charge sheet served on Mr. Afzal Saeed is neither summarized nor does it appear as an annexure. Although a portion of Mr. Afzal Saeed's reply of 22<sup>nd</sup> September has been summarized at page 25, the charge sheet itself appears nowhere in the White Paper.

(b) Supplementary statement on 26<sup>th</sup> September 1977, as per annexure A-225 and mentioned on page 225. Neither the annexure indicates nor the White Paper mentions before whom or to whom this supplementary statement was made only four days after the original statement. The original statement of 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1977 is silent on the charge-sheeting authority. The obvious presumption is that it can only be a Martial Law authority. The other agencies such as F.I.A are freely mentioned as investigating agencies but not the Martial Law authorities. Not being satisfied with the original reply to the charge-sheet, the Martial Law authorities have further intimidated and cajoled him to give the supplementary statement.

(c) A hand-written statement as per Annexure A-152 to the Inquiry Committee on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1978, which the White Paper on page 160 describes as a statement throwing "some light" on the "overall planning and conduct of elections, including finances".

He has given all the three statements while in the custody and detention of Martial Law. On the basis of these statements and reinforced by its own belief that Mr. Afzal Saeed was "wholly involved in party affairs and party funds," the White Paper comes to a finding at page 225:

Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan, as already mentioned, has indicated three sources of funds-(a) legitimate party funds received by way of membership dues and deposits with applications for electoral seats; (b) funds from a foreign Head of State, estimated by him between Rs 2 crores to Rs 3 crores; and (c) diversion of the State's secret service funds for party purposes.

I have endeavored to repudiate the charge made in regard to (b). I would call a spade a spade to blow this falsehood in the face of the accusers. However, I shall refrain, as the subject is very delicate and sensitive. The regime can be reckless about Pakistan's relations with friendly foreign States and their respected Heads of State, but I cannot emulate the regime's nihilistic example. Within the permissible limits of propriety, I have exposed the falsehood. For my personal reputation I am tempted to go beyond what I have stated, but the interest of the Nation holds me back. (a) Does not require any comment as it has been conceded that the funds in question were legitimate party funds, (c) deals with State secret funds.

This subject is as sensitive and delicate as that raised in (b). It relates to expenditures incurred from the years 1971-77 and according to the White Paper, it works out to be “a staggering total of Rs 1.92 crores.” Given access to official papers and to some other documents and diaries, I would have no difficulty in proving that whatever the amount, whether Rs 1.92 crores or less or more, was validly utilized by me in the five and a half years of my office as President and Prime Minister. It must be remembered that the Governors, Federal Ministers and Chief Ministers of the Provinces were not only PPP leaders but that they were holding high offices of State. I will give only one example to make the point while treading on this brittle ground.

The example is of Ghaus Baksh Raisani. It is true that Ghaus Baksh Raisani was the President of Pakistan People’s Party for Baluchistan, but he was also the former Governor of Baluchistan, a former Federal Minister and the Senior Minister in the provincial Government of Baluchistan when the bounty of Martial Law descended from heaven. I have taken the example of Raisani because he has joined the camp of the regime and is now safe in its protective arms. All his sins of commission and omission have been forgotten by this God-fearing regime. He is as clean and as purified as the others who have deserted me and the Pakistan People’s Party. He will be protected by the shield of Martial Law.

The other reason for picking Raisani is that the military establishment knows that Raisani was given a special assignment during the insurgency in Baluchistan. He was on good terms with the well-known guerilla, Safar Khan Zarakzai. The government was very keen to get Safar Khan down from the mountains through an honorable settlement. If the Endeavour had succeeded, peace would have returned to Sarawan. In this connection, Raisani was directed to establish contact with his friend Safar Khan and prevail upon him to arrive at an honorable settlement. It is known to the military establishment that Raisani met Safar Khan Zarakzai on a number of occasions. Raisani received full backing and co-operation from the government for the effort. Despite the full and generous co-operation, Raisani was unable to prevail on Mir Safar Khan Zarakzai. A few months before Martial Law, Mir Safar Khan Zarakzai was killed in an encounter. The Chief of the Army Staff was jumping with jubilation. Later, we learnt that Mir Safar Khan Zarakzai was killed in an ambush laid by his own feuding Zarakzai clan. This is how Raisani appears in the figures of the secret service funds.

If this subject is pursued and I am forced to defend my reputation by coming out with the details of the expenditure, national and international interests of Pakistan will be irreparably and I repeat, irreparably, damaged. This is the first time in the history of states, ancient, medieval or modern, when the subject matter of state secret service funds has been pursued at the highest level

and in the form of an investigation and trail. There is no precedent for it in any system of government. For good reason secret service funds are exclusively in the discretion of the Chief Executive. He has only to give a general certificate and not furnish any details or specific information of any nature. If the secrecy is removed from the utilization of funds for secret services, the need for a secret service fund would not exist.

If every successor regime or government is going to sit in judgment on whether its predecessor rightly or wrongly utilized secret service funds, nothing short of a Pandora's Box will be opened. We had Chief Ministers. This regime has Martial Law Administrators. The demands of the secret service funds have not vanished. Certainly the Chief Martial Law Administrator is not spending his personal wealth on the exigencies of secret service. He cannot take the position that in over a year of his usurpation, he has not touched secret service funds. By creating such a precedent, the successor government to his regime will be entitled to scrutinize and determine if the Executive discretion exercised by him on the utilization of secret service funds was the proper exercise of discretion. There is no doubt that this man and his regime are sowing the seeds of chaotic catastrophe.

By way of analogy and comparison, let the statistics of the current year speak themselves. I was accused of wasting funds of the national exchequer. Let us see how the austerity-minded Martial Law regime, without any representative responsibilities, has budgeted for the Secretariat of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in its first lack-justre year:

(i) An amount of Rs 6, 32, 500 has been kept aside by way of salaries for those employed in the Chief Martial Law Administrator's Secretariat. In my days, the amount was Rs 5, 67, 500.

(ii) Under contract allowance, Rs 8, 90, 000 have been demanded. A year before, Rs 8, 25, 000 had been asked for under this head.

(iii) In my time, Rs 4 lacs had been proportioned for tours and visits. The same figure has been allocated in the current budget, although this is non-representative set-up having no public contact.

(iv) Staff salaries claim Rs 6, 13, 300 this year. In the spendthrift days of my tenure, the figure stood at Rs 3, 65, 000 and it was a tenure of democratic rule. During one year of unrepresentative rule, the expenditure under this head has touched Rs 5, 96, 500.

(v) By way of staff allowances, Rs 3, 90, 000 had been demanded by my Secretariat. This year, the demand for staff allowance is Rs 6, 98, 3000.

(vi) This year, the innovation of the security nucleus attached to the Martial Law Secretariat will eat up another Rs 83,000.

(vii) The secret Service has now been budgeted Rs 10,00,000 over and above the Security Cell.

(viii). I, the alleged Prince of Piccadilly “wasted” a total of Rs 89, 16,000 in the last year of my rule. This year, Rs 1,06,48,000 will be spent on the Chief Martial Law Administrator’s Secretariat. This sum does not take into account what the Chief Martial Law Administrator and many of his associates will draw as salaries and allowances from the Armed Services appropriations.

(ix) In my bad days, the Intelligence Bureau gobbled up Rs 3,56,78,000. In the present saintly days, Rs 3,85,64,000 will be spent on the Intelligence Bureau. These figures tell their own story.

Having dealt with the three heads of party funds mentioned in the White Paper, in contrast to the involuntary supplementary statements reproduced in the White Paper, I should like to make a voluntary supplementary statement: My statement is that my wife, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, had absolutely nothing to do with party funds. The White Paper quotes the following statement of Mr. Afzal Saeed at page 160 in order to maliciously involve Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the Acting Chairman of Pakistan People’s Party. This is what Mr. Afzal Saeed has been made to say. “As far as I know the finances for the elections were handled by the ex-Prime Minister himself or by Begum Nusrat Bhutto.”

“As far as I know” is certainly not much. He is not sure. But at page 163, Mr. Vaqar Ahmed the Establishment and Cabinet Secretary described by the White Paper at page 252 as “another pillar of the regime, is very sure. He says “Begum Bhutto was in charge of the women’s section. Mr. Afzal Saeed was in charge of account. “When the ex-Prime Minister himself says that Begum Nusrat Bhutto had nothing to do with the finances of the elections, Afzal Saeed’s statement, if it is to be believed at all, should be believed to the extent that the ex-Prime Minister himself handled the finances of the elections.

To pursue doggedly its malafide purpose, the White Paper quotes on page 161, a note of Rafi Raza dated 9<sup>th</sup> October 1976. It is a long note of about eight pages summarizing the preliminary recommendations of two meetings of a committee on elections. In this preliminary note, the recommendation relating to “Budget and Finances” as reported on page 161 is as follows:

The Election funds shall be controlled by Begum Nusrat Bhutto. However, it would not be appropriate to involve Begum Sahiba in day to day accounting Budgets and expenditure on an overall basis should be

regularly discussed with and settled by her. Thereafter it was decided to recommend that the election office should deal with Begum Sahiba through Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan who should act as the disbursing source. A Finance Section shall be opened in the Election Office which shall maintain detailed accounts.

Like a vulture, the White Paper seizes on this recommendation to state at page 236.

The other large source of funds was the money brought in by Agha Hasan Abedi. This was disbursed by Begum Bhutto as disclosed by Mr. Afzal Saeed Khan and indirectly confirmed in the note (Annexure 17) of Mr. Rafi Raza of October 9<sup>th</sup> 1976. Part of this money may have been diverted to the provincial party, funds. Contributions from industrialists and businessmen also were collected.

The author of the White Paper has discarded the categorical statement of Mr. Vaqar Ahmed, "the pillar of the regime," but has relied on the vague, equivocal and qualified statement of Mr. Afzal Saeed and the recommendatory note of Mr. Rafi Raza to jump to the conclusion that Begum Bhutto "disbursed the large source of funds."

The author of the White Paper is in a frenzied search for any flimsy pretext, any straw in the wind that might not only hang me but my wife and my children. I want my people to remember these words of mine because they are made solemnly and with the firm expectation that the eighty million people of this Nation are not without "*Gheirat*." I have emphatically denied the involvement of Agha Hasan Abedi and so have Abedi himself. I have shown how no reliance can be placed on any statement of Mr. Afzal Saeed, especially a statement which is vague and qualified. Moreover, if the White Paper itself has come to the definite conclusion that Afzal Saeed was in charge of Party funds, and its finding is corroborated by Mr. Vaqar Ahmed, "a pillar" of my regime, how can it contradict its own finding on Afzal Saeed's control of the funds? The White Paper has been caught red-handed in telling lies.

The authors of this White Paper are not ashamed to tell open lies in blatant contradiction to its own conclusions as long as they have the dubious satisfaction of harming me, my wife and my children. All those who are devoted to me personally and politically are duty bound to engrave these words of mine on their hearts. The note of Rafi Raza is recommendatory and my "Yes" in the margin is a tentative and general approval. On further consideration, I might have modified or rejected it; or Begum Nusrat Bhutto might herself have declined. Begum Nusrat Bhutto was not involved and there is nothing in this"

White Paper or any of its 342 annexures for a fair-minded and reasonable person to rope her into this part of the vendetta also.

If my Party had all these funds, I would not have written “the last letter relating to party funds on July 4<sup>th</sup> 1977.” This is what the White Paper says on page 242:

The last letter of Mr. Z.A. Bhutto relating to party funds is dated July 4<sup>th</sup> 1977 and can be seen at Annexure 272. It is addressed to Shaikh Rafiq Ahmed, President, PPP Punjab, and is a stiff reminder that large amounts of enrollment fee are still outstanding which should be deposited with the Chairman’s account with Habib Bank Ltd. The need for fresh funds was felt in view of the re-elections being on the cards. Rao Rashid had indicated requirement of Rs one hundred million for the aborted referendum. What the financial requirements would have been for the re-elections is not possible to guess. But it would not be unfair to assume that the enrollment proceeds would not have sufficed.

