

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

Talking Points for the DCI

22 September 1988

Internal Situation in Pakistan

The political situation in Pakistan remains calm, with the political parties preparing for the 16 November parliamentary elections.

- On 2 October the Supreme Court begins deliberations on Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto's petition challenging President Zia's decision to hold nonparty elections.
- The former ruling Pakistan Muslim League has split into two rival factions. One faction is headed by former Prime Minister Junejo. The other is led by Fida Mohammad Khan and includes the current interim government's caretaker ministers who command their own personal power bases and wield considerable patronage.
- Benazir, in an effort to assuage the military's suspicions and attract the Pakistani business community, is burnishing her moderate credentials by emphasizing the military's legitimate role in Pakistan's security and disavowing radical economic policies, such as nationalization of key sectors.

25X1

The military is probably content with the situation as it stands; the Army has the influence it needs but is shielded from criticism arising from the day-to-day administration of national affairs.

[Redacted]

25X1

- The military will keep a close eye on the upcoming campaign and elections. The generals probably prefer nonparty elections--which would impede the PPP--but will go along if the Supreme Court rules in favor of party-based polling. General Beg has denounced Bhutto and the PPP to US diplomats, but we do not believe he will move against her before the elections.

25X1

[Redacted]

TOP SECRET

25X1
25X1

[Redacted]

--The Army would intervene if widespread unrest--especially in the Punjab--accompanied the elections and their aftermath. [Redacted]

25X1

We believe that the Army would try to work with a PPP government if it pledged to protect the military's interests and took no action against officers involved in the execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

--Intelligence Chief Gul took a sounding of Army officers and believes the Army would initially work with a PPP government, [Redacted]

50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM

--The generals could be concerned that prohibiting Benazir from taking office would create unrest. [Redacted]

25X1

Islamabad is convinced that the recent spate of cross-border airstrikes by Afghanistan and the Soviets is part of an effort to intimidate Pakistan into curtailing support for the Afghan resistance.

--Three airstrikes against Pakistani villages have occurred this month, killing five and injuring at least 17.

--The airstrikes were almost certainly deliberate. The villages were populated by Pakistanis--and not Afghan refugees--and were well inside Pakistani territory.

--Islamabad has asked Washington to protest the raids to Moscow and may try to use them as evidence for Pakistan's need for E-3 AWACS aircraft. [Redacted]

25X1

Indo-Pak Relations

We do not expect the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations to change in the weeks leading up to Pakistani elections in November. Indian officials are maintaining a wait-and-see attitude and are not likely to initiate any new confidence-building measures or other bilateral agreements until Pakistan settles on a new government. Pakistani officials are preoccupied with the elections.

--New Delhi is probably quietly hoping for a Benezir Bhutto victory. New Delhi will not take any action that could lead to charges of interfering in Pakistani internal affairs or prompt the generals into taking over.

--The Pakistanis have toned down their rhetoric indicating a "foreign hand" in Zia's plane crash, but we do not rule out the possibility

25X1

[Redacted]

that they might raise possible Indian complicity again, perhaps to deflect charges that military incompetence led to the crash. [Redacted]

25X1

Afghanistan: Status of the Soviet Withdrawal

Since 15 August the Soviet troop withdrawal process has slowed, but not stopped.

--Small support units, residual elements of previously-withdrawn combat units, and small groups of individuals continue to leave Afghanistan.

--Meanwhile, the Soviets have continued to rotate units and are continuing to replace rotating conscripts in order to maintain the manning levels and combat effectiveness of those ground force units still operating in Afghanistan. [Redacted]

25X1

While Soviet forces protect convoys and conduct road security operations, they have given continued support to the Afghan armed forces since mid-August.

--Except for the Konduz relief operation, most Soviet support has taken the form of artillery and air support.

--We have no evidence to confirm the persistent rumors that Soviet troops have been sent to shore up the beleaguered Afghan defenders of Qandahar.

[Redacted]

25X1

Status of the Regime

The Kabul regime continues to deteriorate as resistance successes and the failure of Najibullah's consolidation efforts increases internal factionalism.

--Najibullah's efforts to placate hardline Khalqis by promoting several Khalqis within the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries appears instead to have alienated his own following in the party and improved the Khalqi position for an eventual coup.

--Rumors that Moscow and Najibullah are considering the Cordovez Plan--in which the regime would surrender power to a neutral interim government--are probably untrue, but have further increased regime nervousness. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

Insurgent Morale

Insurgent morale is at an all-time high following several recent military victories.

--The capture of Spin Buldak last week completes the isolation of Qandahar city. The insurgents view the fall of Qandahar, the second largest city in Afghanistan, as just a matter of time,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM

--Over the past few weeks, insurgents have captured provincial capitals in three widely separate areas of the country--Taloqan in the north, Bamian in central Afghanistan, and Zareh Sharan in Paktika Province in the east--underscoring the insurgency's wide effectiveness.

--Insurgent attacks have closed the Kabul International Airport twice, at the end of August and beginning of September, damaging the main runway and destroying an ammunition depot.

--In August, an insurgent rocket attack destroyed a major Soviet ammunition depot at Pol-e Khomri, killing at least 100 Soviets.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

The attacks serve both military and psychological ends. Militarily, successful attacks on ammunition depots and airfields reduces the regime's ability to fight.

--When the insurgents overrun garrisons, generally they capture large amounts of supplies and ammunition, which further reduces the regime's ability to fight and increases the insurgents' supply of weapons and food.

[Redacted]

25X1

Psychologically, successful insurgent attacks and captured cities underscores regime ineffectiveness and reduce regime legitimacy and morale. Successful attacks also boost insurgent morale.

--The insurgents will continue their successful strategy of using siege and psychological warfare tactics, but will not hesitate to take advantage of any opportunities the crumbling regime forces give them.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

TOP SECRET




Impact of Leadership Change in Pakistan

Although President Zia's death could seriously alter Pakistan's Afghan policy over the long term, we expect little immediate change.

- Acting President Ishaq Khan was closely involved in forming Pakistan's Afghan policy under Zia, and available evidence suggests that he believes, as Zia did, that a Soviet withdrawal, followed by a resistance victory, are essential to Pakistan's security.
- Domestic concerns are, however, likely to limit the attention Islamabad can give to Afghan affairs. Pakistani efforts to manipulate resistance politics in favor of the Islamist parties are likely to decline.
- Zia's personal mediation was often necessary to paper over divisions within the alliance leadership. Without Zia, resistance political splits are likely to grow and may lead to the eventual collapse of the alliance interim government.
- Diplomatic reporting indicates that radical Islamist leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is concerned that Zia's death might endanger his perceived status as Islamabad's choice for post-Soviet Afghan leader.



25X1



25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1