




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


# Afghanistan Situation Report



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5 May 1987



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


AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT



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CONTENTS



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KARMAL TO MOSCOW



2

25X1

Former PDPA chief Babrak Karmal has gone to the USSR for medical treatment, although his removal from Afghanistan almost certainly will do little to quell discontent within the party.



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USSR BOLSTERING LINKS WITH NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN



3

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A delegation from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic recently signed a protocol of cooperation with Balkh Province officials. This is the latest Soviet effort to strengthen linkages between Soviet Central Asian republics and northern Afghan provinces.



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CONSCRIPTION OF CRIMINALS



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The Afghan regime recently announced that some prisoners will be conscripted, but the measure will do little to overcome the military's manpower problems.



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
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**PERSPECTIVE**


**GULBUDDIN'S HIZBI ISLAMI: LOSING SUPPORT IN THE RESISTANCE**

**8**



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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar heads a faction of the Hizbi Islami that is one of the most effective Afghan resistance groups. But his force frequently attacks other insurgent groups, and Gulbuddin's intransigence and divisive policies are alienating other resistance fighters as well as some of his own followers.



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


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KARMAL TO MOSCOW

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According to TASS, former PDPA leader Babrak Karmal arrived in Moscow for medical treatment on 4 May. Earlier media stories claimed that he was being held in Pol-e Charki prison. Karmal had been under house arrest since late 1986.

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**COMMENT:** Karmal had long been the rallying point for PDPA members--both Khalqis and Parchamis--who oppose Najib and his Soviet masters. Pro-Karmal demonstrations during the Revolution Day parade on 27 April probably convinced the Soviets that he was too much of a threat to the current regime to keep in Kabul.



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The removal of Karmal is unlikely to quell discontent that has been intensifying in the PDPA since January. Should dissidents see the deportation as an indication of a pending purge, they may increase demands on Najib for greater powersharing while stepping up anti-regime sabotage and random physical attacks on Najib's supporters.



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**USSR BOLSTERING LINKS WITH NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN**



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A Soviet delegation from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) visited Afghanistan in late April to discuss establishment of economic, technical, and cultural ties with Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, and Baghlan Provinces, according to Afghan press reports. It signed a protocol of cooperation with Balkh Province.




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**COMMENT:** Soviet plans to annex the northern Afghan provinces have surfaced periodically throughout the war. The most economically valuable area of Afghanistan, the region has fertile agricultural land and extensive mineral wealth, including natural gas and petroleum reserves. This protocol and other recent direct agreements between northern Afghan provinces and Soviet Central Asian republics may be Soviet attempts to strengthen linkages between the two areas. Moreover, public demonstrations now of the commonality of interests between governing authorities in these regions serve to counter Afghan insurgent claims of support from the Soviet Central Asian populace.



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
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


CONSCRIPTION OF CRIMINALS




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Kabul recently announced that beginning in mid-June, prisoners who have served at least one-fourth of their sentences will be inducted into the military. Only recidivists or "insurgent supporters" will be excluded. Prisoners pardoned in February under the national reconciliation campaign were also conscripted, according to the US Embassy in Kabul.



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
COMMENT: The military's serious manpower shortages, caused by a continuing high number of desertions and casualties, have driven the prisoner release. This intake of poorly disciplined personnel, however, will not improve the Army's combat effectiveness or manning levels.



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IN BRIEF

-- An Austrian official recently told the US Charge in Kabul that his government probably will consent to a Saudi request to host an Afghan interests section in Saudi Arabia. He also noted that Kabul has previously asked Vienna to allow the opening of an Afghan Embassy in Austria. He speculated that the Afghan regime would push the embassy question, and that Austria--because it has an embassy in Kabul--would be hard pressed to refuse.



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-- Visits initiated in early March by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to regime-held prisoners in Kabul have been "interrupted" by the regime's refusal to let the ICRC prepare registration lists, according to the US Consulate in Peshawar. ICRC officials said, however, that Hizbi Islami insurgents recently released Afghan soldiers held prisoner since last spring.