This shows the Party was short of funds. It shows my concern over the matter. If a generous foreign Head of State were underwriting our elections, I would not be writing letters on 4<sup>th</sup> July 1977, to party leaders for the collection of party funds. I had only recently returned from a tour of Middle Eastern countries. PNA had reopened negotiations, and I was still concerned over party funds. It is not the normal reaction of a prosperous party or a party financed by an opulent foreign Head of State. In a number of places, the White Paper states that Rao Rashid and Hafeez Pirzada mentioned a huge sum that would be needed for the referendum. A referendum is held by the State. The funds for a referendum are borne by the State. The Chief Martial Law Administrator would have squandered State funds if he had held a referendum on the farcical question of local bodies elections. Hence, the question of raising party funds for a referendum does not arise even if anyone raised the question. A referendum is not an election, as Pakistan kept telling India on the issue of ascertaining the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir as regards their destiny.

If a Chandio chieftain’s status can be derided, I shall not make an attempt to say that I was not a pauper when. I became a Federal Minister in 1958. Due to the chronic deficit in the balance of payments of Pakistan, the Ministry of Commerce has always been a lucrative one. I became the Federal Minister of Commerce in the “golden era” of President Ayub Khan. The Ministry of Commerce was one of the big gold mines. If the sons of Ayub Khan could become millionaires overnight, my second son was also born a month after Martial Law. It was the era of the robber barons, the time when Ministers held two posts, one in Islamabad as Finance Minister and the other, in Washington, as an Executive Director in the World Bank. Organized and large-scale corruption

made its appearance in Pakistan during the first Martial Law. The golden era was the era of "*Sarkari sallas*" (Government's brothers in law). I can proudly say that my integrity was above board. I was among the handful of leaders of that regime whose hands were clean.

At a reception in Karachi, a few months after the declaration of Martial Law, while talking to me, a cocky industrialist remarked, half in jest, that Martial Law could not stop black marketing. I asked him whether he was black marketing. His reply was "To tell you the truth Sir, I do, otherwise my business would come to a standstill." Thereupon, I ordered his arrest there and then, "on the spot," as they say. This news appeared in the New York Times but was suppressed in Pakistan. The industrialist was released within an hour on the grounds that the impetuous action of the brash young Minister for Commerce would frighten the business community and dampen the climate for private investment.

Later, I became the Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, another "gold mine." In that position, I broke the strangulating monopoly of the western oil companies in Pakistan. I ordered the expulsion from Pakistan of two mighty foreign representatives of two oil empires on the ground that they were indulging in appalling malpractices and corrupting the top bureaucracy in the Economic Ministries. I concluded the oil agreement with the Soviet Union in December 1960, and March 1961 Thereafter, I became the Minister for Industries, the biggest gold mine of the golden gate. With tenacious dedication, I turned to the public sector and gave attention to P.I.D.C. After some time, the 22 families and their patron, the Finance Minister, got me eased out of that Ministry because my probes into corrupt practices were beginning to hurt them.

The fictitious 20-30 million rupees from a mysterious Foreign Head of State are peanuts compared to the inducements I contemptuously rejected as Foreign Minister of Pakistan in October 1963, and in December 1965. I was not a PNA politician to compromise the foreign policy of my country. In the summer of 1968, my wife and I were in Paris. We were invited to a banquet. A Princess from a very important and affluent neighboring Muslim country was also invited. She asked us to join her at her residence before the banquet. We went to her exquisite mansion and had an animated discussion on politics in Pakistan and in our region. Afterwards we left for the dinner but continued the discussion in the car.

The Princess was wearing a diamond pendant. The diamond was like a rock. When the dinner finished, we went to another room for coffee. My wife and I were seated in a corner with the Princess and two of her ladies-in waiting. She chose to continue the discussion. It became a lively conversation. At the end of it, the Princess appeared to be ruminating. She was playing with her pendant and

engraved in deep thought. Suddenly, she said: "Look, Zulfikar, if you do become the President of Pakistan, I will give you this," and she put her fingers on her pendant. We all laughed heartily and the matter was over.

Years later, when I went to her great country as President of Pakistan, the Princess invited me and my wife to her palace. After we settled down, she produced a wrapped package and asked me to open it. Upon doing so, I saw the diamond pendant. I told her that it would be impossible for me to accept it. The Princess told me, "We do not break our promises." Eventually, with considerable difficulty, the Princess was kind enough to understand. I had to implore her to retain her priceless pendant. I told her that her gesture was more valuable than the gift and her thought more precious than the pendant.

During the elections of 1970, I was staying in Hotel in Lahore when a foreigner called on me. After the introductions and formalities were over, the gentleman told me that he had been sent by his President to offer assistance to me in the elections. How did I respond? Exactly four days later at a reception for me by some lawyers of Lahore at the International Hotel, I strongly attacked that President for accepting the "Rogers Plan" for a Middle-East settlement. A week or so after my speech, the Ambassador of that country met me at my residence in Karachi. He told me that his President had read my speech and he had asked his Ambassador to tell me that I had "broken his heart." I told the Ambassador to convey to his President most respectfully, that "he had broken my heart."

There are countless examples. The most recent being when His Majesty King Khalid of Saudi Arabia visited Pakistan in October 1976. His Majesty presented me a Rolls-Royce automobile and insisted that it was a personal gift, meant for my person. I thanked the King profusely for his generous gift. The car was, however, immediately registered as State property. If Ghulam Mohammad could have pocketed a Cadillac of His Majesty King Ibn Saud, I could have kept the Rolls-Royce. I am not a saint, but nor am I the sinner the Junta is trying to make me out to be. I do not relish the idea of mentioning such matters, but what can I do? The regime has lost its balance. I am compelled to come out with the barest minimum information in defence of my name.

All these years I have tried jealously to guard my reputation. I have many weaknesses. I have openly admitted my frailties in mammoth public meetings. I am full of error, but whatever my error, I am not a corrupt person. It is very painful to be chastised in this ungrateful manner. There is bound to be retribution. My tormentors have brought disgrace to the name of Pakistan. Thirty to thirty-Five years of public service stands behind me. Time will tell whether my name will be bracketed with the criminals of the subcontinent or with the heroes who have waded across its lands. My name and my reputation is safe in the custody of the people and in the heart of history.



## 12. The Death Cell and History.

Hostile propaganda is emitting out against me at this critical juncture like bullets out of an automatic weapon. Even a knave knows why this barrage of abuse is pouring out at this point of time. It has gone on for over a year, the worst and the filthiest propaganda ever to be unleashed by a civilized people. This opera of hate is reaching a crescendo during the hearing of my appealing the Supreme Court. This is obvious.

Since 18<sup>th</sup> March 1978, I have spent twenty two to twenty three hours out of the twenty four in a congested and suffocating death cell. I have been hemmed in by its sordidness and stink throughout the heat and the rain of the long hot summer. The light is poor. My eye sight has worsened. My health has been shattered. I have been in solitary confinement for almost a year, but my morale is high because I am not made of the wood which burns easily. Through sheer will-power, in conditions, that are adverse in the extreme, I have written this rejoinder. Let all the White Papers come. I do not have to defend myself at the bar of public opinion. My services to the cause of our people are a mirror in front of them. My name is synonymous with the return of Prisoners of War, with Kashmir, with the Islamic Summit, with the Security Council, with proletarian causes. Ordinarily, I would not have bothered to reply to the tissue of lies contained in this disgusting document. But the circumstances are not ordinary. A principle is involved the principle of the right of reply, the principle of the right to face the lie with the truth.

It is said that some good comes out of the worst of evils. The good that might come out of this evil document is that perhaps the confusion over scurrilous publicity and the right of public trial will be removed once and for all. When I protested on the conversion of my trial for murder from open proceedings into an in camera trial for my defence, somehow I could not make clear to the Judges the difference between publicity and justice. I was demanding a public trial because the concept of justice is inextricably intertwined with an open trial. The political and legal struggle for an open trial, especially if it involves capital punishment, is writ large in golden letters. Prophet Moses preached it to his people during their long journey from tyranny. The same message is contained in Christ's Sermon on the Mount. The last and final Messenger of God dispensed justice in an open mosque and not as a "cloistered virtue." The Roman slave, Spartacus, gave his life for justice. Plato, Aristotle and Socrates philosophized on the openness of justice.

The history of Europe and Britain is rich and replete in the tradition of open trial. The Common Law considers an open trial as being an indispensable ingredient of justice. After a gallant struggle, the free people of America made certain that the right of public trial became inviolable by incorporating it as the 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the American Constitution. The maxim: "Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done," is an elementary and unimpeachable norm of law. During the murder trial, one judge made the profound observation that "We are trying you and not the public." On this illuminating remark, the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court added "but he wants publicity." What an irony! As I said in the trial of Lahore:

*Forget the fact that I have been the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. Forget the fact that I am the leader of the premier party of this country. Forget all these things. But I am a citizen of this country, and I am facing a murder trial. Even the ordinary citizen-and I consider myself one-is not denied justice.*

The sensitivity of the trial judges on the exposure of their bias was more important to them than my life. If a trial for murder can be held in camera, there is no need to hold any trial in public. There is no need to record any evidence or to write any order or judgment. If that practice is followed, justice will turn from the majesty of Law to the tyranny of law. It would mean the legalization of murder.

Yet even in that convoluted and closed court, I was not permitted to put forward my defence. Orally I was informed in Kot Lakhpat jail that my request to address the court after the Prosecution was rejected. I was not a practicing lawyer. From 9<sup>th</sup> January 1978, I was not being defended by lawyers. I had not heard the prosecution witnesses during my long illness and absence from the court. I had been insulted and humiliated by the court during the open trial for three months. The prosecution case had received the full blast of publicity. The trial had been converted into a secret conclave. The dice was completely loaded against me. But with all those harrowing handicaps, when I sought to address the closed court in defence of my life, I was not permitted because I wanted to hear the Prosecution before replying as a layman, without legal notes, without the aid of law books and legal rulings.

This pre-eminently reasonable request, this request for rough and ready justice was turned down. What is an *ex parte* judgment if the judgment of the trial court which awards the death sentence without hearing the defence of the illegally described "principal accused" is not an *ex parte* judgment? This is the extent to which I have been made a victim of criminal injustice. Where in the world is it considered intolerable and insufferable to allow an individual charged with murder to address a closed court as a layman on his innocence without

legal preparation and legal counsel? My request to be heard in camera was turned down because it would have amounted to publicity.

It is wrong to state that I did not try to cooperate with the trial bench. Nothing short of my life was at stake. I had sense enough to extend cooperation and courtesy to those who would tell me that I should hang until I am dead. But the trial bench wanted me to prostrate myself before it. This is why I had to tell the bench that I would not crawl and cringe before it. A Muslim can only prostrate himself before his Creator. But the bench, in particular the Chief Justice, was always rude, abrasive and insulting to me. In striking contrast, the Chief Justice was kindness itself to the confessing co-accused. He smiled at them. He enjoyed their rustic sense of humor at my expense. He was patient with them in a fatherly fashion. He would translate the questions in Urdu and Punjabi for them whenever he thought that they were not able to follow the English. The taunts, the frowns and shouts were reserved only for me. I was favored with the commands to "shut up," "get up" and "take this man away until he regains his senses." In these circumstances, to talk of cooperation is to ask for the patience of a saint.

It was not that the trial court was oblivious of the basic norms of law, nor that it was really unable to follow the difference between publicity and public trial. The compilers of the White Paper are acutely conscious of the value of publicity. On page 145 of the White Paper, a rebuke is registered against my Government for the discrimination in allotting time to PNA on the radio and television. It says that whereas my news conference of 24<sup>th</sup> January 1977 was extensively covered by the radio and television, "neither the Pakistan National Alliance nor any other contesting party was allowed these facilities. Radio and Television covered briefly their manifestos in their news bulletins only. Actually, this discriminatory approach became more pronounced as the tempo of electioneering built up. Every election speech of Mr. Bhutto was given full sound and visual coverage. No Opposition leader was given sound coverage. Their speeches were reported briefly in news only. Visually they sometimes did get a few fleeting seconds but in the matter of showing crowds, television used camera tricks to maximize the PPP crowds and minimize the Opposition meetings."

During the election campaign PNA filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court on the alleged discrimination. I believe the Lahore High Court ordered that PNA should be allotted time on the radio and television commensurate with its importance. If I am not mistaken one of the Honorable justices of the Supreme Court was at that time a justice of the Lahore High Court and he sat on the bench which heard the writ filed by PNA and passed the order against discrimination. I did not make a grievance out of it then nor am I doing so now. I am pleading for consistency. It is a part of equity to allow political opponents to put across their point of view to the public for getting votes, it is

the essence of equity that the trial for murder of the leader of the largest and most powerful political party in the country and its former President and Prime Minister should have an open trial and get commensurate coverage.

