Anwar H. Syed

THE DISCOURSE AND POLITICS OF ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO

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WALTER LIPPMANN'S PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

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To Shameem

who is more beautiful
and precious to my eyes
than ever as we enter the
thirty-second year of our
togetherness

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Foreword

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, president and later prime minister of Pakistan, overthrown by the military in the summer of 1977, met death on the gallows in the early morning hours of April 4, 1979. Upon hearing of his execution many Pakistanis wept; some rejoiced. Never before had a politician or ruler in the country been loved and hated as much as he. Eleven years after his death crowds still shout "Jiye Bhutto" (Long live Bhutto) while others loathe and fear his legacy. At a recent seminar, called to commemorate the tenth anniversary of his death, his widow, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, remarked that neither in life nor in death had he been an ordinary man. That is true. I have written of him not simply because he was an unusual man but because his leadership and rule were fraught with momentous consequences for politics in Pakistan.

This book is *not* a biography of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Nor is it my purpose to establish that he was, or that he was not, a "great man." I examine his political ideas, style, and practice in the expectation that as we understand his politics we will improve our understanding of Pakistan as a polity. I have stopped at his ouster on July 5, 1977 because his career as a leader and ruler ended on that day. His subsequent imprisonment and trial are fit subjects for other books which persons better qualified for the undertaking will undoubtedly write.

This book is based partly on published materials, including Mr Bhutto's own writings, and partly on my interviews with him and with politicians both in his party and in the opposition. I saw the late prime minister twice in December 1973 and twice in August 1974. In the first of these meetings I explained to him that I hoped to write a scholarly account of his politics, not a "commissioned" book. He smiled, and said to me: "It must be an honest book, if it is to be a good book." I am happy to be able to say that he was frank and forthcoming beyond my expectation each time I talked with him. The same was true of most other politicians I met. I recall with particular satisfaction the extended interviews I had with Dr Mubashir Hasan and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan in the spring of 1980. Each, in his

own way, is a "gentleman of the old school." They were both gracious and exceedingly kind to me. I interviewed dozens of other politicians in 1973, 1974, 1976, 1980, 1986, and 1989. But I remember my meetings with Abdul Wali Khan and the late Maulana Mufti Mahmood with an especially good feeling, for their civility, modesty, and candor touched me greatly at the time.

Prime Minister Bhutto was kind enough to let me see some of the files in his secretariat. These contained the memoranda (called "directives") that he sent out to ministers, provincial governors and chief ministers, civil servants, and party functionaries from time to time. I spent several days reading these files and took detailed notes. References to Mr Bhutto's memoranda in the following text are based on these notes.

I have been thinking about Mr Bhutto for some twenty years and, during this time, I have discussed his politics with countless persons in Pakistan and here in the United States. There is one man with whom I rarely, if ever, talked on the subject and, yet, this book could not have been written without his help. He is my old friend, Major General Imtiaz Ali, who served as Prime Minister Bhutto's military secretary between 1973 and 1977. He is the one who persuaded Mr Bhutto to let me interview him, observe a cabinet meeting, and read his files. He understood that I would write the book as and when the spirit might move me, and he never attempted to influence its direction. For all of this I am forever in his debt.

Discussing Mr Bhutto with others has not always been easy. His admirers, and his detractors, have not only pressed their views upon me with a passion, they have expected me to agree with them. This I have not been able to do, and I imagine both sides will be displeased with my interpretations. I should like to recall to them a line from Asadullah Khan Ghalib (a celebrity in Urdu poetry), which says: "hum sukhan fehm hain, Ghalib ke tarafdar nahin" (understanders of poetry [in our case, the craft of politics] we are, but partisans of Ghalib we are not).

I should now like to acknowledge my debts. Hafeez Malik, Simon Winder, Craig Baxter, Rukun Advani, Izazul Haque, and my brother, Ikram Hussain, read the entire manuscript and I am grateful to them for their encouragement and counsel. Howard Wiarda, M. J. Peterson, Nigar Khan, Mansoor Hussain, Najam Wasty, Altaf and Nasim Khan, and my old friend, A. K.

Durrani read parts of it and I want to thank them for their astute and helpful comments. But I alone am responsible for any defects the book has even after their efforts to save me from error.

My sons, Sameer and Amir, were most comforting while I was embarked upon this work. They asked about its progress, worried that I might be working "too hard," and relieved me of my "chores" at home such as mowing the half-acre of grass around our house and trimming the bushes (of which I always thought we had too many). My daughter, Sarah, called every week to express the same kind of interest and concerns. I am grateful to all of them and hope they go from strength to strength as they move ahead in their lives.

Linda Chatfield typed the bulk of the manuscript, more than once, with competence and good humor. She has a marvelous sense of the niceties of the English language which she applied to my material, here and there, as she typed it, and I am much beholden to her.

Amherst, Massachusetts ANWAR H. SYED

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Parts of my article, "Z. A. Bhutto's Self-Characterizations and Pakistani Political Culture," which appeared in *Asian Survey,* vol. XVIII, no. 12 (December 1978) are included with the permission of the Regents of the University of California.

A.H.S.

A Note on Transliteration

Most names of persons and organizations in this book come from Arabic or Farsi (Persian), but they have undergone some change of pronunciation in their Pakistani usage. Different English spellings of the same name are in vogue. I have therefore made no effort to be a "purist" and have retained the spellings I have been using in my writing on Pakistan over the past twenty or more years.

List of Abbreviations

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICS	Indian Civil Service
JI	Jamat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat-al-Ulema-e-Islam
JUP	Jamiat-al-Ulema-e-Pakistan
MNA	Member of the National Assembly
NAP	National Awami Party
NEFA	North Eastern Frontier Agency
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
PDP	Pakistan Democratic Party
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNP	Pakistan National Party
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
QML	Qayyum Muslim League
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UDF	United Democratic Front

1 Perspectives on Leadership and Political Culture

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was an intellectual, a mass leader, and a ruler. He was a complex man, and it would not be wrong to say that his mind was a battleground of conflicting impulses and commitments. He was a feudal lord who condemned his class but could not quite discard its ethos. He praised democracy but, in his practice of statecraft, he appeared to favor a mass-based autocracy. His speech and acts flowed partly from his own volition and preferences, but they were also his responses to the attitudes and values of those with whom he dealt and of the people he served. We cannot assess his public service without some understanding of leadership as a function. We must also inquire into the sources of his style of leadership and rule and ask to what extent the relevant groups in Pakistan liked or disapproved of that style. These are the tasks to which we address ourselves below.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

A massive study on the subject, published some ten years ago, opens with the rather sobering statement that "leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth."[1] The author, James MacGregor Burns, notes that while biographies of rulers and leaders abound in libraries, we do not know very much about leadership.

Leaders may be rulers, but not all rulers, holders and wielders of power are leaders. Hitler, once in power, was a tyrant; he was no leader. Bhutto was both a leader and a ruler. No man or woman is a leader unless he or she has followers. Leadership and followership go together. Leaders may have their own purposes such as a quest for power and the accoutrements that come with it. But, to be successful, they must also adopt the

purposes of those whom they would have as followers. Their effectiveness is to be measured by the satisfaction of human needs and aspirations they bring about.

Burns proposes two categories in which to place leaders, and these appear to be useful. There are, first, "transactional" leaders who propose a bargain to prospective supporters: a set of private or public goods – jobs, schools, clinics – in return for votes. The exchange may be repeated periodically, let us say, at successive elections and may acquire a measure of durability. But it is not the transactional leader's function to tell his constituents what they *should* want. The relationship between him and them remains limited and essentially transient. Once the two sides have delivered the promised goods, they may go their separate ways. The values involved in evaluating transactional leadership are "modal," relating to means. These are honesty, openness, respect for the dignity of others, fairness, and honoring of commitments.[2] They are operative on the basis of reciprocity: if votes are not delivered, schools, clinics, and jobs would not be forthcoming.

Then there is transformational leadership. The transforming leader considers not only the actually felt but also the potential needs and aspirations of his followers. He teaches them new aspirations and values which may be political, psychological, and moral as well as economic. He elevates his followers to a higher level of aspiration and engages them more fully.[3] Thus he exercises moral leadership; thus he brings about social change. Leaders and followers have shared goals, and they mobilize resources to achieve them. Values appropriate to transactional leadership, noted above, are relevant to transforming leadership also. But in addition the latter is concerned with "end values," such as equality, liberty, and justice.

Leadership functions in a context of conflict or competition. Rival groups and values are in contestation. A tyrant, exercising naked power, may outlaw competition. But leadership is not the exercise of naked power. A tyrant may regard and treat persons as things but a leader cannot do so. Leadership is not simply manipulation or even salesmanship. Leaders and followers are engaged in a common enterprise. They influence each other. The leader may change his followers, but he may also have to revise his own program in response to his

followers' preferences. Their perceptions, expectations, customs, styles, and values – in short, their political culture – supply the framework within which he must function. This framework may not be rigidly set. Indeed, as we have said above, it is the leader's role as a change-maker to modify it. But even as it undergoes gradual change, it is present and operative as a bill of guidance and constraint that the leader will ignore only to his detriment. Thus, even if a general theory of leadership is possible, we cannot ignore the particularities of time and place in discussions of specific leaders. Indeed, as Burns has noted, leaders must often contend with the "situationist ethics" of specific groups and localities. What outsiders may see as parochialism or even as perversity may actually be nothing other than local tradition, morality, and structure. It takes much skill and perseverance on the part of leaders to draw followers out of these narrow concerns and to place them on the ground of "higher purpose and principle."[4] In any case, leaders and followers interact in the context of a political culture. A national leader who has to respond to diverse groups and classes across his country may have to take account of several political cultures in addition to the one which may have influenced his own perceptions, style, and values the most.

Bhutto was both a transactional and a transforming leader. His success may be assessed by the well-being he was able to bring to his followers who were, for the most part, the poor and the downtrodden of Pakistan. But his fall from power cannot be said to have resulted merely from an insufficiency of performance in this regard. Constituents do normally expect a certain shortfall in the actual delivery of goods relative to that which had been promised during an election campaign. Bhutto's followers would have been willing to give him more time. His failure is also to be viewed with reference to how much he honored, or violated, the modal and end values which Pakistanis, especially the middle classes, associate with acceptable political leadership. Considering that several political cultures are involved, that they make different, sometimes conflicting, demands upon leaders, it is probable that the salience of one of them over others at critical junctures had a substantial bearing upon Bhutto's fortunes.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was not a politician who responded passively to his environment. He was a wilful man with firm political

attitudes and preferences. He was also a complex man. He was well-read in Western social science, humanities, and the law. Within the Western tradition he admired the style and work of certain political actors – Napoleon, Bismarck, Metternich – more than those of others. He came from a family of great Sindhi *waderas* (landlords) and partook of their values and behavior patterns even though he disowned them in his public speech and may have striven to rise above them.

Bhutto was a charismatic leader. Charisma comes and goes, depending upon the leader's performance in response to the political culture within which he is operating. Charismatic leaders confront a peculiar dilemma. They hope their mission will outlive them, and so they build institutions that may carry on their work after they are gone. But while they have power, command the following of huge crowds, see themselves as agents of destiny, they want to act as they deem fit. Institutions, by their very nature, function as systems of constraint upon the ruler who would act outside the established law and procedure. The charismatic leader does not, therefore, want to allow the institutions he has built or inherited to gather strength enough to restrain him.[5] This internal conflict of inclinations will also have a part in accounting for some of Bhutto's more notable failings.

In preparing a conceptual framework for evaluating Bhutto's roles as a leader and as a ruler, beyond the general observations made above, it is necessary to identify the relevant specifics of Pakistani political cultures. In addition, and as far as possible, we must take note of Bhutto's own thinking and predilections. Some of his thinking is on record and available to those who would study it. Then there is his unpublished thinking which we hope to reach through deduction and speculation.

LEADERSHIP IN PAKISTANI POLITICAL CULTURE

A political culture will most likely offer images of the ideal leader and those of the leader in real life. Leaders plan their deviance from the ideal according to their estimates of the limit of their constituents' tolerance. One may say that Bhutto fell from power in 1977 because some Pakistanis thought he had

gone too far away from the ideal. Those who still cherish him do not regard his deviance as especially significant or blameworthy.

Pakistani political culture is a neglected subject in the social sciences, but politically relevant themes have figured in Pakistani poetry, fiction, and plays with increasing frequency. Political leadership is a favorite target in satire.[6] In the poetry of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), the celebrated poet-philosopher of Pakistan, we see numerous references to the leadership provided by Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, and the four "pious" caliphs who succeeded him. Muslims regard them as ideal leaders but, at the same time, assume that ordinary mortals cannot reach their level of excellence. At a more earthy level there is the example of M. A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, the "Quaid-e-Azam." Pakistanis regard him as an exemplary leader, above and beyond serious criticism. Politicians should strive to follow his example, and they may be judged on the basis of how well their qualities correspond to his. The following qualities are generally attributed to him:

> handsome, elegant, eloquent, successful, wealthy, shrewd, prudent, frugal; hard-working and persevering; tough, grave, disciplined, orderly; competent organizer, skilful negotiator, able tactician, master of detail; unafraid, proud, assertive, wilful; unselfish, honest, incorruptible; rational, logical, modernist, constitutionalist; tolerant of honest criticism, democratic, covenant-keeper; dedicated to his people's welfare; servant of Islam.[7]

Jinnah was worldly but admittedly unusual; his model is attainable, but not easily. No Pakistani politician after him has been acknowledged as his peer. Most politicians are considered more or less wicked. In one of his poems Iqbal offered a portrayal of the more common political leader of his day which may be useful to note here. This leader is not regular in prayer and fasting, appears in the mosque only on religious holidays, pretends to have been moved by the priest's sermon, wishes to be in London but talks of Mecca, tells lies and deceives when expedient, assumes a posture of humility but covets high office, claims to be a servant of Islam while actually serving British interests in India, takes ambivalent positions on issues of public

policy, pays newspapers to praise him, and has a way with words.[8]

In Iqbal's time politicians were devious and self-serving, but their reputation was to fall much lower in post-independence Pakistan. We turn to Majid Lahori (1916–57), a popular political satirist, for a characterization of the generality of Pakistani politicians. The typical leader emerging from his pages has the following attributes:

> he is lusty of office and power; makes lavish but false promises to get votes; wins elections by employing gangsters to intimidate opponents and by tampering with the ballot box; talks of democracy but wishes to be a monarch; misuses power to get industrial units and real estate allotted to himself and his relatives; resorts to factional intrigue and will disrupt the nation, instead of uniting it, if that suits his interest; is incompetent, often a middle school dropout; drinks liquor, watches belly dancing, indulges in womanizing, and yet insists that both Islam and the country will be ruined if he is not elected to high office.[9]

POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE PAKISTANI LANDLORDS

Majid Lahori's picture of Pakistani politicians contains an element of poetic exaggeration, but it is not a caricature. How did his political leader become what he was and still is? Many politicians in Pakistan are zamindars (landlords), known as *waderas* in Sind. They carry their traditional lifestyles, including their ways of dealing with adversaries and unyielding subordinates, to political office. Since they dominate legislatures and the major political parties, their political culture is a given of Pakistani politics with which even those who are not landowners must come to terms. Bhutto grew up in a feudal social and political environment. His father, Sir Shahnawaz, was a "feudal baron" who accepted the values of his class. Politicians, all of them *waderas,* frequented the Bhutto home and Zulfikar Ali heard and watched them talk and play politics in his father's drawing-room. In these formative years he developed an attachment to the land and understood its traditions.[10]

What were these traditions? Bhutto himself has left a brief statement on the subject which deserves to be noted. Speaking in the National Assembly of Pakistan on July 10, 1962, he observed:

> we suffered and continue to suffer from [the] petty-mindedness of feudal rivalry in our province. I too am a part of that society. Perhaps one reason why I am here today as a minister is that I belong to this privileged class . . . But, Sir, in spite of the advantages that some of us have derived from the system, in spite of the fact that some of us would fight to see it remain, it has many inherent drawbacks. It leads to petty intrigues, it leads to victimization of the people, it leads to callousness towards poverty, and it leads to lethargy. So when feudal rivals clashed with each other the people remained exactly where they were. There was no development, no factories, no roads, no communication; absolute darkness and miserable poverty prevailed. Only the great ones, the chosen few, prospered. What issues were such arrogant lords going to take to their chattel – the downtrodden people?[11]

Intrigue and infighting, oppression of the people, absence of a work ethic, indifference toward the poor, lack of interest in improvement, social and economic inertia – these, in Bhutto's perception, were the characteristics of his class.

For an even more forceful description we go to M. Masud's well-known minute of dissent to the Hari Committee Report of 1948. Masud, who served as a district officer in Sind for several years, tells us that the zamindar has lived a life of leisure for generations. Working for a living is beneath his station. When he wants to be active, he hunts, and he maintains large portions of his land as hunting preserves. Masud notes that the typical Sindhi zamindar has many servants, fine horses, and a large supply of weapons. He is fond of "pomp and show," keeps expensive cars, goes after women, drinks excessively, and entertains lavishly. He replenishes his dwindling purse by swindling his *haris* (tenants) and by protecting and patronizing robbers and cattle-lifters. He bribes civil and police officials who reciprocate his attention by overlooking his atrocities. He makes a show of his high living, official connections, and command of gangsters to overawe other zamindars. His prestige and feudal honor are at stake in his rivalries with them.

> He has . . . to maintain his prestige among his retinue and the haris who would lose faith in him if they were to know that he was weaker than his rivals. He must, therefore, keep a reputation for *zulm* [cruelty] and *zabardasti* [high-handedness] by spreading awe all around . . . When a show of power is to be made he sends out a few of his thieves to steal cattle of the rival party . . . [or to] fire a few gun shots to terrify them.[12]

The landlord in the Punjab, which was the bastion of Bhutto's political power, may be somewhat less profligate and his tenant slightly less miserable and servile. But these are small differences of degree. Masud's characterizations are substantially correct and relevant for both Sind and the Punjab.

The ancestors of today's great landlords acquired land, in the first instance, by seizing it from its original occupants or by receiving it as a grant from conquerors and kings.[13] In return they paid tribute and revenue to the king and, when required, provided fighting men and supplies in aid of his military expeditions. The king was the sovereign, the landlord his vassal. This sovereign–vassal, or patron–client, relationship still holds. The government's policies can make landlords as a class more or less prosperous. Its agents can enlarge or limit, within the law or outside it, the individual landlord's access to irrigation water, credit, arms licenses, appointive or elective office. They may side with him or against him in his disputes with other landlords. Above all, they may open or close his access to themselves. His power and prestige will diminish if it becomes known that he no longer has the ear of the civil and police officials in his area.

Landlords are conscious of a hierarchical order among themselves and in relation to other groups and classes connected with land. They will be dominant or acquiescent, depending upon how great a landlord a person is as compared to others. From small landowners, tenants, laborers, and artisans in the village they expect subservience. They make factions, play factional politics, and wage factional conflict that may go on for generations. Faction leaders gather support from their kinsmen and economic dependents, make alliances with other factions, and try to recruit the small independent farmers in their area. A job to a small landowner's brother or son may be used as

leverage to put pressure on him. But if gentle persuasion will not do, harsh measures, similar to those Masud described, may be used.[14]

Resort to force and violence in the pursuit of power and dominance is a part of the landlord's tradition. Many of the groups now known as castes were once tribes that clashed with one another frequently.[15] Within the tribe or the clan itself violence against actual or potential rivals used to be common and murder of close relatives was not unknown. Landlords, by the same token, are in awe of superior force and contemptuous of its lack.[16] In factional conflict they will not only make alliances but seek the patronage of a higher authority, the overlord of all factions, be it the king or, closer to our own time, the men who control the central and provincial governments. But their alliances and allegiance are transient, shifting from one overlord to another as their power and authority appear to be ascendant or declining.

Landlords view politics as a way of receiving favors in exchange for offerings of allegiance to the government and tribute to its officers.[17] They are sensitive to their immediate interests as they perceive them, but they are not disposed to concern themselves with the larger issues of public policy. They have contested the election because it is a new and approved way of conducting factional conflict. They have won and humbled their rivals. Their dominance in their area has been confirmed through a modern agency. They have become part of the governmental system and thus obtained a new standing from which to demand advantages for themselves and their preferred constituents.[18]

The dispositions we attribute to landlords may not be characteristic of every member of that class in full and equal measure. A Bhutto or a Daultana (a former chief minister of the Punjab) may have been liberated from them as a result of higher education and contact with other cultures, classes, and vocations. But this liberation, if it has taken place, is probably more philosophical than functional, for this liberated person, if he holds high political office, must interact with fellow landlords who remain traditional. His transactions with them will fail if he speaks and acts as if he were a stranger to their perspectives and values.

THE POOR AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES

It is generally thought that the poor of Pakistan gave Zulfikar Ali Bhutto a great victory in the 1970 election, and that they still honor him. It is also said that his rule alienated large segments of the middle class which then supported a mass movement against him in the spring of 1977. There is little specifically relevant sociological literature to which we can turn for an account of the political culture of the middle and lower classes in Pakistan. The observations that follow are based largely on personal knowledge and partly on writing in the field of political development.

Who are the "poor," the lower class, in Pakistan? They should reasonably include landless peasants, tenants, small peasant proprietors, and some of the village artisans and tradesmen. In urban areas they should include unskilled manual workers, sidewalk vendors, rickshaw drivers, domestic servants, sweepers and trash collectors, and the first three or four of the lowest grades in government service and their counterparts in private employment. Most of these folks are illiterate or semi-literate. They live in infirm dwellings, cannot afford enough of nutritious food, have low media exposure, and do not have easy access to civic amenities such as potable water, transportation, education, and health care.

The peasant in Pakistan, as elsewhere in the third world, will endure his misery stoically for a time but, when his condition becomes unbearable, he may resort to violence – seize land and kill the landlord's agent or the tax collecter – especially when he is encouraged by an external force capable of challenging the local powers that oppress him. The slum-dweller in the city is also not averse to violence. But he and the peasant are both concerned with their specific and local grievances to the exclusion of larger issues of principle or policy.[19]

The poor in Pakistan look to the government as a provider and approve of its taking from the rich to give to the disadvantaged. If they perceive the ruler as friendly to their aspirations, they will not object to his violation of the civil rights of his adversaries or even to the use of violence against them. Nor would they be agitated if, on occasion, he acted outside the law or disregarded democratic procedure. Indeed, they are likely to be disheartened if they find that their leader cannot, or will

not, suppress his foes. They take religion in stride in their own fulfillment of its requirements and in assessing their leader's performance.

The urban middle class in the third world, says Samuel P. Huntington, is the locus of opposition to the government. The intellectuals within it, and among them the students, are the most strident and likely to approve of violence. As the middle class becomes larger and more diverse, it will include conservative elements, notably merchants and civil servants.[20] It does not manifest a coherent class consciousness or a community of political values. Its members in Pakistan stand at varying degrees to the left or right of the political spectrum. The leftists are generally secular-minded; the rightists take religion more seriously and will support talk of Islamizing the Pakistani society and polity. They are likely to be disapproving of a leader who is thought, or known, to violate Islamic ethic, especially the injunctions relating to "wine, women, and dice."

Middle-class individuals may be personally corrupt – take and give bribes, engage in nepotism, speak falsehoods, break covenants, evade taxes – but they denounce corruption on principle and object to its presence in a leader.[21] The rightists, more than the leftists, favor order and tranquility, and they want democracy if it will not be unruly. The merchants may, on occasion, finance a revolt against an oppressive ruler, but normally they hate strikes, protest marches, demonstrations, and riots because these are all bad for business. If democracy could not remain orderly and quiet, they would rather not have it. They prospered during General Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship (1977-88) and many of them miss him.[22]

The middle class in developing countries is concerned mostly with the enhancement of its own security and economic opportunity. It does not take an interest in the needs of the peasant or the slum-dweller. Indeed, it is scared and, at the same time, contemptuous of them. The politician's talk of welfare programs and income equalization measures, likely to increase inflation and taxes, worries civil servants, merchants, and entrepreneurs.[23]

In a recent interview with a cloth merchant in Lahore (who had been president of the Anarkali Bazar Merchants' Association for over ten years), I asked him why he and many other merchants had not supported the PPP in the general election of November 1988. He asserted that the PPP was a party of the

riffraff.[24] I asked if by that he meant the poor and, of course, he said no. But I suspect that he did indeed think of the poor as riffraff. The poor were thought to be good and simple folks as long as they were meek, knew their place, showed deference to the upper castes and classes, and served their employers and superiors beyond the call of contractual or sanctioned obligation. Bhutto gave them self-respect and a disposition to self-assertion. As a result, they would no longer take abuse or do chores and errands free of charge; they demanded higher wages, rest periods and holidays. They came out on the streets, shouted slogans, sang and danced. They were loud. In the eyes of the middle class they had become boisterous riffraff.

MODELS OF RULERSHIP

In a letter to his daughter, Benazir, Bhutto advised her to read of Napoleon Bonaparte (whom he described as the "most complete man of modern history") and Bismarck among others. In his own last testament he wrote that from Napoleon he had "imbibed the politics of power."[25] Salman Taseer tells us that Metternich and Talleyrand were also his favorites.[26] These four men – Napoleon Bonaparte, Charles Talleyrand, Prince Clement Metternich, and Otto von Bismarck – were not all of the same mold, yet their politics bore many similarities.[27] Three of them were landed aristocrats; Napoleon's family was impoverished but noble. All were supremely self-confident; Napoleon and Metternich were unsurpassed egotists. They were adroit, skillful, and calculating politicians and diplomatists. They were "realists" in their approach to politics, believing in the primacy of power. They regarded secrecy, deviousness, intrigue, opportunism, shifting alliances, flexibility in the choice of means, and manipulation of persons and events as tools of statecraft which a statesman need not deny himself in serving his king or country.

All of them favored autocratic rule; Napoleon, however, wanted to be and actually was a popular autocrat. He was an empire builder, Bismarck a unifier of Germany. *Both were great centralizers.* Napoleon concentrated in his own hands vast powers of appointment in all spheres, extending down to prefects in the departments and mayors of municipalities. With the

exception of Talleyrand, they all fell from power under foreign or domestic pressure.

An additional word or two should perhaps be said about Napoleon, from whom Bhutto learned the "politics of power." The emperor was exceedingly well-read in geography, history, and the art of warfare. He was ambitious, and even as a brigadier he felt that one day he would be the master of France. It was said of him that he would "never stop short of mounting either the scaffold or the throne. For a person of his genius and daring a commonplace destiny was unthinkable."[28] Napoleon wished to be an absolute ruler. But he made a show of deference to the democratic idea by submitting a constitution which he himself had dictated, and later another which designated him Emperor for Life, to a popular plebiscite. "My policy," he once observed, "is to govern in accordance with the wishes of the great majority. That, I believe, is the way to recognize the sovereignty of the people."[29]

But Napoleon denied his people liberty on the reasoning that they knew "nothing about it." He condemned the eighteenth-century philosophers because they had "corrupted" public opinion by inspiring thought among people who had been innocent of it before. He shut down newspapers, journals, publishing houses, and theaters, imposed strict censorship on those which remained, and persecuted men of letters. He employed hundreds of secret police who watched political suspects and imprisoned them without trial. According to one estimate, as many as 2500 political prisoners languished in French jails in 1814. The emperor was not incapable of fabricating plots against himself or the state to entrap potential rivals whom he then liquidated after crooked or perfunctory trials.[30]

There were other men Bhutto admired and of whom Benazir was to read, namely, Lenin, Kemal Ataturk, and Mao Zedong. We know that, closer to his own generation, he was favorably impressed with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. Some of these politicians were great revolutionaries; all of them were nation-makers and builders of new political systems. They did not belong to the same civilization and, as we might expect, their basic political premises, outlooks, and styles differed. In one critical respect they were similar: they were all popular autocrats. This fact might lead one to think that popular autocracy – as distin-

guished, let us say, from a military dictatorship – was perhaps the most suitable for the developing world of Asia and Africa. But then there was a political giant on the Asian scene – Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India for 17 years – who was thought to be a democrat. It seems that Bhutto admired Nehru also, even if grudgingly. He has left a fascinating interpretation of Nehru's leadership and politics which we present below.

BHUTTO ON NEHRU

As Bhutto saw him, Nehru was a man of many parts or, as he put it, a "mass of contradictions."[31] Well-read in history, a patron of the arts, he was a "peerless knight" among India's intellectuals. A liberal by background and education, emotionally a socialist, he despised bourgeois values but let capitalism flourish alongside a public sector in the Indian economy. The young people saw the vitality of their own age in him. Liberals regarded him as their leader, conservatives viewed him as a link between tradition and modernity, and the visitor from Europe or America thought of him as a bridge between East and West.

Bhutto wrote that foreign policy was Nehru's forte, and here he excelled "to the point of dangerous perfection." He was subtle, ingenious, novel, and aggressive. He claimed to base his policies on intellectual and ethical foundations, but actually he was amoral. His knowledge of history had taught him that international communism, like all revolutionary ideologies, must eventually mellow, and it need not therefore be feared. Thus he approached the Soviet Union without inhibition. He produced the idea of non-alignment for Asia and Africa which made him a world leader, gave his people self-respect and national pride, and enabled him to receive aid from both sides in the cold war. But Nehru was vain. He failed to settle India's disputes with its neighbors, including China, and he estranged Indonesia. He hated Pakistan.

At home Nehru was a masterful politician. A charismatic leader, he traveled throughout India to keep contact with the people who flocked to him, loved and even worshiped him. From the adoration and trust they gave him he drew his strength and exercised "compulsive power" over them. "At his best, he

could make them believe anything." He claimed to be secular-minded but, in the name of the Hindu majority's democratic right to prevail he suppressed Muslim rights and interests in India. His professions of democratic faith, like his secularism, were more apparent than real.

Contemptuous of lesser men, armed with the immense power he derived from his people, Nehru reigned supreme in India. He overawed the higher bureaucracy, men of the old Indian Civil Service, with his own Western skills and knowledge, cut them down to size, exercised "royal control" over them, and compelled them to change their mentality. He strengthened the Congress Party and made it into his own instrument. He led his people to the polls in a series of elaborate elections. He let smaller opposition parties function, allowed the intellectual to criticize government policy and the press to print freely, knowing that he stood tall above them. But all of this, according to Bhutto, meant only that Nehru had given India an impressive facade of democracy without vitalizing the "tissues of its substance." He ruled the Congress Party and the country by personal fiat. He dismissed popularly elected provincial governments that would not obey him, and he wiped out opponents who might become capable of posing an effective challenge to his authority. He manipulated rival political forces so that he could keep the reins of final authority in his own hands. He was more of a dictator than a democrat. He too, like the others Bhutto admired, was after all a popular autocrat.

INTERPRETATION

What is the significance of these models of leadership and rulership for our study of Bhutto's politics? It should first be noted that the political cultures referred to above create a dilemma for anyone wishing to be a national – not merely sectional – leader in Pakistan. Notwithstanding its own corruptions, the middle class applauds Jinnah's model of leadership and denounces the landlord's operational style. It is not numerous enough to win elections, but it is resourceful enough to destabilize a government by spreading disaffection against it in the urban centers. The landlords who win elections, for the

most part, cannot govern without the acquiescence of the middle class. Elections cannot be won without the support of the poor and, yet, their aspirations and behavior are resented by both the landlords and the middle class. A national leader, thus, needs the support, or at least the tolerance, of several distinct groups that hold one another in low esteem. His task is by no means easy.

A word now about the preference for autocratic rule in the models of rulership considered above. That Napoleon and Bismarck were autocrats would seem to have little force as an example to be followed in Pakistan. These men functioned in Europe more than a hundred years ago. Times, it may be said, have changed. Lenin and Mao founded and ruled socialist states and their operational styles would also not constitute appropriate models for Pakistani leaders. Sukarno, Nasser, and Qaddafi were popular autocrats ruling in third world Muslim states. Would their conduct qualify as a model? No, because Pakistan, as part of the Indian subcontinent, had received much greater exposure to democratic ideas and practice than any of these other countries did. It would then be retrogressive for Pakistan to follow the Indonesian or the Egyptian example, let alone the Libyan. But what about India itself? If democracy in India could be seen as superficial and Nehru, deep down, as no more than a popular autocrat, mass-based autocracy as a political model might acquire respectability.

As Bhutto studied Napoleon, many of the latter's attributes and attitudes would strike him as similar to his own. But a public endorsement of the Napoleonic model would be considered preposterous and alarming in Pakistan. As Bhutto studied Nehru, he would again see similarities between himself and the Indian prime minister. Both were well-born. They had attended good Western schools, read history, and thought of themselves as intellectuals. Socialists in a manner of speaking, they had little respect for bourgeois values. Both excelled in the knowledge and expertise of foreign affairs. Eloquent and charismatic, both commanded large popular followings. Each stood taller than his colleagues and rivals. If it was acceptable in Nehru to be a popular autocrat, would it be wrong for Bhutto to be one? If popular autocracy could work in India, with reference to whose affairs Pakistanis often justified their own, would it not do for Pakistan?

THINKING ALOUD ON MAJOR ISSUES

We hope to open windows on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's political thinking as we proceed. But his portrayal of a good leader in Pakistan, statements on two perennial issues, namely regional autonomy and democracy, and a theory of small state behavior in international politics are on record and should be noted at this point. Bhutto attributed certain qualities to himself during his mass mobilization campaign between 1966 and 1970. He must have assumed that these attributions would meet with popular approval. They may then be said to reflect his own reading of the Pakistani political culture with regard to leadership. He claimed to be cool, deliberate, discreet, and competent; honest, upright, keeper of his covenants, and principled; friend to the poor, man of the people, egalitarian; brave, ready to face death in the service of Pakistan; a good Muslim; and a preserver of Pakistani nationhood and the state against India's aggressive and expansionist pressures.[32] It will be noticed that these qualities correspond well with those mentioned above as desirable in a Pakistani leader.

Bhutto made a significant contribution to Pakistan's intellectual life by popularizing the idea of Islamic socialism to which the nation's founding fathers had referred on occasion, and we shall discuss it later. The quest for regional autonomy, rejection of a "strong center," and restoration of democracy have been persistent themes in the political opposition's discourse. When he was not in power, Bhutto identified with these quests and argued that they were essential to the promotion and preservation of national unity and integrity.

In 1954, Bhutto published a scholarly essay opposing the integration of the four West Pakistan provinces into a single political unit. He observed that federalism called for dividing sovereignty and political power "between the central and local governments so that each of them within its own sphere is independent of the other." While acknowledging that federalism may be a stage in the march toward a unitary government, he contended that "an attempt to artificially hasten the process of centralization imperils forever the prospects of homogeneity." He approvingly quoted Stalin's observation that "no unification of peoples into a single state can be firm unless these people themselves voluntarily so decide." With reference to

Pakistan, he recalled Jinnah's commitment to preserve the equality and autonomy of the country's component units. He invoked Islam in behalf of regional autonomy in a federal system, saying that "Islam would not sanction the leveling of cultures by coercion," and that "the synthesis of Islamic culture has been essentially a federal process."[33]

In Bhutto's view, only federalism could hold the culturally diverse people of West Pakistan together in a larger unity. Integrating them into a single province would perpetuate provincialism and "augment disintegration." Eventually, after a cultural synthesis had come about, and only then, federalism might give way to a unitary state. His own province, Sind, had joined the struggle for Pakistan in the expectation that it would be an equal partner of the other provinces in the new state. Its goal remained an "equitable distribution of political power" among the federating units.[34] Analyzing the developments that had brought on the civil war in 1971, Bhutto again turned to the subject of dividing power between the center and the provinces. The failure of the previous regimes to establish a genuinely federal system, he said, had been one of the two main causes of disruption; "cold-blooded" exploitation of the people being the other.

> The tragedy of Pakistan lies in the fact that . . . [it] has been . . . a federation in name only . . . The spirit of federalism and the rules of co-existence were sacrificed at the altar of ambition. In the name of a "strong center" the powers of the provinces were weakened to the point of being extinguished.[35]

Arousing public passion against Ayub Khan, who had been a military dictator and then an unpopular autocrat, it was but natural that Bhutto should have raised the banner of democracy as other politicians in the opposition were also doing. Without democracy, he said, Pakistan would not have come into being and without it the country could not be preserved. Pakistanis would not unite unless they saw that they had a stake in uniting, unless they received the assurance that their self-respect would be restored and their individual liberties protected. Bhutto emphasized that democratic rights and freedoms were essential to national cohesion and warned that if the people were not made "partners in power," they would fall under the influence

of alien agents working to break up Pakistan. He defended civil liberties and asserted the dissident's right to oppose the government of the day. Challenging his own imprisonment under a preventive detention law, he presented a glowing defense of democratic rights before the Lahore High Court in February 1969:

> Yes, My Lords, democracy is certainly . . . like a breath of fresh air, like the fragrance of a spring flower. It is a melody of liberty, richer in sensation than a tangible touch. But more than a feeling, democracy is fundamental rights, it is adult franchise, the secrecy of the ballot, free press, free association, independence of the judiciary, supremacy of the legislature, controls on the executive and other related conditions which are conspicuously absent in the [present] regime's system.[36]

BILATERALISM: THE SMALL STATE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

While international politics are dominated by calculations of the coercive capabilities and self-interest of nations, the options of a relatively small state, such as Pakistan, contending with the hostility of a much larger neighbor and the cross-pressures of mutually antagonistic global powers, tend to be narrowly circumscribed. A theory of Pakistani foreign policy would have to be a theory of small state behavior. Such a state may be defined as one which recognizes, as do others, that it cannot safeguard its security "primarily by the use of its own capabilities, and it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so."[37]

Historically, small states have played the game of power politics as best they could.[38] When a balance of power prevailed, great powers were reluctant to molest a small state enjoying the protection of another great power for fear of generating a larger conflict. But when the great powers acted in concert and made decisions affecting a small state, the latter had to comply. It has been recognized at least since the time of Machiavelli that alliances between small states and great powers can be dangerous to the former and irksome to the latter. The small state wants to be protected from all threats to its security. Its

ally, the great power, is unwilling to make such a wide-ranging commitment. The small state worries about the balance of power in its own neighborhood; the great power, having global interests, is concerned with the balance of a much larger international system to whose preservation the security interests of its small ally may, at times, become irrelevant. They may even have to be sacrificed. There is also the danger that the alliance may turn the small state into a satellite of the great power without alleviating its insecurity.

This was the context in which Bhutto had to function as Pakistan's foreign minister. He did not like it and wrote what may be called a prescriptive theory of small state behavior. His book, *The Myth of Independence,* and a pamphlet called *Bilateralism* are addressed to the problem of how a small state may preserve its independence and protect its interests in the face of a global power's pressures.

In the unequal relationship between a global power and a small state, wrote Bhutto, the former is often able to impose its will upon the latter and exact one-sided concessions. Guided by its own national interests, it is unreceptive to the small state's pleas of justice or reminders of past services. Yet, a smaller state should not, as a matter of course, submit to a global power's dictation. It should attempt to isolate the area of conflict and propose that neither side call upon the other to change its position on disputed matters. If such "segregation" of conflicting interests has been effected, the global power and the small state may have mutually advantageous relations in areas where their interests are compatible.

An alliance between a great power and a small state, said Bhutto, does not entail "all-embracing categorical imperatives." It should not be deemed to require from the small state unlimited compliance with the great power's wishes. The goals of the alliance may lose some of their original relevance, and thus become less compelling, with the passage of time. For instance, inasmuch as the danger of war between the United States and the Soviet Union has receded, the Pakistan-American alliance should not be seen as precluding cooperative relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union on a selective basis. The alliance should focus on elements which have remained constant despite changes in the international environment, and obligations flowing from them should be honored. But in other areas each

side should be free to choose and act according to its own lights and interests.[39]

The small state should avoid conflict with a global power, but if the latter does not agree to the above model of bilateral relations, it is better to take a stand, to have "one sharp crisis," than to let a series of capitulations erode its independence. "Pressure is both a worm and a monster. It is a worm if you stamp on it, but it becomes a monster if you recoil."[40] The small state's chances of survival in such unequal confrontations will improve if its own resolve to resist pressure is supplemented by the support of other small nations in the third world and the support of those global and great powers with whom it does not have conflicts of interest. It is largely by the compulsion of these outside forces that the state concerned can bring about a change in the global power's attitude on the points of difference.[41]

Bhutto noted that the global powers were engaged in a struggle for hegemony in the world. The Sino-American confrontation, he hoped, would one day end. The Sino-Soviet rift, on the other hand, was a blessing in disguise for the third world. In its absence, the United States and the Soviet Union would have been inclined to divide the world into spheres of influence, offering China only a secondary role. Such a role China did not accept. Her insistence on equality of status with the United States and the Soviet Union acted as a brake on Soviet and American expansionism. This clash at the summit offered "opportunities, which small powers can ill afford to ignore, for the protection of their own vital interests and, indeed, sovereignty."[42]

In sum, a small state under pressure from a great or global power should handle its affairs adroitly; propose a limited cooperative relationship to the hostile power and thus dissuade it from being hostile; muster the support of other small states and sympathetic great and global powers to resist the hostile power if it persists in its policy of pressure; see and take such opportunities as the current conflict among the global powers themselves seems to offer; be more cordial with those who support its causes than with those who do not.

This is good advice to the extent that it can be followed in the actual conduct of affairs. But global powers, and others, having the requisite means of coercion, are often unwilling to isolate, *and thus abandon,* their interests and positions merely

because they conflict with those of another state. Bhutto was not unaware of this disposition on their part. "It would be idealistic to expect a great power to change its global objectives on the demand of a smaller state," he wrote, and added that "in the long run, a great power cannot be outwitted or outsmarted."[43] But for him it did not follow that a small state should simply obey the great power's dictates. It should maintain a "lively dialogue" with the great power on the differences between them and it may eventually obtain concessions to its point of view.

In his speech and writing Bhutto often stated that Pakistan's foreign policy must be based on principles. "If Pakistan's policies remain consistent and moral and are of a lofty tone and character, other states are bound to be influenced by such an attitude and behavior."[44] He knew that policies were based on interest, but he reasoned that when a vital national interest was not involved, or where the interest itself might be open to question, international issues should be judged on their merits. He identified the following criteria for determining merit: principles of international law, resolutions of the United Nations, treaty obligations, consistency of a government's present position with its previous declarations on the subject and the settled position of other governments on the same or similar issues, and willingness to have recourse to the peaceful methods of resolving disputes mentioned in the United Nations Charter.[45] Repeatedly Bhutto made the optimistic observation that "in the end" justice must, and does, prevail. Even when he called for an end to the protracted confrontation between Pakistan and India, he insisted that their disputes be resolved according to international law and morality, and that the two sides honor the commitments they had made.

This apparently moralistic position was not merely an expression of Bhutto's unyielding posture toward India. It accommodated the insight, well-known to political theorists, that resort to principles, and the implicit appeal to the conscience of mankind, can be of some supplemental use to small states in unequal confrontations. Indeed, there may be times when a small state has no other recourse.

These then are the positions Bhutto adopted in his public speech and writing. In the following chapters we will have the occasion to see how true to these principles and values he was

when he became Pakistan's ruler. The perspectives on leadership and culture set forth above would inform our interpretation of his political behavior.

NOTES

1. James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 426.
3. Ibid., pp. 4–5.
4. Ibid., p. 429.
5. See Jean C. Robinson, "Institutionalizing Charisma: Leadership, Faith and Rationality in Three Societies," *Polity,* Winter 1985, pp. 181–203.
6. In addition to the poetry of Majid Lahori, to which we refer below, that of Rais Amrohi is worthy of mention. See the two volumes of his *Qitaat* (Karachi: Akhbar-e-Jahan Publications, 1969).
7. These characterizations of Jinnah are taken from some of the papers presented during the grand centenary celebration of his birth in December 1976 at Islamabad. See especially H. V. Hodson, "Quaid-e-Azam and the British"; L. F. Rushbrook Williams, "The Evolution of the Quaid-e-Azam"; Noor Ahmad Husain, "Reminiscences of Quaid-e-Azam's Last Aide-de-Camp"; Z. H. Zaidi, "M. A. Jinnah – The Man"; Lawrence Ziring, "Jinnah: The Burden of Leadership" in Ahmad Hasan Dani, *World Scholars on Quaid-e-Azam* (Islamabad: Quaid-e-Azam University, 1979).
8. See "Nasihat" (Advice) in *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal* (Collected Works of Iqbal), Urdu (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1973), pp. 176-7.
9. Majid Lahori, *Kan-e-Nimak* (Salt Mine), Urdu (Karachi: Maktaba-e-Majid, 1958), pp. 26–34, 37–45 and *passim.*
10. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), pp. 11–22.
11. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Reshaping Foreign Policy: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1948-1966* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 173
12. M. Masud, *Hari Report: Note of Dissent* (Karachi: The Hari Publications, n.d.), pp. 9–14, quoted material on p. 11.
13. See A. R. Shibli, *Pakistan Ke Deh Khuda* (The Village Rulers of Pakistan), Urdu (Lahore: People's Publishers, 1973) for an account of how the major landlord families in the Punjab acquired land.
14. See Charles H. Kennedy, "Rural Groups and the Stability of the Zia Regime," in Craig Baxter (ed.), *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985), pp. 27-9, 40; Shahnaz J. Rouse, "Systematic Injustices and Inequalities: Maalik and Riaya," in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds), *Pakistan: The Unstable State* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1983), pp. 264–70; Saghir Ahmad, *Class and Power in a Punjabi Village* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp. 91–109; Asaf

Hussain, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan* (Folkestone, England: Dawson, 1979), pp. 47–52. For an account of Punjabi Muslim landlords before independence, see Malcolm L. Darling, *Rusticus Loquitur or the Old Light and the New in the Punjab Village* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), chs 7–11 (but for some of the points being made here, see pp. 186–7, 196, 227–8).

15. See A. R. Shibli, *Pakistan Ke Deh Khuda,* pp. 79–198. For Sind, see T. Postans, *Personal Observations on Sind* (London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longman, 1843), pp. 42–3 and *passim.*
16. See Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana, "Feudals Have Never Opposed the Government of the Day" in *Herald* (Karachi), January 1984, pp. 214–15. See also Abdullah Malik, "The Rulers and the Political Apparatus," *Outlook* (Karachi) June 1, 1974, pp. 9–11. Abdullah Malik is one of the more astute students of Pakistani politics and his observations in this article support much of what we have said above about the political culture of Pakistani landlords.
17. See Firoz Khan Noon, *From Memory* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1969), pp. 243–4.
18. See Philip Woodruff (pseud.), *The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1954), p. 253; Darling, *Rusticus Loquitur,* pp. 211–12; Saghir Ahmad, *Class and Power,* p. 100.
19. See Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 290–301; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 39–59, 293–5, 374–80; John Wilson Lewis (ed.), *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), *passim.*
20. *Political Order,* pp. 289–90, 301, 369–70.
21. Writing in *Outlook* (February 23, 1974) Zafrullah Poshni observed that he made money by writing advertisements which was a "soul-searing" occupation. He consoled himself, saying: "In a corrupt, selfish, degenerate and dishonest society every profession becomes a soul killer." He reported a woman lawyer as having told him that a majority of the magistrates and nearly all of the lower staff in the courts took graft. Poshni went on to say that corruption pervaded other professions as well (p. 12). It is clear that the persons to whom Poshni was referring were members of the middle class.

    Another journalist alleged that students, and *not* professional criminals, usually removed wheel covers and wipers from parked cars, bulbs from street lights, fans from railroad carriages, coins from public telephone booths, and in some cases even the phones: *Alfatah* (Karachi), May 10, 1974, pp. 22–3.
22. According to an Indian journalist, who interviewed Bhutto, the prime minister believed the "Pakistani people have been so conditioned by long years of military dictatorship that they are incapable of adjusting themselves to democratic rule . . . that given half a chance, they would disrupt the system, and that the transition to democracy [in Pakistan] must therefore be slow and painful." Inder Malhotra's report in *Times of India,* January 4, 1974.
23. Monte Palmer, *Dilemmas of Political Development* (Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock,

1989), pp. 203–4.
24. Interview with Khwaja Abdul Raziq in March 1989.
25. Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), p. 38; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), p. 224.
26. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto,* p. 143.
27. For an extended account and analysis of Metternich and Talleyrand see Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); briefer accounts of these two men and Napoleon may be seen in Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); also see Eric Eyek, *Bismarck and the German Empire* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968).
28. Thad W. Riker, *A History of Modern Europe* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 273.
29. Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1933), p. 348. See chapter 13 for an account of Napoleon's career, views, and political style.
30. Ibid., pp. 344, 376–7, 462–4.
31. Bhutto's interpretation of Nehru presented here is based on his article, "Nehru: An Appraisal" which is included in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings 1963-1965* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), pp. 61–75. No further references to page numbers in this source will be made.
32. For a fuller discussion see Chapter 3 below.
33. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Pakistan: A Federal or Unitary State," *Vision* (Karachi), August 1954. Reproduced in his *Reshaping Foreign Policy,* pp. 29–40.
34. *Reshaping Foreign Policy,* pp. 38–9, 58.
35. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy* (Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971), pp. 5–6.
36. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Affidavit submitted to the Lahore High Court and reproduced in a collection of his statements and speeches between 1966 and 1969 entitled *Awakening the People* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 205 for the quoted material.
37. Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29.
38. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Bilateralism: New Directions* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1976), p. 68.
39. Bhutto, *Bilateralism,* pp. 27–8.
40. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 13, 139–40.
41. Ibid., p. 15.
42. Ibid., p. 16.
43. Bhutto, *Bilateralism,* p. 69.
44. Ibid., p. 71.
45. Ibid., p. 29.

2 Stumbling into a War

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's political career began when President Iskander Mirza chose him to be the minister of commerce in the central government of Pakistan following General Mohammad Ayub Khan's *coup d'état* on October 7, 1958. The General ousted Mirza 20 days later but kept Bhutto. Being the youngest of Ayub Khan's ministers he treaded his way into cabinet discussions cautiously. His superior ability and great capacity for hard work enabled him to distinguish himself in performing assigned roles and tasks. He soon won the president's approval and trust. In January 1960 he left commerce to take charge of the ministry of information and, a few months later, he became minister for fuel, power, and natural resources. When Mohammad Ali Bogra died in January 1963, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became Pakistan's foreign minister, the post he had coveted all along.[1]

DOMESTIC POLITICS: A LEARNING EXPERIENCE

In domestic politics Bhutto acted as Ayub Khan's helper and strove to build his own political base in Larkana. He applauded the president's land reforms which, he said, would not only provide incentives for increasing productivity but would broaden the economic and social base of political power. The president's system of basic democracies, he wrote, would "diffuse political and social confidence . . . essential for a democratic system of government."[2] He joined heads with Mohammad Ali Bogra to change Ayub Khan's mind in favor of restoring political parties. They argued that parties were needed to mobilize the people in support of government policies, and that they might even serve to fragment the opposition to his regime.[3]

A bill to allow political parties to resurface was introduced in the National Assembly on June 30, 1962. But it would keep party doors closed to some seven thousand politicians, three thousand of them in West Pakistan, who had been forced to

withdraw from politics under an Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) in 1959. Under subsequent amendments to the Political Parties Act they would be barred even from making political statements.[4] Bhutto took upon himself the burdensome task of defending Ayub Khan's new constitution, which was exceedingly unpopular among the country's intelligentsia; even more surprisingly, he chose to justify the exclusion of virtually all experienced politicians from the nation's public life under EBDO and the Political Parties Act of 1962.

Rising as a "God-fearing Muslim" in the National Assembly on July 10, 1962, Bhutto claimed that the current regime cherished democracy and wanted to see it take root and flourish in Pakistan. But it was, then, "absolutely essential" that those who had misled the people in the past, played with their emotions, betrayed their interests, ignored their opinion, usurped their rights, rigged elections, suppressed opponents, and established a virtual dictatorship, should not be allowed to disrupt the new democratic experiment. To those who objected that the excluded politicians had been treated arbitrarily, Bhutto made the rather frightening response that they should be grateful they had not been treated more sternly. He recalled to the Assembly Stalin's response to a questioner's observation that his hands were bloody: "I am full of blood . . . When you have a revolution . . . it is necessary to be full of blood up to your elbows."[5] Bhutto conveyed a thinly veiled threat that the return of old politicians and their disruptive politics might invite a reimposition of martial law.

Following the adoption of the new constitution and the Political Parties Act, the president's advisors counseled that he should have a political base among the people and suggested that the Pakistan Muslim League might serve as the appropriate vehicle for creating it. Most of the better-known Muslim League politicians had denounced Ayub Khan's constitution. Moreover, they had been disgraced and disabled under his EBDO. Others, whose reputations remained untouched, such as Khwaja Nazimuddin, did not wish to work with him. Bhutto played a leading role in bringing available politicians to a convention in Karachi in September 1962. This group, which came to be known as the Convention Muslim League, took Ayub Khan as its president on December 24. He appointed Bhutto as the party's secretary-general.

In 1962 Bhutto ran for the National Assembly from Larkana and, with the goodwill of the Nawab of Kalabagh, the West Pakistan governor, and some help from the district administration, he won easily. The following year the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled that, given the system of separation of powers placed in the new constitution, ministers could not be members of the Assembly. Bhutto now designated a relative, Pir Bux Bhutto, to run for the seat he had vacated. Opposing Pir Bux was Abdul Hamid Jatoi, a substantial landlord and a well-known liberal politician. This time the governor and the district administration chose to be neutral, and Bhutto had to set up shop in Larkana to help Pir Bux.[6] The electors consisted of 1613 "basic democrats," most of them landowners and, to a degree, men of prominence in the area. They would not be swayed by oratorical appeals to principle or policy. They wanted to know what a candidate would do for them and theirs. Presumably Bhutto excelled Jatoi in invoking previous obligations, and in making promises and alliances, for his candidate won.[7] The campaign established Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a politician to be reckoned with in Larkana. In 1965 he persuaded his cousin, Mumtaz, to run from the same constituency and he too won. This time Bhutto also campaigned for other Muslim League candidates in Sind and, in the process, forged links and made alliances with Sindhi feudal lords.

Ayub Khan regarded Bhutto as a political troubleshooter, drew close to him, treated him almost like a son, and awarded him the Hilal-e-Pakistan, the country's highest civil award. In return Bhutto appeared to be intensely loyal to the president and praised him lavishly. He referred to Ayub Khan as Pakistan's Lincoln, Lenin, Ataturk (the founder of modern Turkey) and, above all, as Saladin (Salahuddin, the sultan of Syria and Egypt, who had frustrated the Christian crusaders in Palestine in the twelfth century).[8]

FOREIGN POLICY: BROAD ORIENTATIONS

Bhutto had a zest for foreign affairs and, as noted above, his contributions in this area were the more significant. He adopted a tough and defiant posture toward India and argued Pakistan's case in the dispute over Kashmir with zeal and competence. He

advocated Afro-Asian solidarity and fraternal ties among Muslim nations. After leaving Ayub Khan's administration he would often take credit for normalizing Pakistan's relations with socialist countries. His admirers regard him as the "supreme architect" of an independent foreign policy for Pakistan and project him as a pioneer who overcame heavy odds in developing an *entente cordiale* with China.[9]

In his pronouncements at the United Nations between 1957 and 1965 he urged respect for international law and morality, values of equity and justice, and the honoring of one's commitments and covenants. He spoke of bringing people together, extending their horizons, discouraging narrow parochialism and exclusive nationalism, and opening new vistas to promote human solidarity and to bring about a genuine world community. He maintained that the smaller Afro-Asian and Latin American states had an enormous stake in the United Nations' capacity for resolving disputes and maintaining international peace. He deplored the tendency of the great powers to view disputes among other nations in terms of their own interests instead of judging them on merits and resolving them accordingly.[10] He supported arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, denounced colonialism and racism, and upheld the cause of developing nations in international economic relations.

Bhutto applauded the passing away of colonialism, at least in its traditional form, but regretted that Portugal, "acting contrary to the trend of history and the laws of life," persisted in holding on to parts of Africa. He hailed the rising of Africa to self-awareness and self-assertion. He praised the conference of African nations in Addis Ababa in May 1963 and the resulting Organization for African Unity (OAU). Speaking in the General Assembly on January 22, 1965, he called upon the United Nations to "delegate" its peace-keeping role in the Congo (now Zaire) to the OAU which, he said, had a stake in that country and a better understanding of the "currents and cross-currents" that blocked a just and equitable settlement. He condemned the racist arrogance of the white minority in South Africa. "The rulers of that unhappy country, blind to the evidence of their eyes, deaf to the appeals of the world, and ignoring the march of history, have attempted to halt its course. South Africa could become the hope of Africa; its rulers have chosen to make it the shame of the world."[11] He asked the United Nations and the

world community to take effective measures, including economic sanctions, to prevent the South African government from continuing its repression of the black majority in that country.

AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY

The peoples of Asia and Africa were diverse in terms of ethnic origin, religious affiliation, cultural expression, and historical experience. Yet they came together and often acted in concert at the United Nations and in other forums. Bhutto maintained that their sense of solidarity derived from their common experience of indignity and exploitation suffered during colonial rule. At an even deeper and firmer level, the community of feeling and purpose among them rested on the moral belief that colonialism was wrong because it held that "might is right." Their quest for freedom from foreign domination should be seen as a positive force for human dignity and freedom. They wished to consolidate peace, establish justice, promote social welfare, and give impetus to a flowering of cultures. Relatively poor and weak they might be, but speaking in unison their voice could not be ignored in world councils. Indeed, their influence could be formidable. But they must have vigorous, strong and dedicated leadership, in fact "masculine leadership."[12] Bhutto urged the Afro-Asian peoples to mobilize their resources for development and stand together in negotiating terms of trade and aid with the "NORTH." While accepting assistance from the industrialized states, they should not allow a sense of dependence to seize them. Much of the aid was given as loans which must someday be repaid. Moreover, they were good business for the lender. Bhutto argued also that the Western powers had a moral obligation to aid their former colonies as partial compensation for the exploitation, even plunder, to which they had subjected the Afro-Asians. Neither the donor nor the recipient should see foreign aid as charity.[13]

But Afro-Asia was not a lake of tranquility. There were differences of size and capability within its ranks. Some of the larger states entertained imperialistic and expansionist ambitions. Bhutto saw India's continued occupation of Kashmir as no different from Portugal's colonial rule in Angola and Mozam-

bique. He advised the Afro-Asian states to apply the principles they professed to the resolution of their disputes. If they ignored law, equity, and justice, and allowed local imperialisms to arise, Afro-Asian solidarity would be no more. Bhutto asked them to support the Kashmiri people's struggle for freedom and self-determination which, he added, must eventually succeed, "for in the end justice always prevails."[14]

As Bhutto said in an essay on the subject,[15] Muslims in the Indian subcontinent have been supporting Turkish, Palestinian, and Arab causes since before the First World War. Pakistanis have identified with the struggle of the North African Muslim states – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt – for freedom from Western colonial dominance or rule. Bhutto wrote that Pakistan supported all drives for Arab unity, and welcomed cooperation among Arab states for their own collective security and economic well-being which, he hoped, would be a source of strength for Muslims everywhere. At the request of the Afro-Asian group in the UN General Assembly in 1959, he moved a draft resolution in support of Algeria's right to self-determination. Speaking on the subject again in 1960 he deplored that the "blood of patriots" still flowed in Algeria and complimented its "valiant sons" on their heroic fight for freedom.[16]

In discussing Pakistan's relations with Muslim countries, Bhutto spoke as a Muslim, proud of the splendor the world of Islam once was, and hopeful that it would regain its former vigor and dynamism. Ideas of Muslim unity and Afro-Asian solidarity merged easily in his thinking. Muslim populations formed the majority in 22 of the 35 independent African countries. He saw Islam as energizing Africa's striving for full emancipation from colonial domination. "It is the universality of the spirit of Islam, its emphasis on brotherhood and equality between man and man, its inherent vitality and vigor, which have led to its fusion with the forces of revolution in Africa."[17]

Bhutto welcomed the periodic coming together of Muslim leaders. Their growing contact and collaboration, he thought, would give impetus "to the renaissance of Islam in the twentieth century." But Muslim leaders must demand a new world order based upon fraternity, equality, and justice. The egalitarian principles of Islam would have to be shown at work in real life, and the enterprise would require of Muslims physical and intellectual discipline of the highest order. Bhutto urged Muslim

intellectuals to provide fresh interpretations of known values. Pakistanis could have an important part in this mission; combining Islamic fervor with elements of other great civilizations in their heritage, they had developed a "unique cosmopolitan outlook."[18]

Many educated Muslims in Pakistan, aware of their international environment, share Bhutto's identification with the Muslim world. But not all of them would subscribe to his notion of Afro-Asian solidarity. Bhutto combined in his mind a wide knowledge of the West with pride in his own nativity. He was conscious of being an Asian and he was a Pakistani nationalist. He was pleased to be a Sindhi and he was proud of being a Bhutto. He had lived, but not served, under British rule in India. He was exceedingly well-read, bright, and articulate. He was an aristocrat. The proposition that a man might claim superiority and title to rule over him merely because he, the claimant, had lighter skin must have appeared to Bhutto as preposterous, intolerable. Yet this offensive proposition had held sway in Asia and Africa for two hundred and more years. Continuance of the white man's colonial dominance in the third world under new guises would not only be cruel as before but just as insulting.