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
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-- On 29 April the Red Cross Society of China donated medical supplies, food, clothing, and transportation vehicles worth approximately \$100,000 to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This modest public donation is intended in part to underscore China's continuing support for Islamabad's Afghan policies.



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-- Based on conversations with refugees and humanitarian relief agencies in Pakistan, the US Embassy in Islamabad believes that only a few thousand refugees have accepted Kabul's national reconciliation offer and returned to Afghanistan. In contrast, the Afghan regime claims that 30,000 to 50,000 refugees have gone back. Regime officials may be including in their count refugees who periodically return home for personal or business reasons.



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-- According to UK officials, the European Community (EC) will soon deliver a demarche to Harare asking the Zimbabweans to prolong discussions with Kabul about the timing of an exchange of ambassadors. The EC apparently will argue that a quick envoy exchange on the heels of Harare's recognition of Kabul will make it more difficult to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Prime Minister Mugabe is unlikely to be swayed by the argument.



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-- A Soviet sociologist recently told the US Embassy in Moscow that the Institute of Sociological Research is conducting a poll among Muscovites on their attitudes toward the Afghan war. He claimed that such a poll would have been "unthinkable" a year ago because of opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which reportedly is now pushing to see the results of the poll.



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
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
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-- Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Wakil met with Fidel Castro on 25 April. Wakil, who led an Afghan delegation to the sixth session of the Group-77 in Havana, reportedly briefed Castro on the Kabul regime's "national reconciliation program," and discussed Afghan and Cuban positions on regional and international matters. Wakil also met with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Vice President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers.



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**PERSPECTIVE**

**GULBUDDIN'S HIZBI ISLAMI: LOSING SUPPORT IN THE RESISTANCE**



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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar leads a faction of the Hizbi Islami that is one of the most effective Afghan resistance groups. His force, however, has often been accused of attacking other insurgent groups and collaborating with the Soviets and the Kabul regime, and Gulbuddin's intransigence and divisive policies are alienating other resistance fighters as well as some of his own followers.



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Supporters of the Hizbi-Islami

The Hizbi Islami is one of the largest of the seven major resistance groups.

Gulbuddin controls 15 to 20 percent of the armed insurgents--an estimated 22,000 to 30,000 guerrillas; Gulbuddin himself claims to have more than 100,000 armed followers. The organization operates in all areas of Afghanistan except for the Hazarehjat, but we believe it is strongest in Nangarhar, Konarha, Laghman, and Parvan Provinces. The group is dominated by Sunni Pashtuns.




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
Gulbuddin reportedly has close ties with the Islamic fundamentalist organizations outside Afghanistan. He receives money and materiel from the Moslem Brotherhood and the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami political party. Although Gulbuddin denies that he has privileged relations with the Jamaat-i-Islami, the group has supported him since the 1970s and clearly favors the Hizbi Islami over other resistance groups.



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Gulbuddin also enjoys good relations with senior Pakistani military and civilian officials,



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
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He allegedly receives the largest share of military aid to the resistance from the Pakistani Government because of his Pushtun connections and close relationship with the Jamaat-i-Islami. This perceived favoritism by Pakistan



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and other outside supporters has prompted substantial criticism from other resistance leaders. [redacted]

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Gulbuddin also received some arms and supplies from Iran until late 1984, when the Hizbi Islami joined the fundamentalist alliance headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.

[redacted] the Iranians opposed the alliance because they believed it to be anti-Shia. Citing Iran's "failure" to cooperate in supply matters, Gulbuddin closed the Hizbi office in Tehran in July 1985. [redacted] he may shortly visit Tehran, possibly to discuss renewed Iranian support. [redacted]

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Gulbuddin's Organization

The Hizbi Islami has the most highly organized administration and command-and-control structure in the resistance. [redacted] the group's tight cell structure is modeled on that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. [redacted]

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The Hizbi Islami organization inside Afghanistan is organized by provinces, which consist of fronts of 300 to 500 insurgents. Fronts are represented at the headquarters in Peshawar by a provincial military office. Its representatives lobby the committees for support and distribute the armaments and supplies obtained. Hizbi Islami commanders must align themselves with a front to get assistance, [redacted]

