SPECIAL REPORT

PAKISTAN AND THE FREE WORLD ALLIANCE

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PAKISTAN AND THE FREE WORLD ALLIANCE

Pakistan's relations with the free world are undergoing fundamental changes. In the late 1950s Pakistan was highly regarded by the West for its close cooperation with its allies, especially the United States, and was esteemed as the "bridge between CENTO and SEATO." Official confidences were exchanged frequently and easily, policy coordination was commonplace, and Pakistan stood ready to fight the enemies of the alliances. India's rapprochement with the West has changed all this, and Pakistan's cooperation now is measured by how little it damages the alliances. The Ayub government now is considering withdrawing from both CENTO and SEATO.

Pakistan Joins the Alliances

Pakistan's original motivation for joining the free world alliance system in 1954 was mixed. Pakistani political and military leaders felt that their country was endangered by aggressive pressures from the Communist bloc. An even greater danger in their view then, as now, was the spectre of a Hindu horde overrunning their Muslim preserve and erasing the partition which took place in 1947. With the mass butchery that followed that division of British India still a fresh memory, and with India militarily and economically much the stronger of the two, Pakistan welcomed Western interest in an anti-Communist alliance as something which it could exploit to build up its military strength vis-a-vis India.

Through the mid-1950s Pakistan's new allies recognized this dual motivation and tacitly accepted it. There was no obvi-
troops did not seem far fetched to Pakistanis.

Under these circumstances, Pakistan without difficulty abandoned the Afro-Asian nonaligned group in which Nehru reigned supreme in the early 1950s. Despite the Pakistani peoples' original self-identification with this group, their pro-neutralist sentiment was more than matched by their fear of and bias against India.

Pakistanis therefore did not object strenuously when their government signed a mutual security agreement with the United States in 1954, became a member of SEATO the same year, joined the Baghdad Pact—later to become CENTO—and, finally, signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States in 1959.

If Pakistan had a complaint about SEATO and CENTO during the 1950s, it was that these pacts paid too little attention to the Asian members' disputes with their non-Communist neighbors. The Pakistanis also felt that the pacts had too little military content, and from time to time pressed for the conversion of SEATO and CENTO into strong military organizations along the lines of NATO, with command structures and forces of their own.

Shifting Relationships

All this has now changed. Today, Pakistani leaders simply cannot imagine American forces fighting against Indian troops to help Pakistan. Their faith in American assurances of aid in this unlikely event has progressively eroded. Moreover, major shifts during the last five years in relationships among those powers with a stake in South Asia tell the story.

These shifts include the confrontation between India and Communist China, the widening breach between China and the USSR, and the limited detente between the USSR and the US. Most important of all in Pakistan's view, is the progressively close link between India and the United States. Pakistan generally has narrowed its cooperation with the alliance, particularly the United States, as a direct response to the development of US support for India.

The first hint of these major shifts began in early 1958, when some Pakistani politicians began to attack what they regarded as a newly "soft" American policy toward neutralism. They questioned the value of the alliances, which they said brought Pakistan no greater material benefits than were being bestowed on neutral India.

This was about six months before General Ayub took over the Pakistani Government and gave it a new sense of dignity and self-confidence. The West about this time was deciding in favor of a massive effort to "save" India's Second Five-Year Plan from disaster. The relationships between Pakistan and its allies retained considerable momentum, however, and the confidence and coordination continued for the time being.
In early 1959, the Chinese suppressed the revolt in Tibet and built up their garrisons there, including those along the Indian frontier in the high Himalayas. The following August, public opinion was aroused when Nehru told the Indian Parliament that Indian and Chinese border forces had clashed and that the Chinese two years previously had built a road across the remote Aksai Chin region of Indian-claimed territory in Ladakh.

That summer, Pakistan made an important foreign policy move affecting free world interests without advising its allies. For some time Pakistan had consulted closely with the US and other allies on Afghan matters, sharing the then common concern about the rapidly expanding Soviet military and economic aid programs in Afghanistan. After tolerating Afghanistan's ever more strident propaganda attacks demanding self-determination for the Pushto tribesmen living on Pakistan's side of the border, Pakistan finally launched a propaganda campaign itself, without discussing its moves in advance.

In August 1960 the Ayub regime took a second major step outside the framework of the alliances by concluding a $30 million oil exploration assistance agreement with the USSR. Work on this project still continues.

By 1961, Pakistan's position was becoming more and more ambivalent. Ayub put stronger emphasis on his role as an independent nationalist leader but still remained a close ally. On the one hand, his regime stood ready to send troops to Laos if SEATO military action proved to be necessary. On the other, Pakistan began to support the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. As India's relations with China became still more embittered over conflicting border claims, and as US relations with New Delhi grew still more friendly, Pakistan made other, relatively minor, gestures toward Peiping.
The Chinese Attack on India

The climax to these developments came in October 1962 when, following India's half-hearted attempts to move a few border outposts forward, the Chinese launched division-sized attacks and made good all of their territorial claims before unilaterally withdrawing. Ayub and his advisers apparently calculated that this event would force India to secure its flank by quickly composing its long-standing differences with Pakistan, particularly regarding Kashmir.

Pakistani political and military leaders grew bitter as they watched the swiftness with which America and other allies moved to India's assistance, airlifting military supplies just 12 days after the first Chinese attacks. They felt, as an ally, they should have been consulted. In particular, it appeared Ayub's pride was stung. The Pakistanis were deeply frustrated that their allies were depriving them of the chance to exploit India's predicament to push closer toward a Kashmir settlement on favorable terms. Pakistan's feeling of being deserted still grows as US military assistance to India continues beyond the original emergency period.