More than votes are at stake. More than my life is at stake. Make no mistake about it, the future of Pakistan is at stake, but when my Counsel complains of the complete blackout of the defence case on the radio and television, he is nonchalantly told that there will be no publicity on the radio and television. That is the end of the matter. In the name of God, do not allow the defence to be heard by the public on the radio and television, but kindly be merciful enough not to call it publicity. Is it that I want to popularize executions and hangings that I want publicity? What I want is even handed justice? What I want is for the people of Pakistan also to come to a conclusion on whether the leader they voted into power as their President and Prime Minister is a murderer or whether he has been framed.

The proposition is very simple. I refuse to believe that it is not being understood or that it is not being articulated with clarity. This so-called White Paper which has been thrown on the ground has come in the middle of my appeal against the death sentence. It has been distributed throughout the world. It has been extensively broadcast on the radio and television. Nasty and vicious editorials have appeared on it. Foreign journalists are being requested to publicize it. Ambassadors of Pakistan are holding receptions for the elite of the countries of their accreditation for the distribution of this document. It is a big extravaganza on a worldwide scale. The bulky blue print on character assassination has been translated into four languages including Arabic.

I wonder why in Arabic? How does the subject matter of elections concern the Arab States? The system of government in Arab countries is of monarchy or the one party state. Lebanon had parliamentary democracy but these days the people of that unfortunate country are barely able to keep their country together. With bullets flying over their heads, I doubt if they will be interested in this prescription for a *coup d'état*. Kuwait and Bahrain have either suspended or dissolved their parliaments. The subject matter of this White Paper is not a task shared by the military regime of Pakistan and the monarchies and one party States of the Arab world. It does not concern them. Unless it is a call to brother military officers in those countries to rise and spread the menace of *coup-gemony* in the Arab states.

A White Paper on how to have a *coup d'état* in twelve hours would be most useful to those military officers in the Arab states who are looking for a pretext to overthrow their legitimate governments, the established monarchies and sheikdoms. What is its relevance to the Arab states, what is the message it seeks to carry? That Zulfikar Ali Bhutto allegedly rigged elections in Pakistan. If I

were an Arab monarch or an Arab Sheikh or an Arab revolutionary national leader, not having this system and not subscribing to this system of parliamentary elections based on adult franchise. I would say, so what? Those who think that a *coup d'état* is the best thing that happened to Pakistan would, by conviction, like *coup-gemony* to spread to other countries, especially the neighboring countries. There is no other logical explanation for the Arabic translation on how to rig a *coup d'état* and to justify it.

## Lessons to be learnt

A few miscellaneous points need to be covered before dealing with prejudice. The White Paper abounds in passages indicating that I started to prepare for the election campaign much before the scheduled date. One reference will serve the purpose. On page 54, under the caption, "Early Planning," the White Paper states: "Documentary evidence exists to justify the inferences cited above. The threads lead back to 1974, a tribute in fact to the political sagacity and insight of the leadership of the People's Party. Certainly they took their politics seriously and worked hard and in advance to achieve their political goals through legitimate, and more often by illegitimate, means. The first shot in the strategic man oeuvres to get the right type of constituencies demarcated, was fired by Syed Qaim Ali Shah, President, People's Party. On June 12<sup>th</sup> 1974, he wrote a letter (Annexure 25) to the Prime Minister/Chairman, PPP, pointing out that a Bill with regard to the delimitation of constituencies had just been passed."

Firstly, if a "Bill with regard to the delimitation of constituencies had just been passed," the follow-up action was mandatory and not a sign of early planning. Secondly, and this is far more important, a fixed time for elections is the antithesis of the parliamentary system. Only in a presidential system can a prescribed time limit be given for elections and the tenure of office. In marked contrast, in a parliamentary system, the most that a Constitution stipulates is that an election must not be postponed beyond a prescribed time. Any number of elections can be held within the time ceiling. The advantage or disadvantage of a parliamentary system is that an election can be held at any time. The government can take the Opposition by surprise by prematurely dissolving parliament and having snap elections. This prerogative is a part and parcel of the parliamentary system. In contrast, the advantage or disadvantage of a presidential system is that there is a fixed term of office guaranteed by the Constitution. In a parliamentary system, there have been as many as three to four elections before the expiry of the final date.

The elections of March 1977 were held a year in advance. Actually, I was seriously contemplating general elections after the Islamic Summit Conference. I was keen to dissolve all the assemblies after the Islamic Summit and hold the

elections. In this manner, I was also thinking of forward steps in the political entanglement of Baluchistan. But “wiser collective counsel” prevailed. It is an abysmal ignorance of parliamentary democracy to take the view, as the White Paper has dogmatically done, that I was planning for elections much before the elections were due. Fortified with such knowledge of the parliamentary system the White Paper has made a redundant fetish of the preparation for elections in parliamentary democracy. This also means, if I had held elections a year later according to the prescribed ceiling, I would not have been accused of keeping myself in power for one year more, but for taking another extra year for preparing for elections.

It is a falsehood of the darkest and dirtiest hue to charge that after the elections, my government was preparing for civil war. This wicked lie was bandied around after the *coup d'état*. It was taken up in the Supreme Court in Begum Nusrat Bhutto's constitution petition. The canard is quoted all over again in the White Paper. In my affidavit, I sought to establish that the bogey of civil war a malicious after-thought. With authoritative ignorance, they said that polarization had taken place, not knowing that polarization is an inevitable historical evolution. Where the polarization sharpens and reaches an apogee, it means that the victory of the people is at hand. It is during such a period that the vested interests, desperate for survival, use the engine of military *coup d'états* against the people. They cry wolf and strike to get a respite.

This is why PNA cried wolf, and committed aggression. The PNA had the “wheel jams” and the long marches. PNA leaders appealed to the armed forces to revolt. PNA bought large quantities of arms and gave azans from the roof tops to fight the jihad. Every assault was carried out by PNA. All the calls for strikes were given by PNA. All the formulas for a negotiated settlement were rejected by PNA. PNA even went back on the agreed formula meticulously thrashed out with its full concurrence.

My government did not organize a civil war. Furthermore, as I have explained in my affidavit in the Supreme Court petition of Begum Nusrat Bhutto, a civil war has its own historical antecedents and components. A civil war cannot be organized by a whistle from the government. Mass conscience has to reach a recognized level of development and the armed forces have to split into two camps, one with the exploiters and the other with the exploited, for a civil war to take place. A civil war is inconceivable when the armed forces as a whole are used by a Junta to act as a protective shield of the vested interests. Short of the attainment of the objective conditions for civil war, a government can organize pockets of violence and bloodletting, but so can the opposition, as the opposition did in 1977.

When the objective conditions for a civil war ripen, no *coup d'états* can hold the event. A *coup d'état* is the quickest method to ripen the conditions for a civil war. Objectively speaking, today Pakistan is much closer to a civil war than it was in the worst days of spring 1977. Crocodile tears were shed in the petition before the Supreme Court on the warlike statements of one of my Special Assistants to show that civil war around the corner and would have come if the Chief of the Army Staff had not taken a sharp and quick turn to the right. That same Special Assistant has filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court in my appeal stating on oath that the Chief Martial Law Administrator tried to misuse him to the hilt against me. The General who executed the *coup* and put the lollipop of power into the mouth of the Chief of the Army Staff, met this instigator of civil war in London for over three hours on 9<sup>th</sup> August 1978.

On page 398, the White Paper states that my government and party bought arms from Messrs Dossal and Co, of Karachi to prepare for civil war. Ghulam Mohammad Dossal, the proprietor of Messrs Dossal and Co. was put into jail on numerous occasions by my government. This fact can be verified from the Supreme Court Reference on NAP and otherwise from official records. After taking punitive action against the firm and its proprietor not once but repeatedly, we would hardly choose this one firm in the whole of Pakistan to become our armory for illicit weapons needed for the coming civil war. The incongruities of this document are staggering.

The alarming precipitation towards a polarization of no-return, akin to that of Spain, has come about in the last fourteen months. I have thus recalled the junta of Spain. The Junta would be well advised to remember the more recent events in the Southern Mediterranean. Greece is economically and socially more advanced than Pakistan. The per capita income in Greece is \$1200. In Pakistan it is \$184. Greece is the mother of western civilization. The political consciousness of her people has reached comparatively higher standards than those obtaining here. However, the Greek political situation had been unstable for some years. The military colonels took advantage of the situation and seized power through a *coup d'état* in 1967 in order to establish political stability and halt polarization. Within seven years the Colonels had made such a mess of Greece that they not only brought their own country to the brink but also Cyprus. They came to the verge of war with Turkey. The Greek nation had to beckon their political leader Constantine Caramalis to return from Paris to save Greece from ruination.

In Argentina, after having played football with politics for year without solving the problem of polarization General Harguindeguy, a member of the Military Junta, recently observed, "The task ahead cannot belong to a military clique with a few civilian aides." These words were spoken in Buenos Aires, but they ring a bell in Islamabad. General Harguindeguy also emphasized the importance of open government with mass civilian participation.

Italy, another vital centre of civilization, is in the clutches of a deep and serious economic and political crisis. The degree of polarization in Italy is hazardously acute. Convinced that the prevailing system has failed and that the crisis is beyond the grasp of normal remedies, the Red Brigade is determined to demolish the existing structure of the Italian state and to replace it by a new, classless structure. They have come to the conclusion that the quickest and surest way to destroy the existing state structure is to provoke the military into seizing power. They believe that once the military seizes power, the prevailing structure of the Italian state, based on the Constitution and the institutions enacted under it would collapse. They further contend that once the pillars of the State fall, the exploitative state would crumble with its pillars. The Red Brigade regards the military seizure of power in Italy as a solution, the kind of solution we are witnessing in Pakistan.

The military elite of Italy is aware of the pitfalls. The elite is exceptionally well-educated and it is familiar with the history of the Italian nation. The military elite of Italy cannot forget that after his final and decisive military success to unite the Italian nation, Garibaldi disappeared into the hills with his wife Anna, and left the task of consolidating the unity of the new Italian nation to the skilful politician of Piedmont, Count Camille di Cavour. If a hundred years back the task of consolidating the new unity of Italy was a political task, the armed forces of Italy are not going to respond to the invitation of the Red Brigade in a hurry to break the Italian state in 1978 by military intervention in the politics of Italy.

After the Russian Revolution, Lenin had to make sedulous efforts to concretize the political supremacy of the party over the military. Stalin was equally aware of this essential pre-requisite. Both Lenin and Stalin stipulated that the Soviet State would be perilously endangered if the military asserted its supremacy over the party, or, in other words, over the political control and direction of the State. The principle of political ascendancy, that is, the ascendancy of the party over the military, has been an uncompromising and consistent feature of the Soviet state from the day of the Revolution until today. It will remain so in the future. One means progress and power. The other means conflict and chaos. As late as 1957, the Defence Minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Zhukhov, the conqueror of Berlin and one of the greatest Generals of the Second World War, was dismissed for displaying "Bonapartist" tendencies.

The same principle has held good in the People's Republic of China since the dawn of the Revolution. It must hold good for China and her people. If the military in China assumed control over the party and the political leadership, China would return to the old times of the War Lords. The 800 million people of China are not kept united by Martial Law Order Number 12. The 800 million people of China are not progressing and becoming more powerful by public whippings. China and the Chinese people have been taken to pristine heights by

its political leadership and through political motivation. The political factor is the inspiration of China's unity and the cause of the voluntary sacrifices of her 800 million people. When the Defence Minister of China, Marshal Lin Piao, plotted his "Operation Fairplay" called "Outline of Project 571" to kill Chairman Mao Tse-tung and establish military ascendancy in China, Premier Chou En-lai took direct command of the armed forces and played a key role in crushing the plot of Marshal Lin Piao. The timely action by Premier Chou En-lai to uphold the political leadership and to maintain the political ascendancy of the party saved China from a catastrophe.

