MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

24 September 1965

The attached is an interim assessment of the Indian-Pakistan crisis. It is necessarily incomplete, because all returns are not yet in. Also, we have not dealt with all aspects of the crisis, in particular, the role of Communist China. So we will be writing more on the subject. If there are particular aspects you would like to have dealt with, will you inform me.

SHERMAN KENT
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Indo-Pakistan War - A Preliminary Assessment

The India - Pakistan crisis is by no means over; further disputes are inevitable and the fighting could still resume, though the struggle is likely to shift from the military to the diplomatic sphere. Despite the unsettled situation, it seems useful to attempt some analysis of recent events and some assessment of their more enduring consequences. The essential message of this memorandum is that India has won the first round; this will make India more intransigent and put President Ayub's government in a difficult position.

President Ayub clearly agreed to a cease fire only after considerable hesitation and with considerable anguish. He did so for two principal reasons; (1) he was aware that if the fighting continued his forces would be worn down and then defeated by India's larger ones, and (2) he saw that the only way to offset India's military superiority was through a major Chinese military attack on India. Even assuming that China was willing to launch such an attack, which is unlikely, Ayub was clearly unwilling to cast his lot completely with China. However, he
tried to limit the loss of face involved in agreeing to a cease fire by declaring his unwillingness to pull Pakistan's military forces back as called for by the UN until it was clear that India would undertake serious discussion on Kashmir.*

2. India also accepted the cease fire with reservations. There will be constant disputes and delays over executing the terms of the cease fire, and there are factors, e.g. activity by such guerrillas as remain in Indian-held Kashmir, which could threaten its continuance. On balance, we believe that neither side will denounce the cease fire and resume the war.

3. India looks on the UN imposed settlement as a return to the status quo; Pakistan regards it as requiring serious negotiations leading to a settlement on Kashmir, and believes that the US is committed to play an active role in bringing about such a settlement. However, efforts in the UN to get

* The UN resolutions and the official acceptances of India and Pakistan are attached as Annex A.
India to make concessions on the Kashmir issue are likely to fail as they have in the past. This failure will engender substantial bitterness and frustration in Pakistan, feelings which will probably lead to public demands for further military action against India. They will be particularly influenced by the output of Pakistan's propaganda apparatus which is now stating that their army won the war, forced the Indians to plead for a cease fire, and "has convinced the Indian warlords that the Pakistan army in invincible." These pressures will be particularly dangerous in that much of the army and government, and nearly all the general public, now believe that perseverance in the military struggle would have forced India to give up Kashmir.

4. The Pakistan government is faced with the same difficult problems and choices as it was before the fighting started; the need for military security against India, its strong desire to acquire Kashmir, the continued need for foreign economic and military aid, and the question of its international orientation vis-a-vis the US, Communist China, and the Afro-Asian world. Its difficulties have been increased, however, by the failure of its military efforts and by the fact that

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popular expectations have been aroused while knowledge of Pakistan's deteriorating military position is known to very few. Ayub cannot admit Pakistan was -- or soon would have been -- defeated by India, without raising the question why Pakistan embarked on the course it did. Yet the people -- and many civilian and military officials as well -- wonder why Pakistan stopped fighting if it was doing as well militarily as it claimed.

5. Indeed, the survival of Ayub's regime is by no means certain. There are indications of military dissatisfaction with Ayub and of talk to replace him. However, we doubt that Ayub is presently in serious danger.

6. It seems likely that Ayub will give a high priority to patching relations with the US. He has always recognized his dependence on the West in general and the US in particular, and is aware that the USSR will not and Communist China cannot supply the economic and military aid Pakistan needs. Recent events have shown him that his China policy was largely a failure: fear of China did not deter India from striking back at Pakistan; and when India did strike back, it became apparent to Ayub that Chinese intervention would create for Pakistan
more problems than it would solve. However, public opinion still is in favor of working with China, and Ayub probably will not make any move to break existing ties.

7. Public opinion against the US will continue to run strong, and many demands will be made that Pakistan cut all ties with the US because of the latter’s neutrality in the conflict. These attitudes will considerably limit Ayub's freedom of action, and any attempt he makes to move closer to the US will be slow and difficult. In these circumstances, much will depend on how hard the US pushed for a Kashmir settlement, and on the kind of arrangements, particularly regarding aid, the US is willing to make with Pakistan. Ayub is probably aware that his bargaining power with the US has declined, but is also convinced he must continue to receive economic assistance from the US if he is to resist public opinion, repair his relations with the US, and permit US facilities to remain. In time, he will feel the need for renewal of US arms aid as well.