TOWARD SELF-ASSERTION IN FOREIGN POLICY

It has long been believed in Pakistan that nothing of much consequence can happen there without American approval or involvement. The United States did indeed have considerable say in the affairs of Pakistan between 1958 and 1965. American advisors guided Pakistani officials in making economic choices and devising strategies of development. In return for the economic and military aid it received, Pakistan was expected to follow American guidelines in dealing with the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. Ayub Khan, on his part, had no desire to offend American sensibilities. In discussing Bhutto's quest for an independent foreign policy, we are then talking of moderate steps, not giant strides, which he was able to take in this direction.

In cabinet meetings on December 22 and 24, 1958, when he had been less than two months in Ayub Khan's service, Bhutto

conceded that Pakistan needed American aid but reasoned that, since the United States would not come to Pakistan's assistance in case of war with India, "we should not unnecessarily extend the principle of attachment to the United States." He also urged flexibility toward China and recommended efforts to gain its admission to the United Nations. These views did not win cabinet approval at this time but, at Bhutto's insistence, the ministry of commerce was authorized to review Pakistan's existing trade agreements with socialist countries to determine if cotton and other commodities could be exported to them in larger quantities.[19]

Two years later Bhutto made a significant contribution in effecting a change of policy regarding China's admission to the United Nations. Pakistan had voted for admission when the General Assembly first considered the question in 1950. But between 1956 and 1960 it joined the United States in keeping the issue off the Assembly's agenda. In 1960 the Pakistani delegation, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, first abstained from voting but then, upon receiving new instructions from home, presumably under American pressure, changed its position to one of opposing consideration at that time. Bhutto was quite disappointed, and upset, with the change of stance he had been ordered to register. He recommended support for China's case in a letter to Manzur Qadir, the foreign minister, on October 14, 1960. He observed that the American position on the issue had weakened in the United Nations, and that none of the newly admitted African states supported it. He pointed out that in 1960 two NATO members, Norway and Denmark, had voted against the American motion and one, Portugal, had abstained. It followed that Pakistan could remain a firm ally of the United States, as firm as these NATO members, even "if we take a stand on the merits of the question and a recognition of realities." In subsequent despatches he argued that Pakistan's position should be made consistent with the fact of its diplomatic recognition of China. He added that its support of China would enhance its position among Afro-Asian nations, an objective it should pursue "insofar as our vital interests are not adversely affected." The minutes of a cabinet meeting on October 24 show that Ikramullah, who was foreign secretary at the time, did not favor Bhutto's ideas. Pakistan, he said, should do nothing that might call in question

its steadfastness and dependability as an ally of the United States.[20]

These same issues were again considered at a cabinet meeting on November 18. This time, it seems, Bhutto was present and he had already converted some colleagues to his point of view. The cabinet noted that it understood America's difficulty in supporting Pakistan in its disputes with India but observed that then "for that very reason, we have to fend for ourselves," which meant that Pakistan could not continue to maintain "rigid postures towards Russia and China." It must explain to the United States that, "in the present situation," it would have to vote for China's admission to the United Nations at the Assembly's next session. The cabinet agreed also that the government of Pakistan should not isolate itself by ignoring the public feeling in Pakistan and other Afro-Asian countries.[21] In 1961 Pakistan did indeed vote in favor of seating the representative of the People's Republic of China.

The government of Pakistan, before Ayub Khan's *coup* in 1958, had given five American and British companies concessions to look for oil. They found gas in Sylhet (East Pakistan) but discovered oil in only one of the five wells they had drilled in West Pakistan. Bhutto suspected that, content with the abundance of oil in the Middle East, Western companies were not anxious to find it in Pakistan. This led him to take a Soviet offer of assistance in exploring for oil more seriously. The Soviets, it seems, wanted to explore in the Pothwar region, around Rawalpindi, where oil had already been found. The permanent secretary in Bhutto's own ministry, and the pro-American lobby in the cabinet, opposed Soviet presence in this area because of its proximity to the national capital and, more importantly, to the army's general headquarters. The secretary's brief and crisp note of opposition brought out "the best of Bhutto's command of the English language" in a 37-page rebuttal which went out as a cabinet paper and won approval.[22] Bhutto traveled to Moscow in December 1960 and brought back an offer of a $30 million loan at 2.5 percent interest. The agreement was signed in March 1961. An Oil and Gas Development Corporation was then set up to work with the Russians. The Soviet government had hoped that after the oil agreement it would be invited to build a steel mill in Pakistan. But after his conversations with President Kennedy in the summer of 1961 Ayub Khan became cautious

and stepped back from any further expansion of Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union.[23] And the Soviets did not find oil.

Returning to Sino-Pakistan relations, we see that in September 1959 the government of Pakistan saw Chinese maps showing parts of Hunza as Chinese territory. President Ayub Khan announced that his government would soon propose talks for demarcating the border between the two countries, and in March 1962 the Chinese expressed a willingness to discuss the border. Negotiations actually began on October 13, a week before the Chinese were to attack the Indian positions in NEFA, and on December 26 China and Pakistan announced their "agreement in principle" on aligning their common border. The actual border agreement would be signed by Bhutto, as foreign minister, on March 2, 1963.

The agreement brought Pakistan 750 square miles of territory which had been under Chinese control. It placed the Chinese government firmly and formally on record as recognizing that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was disputed territory and not an Indian possession. For the Chinese, it sent a message to the world, and especially to the Afro-Asian states, that they would be reasonable with those who approached them in goodwill, and that if their dispute with India had been lingering, it was because the Indians did not want to be reasonable.[24]

In an interview I had with Prime Minister Bhutto in the fall of 1973, he observed that the Pakistani proposal to the Chinese in November 1959 had been made somewhat reluctantly by way of testing the argument for a more cordial relationship with China which he had been pressing for some time. Bhutto did not have a specific role in initiating or subsequently directing the talks that led to the border agreement and, a few months later, to an air travel agreement with China. But his able and persistent advocacy of a more open and friendly relationship with China, including support for its admission to the United Nations, helped develop an intellectual environment within the government in which the advocacy of a more independent posture in foreign policy would have receptivity. Bhutto was not the author of this trend toward national self-assertion, but he was surely one of its more important promoters. There were others with similar urges. Manzur Qadir, who was foreign min-

ister until the summer of 1962, once told me that as early as December 1958 he had presented a position paper to the cabinet in which he argued that while Pakistan's relations with India and the Soviet Union were not likely to improve significantly, those with China could, and he recommended a policy of closer relations with that country. He recalled that of all the ministers present at that meeting Bhutto alone supported it.[25] Later S. K. Dehlavi and Nazir Ahmad, who were foreign secretary and defense secretary respectively, supported Bhutto's initiative.[26] Other leading officials in the foreign office – Aziz Ahmad, Mumtaz Alvie, and Agha Shahi – also argued for a new China policy.

In November and December of 1962 Mohammad Ali Bogra, the foreign minister, lay ill and it became Bhutto's responsibility to act as the government's spokesman on foreign policy. He called the border agreement with China "a signal triumph for the procedure of peace."[27] On another occasion he stated that the rule of law in international relations would not be strengthened while China remained outside the United Nations; nor could peace be achieved in South and Southeast Asia without Chinese participation and help. He recommended Pakistan's collaboration with China in protecting Afro-Asian nations from colonialism "and its ramparts still maintained by India and Portugal."[28] Reacting to reports in 1962 that China might offer Pakistan a non-aggression pact, Bhutto took the position that the same would not be inconsistent with his country's alliances with the West. "Our alliances are for self-defense," he noted, and added that a non-aggression pact with China would further emphasize their defensive character.[29]

On July 17, 1963, Bhutto made a statement in the National Assembly that caused a stir in Pakistan and abroad. He observed that India, lacking the will and a genuine reason to fight China, might one day direct its increasing military capability against Pakistan. But in that event Pakistan would not be alone, for an Indian invasion of Pakistan would also threaten the security and territorial integrity of China. He said he did not want to elucidate this point much further but assured the house that the Chinese factor, along with others, in Pakistan's international relations was very important, and that "everything is being done . . . to see that our national interests and territorial integrity are safeguarded and protected."[30]

Bhutto may have wanted to encourage the impression that China and Pakistan had already made an alliance against India, something which Indian officials and media had been alleging for some time. But elsewhere his statement was received with considerable scepticism. American officials, including President Kennedy, interpreted it merely as an expression of Pakistan's dissatisfaction with American plans of sending military aid to India on a long-term basis. An alliance with China, they thought, would necessarily jeopardize Pakistan's ties with the United States. Bhutto's listeners in the National Assembly reacted in the same way but some of them carried his argument to a different conclusion. Sardar Bahadur Khan, leader of the opposition, and Maulvi Farid Ahmad, a prominent legislator from East Pakistan, argued that if Pakistan and China had indeed come as close together as Bhutto claimed, then Pakistan's continued membership in SEATO, an alliance directed against China, did not make sense.[31] Mohammad Yusuf Khattak, perceiving the internal contradiction in Bhutto's projection, suggested that the foreign minister had allowed his "romantic imagination" to read more in the Chinese professions of friendship than they had intended to convey.[32]

The government of Pakistan had known for years that the Chinese did not object to its link with SEATO if that would help in obtaining American military hardware which might be used in resisting India at the appropriate time. More importantly, the issue of consistency which opposition members in the National Assembly raised could only be settled by the United States which, at this time, provided Pakistan with annual economic and military assistance to the amount of about $500 million. Any level of Sino-Pakistan relations might become inconsistent with Pakistan's alliance with the United States if the latter found it to be intolerable. Bhutto may only have been trying to see where the Americans would draw the line. By first shocking them and others with the idea of a Sino-Pakistan defense pact, he may also have hoped to induce a state of mind in which they would not unduly restrict Pakistan's pursuit of mutually advantageous transactions with China if these did not hurt America's own vital interests.

It should be emphasized that at no time did Bhutto want to disrupt, let alone terminate, Pakistan's alliances with the West. Responding to critics in the Assembly, he observed that interna-

tional politics were often ruthless, with the result that an alliance, or a state of relations, ideal from one's own point of view, could not be found.[33] Repeatedly in the National Assembly, even when he threatened "agonizing reappraisals," he ended by declaring that his government contemplated no radical change in its foreign policy. A week after the controversial speech referred to above, he said Pakistan valued the friendship of Western powers and appreciated the economic and military help they had given. But he wanted them to understand that India's increasing military capability, to which they had now seen fit to contribute, could only be directed against Pakistan.[34]

Our consideration of Bhutto's role in the development of Sino-Pakistan relations should not be brought to a close without some reference to his assessment of China's objectives in South Asia. He and his colleagues in the government of Pakistan were convinced that China had no intention of coming down to the Indian plains to fight a war of conquest. It might want to rectify the border which, as Bhutto said with quotations from Nehru's own earlier writings, had been imposed upon China by the British colonial rulers in India. China's threat to the Indian subcontinent, if any, could only be regarded as a potential arising from its status as a great power. One should guard against the dynamism of all great powers. India too was on the way to becoming such a power and therefore merited Pakistan's watchful concern especially in view of its high-handedness in Kashmir and Goa and its generally domineering attitude toward its smaller neighbors. Bhutto blamed India, not China, for their border conflict. Speaking in the National Assembly on November 26, 1962, he characterized it as a "phony war" which the Indian government had engineered to obtain military aid from the West. The Western powers, on their part, had rushed to aid India, because they wished to seduce it into their sphere of influence. Actually, neither China nor India had any real intention of fighting the other.[35]

Interpretation

It seems fair to say that Bhutto was a leader among those in Pakistan's foreign policy establishment who understood that bipolarity was not rigidly set and international politics were

once again fluid. They saw that China had appeared on the international scene as a great power, colonialism had ended at least in its more formal sense, numerous states in Africa had recently become independent and declared for non-alignment, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations had turned from friendliness to rivalry, many voices in the United States called for a normalization of relations with China, and the cold war appeared to be in thaw. These developments suggested that even in a patron–client relationship, the patron's control could not be absolute, for many international and domestic forces limited his freedom of action. His constraints became the client's opportunities for making autonomous choices to advance his own interests, assuming that he had the necessary will for independence and self-assertion. Bhutto and others in Ayub Khan's administration recognized that they needed American assistance. But they knew also that the United States could not threaten to withdraw its assistance each time they talked with the Chinese. There might indeed be limits beyond which Pakistan's relationship with China could not be carried. But within these limits there was room for manoeuvre.

Bhutto possessed the ingenuity and the will to explore the opportunity that lay before him. He was ready to assert his own reading of the state of international relations and Pakistan's national interest. He did not think the United States and Pakistan's other Western allies would in all cases oppose the exercise of free choice on its part. "The notion is demonstrably false," he wrote later, "that a great power, qua a great power, remains beyond conversion to a principle which it might not itself have espoused."[36] He believed Pakistan's alliances with the West should not require that it efface its Asian identity or ignore its long-term interests. Bhutto thought, and tried to act, as a Pakistani nationalist, an Asian, and a third world person opposed to imperialistic dominance of the newer, and weaker, nations from whichever quarter – Western or non-Western – it might come. "If I have sought to do anything in our external affairs, it has been . . . to lend an authenticity to our foreign policy. A foreign policy is inauthentic if it does not articulate a nation's psychic urges or reflect an awareness of the historical process."[37] Bhutto wrote these lines much later, in 1976, but it is not unlikely that the sense of national and third world identity and the will to self-assertion which they convey had already

been well settled in his mind when he served as Ayub Khan's minister.

ADVOCACY IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

Pakistan's dispute with India over the status of Jammu and Kashmir has been a major concern of its foreign policy. Bhutto's handling of this issue and his advocacy of Pakistan's case should therefore merit consideration. Underlying his posture and argument are an image and an assessment of India as a society and as a polity which too should be noted, at least, in passing.

Bhutto called the Hindu caste system an atrocious assault upon the value of equality among persons and peoples. The hierarchy and exclusiveness it enjoined made both secularism and democracy strangers in India, unacceptable to the inner core of Hindu life. The Indian government's professions of commitment to secularism and democracy were then merely pretensions. The same would have to be said of the high moral tone of its pronouncements on international issues. Bhutto quoted from the writings and statements of Nehru, Krishna Menon, Sardar K. M. Pannikar and others, to show that India had not abjured resort to force and violence to advance its interests, and that it was an expansionist state, coveting imperial glory. Bhutto held that India had been arrogant in its relations with neighbors. Lacking reason and the spirit of conciliation, it had not been able to settle disputes with any of them. It wished to settle only on its own terms.[38]

But, above all, India reckoned Pakistan as its "enemy number one." Time and again Bhutto told his listeners and readers that the Indian leaders remained unreconciled to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the existence of Pakistan as a separate, sovereign state. It was a sinister and baseless argument, which they made to the world, that their disputes with Pakistan were merely manifestations of its hatred of India, and that their settlement would do nothing to relieve the tension between the two countries. Actually, it was India that hated Pakistan and not vice versa. It wanted to keep Kashmir, a state in which Muslims were in the majority, to negate the two-nation theory which had been the basis for dividing India and establishing Pakistan. India wanted to destroy Pakistan and would attempt to do so as

soon as it had acquired the requisite means. But given its internal divisions and contradictions, and the weakness resulting from them, success in achieving its goal would not be easy. Pakistan should then not be hasty in making concessions to get a resolution of its disputes with India. That would merely whet India's appetite for aggrandizement. Pakistan should stand firm and defiant.[39]

Turning now to Kashmir, Bhutto's presentations in the Security Council in February, March, and May of 1964 may be regarded as fairly comprehensive and representative of his position.[40] He argued that in refusing to hold a plebiscite, and thus denying the people of Kashmir the opportunity to determine and declare their affiliation, the government of India had been violating the solemn pledges it had given the people of the state, the government of Pakistan, the United Nations Security Council, and the world. These pledges had been contained in Prime Minister Nehru's communications to the prime minister of Pakistan and in India's acceptance of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) dated August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, and the Security Council resolutions of April 21 and June 3, 1948, and March 14, 1950. Responding to the Indian argument that it had not gone forward with a plebiscite because Pakistan did not withdraw its forces from Kashmir, Bhutto asserted that under the UNCIP resolutions Pakistani withdrawal was to be synchronized with a staged withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces under a truce agreement which was never made because India would not cooperate in formulating it. In any case, Pakistan had repeatedly proposed an impartial investigation into the facts of this matter and offered to comply with its findings.[41] Pakistan had also been willing to submit the dispute to mediation or limited arbitration, but India had refused these initiatives.

The Indian delegate contended that three elections had been held in Kashmir and a representative assembly had confirmed the state's accession to India. The plebiscite had thus been rendered superfluous, the state had become an integral part of India, and Pakistan's concern with developments within the state or with its future constituted interference in India's domestic affairs. Bhutto called this reasoning and conclusion outrageous and said neither Kashmir nor Pakistan would ever accept it. An election was not the same as a plebiscite on the

specific issue of accession. Moreover, the elections had been farcical. He cited and quoted Indian, British, and American newspaper reports which claimed that all three elections in Kashmir had been rigged. He pointed out that in the 1951 election all of the ruling party's nominees for the 45 assembly seats from the valley of Kashmir were declared to have been elected unopposed and no polling had taken place. Only eight of these 45 seats were contested in the 1957 election and the election in 1962 was also reported to have been subverted.[42] He called attention to the fact that Sheikh Abdullah – released from jail in April 1964 after 11 years of imprisonment without trial – and other Kashmiri leaders were reaffirming their people's right to self-determination and demanding a plebiscite. They had made it clear that they would not accept mere adjustments in the cease-fire line in Kashmir. They insisted that the Maharaja's accession to India in 1947 had been provisional and subject to an impartial plebiscite to be held later.[43]

Bhutto rejected the Indian contention that "passage of time," and the domestic and international developments which took place while time passed, had made the UNCIP and Security Council resolutions on the subject obsolete. This was a pernicious doctrine, he reasoned, which would undermine respect for international engagements, law and morality. He said time would not reconcile Pakistan or the people of Kashmir to the fact of Indian occupation. Indeed, after 17 years of it the Kashmiris were still in revolt. "Unarmed as they are, muffled as their voices are . . . unrepresented as they are, consigned tragically to oblivion as they are, they are persisting in the eternal struggle of oppressed people for freedom."[44] And this despite the fact that India kept one soldier for every ten men in the state.

But instead of allowing self-determination and freedom to Kashmir, the government of India was proceeding to tighten its control over the state. Bhutto referred to the declarations of Prime Minister Nehru and his colleagues saying that they would repeal Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which recognized the special nature of Kashmir's link with India, or simply let it "erode." They were making numerous moves to "integrate" Kashmir and reduce it to the status of an ordinary province in the Indian union. These moves, and not only the theft of a holy relic from the Hazratbal mosque or dissatisfaction with the

local administration, as the Indian delegate to the Security Council alleged, had ignited the protest demonstrations in Kashmir which had gone on for several weeks. Once again Bhutto quoted Indian and foreign press reports to establish that the Kashmiri demonstrators intended to convey their indignation and resentment at India's colonial rule.[45] The revolt in Kashmir, and Indian attempts to suppress it, had provoked communal riots in both India and Pakistan and heightened the tension between them. India, in possession of the major part of the state, would like nothing better than to be left alone and free to handle the revolt in Kashmir in its own way. "But we, seeing our kith and kin, our flesh and blood, suffer tyranny and oppression, shall we remain silent spectators? We who can see and feel the surge of a people determined to be free, shall we not warn of the consequences and dangers of letting the situation drift like this?" He appealed to the Security Council to hear the pleas of the downtrodden in Kashmir and urged India to heed the temper of the times, the spirit of the age, which honored the right of peoples to self-determination. He invited the Indian government to act with vision and statesmanship, redress a wrong, ease Kashmir's burden, and keep a word of honor.[46]

Bhutto went on to say that a satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir dispute would remove "the sole cause of conflict" between India and Pakistan. India's proposal that the two countries subscribe to a "no-war declaration" would achieve nothing unless they also agreed on methods for settling disputes. He recalled that in 1950 Pakistan had proposed a no-war pact which would provide for recourse to mediation, arbitration, or judicial determination to settle disputes if negotiations failed. But India rejected the Pakistani proposal at that time. During a period of 16 years no less than 20 eminent persons had offered proposals for ending the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan had accepted, and India rejected, each one of them.

Responding to the suggestion from some members of the Security Council that India and Pakistan resume negotiations, Bhutto stated that the two governments had held exchanges, discussions, and negotiations virtually every year between 1948 and 1955, in 1960, and then between December 1962 and May 1963. All of these efforts had failed, because India, relying on its might, did not wish to implement the principles relevant to

the case, namely, self-determination and respect for covenants. Further negotiations, even mediation, would not succeed unless they relied upon principles and terms of reference derived from the international agreements the two parties had accepted. Bhutto explained that the dispute did not involve merely a border or a piece of territory. The life and future of "nearly five million people who inhabit a territory six times as large as Switzerland" were at stake.[47]

Bhutto warned that a clash between the people of Kashmir and the Indian occupation force would disrupt peace in the subcontinent. Already tension along the Indo-Pakistan cease-fire line in Kashmir had mounted and heavy exchanges of fire, resulting in casualties, had taken place. Bhutto said he did not want to make threats but he must inform the Council that if India persisted in suppressing the people of Kashmir by force, "the people of Pakistan may find it extremely difficult to stand aside and may demand of their government whatever measures are necessary for the amelioration of the situation in India-occupied Kashmir."[48] He urged the Security Council to take a hand in moving the dispute rapidly towards a peaceful and just settlement. He hoped the Council would lay down the framework – that of Kashmir's right to self-determination – within which further contacts and discussions between India and Pakistan might proceed.

The Security Council did not come to the determination Bhutto had desired. Instead, its president, Ambassador Seydoux of France – in the meeting on May 18, 1964 – recapitulated the debate as it had gone during the previous several meetings, asked the two countries to refrain from measures that might worsen their relations, and hoped they would resume negotiations to settle their dispute.

Interpretation

The Security Council did not give Bhutto the "piece of paper" he wanted, but several members did express sympathy for his case. Outside the Council a growing number of Afro-Asian states publicly endorsed Kashmir's right to self-determination. These included Indonesia and two of India's immediate neighbors, namely, China to the north and Sri Lanka in the south.

As his nation's foreign minister, and therefore spokesman, Bhutto might not mirror the popular passion concerning India and Kashmir, but he could not ignore well-settled Pakistani opinions and attitudes. Evaluating his advocacy in this context, we may be sure that his audience in Pakistan nodded approval of his entire argument, including his wide-ranging denunciations of India as a polity and as a society. Members of the National Assembly participating in the foreign policy debate, mentioned earlier, were much more vociferous in their condemnation of India's position in Kashmir and its allegedly aggressive and expansionist designs against Pakistan. Some members questioned the wisdom of their government's willingness to have negotiations with India. Others called the government spineless and cowardly because it had missed a "golden opportunity" of taking Kashmir by force when India fought China in the fall of 1962. Still others considered war with India inevitable. They argued that in view of India's increasing military preparedness time would not be on Pakistan's side, and that therefore the sooner this war came the better would be Pakistan's chances of taking Kashmir.[49] In this climate of opinion it would be politically hazardous for Pakistan's foreign minister to appear "soft" toward India.

Bhutto had requested Security Council consideration of the revolt in Kashmir referred to above. He would have been pleased to receive the Council's endorsement of his position. But in view of the likely Soviet veto he may not have expected it. Why did he then undertake this exercise? It was not entirely futile from his point of view. The Council debates, like the negotiations with India between December 1962 and May 1963, served to remind the world that the old dispute between Pakistan and India, fraught with danger to international peace, remained unresolved. The world had been inclined to forget it. Indian spokesmen had been asserting for years that Kashmir formed a part of India. If Pakistan did not periodically challenge the Indian position, the world might come to accept it. Negotiations with India in 1963 had once again established that a dispute concerning Kashmir did exist, for none would have been held had there been no dispute to discuss. The Security Council debates further enlivened the issue in the world's consciousness.

It may be puzzling to students of politics that Bhutto kept

insisting on a plebiscite in Kashmir, knowing well enough that India would not hold it. If India were content with Jammu and would let go of the valley of Kashmir, where Muslims are the majority, Pakistan would happily settle. This is apparent from the fact that in the sixth, and final, round of the talks in 1963, Bhutto proposed to limit the plebiscite to the valley. But the territorial adjustments India had earlier offered in the same talks were minor and pertained only to the existing cease-fire line. Knowing the state of public opinion in Pakistan, Bhutto did not want even to discuss them.

In the absence of substantial, and therefore acceptable, Indian concessions the dispute must remain, meaning that Pakistan must continue to agitate world opinion for its case. But an appeal to world opinion could only be made from the ground of some generally accepted and valued principle, which in this case must be a people's right to self-determination. Abandoning the demand for a plebiscite would be to step away from the ground of principle. It might then appear that India, after all, had committed no moral wrong, that the sentiments and will of the Kashmiri people did not matter, and that the issue really involved an old-fashioned appetite for territory. The world community would then have no reason to get involved. Pakistan would have to take whatever India offered it according to its own calculations of present and future costs and benefits. But before throwing in the towel, so to speak, would a trial of strength – suggested in the National Assembly – not be in order?

BHUTTO AND THE WAR OF 1965: AN ASSESSMENT

A trial of strength did come in the form of a war with India in September 1965. Many Pakistanis think of it as a splendid chapter in their history. Bhutto himself spoke of it thus during a speech in the National Assembly on March 16, 1966. Responding to critics who alleged that the government had acted irresponsibly in plunging the country into an unnecessary war and putting its future at great risk, Bhutto distinguished between unjust and just wars, those of "avarice and exploitation" and those for a people's emancipation and liberty. A war of liberation was a glorious war, he declared. He reminded the Assembly

that most governments in the world, and all Muslim nations from Algeria to Indonesia, had supported Pakistan because they considered the Kashmiri people's struggle as just. The right to self-determination, he said, was the "most noble ideal known to modern man." Thus, Pakistan had offered "heroic support" for a great cause. It had been an "epic" struggle in which the nation stood united like a "formidable and impregnable" wall. It won a "mighty and glittering" victory. The people of the Punjab resisted 12 Indian divisions; the Hurs in Sind went in and occupied vast tracts of Indian territory "with their bare hands;" the people of NWFP, Baluchistan, and East Pakistan joined the Punjabis and Sindhis and shed their blood in resisting the Indian onslaught.[50]

The war was won in the sense that it was not lost; the Indian force, three or four times as large, had been thwarted. But Pakistan's objective was not achieved. The war ended in a stalemate and brought Pakistan no gains in Kashmir. It greatly improved Pakistan's relations with China as a result of the latter's threatened move against India.[51] But it led to the termination of American military aid to Pakistan which, until then, had been provided largely on a gratis basis. Pakistani officers and men fought valiantly and the nation was led to believe that they were winning. But when it transpired that they had, after all, not won, public opinion attributed this result to betrayal at the highest level in government. Ayub Khan, the people believed, had surrendered at the conference table in Tashkent the gains which the nation's fighting men had made on the battlefield. This state of mind opened the way for an uprising two years later that ousted Ayub Khan from power.[52]

But worse still, the war, and its inconclusiveness, intensified the separatist feeling in East Pakistan. The strategic theory in Pakistan had always been that the defense of East Pakistan lay in the west, meaning that if India attacked East Pakistan, Pakistan would attack India on the western front and take substantial territory in the Indian Punjab and Kashmir. Awareness of such a Pakistani option, it was thought, would deter India from attacking East Pakistan. The war in 1965 demolished this theory. India did not attack East Pakistan, and Pakistani forces failed to seize much Indian territory except in the uninhabited Rajasthan desert across from Sind. Belief in the efficacy of a common defense against India had been a critical factor in maintaining

the union of East and West Pakistan. The war shattered this belief and ripped the fabric of Pakistan's national unity and integrity. In that sense the war had been a blunder.

Many observers in Pakistan believe that Bhutto played a leading role in initiating the conflict which later escalated into a full-scale war. His admirers, who do not see the war as a mistake, applaud his role.[53] Asghar Khan, one of Bhutto's harsher critics, has written that Bhutto brought on the war to advance his own political career.[54]

> I am convinced that he did so in the expectation that Pakistan would suffer a military defeat. This would result in Ayub Khan being ousted and in the confusion that would follow he, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, would be the obvious person to negotiate a settlement with India and then take over as Pakistan's president . . . Bhutto had tried deliberately to create a situation which would bring him to power.

Asghar Khan was an inveterate foe and his interpretation of Bhutto's motives may be biased. Nevertheless, Bhutto did have a role and it deserves to be examined. Let us first state the facts which are not in dispute.

Pakistani defense planners noted with pleasant surprise that the Indian military had performed poorly against China in the fall of 1962. Their low esteem for it went even lower when it did badly against Pakistan's own forces in the Rann of Kutch in the spring of 1965. India appeared to be a paper tiger. The Indians did have the advantage of numbers but Pakistan's combat aircraft and armor were believed to be superior to those of India at that time. Following Nehru's death India appeared to be drifting under Lal Bahadur Shastri, perceived in Pakistan as a weak man. Kashmiris had risen to revolt against Indian authority just the preceding year and, under appropriate instigation, they might rise again. The UN Security Council had been treating the Kashmir question as a "dead horse," and Pakistan's allies, notably the United States, had professed their inability to help change India's mind. As the foreign policy debate in the National Assembly referred to earlier showed, some politicians in Pakistan, and perhaps the public at large, were receptive to the prospect of a war with India.

Bhutto called the talk of war, and the "golden opportunity" missed in 1962, "irresponsible." At this time – July 1963 –

he stated that Pakistan desired only a peaceful resolution of its dispute with India. But it is known that when the Sino-Indian conflict had erupted in 1962, he went to see Ayub Khan, who was vacationing in Hunza, and argued that this was an opportune time for Pakistan to take Kashmir by force. Later he would condemn Ayub Khan for his passivity at this critical juncture. It is then likely that Bhutto shared the perceptions and assessments of India noted above. Recall also his warning to the UN Security Council in 1964 that the people of Pakistan might compel their government to take measures to relieve Kashmir's misery.

It appears that in the spring or early summer of 1965 a small group of men, of which Bhutto and General Akhtar Malik were the leading members, began work on plans for infiltrating a large number of guerrillas into Indian Kashmir for the purpose of instigating a local insurrection that might force the Indian government to resume negotiations with Pakistan on the basis of more acceptable proposals. In some versions the group included Nazir Ahmad, the defense secretary, Aziz Ahmad, who was then foreign secretary, and Altaf Gauhar, secretary in the ministry of information and one of a few higher civil servants who were close to Ayub Khan.[55]

A few years later, when Bhutto was prime minister, he told Salman Taseer that he had indeed initiated the idea of sending guerrillas into Indian Kashmir, and that he had convinced Ayub Khan that the time to engage India in a confrontation had come. But he added that instead of sending Kashmiri guerrillas, as he had advised, "they" sent in regular Pakistani troops in plain clothes and mismanaged the whole enterprise.[56] In an interview with me in August 1974 Aziz Ahmad, who was minister of state for foreign affairs at that time, confirmed the above version of Bhutto's role. But Bhutto may not have prepared Ayub Khan's mind for a full-scale war with India. Asghar Khan writes that when he met Ayub Khan to offer his services in the war that appeared imminent to him, the president said Bhutto had assured him that Pakistan's incursion into Kashmir would not cause India to attack Pakistani territory.[57] Later Ayub Khan told G. W. Choudhury more than once that the decision to start the conflict with India in 1965 had been the fatal mistake of his career, and he blamed Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad for having misled him.[58]

Did Bhutto deceive Ayub Khan? Bhutto was a politician but he was also a lawyer. It is possible that for a time the lawyer prevailed over the politician. Indian spokesmen claimed Kashmir as an integral part of their country. But to Bhutto's mind this was merely high-handedness on their part. Pakistan, the United Nations documents, and most governments in the world regarded Kashmir as disputed territory. Pakistan's military initiative in this area would then not be the same as an attack on India. India would, of course, be free to respond but, legally, its countermeasures must be confined within Kashmir. It could not respond by attacking Pakistan. This is how Bhutto reasoned in the National Assembly on March 16, 1966. Pakistan, he said, had not started this war. It had reason and the right to support Kashmir's quest for self-determination. But it must be understood, he insisted, that in doing so "we did not commit aggression against India."[59] In support of his contention he pointed to the fact that many governments in the world had judged India to have been the aggressor and Pakistan the victim.

But what happened to the politician in Bhutto and why did Ayub Khan accept this legalistic reasoning? The president was not without considerable intelligence and, by this time, experience of both domestic and international politics. Moreover, Prime Minister Shastri had openly declared during and after the Rann of Kutch incident that India would retaliate at a time and place of its own choosing. Consider the possibility that Ayub Khan was not unreceptive to Bhutto's idea of a confrontation with India. He too had a low regard for India's military capability. Earlier in 1965 he had told an interviewer in London that Pakistani forces would have destroyed a whole Indian division in the Rann of Kutch had he not restrained them.[60] M. H. Zuberi has written that when, in the course of a meeting, he congratulated Ayub Khan on the army's good showing in the Rann, the president boasted: "I have reorganized the army . . . It has developed formidable fire power and if the Indians ever again give armed provocation I will smash them into smithereens."[61] It would then seem to follow that initially both Bhutto and Ayub Khan thought that, given the superiority of Pakistani weapons, they had a good chance of seizing enough territory in Kashmir and, in the event of a larger conflict, in the Indian Punjab to be able to force Indian concessions toward a Kashmir settlement.

Pakistani infiltrators started moving into Indian Kashmir in the first week of August 1965. Unable to speak the local language and lacking reliable local contacts, they failed to instigate the revolt the planners in Rawalpindi had wanted. India responded by capturing certain mountain passes and heights on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line to block further infiltration. Pakistan then mounted an armored attack in the Chhamb sector in Jammu to cut India's access to Srinagar. India used air power to check the rapid Pakistani advance and, on September 6, attacked Lahore across the international border to draw Pakistani forces away from Kashmir. After a week or so of fighting the war entered a stalemate. The United States government had already terminated military supplies to both Pakistan and India. It hurt only Pakistan, for India continued to receive supplies from the Soviet Union. As the war proceeded in a stalemate and Pakistani stocks of ammunition were depleted, Ayub Khan worried and lost his nerve. He first asked China for help, then became uncomfortable with the Chinese ultimatum to India, appealed to President Johnson to use his influence with both sides to stop the war, and finally accepted a United Nations call for a cease fire on September 23. He had not bargained for a protracted conflict. According to Aziz Ahmad, Bhutto wanted to delay the cease fire for a week during which time Pakistan might mount another offensive in Kashmir to gain more territory and, thus, leverage in future negotiations with India. He said some limited replenishments of ammunition and spare parts had arrived so that Pakistan could have continued the fighting for one more week.[62] But Ayub Khan wanted to take no more chances. Moreover, he could not resist the Western pressure to stop the war.

Bhutto spoke for Pakistan at a UN Security Council meeting on the night of September 22, 1965. Before conveying Ayub Khan's acceptance of a cease fire to go into effect the following morning, he called India a "great monster," a "predatory aggressor," that had imposed upon Pakistan a war of "naked aggression." Pakistan, he said, wanted to live in peace with India, but it must be a just and honorable peace, consistent with Pakistan's self-respect and India's own commitments and pledges concerning Kashmir. If India did not want to offer such a peace, Pakistanis would "wage a war for a thousand years, a war of defence."[63] According to unpublished reports, Bhutto

addressed some very colorful Punjabi vocabulary to Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister, which so incensed him that he walked out of the Council in protest. When on a subsequent occasion (October 25, 1965) the Indian delegation left the Council, protesting about Bhutto's references to Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he observed that the Indian "dogs" had left the Security Council but not Kashmir.[64] In later years Bhutto would tell his audiences, as proof of his bravery and effectiveness against India, that he had made the Indian representatives flee from the Security Council. Bhutto then went on to scold the Council for having ignored the Kashmir dispute, and threatened that if it continued this attitude of indifference, Pakistan would withdraw from the United Nations. News of Bhutto's denunciations of India, his defiance of the Security Council, tearful eyes and choking voice while he spoke, greatly endeared him to the people in West Pakistan who had been bewildered and shocked by Ayub Khan's acceptance of a cease fire in a war they thought they were winning.

Bhutto accompanied Ayub Khan to an Indo-Pakistan peace conference which the Soviets had sponsored. Talks opened at Tashkent on January 5, 1966. When Bhutto asked that the two sides find a solution to the Kashmir dispute, Swaran Singh replied that Kashmir, being a part of India, did not form a fit subject for their negotiations. Shastri told Ayub Khan that India could not simply give Kashmir away to Pakistan. After four days of deadlock the Soviets intervened. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, tried to impress upon Bhutto that Pakistan should not expect to gain at the conference what it had failed to achieve on the field of battle. Alexei Kosygin advised Ayub Khan that a plebiscite in Kashmir would be a dangerous thing. When Bhutto tried to respond, Kosygin waved him aside into silence.[65] He persuaded Ayub Khan to be content with the restoration of peace on the basis of *status quo ante bellum.* Bhutto counseled against this course of action, preferring to return home without an accord. A cease fire did prevail and a settlement was therefore not an urgent need. Its absence would keep the issue alive in world councils, Bhutto argued, and work as a pressure on India to be more forthcoming. But Ayub Khan decided otherwise.

According to Asghar Khan, who was also present at Tashkent, some substantive and some rather frivolous considerations in-

fluenced the president's mind. Indian forces were positioned within a few miles of Lahore, the capital of West Pakistan, and Sialkot, a major industrial center. Ayub Khan wished to see them move back behind their own borders. Beyond that he was impressed, perhaps unduly, by Shastri's professed desire for peace and friendship with Pakistan and by the respectful attention the Soviets gave him. High-ranking Soviet officers – Marshals Zhukov, Malinovsky, and Sokolovsky among others – clicked their heels and saluted each time he walked into, or out of, a conference room or a reception hall.[66] He began to feel that he must not keep the Soviet leaders from their important work in Moscow. Above all he feared that a failure to reach an accord would embarrass them for it would be considered their failure as well. Asghar Khan says that weighed down by these considerations and concerns the president began to be annoyed with those in his delegation who would take a tough line in negotiations.[67] He was ready to accept a Soviet draft agreement which included a non-war declaration, but Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad were able to throw it out. As Herbert Feldman has said of Ayub Khan, "the fibre of the man did not correspond to the manner of his address and was unequal to the necessities of his mission."[68] He signed an agreement which said nothing about Kashmir other than that the two sides had discussed it and set forth their respective positions. It provided for an exchange of prisoners of war and the return of Indian and Pakistani forces to positions they held before August 5, 1965.

Returning to the issue of Bhutto's responsibility for this war, we may say that he did have a leading role in initiating the first hostile moves in Indian Kashmir. It is clear also that in his own mind he was prepared, as was also Ayub Khan, for an Indo-Pakistan war in Kashmir which they thought they could win. Bhutto may have seen the possibility that the conflict would spill out of Kashmir and become a wider war. But it is unlikely that he contemplated a protracted war. Most probably he expected, or hoped, that Pakistani forces would quickly occupy considerable Indian space and then hold the line against Indian forces. World opinion and the powers would demand a cease fire which Pakistan would accept. Having Indian territory and population under its control, it would be able to negotiate with India from a position of strength. But all of this was not to be.

Bhutto knew that the cease fire had been intensely unpopular in West Pakistan, especially in the Punjab, and he anticipated that so would be the accord Ayub Khan had signed at Tashkent. He let it be known that he disapproved of it. In front of newsmen and their cameras he looked bored, sullen, and resentful. As news of the accord reached Pakistan it was greeted with "howls of derision and fury." Protesters rioted in major cities of West Pakistan and several were killed in police firing. Upon returning from Tashkent Bhutto retired to seclusion in Larkana which further strengthened the impression that he was unhappy. His defense of the accord was feeble enough to suggest that he did not really favor it. In a statement from Larkana he maintained that the accord was not an end in itself, and that the "slate" of Indo-Pakistan tensions would not be wiped clean until the people of Kashmir had won their right to self-determination. He told the National Assembly that the "famous" Tashkent Declaration was not a contract but only a declaration of intent on the part of both sides to resolve their disputes and build good neighborly relations in accordance with the UN Charter.[69]

As weeks passed it became more generally known that Bhutto had been opposed to this accord and rumors circulated that he would soon leave Ayub Khan's administration. Tashkent had severely wounded Ayub Khan's political standing; Bhutto's dissociation from it served to enhance his stature enormously. Setting aside conventional notions of loyalty, which would require him to remain firmly on Ayub Khan's side in his hour of need, Bhutto saw that the president's administration was a sinking ship which it would be politically wise for him to abandon. A few months later, when Ayub Khan sent him away, allegedly under American pressure, Bhutto's popularity soared, and crowds in the Punjab and Sind welcomed and idolized him as if he were already a great national hero. Thus was he launched upon a political career that would be marked by great vicissitudes.

Interpretation

What did Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the country gain, and lose, from his nearly eight years of service as a minister in Ayub Khan's administration? He obtained an intimate understand-

ing of how the machinery of government and the bureaucracy worked. He cultivated higher civil servants, officers in the armed forces, and diplomats in the foreign office, many of whom came to admire, and follow, him. As foreign minister he articulated the nation's urge for self-respect through themes of an independent foreign policy, Afro-Asian solidarity, opposition to imperialism and colonialism, defiance of India, and Islamic fraternity. His speech brought him much popular approval.

Bhutto also got to know Pakistani politicians and the way they practiced their craft. The experience may have taught him that the traditional style of bargaining in drawing-rooms would no longer do, and that the masses would have to be involved. The affection and praise the people in West Pakistan showered upon him may have caused him to think that they were not without a basic ability to discern political merit. But he may have found no sufficient reason to discard the conventional wisdom in Pakistan that the masses needed control and political opponents restraint.

While Bhutto was able to turn his role in the 1965 war to his own considerable advantage, it brought the country, in quick succession, much excitement, shock, disillusionment, and anguish. We cannot say that he alone was responsible for bringing on this war. But it should be said that he and others, who were together responsible, unwittingly sowed seeds that would soon grow into poisonous weeds of tumult and disruption.

NOTES

1. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. viii.
2. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings 1963-1965* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 50.
3. Karl von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 218–19, 255–6.
4. Ibid., pp. 189–90, 262.
5. Text of the speech is included in Bhutto, *Reshaping Foreign Policy: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1948-1966* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.); quoted material is on p. 175.
6. An opponent of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ghulam Mohammad Wassan from

the Sanghar district of Sind, charged in the National Assembly that Bhutto had pressured local officials to get votes for his candidate. Bhutto denied the allegation and showed that reports of his visits to Larkana, which Wassan had relied upon, were incorrect as to dates and duration: National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*, July 17 and 18, 1963, pp. 1648–59 and 1717–29.

7. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), pp. 46–7.
8. Bhutto's statement in *Pakistan Annual*, 1961, cited in Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1972), pp. 36–7.
9. See, for instance, Rashid Akhtar Nadvi, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Ki Siyasi Swaneh Hayat* (Political Biography of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), Urdu (Islamabad: Idara-e-Muarif-e-Milli, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 162–72. Also see Kausar Niazi, *Deedawar* (Man of Vision), Urdu (Islamabad: Sheikh Ghulam Ali, 1976).
10. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Speeches before the United Nations General Assembly 1957-1965* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), pp. 147–9 and *passim*.
11. Ibid., pp. 110, 154–5.
12. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Afro-Asian Solidarity," in *The Quest for Peace*, pp. 32–3, 35.
13. Bhutto, "Aid – Art Thou Charity," in *The Quest for Peace*, pp. 48–60.
14. Ibid., p. 35.
15. "Pakistan and the Muslim World," in *The Quest for Peace*, pp. 76–106.
16. Bhutto, *Speeches before the General Assembly*, p. 63.
17. Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace*, p. 95.
18. Ibid., p. 104-6.
19. "Résumé of Cabinet Discussions on 22 and 24 December 1958 on Foreign Policy," included as Annex 5 in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Bilateralism: New Directions* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1976), pp. 44–5.
20. Text of Bhutto's letter dated October 14, 1960 to Manzur Qadir, the foreign minister, and the résumé of cabinet meetings on October 24, 1960 and November 18, 1960 are included as Annex 13 and Annex 14 in Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, pp. 56–60.
21. Ibid., Annex 14, p. 60.
22. Masarrat Husain Zuberi, *Voyage through History* (Karachi: Hamdard Foundation Press, 1984), vol. 2, p. 441. Note that after this incident Zuberi became secretary to the ministry of fuel, power and natural resources under Bhutto.
23. Ibid., pp. 442–3.
24. For a more detailed discussion of the content and timing of this agreement see Anwar H. Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), pp. 82–93. Bhutto's report on the talks with India may be seen in National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*, July 17, 1963, pp. 1667–8.
25. My interview with Manzur Qadir in December, 1973.
26. During a foreign policy debate in the National Assembly in 1963 some members asserted that Dehlavi's pursuit of an independent foreign policy had annoyed the United States and cost him his post in the foreign

office. (He was transferred out as an ambassador abroad.) See National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates,* July 24, 1963, p. 2014.

27. National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates,* July 17, 1963, p. 1669. An edited version of the same speech will be found in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Compendium of Speeches Made in the National Assembly of Pakistan 1962–1964* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964), pp. 68-84 and, for the material under reference, p. 79.
28. Speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan on August 1964 included in Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan,* p. 123. Also see Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace,* p. 29.
29. Speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan on November 26, 1962. See Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan,* p. 31.
30. National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates,* July 17, 1963, p. 1666. Also see Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan,* p. 75.
31. National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates,* July 23 and 24, 1963, pp. 1968, 2006, 2014.
32. National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates,* July 23, 1963, pp. 1964–5.
33. Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan,* p. 66.
34. National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates,* July 24, 1963, pp. 2055-6. Also see Bhutto's address to the Foreign Press Association, London on May 6, 1965 in *The Quest for Peace,* p. 26.
35. Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan,* pp. 40–1.
36. Bhutto, *Bilateralism,* p. 3.
37. Ibid., p. 12.
38. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Speeches before the Security Council 1964* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, c. 1965), pp. 60–1, 88; *The Quest for Peace,* pp. 42–4, 66.
39. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), chs 18 and 19. Also see Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly on July 17, 1963 in the *Debates* for that date, p. 1663.
40. The material below is taken from Bhutto's speeches at the Security Council on February 3 and 7, March 17, May 5, 11, and 18 of 1964. Texts of these speeches have been published in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Speeches before the Security Council,* referred to earlier. Reference to the text will now be made only when citation of page numbers appears necessary.
41. Bhutto, *Speeches before the Security Council,* pp. 26–33, 62-3, 70–2.
42. Bhutto, *Speeches before the Security Council,* pp. 41–3.
43. Ibid., pp. 112–20.
44. Ibid., p. 44.
45. Ibid., pp. 91–3, 98–102.
46. Ibid., pp. 79, 136.
47. Ibid., pp. 104–6.
48. Ibid., pp. 123, 152–3.
49. National Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates,* July 23 and 24, 1963, pp. 1961, 1974, 1989, 1992, 2005–6, 2018, 2030–1.
50. Text of this speech is included in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Reshaping Foreign Policy;* see pp. 289–91, 295.
51. For details of China's role see Anwar H. Syed, *China and Pakistan,* pp. 110–21.

52. See Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 157–8.
53. See, for instance, Rashid Akhtar Nadvi, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Ki Siyasi Swaneh Hayat,* vol. 1, p. 211.
54. Mohammad Asghar Khan, *The First Round* (Lahore: Taabeer Publishing House, 1978), p. 113.
55. S. M. Zafar, *Through the Crisis* (Lahore, 1970), pp. 67–8; Salman Taseer, *Bhutto,* p. 60.
56. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto,* p. 61.
57. Asghar Khan, *The First Round,* p. 12.
58. G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 20.
59. Bhutto, *Reshaping Foreign Policy,* p. 292.
60. Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,* p. 48.
61. Zuberi, *Voyage Through History,* vol. 2, p. 520.
62. My interview with Aziz Ahmad on August 11, 1974.
63. Bhutto, *Reshaping Foreign Policy,* pp. 221–4.
64. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto,* p. 64.
65. My interview with Aziz Ahmad (who, as foreign secretary, was a member of the Pakistani team at Tashkent) on August 11, 1974.
66. *Outlook,* January 12, 1974 cited in Salman Taseer, *Bhutto,* p. 66.
67. Asghar Khan, *The First Round,* p. 119.
68. *From Crisis to Crisis,* p. 297.
69. Bhutto, *Reshaping Foreign Policy,* p. 299. Text of this speech covers pages 287–311.

3 Party-Making and Electioneering

On June 16 Ayub Khan sent Bhutto away on "long leave" to rest and relax in Europe. As Bhutto rode a train from Rawalpindi to Larkana, and then to Karachi, he was amazed by the depth of affection in which the people in West Pakistan seemed to hold him. Large crowds came to greet him at stops on the way. The scene at the railway station in Lahore, where Bhutto was to break the journey for lunch with the Nawab of Kalabagh, was enough to turn any politician's head:

> A vast mass of humanity was swarming over the platform, the carriage roof, bridges . . . and spilling on to the road outside. As the train approached the station they ran forward to garland him, clap and kiss his hand. Thousands of students and well-wishers had flocked to see him. They lifted him on their shoulders and carried him out shouting slogans like "Bhutto Zindabad" (Long live Bhutto), "United States Murdabad" (Down with the United States) . . . and, more surprisingly, anti-Ayub slogans as well. Their affection, warmth and enthusiasm so moved him that tears poured down his face as he was carried out of the station.[1]

It is probable that this massive demonstration of public acclaim, repeated at Larkana and Karachi, made Bhutto aware of his charisma and potential power, and eventually determined his future course of action.

Ayub Khan tried to steer Bhutto away from a mission of opposing the regime. He offered to send Bhutto abroad as an ambassador or grant him industrial licenses in case he preferred to remain in Pakistan. His emissaries threatened that dire consequences would ensue if Bhutto did not see reason.[2] But Bhutto would not offer the assurances they wanted. Beginning in February 1967 Ayub Khan's ministers began denigrating his personal integrity and his role as a minister, and the civil administration disrupted his public meetings.[3] These attacks may

have aroused Bhutto to his need for a political organization in launching a more effective counter-attack. His friends and admirers on the political left urged him to form a new party of his own. Thus the Pakistan People's Party was declared established – and "democrats," friends of the downtrodden, men and women of patriotism and goodwill invited to join it – at meetings on November 30 and December 1, 1967, at Dr Mubashir Hasan's house in Lahore.

DISCOVERING A WINNING IDEOLOGY

What should Bhutto and his new party say to the people of Pakistan? If he was to be a mass leader, and if his party was to wage mass politics, their message must be such as would bring comfort to the masses, who were mostly poor. Bhutto, it seems, had been greatly touched by the deprivation and indignity the poor, particularly those in his native Sind, endured. It is said that his concern for them began at home when, as a young boy, he saw his clan reject his mother, because of her modest social origins, and the anguish she suffered as a result.[4] He once wrote that he had first understood the true meaning of poverty when he read, in a British anthropologist's work, of a family in India who needed no more than four rupees to restore its worldly possessions, all of which had been destroyed when its hut caught fire.

> Poverty is to see little children taken away from you at the height of their beauty. It is to see your wife age quickly and your mother's back bend below the load of life. It is to be defenceless against the arrogant official, to stand unarmed before the exploiter and the cheat . . . Poverty is hunger, frustration, bereavement, futility. There is nothing beautiful about it.[5]

Piloo Mody recalled that Bhutto thought of himself as a socialist when he was a student in California. He went on to lament that Bhutto would often carry his lucid and sensible liberal reasoning to unwarranted socialist conclusions, perhaps because he preferred to be known as a socialist rather than as a liberal. The extent to which Bhutto was a socialist or a liberal,

or neither, is not something we have to settle at this point. But we see that at the time to which Mody was referring, Bhutto was also intensely proud of being a Muslim, regarding Muslim accomplishments through history as his own. He saw the Prophet of Islam as a revolutionary who sought to destroy "all that was evil and decadent," and who established equality among men as a major Islamic value.[6]

The PPP Foundation Documents

The new party's ideological and programmatic positions were first set forth in a series of papers called the *Foundation Documents.* The Urdu version is composed in an elegant literary style, representing a blend of Islamic, socialistic, and liberal democratic values and vocabulary.[7] The second part of *Document* 7 (pp. 64–8) is especially noteworthy for its scriptural style of poetic prose. The *Documents,* purporting to be Bhutto's covenant with the people, spelled out the party's analysis of Pakistan's developmental journey during the previous regimes, the rationale for its coming into being, its basic principles and commitments, and its case for socialism.

The PPP argued that despite appearances of growth during the Ayubian decade, the national economy had remained essentially weak. Heavy industry and the development of advanced technological competence had been neglected. Investment choices were made on the basis of availability of raw materials, for such was written in the Anglo-Saxon books on economics. The Pakistani entrepreneur was not the tough, adventurous "captain of industry" one might read about in the annals of Western industrial development. He was a weakling, unwilling to take risks, who financed his enterprises, at least partly, with public funds and received abundant government protection at the public's expense.

Beyond economics, the party saw a general decline in the quality of Pakistani life: a state of aimlessness and rootlessness prevailed among students, workers, and peasants; false and decadent values had made the intellectual apathetic and sterile; corruption, nepotism, and self-aggrandizement pervaded the power centers; politicization of the bureaucracy had eroded its competence and public service orientation; national integrity appeared more fragile than ever. Political parties were split into

factions, and conservatives among them were insensitive to the need for economic and social change while professing to value democracy. The progressives must therefore come together in a new party unencumbered by the personality conflicts and prejudices of the past. That would be the Pakistan People's Party.

Document 4 asserted that socialism alone could cure Pakistan's economic and political crises. But the road to socialism need not be the same for all; each nation's peculiar circumstances, values, and usages would influence its design. Pakistan must have its own kind of socialism, accommodating its religious and cultural values. Looking to the future, Pakistanis did not wish to disregard their past. Armed with knowledge and determination, the Pakistani socialist *mujahid* (crusader) would rediscover the native springs of his culture and civilization and reassert his national honor and destiny. There were many stages in this struggle and "an appointed time for each stage," indicating a gradualist approach.

The PPP believed that the enterprises basic to industrial development must be nationalized so as to be employed for the welfare of the entire nation. These would include banking and insurance, iron and steel, metallurgy, heavy engineering, machine tools, chemicals and petrochemicals, shipbuilding, armaments, automobiles, gas and oil, mining, generation and distribution of electric power, shipping, railways, and air and road transport. Competent and genuinely competitive private enterprise would be allowed to function and earn reasonable profits in other areas.

Social justice and the establishment of a classless society were said to be the party's guiding principles. Then there were the following programmatic commitments: a constitutional democratic order based on universal adult franchise; civil rights and liberties; full remuneration to peasants and workers for their labor; further elimination of feudalism and landlordism; encouragement of self-help projects and voluntary cooperative farming; development of nationwide unions in certain industries; minimum wages and the workers' right to strike; free health care for peasants and workers; reorganization of education to bring about a classless society; encouragement of regional languages expressing the people's cultural personality. The PPP came out strongly for the freedoms of belief and expression,

press, organization, and assembly. The denial of these rights and liberties, it said, produced a "slave" society afflicted with dictatorship, corruption, police oppression, cultural and moral decay. It compelled free men to resort to violence.

Islam received a place of high honor in the value system projected in the *Documents*. This was easily done since some of the major socialist values – egalitarianism and outlawry of exploitation – are also preeminently Islamic values. Other socialist emphases – nationalization of the means of production, class struggle, neocolonial dominance of the developing world – were balanced by terms of democratic liberalism and Islam. Consider, for instance, the following observations in *Document 7:*

> In the name of God, who rules the entire universe, we submit that when a degenerate social order stifles the values of human decency; when opportunism and hypocrisy become part of the national character; when flattery of the rulers is identified with wisdom, honesty with foolishness; when men become apathetic and close their eyes to reality; when men of learning mislead others for personal advantage, and fountains of creativity dry out; then surely men have left the path of righteousness, and for those who do and should care, time for Jehad has come.
>
> And for this Jehad, we invite the masses of Pakistan to unite with us to abolish ignorance, hypocrisy, oppression, exploitation, and slavery; to uphold and advance knowledge, honesty, probity, justice, equality, liberty; and to throw into this struggle our talents of expression, money, labor, and indeed our very lives, until this land brightens up with the divine light of God. [My free translation of the Urdu text.]

Not wishing to invite widespread hostility when it was just getting off the ground, the PPP preferred to be seen as an agent of social change but not as the maker of a socialist revolution. There is little revolutionary or otherwise militant vocabulary in the *Documents*. The party wanted to attract as many and alienate as few interests as possible in order to prepare for the struggle for power that lay ahead. Nothing would be lost, and possibly much would be gained, by adhering to the estab-

lished political custom of professing one's dedication to Islam; nor would it necessarily be farcical. It would be unwise to alarm the middle land owners in the countryside or the shopkeepers in towns by launching a major attack on landed property or private enterprise. The party promised to demolish the edifice of exploitative capitalism, already under fire from several quarters, but otherwise it chose to project itself as a progressive nation-builder dedicated to the norms of humane and civil conduct.

The 1970 Election *Manifesto*

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto spent much of 1968 building opposition to the Ayub regime by condemning it before students, peasants, workers, lawyers, and various other groups all over West Pakistan. He came to know who were the political notables in rural areas, small towns, and cities and informed himself of their associations and rivalries. He met them and talked politics with them. It would be wrong to say that he alone was responsible for bringing down Ayub Khan's autocratic rule. But there can be little doubt that his campaign, of which we will say more shortly, prepared the ground for a mass movement against the regime. Unable to quell it, Ayub Khan yielded power to the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, on March 25, 1969.

On November 28, Yahya Khan announced that elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies would be held in October of 1970; later postponed to December because of devastating floods in East Pakistan. The National Assembly resulting from the election would frame a new constitution which must, however, meet with his approval before it could become operative. In March 1970 he promulgated a Legal Framework Order (LFO), setting forth the guidelines the new constitution must follow. These were: inviolability of the country's territorial integrity, preservation of Islamic ideology, independence of the judiciary, removal of economic disparities between regions, and a federal system that would not only allow autonomy to the provinces but adequate legislative, administrative, and financial powers to the central government. If the Assembly did not complete its work within 120 days, it would be dissolved and new elections would be held.