Our generals are very fond of quoting the Turkish example with little knowledge of Turkish history. Since the conquest of Constantinople, with a few exceptions, the Turkish armed forces have not seen military defeat or failure. The Turkish armed forces and the military leaders of Turkey carved out the largest empire in the world until the advent of the British Empire. From the time of the Seljuks to that of the Ottomans, it is a history of centuries of military conquests, no doubt, but none of the defeats brought disgrace to the Turkish armed forces or her military leaders. In some battles, the whole force was liquidated, without a single prisoner of war being left behind.

General Mustafa's defeat at the gates of Vienna was not a military defeat. In the Battle of Gallipoli, the Turkish armed forces fought with such valour that the outcome was immaterial. During the First World War, the crushing defeat of the British at the Dardanelles was not forgotten by Winston Churchill until his dying days. Turkey became the "Sickman of Europe" due to the diplomatic intrigues of western powers. The system of "capitulations" imposed on weak and decadent sultans caused a wave of repulsion amongst the patriotic forces and gave birth to the Young Turk movement. This movement was basically a movement for political reform and emerged from the traditions and the character of Turkish history and politics. The political and military personalities and their purposes were indistinguishable and inseparable. The Young Turks were composed of soldiers and politicians.

Men like Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Anwar Pasha, Ismet Pasha, Rauf Pasha and Talat Pasha were soldiers and politicians because, for over five centuries, Turkey was constantly at war. As an Axis power, Turkey lost the First World War along with Germany. But under the dynamic leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Turkey converted defeat into victory. Under his gallant leadership, Attaturk rallied the defeated and dismembered Turkish nation and inflicted crushing military defeats on the Greeks who were aided by France and Britain. After driving out the foreigners from Turkish soil, the greatest military hero of a great military nation discarded his military uniform. He gave Turkey a constitution and a parliament. He modernized Turkey. He emancipated women.

Attaturk set up the one-party state and, in those early days, he ordered a mixed economy for Turkey.

After some time he encouraged and brought into being an opposition party to strengthen democracy in his country. He made Ismet Pasha, the hero of the Battle of Innuan relinquish his military career in order to commit himself fully to politics. He made him the Prime Minister and leader of the People's Republican Party. He encouraged and supported the economist and banker, Ceyal Bayer to become President of the Democrat Party. For historical reasons and with proud justification on account of their brilliant contributions, military traditions were deeply intermingled with the socio-political fabric of Turkey. Had Attaturk lived longer, or had he been in better health, he would have weeded out completely the military influence from the politics of Turkey.

When he died, Attaturk left behind a nascent democracy in Turkey. The young plant of democracy saw many vicissitudes. After decades of rule, the Republican Party was defeated by the Democrat Party in 1950. Ceyal Bayer became the President of the Republic and Adnan Menderes the Prime Minister. Then the Generals struck in May 1960 with a *coup d'état*. They proclaimed that Turkey was on the verge of civil war and they had intervened to stop it. The leaders of the Democrat Party were detained on the island of Yassida and the infamous Yassida trials ensued. Prime Minister Menderes, Foreign Minister Zorku and Finance Minister Krepatkan were given death sentences.

Immediately after the announcement of this mournful decision, President Ayub Khan sent me as his Special Envoy to Ankara to plead with the Junta not to implement the decision. I met President General Gersel in Ankara. The Foreign Minister, Salim Sapar was present and interpreted. It was a lively discussion. General Gersel told me that the problems of Turkey would be resolved by the executions. Firmly, but politely I raised my voice to tell him, 'Mr. President, Sir, the problems of Turkey will begin with the executions.' When I left the office of the President of Turkey, Salim Sapar accompanied me. He told me, "God Bless you." The intense and disturbing polarization which faces Turkey today takes its roots from those ill-advised executions.

The Turkish armed forces have seen that the modulation of polarization is a political phenomenon. The crystallization of a synthesis or equilibrium is an aspect of political evolution. Any direct and ulterior interference from outside the pale of politics can only worsen the situation. Every country has its share of political commotion and turmoil. In Britain, the trade unions are regarded as a supra-government, but the military has not seized power in that country to deal with them. Nor did the British armed forces seize power when the country was paralyzed by the general strike in 1931. During the Great Depression of 1930 and 1931, the American system had all but collapsed, but the American armed forces

did not seize political power. The whole world would be under *coup-gemony* if the yardstick of Pakistan's *coup d'états* were to become applicable as a justification for military intervention.

I am absolutely certain that, if the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army had appeared on television in Rome on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977 and, after reciting a passage from the New Testament, told the people of Italy that he was compelled to intervene, objectively speaking, his words would have carried more credibility. This did not happen and will not happen because it would spell disaster for Italy and her unity;

The armed forces do not have to instigate, encourage or capitalize on a crisis to seize power. Whenever that is done, the crisis is made worse, not resolved. It reappears and becomes more evil. If it is true, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator said at his press conference in Rawalpindi on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1978, that political problems can only be solved by political means, he should have gone on to add, "and by politicians, not by soldiers." At the end of the First World War, Prime Minister Clemenceau of France made a very profound observation. It is an observation that the Generals of Pakistan would do well to remember. Clemenceau remarked, "War is too serious a business to be left to the Generals. "This profound observation is infinitely more valid when peace is the business.

The truth of the matter is that, with all the internal and external intrigues and conspiracies, there is no escaping the conclusion that, by the twilight of a long day of ordeal, I had mastered the situation. Even the opposition is now forced to admit this. After his release from protective custody, the PNA leader, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, admitted that an agreement had been reached on 4<sup>th</sup> July 1977, because at 10.30 p.m. I had withdrawn my objections. The Agreement was to be signed on the following fateful day.

On page 391 the White Paper quotes Rao Rashid's note of 29<sup>th</sup> May 1977: "The law and order situation is constantly improving. Although PNA retains a potential of creating another law and order crisis if the talks fail, passage of time would progressively lessen their potential. As much time, therefore should be bought in conducting the negotiations as possible re-election in the near future would be disastrous from all points of view."

"All points of view" include the national point of view more than any other point of view. After dinner, at approximately 1.20 a.m. on the night of 4<sup>th</sup> July, or morning of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, when the conspirators had already struck, Mr. Hafeez Pirzada told me, "Congratulations, Sir, the crisis is over." I asked him what made him say that. He said that the steam had gone out of the opposition. I laughed and told Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto to wash off some of Pirzada's perennial

optimism. He replied by saying that, in order to do that, he would have to take Pirzada to Sukkur Barrage during high flood. All three of us laughed. Within thirty minutes, we heard the other laughter. Time, in its maturity, will tell who will have the last laugh.

### 13. The Hour has struck

The primordial purpose of this White Paper at this juncture and the others, which follow, is to foul the atmosphere to such an extent, that its odor pierces even the wood-paneled walls. It is the quintessence of prejudice. The object is to vitiate the climate of opinion against me so that everyone from the humblest clerk to the mightiest court may be driven to one conclusion. In assessing the purpose and the intention, the objective and the aim, it can safely be said that a more vulgar and spiteful effort could not have been made to harass a leader.

The onslaught has been gradually escalating from 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977 to 28<sup>th</sup> August 1978, but still the peak of publicity will be reached when the judgment in my appeal is at hand. To keep abreast with the proceedings of the Supreme Court, the nation has been saddled with another bundle of lies and concoctions released on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1978. This new laurel of the regime, announced with hollow fanfare, relates to the misuse of the information media by my government. However, the regime has once more exposed itself. In its duplicity it has chosen to release these poisoned darts into the forum of public opinion at specific intervals, carefully chosen by the Junta. But in its stupidity, it has not covered its tracks. It is quite apparent by removing the sticker with August 28<sup>th</sup> 1978, written on it to discover the printed words "April 1978". This relates to the cover but the same is repeated on the first page. At the bottom of the very last page, the printer's notation is dated 25-03-1978, indicating that the printing deadline was last March. I doubt if a more self-confessed admission can be found of the malicious motive to attempt to prejudice both the public and the Supreme Court judgment.

Furthermore, this second installment in the cascade of curses comes at a time when journalists and writers are being arrested in battalion sizes. Eminent authors are being threatened with being hung upside down. Printing presses have been stolen under the veil of Martial Law Regulations. Newspapers belonging to our party have been closed down at periodic intervals and usurped by the regime. Employees in the government controlled television and radio departments have been given severe punishments by the Summary Military Courts. When I was in Kot Lakhpat jail in Lahore that jail was over crowded with journalists. Now that I am in the District Jail of Rawalpindi, I find that this jail is also full of journalists and employees of the television department.

Now where in the world have journalists been flogged? This regime of Pakistan has the distinction of awarding whipping sentences to journalists. This regime does not have any credentials to bring out a White Paper on the misuse of

the information media by my government. This regime has abused and debased the noble profession of journalism. It has sat on the back of journalists like a Mongol sits on the back of a horse. It has made the journalist gallop with its whip in the same way as a Mongol made his horse gallop. The second White Paper, if it has anything to do with information media and journalists, should be entitled "Be Kind to Animals." With the exception of its poodle press, this regime has treated journalists far worse than the Memsahib treated her pets during the days of the Raj.

This one-sided, insidious propaganda, this unabashed demonstration of prejudice needs to be compared with and contrasted to the rejection of my plea to defend myself in a murder trial held in camera and the refusal to remove me to a hospital for treatment. I am in a death cell. My wife, whose head this regime bravely cut at the Gaddafi Stadium on December 16<sup>th</sup> 1977 and on which the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court remarked on the following day, "I do not care if you are disturbed," has been served with detention orders totaling eleven months so far. My daughter was in detention for over five months. Her detention was held illegal by the High Court, of Sindh. The regime was most upset by her release. My cousin, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, is in jail. Most of the PPP leaders and workers are either in jail or detention.

In these circumstances, where is the opportunity to cleanse the polluted atmosphere? Most of this rejoinder has been written with the paper resting on my knee. On occasions I have felt giddy with sheer exhaustion. A myopic or a biased person might be urged to ask what is the relevance of all the issues raised here to the White Paper. The partial answer to this question is to be found not so much in the White Paper itself but in the over-riding object of the White Paper. This is a more comprehensive answer as well.

All the issues discussed in this rejoinder are as relevant to the White Paper as is the relevance of excluding the conduct of PNA from the purview of a White Paper on the conduct of the general election of March 1977. All these issues flow from the imposition of Martial Law. None of them arises in isolation. Not one of them can be adequately understood separately. Each one of the issues constitutes a part of an integral pattern, not open to the liberty of chiseled distortions in the fashion of the White Paper. Without the total sweep, this paper would have lacked political perception and been unworthy of the author. The post-Martial Law developments in the sub-continent, the state of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the future of the nuclear reprocessing plant, the oscillation between alignment and non-alignment are poignantly pertinent to the destiny of Pakistan. Beyond the imperatives of being duty bound to present a picture in balance, it would have been a disservice to the reader to circumscribe the repast.

The compilers of the White Paper are proud of their knowledge of English grammar and in the Introduction have offered explanations of the errors of others. My knowledge of the Queen's English is not perhaps as advanced as that of most of the compilers of the White Paper. Even if it were, I would not apologise for the errors in English grammar. I would apologise for the errors in the Grammar of Politics. If some thought has not been put across clearly or convincingly, if there is a defect in the political analysis, if the logic is faulty, I would be glad to apologise but also remind the reader that I have been in solitary confinement for almost one year and in a death cell for over five months.

My persecution commenced on and after 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977. If the *coup d'état* had not taken place, Begum Nusrat Bhutto would not have filed a constitution petition in the Supreme Court challenging the imposition of Martial Law. I would not have been arrested. Criminal cases would not have been registered against me. I would not have been detained under Martial Law Regulation No. 12. The trial court at Lahore would not have come into being. It would not have converted itself into a closed court. I would not be in a death cell. There would not have been an appeal in the Supreme Court against the death sentence.

The purpose of dilating on the causation is to show that starting from Martial Law and its validation by the Supreme Court, each event and happening is inter-connected as far as my person is concerned. It is impossible to separate one case from the other in terms of giving separate judgments and sentences. Nor is it possible to separate the dissemination and overlapping of prejudice in one case from the other. A Special Tribunal has been constituted to try a former President and Prime Minister for misconduct. The range of misconduct is from civil to criminal offences. The quasi-judicial tribunal constituted to hear the offences of misconduct of this one and only President and Prime Minister of Pakistan is presided over by Mr. Justice Shafi-ur-Rehman of the Lahore High Court. The proceedings of the Special Tribunal began on 10<sup>th</sup> March 1978, in Kot Lakhpat Jail in Lahore.