8. If Ayub should be removed, or if his freedom of action became greatly reduced, Pakistan's relationship with the US would be considerably altered. Pakistan's dependence on US aid
would be as great as ever, but there would be a substantial chance of its succumbing to its emotions, lashing out at the US, moving closer to China and Indonesia, and leaving the United Nations. It might even seek to renew the war with India. If major hostilities did break out, it might be impossible to prevent the communal violence which thus far both countries have been able to avoid.

9. India will face different problems. Its propaganda claims are nearer the truth, and Shastri's position, and that of the Congress Party, will be greatly strengthened by a de facto Kashmir victory. The hardships of the Indian people will be attributed to Pakistani malevolence, and accepted, in the short term, as patriotic necessities. Indians feel considerable satisfaction with the results of their diplomatic efforts and their ability to stand up under pressure. This will engender increased national self confidence.

10. However, the Indian economy is not in good shape. Food scarcities, increasing inflationary pressures, a foreign exchange crisis and an unsatisfactory growth rate posed major challenges before August 5. The war has made the situation worse; in particular, the military's preemption of the nation's transportation system has already created very serious food...
shortages in certain areas. Even with a good harvest and massive food imports, India's food situation will remain precarious for some time. There may be pressures for increased military spending in both countries. Further, India -- and Pakistan as well -- will continue to rely very heavily on foreign aid for economic development, though potential donors may be more reluctant to assist them than previously.

11. India's domestic and foreign policies are likely to change but little. New Delhi will almost certainly refuse any compromise on the Kashmir issue. It will probably feel that both the US and the USSR will continue to build up Indian strength as a counterweight to the Chinese threat in Asia. The internal debate on whether to acquire nuclear weapons will be renewed, but we believe that Shastri will, for a time at least, continue to hold a final decision in abeyance.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

SHERMAN KENT

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4 September 1965 Security Council Resolution

The Security Council, noting the report of the Secretary General dated 3 September 1965. Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, concerning the deteriorating situation along the ceasefire line in Kashmir.

1. Calls upon the Government of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all steps for an immediate ceasefire;

2. Calls upon the two governments to respect the ceasefire line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its side of the line;

3. Calls upon the two governments to cooperate fully with the United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan in its task of supervising the observance of the ceasefire and,

4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council within three days on the implementation of this resolution.
6 September 1965 Security Council Resolution


Noting with deep concern the extension of the fighting which adds immeasurably to the seriousness of the situation

(1) Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them after 5 August 1965.

(2) Requests the Secretary General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution and the resolution of 4 September 1965, to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and to keep the Council promptly informed on the implementation of the resolution and on the situation in the area.

(3) Decides to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps may be necessary to secure peace and security in the area.
20 September 1965 Security Council Resolution

The Security Council, having considered the reports of the SYG on his consultations with the Government of India and Pakistan, commending the SYG for his unrelenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the SYG's resolutions of 4 and 6 September, having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease fire as set out in the report of the SYG (S/6683), but noting further with concern that no cease fire has yet come into being, convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters,

1. Demands that a cease fire should take effect on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours GMT and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965;
2. Requests the SYG to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;

3. Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;

4. Decides to consider as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's Res 210 of 6 September has been implemented. What steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the charter, to this end;

5. Requests the SYG to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the SC thereon.
Shastri's message to the Secretary General

"As already communicated to you in my letter of 15th Sept. 1965, I am willing to order simple cease fire and cessation of hostilities on being informed of Pakistan's agreement to do likewise. To carry into effect such cease fire from 7 a.m. GMT on Wednesday, 22nd Sept, as provided in SC RES, it would be necessary for me to arrange for issue of necessary orders to field commanders by 12 noon GMT on 21st Sept. I would, therefore, request you kindly to inform me of Pakistan's agreement to cease fire before this hour."

Ayub's answer as read by Bhutto on September 22, 1965

Pakistan considers Security Council Resolution 211 of 20 September as unsatisfactory. However, in the interest of international peace and in order to enable the Security Council to evolve a self-executing procedure which will lead to an honorable settlement of the root causes of the present conflict, namely the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, I have issued the following order to the Pakistan armed forces: You will stop fighting as of 3 a.m. on 23 September -- 2200 GMT 22 September, and from that time you will not fire on enemy forces unless fired on.