By the end of 1969 PPP offices had sprung up in a great number of towns and cities, and Bhutto had established himself as the most popular political leader in West Pakistan. His and his party's enhanced status and self-confidence were reflected in their election *Manifesto* which appeared in early 1970. Written in fluent, readable English, its crisp and hardhitting sentences were laced with militant socialist vocabulary – class struggle, monopoly capitalism, the idea of labor as the author of all value, theory of surplus value, a Leninist interpretation of imperialism – much more than the *Foundation Documents* had been in 1967. It would be repetitive to cover the programmatic positions taken in the *Manifesto,* for they were substantially the same as those in the *Documents.* The discussion below will focus on the *Manifesto's* distinctive features.

The party was now ready to specify the dimensions of the public sector under its regime. Eventually, "all major sources of the production of wealth," to the extent of *80 percent* of the economy (excluding agriculture) would be nationalized. The remaining 20 percent would comprise small industry and retail trade, but even here the possibility of urban and rural consumer cooperatives was not excluded. The *Manifesto* asserted that, all production of wealth being the result of human labor, landlords and capitalists were "functional superfluities." They contributed nothing that peasants and workers and public authorities could not provide. They only exploited the labor of others and pocketed the "surplus value." The earlier, rather generous, interpretation of Ayub Khan's land reforms now gave way to the assertion that by granting state lands to privileged groups – notably high civil and military officials – the Ayub regime had expanded landlordism, saddling the economy with "consumption-oriented non-producers." His land reforms had not broken up the large estates or the power of feudal lords, who continued to be a formidable barrier to social change. The PPP would appoint a new ceiling on holdings: 50 to 150 acres of irrigated land, depending on yield per acre. It would protect the interests of the peasantry "in accordance with the established principles of socialism." It would encourage the establishment of multipurpose "social cooperative farms" on a voluntary basis and develop some two hundred "Agrovilles" – small towns functionally linked with the surrounding countryside. Tenants and poorer peasants would pay no land revenue.

The *Manifesto,* like the *Documents* before, offered a splendid defense of the freedom of belief and expression. One must not insist that only approved beliefs be expressed. "Bigotry is an insult to faith and intelligence alike." The party would lift the blinkers that the previous regimes had placed on the nation's eyes. It suggested that, in an earlier era, Muslim intellectual life had deteriorated because of the rise of "dogmatic fanaticism." Under the "socialist regime," therefore, "no book shall be proscribed merely on the ground that its contents differ from the tenets or beliefs of any religion or faith." Nor would there be any censorship of "true" news items.

The *Manifesto* was much more than a general statement of the party's principles and goals. It read like a plan, with an amazing amount of specificity and detail. The reader could see, among other things, reference to toys and their contribution to children's mental development; comparative life expectancy statistics; elements of fats and proteins in the Pakistani diet; expense accounts; truth in advertising; forests and woodlands; poultry farms and cattle ranches; training and diplomas for artisans; rental of floor space in factory halls; revocation of civil awards; tax evasion; trash collection; water rates; the brain drain. The character and dimensions of social change proposed in the *Manifesto* were revolutionary. The existing system, which permitted "outright plunder" of the people, was "rotten." Therefore, the party would "abolish the system itself."

Of Islamic Socialism

The PPP designated its ideological position as "Islamic socialism," and although the phrase, as such, had not figured in either the *Documents* or the *Manifesto,* Bhutto began using it within a few days of launching his election campaign in January 1970. He may have been aware of the affinities between Islam and socialism, but it is likely that the term itself was suggested to him by associates who were more conversant with Islamic literature, for instance, Haneef Ramay. Consider also that Islamic socialism had been the subject of a vigorous public debate in Pakistan only a few years earlier. A. K. Sumar called it a trickery during a speech in the National Assembly on June 24, 1966. Ramay published a rebuttal in the *Newa-e-Waqt* of June 29. A wider debate then followed in which many Pakistanis, some of

them leading intellectuals, published articles and letters, pro and con, in the *Nawa-e-Waqt, Dawn,* and several other newspapers.[8] Ramay, who published a journal called *Nusrat,* devoted its October 1966 issue to essays on Islamic socialism, and a copy was presented to Bhutto on his return from Europe at about the same time.

It should, however, be noted that, much earlier, the Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had made approving references to Islamic socialism,[9] and the term had been current in Muslim political discourse in the Indian subcontinent and the Arab world for several decades. It represented, among other things, a sympathetic response to the value of egalitarianism and opposition to exploitation that socialists urged. The PPP's linkage between Islam and socialism was substantially the same.

> The ultimate objective of the party's policy is the attainment of a classless society, which is possible only through socialism in our time. This means true equality of the citizens, fraternity under the rule of democracy in an order based on economic and social justice. These aims follow from the political and social ethics of Islam. The party thus strives to put in practice the noble ideals of the Muslim faith.[10]

The party argued, as did other exponents of Islamic socialism, that the right to private property was subordinate to the interest of the community, which transcended that of the individual, so that property could be nationalized if and when there were compelling public reasons for doing so.[11]

BHUTTO AND THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1970

The election campaign opened on January 1, 1970 when Yahya Khan lifted the restrictions on political activity which he had imposed earlier. Most politicians in the field lacked Bhutto's charisma and mass appeal. The Council Muslim League was led by Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana at the national level, by Sardar Shaukat Hayat in the Punjab, and by M. A. Khuhro in Sind. These men had belonged to the Muslim League since before independence, and they had given loyal service during

the struggle for Pakistan. They had not collaborated with Ayub Khan but, at the same time, they had not actively opposed him. Not one of them had ever been a mass politician or an inspiring public speaker. Daultana and Shaukat Hayat were still rather young, but they seemed to have aged and tired prematurely. The Convention Muslim League, patronized by Ayub Khan, had a great deal of money but no leaders, and Yahya Khan froze its bank account before it could spend much of its funds on the election. Abdul Qayyum Khan, head of his own faction of the Muslim League and known for his stern and autocratic rule in NWFP between 1947 and 1953, used to be an energetic and effective public speaker, but he was now close to 70 and sluggish. Moreover, he had quarreled with Daultana and split the party, which diminished his influence considerably. The leaders of the Islamic parties were known to be good and pious but did not command mass following. The National Awami Party included several popular leaders with oratorical skills, notably Abdul Wali Khan, but persistent government propaganda, which branded them as separatists, had limited their appeal to certain districts of NWFP and Baluchistan. Asghar Khan, who first founded the Justice Party and then Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, had been eminently successful as commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Air Force when he served in that post in the early 1960s, and he was thought to be a fine "gentleman of the old school," but he was dull as a public speaker. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was eloquent in Urdu speech, and he was a skillful negotiator in conference diplomacy, but his party (PDP) had never really got off the ground.

A New Kind of Campaign

In the past, electoral politics in Pakistan had consisted mainly of drawing-room negotiations and bargaining. Voters were often approached through intermediaries, including police and revenue officials, village notables, caste and clan elders. But this time, largely as a result of Bhutto's political strategy and style, the traditional modes of contact were set aside in many electoral districts. Public meetings, rallies, processions, announcers and slogan-chanting teams in vehicles fitted with loudspeakers, posters and handbills dominated the year-long campaign. Politicians delivered fiery speeches in cities and towns and some,

notably Bhutto, went to villages and addressed peasants. The people of Pakistan took to politics with great enthusiasm. Party flags flew on tops of private homes and portraits of favored political leaders graced shops. Lack of formal education appeared to be irrelevant to political participation. Issues were discussed not only in coffee houses, intellectual forums, and the press but in homes, barbers' shops, and the workplace. Not unoften members of the same family took opposite sides.[12]

Politics and the people were divided between right and left, partly because Bhutto wanted this kind of polarization, and partly because the "rightists" launched vituperative attacks on him and his party. On February 24, 1970, an assembly of 113 ulema described socialism as the greatest of all dangers to the security and well-being of Pakistan and called upon all Muslims to rise against this "accursed" ideology. The ulema declared that individuals and groups who preached socialism were rebels against God and His book, and that it would be gravely sinful for any Muslim to aid, or vote for, them.[13] The rightists had help from some of Yahya Khan's ministers, notably, Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan, minister for information, and the newspapers his ministry controlled. The Islamic parties and the Muslim League projected the election as a contest between Islam and its enemies. They used the occasion of the Prophet's birthday and other Islamic holidays not so much to celebrate Islam or their own programs as to denounce Bhutto and his party. They alleged, as Ayub Khan's ministers had done in 1967, that Bhutto had been claiming Indian citizenship until a few months before he became a minister in 1958. They condemned his association with the Ayub regime, accused him of being a drinker and a womanizer, and said that his mother had been a Hindu. But as the election results would later show, these accusations had little effect.

The PPP ran a folksy and colorful campaign. Large portraits of Bhutto were displayed at meetings and carried in processions. Rhyming and catching slogans were invented and shouted at public meetings and rallies. For instance: "Bhutto Sada Sher Hai, Baqi Her Pher Hai" (Our Bhutto is truly a lion while the others are merely devious); "Valika Tha, Amrika Tha, Bhutto Wah, Wah, Wah" (Valika, the industrialist, is down, America is down, cheers for Bhutto); "Sada Bhutto Awe-i-Awe" (Our Bhutto is bound to come to power); "Bhutto Jiye Hazar Sal" (May Bhutto live a thousand years).[14] On his part, Bhutto proved to

be a tireless campaigner. He addressed huge gatherings at the celebrated meeting grounds in major cities – Mochi Gate in Lahore, Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, Chowk Yadgar in Peshawar, Nishtar Park in Karachi. But he also went to poor neighborhoods, city slums, small towns, and villages. There were times when he addressed as many as a dozen public meetings in a single day. His speeches were often long, and some of them went on for two or even three hours; the length of time for which a speaker can hold his audience is a measure of his oratorical excellence, which is highly regarded in the Pakistani political culture. A political speech may have educational value, but it is also entertainment. A short speech would be disappointing to listeners who had traveled some distance to the meeting place; not worth the time and effort they had spent.

At this point, a word on Bhutto's style of public speaking may be appropriate. He was the only politician in recent Pakistani experience to have recognized the necessity of learning, in adult life, a Pakistani language (Urdu) other than his native tongue. While he spoke the King's English well enough to overawe those Pakistanis who might consider such an accomplishment a hallmark of sophistication, his Urdu speech was refreshingly pedestrian and his Sindhi rural. When he addressed mass meetings his idiom, metaphors, jokes, gibes, and even gesticulations were those of the ordinary folk. He was fluent in all three languages. Verb endings might not agree with number and gender in his Urdu speech, but words, even if sometimes mispronounced, came out like a torrent. His lapses of diction were, in fact, a political advantage: they enhanced his rapport with his audience by amusing the better-knowing and by giving peasants and workers the good feeling that he spoke their kind of Urdu or Sindhi. As he went along in his speech, he informed, instructed, flattered, and sometimes even scolded his audience. That he was often quite repetitive could have been an act of choice, for it enabled his message to sink in, maintained his oratorical flow, and gave him time to phrase his next sentence when dealing with a complex issue.

The supremacy of the people became a recurring theme in Bhutto's speeches. On occasion he would express his identification with them, and presumably theirs with him, in terms of completeness suggestive of a union of spirits or souls well-known to students of mysticism. Twice in the fall of 1973, when

Bhutto was prime minister, I heard him tell his audiences that there were two Bhuttos, one that lived in his own body and the other that resided in each one of them. They and he were thus united in an unbreakable bond and made inseparable.

Periodically, the PPP organized slow-moving processions of automobiles and other vehicles which Bhutto led and which stretched over long distances; the longer the procession the greater its success and the popularity of its leader were deemed to be. An account of one such procession, appearing in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* of Lahore in the first week of March 1970, may be of interest. The paper's correspondent in Gujrat filed the following despatch on March 1:

> Today a long procession – consisting of cars, jeeps, motor scooters, and trucks – to honor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set out from Deena in Jhelum district and started moving toward Gujrat. It received animated welcome from crowds as it passed various towns on the way. Cheering supporters and sympathizers set off fireworks and showered flowers on Bhutto. Many rushed toward his car as it came to sight and shouted "Long live Bhutto." Decorative arches and gates had been constructed on which large portraits of Bhutto hung and PPP flags fluttered. As the procession approached Jhelum, people of all ages lined both sides of the road for one and a half miles to greet Bhutto who waved to them. When the procession reached Sara-e-Alamgir, young men beat drums, sang, and danced while others, mounted on camels, shouted pro-Bhutto slogans. At Kharian a full-scale band played.
>
> Nineteen miles from Gujrat Bhutto transferred to an open jeep. PPP workers shouted slogans from two vehicles equipped with loudspeakers. Pro-socialism slogans were avoided as the procession went through rural areas but as it approached the city of Gujrat slogans in support of socialism, the PPP, and Bhutto were raised. Slogans condemning the ulema, who had denounced socialism as un-Islamic, were also shouted, and their "fatwa" (edict) to this effect was called an American "fatwa."[15]

Bhutto tried to deemphasize the fact of his being a Sindhi. He said he loved all regions of Pakistan as well as his native Sind, and that he would work to advance the prosperity and

well-being of all of them. He condemned the periodic fighting between the Muhajirs and Sindhis, and between the latter and the Punjabi settlers, in his own province. He invited all "nationalities" to unite in a common struggle to protect their rights against their oppressors. At the same time, he did allow slight variations of emphasis as he went from one province to the next. In NWFP he praised the valor of the Pathans, in Sind he condemned the *waderas* and the "One Unit," and in the Punjab he vowed to resist India.[16] The PPP adopted an economical campaign strategy. It decided not to contest in East Pakistan, and allocated only a small portion of its resources to the campaign in Baluchistan. It focused on the Punjab and Sind, and to a lesser extent on NWFP, and within these provinces it concentrated its effort on districts which were economically more developed than others.

Bhutto made himself attractive to several diverse groups in West Pakistan. Some landlords joined his camp either because they too were progressive or because they dismissed his egalitarianism as campaign rhetoric. Leftist intellectuals, journalists, poets, and professionals flocked to the PPP because they liked its opposition to capitalism, feudalism, and imperialism. Moreover, they thought that under its rule they would be able to speak freely again. Even those who were skeptical of Bhutto's socialism were pleased that his speeches had given it respectability in the country's political discourse. The party's promise to "toss crowns and tumble thrones," give land to the tiller and factories to the workers, and act as the vanguard of the young people and their idealism pulled in the relevant groups. Students, workers, and peasants became enthusiastically involved with the PPP. In many instances they opened party offices in remote places without the prior authorization, or even knowledge, of the PPP leadership.[17]

Bhutto himself addressed most of the PPP's major meetings while lower party functionaries spoke at street corners and undertook door-to-door canvassing. Bhutto's audiences were attracted to his person as well as to his *Manifesto.* In his speeches he did, of course, explain his program, but he also talked about himself. This was a novel technique. It had been customary for Pakistani politicians to promise their listeners the good things of life and to stress the unworthiness of their opponents, but they did not normally dwell on their own merits for the office

they sought. Bhutto repeatedly attributed certain qualities to himself, and it may be argued that his self-projection fortified his charisma inasmuch as it answered his audience's image of a good and great leader. As one might expect, he also criticized his detractors and opponents. We present below an account of how he characterized himself and his adversaries, for it reveals his astute understanding of the idiom and style of reasoning which mass audiences in Pakistan at that time, and probably even now, would understand and enjoy.

Bhutto on Himself and His Foes

Competent: Bhutto projected himself as a well-educated, mature, shrewd, and capable politician. He reminded his audiences that he had earned several academic degrees, served as the nation's foreign minister, participated in numerous international conferences, and seen virtually the whole world. He claimed that when he was foreign minister all Muslim nations supported Pakistan during its war with India. This support had weakened since then, but he could gather it again. Much tact and political insight were needed to succeed in the intricate game of international politics. These were rare qualities which he possessed and which his opponents lacked.

He could have become a farmer or practiced law, but his real calling was politics, the "milk" he had received at birth. "It is politics, above all, that inspires me and kindles in me the flame of a lasting romance." He could outdo Ayub Khan and his other political rivals who were mere novices. Ayub had hoped that, like a hunter, he would capture Bhutto. "But I am a better hunter. He could trap others but failed to trap Zulfikar Ali."[18] Bhutto asked voters to elect those who understood statecraft and had served Pakistan ably in the past. He invited them to compare his capabilities and services with those of his opponents whose experience, he alleged, was limited to hatching intrigues and conspiracies.[19]

As further evidence of his competence, Bhutto claimed to have restored balance to Pakistani foreign policy, lifting the country from the status of a mere satellite of the United States (a "laughing-stock of the world") to that of an independent and respected member of the family of nations. He said he had surmounted "insuperable hurdles" in initiating and then carry-

ing forward friendly relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. During the 1965 war he had gone to China and obtained its firm support of Pakistan. So significant had this achievement been that on his return Ayub Khan embraced him and told him that the nation would be forever in his debt because of his great service.[20]

Patriot and Democrat: Bhutto represented himself as a civil, broad-minded, liberal politician, as a Pakistani patriot, and as one committed to democracy. He would ensure that democracy should never again be endangered in Pakistan, for a dictatorship was no substitute for people's rule. He did not believe in rancor, he said, and would not allow personal feeling to influence his political decisions. He was not intolerant or conceited and did not wish to become a dictator. Born a Sindhi, he treated all Pakistanis as his brothers. Some of his opponents had alleged that he was an Indian, some that he was a communist, and others that he was a fascist. But "I swear by God, I am nothing but a Pakistani." And, again, "this is your country, and my country, and this is where we have to live and die."[21]

Principled and Upright: Bhutto said he was a man of principles and one who was upright and kept his covenants. He professed to believe in the primacy of ideals and discounted the capacity of realism, pragmatism, and a "down-to-earth" disposition to achieve results. Nothing excelled the power of an ideal, he would say.[22] The government of the day might arrest him but it could not imprison his ideas and ideology. In fact, his arrest would enhance their appeal by arousing the people's consciousness. He said he was undertaking an "epoch-making" struggle to establish truth, right, and justice in Pakistan.[23]

Bhutto claimed to be honest and upright. Had he been lusty of power, as his detractors alleged, he would have accommodated himself to Ayub's policies and kept his job. He had resigned his office to serve the people, speak out on national issues, and defend national integrity. Like Ayub Khan, he too could have amassed wealth while he was a minister but he did not choose to do so. Bhutto's opponents wanted to know why he had served Ayub Khan for eight years if the latter was corrupt and unpatriotic as he alleged. This had been a mistake, he said.

Mistakes were a part of life, which was a learning process, a continuous series of tests to which one's responses could not always be right.[24]

Man of the People: In speech after speech Bhutto projected himself as a man of the people. On April 19, 1970 at Campbellpur, for instance, he stressed variations on this theme no less than 14 times. On the other hand, he represented his adversaries as "drawing-room" politicians, indifferent or hostile to the people's aspirations and contemptuous of their judgment.[25]

Bhutto said he was a servant of the people, their brother, friend and comrade, their spokesman, and therefore worthy of being their leader. In a struggle for restoring their rights, he had been with them every step of the way, "at every turn," "on all fronts," "through thick and thin," and through all "trials and tribulations." Together they – the people and he – had fought Ayub Khan, that "Hitler of Pakistan," and ousted him from power. Together they had faced police batons and tear gas shells. When they went to jail, he too went to jail. His opponents feared him because they feared the people. His voice was the people's voice, his speeches their speeches. There was no difference between them and him; they and he were the same.[26]

Brave: Bhutto declared that he would defy all difficulties the people's oppressors placed in his way. Neither physical discomfort, nor violence to his person, nor even threats against his very life would deter him. He was a man unafraid, brave, and tough.

This claim to bravery referred to a variety of contexts. Bhutto claimed that he and his friends had been subjected to a "mounting wave" of harassment. The government sent armed gangsters to disrupt his meetings in the hope of scaring him away from politics. But he would not be frightened or browbeaten. If he could not speak to the people in one town, he would address them in another. But meet the people he did. He did not go into hiding as other politicians had done.[27] Nor was he afraid of imprisonment. He had gone to jail and suffered torture; he had lived in a cell infested with flies, mosquitoes, rats, bats, and dirt.[28]

Willingness to face death being bravery of a high order, Bhutto professed to be ever willing to lay down his life in the

nation's service. He would expose the Ayub regime even "if they kill me." On numerous occasions he alleged that his opponents, with the connivance of the local police and civil authorities, had tried to kill him at Sanghar on March 31, 1970. This is how he related the incident:

> a hail of bullets was fired at me. I was in a motor car but I came out because I wanted to face death bravely. I started walking forward and told my opponents that there I was standing before them and that they need not fire on my friends and colleagues. I was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and they could shoot me. Then they started firing again. My friends fell upon me [to cover me] and I had a very narrow escape.[29]

Bhutto asserted that, by contrast, his opponents were timid. If they criticized the government in a public speech, they went to the deputy commissioner's house in the evening to apologize for it. They did not have the courage or toughness to face imprisonment, lathi charges, tear gas, and bullets.

A Socialist Servant of Islam: Bhutto's opponents argued that his "Islamic socialism" was a contradiction in terms, for socialism, being antithetical to God and religion, could not be Islamic. Responding to this challenge, Bhutto advertised his personal dedication to Islam, denied that Islam and socialism were incompatible, or that his espousal of socialism posed any danger to Islam.

Bhutto insisted that he was a good Muslim: he recited the *kalima* (the affirmation that there is no God other than Allah, and that Muhammad is His Prophet), and believed that life and death, honor and disgrace, were all in God's hands. But, beyond this, he was a servant of Islam and a *mujahid* (soldier) in its cause. Of his faith and dedication, and of his service to Islam, his "Creator knows the truth," which He would declare on the Day of Judgment! Peasants, workers, and students also knew of it.

Bhutto said he advocated socialism because, in the economic sphere, it was the same as Islam. In fact, "the first seeds of socialism had flowered under Islam, the Islam of the days of our Prophet" and the first four caliphs, who had organized the

polity on the principle of equality. That Islam and socialism were antagonistic was "mere propaganda by those who want to exploit the people and suck their blood." Bhutto offered the following more sophisticated argument in a radio address that would be heard by the intelligentsia:

> The roots of socialism lie deep in a profoundly ethical view of life. We of the Pakistan People's Party earnestly maintain that the high ideals of Islam in relation to society can be attained only through a socialist system abolishing the exploitation of man by man. We believe that the nature of justice in the world demanded by our religion is inherent in the conception of a classless society. In this Islam differs fundamentally from other religions. Islam recognizes no castes. Capitalist society has a class structure which is opposed to the equality and brotherhood enjoined upon Muslims by Islam. When we call our economic program Islamic socialism we are . . . within the moral traditions of Islam. In the name of justice the Pakistan People's Party spells out Islam in concrete terms of fraternity and friendship.[30]

Bhutto interpreted service to Islam as service to Muslims which, he said, he and his associates were rendering. Thus, they were "true" Muslims. The ideology of Pakistan meant that Muslims should govern that country, make it prosperous, and free it from corruption and injustice. It meant assuring political participation to the "people at large" and ameliorating their economic distress. "We believe in the ideology of Pakistan. We want to serve the cause of Islam by enabling the people of Pakistan to solve their problems."[31]

Responding to some of the ulema, who alleged that his program would subvert the faith, Bhutto adopted a theological mode of reasoning. If Islam was an eternal religion, he argued, and if God himself had chosen to be its protector, as all Muslims agreed, there could never be any danger to its integrity. Again, the finality of Muhammad's prophethood was itself a guarantee that Islam would never be in danger. If it were possible for any danger to Islam to arise, God would surely have provided for other prophets to follow Muhammad to overcome the danger. But He had made no such provision.[32] Not Islam, but capitalists, feudal lords, exploiters and their stooges were in danger, Bhutto said.

Interpretation

Bhutto said he was competent, democratic, upright, keeper of his covenants, brave, friend and servant of the people, egalitarian, a good Muslim, patriotic, and a resister of Indian pressures against Pakistan. These attributes were, and still are, indisputably desirable in a Pakistani leader regardless of the degree to which individual politicians and others might practice them in their own professional and personal conduct. They express the professed values of Pakistani political culture. But the idiom and the style of reasoning Bhutto employed to establish his claim to these attributes exasperated his opponents and amazed the "discerning" others, including some in his own camp. Let us consider a few examples:

(a) At Sanghar he came out of his car, walked toward his assailants, confronted them, and shouted: 'Come on shoot me, I am Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, but don't fire upon my friends.'
(b) On numerous other occasions, we find him shouting: 'Arrest me, I am not afraid of imprisonment, I am ready to die for my people, I am ready for martyrdom.' (Sometimes, while saying these things, he would take off his jacket, roll up his shirt sleeves, open his shirt front, and at least once he even tore up his shirt.)
(c) He said he was a good Muslim because he recited the *kalima.*
(d) He asserted that socialism was merely the English equivalent of the Arabic word *musawat* (equality).
(e) He argued that there could be no danger to Islam in Pakistan because Allah Himself had chosen to be its protector.

The walk to confront the opponent, challenging shouts of "come on," rolling up of sleeves, and declarations of fearlessness are expressions of brave conduct in physical combat which the educated upper and middle classes in Pakistan associate with the uncivil "riffraff." Bhutto was known to be capable of sophisticated speech. It would then appear to his critics and others that he had deliberately chosen to be crude in order to please the crowd which was, *ipso facto,* also crude.

His assertions involving Islam might be convincing, even reassuring, to his listeners, many of whom also believed that it

was enough to recite the *kalima* to be a Muslim. These assertions were not necessarily false, but critics could say that they consisted of theological bits and pieces, half-truths, and inappropriate analogies assembled in specious reasoning to confound important issues. The ulema and Bhutto's other opponents may have been infuriated also because they could not rebut him except by a complex train of reasoning which the masses would not readily understand. They felt that he was vulgarizing not only the political discourse in Pakistan but also Islam. They saw him as an artful demagogue misleading the common folk, who were credulous, and at the same time confirming them in their ignorant beliefs, passions, and prejudices.

Many of the better-educated Pakistanis who heard and watched Bhutto would not support him. But many others in the same group, even if they were disdainful of his folksy speech and gestures, voted for him in the expectation that, if he won, he would bring about the kind of changes they desired. Still others applauded his creativity and daring in contriving forms of communication which, because of their close connection with the native idiom and metaphor, won the hearts and minds of large aggregations of people for him and his party. Cogent criticisms of his record and program did occasionally appear. But many of Bhutto's opponents, lacking the ingenuity to devise adequate responses, turned to the simpler strategy of denouncing his person and ideology.[33]

THE ELECTION RESULTS: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Elections to the National Assembly were scheduled for December 7, 1970. East Pakistan and the four provinces of West Pakistan, which Yahya Khan had restored, would each be represented in the Assembly according to its population. Of the 300 Assembly seats, 138 would thus be filled from West Pakistan, and 162 from East Pakistan. Elections to the provincial assemblies were to follow ten days later. Needless to say, the PPP wanted to win as many as possible of the seats allocated to West Pakistan. Bhutto himself thought it might win as many as 40,

whereas other observers anticipated that it would take only about 20.[34]

Many of the party nominees, especially in the Punjab, were little-known lawyers, engineers, and other political novices. Some of them were serious socialists: for instance, Dr Mubashir Hasan, Sheikh Rashid, Khurshid Hasan Meer, Meraj Mohammad Khan, and Mukhtar Rana. But a number of "feudals" had also received the party "tickets." Notable among them were Nasir Ali Rizvi, Shahzada Saeed-ur-Rashid Abbasi, Malik Muzaffar Khan, Malik Anwar Ali Noon, Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, and Ghulam Mustafa Khar in the Punjab; Darya Khan Khoso, Mumtaz Bhutto, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Jam Sadiq Ali, and the Makhdoom of Hala in Sind. Bhutto defended the award of party tickets to these landlords and *waderas,* saying that they had promised to respect the PPP's platform.

The election results, shown in the following tables, pleasantly surprised Bhutto and stunned his opponents. His party had won a spectacular victory in the Punjab and a substantial victory in Sind. After taking its share of the seats reserved for women, the PPP would have close to a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly seats from West Pakistan, a similar majority in the Punjab provincial assembly, and a clear majority in the Sind provincial assembly.

Table 3.1 National Assembly elections, 1970: seats won

		Muslim League factions				*Islamic parties*				
Provinces	*Total seats*	*PPP*	*PML/ Qayyum*	*PML/ Council*	*PML/ Convention*	*JI*	*JUI*	*JUP*	*NAP*	*Independents*
Punjab	82	62	1	7	2	1	–	4	–	5
Sind	27	18	1	–	–	2	–	3	–	3
NWFP	18	1	7	–	–	1	6	–	3	–
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area)	7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	7
Baluchistan	4	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	3	–
Total	138	81	9	7	2	4	7	7	6	15

Source: Election Commission, *Report on General Elections 1970-71* (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1972), pp. 204-5.

Table 3.2 National Assembly elections, 1970: percentage of valid votes received by PPP and selected others

Provinces	*Valid votes % of eligible votes*	*PPP*	*Three PML factions*	*Three Islamic parties*	*NAP*	*Independents*
Punjab	66.48	41.66	23.19	20.15	–	11.65
Sind	58.44	44.95	19.33	22.1	0.37	11.11
NWFP (including FATA)	46.83	14.28	27.27	33.23	18.50	6.01
Baluchistan	39.04	2.38	21.93	21.16	45.23	6.81

Source: Election Commission, *Report on General Elections 1970-71,* pp. 202-3.

Table 3.3 Provincial assembly elections, 1970: seats won

Provinces	*Total seats*	*PPP*	*QML*	*Con ML*	*Conv ML*	*JI*	*JUI*	*JUP*	*NAP*	*PDP*	*Ind*	*Oth*
Punjab	180	113	6	16	5	1	2	4	–	4	27	2
Sind	60	28	5	4	–	1	–	7	–	–	14	1
NWFP	40	3	10	1	2	1	4	–	13	–	6	–
Baluchistan	20	–	2	–	–	–	3	–	8	–	6	1

Source: Election Commission, *Report on General Elections 1970-71,* pp. 218-19.

Key:
Con: Council
Conv: Convention
Ind: Independent
Oth: Others

Just as satisfactory was the fact that some of the party's political novices had defeated well-established politicians. More notable of those who lost to PPP candidates were Rafique Saigol (industrialist), Mian Tufail Mohammad (deputy chief of the Jamat-e-Islami), Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi (Jumiat-al-Ulema-e-Pakistan), Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (PDP), Amir Mohammad Khan of Hoti, M. A. Khuhro, G. M. Syed, Kazi Fazlullah, Kazi Mohammad Akbar (wealthy businessman in

Hyderabad), Yusuf Chandio (one of the largest landlords in Thatta), A. K. Brohi (celebrated Sindhi lawyer and jurist), and Saeed Haroon (industrialist). Several retired army and air force officers also lost, for instance, Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Tehrik-e-Istaqlal), General Umrao Khan (Jamat-e-Islami), and General Sarfraz Khan. Javed Iqbal, son of Pakistan's poet–philosopher Mohammad Iqbal, lost to Bhutto in Lahore. Bhutto himself won a splendid victory; contesting from six National Assembly constituencies, he won in five.

Soon after the election, and throughout 1971, as a constitutional crisis and then a civil war raged in East Pakistan, Bhutto claimed that he and his party alone were entitled to speak for West Pakistan because its people had defeated, and repudiated, other parties and leaders. This was not quite true. Neither on the basis of the number of seats won, nor with reference to the percentages of votes received, could the PPP claim to represent the people of NWFP and Baluchistan. Its mandate in the Punjab and Sind was authentic in terms of the number of Assembly seats won. But considering the number of valid votes received, the other parties, if they could act together, would have had as good a title to speak for the people of the Punjab and Sind as did the PPP.

Without belittling the PPP's performance in the 1970 election, we may say that two factors, other than its program and leadership, helped it achieve a victory that was disproportionately large relative to the percentage of valid votes it received. There was first the system of plurality-based election in single-member constituencies; then there was the fact that a great number of candidates ran and divided the vote among themselves to the PPP's advantage. As many as 595 candidates, belonging to more than a dozen political parties, plus 203 independents (a total of 798) contested the 138 National Assembly seats in West Pakistan. Straight, one-against-one, contest took place in only one constituency in the Punjab and three in NWFP. In 74 constituencies in the Punjab four or more candidates contested each seat; in ten constituencies as many as seven, and in another ten as many as eight candidates ran.[35]

The election results would not sustain the proposition that the people of West Pakistan had given Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his party a mandate for undertaking revolutionary change. Bhutto had done much to awaken the people and to incline

them in favor of a socialist economy. But in the process he had alarmed those who were opposed to socialism. He polarized politics in West Pakistan, and the election left it in the same state of polarization. Neither side had achieved a decisive sway over the minds and affections of the people.

The PPP had projected itself as a party of the poor and the downtrodden. But its ranks included some wealthy landlords, many prosperous professionals, middle-level entrepreneurs, and farmers. On the other hand, the poorest of the poor were still much too uninformed and docile to have broken away from the control of landlords and tribal chiefs, and many of them did not vote for the PPP. Craig Baxter, in his study of the 1970 election, maintained that the PPP had done well in the relatively affluent areas of the Lahore and Multan divisions and along the Grand Trunk road all the way to Rawalpindi. These were areas where significant industrial development had taken place and, in the rural sector, moderately well-to-do landowners predominated. The party did not do as well in districts along the Indus River where economic development and modernization had not, as yet, touched the lives of people very much. Here the Islamic parties fared better. The pattern was different in Sind where Bhutto had recruited several of the more important *waderas,* and where the younger men in many of the established political families were attracted to his dynamic and charismatic personality.[36] The fact that he was a fellow-Sindhi also counted. But note that the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs in Karachi and Hyderabad remained aloof from the PPP. Candidates belonging to one or another of the Islamic parties won five of the seven seats in Karachi and the single seat in Hyderabad. The PPP won two seats in suburban Karachi.[37]

Using a modernization index, which took account of levels and rates of growth of urbanization, industrialization, and education, Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter studied the PPP vote at the sub-district ("tehsil") level in the Punjab. They found that the growth indices correlated better with the PPP's vote than did the level indices for the same factor. In other words, the PPP polled more votes in rapidly modernizing areas than it did in those where modernization had become stable ("stagnant") at a certain level.[38] The explanation may be that the people whose lives were changing, but whose goals had not yet been reached, favored the PPP because it promised to hasten

the ongoing process of change and bring it to fruition. Thus, it may be said that in towns and cities the street vendor who wanted to be a shopkeeper, the rickshaw driver who wished to own his rickshaw, the student who was in college but did not see the prospect of a decent job, the college graduate who had become a clerk but thought he deserved a higher post, the lawyer who had a degree but few clients – these groups, all alienated from the system, perceived the PPP as a party of radical change and supported it in the expectation that it would carry them forward to a higher level of achievement. The "agricultural entrepreneurs" in the countryside hoped the PPP would help them in their struggle against the larger landlords who had hitherto dominated the rural Punjab.

The modernization index which Burki and Baxter used in this study was based on one that Burki had earlier devised to explain Ayub Khan's fall from power.[39] In that work he had divided the districts of the Punjab into advanced and intermediate groups according to their levels of economic development and modernization. More recently, Hafiz A. Pasha and Tariq Hasan employed 26 indicators to identify the level of development in agriculture, industry, education, health, housing, transport, and telecommunications in the 46 districts of Pakistan (formerly West Pakistan). They computed the scores each district had received on their factors and gave it a development ranking.[40] We have taken the Punjab districts in their study and given each a ranking in accordance with that which they had given it on an all-Pakistan basis. We list below these districts in the order in which they appeared in Burki's index, indicate the ranking each would receive from Pasha and Hasan, and show the number of National Assembly seats the PPP won.

The number of seats the PPP won is shown to be 66 in the above table whereas it was declared to be 62 on the election day. The number in the table is based on my count of those who named the PPP as the party of their affiliation in a biographical directory published by the National Assembly secretariat.[41] It seems that four Assembly members from the Punjab (and two in Sind), initially elected as independent candidates, later joined the party. We are not able to identify these four independents or the districts to which they belonged. But regardless of where we place them, it is clear that the PPP's victory was substantially larger in the advanced districts of the Punjab than it was in the

Table 3.4 Economic development and modernization ranking of the Punjab districts

Burki's order	*Pasha and Hasan ranking*	*Total number of NA seats*	*PPP won*
Advanced districts			
1. Lahore	1	8	7
2. Lyallpur (now Faisalabad)	3	9	9
3. Multan	5	9	8
4. Rawalpindi	2	4	4
5. Sahiwal	10	7	7
6. Gujranwala	4	4	4
7. Sargodha	7	5	3
8. Sialkot	6	5	5
9. Gujrat	11	4	3
10. Jhelum	8	3	3
11. Sheikhupura	9	4	4
Intermediate districts			
12. Rahimyar Khan	12	3	1
13. Mianwali	18	2	1
14. Jhang	13	3	0
15. Campbellpur	15	2	1
16. Bahawalpur	14	3	2
17. Bahawalnagar	17	2	1
18. Dear Ghazi Khan	19	2	1
19. Muzaffargarh	16	3	2

less developed and less modern ones (which were the same as Burki's intermediate districts).

Urbanization was clearly important. The party won impressive victories in districts where large cities were located: Lahore, Rawalpindi, Lyallpur, Gujranwala, Multan, and Sialkot. These districts ranked high in Burki's scheme and also in that of Pasha and Hasan. But it is interesting to note that some of these districts were not particularly urbanized outside the large city. In Sialkot, where the PPP won all five seats, one of the five tehsils was urban, two were "advanced rural," and two were simply rural. Of the seven tehsils in Multan, where the PPP won eight of the nine seats, Burki and Baxter counted one as urban,

one as semi-urban, one as advanced rural, and four as rural.[42] Industrialization too was important but not decisive. Lahore, Lyallpur, Multan, Gujranwala, and Sialkot were industrial cities. But Rawalpindi, Sahiwal, Sheikhupura, and Jhelum were not as industrialized and yet the PPP won all of the seats in each one of these districts.

Levels and rates of economic development and modernization may indeed have had a bearing upon the PPP's electoral performance, but it should be recognized that they did not determine the outcome in all cases. The PPP did poorly not only in Karachi and Hyderabad but in the urban centers of NWFP and Baluchistan. Even in the Punjab other factors were also at work, some to the party's advantage and some to its detriment. The most important of the advantageous kind were surely Bhutto's own charisma, campaign style, and hard work.

A word should now be said about the persons who won the election to the National Assembly as PPP nominees, excluding the women who were subsequently chosen to fill the seats reserved for them. One of the party's Sindhi MNAs provided no information beyond his name, and several others did not reveal their date of birth. Among the party's 66 Punjabi MNAs 26 were 40 years of age or younger, one had received only religious education, 20 had passed high or higher secondary school, and 45 held bachelor's, and in some cases higher, degrees. Their number included six businessmen, three doctors, two engineers, one journalist, 24 lawyers, and 30 who listed "agriculture" or "farming" as their occupation. Two of the 20 Sindhi MNAs belonging to the PPP had only had religious education, six had passed high school, and ten held college, or higher, degrees. Seventeen of them were "farmers" and two were lawyers. Four of the Punjabi and two of the Sindhi "farmers" also listed law as their occupation, and one of the Sindhi "farmers" said he was also a businessman.[43]

It is noteworthy that the majority of those elected on the PPP ticket from the Punjab were lawyers, professional people, and businessmen rather than landlords. A few of those who called themselves "farmers" were indeed great landlords, but most on the list were probably no more than well-to-do middle-level landowners. By contrast, all but two of the party's Sindhi MNAs were substantial landlords, and several of them were among the great *waderas* of Sind.

An informal coalition, including sections of the urban middle class and the rural gentry, and the urban and rural poor, carried the PPP to its electoral victory. These diverse groups acted together probably because of an unusual convergence of certain circumstances. They saw the prospect of democratic governance after more than 12 years of authoritarian rule. They were having general elections, based on universal adult franchise, for the first time in their history. Bhutto had been a central figure in the struggle for democracy and, at this point, nothing was known of him as a ruler. But the coalition was inherently unstable. The urban intellectual's contempt for the shopkeeper, the farmer, and the peasant, the city-dweller's disdain for the village folks, the latter's distrust of the city and indifference toward its problems, and the middle class's condescending attitude toward the poor are well-known. Moreover, their interests would clash. Public policies designed to help the far more numerous poor would be seen by the middle class as its burdens. It would be difficult to keep these groups together.

Many of the PPP winners in the Punjab belonged to the middle class. One might have thought that, for the first time in Pakistani experience, the way had been opened for this class to rule. A new kind of politics might develop. But that was not to be. These men had won not because of who and what they were by themselves but because Bhutto had given them his party's ticket. They were his political creatures and they would have to do his bidding. He did not belong to their class, and he had no use for its attitudes and values. The middle class might support or denounce a regime, instigate a revolt or even a mass movement in the towns and cities to bring down a government, but it was not yet numerous or internally coherent enough to rule.

NOTES

1. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), pp. 76–7. A similar account, along with pictures of Bhutto's reception at the Lahore and Karachi railway stations, may be seen in Rashid Akhtar Nadvi, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Ki Siyasi Swaneh Hayat* (Political Biography of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), Urdu (Islamabad: Idara-e-Muarif-e-Milli, 1975), Vol. 1, pp. 349–55.

2. Bhutto himself later provided an account of these offers and threats in his "Affidavit" in the Lahore High Court on February 5, 1969, reproduced in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Awakening the People: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1966-1969* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.). See pp. 212–14.
3. In one such case in Lahore government agents flooded the meeting ground where Bhutto was addressing a crowd and snapped overhead electric cables which fell in the water. As a result, many people in the audience received electric shocks. See Nadvi, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,* pp. 387–8.
4. In an interview with me in January 1989, Abdul Khaliq Khan, a PPP politician in Peshawar, said Bhutto had once mentioned his mother's situation to him and others as one of the reasons for his inclination toward socialism despite his aristocratic background.
5. Verrier Elwin, the British anthropologist, quoted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings 1963–1965* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), pp. 59–60.
6. Piloo Mody, *Zulfi My Friend* (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1973), pp. 49–50; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "The Islamic Heritage," a lecture he delivered when he was just 20 and a college freshman, is included in *Reshaping Foreign Policy: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1948-1966* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), pp. 7–18.
7. *Foundation Documents of the Pakistan People's Party* (Lahore, November 1967). Dr Mubashir Hasan told me in the spring of 1980 that Bhutto himself had written some of the *Documents* in the English version and J. A. Rahim, who became the party's secretary-general and ideologue, wrote some. Dr Hasan and Haneef Ramay helped with the Urdu version.
8. These articles and letters, along with many others, are collected in Muhammad Haneef Ramay (ed.), *Islami Socialism,* Urdu (Lahore: Al-Bayan, c. 1975).
9. See M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan* (Karachi: Ferozsons, n.d.), p. 98; *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-e-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1967), p. 267.
10. *Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People's Party, 1970,* p. 13.
11. Khalifa Abdul Hakim says that Islam does not forbid private property or the accumulation of private capital, but as the classical Muslim jurists said, "there is no right in which Allah has not a share." Allah in Muslim jurisprudence, he notes, means the public weal. It follows that private ownership will not be permitted if it is an impediment to general well-being: *Islam and Communism* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1962), pp. 179–80, 189.
12. Iftikhar Ahmad, *General Elections 1970: A Study in Political Participation and Behavior* (Lahore: University of Punjab, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1972), pp. 115–17. Many other Pakistanis with whom I talked in the fall of 1973, and who had witnessed the campaign, provided similar accounts.
13. Rana Rehman Zafar, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Azeem Siyasi Rahnuma* (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Great Political Leader), Urdu (Lahore: Khyber Publishers, 1973), pp. 260–1.
14. Yunas Adeeb, *Quaid-e-Awam* (Leader of the Masses), Urdu (Lahore:

Maktaba-e-Pakistan, 1972), pp. 203–4. Also see Salman Taseer, *Bhutto,* p. 111.

15. My free translation of the Urdu text which is reproduced in Rana Rehman Zafar, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,* pp. 266–7.
16. Meenakshi Gopinath, *Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of the Pakistan People's Party* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1975), pp. 54–5, 60–1.
17. Iftikhar Ahmad, *General Elections 1970,* pp. 104, 106, 112–13. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, one of Pakistan's great poets, wrote a poem conveying the message about "tossing crowns and tumbling thrones," and Iqbal Bano, one of the country's great singers, sang and popularized it.
18. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy: Statements and Speeches* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, c. 1972), pp. 15, 36, 47. For an even fuller discussion of Bhutto's self-characterizations see Anwar H. Syed, "Z. A. Bhutto's Self-Characterizations and Pakistani Political Culture," *Asian Survey,* December 1978, pp. 1250–66.
19. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 18, 60, 65, 69, 146–50.
20. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy,* p. 39 and pp. 7, 14, 41, 59, 73; and *Awakening the People,* pp. 34–36, 40, 163, 195.
21. Bhutto, *Awakening the People,* pp. 39, 47, 82; and *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 39, 44, 148.
22. Bhutto, *Awakening the People,* pp. 5-6, 58–9, 67.
23. Bhutto, *Awakening the People,* pp. 53, 60; and *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 127, 166.
24. Bhutto, *Awakening the People,* pp. 81, 165.
25. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 50–7.
26. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy,* p. 51, and pp. 23, 47-8, 62, 71, 74, 78–9, 81, 86, 90–1; and *Awakening the People,* pp. 38, 45, 141.
27. Bhutto, *Awakening the People,* pp. 32, 49, 54, 166, 211, 214–15; and *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 27, 104, 107, 112, 120–1.
28. Bhutto, *Awakening the People,* pp. 57, 171.
29. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 45, 138.
30. Bhutto, ibid., p. 158.
31. Bhutto, ibid., p. 76, and pp. 37, 62.
32. Bhutto, ibid., p. 58 and *passim.*
33. See Gopinath, *Pakistan in Transition,* pp. 84–6.
34. See Salman Taseer, *Bhutto,* p. 114; and Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1972), p. 69, n. 3.
35. Government of Pakistan, Election Commission, *Report on General Elections 1970-71* (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1972), pp. 197–9, 204–5.
36. Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes – 1970," *Asian Survey,* March 1971, pp. 213-14.
37. The PPP did better in the provincial assembly election, taking eight of the 15 seats from the city of Karachi.
38. Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, "Socio-Economic Indicators of the People's Party Vote in the Punjab: A Study at the Tehsil Level," in W. Howard Wriggins (ed.), *Pakistan in Transition* (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975), pp. 166–7.
39. Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation," *Asian Survey,* March 1972, pp. 201–12.

40. Hafiz A. Pasha and Tariq Hasan, "Development Ranking of Districts of Pakistan," in Ijaz Nabi (ed.), *The Quality of Life in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1986), ch. 3, especially table 7 on p. 75.
41. *Who's Who in the National Assembly of Pakistan* (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan, c. 1973).
42. Burki and Baxter, "Socio-Economic Indicators of the People's Party Vote in the Punjab," pp. 178 and 178a.
43. These figures are derived from *Who's Who in the National Assembly of Pakistan*. They include the four independents who joined the PPP sometime after the election. They also include Mahmud Ali Kasuri and Ahmad Raza Kasuri, who were elected on PPP tickets but later expelled from the party.

4 The Dismemberment of Pakistan

Normally when politicians win elections they come to power. This did not happen in Pakistan following the general elections held in December 1970, because the winners were expected first to prepare a new constitution for the country. The question of who would rule, and where, was to be taken up after a constitution acceptable to President Yahya Khan had been made. This constitution was never written; indeed the new National Assembly, which was to frame it, never even met. It did not meet because Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party, the Awami League, which had won an astounding electoral victory in East Pakistan, insisted on enacting their regional autonomy plan, while Bhutto and his party said they would not attend the Assembly unless the Awami League first modified that plan to their satisfaction. The Awami League's refusal to relent eventually invited military action in East Pakistan which, after some nine months of civil war, led to the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh. The winners of the 1970 election would ultimately reach power but not before the country had seen war, humiliation, and disintegration.

BHUTTO'S ACCUSERS

Bhutto's detractors hold him responsible for the events of 1971. "He broke up Pakistan," they say. They allege that he instigated the crisis by insisting on a broad agreement between his party, the PPP, and the dominant party in East Pakistan, namely the Awami League, on major constitutional issues and certain power-sharing arrangements even before the recently elected National Assembly could meet and, when such an agreement could not be obtained, by refusing to attend the Assembly session President Yahya Khan had called for March 3, 1971. They argue that his move was intended to stop the Awami

League, which had won an absolute majority of seats in the Assembly, from exercising its democratic right of steering and guiding the Assembly's deliberations and decisions. His demand for a share of power in the central government, in the forming of which the majority party did not need his support, was meant to thwart the majority's right to rule the country. In all of this, the critics say, he acted from an unseemly lust for power.[1]

Needless to say, Bhutto denied responsibility for the crisis. But the controversy has not been laid to rest. Even now, years after his death, his admirers defend his role,[2] friendly critics anguish over it, and those hostile to his legacy denounce it.[3] Some of his opponents argue that his claim to a share in power – on the reasoning that there were two parts of Pakistan and therefore two majorities of which he represented the one in West Pakistan while Mujibur Rahman spoke for that in East Pakistan – opened the way for splitting the country.[4] Still others maintain that he and Yahya Khan "colluded" to postpone the Assembly for the purpose of frustrating Mujibur Rahman,[5] and that they "conspired" together subsequently to fuel the train of events that ended in the Pakistan army's defeat and East Pakistan's secession.[6] Yahya Khan is portrayed as the principal villain, and Bhutto his accomplice, in some versions;[7] in others the roles are reversed.[8]

The conspiracy theorists maintain that initially the two men agreed to prevent Mujibur Rahman from taking power and making a constitution according to his regional autonomy design popularly known as the "Six Points." They agreed also that if a satisfactory arrangement could not be negotiated with him, military force would be used to destroy his movement.[9] They would rather break up Pakistan, and rule in West Pakistan, than transfer power to Mujibur Rahman. Yet, unwilling to let go of East Pakistan peacefully, they preferred to have the Indian army take it out. Yahya Khan did not prepare an adequate defense against the anticipated Indian military intervention,[10] and Bhutto, at the United Nations, disregarded resolutions that called for a transfer of power to the Awami League and withdrawal of Pakistani forces from East Pakistan. He would rather see the Pakistan army accept defeat.[11]

The authors of these accusations present no hard evidence to support them. Connections have been made between events,

and conclusions drawn from them, essentially on a speculative basis. For instance, no one really knows what passed between them when Bhutto entertained Yahya Khan at his Larkana home in January 1971. But beliefs that both men desired power, distrusted Mujibur Rahman, enjoyed drinking, and that Bhutto had friends among Yahya Khan's "junta," have led some critics to conclude that the two conspired at Larkana to oppose Mujibur Rahman.[12]

Nevertheless, the following assertions regarding Bhutto's role in the East Pakistan crisis may be accepted: he opposed the Awami League's Six Points; he desired power; he refused to attend the National Assembly meeting as scheduled to force concessions from Mujibur Rahman and to prevent Yahya Khan from yielding to him; he rejected a settlement that the Awami League proposed in the last days of its negotiations with Yahya Khan, providing, among other things, for a *confederation* between East and West Pakistan; he made no move at the United Nations to accept the secession of East Pakistan in return for the evacuation of Pakistani forces and avoidance of a formal surrender.

These assertions are not accusations, for the actions to which they refer were not necessarily unworthy. We will argue below that any blame that Bhutto deserves does not lie where his critics place it. It lies rather in his failure to tell the people the truth which many among the elite in West Pakistan already knew, to wit, that East Pakistan now wanted to be separate and independent, that it could not be kept in the union by force, and that it would therefore be prudent, and more civil, to let it go its own way in peace. This is not to say that if Bhutto had gathered the courage to tell this truth his listeners would have liked it and followed him. But of this more later.

BHUTTO AND THE AWAMI LEAGUE'S SIX POINTS

The Awami League contested the 1970 election from a platform of extensive provincial autonomy, spelled out in its Six Points, which provided for a federal, parliamentary system based on universal adult franchise, direct elections, and legislative representation of the federating units on the basis of population. It would limit the federal government's jurisdiction to defense

and foreign affairs minus foreign trade and aid, which governments in the two regions would negotiate and manage. The federal government would have no taxing authority, or foreign exchange resources, of its own. It would meet its expenses out of monies, including foreign exchange, supplied to it by the federating units – that is, the provincial governments – in a manner and in proportions to be specified in the constitution. Each of the federating units would levy taxes, control the use of its foreign exchange resources, make and implement its fiscal policy independently of the federal government. Each of the two regions of Pakistan would have its own currency or, in the alternative of a common currency, its own federal reserve banks to prevent the "transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to the other." The federating units would have the authority to raise and maintain para-military forces "to contribute effectively to national security." References to "wings," "regions," and "regional governments" in the text implied that the Awami League envisaged a sub-federation of the provinces of West Pakistan.[13] In case this did not materialize, control over currency, inter-provincial or inter-regional movement of funds, and negotiation of trade and aid agreements with foreign governments would also devolve upon the provincial governments.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami League leader, first introduced this formula at a national conference of political leaders in Lahore in February 1966. It was not well received. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who was then president of the Awami League in West Pakistan, rejected it; the Council Muslim League decried it as a demand for a confederation; the Jamat-e-Islami saw it as a separatist design; even the National Awami Party, which favored substantial provincial autonomy, dismissed it as being parochial.[14] In its *Foundation Documents,* issued in 1967, the PPP condemned the Six Points, saying that they would subvert the integrity of Pakistan.

It seems that in his own mind Bhutto was reconciled to a certain enlargement of the provincial governments' authority. On December 12, 1970 he told a group of supporters in Lahore that the future constitution of Pakistan would have to allow the provinces "maximum autonomy."[15] But clearly his "maximum" was considerably less than that which the Awami League considered necessary. Bhutto believed that, taken together, the Six Points were a scheme for a confederation that contained the

potential of "constitutional secession" for each member state. It made for a central government that would be completely helpless "amid the clamor of five warring provinces, each asserting its own brand of sub-nationalism," and each pulled in a different direction by foreign intrigue. Without control of foreign trade and aid the central government would have little to do in the area of foreign affairs. Since foreign policy and defense policy were related, as were economics and politics, the central government, excluded from foreign economic policy, would not be able to formulate and implement an effective defense policy. Each with its own foreign economic relations, the two wings of the country – worse still the five provinces – would develop different attitudes and attachments towards foreign powers, including India, with the result that a common foreign policy would become impossible to develop. With two currencies, and two or more foreign exchange control systems, the Pakistan rupee would be no more. Trade between East Pakistan and West Pakistan would be restricted, and that which remained would have to proceed either on a barter basis or on payment in foreign exchange. Considering that much in foreign relations and defense is confidential, the National Assembly under the Six Points would have little to hear or say. "In essence, the Six Points formula was meant to strike at the roots of our nationhood. Initially, it would have created two Pakistans, and later it might well have brought five independent states into being."[16]

BHUTTO'S QUEST FOR POWER: A PREDICAMENT

The election results in December 1970 were astounding. The Awami League won 160 of 162 National Assembly seats allocated to East Pakistan in a house of 300. It contested seven constituencies in West Pakistan but won none. The PPP contested no seats from East Pakistan. As noted in the preceding chapter, it captured 81 of the 138 National Assembly seats allotted to West Pakistan, and it won impressive victories in the provincial assembly elections in the Punjab and Sind. That Bhutto desired power goes without saying and he made no secret of it. Addressing a crowd of supporters outside the Assembly Chambers in Lahore on December 12, 1970, and responding to a sugges-

tion in the *Pakistan Times* that he would have to sit in the opposition for the next five years, he shouted: "Be quiet, I say, you men of *Pakistan Times,* I am not like Mrs Bandaranaike [of Sri Lanka] to remain in the opposition for five years." His party might, or might not, rule at the center, but no central government could function, nor could a constitution be made, without its cooperation and support. Punjab and Sind were great centers of power in Pakistan; he held the keys to the Punjab Assembly in one of his pockets, and those to the Sind Assembly in another. He went on to say that he had to fulfill promises, relieve the people's deprivation and distress, and remake Pakistan, for all of which he must have power.[17]

The election results placed Bhutto in a curious predicament. He had been mobilizing the people in West Pakistan since the summer of 1966. He awakened the masses as no other politician had ever done before. They gave him a huge electoral victory in the Punjab and a substantial one in Sind. But how was he to convert this victory into a position of power, and where would that position be? Would he, for instance, become the chief minister of Sind, one of the smaller provinces of West Pakistan? That would be a reward too small, almost preposterous, for him to accept. He could not become chief minister of the Punjab because he had no real base there. His family connections, his lands, his peasants and tenants, and his cultural roots were all in Sind. Bhutto first sought a partnership with Mujibur Rahman during their talks in Dacca in January 1971. He reasoned that since the Awami League's majority in the National Assembly did not include representatives from West Pakistan, and since the PPP was the party that truly represented the western wing, it would be wrong to exclude it from participation in the central government. Its exclusion would mean the exclusion of West Pakistan. Mujibur Rahman rejected Bhutto's plea for a variety of reasons: he did not trust Bhutto;[18] he did not want a strong leader with a large following in the Assembly as a coalition partner; he could recruit West Pakistanis from smaller parties that would be much less demanding or troublesome.

But why did Bhutto want office in a government which, under the Six Points, would have severely limited resources and functions? His will to power would have hardly any avenues for expression in such a government. From Bhutto's perspective, the Six Points were then to be resisted not only because they

would weaken Pakistan as a federal union but also because they provided for a central government so feeble that it would not invite the interest or service of ambitious, energetic, and competent politicians.[19] Mujibur Rahman and his party must be asked to modify the Six Points. If they did not listen to reason, then pressure must be brought to bear upon them. It would take the form of denying them the forum – a National Assembly session – they needed to enact their program. Above all Bhutto must dissociate himself from a plan, and accept no share of responsibility for one, that contained the potential for breaking up the country.

POLITICS OF PRESSURE

Mujibur Rahman had given President Yahya Khan and the politicians in West Pakistan the understanding that his Six Points would be subject to discussion and amendment after the election. But seeing the magnitude of his electoral victory, and pressed by the more militant elements within and outside his party,[20] he adopted the position that the Six Points had become the "property" of the people, that he and his associates could no longer tamper with them, and that any settlement with the regime and other political forces in the country concerning the status of East Pakistan in the union must begin with their acceptance of this formula.