In this Special Tribunal of Mr. Justice Shafi-ur-Rehman, I have been charged with six criminal offences by the Junta. One of those six criminal offences directly related to the White Paper brought out by the Junta. In other words, the Junta, having constituted the Special Tribunal to find out if I committed the offence, has come out with a document of 1,044 pages including 342 annexures, with the sole purpose of proving that I am definitely guilty of precisely the offence for which I have been charged in the Special Tribunal, presided over by Mr. Justice Shafi-ur-Rehman. What more is there left to decide? The Junta has given its judgment to the tribunal it has created.

Our intelligentsia includes a tiny element of experts on lopsided hair-splitting. If hair-splitting arguments were used to say that there is no connection

between the White Paper and the Special Tribunal or the appeal in the Supreme Court, the overwhelming majority of the non-hair-splitting intelligentsia would regard it as a manifestation of prejudice deeper than that of the Junta. There is a definite connection, and a positive correlation. All the harassments and the torments, all the criminal and civil litigation can be traced back to Marital<sup>T</sup> law. The White Paper keeps harping back to the Supreme Court judgment. In places it seeks to misrepresent the judgment by making *obita dicta* appear as the *ratio dissidenda*.

In its effort to poison the atmosphere completely, the White Paper has tried to contaminate the general public with prejudice and in particular, those concerned with my fate at this point of time. The White Paper is soaked in prejudice. I have already mentioned that through Mr. A. Z. Faruqi, the Secretary to the Election Commission, the White Paper has tried to generate resentment and hatred against me. The Chief Election Commission, Mr. Sajjad Ahmed Jan, does not give evidence on what I allegedly told him on the telephone about the Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Muhammad Iqbal's publicity. No, he does not say it now, nor did he say it before. However, Mr. A. Z. Faruqi, the nephew of Mr. N. A. Faruqi, the brother-in-law of the principal approver, Masood Mahmood, tells F.I.A., on 24<sup>th</sup> May 1978, in one of those notorious supplementary statements, that the Chief Election Commissioner has told him on the telephone that I had told the Chief Election Commissioner on the telephone: "Do you want to destroy us with your publicity? You keep on referring to the Quaid-e-Azam and Iqbal."

This white lie of the White Paper will not cut any ice. Events were not born on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977. When my government organized the centenaries of the Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Mohammad Iqbal, the opposition leaders accused me of wasting money on the extensive celebrations of the centenaries and were highly critical of the publicity given to the Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal. They abused the founder of Pakistan and attacked him without mercy. To this day those in the limelight of Martial Law have not gone to the Mausoleum of the Quaid-e-Azam to offer "Fataha" at his grave. They refuse to recognize him as their leader. On 21<sup>st</sup> December 1976, I addressed Parliament on the centenary of the Quaid-e-Azam. In that speech I analyzed and quoted details of the opposition to the Quaid-e-Azam from Maudoodi and his Jamaat-i-Islami. Addressing the portrait of the Quaid-e-Azam, I said:

*While you struggled for the glory of Islam and the restoration of the Muslim's pride, they vilified you most who claimed to be concerned with the fate of Islam and of the Muslims of this region. I know they honor you today. I know they now write letters to newspapers containing eulogies to your character and personality. But, in your own lifetime, when you were in the midst of your struggle, when-as you said once in Lahore-you were running your blood into water, what did they*

*say? What did those 'Maulanas' and 'Moulvis' of whom you spoke in public do? Did they hesitate from an attack on your faith? You did not carry your faith in Islam with you for display: You carried it in the innermost recesses of your heart. So one vile-tongued person called you 'Kafir-i-Azam'.*

I believe that important speech may have been removed from the archives of the National Assembly. However, the patriots cannot forget what Maudoodi and the Jamaat-i-Islami leaders said against the Quaid-e-Azam:

(a) These people who do not have any knowledge of Islam from the beginning, to consider them qualified for the leadership of Muslims only because they are experts in Western politics or specialists in a Western type of organization, and because they are saturated with love of their nation - to do so shows a total ignorance of Islam and betrays an un-Islamic mentality.

(b) Those who by being deceived by the words 'Muslim' consider as Muslim an organization which follows the ways of '*jahiliyat*' and think this type of organization will be useful from an Islamic point of view-their stupidity deserves to be mourned.

(c) What a pity that from the Quaid-e-Azam of the League down to the League's followers, there is not one who would have an Islamic mind or sensibility and an Islamic way of thinking and who would look at affairs from an Islamic viewpoint.

(d) As a Muslim, I have no interest in the issue of Muslims establishing a State or forming a government in those areas of India where they are in a majority.

I recall saying, on the centenary of the Quaid-e-Azam in Parliament: "We know how they called us 'kafirs'; in doing so they were only continuing the war they had started in the Quaid's own lifetime." Little more than a year after that speech, the Lahore High Court Judgment dubbed me a 'Muslim only in name'. And, as I sit in this stinking death cell, I know how true were my words in the Parliament on that historic day: "Who dare attack the Quaid now? It would be treason. Therefore, the attack is shifted to those who are now leading Pakistan. Yes, if you can't attack the Quaid, you can still attack his legacy."

The distorted and baseless references to Kashmir and the Hamood-ur-Rehman Report on page 107 of the White Paper have been dealt with earlier. Here it is necessary only to mention that the distortions are aimed at inciting public alienation and causing a misconception in the Armed Forces.

In the context of the existing situation, the object of the Battle Plan based on the Model Plan of the Junta for the conquest of Pakistan is to neutralize the public by hostile and insidious propaganda. The attempt to prejudice the judiciary, in particular, does not require any elaboration. After telling the public the monstrous lie about the disparaging remarks on the Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal, a pathetic effort has been made to arouse the anger of the Judiciary. Once again, the ubiquitous Mr. A. Z. Faruqi, Secretary to the Election Commission, has been recruited to say that Mohammad Hayat Tamman told him that he should “not worry about the Judges since they come to the government for very small favors. They would be managed.” As if this one fantastic falsehood mentioned at page 33 were not enough, to make certain that the attempted insult reaches home, the White Paper goes out of its way to repeat the remark at page 44. I have already made it quite clear that Mr. Tamman would never talk foolishly or disrespectfully of the judiciary. Such types are cautious enough not to annoy even a sub-inspector or a *tehsildar* and *patwari*. This concoction cannot apply to a man like Tamman.

There are a multitude of references in the White Paper to the Supreme Court’s hearing and judgment in Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s constitutional writ petition. Although such references are important and have a specific significance, as far as I can gather the more important references are at pages: 205, 224, 227, 238, 259, 266, 338-39, 381, 393, 395 and 400. Any reference to the Supreme Court in that case, connected to a matter of which I am the target carried certain presumptions in the eye of equity. All my trials and tribulations are an offshoot and a byproduct of Martial Law. Such copious and, at places, willfully misconstrued references to Law have not been lifted aimlessly. Each reference has been handpicked and thrown like an arrow at the target, Z. A. Bhutto, the Appellant in the Supreme Court Appeal against the death sentence of the Court of the Chief Justice of the Lahore Court. To expose the purpose and to indicate the extent of malice, I will give only two illustrations:

(a) At page 205 the White Paper states:

Mr. A. K. Brohi had some more spine chilling details to disclose about the Federal Security Force in his statement before the Supreme Court on October 10<sup>th</sup> 1977. According to his statement, Mian Mohammad Abbas was also instrumental in setting up a Demolishing Squad. The object for which this Squad was set up was to disrupt and break up public meetings of Opposition political parties. Mr. Rao A. Rashid Khan was also responsible, together with other senior officers of the FSF, for setting up squads of bomb blasters, sharp shooters and knife runners.

This is precisely the prosecution case in the murder trial. This is the false version of the Federal Security Force, which the two approvers and the co-

accused have given. The defence vehemently denied these versions and contended that the evidence of the approvers, the accomplices and the co-accused was baseless and false. The trial court, however, accepted the version of the prosecution: Hence this appeal. Mian Mohammad Abbas is a co-accused or co-appellant. The other co-accused or co-appellants are equally concerned. Whether they are concerned or not, I am certainly concerned. The Federal Security Force is concerned. The role and activities of the Federal Security Force are the subject matter of the appeal. In the midst of the appeal, the White Paper injects as the “authentic” version, the false version of the prosecution on one of the main submissions requiring being determined in my appeal before the Supreme Court.

It is a timely reminder to the Supreme Court that on 10<sup>th</sup> October 1977, Mr. A. K. Brohi, the then counsel for the respondent and now the Law Minister, told the Supreme Court exactly what the prosecution later told the trial court, and in a few days will repeat once more to the Supreme Court. To further prejudice and adversely influence everyone, the White Paper describes Mr. A. K. Brohi’s narration in the Supreme Court as “some more spine chilling details about the Federal Security Force.” In the first place, the White Paper endeavors to deal with the rigging of the elections by my government and the civil officials. As for the alleged role of the Federal Security Force in the elections, the White Paper quotes on page 203 the statement of Approver Masood Mahmood on 5<sup>th</sup> August 1977 in a contempt case in the Lahore High Court.

In that statement, Masood Mahmood, the then Director General of the Federal Security Force, says that the only task assigned to him for the elections was “the collection of political intelligence” and “complete dossiers on all the political personalities liable to or claiming to contest elections.” He further states that he “entrusted this task to Mr. Habib-ur-Rehman Khan, the then Deputy Director General (Operations) and No. 3 in my organization”. Here it is pertinent to note that Mr. Habib-ur-Rehman Khan then Deputy Director General (Operations) is at present the Inspector General of Police of the province of Punjab. He was the Officer in Charge of Operations in the Federal Security Force. If the spine-chilling details of the Federal Security Force, as narrated by Mr. A.K. Brohi in the Supreme Court on 10<sup>th</sup> October 1977, are to be believed and, if the sensational but equally false version of the prosecution is also correct, Mr. Habib ur Rehman, the Officer in charge of the Operations of the FSF should be an approver or a confessing co-accused, or a co-accused in this trial.

But the officer who was directly in charge of the fanciful and fictitious “demolishing squad, the bomb blasters, sharp shooters and knife runners” is the Inspector General of Police of Punjab in this regime. His brother, Major-General Mujib-ur-Rehman is the Information Secretary at Islamabad, responsible for giving worldwide publicity to this White Paper. The statement of Approver

Masood Mahmood that the only task assigned to the Federal Security Force for election purposes was to collect information on the probable candidates is confirmed by the White Paper on page 205, "Official records also established the fact that under 'Operation Victory', data was collected about the probable candidates of the PPP to assess their suitability for the award of party tickets in the elections".

During the three-month surcharged election campaign, not a single public meeting or procession of the opposition was disrupted or broken up. At no stage of the tension-ridden campaign did the opposition make any such charge. At the end of the last day of the campaign, some opposition leaders expressed their satisfaction over the arrangements. None of them complained that their meetings or processions were broken up or disrupted. Throughout the White Paper, the Federal Security Force is not ascribed the kind of role to warrant a reproduction of the submissions of Mr. A.K. Brohi, which he made on the Federal Security Force in the Supreme Court on 10<sup>th</sup> October 1977. There is absolutely no connection between the White Paper and these remarks. The only connection between the White Paper and those remarks is with my appeal.

## **Kasuri Murder**

The "spine chilling details" about the FSF, the role of Mian Mohammad Abbas, "the demolishing squads, and the squads of bomb blasters, sharp shooters and knife runners" do not figure at all in the election, or in the election complaints. They figure very much in my trial and my appeal in the Supreme Court. This is the reason why those special and juicy remarks of Mr. A. K. Brohi have been grafted into the White Paper without relevance to the object of the White Paper. The Supreme Court did not come to any finding on those remarks. But this would not be clear to a layman. The aim is to give more power to the elbow of the prosecution in the appeal being heard by the Supreme Court on, interlaid the alleged role of the Federal Security Force, Mian Muhammad Abbas and other personnel of the FSF in the assassination of Kasuri's father. However, if Mr. A. K. Brohi is right about the squads of sharp shooters in the FSF and if the prosecution is to be believed that the assassination was allegedly the work of the FSF, the force could not have recruited "sharp shooters" to do such a lousy job.