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[redacted] Front commanders are required to coordinate all military activities through their provincial military office. [redacted]

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[redacted] Gulbuddin keeps a tight reign on his field commanders, who take no initiatives without his prior approval. He reportedly has personally planned several operations and frequently travels into Afghanistan to take part in the



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fighting. [Redacted] he requires daily status reports from commanders inside Afghanistan on activity, manpower, and supplies. [Redacted]

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Fighting in the Field

The Hizbi Islami has been effective in combat against the Soviets and the Afghan regime. Gulbuddin's field commanders are generally well trained, ideologically dedicated, and highly motivated. Most fronts-- particularly those in Nangarhar, Lowgar, Parvan, Laghman, Konarha, and Kabul Provinces--are relatively well armed with light weapons, heavy machineguns, mortars, and rocket launchers, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The Hizbi Islami reportedly was the first insurgent group to receive the Stinger anti-aircraft missile. [Redacted]

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The organization's Tobuk Front in Nangarhar Province, commanded by Engineer Abdul Ghaffar, is probably Gulbuddin's most effective force. The front has ample light and heavy weapons, including Stinger missiles and BM-12 multiple rocket launchers, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Since receiving the Stinger system late last summer, Ghaffar's men have shot down several aircraft around Jalalabad; [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Soviet and Afghan regime forces have reacted to this Stinger threat by sharply increasing attacks on Ghaffar's area of operations and by establishing numerous outposts in the lower Konar Valley, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Ghaffar cooperates closely with the local Hizbi Islami (Khalis) commander, Hazrat Ali, and provides backup when needed. [Redacted]

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Other prominent Hizbi Islami commanders include:

--Ustad Karim--leader of a small and strictly disciplined urban operations unit in Kabul. He is one of the few insurgent unit commanders who plans extensively for operations, [Redacted]

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--Sanagul--commander of the Saur Kamar Front in Laghman Province. His force has been highly effective in striking convoys along the Kabul-Jalalabad road.

--Mamur Ghoyur--principal insurgent commander fighting near Baghlan city. [redacted] his men frequently harass local Soviet and regime posts and ambush convoys en route to and from Kabul.

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--Haji Abdul Karim--commands 120 insurgents and operates out in Talukan in Qandahar Province. He has conducted several joint operations with guerrilla forces from Khalis' Hizbi Islami faction and the Jamiat-i-Islami near Qandahar city. [redacted]

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Instigator of Infighting

The Hizbi Islami is responsible for much of the internecine fighting that takes place between resistance groups inside Afghanistan. [redacted]

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
[redacted] Gulbuddin--in pursuit of a position of dominance in the resistance--instructs his field commanders to attack other insurgent groups whose power and influence threaten expansion of the Hizbi Islami. Most of these attacks are directed at the Jamiat-i-Islami. We believe Gulbuddin is particularly jealous of Jamiat insurgent leader Ahmad Shah Masood.

[redacted] Gulbuddin has ordered interdiction of Masood's supply lines, attacks on his forces, and interference with his operations against the Soviet and Afghan regime forces. [redacted]

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Gulbuddin, accused of collaborating with the Soviets and the Kabul regime, has also been labeled by some opponents as an agent of the Afghan Government.

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Gulbuddin's Growing Isolation

[Redacted] dissension is on the rise in the Hizbi Islami. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] in the last two months, there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of Hizbi commanders defecting to the Jamiat-i-Islami. Many prominent commanders from Konduz, Baghlan, Nangarhar, Kabul, and Lowgar Provinces have indicated to Rabbani that they are tired of Gulbuddin's extreme and divisive policies and inadequate support. The Jamiat has apparently received so many inquiries for membership from former Hizbi members that they are becoming more selective in accepting defectors. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Gulbuddin's anti-Masood efforts have resulted in armed clashes inside Afghanistan. [Redacted]