Yahya Khan went to Dacca to confer with Mujibur Rahman and they had several meetings starting January 12, 1971. Different accounts – some of them unsubstantiated – of these talks have appeared. According to Altaf Hasan Qureshi, Yahya Khan was pleased to hear that he would be kept as president but worried about his powers under the new constitution.[21] Safdar Mahmood says Yahya Khan was greatly agitated to find that while he might remain as a "constitutional" president no positions would be offered to his close associates in the "junta."[22] This would damage his credibility as a political manager among his army colleagues. G. W. Choudhury, who accompanied the president and advised him during his visit, reports that the talks did not go well. Yahya Khan was willing to accept the Six Points with some minor reservations, but the Awami League negotiators, nevertheless, adopted a tough posture. Mujibur Rahman

would not show the president the draft constitution his associates had prepared. He asserted that as leader of the majority party he alone had the right and the responsibility for framing a new constitution, that Yahya Khan's role was only to call the Assembly to meet immediately, and that "dire consequences" would ensue if he did not do so.[23]

Frustrated and feeling cheated, Yahya Khan proceeded to consult with Bhutto. But instead of inviting him to Rawalpindi, the president took the rather unusual step of visiting Bhutto at his family home and estate in Larkana on January 17.[24] Generals Abdul Hamid Khan and S. G. M. M. Peerzada, his close associates in the "junta," accompanied him. Here then, according to critics, a "sinister alliance" between Bhutto and the generals took place. They advised Yahya Khan to stand firm and refuse to summon the National Assembly until Mujibur Rahman agreed to modify his Six Points. They also urged him to "crush Mujib through army action" if necessary.[25] In Bhutto's own version the president told him of his talks with Mujibur Rahman, and added that he had advised the Awami League leader to reach a settlement with the PPP. He did not appear to have thought much about the Six Points. He said that, being a soldier, he did not understand the distinction between a federation and a confederation, and that he was only interested in keeping the country together. When Bhutto explained his objections to the Six Points, the president asked him to discuss these directly with Mujibur Rahman.[26]

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Bhutto's accusers are right. Considering the hazard to the state's integrity which the Six Points admittedly posed, Bhutto may indeed have argued that Yahya Khan must not give away too much too soon. A few weeks later, after the crisis in East Pakistan erupted, he himself would be ready to concede the Six Points minus regional or provincial control of foreign trade and aid. But that would be later. On January 17 or 18, when no crisis had as yet appeared, the advice against premature and excessive concessions to the separatist forces in East Pakistan cannot be judged to have been mischievous or foolish. Another aspect of the matter should be considered. When Yahya Khan established a time limit of 120 days in which the Assembly must complete its work of framing a new constitution, all parties, including Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, had agreed that major issues relating to the

constitution would be discussed and settled before the Assembly formally met.[27] They recognized that only thus could the Assembly complete its work within the allotted time. In taking the position that his Six Points were no longer open to discussion, Mujibur Rahman had gone back on this agreement. Bhutto's advice that he should be forced to honor it, and that the Assembly should not be called until he did so, was then not unreasonable.

At Larkana Bhutto told Yahya Khan that, despite his opposition to the Awami League's program, he and his associates would seek a "viable compromise" in discussions they hoped to have with its leaders in Dacca in the near future. And to Dacca they went on January 27. Mujibur Rahman treated Bhutto cordially, "wined and dined" him at the Hotel Intercontinental, and took him for a boat ride. But on substantive issues he remained intractable.[28] He declined to discuss Bhutto's proposals until he and his party accepted the Six Points "in toto." Mujibur Rahman wanted the Assembly to meet on February 15. Bhutto requested a delay to allow him more time to prepare the public opinion in West Pakistan for concessions to the Awami League's point of view. Mujibur Rahman responded that he was not concerned with Bhutto's problems in West Pakistan. Bhutto says he returned from Dacca on February 1, 1971 feeling that Mujibur Rahman wanted to "bring the National Assembly to session without loss of time in order to . . . thrust a Six Points constitution on the country" without allowing it time for reflection.[29]

Bhutto decided that Mujibur Rahman must be resisted and his pressure for an early meeting of the Assembly repelled. The objects of this counter-pressure would be to keep Yahya Khan from submitting to Mujibur Rahman's demand and to force Mujibur Rahman to enter into negotiations with Bhutto on the Six Points and related issues. The needed pressure would materialize if as many members of the National Assembly from West Pakistan as possible declined to attend its meeting if it was called before a settlement between Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman had been reached.

If negotiations and bargaining with Mujibur Rahman were the object, Bhutto must be capable of making concessions as well as demands. He should have his constituents' support in both. It would not be useful to convince them that the Six

Points were harmless. In that case Mujibur Rahman would have no reason to change his position. Nor would it do to tell the people in West Pakistan that the Six Points were an unmitigated evil. For then they would not allow Bhutto to make any concession to Mujibur Rahman and his flexibility in negotiations would be gone. A degree of ambivalence must then be maintained. Before leaving Dacca, and in subsequent statements, Bhutto gave an indication of how far he might go in accepting the Six Points. Points one and six – relating to a federal, parliamentary structure, universal adult franchise, legislative supremacy, and the provincial governments' authority to maintain paramilitary forces – were acceptable without further ado. The issues relating to currency, foreign exchange resources, and the central government's revenues would have to be discussed, but he thought these could be resolved to the Awami League's satisfaction. But he would not deprive the central government of control over foreign trade and aid.[30]

During the first two weeks after his return from Dacca Bhutto conferred with his party notables, met Yahya Khan several times, and talked with leaders of other political parties. He explained his opposition to the Awami League's program and, presumably, asked his colleagues to stand united with him. He told Yahya Khan that his party would not go to the Assembly merely to "rubberstamp" a constitution that the Awami League had prepared. He requested the president to summon the Assembly towards the end of March, which would give him time to complete consultations within his own party, address public meetings in the major cities of West Pakistan to prepare public opinion for a compromise with the Awami League, and have one more round of talks with Mujibur Rahman in search of a broad settlement.[31] Bhutto's contacts with other political parties were only partially successful. He was able to secure the support of Abdul Qayyum Khan whose faction of the Muslim League held nine seats in the National Assembly. But Abdul Wali Khan, head of the National Awami Party (NAP), rebuffed him,[32] and apparently so did leaders of other political parties, all of whom were anxious to attend the Assembly and desired its meeting as soon as possible.

On February 13, 1971, Yahya Khan called the National Assembly to meet in Dacca on March 3. Two days later, on February 15, Bhutto announced that unless he received assurances from

the Awami League that his party would get a proper hearing in the Assembly they would not attend its meeting on March 3. At the same time he demanded a postponement of the meeting. His move was not well received in certain political circles in West Pakistan. They worried that East Pakistan would "cut itself away from us" if the Assembly did not meet soon. In its issue of February 17, 1971, the daily *Jasarat* of Karachi charged that Bhutto meant to obstruct democracy in Pakistan, because he did not see his way to a position of power for himself in the central government.

It now became necessary for Bhutto to justify his dissociation from the Assembly session. Addressing a group of students at the Punjab University campus on February 22, he said he had been opposed to the Six Points ever since their unveiling in 1966 but, even so, he had maintained a flexible and conciliatory stance in his discussions with Mujibur Rahman. He had been willing to move as close as possible toward the Awami League's design, but he could not cross the limit beyond which lay the country's ruin. He had been trying to avoid a confrontation. "In fact, we kept retreating . . . We retreated so much that people began to ask what had happened to Bhutto." But Mujibur Rahman remained inflexible. His intransigence would surely deadlock the Assembly; it would then be best to postpone its meeting until major issues concerning the future constitution had been resolved in further discussions between the PPP and the Awami League. As Bhutto finished his speech, the students shouted: "Death to the Six Points."[33]

On February 28 Bhutto addressed a mammoth public meeting in the vast Iqbal Park in Lahore where he reasoned that in a federal system, which the Awami League wanted, a parliamentary majority could not have an unrestricted right to settle issues and to rule. The constitution must be acceptable to all federating units and, beyond that, the system required a bicameral legislature. Moreover, the same pattern of central–provincial relations must apply to all federating units. The autonomy conceded to East Pakistan must also be allowed to the provinces in West Pakistan.

Bhutto explained that given the Awami League's unwillingness to consider other points of view, his party members would accomplish nothing by attending the Assembly session. "If they go there and abstain what good will that do?" On the other

hand, voting "for the Awami League's draft constitution will be like breaking the backbone of our national integrity." Once again he demanded a postponement of the Assembly meeting to give him time for further discussions with the Awami League. Alternatively, Yahya Khan should lift his deadline of 120 days for framing the constitution. In either case he would go to Dacca immediately to have a dialogue with his "elder brother," that is, Mujibur Rahman. But if the president did neither, Bhutto would launch a civil disobedience movement from Peshawar to Karachi in West Pakistan.[34] The president was suitably impressed and the next day, March 1, he postponed the Assembly indefinitely.

THE AWAMI LEAGUE'S ANSWER

Bhutto's strategy worked with Yahya Khan, who postponed the Assembly, but not with Mujibur Rahman, who revolted. He called for a general strike on March 2 and for a civil disobedience movement two days later. He issued directives in the name of Bangladesh and the people obeyed. Bengali civil servants, police, judges, bankers, telephone operators, shopkeepers functioned as told. The Chief Justice of the East Pakistan High Court would not swear in the new provincial governor, General Tikka Khan. The authority of the central government collapsed entirely.[35] It was widely expected, or feared, that in a public speech scheduled for March 7 Mujibur Rahman would declare Bangladesh independent.

On March 6 Yahya Khan announced that the Assembly would meet on the 25th day of that month. Bhutto agreed to attend on the president's assurance that he would not authenticate a constitution made by the Awami League unilaterally. But in his speech on March 7 Mujibur Rahman put forward his own conditions for attending the Assembly. He demanded an immediate withdrawal of the martial law, return of the army to the barracks, investigation of incidents of the army's firing upon crowds, and transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.[36]

The pressure Bhutto attempted to put on Mujibur Rahman had backfired. The revolt in East Pakistan stunned observers in the west, and Bhutto's opponents said he was responsible. They

ignored the Awami League's provocation. Its leaders had asserted repeatedly that they alone had the right to frame the constitution and form a government. In his Dacca speech of January 3, 1971, Mujibur Rahman warned that those who placed obstacles in his way would be eliminated. On February 27 he observed that if the provinces in West Pakistan did not want a constitution based on the Six Points, they could have a constitution of their own and go their separate way.[37]

Given the above context, and the time frame of February 1971 when the revolt in East Pakistan had not yet appeared, consider the fact that walkouts, boycotts, protest marches, strikes, non-cooperation, and civil disobedience are all familiar proceedings in the political culture of the Indian subcontinent. It may not have been fanciful on Bhutto's part to expect that Mujibur Rahman would yield on issues of foreign trade and aid, and accept small adjustments with regard to currency and taxation, if he saw that he could not get everything he wanted. A viable federal government would then be possible and Pakistan could remain united. A few weeks' delay in convening the Assembly, and the bit of protest it might bring forth, should be taken as small and acceptable costs. Above all, a politician with a substantial popular mandate should not be expected simply, and meekly, to submit to the imperious demands of another politician.

There was no longer any question of the Awami League yielding on its Six Points program. Acceptance of its demands would signal approval of Pakistan's gradual disintegration, and rejection might lead it to declare independence forthwith. Either way Pakistan seemed to be headed for dismemberment. Bhutto saw that he could not control the events and apparently concluded that he must then dissociate himself from the result toward which they were moving. He must also appear to his constituents in West Pakistan as a defender of the country's unity and integrity.

POLITICS OF DISSOCIATION

Bhutto deplored the Awami League's "disproportionate" reaction to the Assembly's postponement, expressed his readiness for another dialogue with Mujibur Rahman, and declared that

if the latter did not reciprocate "the onus for the consequences will not be on us." In a cable to Mujibur Rahman, intended as much or more for effect in West Pakistan, Bhutto invited the Awami League leader to join him in devising a "new order" for ending exploitation in Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan, he said, must immediately come to an understanding if the country was to be saved, which it must be, "whatever the cost." Everything "humanly possible" must be done to keep the people of Pakistan together and united so that they "may march forward hand in hand as brothers." Let not history record later, he pleaded, that they had failed the people.[38]

The Awami League disregarded Bhutto's cable, and his adversaries in West Pakistan dismissed it as a "smokescreen." They regarded Mujibur Rahman "as the last link between the two wings" of Pakistan and urged a transfer of power to him and his party not only in East Pakistan but also in the central government.[39] Their recommendation might – or might not – keep Pakistan united, but it would keep Bhutto out of power at the center. Needless to say, he thought of these politicians and their proposal as misguided and, more likely, perverse. On March 14 he told Yahya Khan, who was on his way to Dacca, that any settlement he might want to make with the Awami League must have the PPP's consent.

The same day that he met Yahya Khan, March 14, he delivered a marathon speech at a public meeting in Karachi where he stressed the following themes: denial of responsibility for the crisis in East Pakistan; denial of collusion with the vested interests to prevent transfer of power to the majority party; further explanation of his earlier refusal to attend the Assembly on March 3; willingness to accept much in the Six Points "despite the dangers inherent in them"; the PPP's right to a share of power in any central government that might be formed.

Bhutto observed that he had come very close to accepting the Awami League's Six Points. The equivalent of only one point was left to be discussed, for which he wanted a brief postponement of the Assembly. "And for this alone such a big crisis was created." He said he and his associates had become helpless because "our brothers in East Pakistan" would not "talk to us."

> They have left no room whatsoever for give and take . . . They

> vowed they would rather be buried alive than support any change in the Six Points . . . It is suggested that we should have gone to debate all issues on the Assembly floor. Well, how can you debate when there is no room left for it? So if at all there was to be a debate, it should have been outside the Assembly. And it was for this reason that I wanted some time.[40]

Bhutto agreed with Mujibur Rahman that power must be transferred to the elected representatives. This should be done so that the capitalistic system and its exploitation of the people could be ended. "On this there should be no question of majority or minority. If they are in a majority there, we are in a majority here. Pakistan consists of two parts. Both parts have to prosper equally." He went on to say that he had to serve the poor, those in rags and those dying of hunger, and so he had to form governments. "It is the people's verdict, not mine. They want us to come into power . . . It is because they want their problems to be solved. And it is the PPP alone which can serve them better and solve their problems."[41]

Bhutto has been much maligned for his reference to two majorities in this speech and for his demand that power should be transferred to both of them. His opponents in West Pakistan called it a wicked plan to divide the country. They construed his statement to mean that power should be handed over to the PPP in West Pakistan and to the Awami League in the east. But this was a misinterpretation inasmuch as no political entity of the name of West Pakistan existed at that time over which Bhutto and his party could have assumed governmental authority and power. Bhutto explained the next day that he had called for a transfer of power to the PPP and the Awami League, *together,* at the center and to the relevant majority parties or coalitions in the provinces. Actually this was not a demand for any transfer of power at all. Considering that Mujibur Rahman did not wish to share power with Bhutto at the center, and Bhutto knew as much, his "demand" was a way of telling Yahya Khan, once again, not to surrender power to Mujibur Rahman in an arrangement to which the PPP had not consented.

Yahya Khan proceeded to Dacca on March 15 to confer with the Awami League leaders. Bhutto and some of his PPP colleagues reached Dacca on March 20 and talked with the

president and his advisors. Mujibur Rahman did not want to have discussions or negotiations with Bhutto; he preferred to convey his demands to Yahya Khan and expected him to secure the West Pakistani politicians' agreement to them. There are several versions of what transpired at Dacca between Yahya Khan's arrival on March 15 and the beginning of army action on the evening of March 25. Bhutto's report of what he learned from Yahya Khan must, of course, be considered. G. W. Choudhury, who says he read the minutes of meetings and the original draft proposals submitted by the two sides, has written an account which too should be consulted.

In Bhutto's version, the Awami League asked the president to issue a proclamation to the following effect:[42]

1. martial law would be withdrawn forthwith;
2. power would be transferred to elected representatives at the provincial level;
3. Yahya Khan would continue to operate the central government, on an interim basis, with or without advisors;
4. relations between this central government and the government of Bangladesh would follow the Six Points;
5. relations between the central government and the provincial governments in West Pakistan would, in the interim, follow the constitution of 1962 with the possibility that the provinces may be allowed greater autonomy with the president's approval;
6. members of the National Assembly from East Pakistan and West Pakistan would sit, *ab initio,* as separate committees or conventions, each to prepare and submit its "report" to the National Assembly within a stipulated time which would then consider it and find "ways and means of living together."

The proposal to divide the Assembly would seem to have had the purpose of enabling each committee to prepare a constitution for the internal governance of the provinces and, in the case of West Pakistan, to discuss and provide for an arrangement, such as a sub-federation, whereby its four provinces would link and relate to one another. Constitutional arrangements for the governance of the two wings – Bangladesh and West Pakistan – having been settled, the National Assembly would meet to find a framework for continuing their union.[43] If agree-

ment on such a framework could not be reached, the two wings would, presumably, separate in an orderly fashion.

Yahya Khan said he had told Mujibur Rahman that he would accept these proposals only if Bhutto and other West Pakistani leaders agreed to them. Bhutto says he rejected them because they were calculated to divide the country, but also because he thought that if they were to be accepted, they should be adopted by the National Assembly and not by politicians acting outside it. On the morning of March 22 Bhutto saw Mujibur Rahman briefly in Yahya Khan's presence, and as he went out to see Mujibur Rahman to his car, a private conversation began which, in Bhutto's own words, went as follows:[44]

> He told me that the situation was very grave and that he needed my help to overcome it . . . that things had now gone too far and there was no turning back. According to him the best way out was for me to agree to his proposals. He emphasized that there was no other alternative . . . He suggested that I should become the Prime Minister of West Pakistan and he would look after East Pakistan . . . He went on to say that in the present circumstances it would be impossible for the National Assembly to meet at all as one body; it should be adjourned *sine die* . . .
>
> I told him that I would naturally give my most careful thought to his proposal, [but that] it should be passed by the National Assembly . . . I further informed him that I was not prepared to give any letter in connection with proposals made outside the Assembly. I could not assume this responsibility as an individual or on behalf of my party when the people's representatives to the Assembly had already been elected.

On March 23 Yahya Khan consulted other politicians from West Pakistan – Mumtaz Daultana, Shaukat Hayat, Mufti Mahmood, Abdul Wali Khan, Abdul Qayyum Khan, and Maulana Noorani – and it seems they all rejected the idea of a settlement outside the Assembly.[45]

G. W. Choudhury reports that after four days of talks Yahya Khan and Mujibur Rahman had come close to an agreement on the modalities of transferring power. A draft proclamation was ready; it provided for central and provincial governments composed of elected representatives, central–Bangladesh relations on the basis of the Six Points, and splitting the National

Assembly into two committees. Upon his arrival in Dacca Bhutto objected to this arrangement. But at this point the Awami League leaders changed their stance. They said they were no longer interested in the setting up of a central government, and demanded transfer of power to the provinces or to the two regions of Pakistan. Yahya Khan rejected this demand and told Mujibur Rahman that it would be resisted. The Awami League then presented an alternative plan on the morning of March 23. It envisaged two constitutional conventions and two constitutions, one for East Pakistan and one for West Pakistan, and later a "confederation of Pakistan." The plan treated trade between East Pakistan and West Pakistan as foreign trade. Its financial provisions implied that the central government would end up making payments to the government of Bangladesh instead of receiving contributions from it. Yahya Khan and his aides proposed revisions but the Awami League turned them down. G. W. Choudhury writes that the plan, submitted with the demand that the president promulgate it through a proclamation within 48 hours, amounted to an "unqualified scheme for splitting the country."[46] Yahya Khan's response came on the evening of March 25 when the Pakistan army began its assault on the Awami League and its supporters, an assault that would soon become one of the bloodiest civil wars of our time.

By the middle of the summer the army appeared to have slowed down the independence movement in East Pakistan. The rebel forces, called the Mukti Bahini, were not able to make headway despite Indian military supplies, training, and sanctuaries. The government of India concluded that it must act more directly to make Pakistan yield. Indian forces entered East Pakistan on November 22 and advanced rapidly, meeting little opposition. By December 15 they had reached the outskirts of Dacca, and the next day the Pakistani commander (General Niazi) surrendered. He and some 93 000 Pakistani military officers and men, and civil servants, were taken to India as prisoners of war.

BHUTTO AT THE UNITED NATIONS: MORE OF DISSOCIATION

Bhutto represented Pakistan in the Security Council debates on

the Indian invasion of East Pakistan. His critics allege that he caused Pakistan the humiliation of a formal surrender by disregarding resolutions that would have extricated Pakistani forces from East Pakistan without the disgrace and anguish they later endured. Two resolutions, of the kind to which the critics refer, were moved by the Soviet Union on December 6 and one was offered by Poland on December 15, 1971. The Soviet resolutions, debated several days *before* Bhutto's arrival in New York, called for a "political settlement" that would bring hostilities to an end and give "immediate recognition" to the will of the East Pakistani people as expressed in the election of December 1970. China vetoed the first resolution, presumably at Pakistan's request, and the second did not come to a vote.

It should be noted that the "political settlement" which the Soviet Union urged no longer meant acceptance of the Awami League's Six Points. It meant political independence for East Pakistan. For India, whom the Soviet moves were intended to benefit, was now determined to break up Pakistan unambiguously. If Yahya Khan and his associates were willing to let go of East Pakistan, in a public act performed in an open forum in full view of the world, including their own people, and thus perhaps avoid the humiliation of a formal military surrender which, they must have known, would befall them in a few days, they could have accepted the Soviet resolutions. But they chose not to do so.

Bhutto arrived in New York on December 10 and spoke in the Security Council on December 12, 13, and 15. On December 15, when a political solution within the context of a united Pakistan had become irrelevant, because the Indian invading force was about to enter Dacca, Poland moved a resolution in the Security Council which called upon the government of Pakistan to transfer power to the lawfully elected representatives of the people and provided, simultaneously, for a cessation of military action in all areas and for the evacuation of West Pakistani armed forces and civilians from East Pakistan. Bhutto's critics deplore, and those friendly to him are puzzled, that he did not accept this resolution. But his inaction is not hard to explain. His acceptance of the Polish call would clearly mean his acceptance of East Pakistan's separation, and it would not prevent General Niazi's surrender the following morning. It is likely that, in the event of Bhutto's acceptance, the Indian

delegate would have asked for time to consult his government. Before his return to the Council the Indian army would have entered Dacca and forced Niazi to surrender. The Polish resolution would then have become infructuous. But Bhutto would, nevertheless, be blamed for having accepted Pakistan's dismemberment.

In the speech he delivered on this occasion, Bhutto rebuked the Security Council and then struck a note of defiance. The Council had failed – "miserably, shamefully" – to do justice. Its proceedings had been farcical. It had procrastinated for four days to allow time for the fall of Dacca. "So what if Dacca falls? . . . We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a greater Pakistan." The world must know, and his own people must know, that he had not come to the United Nations to offer a surrender. If the Security Council wanted him to be a party to its "legislation" of an "abject surrender" on the part of his country, then his answer was that "under no circumstances shall it be so." Addressing himself to Swaran Singh, the Indian representative, he said if India had thoughts of subordinating Pakistan to its will, "then we shall say," as Cato had said to the Romans, "Carthage must be destroyed. We shall tell our children and they will tell their children that Carthage must be destroyed."[47]

Ever since the beginning of the Indian invasion knowledgeable quarters had expected, or feared, that East Pakistan would soon be Bangladesh. On November 26 Dr A. M. Malik, the governor of East Pakistan, urged Yahya Khan either to secure UN intervention to stop the war or to make a political settlement with the Awami League. In a telegram to the president on December 7 he asked: "Is it worth sacrificing so much when the end seems inevitable?" In messages to the Chief of the Army Staff on December 9 and 10 General Niazi stated that his forces could not withstand the Indian invasion for more than a few days. At about the same time the governor's military advisor, Major General Rao Farman Ali, sent a telegram to the UN Secretary-General requesting him to arrange the evacuation of West Pakistani military personnel from East Pakistan. On December 14 Indian planes strafed the governor's mansion in Dacca; the governor and his cabinet resigned and sought refuge with the International Red Cross. And, on December 15, when Bhutto made his third and last speech in the Security Council,

General Niazi sent a message to General Manekshaw, Chief of Staff of the Indian army, requesting a cease fire and offering to surrender under certain conditions. Manekshaw insisted on a "complete surrender" by the following morning, and Niazi complied.[48]

It is fair to assume that Bhutto knew of these events and developments. He could see that his country was about to be dismembered and there was nothing he could do to prevent it. He knew also that Yahya Khan and other generals in the "junta" had ignored numerous opportunities of extricating the army from East Pakistan in return for a political settlement. They were probably afraid of telling their people that they meant to trade East Pakistan for the safety of their troops. Bhutto would not be their agent for making such a trade.

CONCLUSION

The contestation between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman focused on the latter's Six Points. Bhutto's opposition to them formed the thread that linked his moves which we have discussed above. Some of Bhutto's critics – G. W. Choudhury, Safdar Mahmood, Altaf Hasan Qureshi – denounced the Six Points as a veritable scheme for breaking Pakistan.[49] At the same time, they condemned Bhutto's actions in resisting the full force of this scheme. Their criticism must then be dismissed as incoherent, if not mindless. Others have lamented that if Bhutto and his party had gone and sat in the Assembly, and once debate had begun, the Awami League would have modified its position. But they offer no reason for their optimism in this regard. On the other hand, we know of the Awami League's numerous declarations that its plan would not change. The accusation that Bhutto sought to prevent the Awami League from ruling Pakistan which, by virtue of its majority in the Assembly, it was entitled to do, is likewise feeble. The Awami League wanted to break, more than it wanted to rule, Pakistan.

It was Bhutto's destiny to be the prime minister of a federation of the provinces of West Pakistan, which became the "new Pakistan" after the emergence of Bangladesh. Could he not have attained this post peacefully? The Awami League's program envisaged a sub-federation of the provinces of West Paki-

stan. On Bhutto's own testimony, Mujibur Rahman offered him support in becoming the prime minister of West Pakistan. The project would answer Bhutto's quest for power. It would also enable East and West Pakistan to remain together in a loose union under the Six Points, and if, any time later, East Pakistan wanted to separate, it could do so in an orderly fashion. A federal government would already be in place in West Pakistan; it would add defense and foreign affairs to its functions and keep going.

The bloody civil war in East Pakistan, the war with India, and the subsequent defeat and surrender were traumatic events. They might have been avoided if the ruling establishment, politicians, and the people in West Pakistan had accepted the idea of a peaceful separation, or virtual separation, from East Pakistan. It is said that many among the elite in West Pakistan, including politicians, had come to think of East Pakistan as a burden and were ready to give it "its walking papers."[50] Could Bhutto have proposed such a course of action?

Making a state is difficult enough; breaking it is always tumultuous. The people of East Pakistan, being disadvantaged, may have lost their attachment to the state of Pakistan. But the people in West Pakistan, especially the Punjabis who were the mainstay of Bhutto's political standing, were devoted to the "idea" of Pakistan even if they did not give much thought to the requirements of its preservation. They may not have understood the abstraction called the state, but they understood heroes and villains and the struggle that had been waged for the attainment of Pakistan. They knew that the country which their great and revered leader, M. A. Jinnah, had founded consisted of East and West Pakistan. It was the "Quaid-e-Azam's Pakistan," and they would not countenance talk of breaking it up. They might support demands for larger provincial autonomy. But they would be outraged at the suggestion that they should simply let go of East Pakistan. Stop the secessionists, they would have said, by force if necessary.

However, when the elite came to know of the scale of bloodshed and atrocities in East Pakistan – or when it became apparent that, because of India's involvement, East Pakistan could not be kept in the union – Bhutto and others might have proposed to let it go. How would such a proposal be received? And what could be said to the people? Could they be told, for

instance, that their army had killed not only "rebels" but thousands of their "brothers," and dishonored their "sisters," in East Pakistan? They would be shocked, disbelieving, and angry. They would become suspicious of Bhutto's motives, even turn against him, were he to be the bearer of such news. Other politicians, hostile to Bhutto, would rush to denounce him for impugning the army's honor, and for proposing to break up Pakistan. The generals, of course, would not allow such reports to stand; they would brand them as false and malicious and throw Bhutto in jail.

It was equally difficult to tell the people that India was about to invade East Pakistan, that the Pakistan army would not be able to withstand the invasion, and that it would therefore be best to let the eastern province go. This message would incense and demoralize them. The idea that the army whom they had honored and pampered for the last 24 years should give up one half of the country under Indian pressure without even putting up a fight would have been considered abominable. If the army wanted to run away from battle in East Pakistan, would it fight to defend West Pakistan? Once again neither the generals nor the politicians would publicly concur in this proposal; they would find it more to their advantage to attack its author.

Bhutto, other politicians, and the generals may all have known, at various points in 1971, that East Pakistan would soon go its own way. But none considered it safe to acknowledge this perception, and state the relevant facts and reasoning, publicly. They thought it more prudent to let the events take their course and produce the outcomes that their inner logic commanded.

Bhutto was a mass leader whose "charisma" had surfaced only recently; he did not have unlimited influence over his followers. They had needs and aspirations which he had promised to serve; but they also had their beliefs and passions which he could not afford to insult. He may have read Machiavelli's advice to the prince concerning the need to maintain proper appearances and to indulge the "crowd's" passions and prejudices;[51] he may also have known of John Adams' warning that, when feeling betrayed, the people will "swell like the sea" and ruin all before them.[52] His constituents' attachment to the "Quaid-e-Azam's Pakistan" was not something Bhutto could treat lightly.

Finally, in all of this, it is well to remember that Yahya Khan and the generals, not Bhutto, ruled Pakistan at this time; they, not he, made the ultimate decisions for the consequences of which they, more than anyone else, must bear the responsibility.

NOTES

1. Speakers at a Tehrik-e-Istaqlal rally in Peshawar on December 20, 1972 said emphatically that Bhutto had deliberately planned to break up Pakistan so that he could become the ruler of the remaining part. See Mukhtar Hasan's report in *Zindagi,* December 31, 172, pp. 7–8. Also see G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 146, 162–3; and David Dunbar (pseud.), "Pakistan: The Failure of Political Negotiations," *Asian Survey,* May 1972, pp. 444–61.
2. Rao Abdul Rashid, *Jo Main ne Dekha* (That Which I Saw), Urdu (Lahore: Atishfashan Publications, 1985), pp. 54–85. Rao Rashid, Inspector General of Police in the Punjab, was later security advisor to Prime Minister Bhutto.
3. Ahmad Raza Kasuri, *Idhar Hum, Udhar Tum* (We Here, You There), Urdu (Lahore: Brittanica Publishing House, 1988).
4. See Dr Nazir Ahmad's speech at Rajanpur on May 27, 1972. The text may be seen in *Zindagi,* July 31, 1972. Dr Nazir Ahmad was a Jamat-e-Islami leader in the area and a persistent critic of Bhutto.
5. See Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided* (Lahore: Ferozesons, 1984), p. 100.
6. Altaf Hasan Qureshi, "Saqoot-e-Dhaka se Parda Uthta Hai" (Curtain Lifts from the Secession of Dacca), *Urdu Digest,* February 1972, pp. 22–40. The same presentation also appeared in *Zindagi,* March 23, 1972, pp. 19–30.
7. See, for instance, Malik Ghulam Jilani's letter to President Yahya Khan, mimeographed and distributed to politicians sometime in the summer of 1971, reproduced in Urdu translation in *Zindagi,* January 17, 1972.
8. For this, too, see Malik Ghulam Jilani's letter, this time, to his daughter, Asma, dated February 7, 1972, mimeographed and distributed. Text in Urdu translation published in *Zindagi,* September 10, 1973.
9. Apparently Bhutto admitted as much in an interview with an Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar (*Statesman,* March 23, 1972) and in a National Assembly speech on April 14, 1972. See Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided,* p. 133.
10. In response to questions from the editor of *Urdu Digest,* several retired generals and politicians maintained that the 1971 war with India had been a phony war, that no real fighting had taken place, and that the defeat had been self-inflicted, an act of treason. See *Urdu Digest,* April 1972,

pp. 90–5, and July 1972, pp. 26–39.

11. Altaf Hasan Qureshi, "Saqoot-e-Dhaka," *Urdu Digest,* February 1972, pp. 33–40. Soon after Bhutto's assumption of power a newsreel containing scenes of General Niazi's surrender to the Indian military commander in Dacca on December 16, 1971 was shown in cinema houses all over Pakistan. This greatly agitated, even incensed, many viewers and encouraged Bhutto's opponents to charge that he was deliberately taking steps to destroy the Pakistan army as an institution. See, for instance, Malik Mohammad Qasim's interview in *Zindagi,* February 21, 1972, pp. 11–12, and Sardar Shaukat Hayat's commentary in *Zindagi,* March 6, 1972, p. 13.
12. Altaf Hasan Qureshi, "Saqoot-e-Dhaka"; Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided,* p. 100; G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days,* p. 152.
13. The text of the Six Points may be seen in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy* (Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971), pp. 91–4.
14. Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 140.
15. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy: Statements and Speeches* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, c. 1972), p. 163.
16. Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy,* p. 13.
17. Yunas, Adeeb, *Quaid-e-Awam* (The People's Leader), Urdu (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Pakistan, 1972), p. 223.
18. G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days,* pp. 148, 154.
19. See Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist,* no. 17.
20. For an account of these pressures see Rounaq Jahan, "Elite in Crisis: An Analysis of the Failure of Mujib-Yahya-Bhutto Negotiations," Harvard University, mimeograph, March 19, 1972.
21. Qureshi, "Saqoot-e-Dhaka," *Urdu Digest,* February 1972. In this account Yahya Khan wanted to retain substantial authority, including control over the armed forces and the provincial governments. See also Anwar Mazdaki, *Taqseem-e-Pakistan: Sadarat Se Ghaddari Tak* (Division of Pakistan: From Presidency to Treason), Urdu (Lahore: Tariq Publishers, 1972) p. 126.
22. Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided,* pp. 99–100.
23. G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days,* pp. 149–50.
24. According to Piloo Mody, who would appear to have got his information from Bhutto, Yahya Khan insisted on coming to Larkana. See Mody's *Zulfi My Friend* (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1973), pp. 114–15.
25. At a private meeting with his party associates on February 15, 1971, Bhutto is reported to have argued that either East Pakistan should be allowed independence or Mujibur Rahman should be arrested and "taken to task." A year later he revealed that he had advised Yahya Khan in favor of "light military action" to prevent East Pakistan's secession: Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided,* pp. 109, 133.
26. *The Great Tragedy,* p. 20, and Piloo Mody, *Zulfi My Friend,* pp. 114–15.
27. G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days,* p. 152.
28. Oriana Fallaci's notes published in *Europeo* and reprinted in *Outlook* (Karachi), April 8, 1972.
29. *The Great Tragedy,* pp. 22–3.

30. Ibid., pp. 24–5.
31. Ibid., p. 24.
32. Anwar Mazdaki, *Wali Khan ki Siyasat* (Wali Khan's Politics), Urdu (Lahore: Tariq Publishers, 1972), p. 50.
33. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 167–70.
34. Ibid., pp. 172–5.
35. *New York Times,* March 9, 1971. Also see Peggy Durdin, "The Political Tidal Wave that Struck East Pakistan," *New York Times* Magazine, May 2, 1971.
36. *New York Times,* March 8, 1971.
37. Rana Rahman Zafar, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Azim Siyasi Rahnuma* (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Great Political Leader), Urdu (Lahore: Khyber Publications, 1973), pp. 325–7. Also see Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided,* p. 112.
38. *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 177–80.
39. Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy,* p. 35.
40. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy,* p. 190.
41. Ibid., pp. 191–3.
42. *The Great Tragedy,* pp. 41–4.
43. G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days,* pp. 171–7.
44. *The Great Tragedy,* pp. 43–4.
45. Anwar Mazdaki, *Taqseem,* p. 23.
46. *The Last Days,* pp. 172–8.
47. *Marching Towards Democracy,* pp. 269, 271, 276.
48. *New York Times,* December 12, 15, 16 and 17, 1971. Also see Wayne Wilcox, *The Emergence of Bangladesh* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1973), p. 50; Herbert Feldman, *The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969–1971* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 183–4.
49. G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days,* pp. 133–7; Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided,* pp. 68–73; Altaf Hasan Qureshi, "Pakistan Ka Naya Dastoor" (A New Constitution for Pakistan), *Urdu Digest,* February 1971, pp. 26–7, and his commentary in ibid., June 1971, pp. 34–5.
50. Wayne Wilcox, *The Emergence of Bangladesh,* pp. 21–2. Also see Altaf Hasan Qureshi's commentary in *Urdu Digest,* April 1972, p. 38.
51. *The Prince,* chs 18, 21.
52. 'A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, 1787–1788,' excerpted in Alpheus T. Mason, *Free Government in the Making* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 182.

5 Restructuring the Polity

Considering the anguish and anger the Pakistan army's surrender in Dacca on December 16, 1971 had caused in West Pakistan, the generals in Rawalpindi concluded that they could no longer rule. Bhutto returned from New York on the morning of December 20, and a few hours later Yahya Khan swore him in as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. The country had broken up and, in Bhutto's own words, he and others had to pick up the pieces. This meant, first and foremost, lifting the people's morale, giving them hope that the country and their lives in it could still have meaning and worth. Further down the road lay the task of recovering the Pakistani territory India had seized during the war, and bringing home the soldiers and civilians it held as prisoners.

Lifting the people's morale, and giving them self-confidence, would require the impression that a clean break with the past had been made, and that a new regime, substantially different from its predecessors in both structure and orientation, was in place. It would be democratic whereas they had been authoritarian; it would be a "people's government," while they were elitist; it would comfort the disadvantaged, while they had made the rich richer. But beyond declarations of intent, the new regime must begin taking remedial action; it must give the appearance of dynamic capability, moving swiftly from one problem area to the next.

BHUTTO'S COVENANT

Within hours of assuming office Bhutto addressed the nation on radio and television, spoke heartening words, and offered commitments which may be regarded as his covenant with the people of Pakistan. After soliciting their cooperation in meeting the current crisis, he pledged to restore democracy. He wanted to see "suffocation" end, the people take initiative, and the society flourish. He observed that the country had come to

the verge of ruin because its rulers had not been held accountable and its institutions had been destroyed or seriously weakened. He would rebuild institutions and make the government responsible to the people.[1]

Bhutto assured his listeners that he would always act from considerations of the national interest, never from vindictiveness or partisanship. There would be no victimisation of those who had opposed him in the past. By way of demonstrating that he wanted to start with a "clean slate," he lifted the previous government's ban on the National Awami Party (NAP) headed by Abdul Wali Khan. He called upon the NAP leaders to meet with him and said he intended to confer with other opposition politicians as well.

Bhutto promised to introduce reforms that would bring about economic and social justice, reduce the common man's burden, and eradicate corruption. He said the bureaucracy must be dynamic and hard-working, the police must stop their *zulm* (tyranny) over the people and the common man must be enabled to receive his due under the law without having to look for *sifarish* (connections). He asked the industrialists not to lay off workers, because they "are our masters" and "the producers of wealth." Similarly, farmers were "the backbone of the nation;" they must not be displaced from the land they tilled. He assured the students that his party and government would not interfere in their campus politics, would let them make their own decisions and go forward as a community.[2] Speaking to judges and lawyers on December 29, he pledged, once again, to restore and nourish democracy in Pakistan. He said he hoped that after he had retired from politics, and gone to live in Larkana, his countrymen would tell his children that "their father did try to serve Pakistan, and that he did not try to . . . become a dictator."[3]

Bhutto's covenant brought glad tidings to his three major constituencies, namely, peasants, workers, and students. Changes and reforms, listed below, rained like a blitzkrieg during his first six months in office, and there can be little doubt that the appearance of a forward movement of some great significance was created.

Reforms and other changes, December 1971 – May 1972

December 20 Yahya Khan and several other generals

	retired
January 2	units in ten categories of basic industries nationalized
January 16	managing agency system abolished
February 10	labor reforms announced
March 1	land reforms announced
March 3	General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan retired
March 12	over 1300 civil servants retired, demoted, or dismissed for alleged corruption or incompetence
March 19	nationalization of life insurance companies announced
March 29	education reforms, including nationalization of private schools and colleges, announced
April 12	police reforms announced
April 13	law reforms announced
May 11	Pakistan rupee devalued
May 19	procedural reforms, increasing the State Bank's control over the private banks' lending policies and operations, announced

Additional changes and reforms would come later, but it is clear that by the end of March 1972 Bhutto had overawed the potentially hostile centers of power in the country and encouraged his support groups. He had conciliated the intellectuals, professional groups, and possibly many others in the middle classes, with his promise to restore democracy, and thus consolidated his rule.

It is not necessary to examine each one of the changes mentioned above. We will limit ourselves to a discussion of Bhutto's nationalization measures, his land reforms, and his administrative restructuring. Suffice it to say of the others that some of them did not intend far-reaching change, and some produced very mixed political consequences for the regime. For instance, the police reforms merely increased the salary and allowances of lower-ranking officers. The law reforms promised to separate the executive from the judiciary but this undertaking was never implemented.[4] Labor reforms increased the real income of workers but alienated the small and middle-sized entrepreneur, who had been a PPP supporter, by extend-

ing the operation of labor laws to enterprises that employed as few as five persons.

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIES

It is well-known that toward the end of Ayub Khan's rule 22 families controlled much of the large-scale industry, commerce, banking, and insurance in Pakistan. The PPP's election manifesto in 1970 promised to break their power by locating "all major sources of the production of wealth," excluding agriculture, in the public sector. Earlier the party's *Foundation Documents* had called for the nationalization of basic industries, banking and insurance. Bhutto may have wanted to honor these commitments when on January 2, 1972 he announced the placement of industrial units in the following ten categories under public management and control: iron and steel; basic metals; heavy engineering; heavy electrical industries; assembly and manufacture of motor vehicles; assembly and manufacture of tractors; heavy and basic chemicals; petro-chemical industries; cement; public utilities, including electricity (generation, transmission, and distribution), gas, and oil refineries.[5]

Bhutto said these industries had been brought under the people's control and command to carry the benefits of industrialization to the common man and to stop the concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of a few "ruling tycoons." He appealed to workers to increase production in the nationalized plants and make them successful, because they had now become public enterprises. Worker committees were later organized to help the new managers maximise the "social benefit" their units generated. Bhutto called this "reform" limited in scope and declared that his government would not nationalize industries in the remaining categories; it intended to maintain a "happy blend" of public and private sectors. He urged the private sector to treat its workers " with dignity," improve the quality of its products, and produce to maximum capacity.

Within about two weeks of Bhutto's announcement the government took over the management, but not the ownership, of 33 industrial units in the categories identified above. That the nationalized industries were basic might have caused the impression that a change of grand proportions had been effected.

Actually, that was not the case. The large-scale industrial sector, of which the nationalized units were a part, was itself rather small. It accounted for no more than 12.8 percent of the gross domestic product, 3.4 percent of the labor force, and 8.3 percent of Pakistan's exports.[6] Stanley Kochanek placed the "net worth" of the nationalized units at 780 million rupees, and Eric Gustafson noted that their productive capacity had been quite modest.[7] Many of them had been mismanaged, suffered "cash flow" problems, and some were said to be close to bankruptcy. There was, thus, more high drama than hope of substantial material gain for the common man in this measure.

Bhutto's promise – that no more enterprises would be taken – was not kept. In June 1973 the government took over the rice export trade and the purchasing of cotton from growers, ostensibly to assure them a larger return. A few weeks later, devastating floods hit the country causing damage to crops, homes, and cattle to the amount of approximately $800 million.[8] Essential items of consumption became scarce in the affected areas, and prices rose. The price of vegetable ghee (shortening) trebled. On August 16, 1973 the Bhutto regime nationalized this industry, saying that the industrialists concerned had exploited a national crisis to multiply their private gain. On January 1, 1974 all domestically owned private banks were nationalized, and in July 1976 over two thousand rice-husking and wheat flour mills and cotton gins were seized.[9]

These nationalization measures, taken together, constituted a major structural change and reorientation in the economy. It is therefore important to ask if the regime's expectations – increased production, distributive justice, and a dynamic impact on the larger economy – were met. Observers are virtually unanimous in the assessment that the nationalized industrial units did not work well. Some of them were sick to begin with and should not have been taken over at all. Others became sick under bureaucratic management. Even in the vegetable ghee industry, whose product is in steady demand, prices rose and yet most of the nationalized plants lost money.[10] During the last three years of the Bhutto regime the production and sales of state enterprises slowed down, on the whole, and declined in several instances. Bureaucratization, lack of a good business sense on the part of managers, and over-employment seem to have been the major reasons for their poor performance.

Nationalized industrial units were grouped into ten corporations, each headed by a chairman who was a civil servant. Managing directors, heading individual units, reported to their respective chairmen who, in turn, reported to a Bureau of Industrial Management (BIM) under the Minister for Production in the central government. A plant manager thus had to penetrate three layers of bureaucratic red tape and tardiness before he could proceed with a major decision or operation. Employment in the units under the BIM increased from 40 817 to 61 731 by the end of 1976, and it doubled in the ginning sector even though the number of units had been halved.[11] The payroll of nationalized industries increased also because of the labor reforms the regime had instituted.

The nationalization of over two thousand rather small agro-industrial units – cotton gins, and rice and flour mills – would seem to have been especially unwise. The replacement of a complex network of private traders by civil servants and political appointees made these enterprises flounder. Their earlier success had depended upon the personal interest and supervision of owner-managers which the new managers simply could not provide. No wonder then that in May 1977 the government returned 1523 small rice hullers to their former owners, and later Zia-ul-Haq returned the remaining mills.[12] It should be noted also that in all public enterprises the bureaucratic managers brought graft and other forms of corruption to which they had been accustomed in government.

If the nationalized industries did not work well, their impact upon the rest of the economy could not have been beneficial. But any economic slowdown that we see during the Bhutto years should not, without qualification, be blamed on his nationalization measures. Actually, the economy showed signs of considerable dynamism during the first two years of his rule. Exports increased substantially and more than made up for the loss of East Pakistan both as a foreign exchange earner and as a market. A number of items – carpets, leather goods, and garments among others – which had never amounted to much began to be exported in significant quantities. The output of major crops, other than cotton, increased steadily. But it is true that large-scale industry stagnated, and even declined in some sectors, after 1973.[13] The economy as a whole grew at the rate of 2 percent or less per annum which was lower than the annual

rate of population increase. Consequently, per capita income decreased. Investment rose enormously in the public sector but fell sharply in the private sector. Domestic and foreign debt, money supply, deficit financing, and prices increased. A number of Pakistani industrialists took their capital, and managers their talent, to the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. Some of those remaining in the country turned away from manufacturing and put their money in real estate, construction, deep sea fishing, and trade.[14]

One should not overlook the psychological reasons for the economic reverses noted above. Bhutto had broken his word, and the business community began to feel he could not be trusted. This breakdown of trust should be examined a little further. Bhutto had moved to intimidate businessmen within days of assuming office. His government impounded the passports of the 22 families and threw the heads of several of them in jail. Television newscasts added insult to injury by showing Ahmad Dawood and Fakhruddin Valika handcuffed in police custody. In his speech, announcing the nationalization of basic industries, Bhutto said there would be no more nationalization.[15] But three weeks later he became ambivalent. He told a group of businessmen and industrialists, whom he had summoned to Karachi airport before leaving for a visit abroad, that there would be no further nationalization of industry "during this period of Martial Law." But he could not say what the National Assembly might do when called to session, for he was only "a member of it." After jolting them with this qualification, he tried to pacify them with the observation that he was not their enemy, and that he recognized their importance for the country. He appealed to them to play a "positive role" in the development of Pakistan. Then he saw fit to declare that industrialization under the previous regimes had proceeded without regard to social goals and the value of egalitarianism. As a result, the common man regarded the industrialists as "parasites and bloodsuckers." He wanted to make peace between them and the people; give them "another chance, the second chance." Throughout the speech the stick and the carrot alternated. He said he did not want to hear threats of an industrial collapse, for industry had already collapsed as had the country. Moreover, "Pakistan is basically an agricultural country. So, we will fall back on agriculture."[16]

ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING

Considering that the public sector performed poorly, and that its impact on the economy was not wholesome, one may ask why and how the nationalization decisions referred to above were made. Shahid Javed Burki attributes them to the influence of the "left," led by Dr Mubashir Hasan, in the PPP.[17] Some of the more notable "scientific socialists" in the party held important posts in Bhutto's cabinet: Mubashir Hasan was minister for finance, planning, and economic development; J. A. Rahim headed the ministry of production; K. H. Meer had charge of the establishment; and Sheikh Rashid managed – or mismanaged as his detractors said – the health ministry. According to Burki, these men were ideologically committed to nationalization and, left to themselves, would have brought even more of the economy in the public sector. Had they remained in the government, they might have devised ways of rationalizing the process of economic decision-making and improving the performance of nationalized industries. But Bhutto discharged them in October 1974. He then became the arbiter, and often even the initiator, of economic policy and decisions. He found the planning process and its procedural requirements intolerably irksome with the result that decisions were often made on whimsical grounds.

It should be of interest to note that Mubashir Hasan denies having had the influence with which Burki credits him. He told me in the summer of 1980 that he and the other leftists in the cabinet did not act in concert. The initial act of nationalization in January 1972, he recalled, was done to honor the commitment made in the party's *Foundation Documents* and the *Election Manifesto.* But Bhutto himself made the decision and chose the timing. He asked Mubashir Hasan and Qamar-ul-Islam, secretary to the ministry of industries, to prepare the draft ordinance. The questions of who would manage the nationalized enterprises, and whether the government or the party had the relevant managerial resources, were not considered at this time.[18]

In Mubashir Hasan's version the decision to nationalize the vegetable ghee industry was made in similar circumstances. At a meeting of cabinet ministers and higher civil servants in

Quetta in August 1973, called to discuss the shortages resulting from the floods, Bhutto suddenly demanded, then ordered, nationalization. He wanted action to be taken even before the necessary papers could be prepared. The lists of plants, their locations and owners were not available in Quetta. Mubashir Hasan and a few others sat down to call the commissioners and deputy commissioners across the country on the telephone and instructed them to seize the vegetable ghee plants in their jurisdictions the next morning.[19] It has been alleged that the nationalization of agro-based industries in July 1976 was also Bhutto's personal decision, made without prior discussion in the cabinet or any other policy-making forum.[20]

Taking Burki's account together with that of Mubashir Hasan, we encounter an element of impetuousness in these decisions. This impression would probably bear qualification. Bhutto's announcement of his decisions to others may have been abrupt, but it is not unlikely that he had been considering each move in his own mind for a time. It may then have been a considered act; the consideration, however, was his own. It had not received the technical scrutiny of appropriate experts in the bureaucracy; nor had it benefited from the political judgment of Bhutto's associates in the cabinet or the party. This is not to say that all of his decisions were made in this fashion. Every week he settled scores of issues posed in files which had traveled through the hierarchical consideration of civil servants, and he discussed matters in cabinet meetings. But it is clear also that he was capable of ignoring the routine procedures of collective deliberation when he felt his own view of the public interest, or his political needs, must prevail.

Some of these decisions may have entailed political costs. But a powerful political consideration, relevant to all of them, should be mentioned before we take leave of this subject. Bhutto's nationalization measures substantially expanded the domain in which his will to power could express itself. Not only the government departments, their budgets and personnel, but banks, insurance companies, schools and colleges, industrial plants and trading corporations, including their posts and funds, would now be under his sway: thousands of jobs to which friends and supporters might be appointed and from which those hostile toward his regime removed.

LAND REFORMS

Redistribution of land, taking it from its existing owners and giving it to others under various terms and conditions, has been attempted in many developing countries partly to increase agricultural productivity and partly to implement the reformer's notion of social justice. Acting with the force of a martial law regulation (MLR 64), Ayub Khan ordered one such exercise in 1959. He imposed a ceiling of 500 acres on individual holdings of irrigated, and 1000 acres of unirrigated, land. At the time Bhutto praised these reforms, but later he called them a mere subterfuge, not only because the ceilings were high but because actually they became even higher as a result of the exemptions allowed for certain kinds of land use. Addressing the "citizens, tenants, and landless peasants" of Pakistan in a speech on March 1, 1972, Bhutto announced a new set of land reforms which would lower the ceiling to 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of unirrigated land; withdraw the previous exemptions for orchards, *shikargahs* (hunting preserves), stud and livestock farms, religious and educational endowments; shift the water rate, land revenue, other taxes, and the cost of seed to the landlord; require equal sharing of the cost of other inputs between the landlord and the tenant; forbid eviction of tenants except for cause (failure to pay rent or the landlord's share of the crop); abolish cess and service formerly imposed upon tenants; and recover state lands illegally occupied by influential persons in the Pat Feeder area of Baluchistan and elsewhere.[21] Land in excess of the appointed ceilings would be taken without compensation to owners and distributed among landless tenants and little peasants free of charge. Public officials, excluding those serving in the armed forces, would forfeit land in excess of 100 acres that they had received from the government during their tenures of service. These and all other state lands would be reserved for distribution to tenants and landless peasants.

In the same speech Bhutto spelled out the rationale for his land reforms. First and foremost he wanted to end the existing "oppressive and iniquitous agrarian system under which our people have suffered in silence for centuries," eradicate "the curse of feudalism and man's unjust overlordship of the good earth." He wanted to bring dignity to Pakistan's rural masses, to

enable them to "lift their heads from the dust and regain their pride and manhood, their self-respect and honor." The peasantry had lived, since time immemorial, in abject poverty and servitude. "We shall not allow this abominable *status quo* to continue." He claimed that his reforms would strike at the root of the rural problem and bring about "profound improvements" in the economic and social status of the farmer. He knew that the landed aristocrats would do all in their power to defeat his reforms, and warned that he would employ the full force of martial law against such enemies of the people.

> I am determined to guarantee social and economic justice and wipe out the primitive and oppressive system of feudalism . . . We have opened a brave new world for our children. We have secured the future of generations to come. I have kept my pledge with God and man . . . The hour has struck and we must rejoice on hearing the shackles break.[22]

Bhutto's solicitude for the poor peasant and his apparently intense feeling against feudalism did not mean that he wished to break the large landowners. He made the distinction between good and bad landlords, which others before him had also made. Enterprising and enlightened farmers should continue to live on the land, he thought, and agriculture should remain an "attractive and profitable vocation." Holdings should be large enough to allow investment for increasing productivity. "We are as much for the creative and humane landowner as we are for a productive and conscientious owner of industry."[23] Increasing agricultural productivity was clearly an important objective and Bhutto, it seems, looked to the "gentleman farmer" to bring it about. Ronald J. Herring notes that even though the new ceilings were a dramatic drop from those Ayub Khan had instituted, they were high enough, considering that 87 percent of all operated holdings in Pakistan consisted of less than 25 acres each and 44 percent were no larger than 7.5 acres each. The "policy logic" of Bhutto's land reforms echoed the "progressive gentry model" favored during British rule in India. Disparities of income and wealth may remain if the larger owners are enlightened and enterprising. An excessively low ceiling would be counter-productive because it would discourage the modern entrepreneur. It should be capable of afford-

ing him a standard of living he can command in other occupations.[24]

Bhutto's speech would suggest that while increased productivity was a goal, release of the peasantry from the oppression and indignities of feudalism was a much more dominant consideration. Would the feudal lord's high-handedness and the peasant's humiliation end as a result of Bhutto's reforms? That would depend upon how much land the tenant and the little peasant received and to what extent the terms of tenancy stipulated in the reforms were enforced. Let us first see the dimensions of change the reforms effected. *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976-77* contained figures of which the following would appear to be relevant to our inquiry.[25]

Table 5.1 Results of land reforms under Ayub Khan and Bhutto

	MLR 64 (1959)	*MLR 115 (1972)*	*MLR 117 (1972)*
Owners who surrendered land	na	2 298	na *
Total area resumed (acres)	1 094 821	1 156 362	521 816
Acreage distributed (acres)	496 384	695 679	267 510
Tenants/peasants receiving land	48 423	70 851	17 731
Balance of land remaining with government	598 437	460 683	254 306

* Land taken under MLR 117 was state land in the Pat Feeder area of Baluchistan and it had been occupied by persons whose titles were in dispute.

It is possible that the figures in *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976-77* were exaggerated. A confidential "working paper," prepared by the Federal Land Commission for discussion at a cabinet meeting on December 14, 1973 (which I had the opportunity of watching) provided more modest figures of the acreage resumed and distributed under the reforms. These appear below.[26]

In addition, an area of 69 439 acres under stud and livestock farms was resumed, but only 3 860 acres of it were distributed,

Table 5.2 Impact of Bhutto's land reforms under MLR 115

	Area resumed	*Distributed*	*In process of being distributed*	*Under litigation or appeal with FLC*	*Unfit for cultivation*	*Unsurveyed/ lacking irrigation/not ready for distribution*
Punjab	227 625	84 932	27 316 15 502[a]	17 270 27 406[b]	55 199	
Sind	225 936	68 281				157 655[c]
NWFP	156 512	81 070		13 254	62 131 57[d]	
Baluchistan	171 185		33 708		137 477	
Total	781 258	234 283	76 526	57 930	254 864	157 655

[a] said to be under "partition" presumably parceling.
[b] under appeal with the Federal Land Commission (FLC).
[c] tenants in Sind preferred to buy parcels of state land which was better and of which 600 000 acres were available.
[d] under graveyard or homes for the homeless.

and the rest was either leased to existing holders or placed under government management. Four small *shikargahs* were distributed among the *haris* in Sind. A larger *shikargah* (20 000 acres), belonging to the Amir of Bahawalpur, was in litigation, and a much larger one (125 519 acres), formerly owned by Sultan Ahmad Chandio in Sind, needed surveying. The Bhutto regime resumed 604 115 acres of land in the Pat Feeder area of Baluchistan under MLR 117. This was actually state land which had been occupied, for the most part, by the tribal *sardars* and their kin. They claimed to have *sanads* (certificates) that established valid titles to their holdings. Their claims were in the process of being scrutinized at the end of 1973. At that time only 81 000 acres of this land had been given to "indigent" persons.[27]

This was the state of affairs at the end of 1973, that is, one and a half years after the land reforms had come into operation. It is noteworthy that more than half the land (412 519 acres) the landlords surrendered was uncultivable, unsurveyed, and/or lacking in irrigation facilities. It is doubtful that any significant part of it was subsequently made cultivable and distributed. Let us assume that two-thirds of the area under litigation or appeal was eventually taken and distributed (38 260 acres), and that all of the area said to be in the process of distribution was in fact distributed later. Adding these to the area shown as actually distributed in the above table, we may say that in all 349 069 acres of land – and only a small portion of it irrigated – were probably given to landless tenants and peasants as implementation of the reforms progressed. This would be less than one percent of the cultivated land in Pakistan. If we take Gustafson's more optimistic figures for the land resumed and distributed under MLR 115 *and* MLR 117 (961 207 acres), we are talking of less than 2 percent of the total cultivable (actually cultivated *plus* "culturable waste") land in the country. Again, relying on his figures, we see that the reforms touched the lives of 2 298 landowners, who had to surrender some of their land, and 88 582 tenants and small peasants who received it. The dimensions of change were then by no means revolutionary; indeed, they were rather modest.

Bhutto knew that his reforms were not going well. Officials in the federal and provincial land commissions, and those in the district administration, lacked the will, and perhaps also the

means, to resist the pressures the landlords were able to bring to bear upon them. In a note to the Federal Land Commission Bhutto complained that "from top to bottom" and "at every level" the implementation was tilted in favor of the zamindars. Powerful vested interests and corrupt officials, he wrote, were turning his reforms into a farce. Commenting on the appeals a provincial land commission had decided in favor of the landlords, Bhutto observed that seven of the eight appeals, mentioned in the file submitted to him, would have been rejected summarily had the "spirit of reforms" been kept in mind.