On pages 338 and 339, the White Paper quotes the observations of the Supreme Court on the elections in such a way as to convey the impression that the Supreme Court Judgment supports the White Paper. The rider of the Supreme Court that it has not been "called" upon to record a judicial finding as to whether the dissatisfaction was in fact justified or not" has been mentioned at page 339, but it is like a drop of water in an ocean of distortions, half truths and falsehoods.

Ordinarily, I would have prayed for a prohibitive order requesting the Supreme Court to ban this White Paper as it seeks to predetermine the course of justice in the Special Tribunal of Mr. Justice Shafi-ur-Rehman and to cause dire prejudice to my appeal in the Supreme Court. Ordinarily, I would have prayed for a prohibitive order on all other official documents contemplated for release in order to fulfill and further the purpose of this White Paper, until the Special Tribunal and the Supreme Court have given their respective verdicts. Ordinarily, in the alternative, I would have prayed for adequate and necessary facilities to rebut the one-sided, false and malicious propaganda of the regime.

This is my inalienable right both as a citizen of Pakistan and as the former President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. This is so because the manner in which the regime has tried to malign me has caused incalculable harm to the highest elective offices in the country and to the country itself. As the right of reply is an enshrined article of faith in the judicial process, and since, this White Paper has sought to cast an ominous shadow over my appeal in the Supreme Court, the people of Pakistan are entitled to have full and unhindered access to my defence, not as a favor of publicity, but as a right to protect my honor and to establish my innocence. This right cannot be curtailed nor infringed. In this connection the release of another paranoia of propaganda on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1978, must also be borne in mind. In the Supreme Court hearing of Begum Bhutto's writ petition, the respondent's counsel released all the Nusrat material to the press before obtaining permission of the Supreme Court. This is an appeal against murder, which has more than my life at stake.

To show that it is a masterpiece, the White Paper has ended with an Epilogue. It has the audacity to quote history to me. For the compilers of this document to quote Napoleon is to insult history to the hilt. Just as the authors of the White Paper completely missed the point and nuances of my speech of 28<sup>th</sup> March 1977, in the National Assembly, so has the philosophical content of Napoleon's remark been totally lost on these lamentable creatures? However, if they want to make a literal interpretation of Napoleon's remarks that history is a fable, in that event, this White Paper is the feeblest of all fables. It would have been more appropriate if the White Paper had quoted Karl Marx when he said that history is written behind the back of people. The White Paper has been released behind my back. It could not have come out otherwise.

Nations rise and fall, as the sunrises and sets. Through culture and civilization, some nations make themselves great. Through *coup-gemony* and conspiracies other nations turn into the debris of history. In October 1977, I stated before the Supreme Court that if the Constitution of 1973 were suspended beyond a minimum period, the legal fiction of its suspension would become unacceptable. The abrogation of the Constitution of 1973 would have two judicial consequences:

(a) It would mean falling back on the Indian Independence Act of 1947 passed by the British Parliament;

(b) It would also mean that the quantum of autonomy voluntarily surrendered to the Federation by the Provinces would revert back to the Provinces in preference to the restoration of the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

I told the Supreme Court that the regime was opening options, which should never be opened, and closing options, which should never be closed. To make matters worse, to add insult to injury, not only has the Constitution been kept in deep freeze for a period longer than necessary even under the definition of the Supreme Court's "doctrine of necessity," but its fundamental provision relating to the electorate are being amended by one man, according to his whims.

Either a Constitution is in use or it is not. It is not a centerpiece, which can be taken away and then put back on the table. It is not a painting, which can be stored away and brought back. The Constitution is the State. There would have been no scope, at least no legitimate scope for reviving the autonomy controversy if the Constitution had not been suspended.

When we made constitutional amendments in Parliament according to the provisions of the Constitution, PNA said that these were "unilateral" amendments and that they had invalidated the Constitution. All the amendments were strictly according to the provisions of the Constitution. Even so PNA considered them unacceptable. If there was even an iota of truth or merit in that stand, how is it that the same individuals are today saying that the Constitution remains valid in spite of the *coup*, the suspension of Constitution beyond the doctrine of necessity and its amendment of fundamental provisions by one man? The present Martial Law is outside the Constitution. It is what is called a Duke of Wellington's Martial Law or a meta-juristic Martial Law. It has no association with the Constitution. It does not flow from the provisions of the Constitution. Events are driving the regime in an inexorable direction. The matter does not close at the end of the tunnel. At the end of this tunnel, there is another tunnel. There is a tomorrow and, as you sow, so shall you reap. Either way, Pakistan will reap the bitter harvest.

On his return from Saudi Arabia on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1978, General Zia-ul-Haq announced that he had "good, friendly and profitable talks" with the "very seasoned politician" and "accommodating" Indian Prime Minister in a very friendly atmosphere in Nairobi at the funeral of Jomo Kenyatta. In answer to a question the General observed that "the record of the past thirty years of relations between the two countries has created a lot of misunderstanding and lack of confidence. What was needed was the removal of suspicions about India.

As a senior partner, India should take the initiative in removing these suspicions." The room for a "senior partner" does not exist in the concept of sovereign equality of States.

But how is India a partner? If we are partners in any form, the *raison d'être* of Pakistan disappears because the Quaid-e-Azam's main theme was that Pakistan was the only alternative since we could not live as partners. India is not only a senior partner; she is not a partner at all- senior, junior or equal. Where is the partnership? How is there a partnership of any level or nature? Has Pakistan entered into some secret agreement of a partnership of confederation with India? Has the regime forged some hidden agreement, which brings the relations between India and Pakistan into a partnership? Is that why the General is flattering India all the time and praising her leaders and behaving in a sycophantic manner?

One of the dominant urges for Pakistan has been to dispel the notion of seniority or superiority of Hindu India over Muslim India by creating a Muslim State equal and sovereign to the other State. The notion of a "senior partner" exists only in the sphere of hegemony and hegemony alone. Is this why the very seasoned politician appeared to be an accommodating Prime Minister? Such a feeling of accommodation arises out of arrogance and patronage, from a sense of superiority and seniority inherent in the mentality of a hegemonic power. The gravity of the remarks of General Zia-ul-Haq is to be found in the following words: Mr. Morarji Desai, the Indian Prime Minister told the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan that India was anxious for normalization of relations with Pakistan. "A strong and stable Pakistan is in the interest of India" is what Mr. Desai is reported to have told General Zia-ul-Haq. The General added that the Indian Premier told him that "not only the Government but also the people of India were very keen to normalize relations with Pakistan and that they were the last to see that Pakistan's progress was hampered." These words, General Zia-ul-Haq noted came from the Prime Minister of India and hence were important words. Undoubtedly, these words, coming from the Prime Minister of India are important but they can be reassuring and gratifying to those who have not been bitten once to be twice shy.

In this connection, it is germane to quote former President Richard Nixon's memoirs on his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister at the White House on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1971. At page 525 of his recently published memoirs entitled "RN," he states:

*Mrs. Gandhi complimented me highly on the way I was winding down the war in Vietnam, and on the boldness of the China initiative. We talked about the uneasy situation in Pakistan and I stressed how important it was that India not taken any action that could exacerbate it.*

*She earnestly assured me that India was not motivated in any way by anti Pakistan attitudes. "India has never wished the destruction of Pakistan or its permanent crippling," she said. "Above all, India seeks the restoration of stability. We want to eliminate chaos at all costs."*

*I later learnt that even as we spoke, Mrs. Gandhi knew that her Generals and advisers were planning to intervene in East Pakistan and were considering contingency plans for attacking West Pakistan as well.*

Earlier, another Prime Minister of India had solemnly stated that India's pledge for a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a pledge not only to the people of Kashmir but to the entire world. While on a visit to the White House in the presence of the late President John F Kennedy, the same Indian Prime Minister declared that "peace is a passion for us." A few days later his Indian armies marched into Goa with full passion. Again, the same Indian Prime Minister vehemently announced that India and China were "Bhai-Bahi" and that India would never go to war with China. A few years later, he ordered his Generals to throw out the Chinese from Nefra and Ladakh. A day after the death of the Quaid-e-Azam, the armies of India marched into Hyderabad and, before that, into Junagadh, Mangrol and Manavadar.

The record is a sad and sorry commentary of broken promises, of colossal chicanery and of diabolical deception. The Indian position on the vivisection of Mother India remains unchanged. Over the years she has achieved remarkable success in crippling and dismembering Pakistan. She has pursued this steadfast and unshakeable aim from the day Pakistan came into being. She refused to transfer the assets of Pakistan until Gandhi went on a fast. She abruptly closed all trade with Pakistan to destroy the economy of Pakistan merely because Pakistan took the sovereign decision -against the devaluation of her own currency. The hoary stories of repeated aggressions apart, India could not even be "accommodating" on the funds transferred by the Nizam of Hyderabad to Pakistan, nor on the division of the books of India Office in London. On the Indus Basin Treaty, she was not "accommodating" on a single drop of water. Undoubtedly, the words of this Prime Minister of India are as important as the words of his two illustrious predecessors.

General Zia-ul-Haq would be well advised not to rush into treading the ground the angels fear to tread. Since judicial notice can now be taken of his successive blunders, he should be prevented from crowning another failure. As he is not a politician, leave aside a seasoned politician, with one naive banter he destroyed all that I achieved with Afghanistan and, concomitantly, within the country in NWFP and Baluchistan. For these two stupendous follies, Pakistan might have to pay an irretrievable price. By restoring to petty tactics, the General and his minions have already gravely damaged the Kashmir case by floating

fictitious “secret clauses.” Perhaps this was precisely the macabre object. I did not merely claim to get back 90,000 prisoners of war and more than five thousand square miles of territory, but I actually did get them back. Not even my bitterest enemies can deny this achievement. More than that, I stopped the war trials threatened by Mujibur Rehman. I held firm on the right of self-determination of Jammu and Kashmir. I prevailed on the Shahinshah of Iran not to give India a loan to construct the formidable defence fortification called the Rajistan Canal. On the objection of the GHQ, I refused to conclude the agreement on Salal dam. From the President of France, the General received a lemon. If he goes to India, the General will receive a *chicko* from the Prime Minister of India.

It is about time the General turned inward and looked into the deep well of crisis he has created in Pakistan. Let me make it abundantly clear. Let there be no mistake about it. Selfishness, ineptitude and a heathen vendetta have synchronized to the flash point of a mortal crisis. The crisis that Pakistan faces today is far graver and more catastrophic than the crisis of 1971. Objectively speaking, according to the rules of real politic and power politics, five neighboring States are directly concerned. If trouble and instability mar the future of Pakistan, it would be very dangerous to assume that none of the five neighboring States would get sucked into the situation. It would be the height of optimism to expect that all five of them will turn into hermits and look the other way. Each one of them has a direct strategic and geo-political interest in residuary Pakistan. None of them can ignore it without peril to itself. Our beloved country can become a battlefield more devastating than Vietnam.

After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the great empire founded by Babur began to disintegrate. Foreign invaders marched in to grab the booty of an empire as rich as that of any Caesar. Former governors, dispossessed Sardars and soldiers of fortune carved out independent principalities. If such a calamitous misfortune could overtake the descendants of Chenghis Khan, history is capable of repeating itself for lesser or smaller men. Nauseating debates on dead or living horses are futile. The hour has struck. The supreme challenge lies in preventing another outbreak. Tongue-lashing, abuses and the employment of force will be disastrously counterproductive. Time is crying out for political dexterity, for vision and for a genuine consensus. The immediate imperative is for a comprehensive political settlement based on an equitable formula. This is the moment for quiet and sincere negotiations between brothers, without malice or prejudice.

The curse and stigma of Martial Law needs to be withdrawn without delay. The larceny of seizing power through the chimney will only gather more smoke. The pathetic and myopic jingoists are unloading their volley of words on a Balouch politician. I am more concerned, indeed, I am deeply perturbed not by the voice but by the voice or voices behind him. I am not suggesting that anyone

is a spokesman for other powers. It is quite possible that thoughts and ideas outside the frontiers can conform and harmonize with thoughts inside the frontiers. This is what makes ideology international and this is what makes the struggle more potent and powerful. In June 1977, I stated in the National Assembly of Pakistan that there will be an acute horizontal and vertical polarization if Pakistan were to be destabilized. By horizontal polarization, I meant and said provincial polarization, and by vertical polarization, I meant and said class polarization. This is what has happened.