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Shir Gul, a pro-Masood Hizbi commander in the Salang Valley, had a running feud with his front commander, Engineer Tariq, who is close to Gulbuddin and particularly hostile to Masood. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Anti-Gulbuddin sentiments also appear to be increasing throughout Afghanistan. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Gulbuddin has not been able to recruit sufficient replacements for the losses his forces are suffering in combat and through defections. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Gulbuddin has been forced to replace those groups with followers not native to the areas to which they have been assigned; these "outsiders" are typically resented by the local populations. Such a situation exists for Gulbuddin in the Chowr Band Valley, where most of the insurgents are former villagers from the Shomali Plain, and in Ghazni, where the insurgents are natives of Zabol and Vardak Provinces. [Redacted]

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Gulbuddin's belligerent and confrontational attitude has alienated some members of the resistance alliance.

[redacted] fundamentalist leaders Rabbani, Yunus Khalis, and Sayyaf recently created an informal alliance based on their common concerns for a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Although Gulbuddin's views on the issue are similar to those of the three leaders, they refused his inclusion because they consider him too unpredictable and ambitious to trust. [redacted]

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Prospects

We believe that Gulbuddin and the Hizbi Islami will continue to be a divisive element in the Afghan resistance. Insurgent infighting involving Gulbuddin's and Masood's forces is unlikely to decline, given Gulbuddin's determination to thwart Masood's expanding influence in northern Afghanistan. Gulbuddin's quest to dominate the resistance will intensify as political maneuvering over a possible settlement continues.

[redacted] the party has been stockpiling arms, ammunition, and other supplies inside Afghanistan in anticipation of a possible cutoff of Pakistani and Western aid. [redacted]

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[redacted] Gulbuddin intends to use these weapons to secure power once the Soviets leave the country. [redacted]

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**Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: The Man They Love to Hate**

Ambitious, outspoken, and doggedly independent, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has long been both a central figure in the resistance and the source of many of its problems. His fellow Peshawar-based resistance leaders dislike and distrust him as a dangerous and autocratic radical. He, in turn, sees them as undercutting his position in the jihad. [redacted]

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Gulbuddin would like to create a militant revolutionary Islamic society in Afghanistan. He is as hostile to Western ideas and influence as he is to Communism and vehemently opposes a role for former King Zahir Shah and other members of the old, Westernized elite in a post-Soviet regime. His long association with the Muslim Brotherhood, the model of the Iranian Revolution, and the example of Libya's Muammar Qadhafi have influenced Gulbuddin's beliefs, [redacted]

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[redacted] Given Gulbuddin's history of stubborn individualism, we doubt that either Tehran or Tripoli could exert strong influence over him should he come to power. [redacted]

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Gulbuddin's organizational skills, as well as his radical tendencies, first became apparent during his days as an engineering student at Kabul University. He was converted there from leftist views to conservative Islam, possibly by Sayyaf, and in 1968 helped found the Javanan Musulman (Muslim Youth League), the predecessor of the Hizbi Islami. With Sayyaf and Rabbani, both then Kabul University professors, Gulbuddin became a central figure in the Islamic movement that battled the Communists for control of the campus in the last years of Zahir Shah's reign. He was "almost brilliant" in the speed with which he could make a Molotov cocktail, according to one fellow student. The young radical was imprisoned for over a year after killing a Communist student but was released following the coup in 1973 during which Mohammad Daud overthrew the King. [redacted]

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In 1974 Gulbuddin was implicated in a coup plot and fled to Pakistan, where then-President Zulfikar Ali

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


Bhutto supported his anti-Daud activities in retaliation for Kabul's agitation among Pushtun and Baluchi border tribes. A failed uprising in the Panjsher in 1975 led to bad feelings between him and Rabbani, but Gulbuddin's continued opposition to the Kabul regime provided him with an organizational base to build on following the Communist takeover in 1978. In early 1979 the Hizbi Islami split, with a minority faction forming a separate organization under Yunis Khalis. 

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Like Sayyaf, Gulbuddin is a Ghilzai Pashtun of the Kharoti tribe. About 40, he was born in Konduz Province and attended high school in Baghlan before entering Kabul University. 

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