> If this is a pointer to the general manner in which land reform cases have been decided, I fear that a great injustice has been done. It is no use telling me that the Chief Land Commissioner has gone through each case very carefully. He has indeed [done so] to see that the zamindar benefits. You say the orders passed by him are just and correct. May I ask just and correct for whom? For the zamindar or for the tenant, and are they just and correct in the concept of the reform I am aiming at?[28]

In a note to Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, governor of Baluchistan, Bhutto stated that "every conceivable effort" to evade the reforms was being made in that province. Referring to Bizenjo as a "genuinely progressive person," and as a personal friend, Bhutto requested his help. "I know if you lend a hand . . . we can achieve much more, and that will be good for the country."[29]

In many instances landlords had prevented tenants and little peasants from taking actual possession of the land given them under the reforms. Public officials had charged them fees and bribes for receiving and processing their applications for parcels of state lands. Mumtaz Bhutto, after yielding the chief ministership of Sind to Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi in the spring of 1974, alleged that the *waderas* in Sind were evicting *haris* without fear of retribution. A newspaper man wrote that Jatoi did order the restoration of *hari* rights and action against the offending *waderas,* but the bureaucracy took no notice of his orders.[30]

Reports in a pro-PPP weekly, *Alfatah,* asserted that landlord oppression of the tenant and the small peasant went on unabated in Sind and elsewhere. The *waderas* were still able to attack and terrorize *haris,* implicate them in bogus crimes, take

their women, force them out of the village, and seize their lands and cattle. The *hari's* access to seed, fertilizer, credit, and irrigation water remained precarious. He was still subjected to numerous illegal exactions and forced labor. The police and civil officials would not help him. Some of them openly sided with the zamindar, saying that Bhutto had made the poor rebellious. Others said they could not proceed against the *wadera* even if Bhutto said they should.[31] The tribal *sardars* (chiefs) in certain districts of the Punjab and the *khans* (landlords) in Dhir and Swat (NWFP) treated their tenants and little peasants no better.[32]

But observers noted also that the "little fellow" had become aware of his rights even if he did not always get his due under the law. He was now talking of the law. He had heard Bhutto say that land belonged to the tiller and he was making the same claim. He saw that his life had been wretched, that he had been wronged, and that the zamindar had been iniquitous. A group of *haris* told an *Outlook* reporter: "We have lived on this land for centuries. It was owned by the government, not by the waderas. The law says the lands along the banks of the river are not to be owned by landlords. They have always been tilled by us."[33] The winds of change were blowing in other parts of the country as well. Tenants and small landowners in districts of NWFP were buying weapons and getting ready to challenge the *khans.*

Interpretation

It may be true that Bhutto wanted as many "tillers of the soil" as possible to get land. But, as Khalid B. Sayeed has suggested, it is also possible that he did not want to end abruptly the landlord's political influence over the peasantry. The allowances and loopholes in the reforms, plus the fact that the ceilings referred to individual holdings, enabled a family of five to retain between 765 and 2480 acres of irrigated land in certain districts of the country.[34] The ceilings might be enforced rigorously upon the regime's opponents, and evasion might be overlooked in other cases. The violators, knowing that they were liable to prosecution, would most likely remain politically docile. Thus, Bhutto was able to keep most landlords acquiescent at the same time that millions of tenants and small peasants regarded him as their benefactor.

Bhutto's land reforms may have created a potential for challenging feudal tyranny, but the power of landlords was not broken. They continued to dominate the countryside.[35] Bhutto may indeed have despised feudalism and wanted to abolish it. But it would not be fanciful to suggest that he hoped to abolish it as much by inducing landlords to become successful entrepreneurs as by awakening the peasant to resist assaults on his dignity as a human person and on his rights under the law.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

In democratic theory politicians make laws and public policies and civil servants implement them. Civil servants may argue against a policy, but they will carry it out as best as they can after they have been heard and overruled. They are politically neutral and accept their subordination to the political heads of government. A different ethos, inherited from the British rule in India, had prevailed in Pakistan. Here the civil servants not only implemented policy, they made it. Thus, they performed an essentially political function and thought of themselves as rulers.[36] They had another, much more overtly political, role. Out in the districts they used their custody of land ownership records, their revenue collection authority, their supervisory jurisdiction over the police, and their power as magistrates to suppress challenges to the government of the day. They banned public meetings as and when necessary in their judgment and, upon instructions from their "political" superiors, arrested and jailed opposition politicians.

The role described above belonged to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) during British rule, and it passed to the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) after independence. They [ICS, and later the CSP, in Pakistan] held the professional politician in low esteem, viewing him as a "meddler," "disruptionist," and "self-serving" rabble rouser.[37] These attitudes and the CSP's political role lived on because professional politicians, reluctant to undertake the toil of building mass support and facing elections, became even weaker than they were during the British rule. Taking advantage of their weakness, and filling the void it had created, civil servants and generals seized positions of supreme political authority.

An unusual situation arose on December 20, 1971: the man called to the helm was a politician and he was not weak. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a mass leader who commanded immense, even if raw, power. At his bidding masses of men might come out and attack the persons and properties of those who had been the effective rulers. Would they, the higher civil servants, obey this "rabble rouser"? Would they surrender authority to this new and rival center of power? Might they not try to frustrate it, render it ineffective, even before it had a chance to settle in and establish itself? Bhutto could not take their cooperation for granted. As a minister in Ayub Khan's administration, he had seen their ways. As an opponent of the regime, he had suffered the harassment they visited upon him.

But any grounds for optimism Bhutto may have had were gone. Something strange, and unprecedented in Pakistani experience, happened toward the end of February 1972: the police in the Punjab went on strike, presumably with the connivance of their superior officers. When the policemen did not heed the government's offer to consider their grievances and its call for them to return to work, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Bhutto's governor in the Punjab, addressed a huge and enthusiastically supportive public meeting in Lahore. He called the strike a rebellion and requested the audience's help in quelling it. Intrigued by the entirely novel idea of attacking the police upon the government's own bidding, the crowd appeared ready to move. Khar threatened to exert the power of the people upon the police whose power by comparison was paltry. He warned that if the police did not return to duty within 24 hours, he would dismiss all of them and raise a new force. Thus confronted, the police capitulated.[38] Bhutto described the strike as a mutiny, and a treacherous one, for it had been called at a time when the country was passing through a grave crisis.

Charles H. Kennedy has written an exhaustive account of Bhutto's administrative reforms, including their intellectual antecedents, the support each measure enjoyed within the bureaucracy, and their political rationale. We will focus here on the implications the reforms had for Bhutto's capacity to control the government and the administration.[39] The police strike did not cause him to make his move, but it may have reinforced the decision he had already made to diminish the bureaucracy as a center of power. As early as January 1972 he had planned

a cleansing operation. He asked the central ministers and secretaries, provincial governors and chief secretaries, and PPP notables to submit names of public officials who deserved to be removed. On March 10 he issued Martial Law Regulation 114 which enabled him to demote, retire, or dismiss officials in the government, universities, and public corporations who were deemed to be corrupt, incompetent, subversive, or otherwise guilty of "misconduct." Evaluations would be made internally – in the Establishment Division and ultimately by Bhutto himself – and the actions taken would not be open to question in any court of law. Two days later, on the evening of March 12, the government announced the names of over 1300 civil servants (572 from Sind, 251 from the Punjab,109 from NWFP, 393 from the central government, but none from Baluchistan) who had been dismissed, retired, or reduced in rank.[40] Provision for internal review of the penalties imposed was made the next day, and in a few cases the persons concerned were eventually – much later – reinstated.

This action did not bring credit to the regime. Since the lists were made in haste, and since "reputation," rather than the established fact of malfeasance, had been considered sufficient to justify inclusion, many persons were penalized on flimsy grounds, and some simply because the reporting official or party man did not like them. Lack of proper care and scrutiny made for grotesque errors: names of officials who had already retired, and some who had been dead for a time, also appeared on the list; it could not be ascertained who the intended victim was among persons bearing the same name in a given service or department; in numerous cases full names of officials, rank and designation, and places of work, were missing or incorrectly stated.[41]

The CSP's claim to a directing role in the polity had been based on the assertion that, having excelled in a rigorous competitive examination, its members represented the "best" of their educated cohorts in the country. The examination was indeed tough by Pakistani educational standards, but these standards were not high. Many Pakistanis, some of them educated in America or Europe, worked at their posts in business and industry, arts and sciences, and the professions, at higher levels of competence than did the civil servants at theirs. Success in the competitive examination as *a priori* proof of excel-

lence must then be decertified. The Bhutto regime initiated a program of "lateral entry" into the public service. Over a three-year period 514 men and women holding mid-career positions in government, business and industry, universities, and the professions were appointed to middle management and higher positions in the central and provincial governments.[42] Appointments were made upon a scrutiny of the candidates' credentials in the Establishment Division, a written examination, an oral examination, or a combination of all of them. Vaqar Ahmad, the Establishment Secretary at the time, maintained that 95 percent of the "political element" had been eliminated in these appointments, and that Bhutto himself had rejected the recommendations of some of his ministers because the persons concerned were not worthy enough. Even if Vaqar Ahmad had understated the number of political appointees, it seems that most of the lateral entrants possessed an adequate level of professional competence.[43]

The new appointees filled the vacancies created by the departure of Bengali officials following the separation of East Pakistan – especially in the foreign office – and those created by the retirements and dismissals ordered under MLR 114. Bhutto maintained that this large number of vacancies could not have been promptly filled through the usual entry level competitive examination.[44] Second, these appointments served to break open the CSP's fortress of special preserves. A lateral entrant placed as a permanent secretary or additional secretary in a ministry could be supervising CSP officers who had already put in 20 years of service. Third, the new entrants were doubtless aware that they owed their positions to the Bhutto regime, and we may assume that they entertained a sense of loyalty toward it. They could thus be counted upon to serve as a counterpoise to the conventionally established higher civil servants, particularly the CSP.

In April 1972 Bhutto appointed a committee, with Khurshid Hasan Meer, the minister in charge of the Establishment, as chairman, to propose administrative reform. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (Minister for Political Affairs), Faizullah Kundi (Chairman, Federal Public Service Commission), and Vaqar Ahmad (Establishment Secretary) served as members. They consulted the analyses and recommendations which individual specialists, committees, and commissions had submitted from time to time

starting with Rowland Egger's work in 1953. They received considerable assistance from Hasan Habib (then Principal, Pakistan Administrative Staff College), who had been a foe to the CSP for many years. The committee would appear to have been influenced the most by the reasoning of Mr Justice A. R. Cornelius, a former Chief Justice of Pakistan and the most senior member of the CSP in the country, but a vigorous critic of its role and ethos nevertheless.[45]

As a result of the committee's recommendations, and through a series of presidential orders and notifications between August and November of 1973, the Civil Service of Pakistan, the Police Service of Pakistan, and all other services, classes, and cadres were abolished and all public servants placed, at appropriate levels, in a unified system of grades and corresponding salary scales. Twenty-three grades replaced the former position classification system that had comprised more than 600 pay scales. Service names and nomenclature were discarded. The new system would operationalize equality of opportunity: key posts would no longer be reserved for any particular group in the public service; lateral entry would continue as and when needed; horizontal movement as well as upward mobility, even out-of-turn promotion for the exceptionally meritorious, would be allowed.[46] Training for all new entrants, upon appropriate ranking in a competitive examination, would begin in the same academy, with additional, more specialized, training to follow for groups destined for various segments of governmental activity – district management, financial administration, secretariat work, and the foreign service, among others.

The government hoped these measures would enable it to pursue "scientific career planning" on the basis of equality and professional competence, undertake more effective performance ratings, and stress merit in promotions. The road to top positions would be open to all; theoretically, a messenger boy or a janitor in grade 2 could some day become a central government secretary in grade 22. The government also expected to bring in, through lateral entry, scientists, engineers, economists, accountants, statisticians, and other professionals to manage the industries it had nationalized and implement the reforms it was undertaking. But there were other, stated and undeclared, concerns that underlay the administrative restructuring described above.

Announcing the reforms in an address to the nation on August 20, 1973, Bhutto observed that many of the public servants in Pakistan were "basically good," but others (presumably the CSP) were arrogant, insulated from the people, indifferent to their needs and aspirations, and therefore hostile to his government's egalitarian commitments. They had constituted themselves as a great vested interest that placed its own advancement above the public good. Their claim to political neutrality was, then, not to be trusted.[47]

Every government needs public servants who will implement its programs in good faith. But, as we will see later, Bhutto's needs and uses of civil servants went beyond loyal implementation of approved policies. Khurshid Hasan Meer may have been expressing Bhutto's thinking when he spoke of "integrating" the administrative system with the political, making public officials the bearers of the PPP's "revolutionary" ideology.[48]

Prime Minister Bhutto had apparently concluded that higher civil servants must be brought and kept under firm political control. The constitution adopted in March 1973 did not include the safeguards civil servants had enjoyed under the previous constitutions relating to their terms of service, tenures, rights and privileges. Bhutto believed it was "absurd" to maintain these guarantees, for they detracted from the supremacy of Parliament, which should have the authority to determine the terms and conditions of employment in the government. Parliament, in its wisdom, gave the prime minister considerable control over the careers of public officials. The Civil Servants Act of 1973 provided that while they would ordinarily retire at the age of 58, "competent" authority, meaning the appointing authority, could retire them – without explanation of reasons – at any time after they had completed 25 years of service and become eligible for retirement benefits.[49] By a notification dated October 20, 1973, the President of Pakistan designated the prime minister as the appointing and competent authority in relation to all posts in grades 16 to 23.[50] Consequently, a great range of officials in the central secretariat and elsewhere, from the section officer to the secretary-general, came under the sway of the prime minister's authority. The Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules of 1973 allowed penalties of compulsory retirement, removal, and dismissal from service

for incompetence, corruption or reputation for corruption, subversion or association with persons engaged in subversion, and disclosure of official secrets to unauthorized persons. The accused would have the opportunity to respond to the charges against him, but could be denied the same in the interest of national security. A notification dated November 7, 1973 named the prime minister as the competent authority for deciding such cases involving officials in grades 17 to 23.[51]

Interpretation

Purges of the bureaucracy had happened before. Ayub Khan removed 526 civil servants, including 84 class I officers serving in the central government,[52] and Yahya Khan dismissed 303 soon after taking power. Three considerations may have prompted these actions. A cleansing of the administration may have been deemed good in itself. Second, the new regime, having taken power unlawfully, may have wanted to project itself as a reformer in order to gain a measure of respectability. Third, it had to show who the "boss" was. The bureaucracy had been the dominant center of power when Ayub Khan seized the government and, again, when he surrendered it. On both occasions the new military regime chose to intimidate the bureaucracy into accepting the former's supremacy. Civil servants would still be needed, but they should be made to recognize that their role was instrumental and their station subordinate.

These motives would also account for Bhutto's moves described above. The crisis of legitimacy was not as stark this time, but it did exist. The government had been handed over to him in circumstances that were, to say the least, unusual. Within days his political opponents began alleging that he had been responsible for the country's dismemberment. His legitimacy would be helped by a cleansing operation. More importantly, this was, for the first time in nearly two decades, a political regime. Its supremacy would require measures beyond the essentially transient effect intimidation could have on the behavior of civil servants. Systemic changes would be needed to place it on a firmer and more enduring footing.

Would the higher bureaucracy, curtailed and "reformed," now obey the politicians, and would it give up its political role?

That would depend upon whether or not the Bhutto regime intended to use civil servants to suppress its political adversaries. We will see later that it did. The services that had traditionally performed this role had lost their "labels," but the men who did the work remained. They were now reassembled in a "secretariat group," a "district management group," and a "police group." Their political role as policy-makers, and their aspiration to be the effective rulers, had flourished in Pakistan because the politicians were feeble. Were they now in good health and vigor? Bhutto was strong in 1973; he commanded substantial following and, to a lesser extent, the same may be said of some of his lieutenants, for instance, Ghulam Mustafa Khar in the Punjab and Mumtaz Bhutto in Sind. But soon the PPP as an organization would weaken from factionalism, violence, and corruption within its ranks; its mass support, and consequently its capacity for generating people's power, would decline. Bhutto might retain much of his charisma, but he would lack the organizational means of converting it into power. A vacuum would once again develop in the domain of professional politics which civil servants, and then the generals, would move to fill as they had done before.

Yet, we cannot say that the reforms were in vain. The abolition of service labels and classes, discarding of reservation of key posts for the CSP, equality of opportunity for the specialist with the generalist, simplification of the position classification system, emphasis on merit in promotion – these were all sound and progressive ideas which scholarly opinion had supported for decades. The use to which ideas and institutions are put, and the subversion they may suffer in the process, cannot be made the test of their soundness.

NOTES

1. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements: December 20, 1971-March 31, 1972* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Department of Films and Publications, 1972), pp. 3–4.
2. Ibid., pp. 9–12.
3. Ibid., p. 26.

4. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Police Reforms," (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Department of Films and Publications, April 1972), pp. 6–7; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Law Reforms," (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Department of Films and Publications, April 1972), pp. 5–6. A detailed account of Bhutto's education reforms may be seen in J. Henry Korson, "Bhutto's Educational Reforms," in Korson (ed.), *Contemporary Problems in Pakistan* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), pp. 119–46.
5. Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements,* pp. 33–4.
6. Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 114–15.
7. Stanley A. Kochanek, *Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 80; Eric Gustafson, "A Review of the Pakistan Economy under Bhutto," in Manzooruddin Ahmad (ed.), *Contemporary Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p. 149; also Gustafson, "Economic Reforms under the Bhutto Regime" in Korson (ed.), *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan,* p. 82.
8. Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto,* p. 117.
9. 2815, to be precise, including 578 cotton-ginning units, 2113 rice-husking and 124 flour mills. See Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime: The Economy* (Islamabad, January 1979), p. 30.
10. Gustafson, "A Review of the Pakistan Economy," p. 151.
11. Gustafson, "A Review of the Pakistan Economy," p. 153; also see *The White Paper: The Economy,* p. 32.
12. Gustafson, "A Review of the Pakistan Economy," p. 153; also see *The White Paper: The Economy,* p. 30.
13. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, *Pakistan Economic Survey 1977-78* (Islamabad, 1978), see tables 9 and 11 for agricultural production, 14 and 15 for industrial production, 27 for movement of prices, and 28 and 29 for foreign trade and exports.
14. Stanley A. Kochanek, *Interest Groups and Development,* p. 186, and Shahid J. Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto,* pp. 118–19.
15. Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements,* pp. 33–4.
16. Ibid., p. 68. Regarding the breakdown of trust between the business community and Bhutto, see Kochanek, *Interest Groups and Development,* pp. 211–16.
17. Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto,* pp. 112–22, 136–41.
18. My interview with Mubashir Hasan on August 3, 1980.
19. My interview as above.
20. *The White Paper: The Economy,* p. 30.
21. Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements,* pp. 98–106.
22. Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements,* p. 106.
23. Ibid., p. 99.
24. Herring, "The Policy Logic of Land Reforms in Pakistan," in Manzooruddin Ahmad (ed.), *Contemporary Pakistan,* pp. 242–3. Also see his larger work, *Land to the Tiller* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), especially ch. 4.
25. Gustafson, "A Review of the Pakistani Economy," p. 147. Gustafson's table, adapted from *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976–77,* also refers to land

resumed by the Federal Land Commission under its Suo Moto powers, but it is not clear how much of it was taken under which regime. In any case, only 18 000 acres of this land were distributed.

26. Government of Pakistan, Federal Land Commission, "Working Paper on the Implementation of Land Reforms up to 31st October, 1973," accompanying a Cabinet-Secretariat call to meeting No. 42/CN/73 dated December 8, 1973.
27. Federal Land Commission, "Working Paper," paragraphs 16–22, 38–9, 45–6.
28. President Bhutto's note to Mr I. U. Khan, Chairman of the Federal Land Commission, dated November 25, 1972. During a research visit to Pakistan in the fall of 1973 I was allowed access to several files of President Bhutto's notes and memoranda addressed to cabinet colleagues, provincial governors and chief ministers, secretaries to the government and others. I took extended notes from these files, and this note to Mr I. U. Khan was in one of them. All subsequent references to Bhutto's correspondence are based on my notes.
29. President Bhutto's note to Governor Bizenjo dated November 3, 1972.
30. See a correspondent's report in the pro-PPP weekly, *Alfatah* (Karachi), May 10, 1974, pp. 5, 33; also see a report in *Zindagi,* December 10, 1972, pp. 17–20.
31. *Alfatah,* January 17, 1974, pp. 27–30; August 2, 1974, pp. 11–12, 15–16. Also see Mohammad Mian, "A Glimpse of Waderaland," *Outlook,* September 22, 1973, and "The Fief of Forty Thieves" in *Outlook,* September 8, 1973.
32. *Alfatah,* January 17, 1974, pp. 29–30, and August 2, 1974, pp. 11–12.
33. *Outlook,* September 29, 1973, p. 6.
34. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 92-3.
35. Cf. Herring, "The Policy Logic," p. 244; Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto,* p. 139; and Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan,* pp. 91, 94.
36. For a fuller discussion see Anwar H. Syed, "Bureaucratic Ethic and Ethos in Pakistan," *Polity,* Winter 1971, pp. 160–94.
37. See Muneer Ahmad, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 127–8. Also see Government of the Punjab, *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953* (Lahore, 1954), popularly known as the "Munir Report," pp. 261–80 and *passim.*
38. In another version the strike ended because the government accepted, or promised to accept, most of the policemen's demands. See a report in *Zindagi,* March 6, 1972, pp. 9–12.
39. Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), especially chs 3–6.
40. Special correspondent's report in *Zindagi,* March 20, 1972, pp. 6–8. Also see Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan,* pp. 80–1.
41. *Zindagi,* March 20, 1972, pp. 6–8.
42. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan,* p. 131.
43. My interview with Vaqar Ahmad on August 12, 1974. An opposition spokesman described this program as a way of raising an "army of

stooges" for the regime. Another source identified over 100 appointees as relatives and friends of central ministers. See Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto,* p. 103. On the other hand, note also that a majority of those appointed were already employed as public servants. For many of them it was a case of rapid and out-of-turn promotion. For others, such as those who entered the Pakistan Foreign Service, the move involved a change in the type of work done. See Muneer Ahmad, *Political Sociology* (Lahore: Punjab Adbi Markaz, 1978), pp. 117–22. Also see Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan,* pp. 133–40, 149.

44. Bhutto's note to the Establishment Secretary dated October 10, 1972. Kennedy says the recruitment was excessive and some of those selected could not promptly be placed. See *Bureaucracy in Pakistan,* p. 144.
45. Hasan Habib's criticism of the CSP may be seen in his book, Nazim (pseud.), *Babus, Brahmins and Bureaucrats: A Critique of the Administrative System in Pakistan* (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1973). For Justice Cornelius' analysis of the CSP's political role and related matters, see Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Pay and Services Commission* (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1969). For Cornelius' influence see Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan,* p. 64.
46. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, *Implementation of Administrative Reforms: Acts, Rules, Regulations, Instructions, etc. from August 15, 1973 to November 30, 1973* (Islamabad, 1973). See notifications dated August 21, September 4, and November 3, 1973 reproduced in part III, pp. 13–14, 15–17, 27–8. Also see Vaqar Ahmad's letter to all secretaries to the government dated August 21, 1973 in part IV, p. 1.
47. Text of this speech is included in *Implementation of Administrative Reforms,* part I, pp. 1–6.
48. Lawrence Ziring and Robert LaPorte, "The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Two Views," *Asian Survey,* December 1974, pp. 1086–7.
49. *The Gazette of Pakistan,* Extraordinary (Extr.), part I, dated September 29, 1973.
50. *The Gazette of Pakistan,* Extr., part II, dated October 20, 1973.
51. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 in *The Gazette of Pakistan,* Extr., dated August 18, 1973 and Notification of November 7, 1973 in *The Gazette of Pakistan,* Extr., part II, dated November 10, 1973.
52. Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958–1969* (Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 12.

6 Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once said of Jawaharlal Nehru that he excelled in his understanding and conduct of international politics to a point of "dangerous perfection." The same may have been true of Bhutto himself. Henry Kissinger found him to be a man of "extraordinary abilities." He was "brilliant, charming, of global stature in his perceptions. He could distinguish posturing from policy . . . He knew the facts as well as I; he was a man without illusions, prepared to do what was necessary . . . to save what was left of his country."[1]

Most observers in Pakistan regarded Prime Minister Bhutto as his nation's foremost diplomatist. He worked hard, and used considerable ingenuity, to enhance Pakistan's standing abroad. But as Agha Shahi, the foreign secretary, stated to me in the summer of 1974, success in negotiations with other governments can only partly be attributed to the negotiator's skill; it depends largely upon the objective conditions with which diplomacy must reckon. It is not our purpose here to discuss all aspects of Bhutto's foreign policy. We provide below a detailed consideration of the peace he made with India, for that was probably the most distinguished achievement of his career as a diplomatist. We will then see how he managed Pakistan's relations with other nations in its neighborhood and those with the United States.

THE SIMLA AGREEMENT

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's competence as a leader and ruler would not be fully established in the minds of his people until he had removed the symbols of the country's defeat in December 1971. India held nearly 93 000 Pakistanis as prisoners and occupied 5139 square miles of Pakistani territory. Pakistani forces had captured only 637 Indian personnel and 69 square miles of

Indian territory. Much of the Pakistani territory lay in the sparsely populated district of Tharparkar in Sind, but more than 500 square miles of it were situated in the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district and other densely populated areas of the Punjab. A million Pakistanis had become homeless as a result of the Indian occupation and lived in temporary shelters.

Pakistani opinion-makers felt that India should consider the dismemberment of their country a large enough gain from the war, should ask no more of Pakistan, and promptly return their men and territory. But the Indians had much more in mind. They wanted Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh, take more than half a million non-Bengalis (Biharis) whom the government of Bangladesh wanted to expel, accept the new cease-fire line in Kashmir as a permanent boundary, sign a "no-war" pact, agree to mutual reductions in armed forces and defense expenditures, settle disputes through bilateral negotiations without resort to third parties or institutions, and expand contact of various kinds between the two countries. India would then return Pakistani territory and personnel. Its spokesmen called these terms a "package deal" and implied that Pakistan would have to accept it as such.

Communicating with each other through the Swiss embassy in their capitals, the two governments agreed upon a meeting between President Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to be held in June 1972. An Indian delegation led by D. P. Dhar, head of the policy planning division in the Indian foreign office, arrived in Rawalpindi in the last week of April. He and Aziz Ahmad, secretary-general in the Pakistan ministry of foreign affairs, settled the agenda for Bhutto's meeting with Mrs Ghandi. That done, Bhutto proceeded to strengthen his negotiating position. He visited 14 Muslim countries in the Middle East and Africa between May 29 and June 10 and received public assurances of their support. At home he consulted opposition politicians and representatives of various other groups – workers, students, teachers, lawyers, journalists, the ulema, and the military commanders – to give them a sense of participation in the coming negotiations with India, gain their support, and enhance his own status as the nation's spokesman. But, above all, he sent messages to the Indian leadership and public opinion through foreign journalists to whom he granted extended interviews.

The most important of these messages related to his own credentials: he was no longer the confrontationist of yesteryear advocating a thousand-year war with India; he now desired "consultation and cooperation" between the two countries. He linked his new posture with a proposition that appeared to be sensible and, therefore, credible. Not he but the reality on the ground had changed, he reasoned. He was a realist, a practical man, now as before. There was a time when Pakistan had an edge over India in military preparedness. A policy of confrontation with India made sense at that time; it was the correct policy; it served Pakistani interests. But the situation had changed radically; India was now militarily preponderant; it had demonstrated its superiority on the field of battle. In these new circumstances confrontation had become the wrong policy and, therefore, he had abandoned it.[2]

As evidence of his realism he adopted a new position on Kashmir. He still believed in the right to self-determination and maintained that this right belonged to the people of Kashmir by virtue of their being a people. But the Kashmiri people must themselves be the ones to struggle for its realization. If they wanted to free themselves from Indian control, they must make the necessary exertions. Responding to Kuldip Nayar, who had asked if this meant that the "Kashmir problem is out of the way," Bhutto said the two countries could maintain their respective historical positions on the subject and yet "defuse the problem." He added that with regard to Kashmir he would no longer want to "run around the world chanceries or the UN."[3] B. G. Vergese of the *Hindustan Times* asked if it was not time for the two sides to undertake some "give and take" along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and recognize it as the international frontier between them. Bhutto observed that the people of Pakistan would not accept a formal settlement on that basis and, therefore, he could not consent to it. But "we can talk it over and . . . draw a picture in our minds," and resolve the issue accordingly "in our minds."[4]

The Indians were greatly relieved to hear Bhutto's new position. It implied that he would no longer taunt and vex them about Kashmir in international forums, and that he would practically end the dispute on the basis of the *status quo.* Nor would the Indians have to hear again of protracted conflict between their country and Bhutto's Pakistan. Could he be

trusted? Yes, because he now understood that he had no alternative to peaceableness.

Bhutto sent word that he was the most appropriate man in Pakistan to negotiate peace with India, and that it would be to the Indian government's advantage to strengthen his hand. He was an elected leader, commanded massive popular support, intended to restore democracy and build democratic institutions in the country. The people trusted him because they knew he would act only in the national interest. He should, therefore, not be expected to sign a peace accord which they would see as an instrument of surrender. If he fell from power, he would most likely be replaced by an intransigent military regime.[5]

The Indian journalists got the understanding that Bhutto favored close ties between Pakistan and India. He said he did not want to use words such as "confederation," which would be interpreted in Pakistan as the country's undoing, or a "no-war pact," which would be seen as subservience to India. But he did want to "go far in opening contacts." He would begin with modest advances and leave "the future to the processes of history and geography" and to his and Mrs Ghandi's successors.[6]

President Bhutto and his delegation arrived at Simla at 12.45 p.m. on June 28. At a brief private meeting after the arrival ceremonies, he proposed and Mrs Gandhi agreed that the two teams of officials would conduct the actual negotiations and the two leaders would talk only if an impasse had been reached. Each team would, of course, report to its own head of government, and get instructions, as talks proceeded. Aziz Ahmad led the Pakistani delegation and D. P. Dhar headed the Indian team at the conference table. Aziz Ahmad and Dhar had negotiated the agenda for this meeting in April, and they had encountered each other at Tashkent in 1966. They got along well; Dhar was eloquent, articulate, and exceedingly polite. But it so happened that he suffered a heart attack the very first night of the conference, and P. N. Haskar took his place. Both Aziz Ahmad and Haskar belonged to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) during British rule; Aziz Ahmad was now head of the foreign office in Islamabad, and Haskar served as Mrs Gandhi's principal secretary. Haskar sounded scholarly, even erudite, delivered long discourses, sermonized, and – to Aziz Ahmad's considerable annoyance – laced his speech with Latin phrases,

French proverbs, and quotations from English poetry. He appeared condescending, if not arrogant.[7]

Serious negotiations began later in the afternoon on June 28. After the opening statements had been made, each side, as is the custom on such occasions, presented a "draft agreement" that contained its own maximum expectations and as little as possible of the other side's demands. The first Pakistani draft asked for a quick repatriation of its prisoners of war, withdrawal of forces from each other's territory, and resumption of diplomatic relations after which, the draft said, the two nations could live in peace. The Indian team ignored this draft and presented its own, which called for a treaty of friendship between the two countries, renunciation of war, bilateralism for resolving disputes, abjuring of alliances directed against either party, a joint economic commission, reductions in defense spending and forces to be monitored by an inspection system, and some of the other concessions on the part of Pakistan that we mentioned earlier. It made no reference to the Pakistani territory or prisoners India held. Aziz Ahmad professed to be outraged and regretful that the Indian negotiators had given no consideration to his "eminently sensible" proposals, threw their draft back at them, and said: "What do you take us for?"[8]

After each meeting Aziz Ahmad saw Bhutto to report progress – more often the lack of it – and to get his instructions and advice for the next round. Over the next several days each side presented seven more drafts. Negotiations were made difficult by India's insistence on ending all irritating issues between the two countries in one sweep and with one "package" of solutions that would be seen in Pakistan as capitulations. More specifically, the Indian negotiators pressed for settling the Kashmir dispute on the basis of the new cease-fire line, which they now called the "line of control," and they demanded a no-war pact to secure that settlement. The Pakistani team failed to move the Indians away from these positions. T. N. Kaul, the Indian foreign secretary, asked why they were meeting at all if they were not to settle the Kashmir dispute.[9]

At 3.00 p.m. on July 2, Bhutto instructed Aziz Ahmad to let it be known that the Pakistani delegation was ready to quit and go home. Aziz Ahmad returned to the meeting, reported Bhutto's feeling that the talks were deadlocked, and spoke some consoling

words to the effect that failure was always a possibility at international conferences. He handed Haskar a draft communique which said the two delegations had talked, gained a better understanding of each other's point of view, and would meet again at some appropriate time in the future.[10] This turn of events disconcerted the Indian spokesmen, and Mrs Gandhi, for they too had a stake in concluding an agreement. Failure would suggest to the world that they had been excessively grasping and domineering.

At 5.00 p.m. Bhutto went to see Mrs Gandhi for tea and, as a result of their conversation, negotiations resumed after dinner. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Bhutto, along with their respective advisors, positioned themselves in rooms across the hall from each other. After hectic exchanges between the two delegations, and consultations within each group, an agreement was finally hammered out, typed up, and signed at 12.40 in the morning of July 3, 1972.[11] Its more important provisions should be noted before we address the admittedly intriguing question of what had passed between Bhutto and Mrs Gandhi at "tea" the previous afternoon.

The agreement provided as follows:[12]

(a) the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter shall govern relations between the two countries;
(b) they are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them; pending final settlement of any problem, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation, and both shall prevent acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations between them;
(c) both sides commit themselves to peaceful coexistence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
(d) both governments agree that in Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the cease fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected without prejudice to the recognized position of either side; neither side shall seek to alter this line unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations; both sides undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of this line;

(e) withdrawals of forces (from each other's territory) shall commence upon the entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of thirty days thereafter;
(f) the agreement will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged;
(g) the two heads of government will meet again at a mutually convenient time later and, in the meantime, their representatives will meet to discuss further the normalization of relations between the two countries, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir, and the resumption of diplomatic relations;
(h) in order to restore and normalize relations between them step by step, the two countries will act to resume communications, promote travel, restore trade, and encourage cultural and scientific exchanges between them.

Let us now identify each side's gains and disappointments:

1. the agreement concerning the withdrawal of forces was a gain for Pakistan inasmuch as it had been one of its two principal objectives at the conference;
2. India made a gain in securing Pakistan's agreement to respect the new line of control in Kashmir, which allowed it additional territory, but its failure to get a final settlement of the dispute was a disappointment;
3. India did not get a no-war pact, which was a disappointment, but it secured its practical effect by Pakistan's agreement to resolve disputes through peaceful means;
4. if Indian interpretations were to prevail, Pakistan's agreement to resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations implied that it would no longer press the Kashmir dispute at the UN; this could be interpreted as a significant limitation of its sovereignty, which would then be seen as a major gain for India and a serious loss for Pakistan;
5. the reference to a "final settlement" in Jammu and Kashmir implied India's recognition that there was indeed a dispute about Kashmir, and this could be seen as a gain for Pakistan;
6. the agreement said nothing about Bangladesh which was a disappointment for India and a relief for Pakistan;

7. the agreement left the issue of the prisoners of war to future negotiations, and this was a setback for Pakistan.

Aziz Ahmad stated to me that certain objectionable features of India's seventh draft were removed at Bhutto's urgings to Mrs Gandhi. Thus, the reference to the UN Charter as a guiding framework for Indo-Pakistan relations, insertion of the phrase "without prejudice to the recognized position of each side" to qualify the obligation to respect the new line of control in Kashmir, and deletion of the word "exclusively" before bilateral negotiations as a way of settling disputes – these modifications in the final draft were made upon Bhutto's insistence.[13]

Interpretation

Why did Mrs Gandhi concede even as much as she did? Bhutto's supporters in Pakistan ascribed the outcome at Simla to his eloquence, knowledge, ingenuity, and even simulation. He was thought to have got the better of Mrs Gandhi and, in some of his statements, he himself encouraged this impression. He told Moti Ram, an Indian journalist, that he had spoken to Mrs Gandhi of their common history, their great and common cultural heritage, their responsibility to the generations to come, his own desire for peace, the greatness that awaited her if they made peace, the condemnation they would both merit if they failed. In this version, Mrs Gandhi was charmed; she smiled at the end of Bhutto's discourse and said they would continue their conversation after dinner.[14]

Bhutto may have spoken to Mrs Gandhi in this vein. But she may have smiled in response to something else he submitted. It is not unreasonable to posit that he said to her what he had already told several Indian journalists, and which they had published in their newspapers, to wit: that his earlier policy of confrontation had become dysfunctional because of India's military preponderance; that he desired peace not because he hated war but because he had no alternative to peace; that the people of Pakistan would not accept a formal settlement in Kashmir on the basis of a cease-fire line, which should not matter, for they did not have the capability to change this line by force; that while he accepted the reality of Bangladesh, he

could not recognize it forthwith, because his people would not hear of it; that his acceptance of the Indian demands concerning Kashmir and Bangladesh would likely provoke a revolt against him and bring about his ouster from office. Being the hard-headed politician she was, this frank statement of a fellow-politician's problems of survival may have influenced Mrs Gandhi more than Bhutto's discourse on history did. She may have explained to him the pressures the opposition politicians in India would put on her if she conceded everything he wanted. Bhutto probably assured her that he was preparing Pakistani public opinion in favor of recognizing Bangladesh, which indeed he was doing. Mrs Gandhi acted with caution: she would return the Pakistani territory but keep the prisoners for a time; she would wait and watch how Bhutto and his government spoke and acted in the coming months.

This is not to belittle Bhutto's accomplishment at Simla. If we conceive his mission as one of "damage control," which is how it should be regarded, considering that he represented the defeated party at a peace conference, we see that he yielded as little as possible. A lesser politician might have caved in under the pressure as Ayub Khan did at Tashkent. Bhutto's strategy consisted of justifying his firmness in terms of political realism that Mrs Gandhi understood. The language of the agreement admitted of more than one interpretation for which also Bhutto and his colleagues might claim credit. Explaining the agreement in the National Assembly and in other forums in Pakistan, he denied that it stopped Pakistan from taking its disputes with India to the UN. He argued that the UN Charter, which both sides had accepted as the guiding framework for their relations, allowed each party recourse to the world organization. But he softened this interpretation with the observation that Pakistan had received little satisfaction from the UN with regard to Kashmir, and that it might be prudent to give bilateral negotiations more of a chance.[15]

That Pakistan had not taken its disputes with India, including the one concerning Kashmir, to the United Nations since the Simla agreement, and that it had not attempted to alter the *status quo* in Kashmir by force, would suggest that Mrs Gandhi too had acted shrewdly. Neither she nor Bhutto had hoodwinked the other.

AFTER SIMLA

The withdrawal of forces was completed on December 20, 1972 and, thus, Pakistan recovered the territory it had lost to India during the war. But the Pakistani prisoners of war were still in India. Their return had been linked with Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh, which continued to be an extremely sensitive issue. The Bhutto regime took certain steps which could be cited as evidence of its intention to move forward toward recognition. In the summer of 1973 it requested the Supreme Court's opinion on whether it had the authority to recognize Bangladesh, and on July 7 the Court said, yes, it did. The National Assembly then passed a resolution authorizing the government to accord recognition at an appropriate time. Pro-government newspapers published columns and editorials in favor of recognition. In his own public meetings Bhutto argued for it. At one such meeting in Rawalpindi on December 20, 1973 – the second anniversary of his regime – he reminded his audience that he had not, until then, recognized Bangladesh even though the Supreme Court and the National Assembly had authorized him to do so. He was waiting for the people's authorization. "But please understand, dear people, we will have to recognize Bangladesh some day because it is a reality which our non-recognition will not change. The reality will have to be accepted."[16]

But the opponents of recognition were also at work. They greeted Bhutto, wherever he went, with shouts of "Bangladesh Namanzoor" (Bangladesh is unacceptable). Columnists and editors opposed to the Bhutto regime argued that recognition of Bangladesh would demolish the ideological foundation of Pakistan and lead to its further disintegration.[17] Legally the way had been cleared, but politically recognition remained problematic.

The Bhutto regime mounted an intense campaign to arouse world opinion concerning the Pakistani prisoners of war. Delegations composed of their relatives went abroad and addressed audiences. Pakistani embassies in foreign capitals sent letters, documents, and legal opinions to persons on their mailing lists to show that India was violating the Geneva Conventions – specifically Article 118 of the Third Convention – which re-

quired prompt repatriation of prisoners upon the cessation of hostilities.[18] The issue became even more embarrassing for India when the prisoners in various camps rioted or tried to escape and the Indian guards shot them down; in a number of such cases between March 1972 and November 1973 38 prisoners were killed.[19] Needless to say, these incidents were reported in the international press. Pakistan requested friendly governments, and those which had recognized Bangladesh, to use their influence on behalf of the prisoners.

China exerted its own kind of pressure. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it vetoed Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations. Seeing that Pakistan would not recognize Bangladesh, and the Chinese would not lift their veto, until the Pakistani prisoners were released, India finally relented.[20] After ten days of hard negotiations, an accord called the Delhi Agreement was signed on August 28, 1973. It provided that India would repatriate all Pakistani civilian internees and prisoners of war as quickly as possible, but that the future of the 195 individuals whom Bangladesh wanted to try for alleged war crimes would be settled in negotiations at a later date; that Pakistan would allow all Bengalis on its territory to leave; and that it would receive a "substantial number" of Biharis from Bangladesh.[21] Subsequently (April 9, 1974), the government of Bangladesh abandoned the project of punishing war crimes. The first group of prisoners – 1680 civilians, including women and children – arrived in Pakistan on September 28, 1973; the last batch, which included General Niazi, returned home on April 30, 1974.[22] Seventy-four thousand Biharis from Bangladesh came to live in Pakistan.

Sometime in 1973 Bhutto decided to convene an Islamic summit in Pakistan, with the thought that the resulting feeling of Muslim brotherhood would create the proper psychological environment for recognizing Bangladesh. And it did. A few weeks before the meeting, which was scheduled for February 1974, the secretary-general of the Islamic Conference – a permanent organization of Muslim states – went to Dacca at Bhutto's request to invite Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He was reluctant, insisting that Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh must come first. Later, the Muslim foreign ministers, assembled in Lahore to prepare an agenda for the meeting, sent a delegation to assure Mujibur Rahman that recognition would soon be forth-

coming. On February 22, 1974, a few hours before the summit was to open, Bhutto announced his government's recognition of Bangladesh. In a televised address to the nation he said he had made this decision in deference to the wishes of the Islamic world. He had resisted the Indian pressure in this regard, but he could not rebuff the heads of Muslim states, his brothers-in-Islam.[23] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman then came to Lahore and was well received. Speaking to a huge crowd in Lahore, Muammar Qaddafi of Libya lent Bhutto a helping hand; he confirmed that all Muslim nations represented at the summit had recommended recognition to honor Islamic brotherhood and unity. The opponents of recognition were thus effectively silenced.

Tensions between Pakistan and India surfaced from time to time even as the normalization of their relations went forward. Bhutto did not deliberately pursue a policy of confrontation, but as he worked to establish an independent role for Pakistan in world affairs, and as he resisted India's assertion of dominance in the region, his posture took on a confrontationist appearance. As Agha Shahi put it to me, Pakistan encountered Indian opposition, or it had to oppose India, in the course of pursuing its own interests. Pakistan could not, for instance, rely upon India's assurance that its nuclear capability would only serve peaceful purposes. India's possession of nuclear weapons, while Pakistan did not have them, could have a disastrous impact on Pakistani morale.[24] The government of Pakistan must then oppose India's nuclear program, take the issue to international forums, and propose to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone. But India would oppose the Pakistani proposal even while professing peaceful intent.

PAKISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet leaders had assisted India in defeating and dismembering Pakistan in 1971. During Bhutto's visit to Moscow in March 1972 they linked the improvement of Soviet-Pakistan relations with the normalization of relations among Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. But they agreed to restore trade and aid relations which were suspended in 1971. Rafi Raza, Bhutto's minister for industries, went to Moscow in December 1974 and brought back word of a Soviet agreement to advance 4.5 billion

rupees, in foreign exchange, to help Pakistan build a steel mill near Karachi. He said the mill would go into production in 1980, employ some 40 000 persons, and help the development of Port Qasim.[25] It is not clear how much of the promised funds was released while Bhutto was still in office. As of June 30, 1977, the Soviet Union had, over the years, committed a total of $517.64 million in loans to Pakistan, but it had actually disbursed only $82.49 million.[26] The mill was eventually built and went into production, but not during Bhutto's time.

Moscow continued to place a higher value on its relations with India and Afghanistan, and as long as Pakistan's relations with these two countries remained tense, its relations with the Soviet Union could not improve significantly. Its membership in CENTO, its alliance with the United States, and its friendship with China were just as irritating to the Soviet Union now as they were before. Bhutto declined support for the Soviet project of creating an Asian security system on the ground that it would be directed against China. He also turned down a Soviet request for access to Pakistani roads for transiting goods in Soviet-Indian trade. The Soviets, on their part, took a hand in fomenting separatism in NWFP and Baluchistan.

PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN

Governments in Afghanistan have traditionally claimed that they have a "political" dispute with Pakistan which must be settled before the two countries can be friendly. At worst they demand that the provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan be allowed to secede from Pakistan and form a state of their own, to be called Pakhtunistan, which may remain independent or join Afghanistan. When the Pakistani–Afghan cold war is in thaw, Kabul asks only that the government of Pakistan allow the Pathan and Baluchi counter-elite to do their political work, compete for power in the Pakistani political system, and rule when and where they win. Between 1963 and 1973, while King Zahir Shah exercised a moderating influence in the Afghan government, the issue remained subsided. Bhutto visited the king shortly after assuming office and received assurances that Afghanistan would not do anything to hamper Pakistan's recovery from its recent war with India. Bhutto, on his part, may

have told the king that he intended to let the National Awami Party (NAP) form the provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan.[27] The NAP politicians had been friends with the regime in Kabul for many years, and the Afghans were pleased, and reassured, when the NAP–JUI governments were formed in May 1972. But relations between these governments and the central government in Islamabad reached breaking-point within a few months, and Bhutto dismissed the one in Baluchistan in February 1973. In March some NAP politicians and men from the "Pakhtun Zalme" (guards affiliated with NAP) fled to Kabul. An insurgency developed in Baluchistan, and several hundred Marri tribesmen took refuge in Afghanistan. In July 1973 Sardar Daoud ousted the king and became president of Afghanistan. He had always been pro-Soviet, pro-India, and anti-Pakistan, and he revived the Pakhtunistan issue with full force.[28]

Initially, Daoud took the position that he did not covet Pakistani territory, and that any settlement between the Bhutto regime and the Pakhtun leaders in Pakistan would be acceptable to him.[29] But as no such settlement materialized, his stance hardened. He told foreign journalists that he could not remain unconcerned if the Pakhtuns and Baluchis in Pakistan were persecuted, and that he expected India and other friendly countries to support Afghanistan in case of a conflict with Pakistan. Afghan ambassadors in London and New Delhi said their country did not recognize the Durand Line as its frontier with Pakistan, and that their government did not accept NWFP and Baluchistan as provinces of Pakistan.[30]

There were reports in 1974 that Baluchi insurgents and a number of the Pakhtun Zalme were being trained – the latter in subversion and sabotage – in Afghanistan. Bomb explosions began to take place in the towns of Baluchistan, NWFP, and the Punjab the same year, and officials in Pakistan believed these were instigated by the government in Kabul. Relations between the two countries remained in a "bad and sad" state in 1974 and 1975. But there was a turn toward improvement the following year. Prime Minister Bhutto visited President Daoud in Kabul in June 1976, and Daoud came to Rawalpindi in August. The two sides then agreed to abide by the Bandung principles of peaceful coexistence and avoid interference in each other's domestic affairs. Bhutto later wrote that Daoud had agreed at these talks to recognize the Durand Line as the frontier between

the two countries, and thus to bury the Pakhtunistan issue, if the government of Pakistan would release the NAP leaders from Baluchistan and NWFP, who had been in jail since 1973 and 1975 respectively.[31] A formal agreement to this effect was to be signed during Bhutto's next visit to Kabul, but this visit did not materialize because of his preoccupation with elections and the subsequent turmoil in Pakistan.

How did this move toward a reconciliation become possible? There is first the well-known role played by the Shah of Iran. He invited President Daoud for talks in Tehran in April 1975, offered him an economic aid package worth two billion dollars, and asked him, among other things, to make peace with Pakistan.[32] He repeated this advice in subsequent contacts as discussions between their two governments concerning Iranian aid progressed. But Bhutto was not relying upon the Shah alone. He had embarked upon a "forward policy" toward Afghanistan as early as 1974. Acting through the army intelligence, he recruited Afghan groups opposed to the Daoud regime and led by Younis Khalis and Gulbadin Hekmatyar. The government of Pakistan covertly trained and funded these dissidents to harass the government in Kabul with acts of subversion, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare.[33] Daoud was shaken by the spreading discontent in his country and an uprising in the Punjsher region in July 1975.[34] Thus, Bhutto, let Daoud know that interference in the domestic affairs of a neighbor was a game he could play just as effectively.

PAKISTAN AND CHINA

Friendly relations between Pakistan and China were firmly established in 1963. Bhutto was known to have made a significant contribution to their development, and the Chinese leaders held him in high personal regard. During his visit to Beijing in February 1972 they agreed to write off some of their earlier loans to Pakistan amounting to $110 million. In May they sent Pakistan 60 MiG-19 fighters and 100 T-54 and T-59 tanks as part of a new $300 million economic and military aid package Bhutto was said to have negotiated during his visit.[35]

Political cooperation between Pakistan and China was even more remarkable. The Shanghai communique at the end of

President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 included a commitment to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Using its veto in the Security Council, China kept Bangladesh out of the United Nations for a time and did not establish diplomatic relations with it until October 1975, which was more than a year after Pakistan had recognized it. Indeed, in 1973 and 1974 the Chinese foreign ministry declined to accept letters which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had sent for Premier Chou En-lai, and which the Burmese and Yugoslav embassies in Beijing had tried to deliver.[36] Similarly, China did not agree to an exchange of ambassadors with India until diplomatic relations between Pakistan and India were restored in July 1976. In both cases the Chinese diplomacy was aimed at inducing settlements in South Asia that would be acceptable to Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, on its part, rebuffed the Soviet Union's Asian security scheme because of its anti-Chinese orientation, and it used its diplomatic resources to bring about an improvement of China's relations with Iran and some of the Arab states. At a somewhat more mundane level, Pakistani businessmen acted as purchasing agents for China to acquire items in the international market which the Chinese themselves could not buy.[37]

PAKISTAN AND IRAN

Pakistan's relations with Iran were always cordial, partly because the Pakistanis entertained a strong sense of religious, linguistic, and cultural affinities with the Iranian people. The two countries had been allies of the United States, and of each other, against the threat of Soviet expansionism. During the 1950s and much of the 1960s, the elites in Pakistan thought they were ahead of the Iranians in terms of economic, administrative, and even political modernization. But their status plunged as Pakistan met defeat and dismemberment in 1971 and as Iran became rich due to enormous increases in its oil revenues. The Shah of Iran assumed the role of protector of Pakistan.

After the British announced their intention to withdraw from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the Shah determined, with American approval, to make Iran the dominant power in the region and an overseer for excluding, or minimizing, Soviet presence and

influence in the region. He embarked upon a massive program of building Iran's military capability to equip it for this role. The Shah was aware that his design conflicted with a similar Indian drive for primacy in the area. Afghanistan, an ally of the Soviet Union and India, and Egypt, a major power in the Arab world, might also oppose the Shah's urges. He tried to conciliate these likely opponents of his project with offers of economic assistance and collaboration.[38]

The Shah thought of Pakistan in two dimensions. First, he was concerned that a separatist movement in Pakistani Baluchistan might travel next door to the Iranian Baluchistan and destabilize it. Second, if Pakistan disintegrated as a result of internal divisions and India occupied it, or if India invaded and conquered Pakistan, India would bear upon Iran as an immediate neighbor. The Shah did not welcome this prospect; he preferred to have Pakistan as a buffer between Iran and India. With these considerations in mind, he offered Pakistan economic and political support.

Iran gave Pakistan a loan of $580 million in 1974, and another loan of $150 million in 1976, to relieve its balance of payments deficits. Both loans carried a modest interest rate of 2.5 percent. Several joint ventures were negotiated. An Iranian–Pakistani company was to set up textile mills in Baluchistan, with Iran meeting the entire foreign exchange cost ($48.77 million). A joint undertaking in cement production was under way. Iran offered Pakistan grants of $4.64 million and $2.4 million for establishing a medical school and an engineering college in Baluchistan. An Iranian loan of $2.2 million was negotiated to finance a water development project, again in Baluchistan, that would sink 120 tubewells to irrigate 12 000 acres of land.[39]

The political relationship between Pakistan and Iran appeared to be close. Bhutto and the Shah met often, two or three times each year, and in 1976 they met four times – in March, April, July, and December – to discuss "matters of mutual interest" and to strengthen their "brotherly" relations. In his public statements Bhutto applauded the cooperation between Pakistan and Iran. He publicized details of the assistance Iran had given Pakistan during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. He maintained that the two governments shared the same goals, and that they had reached identical interpretations of the current trends in the region. This identity of views and purposes

meant that Iranian support to Pakistan in the future would be even more vigorous and determined than before.[40]

Yet, the Iranian expressions of support were not without an element of irritation for the Pakistanis. The Shah projected Iran as a major power and treated Pakistan as a weak neighbor. In statements to foreign journalists he asserted repeatedly that he would not allow the internal cohesion of Pakistan to be disrupted, that he would not let Pakistan disintegrate once again, and that he would intervene to protect Pakistan in case of a military threat to its integrity. Speaking to an Indian journalist, he implied that Iranian weapons would be used against India if it attacked Pakistan. But he also made statements such as that if Pakistan did fall apart again, he would have to make a "protective reaction" in Pakistani Baluchistan, meaning that Iran would occupy it before another power could. The Shah's assertions as a protector cast Pakistan in a subordinate role and offended Pakistani sensibilities. Officials in the Pakistan foreign office noted that Iran was not willing to transfer any of its weapons to Pakistan. If it were then to intervene, let us say, in an Indo-Pakistan war, it would have a large say in how Pakistan was to wage that war, when it must stop the fighting, and what terms it must accept in making peace.[41]

But much more troublesome to many Pakistanis was the fact that, even without a serious threat of war with India, the Shah acted as an overlord and felt free to give Prime Minister Bhutto advice on issues of domestic politics in Pakistan.[42] It was widely believed, and Bhutto himself was reported to have said as much to Abdul Wali Khan, the president of NAP, that the Shah had been greatly displeased with the establishment of a NAP–JUI government in Baluchistan, presumably because of the NAP's pro-Soviet orientation and its espousal of a theory of nationalities, and had urged Bhutto to oust it.

Pakistani officials did not approve of the substantial economic assistance the Shah bestowed upon India, but it is unlikely that they had any say in the matter. The Shah wanted to expand Iran's trade with India and asked Pakistan to open its already congested roads and railways to carry it. Unable to resist him, the government of Pakistan agreed to his demand.[43]

It is said that kings have no relatives, and Prime Minister Bhutto once told me that all his friendships were in the public interest. But it appears that, within the limits implicit in these

observations, Bhutto and the Shah had developed a degree of personal regard for each other. During one of their visits to Pakistan the Shah and his queen stayed at Bhutto's home, Al Murtaza, in Larkana. The prime minister and Begum Nusrat Bhutto received a grand welcome in Tehran, marked by "incomparable pageantry," in the summer of 1973. Bhutto enjoyed the Shah's personal hospitality at the latter's retreat in the Kish islands for two days in 1974.[44] The substance of their bilateral relations would not account for the number of meetings the two men had. It is probable that the Shah valued Bhutto's interpretations and analyses of the ongoing developments in international politics. He hoped also that the rapport Bhutto had cultivated with the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the emirates of the Persian Gulf might be used to calm any fears and suspicions of Iran they had.

Nevertheless, it appears that Bhutto did not enjoy the role of a junior partner in which the Shah had placed him. Referring to his relations with the Iranian monarch before and after 1973, he told a journalist: "Before, when I talked with him, I used to talk to him as a brother. Now I have an audience."[45] But we should add that if he had not dismissed the NAP–JUI government in Baluchistan, and if his posture in domestic politics had been more conciliatory toward the opposition, domestic cohesion would likely have improved, instead of worsening, and neither he nor his country would have been forced to accept the role of a client in relation to Iran and its ruler.

PAKISTAN AND THE ARAB STATES

Bhutto worked to develop relationships of mutual respect, even affection, with several Arab leaders, notably Muammar Qaddafi, Yasser Arafat, and Sheikh Zayd (ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the United Arab Emirates), and he was appropriately respectful to the kings of Saudi Arabia. Benazir Bhutto has written that he won their confidence by offering them cooperation on their terms and for their good, and by assuring them that Pakistan did not desire a hegemonic role, and that it did not see Iran or any Arab state in the area as a rival.[46] He supported Arab and Islamic causes in his meetings with these rulers and leaders, and he articulated their concerns eloquently

in international forums. The Islamic summit in Lahore in February 1974 had been a grand affair and so was an international conference on the life of the Prophet two years later. King Khalid of Saudi Arabia paid a six-day state visit to Pakistan in October 1976. He and Bhutto described Islam as the basis of their nationhoods and as a bond of "unfailing strength and indestructible solidarity" between their two countries. The king called for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute according to the relevant United Nations resolutions, and Bhutto demanded Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories.[47]

Pakistan received considerable financial assistance from Arab sources as shown below, while Bhutto was the prime minister.[48]

Source	*Assistance*	*Purpose*
Saudi Arabia	1974: $100 million interest-free loan	project aid for one fertilizer plant, two cement plants, one polyester plant
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency	1975–6: $30 million grant	help balance of payments deficit
Saudi Development Fund	1976: $30 million loan at 4% interest	fertilizer plant
	1976: $10 million donation	build Islamic Center
	1976: $20 million donation	"social programs"
Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates)	1974–5: $100 million loan at 2.5% interest	"general purposes"
	$31 million equity participation	fertilizer plant
	$21.6 million equity participation	refinery

Source	*Assistance*	*Purpose*
	$40 million pledged loan at 4% interest	refinery
Kuwait (Fund for Arab Economic Development)	1977: $44.2 million pledged loan at 4% interest	power transmission
	$25 million pledged loan at 4% interest	improvement of Pakistan railways
Qatar	1974: $10 million pledged loan at 3% interest	open
Libya	1973-4: $30 million grant	balance of payments support
	1974-5: $50 million Libyan "deposit" with the State Bank of Pakistan	balance of payments support
OPEC Special Fund	$21.45 million interest-free loan	balance of payments support

In return Pakistan helped the Arabs in some ways. Its pilots operated military and commercial aircraft in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, and numerous Pakistani officers served as advisors in these countries. Pakistanis enlisted in the local military and police forces in Oman. Citizens of Kuwait, the Emirates, and other Arab countries attended medical, engineering, business, and arts and science colleges in Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto's friendly relations with the Arab leaders and rulers opened the way for an increasing number of Pakistanis to find employment in the Middle East, especially in Kuwait, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. Migration of Pakistani workers to these countries became sub-

stantial in 1974 and, as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates proceeded to build the infrastructure for their economic development and modernization, it increased enormously. At the close of the Bhutto regime nearly 700 000 Pakistanis worked in the Middle East, 100 000 of them in Dubai alone, and an equal number in Saudi Arabia. They lived frugally and sent their savings to their families in Pakistan. In 1978 these remittances, which Pakistan received in foreign exchange, had already reached $1.5 billion.[49]

PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Pakistan's relations with the United States were free of serious trouble until about the middle of 1976. American economic assistance to Pakistan remained substantial, and it was able to buy ammunition, vehicles, and spare parts for the American military equipment it had. But the supply of whole units in major categories, such as aircraft and tanks, suspended in 1965, was not resumed, despite Bhutto's urging and a favorable decision by the Ford administration in February 1975.

Henry Kissinger implies that while he and Nixon were not unreceptive to Bhutto's request, it could not be met because of strong opposition in the United States Congress. Moreover, there was little sympathy for Bhutto, and considerable disapproval of his style, among career officials in the Department of State, whose area specialists had always been more favorably disposed toward India. Kissinger notes that Bhutto's "anti-American tune" played to "serve his domestic purposes," and his "cynical conduct" from time to time, had created a "legacy of distrust" that "haunted [him] within our government throughout his political life."[50]

Bhutto's diplomacy following the Indian testing of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974 was more effective in changing the American stance. He took the position that his government would keep the option of building nuclear weapons under review, and that while it did not really want to build them, it might be forced to do so if the United States did not supply conventional weapons to Pakistan, and if India's continued military build-up threatened stability in the region. Then there were reports in 1974 that the French were considering a plan to

manufacture Mirage fighter-bombers in Pakistan, make it a major marketing and maintenance center for French weapons to be sold in West Asia and Southeast Asia, and also help Pakistan rebuild its own armed forces.[51] It is likely that the United States wanted to discourage this French plan as well as the Pakistani option of building nuclear weapons. The American ambassador in Pakistan, Henry Byroade, who had formed a close relationship with Prime Minister Bhutto, counseled restraint in Islamabad and, at the same time, worked to persuade Washington to lift the embargo on arms supplies.[52] Bhutto visited the United States in January 1975, conferred with President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the following month the Ford administration announced its decision to allow sales of arms to Pakistan. That the weapons would now be sold, instead of being given gratis as had been the case until 1965, made it easier for American officials to accept the Pakistani request.