## Greatest Achievement

When Mujib-ur-Rehman spoke he also gave his scheme at Lahore, but he would not have come all the way from Dacca to Lahore to announce it if he had not flown on the wings of two foreign powers. Mujib-ur-Rehman was arrested, the counterparts of PNA joined the regime in Dacca but still Dacca fell. The same pattern is emerging almost methodically on the pattern of 1970-71. The same anti-people alignments are being made between obscurantists the same rag-tag bands, the same "think tanks" to do "*Jor-tor*." The scheme is remarkable in its similarities and symptoms-only this time it is far more deadly. Wise men learn from the mistakes and the lessons of the past.

There were two parts of the London Plan. The first part was implemented. I prevented the implementation of the second part. It was buried, but the *coup* of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977 revived it with gusto. It would be a dissipation of vitality to run after phantoms. The physician should heal his own wounds. The Constitution of 1973 should be restored in its unlamented purity as a matter of Olympian patriotism. The portals of negotiation should be thrown open to the accredited and authentic leaders for a magnanimous and magnificent consensus. This is the only way to save what is left of this battered and besieged land for the creation of which millions bathed in blood.

As I sit in the four walls of this tiny death cell, my mind reflects on the canvass of my life spent with dedication in the service of my people. My mind wanders over the rapidly changing, contours of the magnificent political awakening. Man is moving towards revolution and reform. He is determined to snatch his rights from the usurping order of exploitation. In my solitary confinement, I sometimes think I have lived the past twice over. The scenes that come on the screen of my memory are veritable feast. I recall many momentous occasions: the partition, the rebellious mood of youth, the epic struggles, the Indo-Pakistan wars, the Security Council, the matching of wits with the giants. If, out of the whole mosaic of the past, I had to select one piece from my most crucial and momentous achievements, I would not refer to my contributions in the 1965 war, nor the creative bilateral foreign policy I embarked upon for the

glory of my nation. I would not refer to that period when I picked up the broken pieces of a sundered land in 1971, or the Simla Agreement. I would perhaps not refer to the blood, sweat and tears I shed in seeking to create a society marked with equity and justice, my tireless efforts to bring a smile on the face and contentment in the souls of people who had shed bitter tears since Mohenjo-Daro was built.

In the light of recent developments, which have taken place, my single most important achievement, which I believe will dominate the portrait of my public life, is an agreement which I arrived at after an assiduous and tenacious Endeavour spanning over eleven years of negotiations. In the present context, the agreement of mine, concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our people and our nation.

On my twenty-first birthday on 5<sup>th</sup> January 1948, I received in Los Angeles two birthday gifts from Larkana. One was an expensive set of five volumes of Sloane's biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. The other was an inexpensive pamphlet. From Napoleon I imbibed the politics of power. From the pamphlet I absorbed the politics of poverty. The latter ended with the words, "Workers of the world unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains. You have a world to win!"

However, in deference to the sentiments of the Junta, I shall not end of this revolutionary note. I shall conclude with the quotation with which Jawaharlal Nehru ended "The Discovery of India," the last book he wrote in jail before taking command of a free and democratic India. It is a quotation from Oslovosky's "How the Steel was Tempered." It says:

Man's dearest possession is his life, and since it is given to him to live but once, he must so live as not to be scared with the shame of a cowardly and trivial past, so live as not to be tortured for years without purpose, that dying he can say, 'All my life and my strength were given to the first cause in the world-the liberation of mankind'.

The so-called White Paper on the misuse of the media is evidence of the grotesque interference in the course of justice. Printed in March/April 1978, it has been stored away until August 1978 to follow a month after the first hymn of curses. A subject dealing with the media cannot be buried in government warehouses for four long months. This frivolous fiction is of the same standard and quality as its unworthy precursor. The same distortions and half-truths prevail. The same lop-sided and one-sided malicious interpretation dominates the document. The same perverse and petty lies fill the text. It is less than a one-sided account. Documents have been suppressed. There are also indications of tampering and interpolation. In some cases, pages have been deleted and re-

typed to change my original notes. For instance, no journalist or writer received more patronage, or favor from me than Mustafa Sadik of "Wafaq" of Jamaat-i-Islami. The patronage he got was liberal and generous. He is a staunch supporter of Maudoodi, an ardent follower of the Jamaat-i-Islami's philosophy and ethics. His name should have topped the list. Another member of the Majlis-i-Shora, also equally faithful to the ethics of the Jamaat-i-Islami, also received considerable patronage for services rendered.

Why have these PNA journalists and PNA journals been omitted? Is this also a task shared by the regime and PPP, in which the corruption and greed for monetary assistance of PNA journalists is ultra vires of the scope of this White Paper? The same logic is being debased in the same fashion in this second masterpiece of malevolence.

The only permission Mr. Hamid Mahmood took from me was to write on Indo-Pakistan relations. I told him that he was making an odd request because there is no subject in Pakistan on which more was written than on Indo-Pakistan relations. He said that he had some novel idea. I shrugged my shoulders and told him that whether novel or not, the ideas were his and not mine or of my government, so he did not need any permission from me. When I read the article I was surprised at the view he had expressed. I told a colleague of mine that I did not know that like G. Mouennudin, this person was also a Unionist at heart.

In those days many influential and prominent personalities were so downcast and demoralized that they made the strangest proposals to me on our relations with India. One of them brought a press clipping of the statement he gave against Pakistan in 1945. The burden of the statement was that Pakistan was not feasible and that, if it came into being it would fall apart within twenty to thirty years. He felt proud of his wisdom and foresight. A former Chief Minister of the Punjab, Sir Khizer Hayat Tiwana, told me that time had shown that he was right and that the "hotheads" were wrong. A brother of a former Chief Minister of Sindh and, until recently, an adviser in this regime's set up, Maula Baksh Soomro, told me that Pakistan was so unnatural that even God would not be able to administer it. Mufti Mahmood said that he thanked God that he had not soiled his hands in the creation of Pakistan. Maudoodi, the Pope of the Junta, is the author of the concept of five or four nationalities. He wrote in "*Siasi Kash-ma-Kash*" that the creation of Pakistan would give rise to the demand of nationalities by the Provinces of Pakistan.

The Jamaat-i-Islami has removed that booklet from circulation but its copies are still available with a number of people. Meraj Mohammad Khan showed it to me in the Karachi District Bar room when I went there to address the Karachi lawyers in 1970. It is a revealing document. Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti openly called for a confederation with India after the dismemberment of

Pakistan. His statement received considerable international attention. In such an environment, and in the circumstances mentioned, was I expected to make mincemeat out of Hamid Mahmood for expressing his confused views more confusingly? White Paper Volume I says that I told Mr. Rafi Raza that I had no time to meet people like Hamid Mahmood and that he would have to meet them. White Paper Volume II tries to indicate that Hamid Mahmood was such a close confidant of mine that I chose him above all others to float the idea of a Confederation with "dear and great India". The painter chooses his paints for the canvass, the hunter his gun for the prey. What does this regime choose for dismantling me? It chooses contradictions, blatant contradictions.

Much has been said about Altaf Gohar and his brother. These two brothers should know better than the compilers of the White Paper about how I treated them from 1958 to 1966 and how they behaved towards me in return from 1966 to 1970. With all that has been written, I made the brother an Ambassador to Malaysia in 1976 and I gave Altaf Gohar the contracts for the "Roti Plants." He has expressed his gratitude to me in highly flattering terms. My association with the Haroons is not new. Sir Abdullah Haroon was the Vice President of Sindh United Party while my father was the President of the Sindh Mohammedan Association. Abdullah Haroon was one of the Vice Presidents. Mr. Lee Dayton of the Pan American Airlines knows very well that Yousif Haroon would never have got the partnership of the Intercontinental Hotels if it had not been due to my efforts. In a meeting in Karachi, President Ayub Khan told Mr. Dayton in my presence that he would not sanction the hotel chain if the Haroons had anything to do with it. After Dayton left the meeting I prevailed upon President Ayub Khan to change his mind and allow Yousif Haroon's participation. I was concerned with the projects as Commerce Minister, and I put my foot down firmly and officially against the discrimination against Haroon. Mr. Lee Dayton was frightful surprised when informed the following morning that the objection to Haroon's partnership in the Intercontinental Hotels had been waived. As Industries Minister, Yousif Haroon sought my approval for him to purchase General Motors.

General Habibullah and Gohar Ayub stepped into the General Motors picture after Yousif Haroon had completed the preliminary transactions. Under pressure from the apex of the pyramid of power, all the ministers and all the ministries subsequently changed their original positions to support the proposal of General Habibullah and Gohar Ayub, as did the all-powerful General Motors Company. Only I did not relent on my original proposal. When President Ayub Khan asked me not to be obstinate, I explained to him that I had decided the matter on merit. I also told him that it was not advisable for his son to get into the sphere of business and industrial tycoons.

I helped the Haroons to save “Dawn” newspaper from the rapacious hands of A. M. Qureshi. But after I left government, the Haroon clan spared no effort to try and damage me and my Party. After returning to power in 1971, I did not retaliate. Mahmud Haroon is a Minister and I am in a death cell. He is free to contradict me, but I know that if he has a grain of his father’s character in him, he would not be able to do it with a clear conscience.

By falsely alleging that Wali Khan’s speeches were torn out of context and distorted, the White Paper does not hesitate to cast an aspersion on the judgment of the Supreme Court. During the reference the Supreme Court refused to rely on notes and verbatim reports of the provincial and Central Intelligence Agencies in considering Wali Khan’s utterances. The Supreme Court heard a number of his taped speeches. It heard Wali Khan’s voice loud and clear without interpolation or distortion. It heard his speeches in toto. It examined witnesses, like the Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence, and the present Defence Secretary. The Supreme Court made a thorough and comprehensive legal probe. The highest court in a democratic and constitutional country does not act in a perfunctory manner.

Amongst other fantastic allegations, the White Paper says, “the vilification of opposition parties and leaders had been developed into a built in system of government which Mr. Bhutto had introduced in the country.” It goes on to say, “No opposition party and no opposition leader of note was spared,” Giving some specific instances the White Paper says that the defunct National Awami Party came under concentrated attack on different occasions from 1972 to 1975 until it was finally banned. The attack began when Mr. Wali Khan and his family, including his father Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan were made the main targets of propaganda offensive. The point for consideration is as to why and who first; made Abdul Ghaffar Khan the “Main targets of a propaganda offensive”? What were the Quaid-e-Azam’s views about him?

What did the first Prime Minister, the late Liaquat Ali Khan, say while addressing the Constituent Assembly, after Abdul Ghaffar Khan had made his maiden speech in that Assembly on 5<sup>th</sup> March 1948: “We have not compelled anybody to join the League. Everyone is free to select and join any organization he likes provided that the organization is not detrimental to the interest of the State. Muslims have achieved Pakistan after great struggle and innumerable loss of lives. We think we will be failing in our duty if we do not crush any such movement started with the object of destroying Pakistan. I will conclude after quoting only one couplet. May it prove false.



نہ وہ بدے نہ دل بدلا نہ دل کی آرزو بدلی  
میں کیسے اعتبار انقلاب آسماں گریوں

(Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates Volume I. 23-2-1948 to 26-3-1948 page 283)

The “propaganda offensive” against Abdul Ghaffar Khan now described as ‘a great patriot of Pakistan,” was launched not by the last Prime Minister of Pakistan but by the first Prime Minister. Why thereafter did the successive governments of Pakistan keep him and Abdul Wali Khan in Jail for long years before I assumed power in December 1971?

Abdul Wali Khan never forgave the first Prime Minister for what he had stated about his father. While threatening me in a speech delivered by him at Tonk on 17<sup>th</sup> November 1973 Wali Khan said:

*I say to Mr. Bhutto that your head too is made of flesh. Bullet has no eye. It hits the head of a dog it can also hit the Prime Minister. If President Kennedy and Liaquat Ali Khan could be murdered, who are you to be left alive? We would remove the chain at Torkhani and keep it at Margheela and from Chaman to Jacobabad.*

(The tape recording of this speech was played and the transcript was produced in the Supreme Court during the Reference about the dissolution of the National Awami Party by RAW 19, Mr. Issa Khan, Deputy Director Intelligence Bureau at page 491 of Evidence).