Pakistani forces are no longer even tentatively available if needed in Laos or anywhere else in Southeast Asia. All of Pakistan's strength, say its leaders, is needed at home to face the growing might of India, made more powerful by both free world and Soviet aid. Instead, Pakistan has requested that SEATO develop contingency plans to come to its aid in the event of an Indian attack. The old practices of exchanging confidences and policy coordination have disappeared.

This breakdown in communication between Pakistan and its Western allies has been made more complete by the difficulty both sides have in explaining their divergent positions. With basic approaches altered, neither side can speak as candidly as it did in the mid-1950s. President Ayub cannot say he wants to seize a golden opportunity, provided by the Sino-Indian border confrontation, to blackmail India. Instead he denies that there is a sufficient threat from Communist China to justify continued Western military aid to India.

Although the Western allies can argue freely the need to prevent the USSR from pre-empting the military aid field in India, they cannot speak so candidly to Pakistanis of a strong desire to exploit the opportunity, also provided by the Sino-Indian border confrontation, to bring India closer to the Western camp. There is a considerable agreement between Ayub's estimate and that of the West on the unlikelihood of imminent Chinese attack but even this agreement is lost from view as the West emphasizes the long-term danger and Ayub concentrates on the lack of a short-term threat from China.
Moves in Response

Since October 1962, Pakistan has been searching for ways to help offset India’s growing military power, to put pressure on New Delhi to come to terms on Kashmir, and to halt or slow Western military aid to India. Unable to achieve any of these goals effectively, and recognizing that Moscow, undiminished in its bias for India, offered no alternative, Pakistan has concentrated its efforts on a series of gestures toward Peiping. Border, trade, and civil air agreements have been concluded, and cultural ties expanded. The air agreement was of particular value to the Chinese Communists by reducing their dependence on Moscow for air connections to Africa and Europe. Rumors persist that an understanding exists with vaguely defined military implications.

In a complementary effort, Pakistan has recently started to re-establish ties with the Afro-Asian group which it deserted a decade ago. As if to underline the importance now placed on these ties, Pakistan’s foreign minister last April absented himself from the SEATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Manila in order to give full attention to the Djakarta preparatory meeting for next year’s Afro-Asian (“Bandung”) Conference.

For a brief period in May there were a few hints that Ayub might be ready to accept the divergences of Pakistan’s interest from its allies as a fact of life, if these could be kept within tolerable limits. He reminded Pakistanis and acknowledged to Americans the valuable contributions the alliances had made to strengthening his country. He apparently wanted to end the sniping and to try to live more comfortably within the alliance, if only as a "marriage of convenience." If this was in his mind, however, it was quickly displaced by events in early June which brought the slow-burning crisis to a new stage.

Crisis and Reassessment

On 26 May, Foreign Minister Bhutto went somewhat further than ever in threatening that Pakistan might withhold its cooperation as an ally. Noting Indian Defense Minister Chavan’s visit to the United States for military aid negotiations, Bhutto privately expressed concern over indications that Washington was thinking of a multiyear program of increased dimensions for India "heedless of the background of discussions with Pakistan or of the consequences." He said that President Ayub had instructed him to inform the US Government that such a program would "inevitably affect Pakistan’s ability to continue its traditional assistance in the wider fields of free world concerns and interests in Asia." Pakistan, he emphasized, would be forced "to concentrate on the narrower field of the preservation of its own vital national interests."
Earlier, the US had informed Pakistan that its military loan and grants to India would total no more than $60 million per year. On 4 June, however, after it was decided to provide a larger loan, Pakistan was notified that the total amount for fiscal 1965 would be $100 million.

Ayub and his advisers fully appreciate the distinctions between grant and loan assistance in their own case. However, when viewing US military assistance to India they are inclined to lump the two together.

Ayub probably felt that prior US statements about military aid to India had been misleading and that the US Government had considered Bhutto's threatened change of policy of 26 May as a bluff and had decided to call it. The Ayub government evidently concluded that if it did not find some way to respond, in a manner strong enough to be suitable for the seriousness of the occasion as they viewed it, Pakistan would have to give up all thought of further pressure against allied military aid to India.

Possibly more important than these reasoned considerations is the fact that Pakistan's leaders are bitter and want to strike back. Ayub recently revealed the depth of his feelings when he told a news reporter that US policy is "based on opportunism and is devoid of moral quality," because "now Americans do not hesitate to let down their friends."

Reassessment of Ties

Since early June, the Pakistani Government has been reviewing all its relations with the West, searching for ways to respond to the recent US decision. Press comment has been restrained by the government, because Ayub regards the problem as far too serious to allow the press to set the tone, even superficially, of Pakistan's reaction.

Foreign Minister Bhutto has, however, told the press that the US decision had "far-reaching political implications" for alignment and called on Pakistan to end the "dialogue" and to take "steps." He may not know himself what these "steps" might be.

Feeling that the US decision struck at Pakistan's vital interests, Ayub presumably has been mulling over different courses of action for more than a month.

He almost certainly calculates that would bring a drastic reduction in the US military and economic assistance on which Pakistan is so heavily dependent and for
which there is no alternative source in sight.

Ayub apparently plans some less drastic response. He probably hopes that, by stopping short of eliminating the United States' most important material stakes in its relations with Pakistan today, he can continue to count on sufficient aid to meet at least Pakistan's minimum needs.

Ayub is reportedly giving serious consideration to withdrawing from CENTO and SEATO. Although he wants to develop further the close relations Pakistan enjoys with the other regional members of CENTO—Turkey and Iran—Ayub considers that these alliances are more or less moribund. He may therefore feel that such an action would not further materially reduce Pakistan's real contribution to the Western alliance system, but that it would have a sufficiently strong general impact to satisfy his desire for a forceful response.