In 1976 Pakistan was negotiating to buy, and the United States appeared willing to sell, 110 American A-7 fighter-bombers. But it seems the United States made the sale conditional upon Pakistan agreeing not to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant which it had contracted to buy from France. The plant became a major irritant in Pakistani-American relations and a quick word of explanation may be useful.

It has been estimated that by the year 2000 Pakistan would need ten times the power-generating capacity it had in 1973.[53] Prime Minister Bhutto's government announced plans to set up a 500 MW nuclear power plant near Kundian in the Chashma barrage area, and said that, starting in 1980, it would install ten or more additional nuclear reactors in the country, at the rate of one every second year.[54] These reactors would need fuel. Plutonium, produced by reprocessing spent uranium, can be used as fuel and it can also be used for producing nuclear weapons. Pakistan said it would use the plutonium it got from its reprocessing plant as fuel, but the United States suspected that it would use the plutonium to build bombs. The nuclear power plant near Karachi, built with Canadian help in 1972, could yield up to 137 kg of plutonium per year, enabling Pakistan to have enough of it by 1985 to build more than 100 nuclear bombs.[55]

During his last visit to Islamabad as secretary of state, Henry

Kissinger warned Bhutto that Pakistan might lose all American economic and military assistance if it did not abandon the project of acquiring a nuclear reprocessing plant. Bhutto responded that he could not submit to American pressure without losing his credibility and standing with his own people.[56] He argued also that Pakistan had accepted the IAEA safeguard and would open its nuclear facilities to international inspection. He went on to say that if the French accepted the American contention that the safeguard clause in their agreement with Pakistan was not "foolproof," his government would be willing to discuss a possible rewording of that clause. But these assurances and representations did not suffice to overcome American opposition.

President Jimmy Carter shared his predecessor's concern regarding nuclear proliferation and his worry that Pakistan might some day contribute to it, but he also found a curious reason for warming up to India and downgrading relations with Pakistan. That was his mother's sojourn in India as a peace corps worker in the early 1960s. In the spring of 1977 the Carter administration turned down a Pakistani purchase order for tear gas, saying it did not want to be involved in the post-election, anti-Bhutto, disturbances in Pakistan (see Chapter 8 below). Lawrence Ziring thinks the administration wanted to send a signal to the opposition parties in Pakistan that it did not have a stake in Bhutto's political survival. Prime Minister Bhutto, on his part, alleged that the United States government had entered a "colossal conspiracy" to secure his ouster, because he wanted to give Pakistan a "nuclear capability," and that it was funding the opposition's campaign against him.[57]

Aziz Ahmad conferred with Cyrus Vance, the new American secretary of state, in Paris on May 31, 1977. They told newsmen that their governments wished to restore the mutual confidence and friendship which had characterized their relations in the past. But three days later the United States government announced its decision to postpone the delivery of the 110 A-7 aircraft which the Ford administration had earlier promised Pakistan.[58]

Interpretation

International politics and foreign policy were considered to be

Bhutto's forte. He himself believed that few, if any, in Pakistan understood these matters as well as he did. It is fair to say that in this area he made gains for Pakistan as much as the "objective realities" on the ground would allow. A lesser man might not have been as successful.

Bhutto was peaceable but defiant toward India; peaceable because his country did not have the capacity to wage conflict; defiant, because, as a patriot and as his country's prime minister, he thought it was his duty to resist India's hegemonic ambitions and designs. The Shah wished to project Iran as a major power. Bhutto knew that while Iran had money, it did not have the technological, organizational, and political resources needed for such a role. But he went along with the Shah, and may even have humored him, in his contemplation of grandeur. The Shah was giving money away, and Bhutto got a fair amount of it for Pakistan. The kings of Saudi Arabia, the Libyan leader, and the amirs of the Gulf states were also rich, but they were less educated and less experienced in the craft of international politics than, let us say, the Shah was. In their company Bhutto could be a giant among men. He offered them counsel, political support, and services. In return they gave Pakistan generous assistance.

In Chapter 1 above we presented Bhutto's prescriptive theory of how a smaller state might manage its relations with the great and global powers. It would be useful to recall his essential argument. He had reasoned that the smaller state and a great power could cooperate in areas of common interest, but that the smaller state should try to persuade the great power to set aside the issues on which they disagreed. If the great power did not accept this mode, and if it proceeded to coerce the smaller state, the latter should resist. But Bhutto knew also that his prescription might not always work. "It would be idealistic to expect a great power to change its global objectives on the demand of a smaller state," he wrote and added that "in the long run, a great power cannot be outwitted or outsmarted."[59] This reservation, more than the original prescription, would explain his inability to overcome the troubles that developed in his dealings with the two global powers. It became apparent that they would not cooperate with Pakistan except on their own terms. The Soviet Union promised Pakistan a steel mill but it also aided Afghanistan in destabilizing the NWFP and

Baluchistan. When Bhutto resisted American pressure with regard to his plans for acquiring a reprocessing plant, President Carter canceled the sale of American A-7 fighters to Pakistan, and his embassy in Islamabad may have given Bhutto's opponents a helping hand in overthrowing him.

The United States resumed military supplies to Pakistan on a substantial scale some three years after Bhutto's ouster even as its distrust of the Pakistani "nuclear program" grew stronger. But this happened when the United States found that it could use Pakistan to serve its objective of harassing the Soviet army in Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq, agreed to serve as a local American agent for distributing weapons to the Afghan insurgents battling the communist regime and Soviet troops in their country. Pakistan also became host to their leaders, commanders, and headquarters. And, it harbored millions of Afghan refugees who were fleeing the regime in Kabul and the Soviet army. Once again the objective reality, more than a leader's ingenuity, made the difference in American policy toward Pakistan. Bhutto did not have the occasion to serve a critical American interest in return for which he could have obtained important concessions. But we should say also that, even if the opportunity had presented itself, he might not have served the American interest as readily as Zia-ul-Haq did without considering the costs it entailed for his own country.

NOTES

1. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), pp. 907–9, and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston; Little, Brown, 1982), p. 676.
2. Government of Pakistan, Department of Films and Publications, *President Bhutto's Interviews to Foreign Correspondents* (Islamabad, 1972), pp. 14, 23, 44, 48.
3. Ibid., pp. 24–5, and 13–15, 46, 62.
4. Ibid., pp. 92–3.
5. Ibid., pp. 5–16, 26, 57–8, 79.
6. Ibid., pp. 13, 22, 27–8.
7. My interview with Abdul Sattar (a director-general in the Pakistan foreign office who was a member of the Pakistani negotiating team at Simla)

on August 10, 1974.
8. My interview with Aziz Ahmad on August 11, 1974.
9. My interviews with Abdul Sattar and Aziz Ahmad on August 10 and 11, 1974.
10. My interview with Aziz Ahmad on August 11, 1974.
11. Benzair Bhutto, *Daughter of Destiny* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), pp. 56–8.
12. Text of the agreement may be seen in *Pakistan Times,* July 3, 1972.
13. My interview with Aziz Ahmad, August 11, 1974.
14. Riaz Ahmad Chaudhry, *Bhutto aur Aqwam-e-Alam* (Bhutto and the World Nations), Urdu (Lahore: New Kitabistan, 1977), pp. 139–41. Also see Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), pp. 140, 144.
15. *Dawn,* July 15, 1972.
16. My paraphrase of Prime Minister Bhutto's Urdu speech which I heard at the meeting place and watched on television later the same day.
17. A typical example of this reasoning may be seen in Z. A. Suleri's column in *Jung International* (London), April 29, May 9, 15, 22, and June 12, 1972.
18. I myself received a great deal of such material from the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C., including a copy of S. I. Riza's letter to Congressman Charles E. Bennett dated August 25, 1972.
19. Baderunnisa Channa, *Indo-Pakistan Relations 1972–1977* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, Department of Political Science, M. A. thesis, May 1978), p. 139.
20. This was stated to me by Agha Shahi in an interview on August 13, 1974.
21. *Dawn,* August 19, 1973.
22. Channa, *Indo-Pakistan Relations,* pp. 143–5.
23. *Pakistan Times,* February 23, 1974.
24. Bhutto himself said the same thing in a press conference in Lahore; *Pakistan Times,* May 20, 1974.
25. *Pakistan Times,* January 2, 1975.
26. Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Pakistan Economic Survey 1977–1978* (Islamabad, 1978), tables 36, 41 and 42 in the section entitled "Statistics."
27. See M. I. Laskar's report in *Outlook,* October 28, 1972, pp. 5–6.
28. *Outlook,* August 11, 1973, p. 5.
29. Askar Ali Shah, "Kabul's Big Question Mark," *Outlook,* August 11, 1973, pp. 8–10.
30. These facts were stated to me by Mansoor Ahmad, a director-general in the Pakistan foreign office, during an interview on August 15, 1974.
31. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 127–8.
32. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an Area of Conflict," *Asian Survey,* May 1977, p. 484.
33. This was stated to me by officials in the Pakistan foreign office and in the prime minister's secretariat in 1974 and 1976. But also see Eqbal Ahmad and Richard J. Barnet, "Bloody Games," *The New Yorker,* April, 11, 1988, pp. 58, 80.
34. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan," p. 484.

35. *New York Times,* March 5 and June 3, 1972.
36. My interview with Agha Shahi on August 13, 1974.
37. My interview with Ahmad Kamal, a director-general in the Pakistan foreign office, on November 6, 1973.
38. For details of Iranian economic assistance to India, Afghanistan, and Egypt see Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan," p. 481.
39. *Pakistan Economic Survey 1977–1978,* p. 128, and tables 41 and 42.
40. *Outlook,* May 26, 1973, pp. 9–10.
41. My interviews with Akram Zaki and other Pakistani diplomats in 1973 and 1974.
42. See an editorial in *Nawa-e-Waqt,* April 2, 1974.
43. A transit trade agreement between Iran and Pakistan went into effect on June 8, 1977 and, soon after that, an Iranian delegation visited to assess the assistance Pakistan would require to enable its roads to take the extra traffic: *Pakistan Economic Survey 1977–1978,* p. 129.
44. Benazir Bhutto, *Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Lahore: Classic, 1978), pp. 50–1.
45. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan," p. 481.
46. Benazir Bhutto, *Foreign Policy in Perspective,* pp. 52–3.
47. Anwar H. Syed, "Pakistan in 1976: Business as Usual," *Asian Survey,* February 1977, p. 188.
48. *Pakistan Economic Survey 1977–1978,* pp. 123–9.
49. Overseas weekly *Dawn,* March 10, 1979. Also see Shahid Javed Burki, "What Migration to the Middle East May Mean for Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,* Spring 1980, pp. 55–66.
50. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval,* p. 677; and *White House Years,* p. 907.
51. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan: The Making of a Nuclear Power," *Asian Survey,* June 1976, pp. 590–1.
52. Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey,* July 1978, p. 722.
53. Khalilzad, "Pakistan," p. 581–2.
54. Ibid., p. 589.
55. Ibid., p. 587.
56. Ziring, "Pakistan and India," p. 724.
57. Ibid., p. 723.
58. Ibid., p. 724-5.
59. See Chapter 1 above, note 43.

7 In Pursuit of Power

With the spread of democratic ideas during the last two hundred years, it has become axiomatic that a polity must have a constitution if it is to be well-ordered. Constitutions are framed to define and limit the authority of governments, to civilize the use of political power. Yet, the more ambitious among the users of power are made restive by the limits a constitution imposes upon them. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began his rule in Pakistan under the authority of martial law. He was then able to do as he might please. But he knew that martial law must soon yield to constitutional government. At the same time, given his dynamism and a great will to power, he wanted to maximize his personal authority. In this chapter we will discuss the constitutional settlement he negotiated with the opposition in the National Assembly, his moves for extending his control to the provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP, and his handling of two grave crises in domestic politics that had the potential for destabilizing his rule.

A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

Following the overthrow of Ayub Khan and the constitution he had imposed upon the country, a national consensus developed in favor of a parliamentary system of government, universal adult franchise, and direct elections to the central and provincial legislatures. Politicians in West Pakistan recognized also that the next constitution would have to allow the provinces substantial autonomy in a federal union. The place of Islam had been a vexing issue since the founding of the state in 1947. The Islamic parties, and others friendly to their persuasion, had been insisting that since Pakistan was established in the name of Islam, it could be preserved only if it became an Islamic state.[1] Provincial autonomy, the role of Islam, and a certain enhancement of democracy were thus the major issues the National Assembly would have to address in framing a new constitution.

Bhutto had pledged to restore democracy, but he now felt the government should be able to restrain, even suppress, its opponents. He was a Muslim, but he had no desire to allow the ulema an interventionist, much less directing, role in the affairs of state. He would, if he could, leave it to individuals to practice Islam according to their own lights and as the spirit moved them. He had written against a strong center and advocated provincial autonomy when he did not hold office. But now that he was head of the central government, he would rather enlarge than diminish its domain.

The more notable of the opposition groups in the National Assembly were the two Muslim League factions, the three Islamic parties, and the National Awami Party (NAP). The Muslim League had always favored a reasonably strong central government, and it had been content with symbolic concessions to Islamic sentiment. The Islamic parties had lived on their advocacy of an Islamic state, but they looked to an energetic central government for implementing their goal. The NAP had been urging decentralization and provincial autonomy since the mid-1950s, and it was secular in its outlook.[2] These differences of orientation and emphasis within the opposition would provide Bhutto his opportunity for gaining approval of a constitution that answered his needs and preferences to a very considerable extent.

Bhutto's own party would follow his lead and so would others who had joined his camp. They were numerous enough – 110 in a house of 146 at that time – to pass a constitution with an impressive majority.[3] But Bhutto wanted wider support. In his controversy with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in early 1971, he had argued that a constitution should be acceptable to all provinces, and that it should not be imposed upon the country by the "brute" majority in one of them. Others could make the same argument now. The PPP had lost the 1970 election in NWFP and Baluchistan, the two provinces where the movement for provincial autonomy had been strong. A constitution rejected by them would then not be satisfactory.

On April 17, 1972 President Bhutto appointed a committee of 25 members of the National Assembly, including six from the opposition, to prepare a draft constitution. After a few meetings, during which the main directions to be taken were settled, the committee asked its chairman, Mahmud Ali Kasuri,

to present a draft for discussion. It seems that not only the opposition but Kasuri himself had reservations about the draft he had been asked to sponsor, and on October 9 he resigned from the committee. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada took his place, but the opposition now decided to stay away from the committee. On October 17 Bhutto invited them for talks and, after four days of hard bargaining, they signed an accord on October 20.[4] A quick reference to its salient features may be useful.

Bhutto agreed to designate Islam as the state religion of Pakistan, something which had not been done before. In addition, he consented to the proposed oaths of office for the president and the prime minister (described below), establishment of a council to propose the Islamization of laws, and deletion of references to Islamic socialism in the draft constitution. As a concession to the provincial autonomists, he agreed to the creation of a "Council of Common Interests" to redress provincial grievances over the distribution of river waters, revenues from the sale of natural gas and electricity, and industrial development. In return the opposition leaders accepted a larger federal jurisdiction than the one allowed in the 1956 constitution and about as large as that envisaged in the Government of India Act of 1935.[5] They also agreed that for the next 15 years a two-thirds majority vote in the National Assembly would be required to pass a motion of no confidence against the prime minister, and that he could dissolve the Assembly even while such a motion was in debate. They accepted a senate with virtually no powers of its own.[6] As they came out of the meeting, they smiled, hugged one another, and seemed pleased with the agreement they had just signed. Why? They had got much less than they had been demanding, but perhaps they had expected even less. The political realities and strategies which brought about this accord were the same as those which produced virtually unanimous support for the constitution adopted in April 1973, and it would be more economical to discuss them together a little later.

The government moved a constitution bill in the National Assembly on December 30, 1972, and the opposition found that it did not fully correspond with the accord they had signed in October. They proposed amendments, but these got nowhere, because the PPP and its allies in the Assembly would not accept them. On March 13, 1973 – after some two weeks of discussion

– the opposition parties came together in an alliance, called the United Democratic Front (UDF), to press for a more Islamic and democratic constitution. They wanted to strengthen its Islamic provisions, reduce the government's preventive detention and emergency powers, allow the superior courts to review the decisions of special tribunals, soften the requirements for passing a no-confidence motion against the prime minister, lower the voting age to 18, make the election commission autonomous, rationalize the constitutional protection to be given to laws made during the operation of martial law, and provide job security to civil servants.[7] On March 16 they sent their proposals to Bhutto and, beginning March 24, they boycotted the National Assembly's consideration of the draft constitution.

Bhutto and his associates held meetings with the UDF leaders on April 9, continued their negotiations the next morning, and reached agreement minutes before the National Assembly met on April 10. The opposition members, led by Abdul Wali Khan, returned to the Assembly, and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada moved to adopt agreed changes in the provisions that had been in dispute.[8] The Assembly then passed the constitution without any dissenting votes and with only a few abstentions. Let us see how the major controversial issues were settled before we offer an interpretation of how the accord on October 20, 1972 and the consensus on April 10, 1973 were obtained.

The constitution did not concede much to the autonomists in the allocation of governmental powers and functions. In addition to defense, foreign affairs, currency, and communications – the functions they would assign the federal government – it placed more than 60 subjects on an exclusively federal list and 47 on a concurrent list with respect to which federal law would prevail over the provincial law. The residuary functions and powers were left to the provinces. The federal list included most revenue sources, banking and insurance, economic planning and coordination, air transport, regulation of corporations, industrial development, interprovincial trade, preventive detention in connection with national security, railways, oil and gas, nuclear energy, elections, and the higher judiciary among others. The concurrent list allowed the federal government overriding jurisdiction with regard to criminal law, criminal

procedure, civil procedure, and labor relations along with numerous other subjects.[9]

The constitution provided potentially significant safeguards for provincial interests. Baluchi politicians had laid claim to the revenues obtained from the extraction of minerals and the sale of natural gas piped out of their province; politicians in NWFP had made a similar claim concerning the electricity generated there and distributed to other provinces. Sind and NWFP had worried over the distribution of the Indus waters. The constitution called for a Council of Common Interests, composed of the four provincial chief ministers and an equal number of federal officials, to formulate policies regarding industrial development, water, power, and the railways, and to supervise the related establishments. Its decisions would be made by majority vote, but a dissatisfied province could appeal to a joint session of Parliament whose determination would be final. A National Economic Council, including provincial representatives, would make plans "in respect of financial, commercial, social, and economic policies," and a National Finance Commission, with provincial representation, would make recommendations concerning federal grants-in-aid and sharing of the net proceeds of certain federal taxes between the federation and the provinces.

The framers of the new constitution retained the Islamic symbols contained in the two previous constitutions and added some of their own. Article 2 designated Islam as the state religion. The president and the prime minister must be Muslim, and their oath of office required them to affirm belief in the unity of God, the finality of Muhammad's prophethood, the Quran as the last of the holy books, and the day of judgment. This oath had the effect of excluding members of the Ahmadi sect from holding either one of these offices. Article 228 provided for a Council of Islamic Ideology, and Article 230 required the legislature to reconsider any law that had been referred to the Council and which it had found to be repugnant to Islam. It asked the Council to submit, within seven years of its appointment, its final report on the Islamization of existing laws, and asked Parliament and the provincial legislatures to consider the report and "enact laws in respect thereof" within a period of two years.

The constitution gave the government nine years before the issue of Islamizing the laws must be met. It did not follow that

Parliament would have to accept the Council's recommendations fully as submitted. An obligation to do so would have made the Council supreme over Parliament. Once the Council's report was placed before the legislatures, public pressure for its acceptance might be generated. But there were also ways of frustrating the Council. It would consist of persons who had "knowledge of the principles and philosophy of Islam . . . or understanding of the economic, political, legal, or administrative problems of Pakistan" (Article 227). It would include the various schools of Islamic thought. The prospect of a consensus among its members might, then, be limited and political manipulation by the government of the day could reduce it further.

These concessions to Islamic sentiment were matched by a touch of socialist flavour. Article 3 promised to create a polity that took "from each according to his ability" and gave to each "according to his work." Article 38 committed the state to promoting general welfare by preventing the concentration of the "means of production and distribution in the hands of a few . . . and by ensuring equitable adjustment of rights between employers and employees, and landlords and tenants." More important, Article 253 authorized Parliament to limit private property of any and all kinds, and to designate businesses and industries that might be placed in the public sector to the partial or complete exclusion of private persons. The ulema and their allies in the National Assembly accepted these provisions; even Article 34, which required the state to ensure the "full participation" of women in all spheres of national life.

Under the 1956 constitution the executive authority of the federation vested in the president, and the prime minister served during his "pleasure." Bhutto expected to be the prime minister under the new constitution but, given his political standing in the country, he would not countenance an interfering president. Accordingly, Article 90 of the constitution named the prime minister as the chief executive of the federation, and Article 48 made the president wholly dependent upon his advice. The constitution also secured the prime minister against his opponents in the Assembly. Article 96 stated that a resolution calling for a vote of no confidence in the prime minister must, at the same time, include the name of a

successor, and that it must have the support of a majority of the total membership of the Assembly to pass.

The constitution appeared to guarantee fundamental rights to citizens, but in several instances it made the right subject to "reasonable restrictions" in the public interest. The power of preventive detention and the authority to declare a state of emergency, during which the fundamental rights could be suspended, were maintained.

Interpretation

Why did the opposition accept this constitution, and earlier the accord in October 1972, which left much to be desired from its point of view? It should first be noted that the opposition was not without divisions and mutual suspicions within its ranks. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo cautioned his colleagues in the NAP councils that the "rightists," such as those in the Jamat-e-Islami, would "stab us in the back" when the "crunch" came. He also thought the NAP had more in common with the PPP than it did with the Islamic parties or the Muslim League.[10] Mir Mardan Khan Jamali, a Muslim League leader from Baluchistan, believed that the PPP was a lesser evil than the NAP. Zahid Sarfraz, another Muslim League leader, shared this view. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi of the Jamiat-al-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) was openly pro-PPP and critical of the NAP and the Jamat-e-Islami. Maulana Abdul Haq (JUI) and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari felt free to have their own separate negotiations with the regime during the critical days preceding the adoption of the constitution. Some members of the Jamiat-al-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) did not honor the UDF's boycott of the Assembly.[11] But above all the opposition knew that, at best, it commanded only 36 votes against the government's 110 in the Assembly.

Bhutto employed the stick and the carrot to tempt, harass, intimidate, and exhaust the opposition. His government and party directed their moves primarily against the Jamat-e-Islami and the NAP. Leftist columnists and editorial writers, who abounded in the government-controlled media, intensified their long-standing campaign against Maulana Maududi, the founder of the Jamat-e-Islami. They recalled his pre-independence denunciations of the Muslim League leadership and his opposition to the idea of Pakistan. They suggested that he and his party did

not regard the country as worth preserving because it would not accept and follow their "obscurantist" notions. This intense questioning of the party's patriotism weakened its posture.

A similar campaign was launched against the NAP. Pro-government commentators pointed out that Abdul Wali Khan, his father, and others in the NAP had once opposed the establishment of Pakistan and alleged that they remained unreconciled to its continuance. The NAP leaders' denials of separatist intent and their declarations of patriotism were drowned in the noise of government propaganda against them. The NAP, like the Jamat-e-Islami, was put on the defensive.[12]

NAP–JUI coalitions governed NWFP and Baluchistan when the constitutional accord was negotiated in October 1972. This was the first time in their careers that any of the NAP or JUI leaders had tasted the fruit of power, and it seems they liked it. Abdul Wali Khan, the president of NAP, was deeply suspicious of Bhutto's intentions. But he was away in London when the accord was made. Bizenjo, who deputized for him, reasoned that the NAP had not prospered as an organization when its leaders and workers dwelt in jail, and that it was important for the party to remain in power to renew and expand its support base.[13]

The Jamat-e-Islami accepted the proverbial half-loaf in October 1972, presumably reserving the right to demand the remaining half at a more opportune time in the future. The JUI was content with the proposed Islamic provisions of the constitution, and it did not want to fight for greater provincial autonomy. The NAP did not wish to be alone in contending with the Bhutto regime. The principal opposition leaders, each for his own reasons, were thus ready to make a settlement. Bhutto, on his part, would seem to have concluded that concessions to the Islamic parties would cost him less in terms of his ruling authority than concessions to the provincial autonomists might.

In February 1973 President Bhutto dismissed the NAP–JUI government in Baluchistan and, reacting impetuously, the NAP–JUI government in NWFP resigned in protest, probably to his great relief. On March 23, PPP workers, aided by the Punjab police, opened fire at a UDF public meeting in Rawalpindi, killing several NAP workers among others. One might have expected that the opposition leaders would now refuse to have anything further to do with the Bhutto regime. Actually, they

exercised remarkable self-restraint. Two weeks later they were once again ready to join President Bhutto at the conference table, and the NAP representatives did not demand greater provincial autonomy. Two considerations may have weighed with them. Bhutto had caused the impression in NAP–JUI circles that their governments in Baluchistan and the NWFP might be restored.[14] They did not want to jeopardize this prospect by annoying him. Second, Abdul Wali Khan and his party hoped to shed their regional image and gain support in the Punjab and Sind. But in the wake of East Pakistan's secession, provincial autonomy, in the sense of limiting the central government to a few functions, was anathema in the Punjab. If Abdul Wali Khan wanted to be a national leader, and if the NAP was to be a national party, they would have to step away from their traditional stand on provincial autonomy.

The passage of the constitution of 1973 is generally acknowledged to have been one of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's more significant accomplishments. In the years following his ouster from power, politicians, even some of his bitter opponents, longed for the restoration of this constitution. They considered it a great national asset because, unlike the two previous constitutions, it represented a broad national consensus.[15] Bhutto's bargaining skills had a part in producing this consensus. But the opposition's willingness to be reasonable and realistic also had a role. They all made concessions, and they all made gains.

Bhutto had reason to be pleased that the central government, of which he was to be the head, had suffered no significant loss of jurisdiction, and that his own office had become more secure and powerful than ever before. The Islamic parties could take satisfaction from having placed the National Assembly under an obligation to move in the direction of Islamizing the country's laws. The autonomists had not been able to reduce the central government, but they could look to the Council of Common Interests and the National Finance Commission for redress of provincial grievances. The government of the day might obstruct the working of these bodies, and thwart their ends, but it could not do so without inviting odium. The institutions established by the constitution might, over time, develop their own drives for survival and self-assertion, aided by friendly political forces and public opinion. Doors had been installed

and they could not be kept shut; sooner or later there would be demands for opening them.

BHUTTO AND THE NAP–JUI GOVERNMENTS

On April 14, 1972 President Bhutto lifted martial law, and the National Assembly adopted a provisional constitution to remain in effect until a permanent constitution (discussed above) could be framed. Provincial assemblies would now have to be called and cabinets installed. The PPP would form ministries in the Punjab and Sind and these would obey Bhutto. But the PPP had won only three seats in the NWFP assembly and none in Baluchistan. The strategy Bhutto employed to capture the governments in these two provinces makes an illuminating study of his drive for power.

The NAP and the JUI had coalesced in the hope of forming the government in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Their coalition commanded a clear majority in the Baluchistan assembly, and it could secure a majority in the NWFP assembly with some help from the independents. Would Bhutto allow this to happen? He could canvass other groups in the assembly to prevent the NAP–JUI alliance from establishing a majority. But such a move would greatly alienate the NAP–JUI leaders, and it would defeat his own efforts to create the appearance of national unity before going to India for talks with Mrs Ghandi.

Bhutto opened negotiations with the NAP–JUI leaders in February 1972 and the three parties signed an accord on March 6. Bhutto agreed to appoint NAP nominees – Arbab Sikander Khalil and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo – as governors of NWFP and Baluchistan respectively starting April 1; allow NAP–JUI governments to be formed in these provinces; call the National Assembly to meet on April 14; and refrain from using his martial law authority to restrict provincial powers and functions. In return the NAP and JUI would support the continuance of martial law until August 14, 1972 and vote in favor of a motion of confidence in President Bhutto when these matters came up in the National Assembly.[16] In a subsequent agreement they undertook not to oppose the central government's emergency powers.[17]

This three-party agreement, as it was called, ran into trouble within days of its conclusion. It seems that Abdul Wali Khan and his colleagues in the NAP developed serious misgivings about the continuance of martial law when President Bhutto removed many hundreds of public officials without giving them access to the courts. Martial law had been used to restrict fundamental rights, judicial authority, and the due process of law. Insofar as many of the dismissed civil servants had belonged to the provincial governments, Bhutto's move could also be construed as an invasion of provincial authority. In view of these considerations, Abdul Wali Khan announced that his party would not vote for the continuance of martial law in the National Assembly, and that the NAP–JUI government would review the cases of provincial civil servants removed under Martial Law Regulation 114.[18]

Abdul Wali Khan's change of stance, howsoever well-intentioned, did amount to a violation of the three-party agreement. President Bhutto treated it accordingly and withheld the appointment of the NAP nominees as governors of NWFP and Baluchistan.[19] Following an exchange of letters between him and Abdul Wali Khan, in which suitable explanations were provided, the president and his colleagues went to Peshawar to confer with the NAP–JUI leaders on April 8, 1972. After a morning session, with the understanding that they would meet again in the evening, Bhutto went to have lunch with Abdul Qayyum Khan and accepted his offer of an alliance as a result of which his party, the Qayyum Muslim League (QML), would support the PPP in the National Assembly and in the NWFP assembly and, in return, Bhutto would take Qayyum Khan as minister for the interior in his cabinet.[20] Bhutto's meeting with the NAP–JUI leaders in the evening failed to resolve their disagreement, but he had already decided in his own mind to withdraw martial law. At the National Assembly session on April 14 he announced its end and, in return, received the Assembly's approval of a provisional constitution and a unanimous vote of confidence in his government. On April 28, 1972 the NAP nominees assumed office as governors in NWFP and Baluchistan and, on May 1, the NAP–JUI governments were sworn in.[21]

The NAP–JUI leaders partook of traditional values. They were interested in stability, tranquillity, respect for individual rights, and the rule of law. They said they would treat all

citizens equally well, and they would work for complete harmony between the provincial and the central governments. Mufti Mahmood, the new chief minister of NWFP, appealed to all citizens to remain within the bounds of law; he called upon landlords to stop ejecting tenants forthwith, and he asked the latter to pay the landlord his share of the crop. The NAP–JUI governments invited investment in their provinces and assured prospective investors that their persons and properties would be fully protected. Ataullah Mengal, the chief minister of Baluchistan, told newsmen that he and his colleagues were working "day and night" to make his province a "shining example of good government."[22] None of the NAP or the JUI leaders had held high public office before. They embarked upon their new careers with considerable enthusiasm, but they were not to have peace.

Bhutto situated rival political forces in relationships that would work to disrupt the NAP–JUI governments. He did not need Abdul Qayyum Khan's support, but he took him as his interior minister probably because the latter had been a foe of the NAP leaders for 25 years and could be relied upon to use the resources of his office to harass the NAP–JUI governments. Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, minister for water and power in the central government, became at the same time the leader of the opposition in the NWFP assembly. As a central minister, he could deny the province funds and cooperation and, as leader of the opposition in the provincial assembly, he could denounce the NAP–JUI government for its failure or tardiness in solving the people's problems.[23] Militant socialists in the PPP camp were eager to agitate class conflict in NWFP and Baluchistan, and thus aid Qayyum Khan's mission of destabilizing the NAP–JUI governments.

Within weeks of his return from Simla, Bhutto began accusing the NAP–JUI government in NWFP of seeking a confrontation with the central government. Abdul Qayyum Khan and other central ministers branded the NAP leaders as traitors, foreign agents, puppets of capitalists and industrialists, and exploiters of the Pakistani workers and peasants. Meraj Mohammad Khan urged the peasants in NWFP to spill the landlords' blood and seize their lands. In some instances federal ministers harbored individuals against whom the provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan had issued warrants of arrest. At the same time,

they condemned the NAP–JUI governments for failing to maintain public order.[24]

Some irritating events, and some disruption of the public order, took place in Baluchistan also. First, the new NAP–JUI government resolved to return to the provinces of their origin several thousand non-Baluchi public servants to make room for the local aspirants for jobs. The Bhutto regime denounced this plan as narrow parochialism that would set one Pakistani group against others. Later in 1972 Marri tribesmen raided Punjabi settlements in the Pat Feeder area and killed several men. The Baluchistan Student Organization (BSO), an affiliate of the NAP at that time, kidnapped federal railway officials in Quetta and interfered with the movement of trains. President Bhutto and his colleagues alleged that the Baluchi NAP leaders, notably the Mengal and Marri *sardars,* opposed the central government's efforts to bring modernization to the province – roads, electricity, schools, clinics, irrigation, industry, rule of law, and impersonal administration – because they wanted to hold their tribesmen as serfs.[25] They asserted also that the NAP leaders were still secessionists at heart, and that they had been smuggling weapons into the province to equip a secessionist force. Reports appeared in pro-government newspapers that Sher Mohammad Marri was training 20 000 Baluch guerrillas somewhere in Afghanistan. On February 12 the police in Islamabad forced its way into the Iraqi embassy and seized more than 60 crates of weapons which, the government said, had been intended for the NAP secessionists in Baluchistan.

In December 1972 the NAP–JUI government arrested the leaders of the Jamote tribe in Lasbela. The Jamotes, who had long been rivals of the Mengals, responded with an uprising. Pleading insufficiency of regular police forces in the province, Ataullah Mengal, the chief minister, raised a private force (*lashkar*), supplied it from government armories, and despatched it to subdue the Jamotes. In the central government's version, this *lashkar* killed 42 Jamotes, besieged 8000 of them in the adjoining hills, and proceeded to starve them by cutting off their supplies. On January 31, 1973 the central government called upon Mengal to halt his operation and, on February 9, it ordered federal troops into Lasbela to disarm his *lashkar* and to relieve the Jamotes. Governor Bizenjo and Chief Minister Mengal opposed the use of federal troops in

their province and, on the night of February 14, President Bhutto dismissed them.[26] The NAP–JUI government in NWFP resigned in protest. A few months later, on August 16, the central government arrested Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal, and Khair Bakhsh Marri and sent them to jail. These events brought on a mini civil war in Baluchistan which went on for more than four years and resulted in many thousands of casualties.[27]

The NAP leaders disputed the central government's version. They claimed that they were patriotic Pakistanis, and that they were wholly committed to the nation's territorial integrity. They disowned Sher Mohammed Marri and repudiated the suggestion that the arms found in the Iraqi embassy were destined for them. They pointed out that the BSO kidnappers and the Marri invaders of Punjabi villages had been arrested and jailed. They said eight Jamotes, not 42, had been killed, and that none had been besieged or starved. Above all, they charged that the Bhutto regime had engineered the Jamote rebellion and other acts of violence in the province to destabilize the NAP–JUI government. Khair Bakhsh Marri told a newsman in May 1973 that Bhutto wished to coerce the NAP leaders into obeying his "commands," despite the fact that their coalition, and not his party, enjoyed majority support in the provincial legislature. He had sent the army into Baluchistan to wipe out the support base of the unyielding Mengal and Marri tribal leaders.[28]

Most opposition leaders rejected the Bhutto regime's accusations against the NAP leaders. They asserted that Bhutto himself had provoked an insurgency in Baluchistan, and condemned his dismissal of the NAP–JUI government as a design to bring the province under his control through undemocratic means.[29] They demanded the reinstatement of the NAP–JUI government and the army's return to the barracks. Some of them were severely critical of the army's role. Speaking in the National Assembly, Sher Baz Mazari said the army had been shooting people down in Baluchistan as if they were dogs, and Mahmud Ali Kasuri charged that its bombings and strafings had killed more than one thousand persons.[30]

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's desire to enlarge his domain moved him to destabilize and then dismiss the government in Baluchistan. But it is noteworthy that political rivalries and the balance of forces in this province, as well as in NWFP, worked

to his advantage. The Baluchi NAP leaders – Marri, Mengal, and Bizenjo – were the leaders of their respective tribes. Of these the Marri and Mengal are the major tribes. The Bugtis are another large tribe of which Nawab Akbar Khan was the leader. Sardar Doda Khan and Nabi Bakhsh were the leaders, respectively, of the Zarakzai and the Zehri tribes. Nabi Bakhsh Zehri and his brother, Qadir Bakhsh, were multi-millionaires as a result of operating coal and marble mines on which they held long-term leases from the provincial government. They belonged to the Qayyum Muslim League, and they had been rivals of the Mengals and the Bizenjos for many years.

In November 1972 the NAP–JUI government issued a series of ordinances enabling it to cancel the existing leaseholders' mining concessions, and to operate the mines through a government agency or a public corporation. The ordinances, if implemented, would ruin the Zehris. On December 4, 1972 the government arrested Nabi Bakhsh's son-in-law, Zafar Iqbal Zehri, on the charge of having killed a worker. The Zehris, thereupon, joined forces with Bhutto in his developing conflict with the NAP leaders. They also sought Abdul Qayyum Khan's protection. The NAP leaders later charged that the Zehris and their allies, the Zarakzais, had instigated and funded the Jamote uprising in Lasbela, referred to above.[31]

Nawab Akbar Bugti did not belong to the NAP but had supported its election campaign in 1970. He believed that, in proper gratitude for his earlier assistance, the NAP leaders should have consulted him before making a settlement with Bhutto. Instead, they drove a wedge between him and his younger brother, Ahmad Nawaz, by appointing him minister for finance and mineral resources in their government. Akbar Bugti was in London at the time. The NAP leaders sent Ahmad Nawaz to conciliate him but the mission failed. Nabi Bakhsh Zehri, whose daughter was married to Akbar's son, Salim, also visited the nawab in London. His plea, and Bhutto's reassurances, persuaded Bugti to return to Pakistan.[32] He supported the Bhutto regime's allegations against the NAP leaders. He claimed that he, too, had been a party to their secessionist conspiracy, but that he had learned better, and abandoned it. Thus, he strengthened Bhutto's case for dismissing the NAP–JUI government. In return, Bhutto appointed him to succeed Bizenjo as governor of Baluchistan.[33]

Bhutto chose Aslam Khattak as the new governor of NWFP, and a coalition of the QML, Khattak's own group, the PPP, and a few independents formed the new government. Bhutto would have preferred to see Sherpao, the PPP president in the province, head the coalition as chief minister, but Aslam Khattak convinced him that Sherpao was not well-liked in the assembly, and that Enayatullah Gandapur, an independent from his own group of supporters, would be more suitable. He assured Bhutto that he and Gandapur would carry out the president's wishes more effectively than Sherpao could. To prove their point, as it were, they surpassed the PPP leaders in maligning the NAP and its president, Abdul Wali Khan, jailed more than 300 NAP workers, banned a NAP newspaper (*Shahbaz*), closed down a moderately pro-NAP weekly (the *Frontier Guardian*), and arrested its editor.[34]

Aslam Khattak and Enayatullah Gandapur were obedient to Bhutto but, even so, he did not want them to become secure and comfortable in their positions. He let word go out from time to time that he was ready to negotiate a reconciliation with the NAP–JUI group. In April 1973 he sent his special assistant, Rafi Raza, to Quetta for talks with the NAP leaders and announced that he himself intended to meet Bizenjo. The following summer he did actually hold meetings with the NAP–JUI leaders in Murree. These talks failed but Bhutto said the door to negotiations remained open. During his visit to Peshawar in March 1974, news appeared that he and Abdul Wali Khan would soon discuss the possibility of a NAP–JUI–PPP coalition government in NWFP. In the course of a debate in the National Assembly, Bhutto offered his "hand of cooperation" and another round of talks to the NAP. Later in the year he had Bizenjo brought out of his confinement in Sihala to the prime minister's house to talk with him.[35] As long as the news of these contacts and talks continued to appear, the possibility of a settlement with the NAP–JUI coalition, and that of the resulting demise of the Khattak–Gandapur government in NWFP, stayed alive.

Sherpao and his group supported the Gandapur ministry in the assembly but worked against it outside. Gandapur and Khattak professed to be Bhutto's servants, but they did all they could to weaken the PPP out in the districts. Sherpao had been without a government job since August 1973 and he saw Aslam

Khattak as the cause of his deprivation. Unable to make Sherpao governor or the chief minister, but wishing to indulge him, Bhutto asked Aslam Khattak to resign, which he did on May 23, 1974.[36] Gandapur then took Sherpao as a minister in his cabinet, and Bhutto appointed Syed Ghawas, a retired army officer and one of the largest landlords in NWFP, as the new governor.

The task of putting together a pliable government in Baluchistan proved to be simpler. Bhutto had appointed Nawab Akbar Bugti as the governor, and in April 1973, he chose Jam Ghulam Qadir, the former ruler of Lasbela, to be the new chief minister. The Jam Sahib did not have majority support in the assembly, but that impediment would soon be removed. The central government arrested Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri on August 16, 1973. Four other members of the assembly, belonging to the NAP, were arrested over the next few months. On May 13, 1974 an unknown assailant murdered Maulvi Shamsuddin (JUI), who had been deputy speaker of the assembly. Seven assembly men, from a house of 21, were thus put out of the way. A PPP nominee later won the seat that had become vacant as a result of Maulvi Shamsuddin's death. In March and May of 1974 the party won three more seats in by-elections, unopposed in two of them. By the summer of 1974 a PPP–QML combination accounted for nine assembly members out of a total of 15 who were still free. The PPP's position in the assembly improved further as more NAP legislators were jailed and the seats of some of them were declared vacant.[37]

Nawab Akbar Bugti resigned as governor in October 1973 because, as he stated, he could not accept the provincial government's complete subordination to the center.[38] Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the Khan of Qalat and, by tradition, the chief of all the tribal chieftains in Baluchistan, but old and infirm, took Bugti's place. In their subservience to the central government, he and Jam Ghulam Qadir excelled Aslam Khattak and Enayatullah Gandapur in NWFP. The way was now clear for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's writ to travel all over Pakistan.

The Bhutto regime had projected the NAP–JUI governments as incapable of maintaining law and order. But the state of public order did not improve after their dismissal. An insurgency raged in Baluchistan. In 1974 and later many bomb explosions occurred in NWFP. Prime Minister Bhutto, his ministers, and the pro-government media charged that the NAP leaders, in

collaboration with the government of Afghanistan, had planned these explosions to spread chaos in the country and to damage its unity and integrity. On February 8, 1975 an explosion killed Hayat Mohammad Sherpao as he rose to address a gathering of students at Peshawar University. A few days later the central government declared the NAP to be an unlawful organization, closed down its offices, and arrested many of its leaders in NWFP and Baluchistan, including Abdul Wali Khan. Members of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies of NWFP and Baluchistan belonging to the NAP, and unwilling to change their affiliation, were thus removed, enabling pro-Bhutto groups to establish secure legislative majorities in the provinces. At the head of one such majority, Nasrullah Khan Khattak (PPP) became the new chief minister of NWFP. The PPP had gone from "rags to riches" in these two provinces but, as we shall see later, the riches would be lost as easily as they had been gained.

Interpretation

The elites controlling the central government in Pakistan have always insisted that those ruling in the provinces be subservient to their will and direction. If the NAP–JUI governments had been willing to accept the role of Bhutto's junior and acquiescent partners, he would probably not have forced them out of office. His subsequent contacts with the NAP–JUI leaders were not intended exclusively to unnerve Khattak and Gandapur. He wanted to see if the NAP leaders would bend after their chastisement. He would reinstate them if they agreed to join his cabinet at the center and form coalition governments with his party in NWFP and Baluchistan. Acceptance of posts in the central cabinet would make the NAP leaders Bhutto's junior partners, a role they did not desire. They did not need the PPP for forming the governments in NWFP and Baluchistan; they worried also that PPP ministers would disrupt, more than strengthen, their governments. They insisted that the central government must first release all political prisoners, restore the NAP–JUI government in Baluchistan, and return the army to the barracks, before they would have any negotiations with the Bhutto regime. They did want to return to power, but they were not lusty enough for it to accept Bhutto's terms.

The political conflict in NWFP and Baluchistan, described

above, was not a contest between the state of Pakistan and a secessionist force. It was, more likely, a clash of rival political wills, initiated by Bhutto's repression of the Baluchi politicians. The NAP leaders wanted to be the insiders of Pakistani politics; they struggled to shed their regional roles and enter the mainstream; but the Bhutto regime blocked their way. The allegation that they opposed modernization in Baluchistan is also not to be taken seriously. It is probable that they wanted to be the ones to manage this modernization process – approve plans, select sites, award contracts, issue licences, offer jobs, and disburse funds – and thus expand their political base.

Explaining the army's deployment in Baluchistan, Prime Minister Bhutto once told the National Assembly that in many countries of the world the process of national consolidation had, at times, required the use of some force.[39] But it is doubtful in the extreme that Bhutto's ouster of the NAP–JUI politicians from power to which a fair election had entitled them, the resulting strife in Baluchistan, and the unrest in NWFP did anything to advance national unity and integrity, the political system, or even his personal standing and fortunes in Pakistan. The entire enterprise would appear to have been misconceived and wasteful.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Some of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's admirers called him a "man of crisis," implying that his higher political capacities came to the fore in tense and threatening situations. His detractors observed that he was not incapable of creating a crisis, when none existed, to have the satisfaction of meeting it. Crises do not just happen; more often they come out of long and complex interplays of mutually antagonistic social forces, and they are not always amenable to resolution. Sometimes even the most skillful of managers can do no better than suppress a crisis, which may subsequently reappear with an even greater upheaval than before. Bhutto had to contend with many tense situations during his years in office. Not all of them were severe enough to be called crises, but two were – the language riots in Sind in 1972, and the anti-Ahmadi disturbances in the summer of 1974 – and we examine these below.

The vast majority of the residents of Sind spoke Sindhi before 1947. But during the years following independence waves of Urdu-speaking immigrants from India (called *muhajirs*) came to live in Sind and, by 1972, they constituted the majority of the population in Karachi, Hyderabad, and most other urban centers in the province.[40] Migrants from other parts of Pakistan also came to work and live in Sind and some of them (called "settlers") owned land in the interior. The *muhajirs* and other non-Sindhi residents dominated the industry and commerce, the professions, and the public services in Sind. As a result of the heavy concentration of industry and commerce in Karachi, per capita income in Sind came to be the highest in Pakistan, but the native Sindhis remained among the country's poorest.[41] They felt deprived, even cheated, and they saw an effective protector in their language.

The *muhajirs* and other non-Sindhi residents claimed superior competence to justify their dominance in the public services and the professions. But if Sindhi, which many of them had never cared to learn, became the official language of the province – the medium of instruction in schools and colleges, the language of oral and written communication in government establishments, the vehicle of public discourse in politics – the *muhajir* argument would lose force. They would soon prove to be relatively incompetent and dysfunctional. They would have to be replaced by Sindhi-speaking functionaries. Additional jobs and promotions would open up for the sons of the soil, who would then be the masters of their own affairs. The honor and self-respect of the Sindhi cultural personality would at last be vindicated.

The Language Crisis in Sind

As the Pakistan People's Party, headed by a fellow Sindhi, took power at the center and in Sind, the proponents of Sindhi moved to advance their case. In March 1972 a procession of some two thousand persons marched to the governor's mansion in Karachi, demanding that Sindhi be accepted as one of the national languages of Pakistan, and that 90 percent of the radio and television programs broadcast in the province be in that language. Rasool Bakhsh Talpur, the governor, assured the group that Sindhi would soon be the official

language of the province.[42] The *muhajirs* were bound to resent this decision, and they should have been expected to protest and resist it.

In a speech in Sanghar on March 31, Bhutto urged a "logical and reasonable" settlement. But, at the same time, he chose to admonish that the natives of Sind must not be made to accept the fate that had befallen the Red Indian in America. This comparison encouraged the protagonists of Sindhi to stand firm, and Mumtaz Bhutto, the chief minister of Sind, declared that a bill designating Sindhi as the official language would soon be moved in the assembly. By June official forms were being printed in English and Sindhi but not in Urdu, and meetings in the government secretariat were conducted in Sindhi.[43] Students at the Liaquat Medical College and Sind University in Jamshoro harassed the *muhajir* faculty and, in some cases, assaulted them, invaded their homes, and took their property. *Muhajir* students at a polytechnic institute treated the Sindhi faculty in like manner and killed one of them.[44]

As the summer of 1972 approached, the trend toward violence increased. In President Bhutto's home town, Larkana, young men armed with sticks, knives, and axes ordered shopkeepers to remove their Urdu nameplates, signboards, posters, and calendars. In other towns *muhajir* stores and Urdu newspaper establishments were attacked. Bhutto condemned this behavior as gangsterism and said it would be suppressed. He pleaded that the struggle in Pakistan must be one between the oppressor and the oppressed and not between the provinces and their cultures. *Muhajirs* and Sindhis were all Pakistanis, and they all must have justice. Turning then to the *muhajirs,* he told them it would be the height of injustice if the Sindhis were reduced to the status of a minority in their own province.[45]

The central committee of the PPP counseled restraint to the provincial government. But Mumtaz Bhutto – professing readiness to lay down his life rather than betray Sindhi interests – announced that a language bill would be presented to the provincial assembly on July 7. Copies of the proposed bill were distributed to members on the morning of July 5. The *muhajir* group submitted amendments later the same day, but it also called for a general strike in the province on July 7 to demonstrate its opposition to the bill. As the assembly met and discussion on the bill opened, the speaker disallowed the amend-

ments. The *muhajir* members in the opposition, and a couple of them from the "treasury" benches, then walked out of the house in protest, and the remaining members passed the bill. Over the next few days, *muhajirs,* Sindhis, Jiye Sind and Sindhu Desh militants, plain gangsters, and the police battled one another, burnt standing crops, plundered and destroyed homes and stores, stole cattle, and killed 55 persons.[46]

In a radio speech on July 7 President Bhutto told the nation that he had instructed the governor of Sind to postpone signing the bill the assembly had passed. At the same time, he invited the two groups to talks with him in Rawalpindi. The *muhajir* delegation included I. H. Qureshi, Hussain Imam, Professor A. B. Haleem, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, G. A. Madani and several other dignitaries. The Sindhi team consisted of Sheikh Ayaz (a famous Sindhi poet and intellectual), Qazi Faiz Mohammad, Ali Bakhsh Talpur, Mohammad Khan Soomro, and two Sind government ministers, namely, Qaim Ali Shah (law) and Dur Mohammad Usto (education). After a preliminary meeting on July 10, at which the two sides set forth their respective positions, Bhutto appointed a committee to consult with the two delegations. It included Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, Meraj Mohammad Khan – all of them central ministers – and Malik Meraj Khalid, the chief minister of the Punjab. Pirzada was a Sindhi, Sherpao a Pathan, and Meraj Mohammad Khan an Urdu-speaking *muhajir* from Karachi. It was, thus, a well-chosen committee. The two delegations submitted their demands, and their accusations against each other, to the committee the next day. The *muhajir* delegation asked that:[47]

1. Urdu and Sindhi, both, be named the official languages of Sind;
2. either the governor or the chief minister, half of the ministers in the provincial cabinet, and half of the members of the public service commission be "new Sindhis" (meaning *muhajirs* or other non-Sindhi speaking residents);
3. 40 percent of the posts in the provincial government be reserved for the new Sindhis, an equal number for old Sindhis, with the remaining 20 percent to be filled on merit;
4. 50 percent of all higher officials in the provincial govern-

ment – secretaries to the government, department heads, directors – be new Sindhis;
5. either the deputy commissioner or the superintendent of police in each district be a new Sindhi;
6. the existing technical and professional colleges in the city of Karachi be reserved for new Sindhis;
7. Karachi's quota of jobs in the central government be merged with that of Sind (with the result that the more competitive *muhajirs* may obtain jobs reserved for the native Sindhis);
8. the city government of Karachi be given additional powers and functions, made autonomous, and placed under an elected mayor.

The old Sindhis' demands, equally extravagant, were as follows:[48]

1. Sindhi should not only be the official language of Sind but one of the national languages of Pakistan;
2. Sindhi inscriptions should appear on currency notes and coins, office buildings, and street signs;
3. the peoples of the four provinces of Pakistan should be recognized as four nations living in a confederation;
4. a militia consisting only of the old Sindhis should be raised and maintained in the province;
5. all secretaries to the government, deputy secretaries, department heads, commissioners, deputy commissioners, superintendents and deputy superintendents of police in the province should be old Sindhis;
6. land allotted to non-Sindhi military and civil officials in Sind should be taken back:
7. the railways, posts and telegraph, radio, television, organizations concerned with the development of industry, water and power, and the Civil Service of Pakistan should be provincialized;
8. Sind's share of the Indus waters should be increased to the level agreed to in an inter-provincial compact in 1945;
9. no refugees from Bangladesh may be settled in Sind.

The government negotiators used delay as a tactic for tiring out the *muhajir* delegation. At their meetings on July 13 and 14, Pirzada proposed to let the Sind governor sign the bill the

assembly had passed and, at the same time, issue an ordinance incorporating such of the *muhajir* demands as were found to be appropriate. The *muhajir* delegation insisted upon agreement to accept Urdu as an official language along with Sindhi, and when Dr Qureshi warned that the *muhajir* community would react most unfavorably to the exclusion of Urdu, Pirzada responded that his government was not without experience in handling strong reactions. He added that the old Sindhis too were ready to take on the *muhajirs*.[49]

On July 15, Javed Hashmi, a student leader affiliated with the Jamat-e-Islami, organized a large procession and public meeting in Lahore to voice support for Urdu. There were signs of mounting resentment in other towns of the Punjab against the happenings in Sind. Not only were the Punjabis strongly pro-Urdu, they were greatly disturbed by the news of attacks on Punjabi settlers, and of molesting of Punjabi women, in the interior of Sind. The Punjab was the bastion of the PPP's strength, and it was well understood that the party could ill afford to lose ground here. It seems that Malik Meraj Khalid, the Punjab chief minister, emphasized these considerations to his colleagues on the government team and pressed for some meaningful concession to the *muhajir* group.[50]

The government then softened its position and an agreement was reached. It provided that Sindhi would become the official language of Sind, that Urdu would be honored and promoted as the national language, and that for a period of 12 years no one would be disadvantaged in public employment or transactions on the ground that he did not know Sindhi.

The *muhajirs* had evidently failed in their mission. They had only received a respite of twelve years during which they must learn Sindhi well enough to compete with its native speakers. They and the migrants from the Punjab and NWFP had worked hard to bring about the industrial development and commercial growth one saw in Karachi and the other towns of Sind. They felt they were entitled to compete on an equal basis for the jobs and benefits the public authority provided in the province of their adoption. But equal opportunity would work to preserve their dominance which the Sindhis were no longer willing to accept. The struggle between the old and the new Sindhis was then not a struggle between right and wrong. It was a contest between two sets of claims neither of which could be

dismissed as unworthy; it was a contest between two rights, the kind that is often the more difficult to resolve.

President Bhutto and the PPP government in Sind did not acknowledge the complexity that characterized the conflict; they spoke and acted from a spirit of simple partisanship. During a tour of Sind toward the end of July 1972, the president preached peace and assured justice to all, but he made no effort to bind the wounds the riots had caused. He insisted that the Sind assembly had acted reasonably in passing the language bill, and that the riots had been instigated by the "reactionaries" (meaning the Islamic parties), who had been trying to dislodge his government since its inception. He said he commanded the power of the state and knew how to use it, and that he would crush those who conspired against his government.

Interpretation

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, being himself a Sindhi, may have been convinced that the Sindhi case had more of right and justice than did the *muhajir* assertions. But his partisanship should also be viewed in the context of his own, and his party's, base in Sind. Their support in the 1970 election had come largely from the Sindhi-speaking voters. The *muhajirs* in Karachi and Hyderabad ignored the PPP candidates for the National Assembly. In the provincial assembly election a few days later, the bulk of the *muhajir* vote went to the Islamic parties and against the PPP. Concessions to the *muhajirs* on the language issue would not necessarily dispose them to favor the PPP in the next election. They might regard these concessions as something to which they were entitled, if not as a sign of diffidence on the part of Sindhis and the PPP government.

Of the 63 members in the Sind assembly the PPP commanded the support of 43, including four *muhajirs*.[51] But recall that initially – that is, when the election results were announced in December 1970 – it had won only 28 seats. Others joined its ranks when they saw that it was likely to form the government. Given these "opportunists" in its ranks, the party's majority in the assembly in the summer of 1972 could not be considered entirely secure. It had to mend fences and enlarge its support base. The Sindhi "nationalist" organizations stood ready to denounce Bhutto and the PPP as agents of the Punjab and as

traitors to the Sindhi cause. It follows that the party could not afford to shy away from supporting the claims of Sindhi.

In order to build his own support base in the province, and also to lift himself from the subordinate station in which President Bhutto wished to keep him, Mumtaz Bhutto chose to project himself as a great Sindhi patriot. He befriended Sindhi nationalists and gave them jobs in his administration. Pro-Sindhu Desh publications, which had numbered only a half-dozen before 1972, rose to more than 30 during his chief ministership. The PPP's own Sindhi language newspaper, *Hilal-e-Pakistan*, employed journalists belonging to the Jiye Sind school and published their separatist thinking.[52] Regardless of how popular Zulfikar Ali Bhutto might be in the Punjab, he could not ignore his political base in Sind or lose it to Mumtaz Bhutto. The Sindhis who had voted for the PPP looked to him to protect their rights and to restore their honor. It would not do for him to oppose the advancing tide of Sindhi self-assertion.

Where do we locate the crisis that Bhutto may be said to have managed? There was rioting, resulting in death and destruction. Neither President Bhutto nor his lieutenants in the government of Sind acted promptly to prevent the violence. It is true also that in handling rioters they were inclined to treat the *muhajirs* more sternly. Being partisans of the Sindhi cause, they may have believed that the *muhajirs* must be worsted in street warfare before they would yield to the Sindhi point of view. The rioting eventually stopped and, in that sense, we may say that the crisis was ended. But it should be noted that in all of this no kind words were spoken to the *muhajirs* and no effort was made to engage them in a reasoned discourse.

If we locate the crisis in the growing estrangement between the ethnic communities living in Sind, as indeed we should, we would have to say that, far from being resolved, it was aggravated. It remained suppressed for a time but, 14 years later, it would reappear with an incredible ferocity. Meanwhile Bhutto and the PPP earned the *muhajirs'* abiding hostility.

The Anti-Ahmadi Riots

Mob violence gripped Pakistan once again in the summer of 1974. A Muslim sect, called the Ahmadis, had been an irritant to the larger Muslim community since the beginning of the

twentieth century, principally because its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, chose to call himself a prophet in violation of the more general Muslim belief that Muhammad, the founder of Islam, had been the last of the prophets. Ghulam Ahmad's claim was regarded as derogatory to Muhammad's exalted status and, from time to time, the Muslim ulema had called for the Ahmadis' excommunication. An anti-Ahmadi mass movement in the early 1950s turned into a rebellion against the state, invited the imposition of martial law in the city of Lahore in March 1953, brought down the government of Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana in the Punjab, and severely damaged the government of Prime Minister Nazimuddin at the center.[53] Another such agitation erupted in 1974 and threatened to sweep away the Bhutto regime.