Let the authors of the White Paper produce a single statement or speech of mine as provocative and vitriolic as those of Abdul Wali Khan. It can also be established that it was Abdul Wali Khan who started the vilification campaign against me at a time when I inducted NAP Governors and NAP governments in NWFP and Baluchistan.

Mr. Wali Khan’s collaboration, albeit short lived, with the present Martial law regime can also be explained by referring to his interview with the Peoples Front in London (reproduced by Pakistan Times, Lahore on 28<sup>th</sup> December 1974 when he said: “If I can get rid of Bhutto and somebody is prepared to come and help me then be it the devil himself, I would shake hands with him” (Annexure E 47, Part III, page 230 in NAP Reference case in the Supreme Court).

The White Paper further alleges that Mr. Bhutto fabricated speeches and attributed them to Mr. Abdul Wali Khan. For instance, it says:

Even reports were fabricated and attributed to him. The statement quoting Mr. Wali Khan as saying that in the event of further disintegration of Pakistan, 'we will not be the loser: in that event we will simply shift the border from Torkhani to Attock Bridge,' was one such fabrication. Mr. Wali Khan was 'reported' to have made the statement during his speech at a public meeting held at Chowk Yadgar in Peshawar on 19<sup>th</sup> October 1973. The two news agencies APP and PPI, supposed to be operating independently of each other, circulated it with identical quotes and almost identical language, and the national press briefed through Press Advice, published it the next day. The only exception was *Nawa-e-Waqt* no partisan of Mr. Wali Khan-which published its own correspondent's report. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* story contained no reference to the shifting of the border. Mr. Wali Khan himself, on 25<sup>th</sup> October, issued a contradiction saying he had made no such statement. But this denial was killed. Again, the *Nawa-e-Waqt* was perhaps the only paper, which published it.

The same month, Mr. Wali Khan was made the victim of yet another fabrication. A story was first plastered in the 30<sup>th</sup> October issue of daily *Mashriq*, Peshawar, quoting him as having said at an Eid congregation at Charsadda that "a new country comprising Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Afghanistan would come into existence and the border-line at Torkham would not be shifted to Attock Bridge, but would be located at Margalla near Rawalpindi." Later, a story based on this report was released through PPI for publication in the national press.

But fabrications were actually part of a propaganda offensive launched towards the middle of 1973. Under Mr. Bhutto's directive, to prepare public opinion for the arrest of Mr. Wali Khan and other NAP leaders. Mr. Bhutto made Mr. Wali Khan's reported statement of 19<sup>th</sup> October the basis of lengthy note in which he dubbed the NAP leadership as 'anti-Pakistan and anti-State, and directed the Information Ministry 'to prepare subtly and discreetly the ground' for the arrest of Mr. Wali Khan, Arbab Skindar Khan and Mr. Afzal Khan through the information media.

The campaign against the NAP leadership reached a new crescendo after assassination of Mr. Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao in February 1975. Mr. Wali Khan and other NAP leaders were arrested and the National Awami Party declared illegal and banned. The assassination was 'projected as a conspiracy in which Afghan Government and NAP had colluded in order to remove the most formidable political opponent in the NWFP from their path'. A reference on the ban was made to the Supreme Court, which was then used as a peg to build up a

major media campaign against Mr. Wali Khan and the rest of the NAP leaders.

When the Supreme Court verdict upholding the ban was announced, special publications were brought out by the Ministry of Information for wide distribution.

Blinded by prejudice and with an insatiable lust to malign me, the authors of the White Paper have maliciously suppressed the evidence on the five tapes of Mr. Wali Khan's speeches in Pushto. These five tapes were played and heard in the Supreme Court. The transcripts of these tape recordings were produced by witness who stated that the chain would be shifted from Torkham to Attock or Margalla, and from Chaman to Jacobabad.

In its judgment the Supreme Court (PLD 1976-S.C.57) says on page 121:

So far as Mr. Abdul Wali Khan is concerned, the learned Attorney General has referred us to the transcript of the speech delivered by him on the 21<sup>st</sup> of September 1973 (Exh. RAW-19/16) to show that Mr. Abdul Wali Khan when asked to contradict the statements of certain Afghan Ministers, which were directed against Pakistan, avoided doing so. In fact, it is said, at various places in his own written statement he has even supported the allegations made by the Afghan Government with regard to the Durand Line and their claim that the areas of NWFP and even portions of Punjab formed integral parts of Afghanistan 'itself.

Again on page 122, the judgment says:

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of October 1973 addressing an Eid Congregation at Charsadda, according to the transcript (Exh. RAW-10/1) prepared by the Referring Authority's witness No. 10, Jalilur Rehman, the Khan is reported to have said that a new country comprising Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Afghanistan would come into existence and its border line would be shifted from Torkham not to the Attock Bridge but to somewhere in the Margalla Hills near Rawalpindi'. He further advised the Pakhtoon Zalmes, the militant organization attached to the NAP, in this speech not to present themselves any more for arrest and added: We will no longer offer arguments and proof of our being patriotic. We have done that for over 25 long years'.

Even earlier on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1973, speaking at Nowshera (vide transcript Exh. RAW 19/2) he had said that "If Pakistan is destroyed, we will not be destroyed. We would remove the chain from Chaman to the borders of Sindh and from Torkham to Margalla". He also told his audience at this place that "Now politics is over," and exhorted the people to "Take up arms for settlement

of the political issues". He repeated the same threat of removing the chain from Chaman to Jacobabad and from Torkham to Margalla in another speech delivered by him at Tank on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1973 (vide transcript Exh. RAW-18/15).

On page 140 of the judgment it is again observed:

Similarly in his speeches at public meetings at Abbottabad on 11.10.1973, (Transcript, Exh. RAW 19/4 and Tape Record Exh. 19/M-1), then at Chowk Yadgar on 19.10.1973 (Transcript Exh.RAW 19/5 and Tape Exh.RAW/M-2) and at Masjid Ghazi Gul Baba in Charsadda on 28<sup>th</sup> October 1973 (Exh. RAW 28/2(53). Mr. Wali Khan is reported to have said that, if people of Baluchistan and NWFP are not given their rights, then he will not be responsible for disintegration of Pakistan.

This speech, which has also been reported in the *Nawa-e-Wuqat* of 1<sup>st</sup> November 1973, ascribes to Mr. Wali Khan the following statement: "Now Pakhtoons and Baluchis will secure their rights by use of force."

By defending Wali Khan on such issues the White Paper is trying to defend the indefensible. Furthermore and this is of paramount importance, by taking this position, the regime has officially identified itself with the cause and concept of four nationalities. I do not have to fabricate statements and attribute them to Wali Khan. His statements about the new country coming into existence (Greater Afghanistan which would include parts of Pakistan) were proved in accordance with the law of evidence before the Supreme Court. His article in the Oxford Magazine Round Table (written in September 1971) published in 1972 was also proved and never by him. In that article Mr. Wali Khan prophesied "the three-way split" of Pakistan after the separation of Bangladesh. The Supreme Court at page 138 of the said judgment, while referring to the above-mentioned article says:

The author of this article, as it has now been established beyond doubt through the oral testimony of Mr. Nasim Ahmed, Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan (RAW 15) supported by a written acknowledgement (Exh.RAW 15/3) from the Editor of the journal, was Mr. Wali Khan. In this article he propounded the theory that the British had committed a mistake in partitioning India, because thereby they had undone all the good work that they had done as empire builders for over two countries. Mr. Wali Khan then opened that "undoing (the partition) would point to a reunification of the Pathans (Pakhtoons or Pashtoons) and a greater Afghan State coming into being". The importance of this quotation lies in the emphasis placed on the 'undoing of partition' and the emergence of a "greater Afghan State" as a

result thereof. Is this not what 'Pakhtoonistan' stands for?

The judgment of the Supreme Court is still holding the field and has not been reviewed yet. It is therefore as such binding on the present regime, the authors of the White Paper as on anybody else. Similarly, each part of the White Paper can be proved to be false, malicious and meant only to prejudice my appeal in the Supreme Court. No regime in recent history has misused the official media more ruthlessly than the present military regime in Pakistan against its one and only political target Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for his character assassination, and no regime has failed more miserably, in achieving its objective than this one.

It is the authors of this White Paper and those behind it who have shown their petty minds by perversely distorting and twisting the most natural and innocuous events and episodes. The conclusions drawn by the compilers are shocking and preposterous, in certain parts; their venom has been nasty and poisonous against not only my person but also against my family. All right, if it pleases you, my wife was unworthy of so-called publicity given to her. All right, if it pleases you, my daughter did not bring credit to Pakistan by being elected President of the Oxford Union.

My functionaries might have tried to get a cover story from Newsweek for Pakistan. But it is most significant that, despite the categorical commitment to have a cover story on Pakistan, immediately after the elections of March 1977, Newsweek changed its mind at the last minute without a plausible explanation. Immediately after the *coup d'état* of 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, the same magazine had General Zia-ul-Haq on its cover.

According to the second White Paper, I was obsessed with building my image as an "undisputed, peerless and supreme leader" of my own country "and then as leader of Asia and ultimately of the Third World." I do not plead guilty to this calumny. On the contrary, the regime has gone berserk in not only trying to destroy my image, but in trying to present me to the people of Pakistan and the world as the greatest villain. I did my best. The regime has done its worst.

After fourteen months of incessant and relentless slander of incomparable dimension, after sullyng my name for over a year with unbelievable viciousness, will the regime pick up the courage to have a referendum on me or thou, on Caesar or Brutus? Let the people decide who is the only Holy Cow.

## ADDENDUM

At the stroke of midnight on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1947, the subcontinent was partitioned into India that is Bharat and Pakistan. To guarantee her unity and the permanence of her Federation, India framed here supreme law, the Constitution of India in 1951. In Pakistan, five years later, the Constitution of 1956 replaced the Indian Independence Act of 1947 and the amended Government of India Act of 1935 to become the fundamental law of Pakistan, the guardian of unity.

The abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 by the imposition of Martial Law shook the foundations of the unity of Pakistan. The abrogation of the Constitution of 1962 by yet another Martial Law in 1969 wrenched Pakistan asunder within two years. Neither the Constitution of 1956 nor that of 1962 was a genuine grand norm, and neither was framed by a truly sovereign and representative assembly. As such, the abrogation of those two quasi-Constitutions, although disastrous, did not carry the virus of total self-annihilation.

Only the Constitution of 1973 had the unique distinction of being the genuine grand norm, framed unanimously by a sovereign and representative assembly. For this self-evident reason, whereas the two previous Martial Laws abrogated the two previous Constitutions, this Martial Law was compelled merely to suspend and not abrogate the Constitution of 1973. It is quite another matter to maintain that the imposition of a meta-legal Martial law automatically wipes out the Constitution as the two cannot cohabit. The myth or sophistry of an illusory co-existence has been vitiated by the repeated violations of the conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in Begum Nusrat Bhutto's case. The nagging doubts, if any, were put to rest with the announcement of 14<sup>th</sup> September 1978, made exactly one month and thirty-one years after the creation of Pakistan, that the Chief of the Army Staff would assume the mantle of the President of Pakistan on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1978. He was determined to demonstrate that Constitution or no Constitution, the Chair of the Chief of the Army Staff is the most powerful chair in Pakistan. Splendid, but who will now have the temerity to contend that the Constitution of 1973 still has some breath left in it?

Pakistan has been turned into an "Animal Farm" and its wretched and God-forsaken people into dirty animals. But a tonic comes when even dirty animals know where they stand. The great game in Afghanistan was over on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1978. It is too soon to give a serious historical judgment whether this game was great or petty, but it came to an end on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1978. It was a day for the bugles to blow to the strains of "the last Post." In retrospect it will be seen

that the *coup d'état* of 1977 was a great offence, but the downright burial of the Constitution of 1973 will be registered in the F.I.R. of history as a greater offence. The 16<sup>th</sup> day of September, 1978 will be no less significant a day than the 10<sup>th</sup> of May 1857, or the 14<sup>th</sup> of August 1947. Indubitably, the offender will stand before the bar of history. "There is something in human history like retribution; and it is the rule of historical retributions that its instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself".

**THE END**