On May 22 a group of 160 students from Multan boarded a train to Peshawar. As the train stopped at Rabwa, a predominantly Ahmadi town that houses the community's spiritual and organizational headquarters, the students came out and shouted slurs and offensive slogans. Upon their return from Peshawar on May 29 they stopped at Rabwa again. This time the Ahmadis were ready. Hundreds of them, armed with knives and sticks, fell upon the students and injured more than 30. The news of this event infuriated the Muslim community. The Punjab government promptly arrested 71 persons in Rabwa and appointed K. M. Samadani, a judge of the Lahore High Court, to investigate the incident and submit his findings. Haneef Ramay, the chief minister, appealed for calm, and asked the people not to make this breach of public order into a sectarian issue.[54]

But calm was not to be had. Nor would the opposition parties and leaders forgo the opportunity of embarrassing the Bhutto regime. The three Islamic parties, the Muslim League, Majlis-e-Ahrar, the Khaksars, Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, numerous bar associations and student groups, and prayer leaders in mosques demanded the dismissal of Ahmadis from key posts in government, disarming of their youth organizations, and the making of Rabwa – which they alleged had become a "state within a state" – into an "open city." Violent demonstrations began, and continued for a week, in all major cities of the Punjab. Enraged crowds burnt down Ahmadi homes, shops, gas stations, and factories. The leaders of the agitation called for a countrywide general strike on June 14 to protest the government's tardiness in

meeting their demands which now included the designation of Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority.[55]

The agitation slowed down and became essentially non-violent after a week. This improvement resulted partly from the way Bhutto reasoned out the issue with the people in his statements and speeches, and partly from the provincial government's readiness to use force to discourage violence. The government imposed partial censorship to prevent commentaries on the subject from becoming inflammatory, and arrested hundreds of demonstrators (most of whom were subsequently released).

Prime Minister Bhutto and other official spokesmen stated repeatedly that the government would protect the life and property of all citizens regardless of their religious affiliation and, to this end, they would use the army if necessary. In addition, Bhutto suggested that an Indo-Soviet "lobby" had inspired the anti-Ahmadi disturbances to weaken Pakistan. In a statement to the press on May 31, he asked: "Is our response to India's atomic blast to be that we shall quarrel among ourselves and attempt to tear ourselves apart?"[56] Speaking in the National Assembly on June 3 he opposed discussion of the Ahmadi question in the house until after public order had been restored. Those in the opposition who wanted immediate discussion wished only to intensify the agitation and ruin the country, he declared.

Prime Minister Bhutto maintained that there was no need for an agitation, because the government, the opposition, and the people at large had the same belief on the issues involved. He asked that the nation consider the Ahmadi question at the appropriate time, and do so calmly and sensibly, without hatred and without bigotry. It must not allow savagery and "cannibalism" in the country. Bhutto addressed the nation on radio and television on June 13. He urged patience, peaceableness, and civility. The Ahmadi question, he said, had been in the public domain for some 90 years, and it could not be resolved in a day. It must be settled with due regard to the feelings of the people and considerations of national solidarity. He assured his listeners that he would place the issue before the National Assembly which would then discuss it. He maintained that the issue had already been settled in the constitution of 1973, but went on to suggest that the Assembly might nevertheless refer it to the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology. He added that the

members of his own party in the Assembly would be free to vote on the subject according to their conscience.[57]

As one might have expected, the ulema and their associates did not find Bhutto's assurances to be satisfactory. Maulana Mufti Mahmood, head of the JUI, suspected that Bhutto did not intend to honor the Muslim nation's demand, and that he meant to put it in "cold storage." The "Action Committee" of an organization dedicated to preserving belief in the finality of Muhammad's prophethood ("Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat") asserted that it would not be enough for the Assembly to pass a mere resolution or to refer the matter to the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology; it must pass a bill declaring the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority. Zafar Baluch, a leader of the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba, took the same position, demanded quick action, and warned that Bhutto would not remain in power if he continued his "double talk" on the Ahmadi question.[58] Opposition members in the Punjab assembly spoke to the same effect, and so did Mian Tufail, "Amir" of the Jamat-e-Islami, and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, president of the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). It seemed the issue would not go away, and resort to violence could begin again. Finally, Bhutto relented, took the issue to the National Assembly which, after extended consideration and a dialogue with the chief of the Ahmadi sect, passed the desired bill on September 7, 1974.

We have not examined the doctrinal positions of the two sides here because we are not concerned with their merits. The following facts may, however, be mentioned in passing. The exchange between the Ahmadi spokesman and members of the National Assembly, who questioned him, took place in a secret session and did not, therefore, get published. Two MNAs stated to me in private conversations that initially many members of the Assembly were opposed to the resolution the ulema wanted. They changed their minds, and voted for it, when they heard the Ahmadi chief admit that he and his people did not regard the non-Ahmadis as true Muslims.

Interpretation

Left to himself, Bhutto would not have made the National Assembly the arbiter of a theological issue and the agent for expelling a sect, even if heretical, from the community of Islam.

Being secular-minded, he did not think such a role appropriately belonged to the Assembly. Beyond proprieties, he may have feared that the expulsion of Ahmadis would have a disruptive impact upon the country. The Ahmadis were a well-knit and well-organized community given to the idea of brotherhood among themselves. They maintained an effective presence in the country's public services, armed forces, professions, business and industry. In sum, they were a powerful group. An official act of the government of Pakistan, ejecting them from the pale of Islam, would not only cause them an emotional trauma, it would offend them deeply and alienate them. Their estrangement from the state and its government could be very troublesome.

These pragmatic concerns were not shared by the ulema and other religiously motivated activists in Pakistan. Indeed, a public expression of these concerns would have confirmed the ulema in their belief that the Ahmadis were dangerous and deserved to be suppressed. Bhutto must have known that in the early 1950s many officials of the ruling party, the Muslim League, had joined the anti-Ahmadi agitation. In 1974, if the issue lingered, many PPP legislators in the Assembly might bend before public pressure, support the ulema's demands, and in effect abandon Bhutto.

The crisis, once again, involved a contest between two rights. The Ahmadis believed they were true and righteous Muslims. But most other Muslims saw the sect as a standing affront to their faith. Bhutto may have thought the issue was religious, not political, and that his government should not be asked to resolve it. But the constitution of 1973, which he had sponsored, had made Pakistan an Islamic, not a secular, state. There were, thus, elements of right and justice in all positions on the subject. This was, once again, a crisis that could not be settled to the satisfaction of all concerned. Bhutto had responded to his political needs as well as to his personal view of the merits of the case in dealing with the language crisis two years earlier. The two considerations were not in conflict then; both required the same action. Now, in 1974, he put aside his own intellectual inclination and preferences to heed the logic of his political survival.

NOTES

1. For an account of the ulema's demands and the ruling elite's responses see Anwar H. Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics, and National Solidarity* (New York: Praeger, 1982), ch. 4.
2. For a detailed account of the position the political parties in Pakistan have taken on the issue of regional autonomy, see Anwar H. Syed, "Political Parties and the Nationality Question in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,* Fall 1988, pp. 42–75.
3. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Phir Marshal La Aa Gaya* (Then Came the Martial Law), Urdu (Lahore: Jung Publishers, 1988), p. 34. Ghafoor Ahmad was leader of the Jamat-e-Islami group in the National Assembly at this time and one of the opposition's principal negotiators with the Bhutto regime on constitutional issues.
4. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Then Came the Martial Law,* p. 32.
5. Raja Mohammad Afzal, "Constitutional Accord Dissected," *Outlook,* December 2, 1972, p. 8.
6. See Asrar Ahmad, "Who Is the Real Winner?" *Outlook,* October 28, 1972, p. 4 and "Opinion" in the same issue on p. 3; Raja Mohammad Afzal Khan, "Constitutional Accord Dissected," *Outlook,* December 2, 1972, p. 8; editorial in *Zindagi,* October 30, 1972, p. 5, and Sajjad Mir's interview with Professor Ghafoor Ahmad on pp. 15–16.
7. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Then Came the Martial Law,* pp. 37–8, 43.
8. Asrar Ahmad, "The Horse Trading," *Outlook,* April 21, 1973, p. 6.
9. National Assembly of Pakistan, *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1973), Fourth Schedule, pp. 165–75.
10. Correspondent's report in *Outlook,* April 21, 1973, pp. 4–5.
11. Mukhtar Hasan's report in *Zindagi,* March 11, 1973, pp. 5–7; and Zafar Awan's report in the same journal, April 22, 1973, pp. 12–13.
12. M. I. Laskar in *Outlook,* January 20, 1973.
13. Ibid.
14. Mukhtar Hasan's report in *Zindagi,* March 11 and April 22, 1973.
15. See, for instance, Syed Hasan Mahmood, *Mera Siyasi Safar* (My Political Journey), Urdu (Lahore: Jung Publishers, 1988), p. 283. The author was one of Bhutto's harsher critics.
16. *Jung* (international edition), March 29, 1972, and a report entitled, "Cracks in the Tripartite Alliance," in *Outlook,* April 8, 1972, pp. 9–11.
17. *Jung,* May 9, 1972 and *Outlook,* May 13, 1972, pp. 4–5.
18. *Outlook,* April 8, 1972, pp. 9–11, and April 15, 1972, pp. 3–4.
19. *Jung,* April 3 and 5, 1972.
20. Askar Ali Shah, "The Story Behind the Hurry," *Outlook,* April 22, 1972, p. 5.
21. *Jung,* April 29 and May 2, 1972.
22. *Jung,* May 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 26, and 30, 1972.
23. Askar Ali Shah, "The Coalition's Anxiety," *Outlook,* August 19, 1972, p. 5.
24. See Mukhtar Hasan's reports in *Zindagi,* September 14 and October 14, 1972; Askar Ali Shah's reports in *Outlook,* July 1 and August 19, 1972. Also see *Outlook,* April 29, 1972, p. 5; September 16, 1972, p. 7; and *Jung,* May 4, 6, and 23, 1972.

Zindagi, an Urdu language weekly in Lahore, was banned in the summer of 1972. It continued to publish under other names – *Lail-o-Nihar, Rafaqat, Azan-e-Haq, Adakar* – but the name *Zindagi* also appeared on the cover. I have ignored these temporary identifications in my references to this journal in this chapter and the next. In dating each issue, *Zindagi* normally provides the first and last dates of the week to which it relates. I have used only the first of these dates for identifying an issue. During the ban, *Zindagi* was on the run, so to speak, with the result that consecutive issues were not always a full week apart.

25. Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Baluchistan* (Rawalpindi, October 1974), p. 5.
26. Ibid., pp. 18–23.
27. Selig Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," *Foreign Policy,* Fall 1978, p. 139.
28. See the statements of Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri, made at the Lahore High Court, in *Pakistan Times,* December 1 and 4, 1974. Also see Khair Bakhsh Marri's interview with Mukhtar Hasan in *Zindagi,* May 27, 1973.
29. Statements to this effect were made by: Professor Ghafoor Ahmad and Mian Tufail Mohammed (Jamat-e-Islami), *Nawa-e-Waqt,* April 27 and June 8, 1974; Asghar Khan, *Nawa-e-Waqt,* June 10, 1974; Chaudhry Zahur Ilahi and Maulana Mufti Mahmood, *Pakistan Times,* February 15, 1974.
30. *Nawa-e-Waqt,* March 31 and June 28, 1974.
31. See Muslim Qureshi's report in *Zindagi,* November 27, 1972 and Aqil Khan's report in *Outlook,* December 9, 1972.
32. Aqil Khan's report in *Outlook,* December 9, 1972.
33. *Zindagi,* January 7, 1973, pp. 21–2. Subsequently, Bhutto himself stated that he knew Bugti and the NAP leaders had been "birds of the same feather," that they had become opponents for tribal reasons, and that he had taken advantage of their recent rivalry: *Pakistan Times,* December 17, 1974.
34. See Yusuf Lodi's report, *Outlook,* February 9, 1974.
35. *Nawa-e-Waqt,* May 1, June 11, and June 20, 1974; *Pakistan Times,* June 20, 1974.
36. See Shaheen Sehbai's reports in *Outlook,* May 18 and June 1, 1974.
37. *Nawa-e-Waqt,* January 21, March 19 and 21, 1974; Arif Nizami's interview with Ahmad Nawaz Bugti in *Nawa-e-Waqt,* April 6, 1974.
38. Akbar Bugti's interview in *Nawa-e-Waqt,* April 30, 1974.
39. *Pakistan Times,* February 15, 1974.
40. For a further discussion of the language issue in Sind, and the rise of Sindhi nationalism associated with it, see Anwar H. Syed, "Political Parties and the Nationality Question in Pakistan," especially pp. 52–62.
41. *Outlook,* July 15, 1972, p. 4.
42. See Jamil-ud-Din Ali's column in *Jung,* March 29, 1972.
43. *Outlook,* July 8, 1972, pp. 13–14.
44. *Jung,* May 8, 1972 and *Zindagi,* August 28, 1972, pp. 10, 20.
45. *Jung,* April 3 and May 30, 1972.
46. *Zindagi,* July 24, 1972, pp. 12–16. Also see Abu Tahir Sirhindi's report in the same journal dated December 31, 1972. Sirhindi wrote that of the 55

persons killed, most of them in police firing, 15 were Sindhis and 40 were *muhajirs.*

47. *Zindagi,* July 17, 1972, p. 5.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., July 24, 1972, pp. 10–11.
50. Regarding the Punjab factor, see Zafrullah Poshni's report in *Outlook,* August 12, 1972.
51. Sirhindi's report in *Zindagi,* December 31, 1972.
52. See Abu Ijaz's report in *Zindagi,* October 8, 1973 and Zaheer Ahmad's report in the same journal dated November 20, 1972.
53. A detailed account of this agitation may be seen in Government of the Punjab, *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953* (Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1954).
54. *Nawa-e-Waqt,* May 31, 1974.
55. Ibid., June 1 and 10, 1974.
56. *Pakistan Times,* June 1, 1974.
57. Ibid., June 14, 1974.
58. *Nawa-e-Waqt,* June 14 and 17, 1974.

8 Institutional Decay and Bhutto's Fall

Joseph Stalin was a poor leader and a bad ruler, says Samuel P. Huntington, because while he increased his personal power, he weakened the party and government organizations, and "when he died, his personal power died with him."[1] In condemning the earlier regimes in Pakistan, Bhutto observed repeatedly that they had destroyed, or weakened, political and governmental institutions. In his covenant with the people, both before and after taking power, he promised to rebuild and vitalize these institutions. This was a promise he did not keep. Throughout his rule he sought to maximize his own authority and power. He did accumulate authority by getting the president to issue appropriate ordinances and the assembly to pass enabling legislation. But power deserted him, because he had built no home for it. He thought he could subdue and command the power of rival forces – the bureaucracy and the army – and make it his own. This was like erecting a house of cards. In the end, when he had to fight for his political survival, his personal power was nowhere to be found.

Bhutto's administrative reforms, discussed earlier, could have been intended to increase the bureaucracy's effectiveness in implementing government policies. But he continued the established practice of using the bureaucracy, especially the district administration and the police, to contain his political adversaries. Thus, he, like his predecessors, kept open the avenues of its corruption, gave it a distorted perception of its mission, distracted it from its proper role, and weakened it.

During the first eight months of his rule Bhutto retired or dismissed 30 high-ranking officers in the armed forces of Pakistan.[2] On March 30, 1973 some 40 army and air force officers were arrested for attempting to subvert their fellow-officers' allegiance to the government. On May 2 it was said that they had been conspiring to destroy the discipline of the armed forces, and ten days later it was alleged that they had intended

to overthrow the government.[3] Bhutto said more than once that he wanted to help the armed forces of Pakistan become the "finest fighting machine" in Asia. But it is true also that during his rule promotions of staff officers depended not only on their professional competence but also on assessments of their loyalty to the regime. This is generally believed to have been true of Tikka Khan's appointment as the army chief of staff. It is a known fact that Bhutto ignored several more senior corps commanders to promote Zia-ul-Haq to the rank of full general, and made him the new army chief, in the mistaken belief that he was more likely than all the others to be loyal. Twice before the generals had usurped power, and Bhutto may have had good reason to be concerned with the loyalty of serving officers. But insofar as his preference in the matter assigned a lower value to professional competence, it detracted from the vigor of the armed forces as an institution.

Of the political institutions, legislatures and parties are the most important. More than doing anything specifically to weaken the legislature, Bhutto enfeebled it by simply neglecting it. The National Assembly met each year for the required number of days, but on any typical day it bore the look of a "ghost town." The bell rang, and kept ringing, but most members did not come in to occupy their seats. Often the speaker would have to adjourn the house for lack of a quorum. Prime Minister Bhutto's party, the PPP, had a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, but at times its bills passed by a slim margin, because its members preferred to sip tea in the cafeteria or to chat in the lobbies instead of sitting in the house. It was not unusual for ministers to be absent from the floor when matters concerning their departments were discussed.[4] Bhutto knew of his party members' indifference and, on occasion, he exhorted them to take their work more seriously, for that would enable the Assembly to grow as a democratic institution.[5]

At times the Assembly was transformed. Let us look at it on a remarkable day in early January of 1974. Every seat was taken, and the galleries were full. As the debate proceeded, interjections were fewer, livelier, and more meaningful than usual. Members appeared to be serious about transacting business. They had done their "homework" and evidently given thought to what they were going to say. They were relevant and articulate. The standard of debate was high, truly impressive. Why the

change? This was a rare occasion: the prime minister was present on the floor.[6]

My own observation of the Assembly's proceedings on numerous occasions in 1973 and 1974 led me to the same conclusion: Bhutto's presence in the house improved the quality of its work. He himself was an eloquent speaker and a skillful debater. The PPP members tried to excel to make a good impression upon him, and the opposition members spoke well to appear competent in comparison with him. But Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to the Assembly only rarely. His visit, instead of being a routine, became a stately event. On the day he was to go to the Assembly hundreds of police were posted on the roads from the Prime Minister's House to the National Assembly Building. He agreed with me, in the course of an interview, that his presence in the house served to improve its performance. When I asked him why, then, he did not go more often, he said he intended to do so.[7] But it seems that, for the most part, he continued to stay away.

If Bhutto saw fit to neglect the Assembly, so did his ministers and, then, the ordinary members. They did the same in provincial assemblies. Thus, the legislatures in Pakistan declined instead of maturing. Members belonged to them to receive their salaries, allowances, perquisites, and – as Prime Minister Bhutto himself said to me – "to make hay while the sun shines." Government supporters and those in the opposition came in more to exchange insults than to reason together on issues of public policy.

BHUTTO AND THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

Writing in 1974, I. H. Burney, the editor of *Outlook,* observed that as an organization the PPP was in a shambles, a "mere shadow of its former self" and "a picture of strife, squabbling and factionalism."[8] This assessment was confirmed by the "self-analysis" which some party notables undertook at the time.[9] The party's growing ineffectiveness, and its consequent inability to counter its adversaries in the affections of the people, made Prime Minister Bhutto "a general without an army," as one of his colleagues once put it to me. He would eventually pay a heavy price for his failure to keep the PPP in good health

and vigor. His neglect did not result from forgetfulness or from pressures of other work. It was a wilful act, a part of his style of conducting politics.[10] I have discussed the presence of violence, corruption, and factionalism within the PPP in considerable detail in an earlier work.[11] A quick reference to factionalism in the party should suffice here.

Factionalism in the PPP

Ideological differences, property and class differentiations, caste distinctions, ancestral rivalries, clashes of personal ambition and interest, and even frivolous and fanciful reasons generated factionalism within the PPP. In March 1972 a faction disrupted Prime Minister Bhutto's public meeting at the Qaddafi Stadium in Lahore to discredit those (the Ramay group) who had been in charge of the arrangements; another factional fight disrupted a "tea party" at the Shalimar Gardens (Lahore) in honor of the newly appointed chief minister of the Punjab, Malik Meraj Khalid. In May 1972 rival groups fought and broke up furniture in the party office in a small town near Wazirabad. A few days later a factional fight occurred in the nearby district town of Gujranwala, in which fists and kicks were freely exchanged until the police came to restore order. Many similar incidents were subsequently reported in the press.

During the 1970 election campaign, Sheikh Rashid, president of the Punjab PPP at the time, had done much organization work and gained the loyalty of a large number of party workers in the province. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Bhutto's friend and confidant, was the secretary-general. Before long the two men – Rashid and Khar – became rivals.[12] During 1972 and the first half of 1973, many pro-Rashid elements were harassed, intimidated, and/or thrown out of the party hierarchy throughout the province. Only one branch organization in the city of Lahore – the one in Baghbanpura – was said to have any pro-Rashid functionaries. Khar was able to take these measures because as governor he controlled not only government patronage but the police. In the summer of 1973, Mian Mohammad Afzal Wattu – a Khar supporter, who had lost the 1970 election in a Bahawalpur constituency – replaced Sheikh Rashid as president of the Punjab PPP. His appointment meant that Khar would now be the effective head of both the party and the

government in the Punjab. During 1972 there were many bloody clashes between peasants and landlords, workers and employers. The landed gentry, interested in order and tranquility, looked to Khar, himself a middle landlord, for protection from the full impact of Bhutto's land reforms. He suppressed the "extremists," dissidents, and opponents within and without the PPP with a ferocity reminiscent of Kalabagh's rule in the 1960s. That some of his ministers, notably Mian Iftikhar Tari, were widely alleged to have underworld connections damaged the regime's legitimacy. Mumtaz Bhutto's government in Sind operated in like fashion.[13] By the fall of 1973 Prime Minister Bhutto concluded that he must dissociate himself from their heavy political style. Toward the end of January 1974, as reports circulated in PPP drawing-rooms that Khar might soon be dismissed, 40 Punjab provincial assembly members (MPAs) submitted a petition to Bhutto, alleging numerous cases of corruption and other malfeasance on Khar's part. In early February five MPAs attacked him on the assembly floor and engaged in a free exchange of colorful Punjabi vocabulary with some of his supporters.

Khar, who was now the chief minister, resigned from his post on March 10, 1974, and Bhutto designated Haneef Ramay – the soft-spoken painter and former journalist – to succeed him. Khar appeared to accept his ouster with good grace, professing infinite loyalty to Bhutto, and suggested that he might withdraw from politics. On his part, Bhutto tried to soften the blow by indicating that he still valued Khar's friendship: he took him to Al-Murtaza, his home in Larkana, and stayed at Khar's house during visits to Lahore. Ramay accommodated two Khar supporters – Abdul Khaliq and Mian Afzal Wattu – in his cabinet.

Khar soon abandoned any thought of retirement he might have had and decided to fight it out with Ramay to show the party chairman who really mattered in the Punjab.[14] He toured the province to meet and organize his supporters in the party. He began to criticize the Ramay government, claiming that it was not a government at all, and that he, not Ramay, commanded majority support in the assembly. The Ramay government, unsure of Bhutto's mind on the subject, did not wish to treat Khar with the harshness customarily reserved for political opponents. There were some factional disruptions of his meetings and a moderate amount of police harassment during his tour

of the province. A provincial minister accused him of fomenting labor and student unrest. Sheikh Rashid alleged that Khar had bought a restaurant in London worth £100 000 with funds illegally transferred abroad. Other charges of corruption and misconduct were made, and some local PPP organizations demanded his expulsion from the party.

At this point Khar suggested that he might even challenge the prime minister himself. He made contact with the opposition parties and PPP dissidents outside the Punjab. He kept in "constant touch" with the NAP leaders, entertained the Talpur brothers at his Clifton home in Karachi, and visited Meraj Mohammad Khan. He claimed to know of Bhutto's lapses that were much worse than anything Ayub might have done at Tashkent. At the same time he was reported to be seeking a meeting with the prime minister, who was in Lahore watching the political scene. Before seeing Khar, Bhutto dissolved the Punjab PPP organization and appointed Malik Meraj Khalid, one of Khar's opponents, as president with a mandate to reorganize the party in the province. On May 22 he met Khar and after two extended meetings, a "reconciliation" was announced.

Factionalism in the PPP was a complex phenomenon. The contributing factors mentioned above were all at work. Above the internal divisions and rivalries stood Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Party notables often declared that they were his creatures, owing their legislative and ministerial roles to his personal popularity with the electorate. Factionalism, thus, involved competition for a higher rating in the order of merit and precedence that he built from time to time. Legislators and party officials at the district and local levels made estimates of where contending dignitaries stood in Bhutto's esteem, and they shifted support accordingly.

The Reformation that Never Happened

Announcements were made periodically of an impending reorganization of the Punjab PPP for the purpose of cleansing it. During Afzal Wattu's presidentship a purge of the corrupt elements was to be completed by the end of March 1974, but actually only a few tehsil-level presidents were removed. The president of the Multan district PPP, M. A. Goheer, lost his post but gained a position on the party's provincial committee.[15]

Malik Meraj Khalid replaced Mian Wattu in May 1974 and prepared to embark upon another reorganization. He said Chairman Bhutto had directed him to rid the party of self-seekers, opportunists, luxury-loving big spenders, and gangsters, and to bring in the *shurafa* (decent folks). The people had begun to hate the PPP, he said, because of the corruption, violence, and high-handedness its functionaries had practiced.[16] Reorganization committees, one for each division, would screen divisional and district level presidents and secretaries and replace the ones found wanting.[17] The party leadership called upon government agents at the tehsil level (*tehsildars*) to submit lists of respectable persons in their areas who might then be persuaded to join the party. One of Prime Minister Bhutto's special assistants, Khuda Bakhsh Buchha, toured the Punjab countryside to spread the word that the PPP wanted to improve its image, that the *shurafa* would have a role in it, and that their dignity and honor would be preserved.[18] But the planned reorganization did not take place, and Malik Meraj Khalid, himself a model of decency, had to abandon the reformation he wanted to undertake.

Chairman Bhutto did some reorganizing of his own. In March 1975 he appointed Khar as governor of the Punjab again, and Khar had to resign his assembly seat to accept that post. Ramay was still the chief minister and, as before, the two men could not work together. In July Bhutto dismissed both of them, and persuaded Ramay to resign his assembly seat in return for a seat in the federal senate. Both Khar and Ramay were thus cast out of the Punjab government and its legislative politics. Khar tried to return to the assembly by contesting a by-election for the seat Ramay had vacated, but Bhutto denied him the party nomination. At that point Khar broke with the party and, surprisingly, so did Ramay. After they were rebuffed by Asghar Khan's Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, the two men found places in the Pagaro faction of the Pakistan Muslim League in November 1975.

In June 1974, Bhutto dismissed J. A. Rahim as a central minister and as secretary-general of the party because of his "misbehavior" at a dinner at the Prime Minister's House. Khurshid Hasan Meer resigned later in the year, because Bhutto would not stop Maulana Kausar Niazi (information minister) from hounding Meer in the press and denouncing him as a communist. Mubashir Hasan, the finance minister, was sent

away to be the party's secretary-general in place of Rahim. But he performed no function in that post because Bhutto assigned him none. He told me in April 1980 that his real work had been to edit, and write for, the weekly magazine section of the party newspaper, *Musawat*. By 1976 the balance of influence within the PPP had tilted heavily in favor of the conservatives as the provincial governments were placed under nawabs and landed aristocrats. The nawab of Bahawalpur came out of retirement to become governor of the Punjab and Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi became the chief minister. Dilawar Khanji, son of the former nawab of Junagadh, was appointed governor of Sind, and the former nawab of Qalat remained as governor of Baluchistan. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a great landlord, and Jam Ghulam Qadir, once the ruler of Lasbela, were the chief ministers, respectively, in Sind and Baluchistan. As another general election approached, landlords, opportunists, and self-seekers – the kind Malik Meraj Khalid had hoped to expel – flooded the party once again.

Bhutto's Role: An Interpretation

Bhutto knew of the corruption, factionalism, and violence in the PPP. The files in his secretariat revealed also that, from time to time, he commended civility and moderation to his associates. For instance, a note to Mumtaz Bhutto (May 20, 1973) regarding the Sind government's plan to import four hundred buses cautioned: "Please see that no hanky-panky takes place and that everything is done above board." Complaining to his finance minister about corruption in a government lending institution (July 3, 1973), he said: "The loans must go to genuine persons and the genuine persons must be the poor people." Many other notes on file contained the statement: "I will not tolerate this corruption." A letter from Senator Agha Ghulam Nabi Pathan (dated November 22, 1973) informed him that the party's involvement with ration depots, and the associated black marketing and smuggling, had lowered its standing so that most party workers could not face the public or do their political work. Noting that "for quite some time I have been receiving similar complaints," the prime minister circulated Pathan's letter to members of the central committee eliciting their views and suggestions.

Bhutto had likewise been aware of violence and gangsterism in the party. A note to Mumtaz Bhutto (December 27, 1972) referred to a report he had received of "utter lawlessness" and the "reign of terror" that gangsters patronized by the party had unleased in Shikarpur. A memo to Governor Khar (August 16, 1973) opened with the following observation: "Pistols to the right of us, pistols to the left of us, pistols all around us. This seems to be the motto of the party. For the most trivial of things pistols are drawn and flashed." The prime minister went on to say that the gangsters who did this sort of thing must feel they "have protection, because this was not their brave habit before we assumed office. How are we going to end if this becomes the order of the day?"

Why these suggestions, appeals, and gentle remonstrances? Were stronger measures not available? Like many other politicians, Bhutto probably believed that in his craft, as practiced in Pakistan, a certain amount of factionalism, graft, and arm-twisting were unavoidable. In addition, he did not fully control the government and the party. Even though his associates and lieutenants insisted that they respected his word as law, it was a "law" they often neglected to implement. His files contained many notes to ministers, provincial governors, and chief ministers, even civil servants, reminding them of things he had asked them to do and which they had not done. He urged them in the name of Pakistan's toiling masses; recalled the pledges made in the party's *Election Manifesto* and reminded them that "men of conscience" must be answerable to the electorate; and warned them of the consequences of the party's falling popularity.

But another perspective is also relevant. His exhortations did not have effect because he did not follow them in his own conduct. As we will see shortly, he was not averse to the use of violence against his own opponents. He may have tolerated corruption in the belief that it worked as a cement to keep men together in the party. He made no serious effort to eradicate factionalism; he may even have intensified it. Instead of valuing internal coherence, Bhutto was inclined to maintain a balance between contending factions within the party to create what he called a "Napoleonic order."[19] He placed opposites together. He must have known that Sheikh Rashid, a serious socialist, and Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a pragmatic pursuer and user of power,

could not work together as president and secretary-general, respectively, of the Punjab PPP. Again, when he made Malik Meraj Khalid, a moderate man who had come up from modest beginnings, president of the Punjab PPP, he appointed Nasir Rizvi, a landed aristocrat, as the secretary-general, and Taj Langah, a radical socialist, as his deputy. There was no way this team could pull together. Rizvi and Langah spoke of each other in most unflattering terms, and both thought of Meraj Khalid as a weakling.[20] These appointments assured only that issues would not be settled at the provincial level and would have to be submitted to Bhutto for resolution.

In a note to Mumtaz Bhutto, the prime minister explained his thinking on the difficult art of maintaining a balance between warring factions; in this case the Lunds and the Mehars in Sind.[21] Mumtaz Bhutto should consider which faction wielded more influence in its region and was, thus, more capable of helping or hurting the PPP and its government in Sind. He should also weigh the antecedents, associations, and basic loyalties of each faction as well as the price it demanded for its support. The prime minister went on to say that the Lunds were attached to the Talpurs, who were opposed to him. The Mehars were more influential and, in addition, they were in conflict with the Pir of Pagaro who was in opposition to Bhutto. The government of Sind would then be wise to "redress" the balance in favor of the Mehars.

All of this might be sensible. But it is clear that the balancing game can be played only if the political landscape is occupied by contending forces. If the overlord is given to playing this game, but if there are no warring factions to be balanced one against the other, he may want to create them so that the game can be played.

POLITICAL REPRESSION

The Bhutto regime showed itself capable of dealing sternly with dissidents and opponents. It suppressed groups of students and workers with a show of massive force and jailed their leaders. It shut down numerous newspapers and periodicals and arrested their editors. In other instances it penalized critical publications by reducing their access to newsprint and by denying them

government advertisements and those sponsored by public corporations. It disrupted the meetings of opposition politicians, visited physical violence upon some, and imprisoned many of them. Reference to some of these happenings was made earlier. A partial list of the more notable arrests appears below,[22] and a few cases of the harassment of opposition politicians or dissidents will be presented later.

Year	*Persons Arrested*	*Allegation/Remarks*
1972	S. U. Durrani (banker)	offensive to Bhutto during the Yahya regime
	Mahmood-ul-Haq Usmani, Nawab Muzaffar, Usman Kennedy (opposition politicians in Sind)	complicity in language riots
	Altaf Gauhar (editor of *Dawn*)	critical of Bhutto
	Bawar Khan, Usman Baluch, Habib-ur-Rahman, Tikka Khan, Shabbar Khan (labor leaders in Karachi)	inciting labor unrest
	Rang Ali Khokkar, Malik Ataullah, Mrs Khurshid Ahmad, Mohammad Nisar (labor leaders in the Punjab)	inciting labor unrest
	Javed Hashmi, Altaf Parvez, Ahmad Bilal (pro-Jamat-e-Islami student leaders in the Punjab);	inciting student unrest

	Ali Mukhtar Rizvi, Amir Hyder Kazmi (pro-NAP student leaders in Sind)	inciting student unrest
	Maulana Ehasan Ilahi Zaheer (religious leader)	preventive detention
	Jam Saqi, Lal Rind (Sind NAP leaders)	preventive detention
	Mukhtar Rana (PPP dissident)	incitement to murder
	Abdul Hamid Jatoi (PPP dissident, MNA from Sind)	abduction and suspicion of murder
	Sher Baz Mazari (opposition MNA from Dera Ghazi Khan)	gun-running
	Altaf Gauhar (editor of *Dawn*)	endangering national security
	Altaf Husain Qureshi, Ijaz Husain, Mujib-ur-Rahman Shami (pro-Jamat-e-Islami editors of *Zindagi* and *Urdu Digest*); Husain Naqi, Muzaffar Qadir (editors of *Punjab Punch*)	preventive detention
1973	Ghulam Jilani (retired major-general and NAP leader)	inciting armed revolt
	Baluchistan NAP Leaders: Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo,	inciting rebellion; charges against

	Khair Bakhsh Marri, Abdul Hayee Baluch (MNAs); Ataullah Mengal, Ahmad Nawaz Bugti (MPAs); Mohammad Aziz Kurd, Zamurrad Husain, Zulfikar Ali Jamote (senators); plus numerous pro-NAP student leaders in Baluchistan	Bizenjo included murder and robbery
	Khalifo Amin Fakir, Mir Mohammad Wassan, Mohammad Aqil (Sind MPAs)	attending a "seditious" meeting
	Ghulam Mustafa Owais (a sessions judge in Sind who granted bail to those arrested and five lawyers who often appeared for political prisoners)	preventive detention
	Mian Tufail Mohammad (Amir, Jamat-e-Islami)	preventive detention
	Malik Mohammad Qasim (secretary-general of a Pakistan Muslim League faction)	preventive detention
	150 NAP and Pakhtun Zalme workers	preventive detention
	Mohammad Salah-ud-Din (editor of *Jasarat,* Karachi)	preventive detention (critical editorials)
1974	Gul Khan Nasir (former minister in	already in jail, sentenced to five

	Baluchistan)	years of "rigorous" imprisonment for inciting a jail riot
	Meraj Mohammad Khan (former minister in Bhutto's cabinet and now an opponent)	preventive detention
1975	Abdul Wali Khan, Arbab Sikander, and numerous other NAP leaders from NWFP	treason
	Sardar Abdul Qayyum (former President of Azad Kashmir)	preventive detention

Some of the persons named above were subjected to physical torture and personal indignities. In a petition filed at the Lahore High Court, Ghulam Jilani alleged that he had been lodged in a filthy cell in the Lahore Fort, kept awake and interrogated for 36 hours, and denied medicine for his angina pains because he would not agree to testify that the arms seized in the Iraqi embassy in February 1973 were intended for the Pakhtun Zalme.[23] Mian Tufail Mohammad was said to have been assaulted in a Lahore jail. Malik Mohammad Qasim told the Lahore High Court that, while he was in a cell at a Lahore police station, two constables made him lie on his stomach, jumped on his legs and back, and injured his spine.[24] Abdul Wali Khan charged that four attempts on his life had been made, and that the Bhutto regime had instigated them. Abdul Sadiq Kansi, an opposition politician in Baluchistan, was killed in April 1972. Opposition leaders asserted that the PPP government had ordered the murder of Dr Nazir Ahmad, a Jamat-e-Islami leader in Dera Ghazi Khan, in June 1972 and that of Khwaja Mohammad Rafiq in Lahore in December. The assailant of Nazir Ahmad was arrested, but later released for lack of sufficient evidence, in spite of the fact that several witnesses had seen and identified him. The men who killed Kansi and Rafiq were never found. Ahmad Raza Kasuri, one of Bhutto's persistent and

more obnoxious critics, alleged that the prime minister had ordered him to be killed, and that while the attackers missed him when they fired at his car on the night between November 10 and 11, 1974, they killed his father, Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan. Needless to say, the Bhutto regime denied responsibility for any of these events.[25]

On the evening of November 12, 1973, the police arrested Chaudhry Zahur Ilahi, a veteran opposition MNA and a harsh critic of Prime Minister Bhutto. They took him to Baluchistan and detained him on a charge of aiding the Marri insurgents. He remained in jail until January 28, 1974, when the Supreme Court of Pakistan ordered his release. This was one of 27 cases in which Zahur Ilahi had been implicated; the charges against him included fraud, burglary, and cattle-lifting.[26]

The Soomro family in Sind was persecuted because Maula Bux (MNA) and Rahim Bux (MPA), who had won their seats in the 1970 election as independent candidates, would not join the PPP. Two textile mills and a 7-Up bottling plant in Shikarpur, belonging to the family, were forcibly closed down in June 1972, and some thirty friends and relatives of the Soomros faced prosecution on various charges. Rahim Bux and Maula Bux's son, Ilahi Bux, were charged with attempted murder (attacking a group of workers, none of whom was hurt).[27]

Sher Baz Mazari, an independent MNA from Dera Ghazi Khan, a friend of the NAP leaders, and a critic of Bhutto's anti-NAP moves in Baluchistan, rejected the regime's invitations for him to join the PPP, and even declined the prime minister's invitation to accompany him to the United States in September 1973. His chastisement was considered necessary. A nephew of his, Farhat Aziz, his estate manager and servants, and 47 persons belonging to his tribe were arrested. Some of them, in handcuffs, were made to walk the city streets while a "mob of gangsters" hurled insults at them. PPP workers encouraged his tenants to seize the harvested and standing crops on his lands. The police in distant Rahimyar Khan registered a case of armed robbery, involving a sum of 45 rupees (less than five dollars) against his son.[28]

Shah Mardan Shah, popularly known as the Pir of Pagaro, was one of the largest landlords in Sind and the spiritual guide (*pir*) of several hundred thousand fiercely loyal *hurs* (fighters for freedom). The Pir had never thought much of Bhutto; indeed,

his *murids* (followers) had disrupted Bhutto's meetings and may have been among those who fired at him and his party in Sanghar on March 31, 1970. His immense following made it much too risky to arrest him or to harm him physically. The regime adopted the strategy of harassing his associates and *murids* in the hope of weakening him by showing that he was incapable of protecting them.[29] In May 1973 Syed Zulfikar Ali Jamote, a senator, and Khalifo Amin Fakir, Mir Mohammad Wassan, and Mohammad Aqil (MPAs) – all supporters of the Pir – were arrested for attending a UDF meeting which the government called "seditious." More arrests were made in August when the UDF decided to launch a movement for the "restoration of democracy."

On October 5, 1973 Ali Bakhsh Junejo, a Pagaro *murid* who had defected to the PPP, was murdered, probably by the headman of a fishing village whom he had insulted earlier in the day. The administration imposed a curfew in Sanghar and arrested some four hundred persons, many of them Pagaro's *murids,* under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. The police raided Mir Wassan's house in Shahdadpur and arrested all members of his family, including women, that it could find. Eighty thousand pounds of cotton were allegedly carted away from his ginning factory, crops on his lands were destroyed, and his cattle were taken. Six of Pagaro's *murids* were brought to a police station and asked to confess not only to Junejo's murder but to a conspiracy to overthrow the government. They refused; two of them died under torture and the other four were carried to a lonely spot by the Mathrao canal and shot dead. The police later claimed that all of them had been killed while resisting arrest. Crops, cattle, and agricultural machinery belonging to Faiz Mohammad Rajar, another *murid,* were seized and his house was razed to the ground. A factory owned by Dhani Bakhsh Nizamani was shut down. Senator Jamote's lands were flooded and his crops destroyed. Khalifo Amin Fakir went to see Jam Sadiq Ali, a provincial minister, and then disappeared.

The Opposition Tactics

The opposition leaders, for their part, were no models of civility. They attempted to destabilize the Bhutto regime by making accusations calculated to bring it into public contempt and

hatred. A few examples of their denunciations of the prime minister follow.

At a press conference in Lahore on April 27, 1973, Asghar Khan called Prime Minister Bhutto "foolish, mentally sick, insane, thoroughly evil, a fascist and, above all, a goonda [gangster]." On other occasions he alleged that Bhutto had engineered the army action in East Pakistan to force it out of the union; that he had instigated the language riots in Sind; that he had invited the Ahmadis to attack the Muslim students at Rabwa; that he had created the Ahmadi issue to divert public attention from the rising prices and also to implement his secret agreements with India; that he saw all signs of life and movement in the country as threats to his rule; that he had rigged by-elections and closed all avenues of democratic action; that he intended to establish the "worst imaginable" fascist regime in Pakistan; that he had broken all his promises to God and man and cut the throat of each one of his benefactors; that he had given the nation nothing but poverty and despair; and that he not only drank liquor but bathed in it. Asghar Khan said also that he did not recognize the Bhutto regime as a legitimate government, and that he intended to organize a mass movement to oust it.[30]

Mian Tufail Mohammad (Jamat-e-Islami) asserted that Bhutto was among the persons upon whose advice Yahya Khan had ordered the Pakistani commander in Dacca to surrender; that he had requested the Indian government to keep the Pakistani POWs and thus prevent them from revealing his responsibility for the dismemberment of Pakistan; that he had been humiliating the Pakistan army for the purpose of weakening it; and that he meant to bring dishonor to the nation by recognizing Bangladesh.[31] Professor Ghafoor Ahmad and Maulana Maududi made similar statements.[32] But of the Jamat-e-Islami spokesmen Dr Nazir Ahmad was the most extravagant. In a speech at Rajanpur on May 27, 1972 – which he had earlier delivered at many other places – he stressed the following points:[33]

1. Bhutto and his friends drank and danced all night every night, and that one night of their licentiousness surpassed three years of Yahya Khan's drinking and womanizing;
2. Ayub Khan's authoritarianism, combined with Yahya Khan's corruption, and multiplied by one hundred, would still fall

short of Bhutto's tyranny and moral turpitude;
3. Bhutto should reform his wife and children before presuming to reform the society and the polity;
4. being an India-lover, Bhutto claimed that his family and that of Indira Ghandhi had been friends for three generations, but her family and the people of Pakistan had been enemies for the same period of time, which meant that Bhutto and Pakistan did not belong together;
5. Bhutto, more than anyone else, had been responsible for the ruin of Pakistan in 1971;
6. if Bhutto submitted to Mrs Ghandi's demands at Simla, he would not be allowed to return to Pakistan; he could then stay on in India and look after his father's property in Bombay to save which he had claimed Indian citizenship until 1958;
7. if and when a just government came to power in Pakistan, it would confiscate the properties of Bhutto and his ministers and use the proceeds to pay the civil servants whom he had dismissed arbitrarily;
8. he (Nazir Ahmad) would publish a detailed "charge sheet" against Bhutto in the first week of August 1972.

Chaudhry Zahur Ilahi was not to be left behind. Speaking at a UDF meeting in Hyderabad (Sind) on May 9, 1973, he held Bhutto responsible for the murders of Dr Nazir Ahmad and Khwaja Rafiq and called him "insane, cruel, shameless, honorless, a drunkard, and a plunderer."[34] Lesser politicians in the opposition referred to the modest social origins of Bhutto's mother and wondered aloud in their public meetings about the identify of his "real" father.

Interpretation

Bhutto did not personally order the repression and its specifics in each case, but there can be little doubt that he knew who was being suppressed and how. He did not put an end to it, and he must therefore bear the ultimate responsibility for it. He knew also that repression had a way of spreading. Public officials who broke the law to harass those who had displeased Bhutto did the same to their own opponents. The entire regime – Bhutto

and his ministers, the bureaucracy, the security forces, legislators, and party functionaries at all levels – became involved in repression. Thousands of tyrants filled the land.

The repression resulted partly from Bhutto's unwillingness to accept competitive politics; he could not, for instance, countenance the NAP as a party in power in NWFP and Baluchistan. But repression was a coin the other side of which showed opposition politicians who were excessive, even irresponsible, in their accusations. They condemned Bhutto's personal life, his family and antecedents, and his past associations more often than they criticized his policies. Some of their assertions were true, others were problematic, and still others were false. It was true, for instance, that he drank but untrue that "he danced all night every night" or that he bathed in liquor. Most opposition leaders knew that the origins of the civil war in Pakistan lay far and deep in the nation's historical experience, and even if they thought Bhutto had a role in the events that intensified the crisis, they could not have believed that he alone, or he more than anyone else, had been the "wrecker" of Pakistan. They had no basis for saying that he was an India-lover, that he had made secret agreements with Mrs Gandhi, or that he had encouraged the Ahmadis to attack the students from Multan at Rabwa. Some of these politicians were religious leaders, thought to be men of God, pious. Yet, they did not hesitate to make accusations which they knew to be infirm or even false. It would then seem to follow that neither the Bhutto regime nor its opponents honored democratic norms; they fought a lawless war.

Repression did not send the opposition politicians into hiding. They continued to make statements and hold meetings. Detentions were brief in most cases, and the politicians concerned resumed their condemnation of Bhutto after they were released. Repression did not make them more moderate or civil. In that sense, it failed. But consider now another element in the regime's response to the opposition. How would Bhutto's own followers feel about him as a ruler and as their leader if he did not punish the abuse Asghar Khan, Chaudhry Zahur Ilahi, Dr Nazir Ahmad and others heaped upon him? They might conclude that the accusations were true; but, more important, they would think Bhutto was "spineless," no longer the fighter, the "lion," he used to be, and therefore no longer deserving to be their

leader. The opposition's attacks and Bhutto's responses were linked with aspects of the Pakistani political culture. We should, however, add that Prime Minister Bhutto did not attempt to reform this culture, make it more civil and, thus, more compatible with democratic politics. He did not exercise moral leadership.

THE ELECTION OF 1977

On January 7, 1977 Prime Minister Bhutto announced that general elections would be held in March and assured the nation that these would be clean and fair. The President of Pakistan then dissolved the assemblies, and the Election Commission appointed March 7 and 10 as the polling dates, respectively, for elections to the National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies. On January 21 nine opposition parties came together in an electoral coalition, called the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), to oppose the PPP. The PNA launched a vigorous campaign and its public meetings drew large crowds. It seemed the contest would be lively, to say the least, and that the PPP would have to work hard to win.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was still popular, and many people thought he was the fittest person among the available politicians to "hold the reins of government," but his party was as sick with corruption and factional strife in 1976 as it had been during the preceding four years.[35] Bhutto's advisors told him that party workers were more despised than corrupt public officials, and that party leaders were ineffective and colorless.[36] Commenting on the state of the party in the Punjab, Rao Abdul Rashid – a police officer who worked as a "special secretary" in the prime minister's secretariat – reported that the chief minister, Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, was not much of a politician, had no mass following, and had alienated his cabinet colleagues and the PPP legislators, that the party lacked public speakers who could hold a crowd and sway the audience, and that neither the ministers nor the MPAs were thinking of the party and its interest.[37] Writing again in February 1977, Rao Rashid stated that the party notables who had failed to get the nomination ("ticket") for the coming election were ready to oppose the

party nominees, and that many of the latter believed it was now the provincial government's task to help them win.[38]

It is not surprising then that the PPP, as an organization, played only a peripheral role in the election. Its "parliamentary boards" did recommend candidates for the award of party tickets, but the prime minister made the actual selection, considering the assessments which district officers and intelligence agencies had submitted as to each aspirant's financial position, local standing, *biradri* connections, character and reputation. He tried to strike a balance between the old party faithful and the new entrants.[39]

That the party was in disarray is not to be taken to mean that its nominees were going to lose. Many of them would win because of their own individual standing, connections, and resources. Others might win because the voters did not like the PNA candidates. Some of the central and provincial ministers, whose corruption and high-handedness had angered constituents, would lose in a fair fight. Those with limited funds would need help. Prime Minister Bhutto, busy with his official duties, would not be free to campaign for party candidates on the scale he had done in 1970. His election managers would seem to have concluded that the party needed the administration's friendly intervention.

Putting together assessments of the PPP's electoral prospects, which the district officers and intelligence agencies submitted periodically, it appeared that the party could win between 95 and 120 of the 192 general seats in the National Assembly.[40] After gaining the allegiance of most of the eight tribal members and six minority representatives, whose custom it had been to side with the larger party, and after taking its share of the ten seats reserved for women, the party could have a comfortable, though not an overwhelming, majority in a house of 216. On March 4 – three days before the election – the Central Intelligence Bureau predicted that the PPP would easily win 55 of the 116 National Assembly seats in the Punjab,[41] and noted that it "should be able to win" 16 more seats from amongst those for which the contest was likely to be hard. Thus, the PPP might win as many as 71 National Assembly seats from the Punjab. After consulting his field officers, the chief secretary to the Punjab government provided a similar estimate: the PPP would win 70 seats.[42] But the actual results, as they came out on the

evening of March 7 and during the day on March 8, showed the PPP to have won 155 of the 192 general seats, including 108 of the 116 seats from the Punjab. This was a victory beyond all expectations. Rao Abdul Rashid recalls that its size startled, and then alarmed, Bhutto.[43]

The PNA alleged that the election had been rigged on a massive scale, rejected the results, boycotted the provincial assembly elections scheduled for March 10, and launched a mass movement to secure Prime Minister Bhutto's resignation and new elections under impartial auspices. General Zia-ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, overthrew the government on the morning of July 5, 1977 and dissolved the newly elected assemblies. Since the election thus became infructuous, we will omit discussion of the party manifestos and the campaign and instead examine the PNA's accusation.

The PNA's allegation, referred to above, meant that the Bhutto regime had resorted to all manner of malpractice – including corruption, coercion, violence, and fraud – to win its victory. There were indeed instances of bogus voting at numerous polling stations in Sind where the voter turnout had equaled, or even exceeded, the total number of registered voters.[44] Upon preliminary investigation the Election Commission found that the election in at least a half-dozen National Assembly constituencies in the Punjab had been rigged.[45] The PPP had won 15 seats unopposed in Sind, and of the remaining 28 seats the PNA won 11. In NWFP the PNA won more than twice as many seats as the PPP did, and in Baluchistan it did not contest. Its charge of rigging was then more pertinent to the PPP's lopsided victory in the Punjab.

The Zia-ul-Haq regime published a White Paper, consisting of 405 pages of text and 1032 pages of "documents," to establish that Prime Minister Bhutto had rigged the election. It includes photocopies of a few notes the prime minister sent to his associates and officials, many more notes and memoranda which the latter addressed to him, official reports, and miscellaneous material. It also includes statements of public servants, who had a role in the conduct of the election, which the martial law authorities obtained from them after Bhutto's ouster. These officials – some of them in jail and others under suspension or threat of dismissal – were pressured to implicate the prime minister in wrongdoing, but as we will see below, the pressure

did not work in all cases. The text in the White Paper is malevolent, and it should be ignored. The notes and memoranda addressed to the prime minister, and his notations on the margins, appear to be genuine. But selective faking cannot be ruled out, and the volume must therefore be approached with considerable caution.

The White Paper opens with an account of a master plan, called the "Larkana Plan," which Prime Minister Bhutto is alleged to have prepared in April 1976 as a model to be followed in all districts of the country. It would require the civil and police administration at all levels to monitor the election campaign in each constituency literally from day to day, mobilize the voters in favor of the PPP candidate, and deliver the vote for him on election day. In his rejoinder to the White Paper, written from his prison cell, Bhutto stated that a Sindhi politician had brought this plan to him, and that he signed and sent it along to his officials without even reading it.[46] The document is not written in Bhutto's own style, but even more important is the fact that it was never implemented. Rao Rashid claims, and so did some district officials, that they had never even heard of it.[47] The "Larkana Plan" may then be disregarded.

In some of the relevant particulars the election was undoubtedly rigged. First, several high-ranking civil servants assisted with planning and executing the ruling party's election strategy. Rao Rashid headed the election "cell" in the prime minister's secretariat. Correspondence with regard to party affairs and the election addressed to the prime minister passed through his secretary, Afzal Said Khan. Vaqar Ahmad, the cabinet secretary, took it upon himself to give advice on matters relating to the election. Nasim Ahmad, secretary to the ministry of information, guided the PPP's publicity campaign. Deputy commissioners and superintendents of police in the field submitted data on the demographic composition, families and clans, alliances and rivalries, likely candidates and their reputations in each constituency. The intelligence agencies assessed the relative strength and weakness of PPP candidates and suggested ways of maximizing the party's victories. One million rupees, taken from a "secret fund" in the ministry of information, were placed in a separate account and disbursed to party officials for helping the needy candidates.[48] Money out of the secret funds in the prime minister's secretariat and in the provincial governments

may also have been used to the ruling party's advantage. Buses, jeeps, and cars belonging to government departments, nationalized banks, and other public authorities were loaned to PPP candidates for their use during the election campaign. It is likely that district officers had a role in taking rival candidates out of the race in at least some of the 15 constituencies in Sind where the PPP nominees won unopposed.[49]

But were field officers in the districts – from the deputy commissioner down to the *naib tehsildar,* and from the police superintendent to the sub-inspector in charge of a local police station – asked to employ unlawful means to enhance the PPP's vote on election day? The "evidence" presented in the White Paper is problematic. Three provincial chief secretaries – Brigadier Muzaffar Ahmad in the Punjab, Syed Munir Hussain in NWFP, and Nasrum Minallah in Baluchistan – asserted in their statements to the martial law authorities that their political superiors had not asked them, and they did not ask any of their subordinates, to rig the election. Let us turn to the Punjab where the PPP's victory was amazingly large and where rigging may, therefore, have taken place more than in any other province. We consider below the statements of a few Punjabi field officers included in the White Paper.

Mohammad Asghar Khan, the deputy inspector general of police (DIG) in Multan at the time, asserts that, at a meeting concerning elections, the chief secretary named the PPP candidates who must be enabled to win "at all costs" and the opposition candidates who must be defeated. In another meeting the chief minister of the Punjab told the DIG that the prime minister would be "very annoyed" if the PPP lost both of the National Assembly seats in Multan city. Asghar Khan claims to have rebuffed the chief minister, saying that any interference by the administration would result in a disturbance of the public order. He goes on to say that the deputy commissioner and the police superintendent at the district headquarters had "obviously" agreed to rig the election for the regime. But a few paragraphs later in his statement he changes his mind and observes that "the police had hardly any role to play in rigging the election."[50]

Shortly before the election, Naved Asif, deputy commissioner of Lyallpur, met Fazal-e-Haq, the interior secretary in the central government, who said he heard Prime Minister Bhutto tell

the provincial chief ministers at a recent conference that they must not do anything on election day "which he may have to explain later on for five years." Addressing a group of civil servants on the subject of elections, the Punjab chief minister, on the other hand, observed that "he who has a conscience would have to put the same to sleep." In any case, Naved Asif did not receive instructions from his superiors "to ignore any flagrant violation of the law by the PPP candidates or their supporters," and in actual fact he did order the police to register cases against PPP notables and workers when they broke the law.[51]

Naved Asif notes that the PPP leaders in the area demanded the district administration's help with their election campaign, but they were told that none would be forthcoming. On the evening before the election day, Mian Ataullah, a federal minister and the PPP candidate for a National Assembly seat from Lyallpur city, visited the deputy commissioner to know if his plans for rigging the election were ready. He hurled "filthy abuse" at the officer, and threatened to "fix him up" after the election, when told that no such plans had been, or would be, made.[52] On election day Mian Ataullah's men confronted the PNA's supporters at a polling station, opened fire, and killed one person. They were arrested. The supporters of another PPP candidate, Malik Ghulam Nabi, beat up an official at a polling station in Sumandri, and a case was registered against them. This is not to say that the PPP candidates were stopped from doing anything illegal. Four of them organized mobile armed gangs that went to remote polling stations in the district, made a show of force, drove voters away, intimidated the polling staff, and put bogus votes in the ballot boxes. Naved Asif says he reported these incidents to his superiors; none asked him to overlook them; the divisional commissioner urged him to take prompt action against the culprits, and the chief secretary told him to do his duty under the law.

A quick reference may now be made to the statements of Syed Sarfraz Hussain and Syed Mohammad Baqir Ali, deputy commissioner and superintendent of police, respectively, in the district of Gujrat.[53] They say the chief secretary told them in January 1977 that "the prime minister does not want to win the election in a manner that he wins it in the country but loses it internationally."[54] In other words, the prime minister wanted

his party's victory to be credible. Sarfraz Hussain and Baqir Ali understood the chief secretary to mean that the PPP should not win more than 80 percent, or less than 60 percent, of the National Assembly seats. They allege that the divisional commissioner told them that the PPP candidates in the district "were to be supported at all costs," and that at a meeting in February 1977 he proposed that ballot boxes filled with favorable votes might be taken to polling stations where the PPP candidates were weak. Upon hearing the commissioner speak thus, they "got upset" and said "this will not be done." The commissioner then suggested that the PPP candidates might be given a free hand to assure their own success, and that the administration might leave their gangsters free to do their work. But the two officers decided not to get involved in the commissioner's wicked plan![55]

The police superintendent adds that the PPP candidates in the district were all well-connected, and the lower field staff were "at their beck and call." They themselves had arranged the rigging of polls, wherever it occurred, due to their hold on the local administration.[56] Naved Asif, the deputy commissioner of Lyallpur, made a similar observation that deserves to be quoted:

> Although there did not appear to be a central plan or directive for universally rigging the polls, some of the ministers and candidates appeared to have determined, on their own, to commit serious irregularities. Wherever they could overawe or persuade the administration to join them in this nefarious design they were able to [implement]it with ease. At other places, including Lyallpur, where the administration refused to succumb to their threats or pressures, they chose to bypass the administration and commit irregularities [anyway] . . . The logistical support available to the district administration was extremely inadequate . . . Each polling station had one or two regular and four or five irregular security persons . . . There were 1000 polling stations scattered all over the district. Once the polling staff and the security staff had been instructed and sent to their outposts, there was very little that officers at the headquarters could do to . . . ensure that they would or could do their duties according to their instructions.[57]

The testimony in the White Paper is inconclusive. Some district officers allege that their superiors had asked them to rig

the election, but that they did not do so. Others say that they were not even asked. The chief secretary to the Punjab government, the district officers in Gujrat, and the deputy commissioner of Lyallpur agree on one point: any rigging that did actually take place was done by the candidates themselves, and in this they were probably helped "by those local officials whose postings they had been able to arrange through the political channels."[58]

A word should not be said about this matter of postings. Beyond the civil and police officers and their role in the districts, to which reference has already been made, persons would be needed to conduct the actual voting, safeguard the ballot boxes, take them to the appropriate "returning officer," count the votes, and announce the results. Tens of thousands of polling stations and several hundred thousand officials were involved. Many of them were school and college teachers, middle-ranking officials in banks or public corporations, and government servants. The provincial government, with help from the district administration, prepared lists of persons available for election duty and sent them on to the Election Commission, which made the appointments. The prime minister's advisors wanted to ensure that persons with an anti-PPP bias were not appointed. His notations on their memoranda show that he shared their concern. But we can also see that the advisors wanted to do more than exclude "bias." In his notes on the subject Rao Abdul Rashid emphasized the need for "absolutely reliable and dependable" persons. In one of these notes – dated July 13, 1976 – he comes close to revealing his mind. Speaking of Baluchistan, he writes that *tehsildars* and *naib tehsildars* would play a vital role in the election. In selecting them for election duty, considerations of efficiency and honesty would have to be set aside. "Officers have to be found who are resourceful and who would be fully cooperative. In other words, who can deliver the goods."[59] The prime minister wrote nothing on the margin alongside this paragraph in Rao Rashid's note.

Interpretation

That the election held on March 7, 1977 was rigged to some degree is beyond question. But two aspects of the matter de-

serve further attention: the extent of rigging, and the measure of Prime Minister Bhutto's responsibility for it. It should first be noted that the PNA leaders, encouraged by the large and apparently enthusiastic crowds at their meetings, had seen fit to declare that the election would be deemed rigged if it did not produce a victory for them. Asghar Khan, the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal leader, got carried away: he not only predicted victory but vowed to hang Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the Kohala Bridge on the Jhelum River. Thus, even before the election was held, the PNA leaders had determined to allege rigging in case they did not win. The Zia-ul-Haq regime subsequently charged that more than a hundred contests had been rigged. But this statement can be dismissed as a gross and self-serving exaggeration. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, deputy chief of the Jamat-e-Islami and a prominent PNA leader, has recently stated that the PPP would have won a "clear majority" in a fair election.[60] Many observers at the time, including this writer, expected the PPP to win approximately 120 seats. The assessment provided by the Central Intelligence Bureau on March 4 showed the PPP as a likely winner in 99 constituencies and as a possible winner in another 23. If we prefer to be cautious and allow the PPP victory in no more than one half of the 23 hard contests, it would still end up with 110 seats nationwide. The PPP was declared to have won 155 seats; we may then say that the election in perhaps as many as 45 constituencies was rigged. In a conversation with Prime Minister Bhutto shortly after the election, his finance minister, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, placed the number of such constituencies somewhere between 30 and 40.[61]

In his rejoinder to the White Paper, referred to earlier, Bhutto said that he had not rigged the election, and that he could not be held responsible for the statements and actions of other persons. This is true, but only in a manner of speaking. He had assigned certain civil servants and government agencies roles and responsibilities connected with the election. He authorized the disbursement of monies out of the government's "secret funds" to the PPP. It follows that in these particulars he did, personally and directly, commit malpractice. He may not have ordered the detention of opposition candidates to prevent them from filing their nomination papers, but he knew of these happenings and did not move to stop them. At the same time, there is no evidence anywhere in the White Paper to show that

he ordered the use of violence or resort to fraud at polling stations.

Prime Minister Bhutto did say on several occasions that the election must be honest and fair. But rigging was in the air, so to speak, and many candidates, even civil servants, assumed that malpractices would be allowed. If public officials could be asked – as they had been under all regimes – to fabricate false criminal cases against the government's political adversaries, they would surely be expected to overlook bogus voting to assure the regime's victory in an election. The prime minister had a part in encouraging this frame of mind. The district administration in his home town, Larkana, arrested his opponent, Jan Mohammad Abbasi, on January 18, 1977 and kept him at an undisclosed location until after the date for filing nomination papers (January 19) had passed. The prime minister was, thus, declared to have been elected unopposed. He could have intervened to allow Abbasi an opportunity to file his papers. But he did not do so and, by all accounts, this was a blunder. He was immensely popular in Larkana, and his victory was certain. Had he come to Abbasi's rescue, his own standing and credibility would have been enhanced. Following his example, each one of the four provincial chief ministers secured his unopposed election to the provincial assembly. These developments strengthened the belief among PPP candidates, and the fear in other quarters, that the election could, and would, be rigged.

A final consideration may now be noted. The several hundred thousand polling staff were essentially local people. Some of them were related to one or another candidate by ties of family, clan, caste, sect, or neighborhood. The government agencies simply did not have the capacity to undertake a screening so thorough as to assure that only "neutral" or pro-PPP persons would be appointed to election duty. Inevitably persons siding with the opposition were included. Moreover, the polling staff, and even the bureaucracy, partook of the polarization existing in the larger society. Many of them liked Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and may have wanted to help the candidate he had nominated. But many despised him and did what they could to deny his nominee any unfair advantage. There was rigging, yes, but not as much as the PNA alleged. Nor is the probability to be overlooked that the PNA also resorted to malpractices where it

could, notably in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad in Sind and in the districts of NWFP.

THE FALL OF ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO

On March 12, 1977 the PNA council resolved to launch a mass movement to secure Prime Minister Bhutto's resignation, dismissal of the newly elected assemblies, and new elections under the supervision of the judiciary and the army. Thousands of city-dwellers – spirited, determined and incensed by the news of electoral fraud – answered the PNA's call. Neither the police lathi-charges and tear gas, nor even the imposition of martial law in the cities of Lahore, Hyderabad, and Karachi, could subdue the agitation thus begun. In April it spread to smaller towns and, by the time the PNA called it off in the first week of June, several hundred persons had been killed, many more injured, and tens of thousands jailed. Property worth hundreds of millions of rupees was destroyed, and business slumped.

In a speech in the National Assembly on April 28, Prime Minister Bhutto asserted that agencies of the United States government, presumably the CIA and the American embassy in Islamabad, had instigated and funded the PNA movement. In a subsequent statement he alleged that a "foreign power," meaning the United States, had recruited Mian Tufail Mohammad (head of the Jamat-e-Islami) and General Zia-ul-Haq (chief of staff of the Pakistan army) in a conspiracy to overthrow his government. They agreed that, in the event of losing the election, the PNA would accuse Bhutto of rigging it and launch a protest movement; Zia-ul-Haq would seize the government at an appropriate moment and remove Bhutto from the PNA's path; and the succeeding regime would abandon Bhutto's project of acquiring a nuclear reprocessing plant for Pakistan. Toward these ends, American agents paid Mian Tufail Mohammad 250 million rupees in February and 50 million rupees in May 1972. Bhutto implied that Zia-ul-Haq, too, had received a consideration for doing his part. Mian Tufail Mohammad disbursed some of this money to the heads of other parties in the PNA without giving them a full account of his bargain with the Americans. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq did not tell the other generals all he knew.[62]

Bhutto wrote that, after taking power and upon the urging of Mian Tufail Mohammad, Zia-ul-Haq destroyed the evidence of American involvement which his government had collected and which Aziz Ahmad had presented to Cyrus Vance, the American secretary of state, when the two men met in Paris in May 1977. He was, therefore, not able to substantiate his charge.

Known cases of American intervention in the domestic politics of other states are far too numerous and frequent for us to dismiss Bhutto's allegation as simply false. But what shall we infer from it? Bhutto's friends would say – as some of them have said to me repeatedly – that without American help the PNA movement would not have gathered the force it did, that the government would have defeated it easily, and that all would then have been well for Bhutto and his regime. Given the fact of American involvement, nothing that he said or did mattered, because Zia-ul-Haq had to keep his end of the bargain.

These inferences are infirm. It should first be noted that powerful, even irresistible, mass movements have been launched in Pakistan without American instigation or funding. There was, for instance, the anti-Ahmadi movement in 1952/3, and the anti-Ayub Khan movement in 1968/9. We cannot therefore assume that without American support the PNA movement would have failed. Second, we cannot accept the proposition that the American involvement had made Bhutto helpless. We will argue below that he could have thwarted Zia-ul-Haq had he acted more expeditiously in making a settlement with the PNA. Third, as we will see later, the Jamat-e-Islami spokesmen in the PNA were not the ones who favored a military coup to oust the Bhutto regime. In any case, Prime Minister Bhutto confronted a crisis that involved his own political survival, and it is incumbent upon us to examine his response.

The Bhutto regime answered the PNA's challenge with the proverbial carrot in one hand and stick in the other. In a radio and television address on March 12 the prime minister denounced the PNA leaders, called their allegation false, but invited them to talks nevertheless. The PNA took the position that it would talk with him only if he first accepted its demands, including the one for his resignation.[63] On March 25, the government arrested the top PNA leaders, including Mufti Mahmood, its president.

The door to negotiations remained shut during most of

April, but other noteworthy developments took place: four members of the National Assembly and six members of the Punjab provincial assembly, elected on the PPP ticket, resigned their seats; Dr Mubashir Hasan walked away from his post as the party's secretary-general; Khurshid Hasan Meer, a former federal minister, and Taj Langah, once the deputy secretary-general of the party in the Punjab, supported the demand for new elections. Seven PPP members of the National Assembly met Bhutto on April 16 to urge a new election. These desertions made the prime minister appear weakened.

While the top, and even the second-ranking, PNA leaders were in jail, their movement came to be guided by the imams in mosques and other spokesmen of the Islamic establishment, who added a demand for Islamizing the society to the PNA's cluster of demands relating to the elections. On April 17 the prime minister, in an attempt to dislodge them from their ground, banned drinking and gambling, shut down night-clubs and racecourses, and reconstituted the Islamic Advisory Council with the mandate to propose measures for Islamizing the country's laws within six months. But the mass movement against his regime would not stop.

On May 18 Bhutto visited Mufti Mahmood at the Sihala "rest" house (a jail for dignitaries near Rawalpindi), reiterated his willingness to hold a new election, and once again invited the PNA to talks. Negotiations began on June 3. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada and Maulana Kausar Nizai, both of them federal ministers, assisted Bhutto, while Maulana Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad spoke for the PNA. The meetings took place in the cabinet room of the prime minister's secretariat, more often in the evening, and proceeded in a pleasant environment. Each time the PNA spokesmen arrived at the secretariat, the prime minister came out and greeted them at the steps of the main building. On a few occasions, at least, he entertained them to a meal and ordered special desserts for Mufti Mahmood who was known to have a weakness for them. As one might expect, progress was rapid at some meetings, slow at others. There were times when the two sides appeared deadlocked, and Bhutto broke spells of awkward silence by engaging the Mufti in light chit-chat. Bargaining was not hard; the PNA representatives had withdrawn their demand for Bhutto's resignation, and while they were

firm on most other issues, they yielded on matters of detail. The prime minister was conciliatory.

A word now to introduce the actors, beyond the conference table, who influenced the negotiations and their outcome. The PNA spokesmen at the table were not plenipotentiaries; any agreement they negotiated required the *unanimous* approval of the PNA council which consisted of two representatives for each of its nine constituent parties. Four of them did not really desire an agreement with the government and preferred that the army ousted Bhutto, took over the government, and then held an election. They were Asghar Khan (Tehrik-e-Istaqlal), Sher Baz Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali Khan (National Democratic Party), and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (Jamiat-al-Ulema-e-Pakistan). Asghar Khan tried, more than once, to assure the PNA council that the army would hold new elections within 90 days of taking power. It is noteworthy that, as early as May 4, 1977, he had addressed a message to the armed forces in which he invited them to mutiny. The Bhutto regime, he said, was illegal, and it was not their duty to support it or to kill their own people to save it.

> As men of honor [it is for you] to do your duty and the call of duty in these trying circumstances is not blind obedience to unlawful commands. There comes a time in the lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you that time has come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan.[64]

Prime Minister Bhutto also had a part – unwittingly, of course – in encouraging the idea of military intervention. He involved the generals in devising his responses to the PNA agitation, discussed the political situation with them as it developed from one week to the next, invited them to cabinet meetings, kept them posted on the progress of his negotiations with the PNA, and solicited their reactions to its proposals. Twice in these meetings the possibility of a military coup was mentioned: on May 31 Kausar Niazi referred to it as one of the possible ways of ending the current crisis; on June 14 Bhutto lectured to the generals on the unwisdom of a coup, making the rather unconvincing argument that rulership was "no bed of roses." On both occasions General Zia-ul-Haq stood up, pledged loyalty to

the prime minister, and assured him that he and his colleagues had no thought of taking power.[65] In April Zia-ul-Haq had advised the imposition of martial law in certain cities, but in May his corps commanders said the army should not be asked to shoot down its own people. They professed to be praying for the success of the prime minister's negotiations with the PNA. But, at the same time, they erected a barrier to that success: they vetoed two of the PNA's critical demands, namely, the army's return to the barracks in Baluchistan, and the disbandment of a special tribunal that was trying Abdul Wali Khan and the other NAP leaders in Hyderabad jail. Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Sher Baz Mazari were not likely to accept an agreement that did not meet these two conditions, and the generals knew it.

Some of Bhutto's ministers and party notables opposed a settlement on the PNA's terms. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada acted the part of a tough negotiator. In his advice to the prime minister, he exaggerated the latter's support within the army and among the masses, understated the PNA's influence, and berated its motives and credentials. The ministers who had won the last election by rigging it, and who feared an honest one, voted against concessions to the PNA. Still others wished to appear as intensely loyal to Bhutto and, therefore, wholly unyielding to his enemies.

We now turn to the substance of the negotiations. At their ninth meeting on June 15 the two sides reached agreement on all basic issues – new elections and the dates on which these would be held, a new election commission with enhanced authority, release of political prisoners, and the establishment of an "Implementation Council" to supervise the proposed elections. Ghafoor Ahmad and Pirzada were asked to fill in the details. Then without prior notice to the PNA, the prime minister proceeded on a quick tour of the neighboring Muslim countries on June 17. In his absence Pirzada and Ghafoor Ahmad made no progress in their mission, because they could not work together. The PNA team now prepared a revised draft agreement, including additional specifics about the constitutional status, composition, authority and powers of the Implementation Council, and presented it to Bhutto upon his return to Pakistan on June 23. At their eleventh meeting on June 25 the two teams examined each clause in this revised draft. The

prime minister accepted most of it, suggested minor changes of a scheduling nature, proposed to postpone consideration of a few items, and asked that the Implementation Council limit itself to matters relevant to the holding of new elections.

Instead of picking up the thread of negotiations where it had been left on June 25, the PNA prepared still another, and this time "final," draft. The council approved it on June 27 and authorized Mufti Mahmood to sign an accord with the prime minister if he accepted the draft as submitted. But it insisted that any changes he might suggest, howsoever inconsequential, must be brought back to the council. The presentation of this draft as an "ultimatum" caused the government some irritation, but Mufti Mahmood and Bhutto were able to overcome it in talks on June 29.

The two sides began their twelfth negotiating session at eight o'clock in the evening of July 1, and when they rose at 6.30 the next morning – ten and a half hours later – they had reached agreement on all issues, large and small. Both sides made concessions and, as a result, the PNA's "final" draft had undergone some change. We present the more important provisions of this agreement below to have a measure of the concessions Bhutto made to his opponents:[66]

1. the assemblies elected on March 7 and 10, 1977 would be dissolved on July 15, new elections to the National and provincial assemblies would be held on October 8 and 10, respectively, and "President's rule" would prevail in the provinces until then;
2. an Implementation Council, composed equally of the government and PNA representatives, chaired by the prime minister, and by Mufti Mahmood in his absence, would assure the holding of free and fair elections, and to this end:
   (a) it would exercise the powers of the president of Pakistan and those of the federal government in relation to the provincial governors and administrations;
   (b) it could proceed against government officials accused or suspected of obstructing the holding of free and fair elections;
   (c) it would approve appointments to all key posts in the central and provincial administrations;

(d) no law, ordinance, or regulation relating to elections, or to the work of the Council, would be made without its prior authorization;
(e) in case of disagreement between the government and PNA representatives in the Council, the issue would be referred to the Supreme Court which must settle it within 72 hours;
(f) the prime minister would secure the implementation of the Council's decisions;

3. new provincial governors would be appointed with the PNA's approval;
4. the government would lift the ongoing state of emergency, restore fundamental rights, release all political prisoners, and disband all special tribunals except the one trying the NAP leaders in Hyderabad jail;
5. the chairman and members of a new Election Commission would be named with the PNA's approval, and the Commission would have the administrative and financial authority necessary for holding fair elections, including the authority to summon the armed forces for assistance;
6. the army would cease its operations in Baluchistan within 45 days of the signing of this accord;
7. all amendments to the constitution of 1973 which had the effect of limiting the rights of citizens or the authority of judges would be repealed;
8. the government would secure the passage of laws necessary for putting this accord into effect.

The PNA council had decided not to insist upon the dissolution of the Hyderabad tribunal, and its negotiators withdrew the demand for a temporary constitutional amendment that would protect the Implementation Council from legal challenges to its existence and authority. It is clear that the prime minister made far-reaching and, in some instances, even radical concessions. In agreeing to the Implementation Council the PNA wanted, he accepted an authority that would override him and his cabinet.

This agreement needed the PNA council's approval. Its negotiators had believed that the changes in their "final" draft, which they had accepted, were minor, and that the council would not hesitate to approve them. In the words of Ghafoor

Ahmad, this was "a comprehensive and an exemplary accord which two rival parties had concluded through negotiations in the best interest of the nation."[67] But when the council met in the evening of July 2, Asghar Khan, Sher Baz Mazari, and Begum Nasim Wali Khan condemned the negotiators for entertaining Bhutto's proposed changes. After further discussion, and consultation with its legal advisors, the council produced nine additional "points" with the instruction to Mufti Mahmood to sign the accord if the prime minister accepted them. The more important of these points were as follows:[68]

1. the Implementation Council must have constitutional protection;
2. provincial governors would not be changed without the PNA's consent;
3. the Federal Security Force would be placed under the authority of the army general headquarters (GHQ) – and not under the ministry of defence as Bhutto had wanted;
4. special tribunals would follow the ordinary courtroom procedure;
5. the president of Pakistan must sign and promulgate any ordinances the Implementation Council might send him to remove such difficulties as had arisen in the way of its mission.

The PNA spokesmen took these "points" to Prime Minister Bhutto at 10.00 p.m. on July 3. They said they regretted having to introduce new material at this stage but, as he knew, their acceptance of his changes in their draft had been contingent upon their council's approval, and that its approval now depended upon his acceptance of the demands they had brought. Mufti Mahmood and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan argued that their new points, being essentially of a technical nature, did not materially affect the accord they had reached the day before. That was not entirely true, for the demand regarding special tribunals (no. 4 above) would in effect disestablish the Hyderabad tribunal, which was something the generals still opposed. According to Kausar Niazi, the Mufti and the Nawabzada reported also that some members of their council were expecting the generals to intervene and impose martial law. Bhutto consulted his team in an adjoining room; Niazi

favored acceptance, but Pirzada insisted that the talk of military intervention was a mere bluff, that the generals were loyal to the prime minister, and that the PNA should be made to bend. Bhutto then told Mufti Mahmood that he needed more time to respond. Upon hearing this the three PNA representatives, visibly anguished, left.[69]

The dominant view at a cabinet meeting later the same evening opposed further concessions to the PNA. General Zia-ul-Haq, who was also present, stood up once again, both hands on his chest, to assure the prime minister of his "complete support," adding: "please rely on us, we are your strong arm."[70] Bhutto then told newsmen that the PNA had gone back on the agreement it had made, presented new demands, and that he would now have to consult his associates. The newspapers on July 4 carried the report that the government and the PNA had once again reached an impasse.

Prime Minister Bhutto held his last cabinet meeting on the evening of Monday, July 4, 1977. The minutes of this meeting show that he had had second thoughts during the day. He observed that continuing conflict with the PNA would damage the country's stability and international standing. If the PNA revived its agitation, and even if the government were able to control it, negotiations with its leaders would have to be held again. A mere restoration of "law and order would not solve the problem." The armed forces had stood by the government, he said, but "they would be put to a severe strain" in case of another agitation.[71] Kausar Niazi recalls that, when the cabinet rose, Zia-ul-Haq had a private meeting with the prime minister, after which the general left hurriedly, unsmiling.

It appears that on the evening of July 4 the prime minister, apprehensive of a military coup, was ready to make a settlement with the PNA. He consulted further with Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (the chief minister of Sind), and Mumtaz Bhutto. Pirzada still opposed concessions to the PNA, but Jatoi and Mumtaz Bhutto counseled acceptance of its latest demands. At a press conference at 11.30 p.m. Prime Minister Bhutto announced his intention to accept the PNA's terms, saying: "The PNA negotiating team had brought in ten new points; they did so apologetically, saying they were helpless; perhaps they were; but I am not helpless, and so I shall sign the accord tomorrow."[72] But before the "tomorrow" of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's

declared intention could dawn, General Zia-ul-Haq had struck and overthrown him.

Interpretation

Elections in Pakistan had been rigged before, notably the presidential election in 1965 and the provincial assembly elections in the early 1950s, but rigging in these instances did not arouse the mass anger it did in 1977. The people of Pakistan were evidently not of the same mind now as they were in those earlier periods. Bhutto himself had changed them; polarized them. Those who disapproved of him did so with a passion. Perceiving his party's victory as dishonest, they determined to undo it. His supporters, on the other hand, had become the "silent majority." The party that might have mobilized them on his behalf lacked the organizational capacity for undertaking such a task. In June 1977, when Bhutto asked Ghulam Hussain, the PPP secretary-general, to call party conventions, presumably to make a show of strength, the one held in Multan disintegrated as rival factions threw furniture at one another.[73] The cardinal fact about Bhutto's negotiations with the PNA, then, is that he bargained from a position of political weakness and the relevant forces in the country, including the generals, knew this to be the case. He, too, understood that his hold on power had become precarious, which is why he made the far-reaching concessions to the PNA referred to above.

General Zia-ul-Haq knew that Prime Minister Bhutto was about to make a settlement with the PNA.[74] Yet he moved to forestall it. Why? An obvious explanation may be that at this point he simply did not want the government–PNA negotiations to succeed. He saw that Bhutto had weakened. His own arrangements were all made, and the call to power, which had been ringing loud and insistent in his ear, had now become irresistible. But the preparations for a coup are not made in a day. It is probable that Zia-ul-Haq had resolved to oust Bhutto as early as April 1977, when he and his corps commanders advised the imposition of martial law in Lahore, Hyderabad, and Karachi – if not even earlier. The general was not only a "pious" man in terms of traditional Islamic observances, he was favorably disposed toward the Jamat-e-Islami. Bhutto was known to be "sinful," and his regime had not only persecuted but

insulted the Jamat-e-Islami leaders. It stands to reason, then, that Zia-ul-Haq did not regard Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a fit ruler for Muslim Pakistan. His remarkable capacity for duplicity kept his disapproval of the prime minister, and his own design, hidden.

But had Bhutto promptly settled matters with the PNA, Zia-ul-Haq might not have found the opportunity to execute his plans. Was he tardy? No regime in Pakistan, or perhaps even elsewhere, submits to an agitation as soon as it begins. Its first impulse is to exhaust or suppress the agitators. Bhutto should have known from his own experience with the mass movement which overthrew Ayub Khan that concessions can come too late to save a regime. A move toward negotiations with the PNA had been made by the end of April. Its demand for Bhutto's resignation was admittedly irritating. But if instead of wielding the stick once again – sending the PNA leaders back to jail – he had offered to hold new elections under credible safeguards, the PNA would probably have withdrawn this demand as, indeed, it later did.

Bhutto was unusually forthcoming once he sat down with the PNA spokesmen at the conference table. But he was late in arriving there – having wasted the entire month of May – and he allowed a week in June to be frittered away after the negotiations had begun to move forward. He did sense a threat to his political survival but, deceived by Zia-ul-Haq's repeated professions of loyalty, he did not realize how imminent it was. He thought he had the time for a little more of the traditional diplomacy. This was a miscalculation, but in saying this we do, of course, have the advantage of hindsight.

It is difficult to understand how Asghar Khan, Sher Baz Mazari, and Begum Nasim Wali Khan were persuaded that the army would seize power only to let the PNA have it. One could say they were simply naive, or that their hatred of Bhutto had blinded them. But in an important respect their inclination was similar to Bhutto's. Instead of employing political means to deal with his opponents, the prime minister had increasingly relied upon the bureaucracy and the security forces to counter them. He found that to be easier. The PNA "hardliners" were doing the same: they looked to the army to remove their formidable foe from the scene and clear their road to power for them. They, too, wanted to avoid the toil involved in securing

the political gains they coveted. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto paid for neglecting his craft – which was "politics of the people" – first by losing his office and then his life. The PNA leaders, including Asghar Khan and his friends, had to endure oblivion, some of it in prison, for the next eight years while Zia-ul-Haq ruled Pakistan under martial law. The nation suffered political decay.

NOTES

1. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 27.
2. *Outlook,* August 19, 1972, 1972, p. 4.
3. Ibid., May 19, 1973, pp. 4–5.
4. See reports in *Pakistan Times,* January 16, 30 and 31, 1974; also see reports in *Outlook,* July 22, 1972 and January 5, 1974.
5. *Pakistan Times,* January 25, 1974.
6. *Outlook,* January 5, 1974, p. 4.
7. My interview with Prime Minister Bhutto on December 5, 1973.
8. See "Opinion" in the issues of May 11 and June 8, 1974.
9. See Malik Meraj Khalid's statements in *Pakistan Times,* May 30 and 31, 1974. During my interview with him on August 18, 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto agreed that the PPP was in a shambles. He thought this was because the party had come to power "too soon." But he also blamed it on the passivity and lethargy of J. A. Rahim, the PPP secretary-general.
10. Some PPP leaders emphasized to me that the talk of Bhutto's neglect of the *party* was misconceived because the PPP, which started out as a movement, had never been made into a party. They were: Dr Mubashir Hasan (interview on July 27, 1980), Maulana Kausar Niazi (interview on August 18, 1974), and Nasir Rizvi (interview on August 2, 1974). Rizvi observed that in 1970 the PPP was a "craze" called Bhutto: it was then– and it remained – a "one-man show," with the result that in 1974 Bhutto was "a general without any army."
11. Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and Two," in Lawrence Ziring *et al.* (eds) *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 91–110.
12. *Jung* (Urdu), May 15 and 22, 1972.
13. In the interview cited in note 10 above, Nasir Rizvi attributed Khar's political repression to his feudal ethos. In an interview on August 20, 1974 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who succeeded Mumtaz Bhutto as the chief minister of Sind, observed to me that Mumtaz followed the Kalabagh model of repressive rule because it suited his personal inclinations. Yousaf Hasan, a PPP ward leader in the Korangi-Landhi area of Karachi, stated to me that the PPP government's use of the police and gangsters

to deal with its political opponents had lowered the party in public esteem (interview on January 25, 1974).

14. The following account of Khar's activities is based on a reading of the *Pakistan Times* for the month of May 1974.
15. *Pakistan Times,* January 17 and 27, 1974; *Nawa-e-Waqt,* January 17, 1974.
16. *Nawa-e-Waqt,* May 23 and 28, and June 17, 1974.
17. Ibid., July 3, 1974.
18. Ibid., May 23, 1974.
19. Bhutto's interview with a correspondent of *Le Monde* reported in the overseas weekly *Dawn,* October 26, 1975.
20. My interviews with Langah and Rizvi on August 1 and 2, 1974, respectively. In my interview with him on August 18, 1974 Prime Minister Bhutto confirmed that these appointments were designed to balance contending elements within the party.
21. Note dated August 16, 1973 in the prime minister's files.
22. This list has been compiled from the following sources: *Outlook,* December 16, 1972, March 24, August 25 and September 1, 1973; *Zindagi,* October 14, 1972 and March 11, 1973; *Jung,* May 6 and 22, 1972; *Pakistan Times,* January 22 and 28, June 1, 1974, and January 7, 1975.
23. *Outlook,* March 24, 1973, p. 5.
24. *Zindagi,* October 22, 1973, p. 19.
25. The Zia-ul-Haq regime, which took power after overthrowing Bhutto in July 1977, prosecuted, convicted, and executed him for complicity in this murder. But many observers believe that the trial of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was unfair, and that his conviction and execution were politically motivated. This is an exceedingly complex issue and we cannot examine it in this work. For accounts of Dr Nazir Ahmad's murder and related matters, see *Outlook,* June 17, 1972, p. 5; and Mukhtar Hasan's report in *Zindagi,* June 26, 1972, pp. 11–13.
26. Yusuf Lodi, "The Strange Case of Chaudhry Zahur Ilahi," *Outlook,* February 2, 1974.
27. Ibid., July 1, 1972, pp. 7–8.
28. Ibid., November 3, 1973, pp. 5–6
29. Accounts of the Bhutto regime's harassment of Pagaro and his followers may be seen in *Zindagi,* September 21, 1972, p. 4; October 22, 1973, pp. 7–10; and M. H. Shah, "Sanghar: A Study in Tyranny," *Outlook,* June 22, 1974, p. 6.
30. *Nawa-e-Waqt,* January 21, June 8 and 15, 1974; *Zindagi,* May 27, 1973, p. 17.
31. *Zindagi,* December 17, 1972.
32. Ibid., March 11 and April 29, 1973.
33. Ibid., July 31, 1972. This entire issue was devoted to Dr Nazir Ahmad.
34. Ibid., April 29, 1973, pp. 27–32 and May 15, 1973, p. 21.
35. Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977* (Rawalpindi, July 1978), Rao Rashid's secret note to the prime minister dated July 29, 1976, pp. A (Annexures) 212–16; also see the results of a secret poll conducted by the Central Intelligence Bureau at pp. A207–11.
36. Ali Mohammad Rashdi's note to the prime minister and Rao Rashid's

note dated June 25, 1976 in the *White Paper,* pp. A25, A203.

37. Rao Rashid's note to the prime minister dated May 4, 1976 in the *White Paper,* pp. A473–4. In an interview on January 11, 1974, Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, who was governor of the Punjab at the time, admitted to me that he was not much of a politician.
38. Rao Rashid's note to the prime minister dated February 1, 1977 in the *White Paper,* p. A502.
39. Prime Minister Bhutto's notations on Rao Rashid's note of May 4, 1976 and his notes dated October 21 and November 13, 1976 in the *White Paper,* pp. A470–2, and pp. A570–1.
40. See the Intelligence Bureau's estimates dated February 19 and March 4, 1977 (and one undated) in the *White Paper,* pp. A517, 574, 578–81, and a detailed analysis for each constituency at pp. A584–633.
41. *White Paper,* p. A517.
42. Statement of the Punjab chief secretary to the martial law authorities in the *White Paper,* p. A762.
43. Rao Abdul Rashid, *Jo Main ne Dekha* (That Which I Saw), Urdu (Lahore: Atishfashan Publications, 1985), pp. 224–5.
44. I. H. Burney, "The March 1977 Elections: An Analysis," *Pakistan Economist,* July 23, 1977, pp. 13–22.
45. Ibid., p. 18.
46. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 69–70.
47. Rao Abdul Rashid, *That Which I Saw,* p. 226.
48. See the correspondence between Afzal Said Khan (prime minister's secretary) and Nasim Ahmad (information secretary) in the *White Paper,* pp. A327–30.
49. See the statement of Mohammad Khan Junejo (home secretary of Sind) in the *White Paper,* pp. A255–6.
50. *White Paper,* pp. A901–3, 907, 909.
51. Ibid., pp. A913, 915–16.
52. Ibid., p. A920.
53. The statements of these two officers appear in the *White Paper* at pp. A785–91, 792–6.
54. Syed Sarfraz Hussain's statement in the *White Paper,* p. A787.
55. *White Paper,* pp. A788–9, 793–4.
56. Ibid., p. A795.
57. Ibid., p. A924.
58. See the Punjab chief secretary's statement in the *White Paper,* p. A762.
59. Rao Rashid's note to the prime minister in the *White Paper,* pp. A267–8.
60. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Phir Marshal La Aa Gaya* (Then Came the Martial Law), Urdu (Lahore: Jung Publishers, 1988), pp. 95, 100–1.
61. Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line Kut Gayee* (And the Telephone Line Was Cut), Urdu (Lahore: Jung Publishers, 1987), p. 41.
62. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated,* ch. 11.
63. The facts in the account below – dates, places, and the substance of talks – have been taken from two detailed and substantially similar versions of the negotiations between the government and the PNA, covering each meeting, that have appeared recently. Kausar Niazi, who assisted Prime

Minister Bhutto at the conference table, has published *Aur Line Kut Gayee* (referred to in the note above), and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, who was one of the three PNA negotiators, wrote *Phir Marshal La Aa Gaya* (cited in note 60 above). Reference to page numbers in these works will be made only where the context makes it essential. I have dated every important event so that accounts of it can be seen in Pakistani newspapers of the following day.

64. Text of Asghar Khan's message may be seen in Ghafoor Ahmad, *Then Came the Martial Law,* pp. A29–30.
65. Kausar Niazi, *And the Telephone Line Was Cut,* pp. 134, 162–3.
66. See the text in Ghafoor Ahmad, *Then Came the Martial Law,* pp. 234–8, A74–80.
67. Ibid., p. 239.
68. Ibid., pp. 245–6.
69. Kausar Niazi, *And the Telephone Line Was Cut,* pp. 177, 184, 195–6.
70. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Then Came the Martial Law,* p. 249.
71. Minutes of the meeting, prepared by the deputy cabinet secretary, may be seen in the *White Paper,* pp. A1026–7.
72. Kausar Niazi, *And the Telephone Line Was Cut,* pp. 200, 202.
73. Ibid., p. 179.
74. The minutes of the cabinet meeting on July 4, 1977 do not list General Zia-ul-Haq among those present. The minutes were prepared after his coup, and the omission of his name may have been deliberate. But as we have seen above, Kausar Niazi recalls that the general was present.

9 Conclusion

Bhutto's leadership and rule in Pakistan have invited considerable attention on the part of scholars, journalists, and biographers during the past twenty years, and we have referred to a number of them in the preceding text. Some of these writers have provided characterizations of his political style, sought to account for his authoritarianism, and attempted to explain his fall from power. Saeed Shafqat described him as a "reformist" political leader;[1] Maleeha Lodhi called him a "power broker," and Gerald A. Heeger saw him as a "patrimonial" ruler;[2] Eqbal Ahmad thought his political repression had the makings of a fascist dictatorship.[3] Mohammad Waseem has scrutinized these labels and concluded that they have limited explanatory value.[4]

We do not have space here for a full-scale review of the relevant literature. But we should, nevertheless, make at least a quick reference to the interpretations offered by Shahid Javed Burki, because he is the only scholar in this country to have written a book on Bhutto (1980), and Khalid B. Sayeed, because he presented an extended discussion of Bhutto's policies and style in his work, *Politics in Pakistan* (1980). Burki focused on economic policies and decision-making under Bhutto, but he also reflected on Bhutto's authoritarianism and fall from power. He linked Bhutto's authoritarian disposition to three influences: (1) Hans Kelsen's teaching at the University of California; (2) the low esteem in which the Bhutto clan held his mother, because of her modest social origins, which presumably gave him a sense of insecurity when he was a child and later made him intolerant of dissidents and opponents; and (3) his background as a Sindhi landlord.[5]

The first two of these clues are not helpful, and we will deal with the third one in a subsequent section. According to Burki, Bhutto learned from Kelsen that a norm becomes valid when the citizens of a state accept it, and it is effective when the state has the "means and the power" to enforce it.[6] This proposition is almost axiomatic in political science and law, and Bhutto did not need Professor Kelsen's courses to know it. It is much too basic to have given any particular direction to his political

inclinations. Kelsen also taught that the distinction between private and public law is untenable. But Bhutto, says Burki, distorted this concept in his actual practice.[7] We cannot, then, say what impact, if any, Kelsen had made on Bhutto's mind. Burki's reference to Bhutto's mother is similarly unavailing because he can tell us nothing of what went on in the Bhutto household when Zulfikar Ali was growing up.

Burki argues that Bhutto fell from power because he had alienated the middle class in Pakistan.[8] That the middle class, or a substantial portion of it, was alienated is true and we have referred to this fact in the preceding chapters. But it does not necessarily follow that he fell because of this alienation. It enabled the PNA to launch an anti-Bhutto movement in the spring of 1977 and, as Khalid B. Sayeed and Stanley Kochanek have noted, the middle class, especially the *petite bourgeoisie,* funded and sustained it.[9] But, as we stated in the preceding chapter, the PNA had halted this movement towards the end of May. Other factors and developments identified earlier – the weak state of the PPP, the slow pace of Bhutto's negotiations with the PNA, and Zia-ul-Haq's intentions – also played their part in bringing Bhutto down.

Khalid B. Sayeed described Bhutto's leadership as "populist," meaning that he had put together a coalition of diverse groups to challenge the *status quo,* with some help from an ideology.[10] Once he became the ruler, he strengthened the "Bonapartist" regime which had functioned in Pakistan since Ayub Khan's coming to power in 1958. His policies and actions were intended not only to advance the public interest, as he defined it, but to augment his own authority and power. He "wanted to control every major class or interest by weakening its power base and by making it subservient to his will."[11] His regime was "more interested in amassing power" than in thinking what might be done with it. Sayeed mentions the reasons for this relentless pursuit of power only in passing. He refers to Napoleon's influence on Bhutto, his "feudal habits," and his notion that his power would serve the public interest and assure him a place of honor in history as contributory factors.[12]

Khalid B. Sayeed also notes that the middle class had turned against Bhutto because his economic policies had hurt its interests. But he adds that it disapproved of his political repression, and sections of it objected to his secular trend. Bhutto's neglect

of his own party and his excessive reliance on the security forces made him vulnerable. Sayeed implies that Zia-ul-Haq's state of mind, and his connection with the Jamat-e-Islami, also had a bearing on Bhutto's fall. The military in Pakistan, he writes, does not allow the "politics of accommodation to function." But in the end Bhutto lost because he was amoral. His "cunning, remorselessness, and inner irresponsibility turned out to be his undoing."[13]

Another interpretation of the urban middle class's opposition to Bhutto should be noted. Firoz Ahmad has argued that it hated him because, deep down, it despised the poor. It resented him also because his policies were calculated to advantage the rural population. Easier credit, subsidized fertilizer, and higher produce prices made the farmer prosper to some detriment of the city-dweller. Moreover, Bhutto infiltrated many rural Sindhis into the bureaucracy at the center and in the provincial government of Sind. The leftist elements in the urban middle class, contemptuous of the rural folk, sulked also because Bhutto had abandoned the socialist revolution he had once promised.[14] Inflation, which remained uncontrolled, oppressed all classes in the city. Firoz Ahmad's argument is not without considerable merit and it should be kept in mind. But as he too has observed, other grievances had a part in intensifying the opposition to Bhutto. The most damaging of them was the perception on the part of the middle class that his regime was a regime of immoral men, hoodlums, and gangsters.

In terms of its quest for power K. B. Sayeed's "Bonapartist" regime resembles the popular autocracy we discussed earlier, and his other interpretations are broadly similar to some of those which we have provided in the preceding chapters. But our enterprise is somewhat different. We have placed Bhutto's actions alongside those of his followers and opponents to get a fuller view of how politics in Pakistan functioned. It is indeed important to explain his desire for "power after power," as Thomas Hobbes would put it, his authoritarian disposition, and his ouster. But we have had other concerns and missions also. His fall does not *prove* that his politics were all wrong.

We ask if, and to what extent, Bhutto's styles of leadership and rulership may be regarded as viable, and whether they corresponded with the salients of Pakistani political culture. Considering that many millions of people in Pakistan still think

well of him while other millions continue to disapprove of him, we should ask what part of his legacy could be taken as having enduring value, and which part might be discarded. Given the fact that leadership and followership are interconnected, we should know what Bhutto's leadership and rulership tell us about Pakistan's journey on the road to political development.

BHUTTO AS A LEADER

There is a time (1967–71) when Bhutto was a leader but not a ruler. Then there is a time (1972–7) when his rulership progressively diminished his role as a leader.[15] He made an abiding contribution to the Pakistani political culture when he went to the people as a leader. That he went to them in the cities, small towns, and villages was in itself something new. The founder of Pakistan, the Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah, had charisma and he too was a mass leader. But his charisma was regal, aloof, and distant. Bhutto identified with the people, especially the poor of Pakistan, in numerous ways and on many levels. He taught them that it was not God's will that they remain wretched, that they were entitled to dignity, that their aspirations deserved fulfillment, and that they could have fulfillment by participating in politics. Thus, he gave them a sense of political efficacy. Others had spoken of their poverty and deprivation, but none with his passion and intensity. Insofar as participation is essential to the workings of a democracy, Bhutto may be said to have opened the way for it in Pakistan. He acted as a change-maker, as a transformational leader, calling the people to a higher purpose and a higher political plane. That is why so many of the poor in Pakistan are still devoted to him.

In the process of identifying with the people, Bhutto projected himself as a foe of the upper classes, polarized and radicalized politics. The voter in 1970 ignored his clan and *biradri* connections and supported candidates on the basis of their position on issues which Bhutto had agitated. This too had not happened before. Bhutto had approached the people, bearing an ideology and promising a revolution. But, once in power, he interrupted mobilization, became pragmatic, and abandoned the revolution. As a result, his supporters lost heart and faith, and his opponents gained ground. The custom of going to the

people, and the idea of mobilizing them, which Bhutto enlivened, deserve to be valued and kept. But the strategy of polarizing them, when revolutionary social change is not intended, would bear reconsideration.

In his public discourse Bhutto said a political leader in Pakistan must be truthful, honest, patriotic, dedicated to the public interest, a man of the people, brave, principled, and a keeper of his covenants. He advocated democracy and provincial autonomy in a federal system. He likened democracy to the fragrance of a spring flower but, going beyond this poetic expression, he made his meaning quite clear. He noted that democracy included free elections, fundamental rights, freedoms of the press and association, legislative supremacy over the executive, public accountability of officials, independence of the judiciary, and the dissident's right to oppose the government of the day. Without democracy, he reasoned, Pakistan would not have come into being and without democracy it could not be preserved. National cohesion would not take place, and Pakistanis would not unite, unless they had liberty and personal dignity. Bhutto argued for dividing governmental functions between the center and the provinces, under a mutually satisfactory scheme, and then letting the provinces exercise their assigned powers without central interference. He urged a gradualist approach to national integration that would allow a cultural synthesis to proceed quietly. He asked his people not to let the country become a client or puppet of a great power. They must be prudent and watchful, and they must work to assert and advance their national interest within the overall framework of a principled foreign policy. These were all eminently sensible ideas, and he expressed them in glorious speech.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto discussed complex intellectual issues – imperialism, colonialism, the third world, bilateralism, feudalism, revolution, democracy, federalism, Islamic socialism, and national integration. He used words as no other politician in Pakistan had ever done. We submit that *his discourse is the more durable part of his legacy.* It is valuable even if he did not follow his own prescriptions. For words, in themselves, have value. We know, for instance, that the founding fathers of America had no intention of allowing equal rights to black persons. But the black man's drive for equality has surely gained from their

assertion of the "self-evident truth" that all men are created equal. Those who signed the Declaration of Independence may not have been true to all of its pronouncements, but who can deny that America would have been the poorer without this grand assertion of values and principles?

Bhutto glorified the masses. In saying that they were worthy of respect, and by adopting their idiom when he was among them, he implied that their ways and values were also worthy. Not only did he honor the native Pakistani dress (*shalwar/qameez*) which he wore, as did then the other dignitaries, he elevated Pakistani folklore, folk art, and folk music. He gave the Pakistani identity self-respect and self-confidence. For the first time in more than a hundred years the elites in Pakistan felt free to own their nativity. When Shahnaz Begum sang "Soni Dharti" – a song that idealized the land and people of Pakistan – they sang with her. Thus Bhutto inspired the sense of a Pakistani nationhood. His style of leadership also indigenized and nativized Pakistani politics.

While Bhutto was still an opposition leader he commanded widespread following among the poor, substantial support among the middle classes, and even the grudging admiration of some in the upper classes in the Punjab and Sind. He won a remarkable victory in the 1970 election, and we may then say that he was effective and successful as a leader at that time.

BHUTTO AS A RULER

We enter a much more difficult terrain when we attempt to assess Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a ruler. He is to be judged in that role by his success in achieving his goals and in securing the implementation of his policies. It is clear that he served Pakistan well in the area of foreign policy. He made an honorable peace with India, kept the friendship of China and, for the most part, that of the United States, strengthened the already friendly and advantageous connection with the Arab/Muslim world, came close to resolving the festering Pakhtunistan dispute with Afghanistan, and enhanced his country's image and status in the third world.

Like all of his predecessors, Bhutto receives a failing grade in the matter of building institutions. He did hold cabinet meet-

ings and, by all accounts, he was a good listener. Some members – Mubashir Hasan, J. A. Rahim, K. H. Meer, Rafi Raza, and Sheikh Rashid – were often ready to speak their minds, while others preferred to echo Bhutto's views if these were known. He did not make his views on an agenda item known at the outset; he let discussion proceed and, at the end, he announced the sense of the meeting. It is said also that on occasion he would go out of his way to accommodate dissenting views in order to obtain a consensus.[16] Nevertheless, the cabinet understood that he was no mere *primus inter pares;* he was the boss, the *"sahib."*

On the other hand, he let his party decline into ineffectiveness, did nothing to strengthen Parliament, weakened the bureaucracy by intimidating it and the judiciary by reducing its authority, and sought to enfeeble the press, the bar associations, and the student and labor unions by curbing them. But this is not a case of failure in achieving one's goals. For it was probably never a part of Bhutto's agenda to build institutions. At an intellectual level he knew that the country needed stable institutions to operate a democracy. At another intellectual level, he had convinced himself that he could govern, and serve the people according to his own conception of their interests, without the help of institutions. He knew also that institutions, being systems of constraint upon the ruler's will, would be in his way. He was unwise in thinking and reasoning along these lines. Strong and stable institutions, including his own party, might have reduced his personal authority, but they would have fortified his position as a leader and as a ruler. In addition to the goals a ruler has adopted, because they appeal to him, there are goals the community may have enjoined upon him, and still others which he *should* accept and strive to achieve because they will advance his people's well-being. Had Bhutto worked to strengthen institutions, both he and the country would have profited. Both lost as a result of his neglecting and undermining them. It was an intellectual failure, and a moral failure, on his part.

Bhutto wanted to improve the quality of life in Pakistan. But his goals were not always implemented. In a note to his ministers he once observed:

There are shortages everywhere . . . The Agricultural Devel-

> opment Bank has not come out with any new schemes to assist the common man, the poor man . . . The rural works program and the rural integrated program remain disintegrated. I have not seen the face of a single Agroville of which we talked a great deal. The low cost housing schemes are coming up on paper only. The drainage schemes have not seen the light of day. Crime is rising without fear . . . In other words, where is our revolution? There is no change. We were supposed to be the harbingers of a new order, but where is the new order? . . . The truth hurts and it hurts me the most.[17]

Actually, some things did get done. The real income of urban workers rose, and a number of peasants received land. Employment opportunities for Pakistanis in the neighboring Arab countries multiplied, and their remittances brought prosperity to many families. Roads and buses, schools, clinics, electricity, and drinking water reached many a village where the people had never before enjoyed these amenities.

But business and industry within the country declined, and public tranquility, which is the foremost goal of all regimes, suffered grave reverses. Ethnic tensions accompanying the language riots in Sind in 1972 did not subside and would intensify later. An insurgency in Baluchistan engaged the Pakistan army. Bombs exploded frequently in NWFP, and armed robbery became common during Khar's rule in the Punjab. The PPP harbored gangsters who terrorized and oppressed citizens. Bhutto's rulership may then be judged as modest in accomplishment even if it was lofty in some of its goals.

POLITICAL REPRESSION

In his discourse, and in his covenant with the people, Bhutto undertook to maintain civil rights and democratic freedoms. In his actual practice as a ruler, he did the opposite. His regime insulted, humiliated, harassed, assaulted, imprisoned and, in some cases, tortured critics and opponents. He had vowed to cultivate respect for the law, but his agents used lawless force against his adversaries. Even old comrades, who had become critics, were not spared. Meraj Mohammad Khan languished in

jail, and Mukhtar Rana almost died under torture. Men from the Federal Security Force broke into J. A. Rahim's house and beat him up so severely that he had to be hospitalized.

This wide gulf between his professions and practice alienated many of his former supporters and converted adversaries into bitter enemies. But the gulf is puzzling for another reason also. How could a man so well-read, educated at some of the most distinguished universities in the Western world, presumably cultivated, apparently urbane and civil – how could such a man unleash crude gangsterism and naked force against those who disagreed with him or even opposed him?

College education in arts and sciences improves the student's capacity to understand, interpret, interconnect, and assess propositions, but it does not necessarily teach him what his ends in life, or in politics, should be. Attitudes, values, and ends are acquired at home, in the family, among friends, and in the social environment in which a person has grown up. Bhutto's study of history could have attached him to John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, or Voltaire but, instead, it gave him over to Napoleon. His basic attitudes and values had already been formed by the time he went to college. He understood democracy, but it had not become a habit of the mind with him. Napoleon's preference for popular autocracy excited him because it suited his own settled inclinations. Education enabled him to justify the preferences he had already made. The proper role for reason – as he may have learned from David Hume – was to serve the passions.

THE FEUDAL CONNECTION

Khalid B. Sayeed, Shahid J. Burki, Lawrence Ziring and many Pakistani commentators relate Bhutto's political style to his feudal ethos.[18] We accept this interpretation but with qualifications. The Sindhi feudal lord did not humor the poor, and he did not concern himself with their well-being. Add to Bhutto's feudal outlook on political power the modern idea of popular support, and the even more recent idea of mass mobilization, and we reach the popular autocracy model proposed earlier to explain his political behavior. An autocratic disposition can derive from any number of sources, but it is a reasonable

assumption that in Bhutto's case it came from his feudal background.

It is simply wrong and misleading, however, to say that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was no more than a Sindhi feudal lord. He was clearly a man of many parts, and the feudal ethos was only one of them. He was learned, extremely hard-working, and prompt. It is well-known that files sent to him were almost invariably returned the following day with his comments and instructions written on the margins. This was very unlike the typical Sindhi landlord who is thought to be lazy and dull. Again, unlike the Sindhi landlord, he devoted himself to public service. He wrote to his colleagues about a great variety of issues and identified the tasks that lay ahead. As a ruler, he was a man of ideas, and a man of great compassion for the poor. These capacities and commitments had nothing to do with his feudal background.

We see Bhutto's feudal ethos at work when we turn to his dispositions and practices related to his pursuit of personal power. His tolerance of factionalism within his own party, arbitrariness, harassment of opponents, and the expedient shifting of alliances are easily understood in the feudal context.[19] It would even explain his neglect of institutions. The feudal outlook does not recognize the value of limits which institutions necessarily impose upon functionaries. Moreover, institutions are forums where men resolve issues by reasoning together; they provide alternatives to the use of force. The feudal disposition prefers force, because reasoning together is not only slow and tiring, it implies equality of status among the participants.

Bhutto dismissed most of his old comrades who had joined him in founding the PPP, and who had then assisted him in reaching power – Mukhtar Rana, Meraj Mohammad Khan, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Haneef Ramay, Khurshid Hasan Meer, Mubashir Hasan, J. A. Rahim, and scores of second-ranking leaders at the district level. Why? Many of them belonged to the urban middle class whose support Bhutto had lost partly as a result of their socialist thrust in his regime's economic policies. They were in no position to recapture this support. Bhutto would now put together a different, a largely rural-based, coalition to win the next election. Moreover, some of them had earned notoriety for their mismanagement, corruption, and oppression while they held office. It would then be advantageous

for Bhutto to let them go and, thus, distance himself from them.

Another consideration may also have been influential. Most of these old comrades were politically weak, lacking their own political constituencies, but they were not intellectually feeble. Their earlier contributions to the party gave them a measure of moral authority and legitimacy. A few of them – Khar and Mumtaz Bhutto, for instance – even had their own support base. They showed signs of assertiveness and, some day, they might challenge Bhutto's supremacy. The "feudals" who replaced the old team as governors, and as ministers, were not popular leaders, and intellectually they were mediocre or worse. In this new terrain Bhutto alone would be a tower of intellectual and political strength, a giant among small men.

Bhutto's skills in diplomacy were also made to serve his feudal inclinations and ends. In his transactions with the opposition politicians he acted as if he was the head of a great and powerful empire while they were petty princes from across the border. He would hold, suspend, and restart negotiations with them, tire them out, send them *aides-mémoire,* make and sign accords with them, break the pacts already made and offer to negotiate new ones. He assumed that adversaries were enemies, that they and he did not belong to the same whole, that Pakistanis did not form a *community* even if they did make a state, and that politics must remain a relentless war in which he had to strike first in order not to be hit.

POLITICAL TRADITION AND CULTURE

It is possible to argue that Bhutto did not stand outside the Pakistani political culture, and that his conduct was a mirror in which many Pakistanis could see their own profiles. Since the "feudals" dominate politics in the country, their ways have inevitably spread beyond their own group. Many relationships throughout society are hierarchical, and the subordinate party is not expected to argue, reason, or debate with the superior. Subordinating one's private interest to the public, and respect for the law do not come easily to any class. The disposition to violence may not be as common among the middle classes as it is among landlords, but it is acceptable when directed against

persons of lower rank or those of an opposing ideological persuasion. Following the nativization of Pakistani politics, referred to above, talk of violence became more pronounced in political speech than it had been before. Referring to Bhutto's alleged role in the dismemberment of Pakistan, and in order to establish their own patriotism, opposition politicians often asserted that they would "chop off" the hand that rose to break up Pakistan again. The PPP stalwarts shouted that they would pull out the tongues of those who made insulting remarks about Bhutto. His opponents denounced his regime's violence because their own kind of people had been its victims. But his supporters did not object; they considered it a just retribution to those who had traditionally invaded the persons and honor of the poor.

Bhutto's defenders will say also that he did nothing which had not been done before. In the early 1950s Abdul Qayyum Khan in NWFP, Mohammad Ayoob Khuhro in Sind, Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana in the Punjab and, in the 1960s, the Nawab of Kalabagh in West Pakistan used lawless force against opponents, implicated them in bogus criminal cases, employed the police to harass them, disrupted their political meetings, and threw them in jail. Hashim Gilzai, a NAP senator from Baluchistan, once gave me a chilling account of the torture he and several Baluchi *sardars* had endured during Ayub Khan's rule. The Nawab of Kalabagh suppressed the regime's opponents with a heavy hand. He operated an extensive intelligence system of his own that kept him informed of the wrongdoings – especially instances of moral turpitude – of both politicians and civil servants. He used this information to blackmail them into doing lawless acts against the regime's opponents. His admirers rationalized his repression as a continuation of the Mughal tradition which put the interest of the throne above even the life of the king's own relatives.[20]

The argument that Bhutto merely followed tradition, and that his conduct is therefore not blameworthy, is plausible but not good. It implies that the hold of tradition cannot be broken, that improvement is impossible, and that Pakistanis cannot have a decent government. It implies that rulers cannot be leaders, because they are mere prisoners of the existing tradition and culture. The argument also ignores differences of degree. A common perception in Pakistan is that Kalabagh was

sterner than, let us say, Daultana, and that the Bhutto regime was harsher than that of Kalabagh. But even if these perceptions are not to be relied upon, because they may not be well-founded, another difference of degree should be considered. It is likely that, as a result of Bhutto's own campaign of political education, many more people in Pakistan had become less tolerant of political repression than had been the case in Kalabagh's time.

A politician who wants to practice the qualities the idealist prescribes, and does so in an uncompromising fashion, may not be able to function. But the Pakistani experience shows also that excessive and blatant violation of the ideal will result in his ouster. He may have to strike a dialectical balance between the ideal and its opposite which the politically relevant forces in the country are able to tolerate. Instead of establishing such a balance, Bhutto adopted the opposite to excess. Elements in the urban middle class and the rural gentry disapproved of his undisguised drinking, his other violations of Islamic morality, and his lavish lifestyle. But they were incensed by his regime's severe repression of opponents, including the violation of their homes and harassment of their women. The feeling spread that *chadar and chardivari* – the honor of women and the privacy of one's home – were not safe while Bhutto ruled. This kind of high-handedness, which Pakistanis call *zulm*, is something that the Muslim tradition has always regarded as a despicable quality in a ruler.

Political cultures are complex, including dispositions to both civil and uncivil behavior, and they are amenable to change. Not all arguments in Pakistan are settled by resort to force. Pakistanis also use the arts of peace – discussion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial determination – to resolve disputes. Again, not all relationships are hierarchical; many of them are horizontal as, for instance, those between friends and neighbors. Not all politicians break their covenants. The NAP–JUI coalition would seem to have been a model alliance. The top leaders of both parties not only made mutual concessions, they gave one another remarkable respect and loyalty even after they had been dismissed from office.

Leaders, followers, and political cultures are in a dynamic relationship of interaction. The ruling politicians before Bhutto did not appeal to the elements of civility in the Pakistani culture; they did not exercise moral leadership. But they were not

popular leaders, and it may be said that they lacked the capacity for such a role. Bhutto, by contrast, commanded mass following; he could have exercised moral leadership, but he ignored this option.

Those in Pakistan who still cherish Zulfikar Ali Bhutto celebrate the man who had awakened and led the masses between 1967 and 1970, the man who befriended the poor, exercised moral leadership, and transformed Pakistani politics. His legacy as a mass leader will live on, and it is to be valued. His announced diagnosis of his country's political problems, and his prescriptions for resolving them, were sound, and we may honor him as an intellectual and as a professor. But beyond his continuing solicitude for the poor, and his able management of Pakistan's foreign relations, his legacy as a ruler from 1972 to 1977 is much too blemished to endure, and it deserves to be set aside.

Many Pakistanis, undoubtedly, want democracy; they have come out on the streets and rioted for it periodically. But they still have to learn the art of associating together for the common good. At the intellectual level they know, as did Bhutto, that reasoning together is the democratic method, that the dissident is entitled to respect, that covenants are to be kept, and that civility is to be preferred to the lawless use of force. But in their actual practice some of them, like Bhutto, do the opposite of what they profess as right and fair. Pakistan is not a traditional or a modern but a transitional society, and Bhutto was a transitional leader. He initiated the process of democratizing politics in Pakistan, but he did not have it in him to carry this process forward to a state of maturing. It was, and still is, for another man or woman – shrewd and competent but also grounded in the civilities of Pakistani culture – to lead the people of Pakistan on the road to political development. The mobilization Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had undertaken is still here, and so is the road, waiting to be taken.

NOTES

1. Saeed Shafqat, *Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy* (Lahore: Progressive, 1989), ch. 6.

2. Maleeha Lodhi, *Bhutto, the Pakistan People's Party, and Political Development in Pakistan* (London: University of London Ph.D thesis, 1980), p. 25 as cited in Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan* (Lahore: Progressive, 1989), p. 358; Gerald A. Heeger, "Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience," *World Politics,* January 1977, pp. 254–61.
3. Eqbal Ahmad, "Pakistan: Signposts to What? *Outlook,* May 18, 1974.
4. Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan,* pp. 353–61.
5. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 81–9.
6. Ibid., p. 85.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp. 178, 184–90, 200.
9. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 157–61; Kochanek, *Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 82, 231.
10. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan,* p. 86.
11. Ibid., pp. 91.
12. Ibid., pp. 103–4.
13. Ibid., pp. 104–10, 161–3.
14. Firoz Ahmad, "Bhuttoism, Bhuttophobia, and Bhuttomania" (Urdu), *Pakistan Forum,* February 1978, pp. 5–14.
15. When Bhutto spoke at public meetings as president or as prime minister, the stage was often as much as 25 feet high, steel bars separated him from the press and VIP enclosures, and the audience sat several hundred feet away on the other side of barbed wire: *Outlook,* January 6, 1973, p. 5.
16. This account was given to me by Khurshid Hasan Meer in interviews on December 26, 1973 and August 15, 1974, and by Dr Mubashir Hasan in interviews on July 18 and 27, 1980.
17. My notes of Prime Minister Bhutto's "directives" on file.
18. Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder; Westview Press, 1980), pp. 145-7. Also see the commentaries of Major Ishaque Mohammad and Abdullah Malik in *Outlook,* March 24, 1973 and June 8, 1974 respectively.
19. See the discussion of the political culture of Pakistani landlords in Chapter 1 above.
20. For an exposition of the Kalabagh model of rule, see *Outlook,* November 4, 1972, p. 7; and Mukhtar Hasan's interview with Chaudhry Zahur Ilahi (one of Kalabagh's victims) in *Zindagi,* April 15, 1973, pp. 22–3.

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