PAKISTAN: THE POLITICS OF PATHAN IDENTITY

by
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Pakistan's 10 million Pathans are divided into factions with diverse, often conflicting interests. No single spokesman or political vehicle represents Pathan interests, nor has Pathan "nationalism" ever been articulated in the form of a clear political program. Yet the Pathans remain a people apart from the mainstream of Pakistani life, at serious odds with the country's dominant groups. Aspects of Pakistan's new constitution and political system appear likely to perpetuate the Pathan sense of alienation. Moreover, Wali Khan and his National Awami Party, however ineffective they may appear in conventional political terms, symbolize a latent assertion of Pathan identity. Should the Pathans perceive a serious threat by the Central Government to this identity or their way of life, they would be more likely to adopt armed resistance than to accept an imposed compromise.
FOREWORD

Pathan nationalism has been a rallying point for antiestablishment forces in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province for more than 50 years. Moreover, the Pathan lands have been a source of friction (the "Pashtunistan" dispute) between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the partition of British India in 1947, and this friction has taken acute form in the wake of the 1973 coup in Kabul. Because of the potential threat which this situation poses both to the territorial integrity of Pakistan and to regional stability, the Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/RNA), asked consultant Joel M. Woldman to analyze the origins, nature, and extent of Pathan nationalism in Pakistan.

INR's consultant program is managed by the Office of External Research. Consultant studies are designed to supplement the Department's own in-house research capabilities by providing independent, expert views on key questions.

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Pakistan's Pathans, an unruly and unpredictable tribal people, dominate the country's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Although greatly outnumbered by the Punjabis, who traditionally have ruled Pakistan, the Pathans have never been docile subjects of any central authority. The legendary Pathan predilection for solving problems through conflict rather than compromise persists, no less in Pakistani politics than in interpersonal tribal relations.

The assertion of Pathan identity and objectives as a political cause has, since the early 1960s, been the rallying cry of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the National Awami Party (NAP). The NAP is essentially a collection of ethnically diverse regionalist groups from Pakistan's three non-Punjabi provinces, whose primary unifying thread is their opposition to the Punjabi-dominated Central Government now headed by Z. A. Bhutto. Given the lack of any Pakistani precedent for a loyal opposition and the absence of a national consensus, it is unlikely that the tension between Bhutto and the NAP will soon be resolved. The NAP campaign for "provincial autonomy" is interpreted by Bhutto as a prelude to secession, invoking memories of similar Bengali demands prior to 1971.

Although Wali Khan claims to speak for all Pathans, his leadership is less readily accepted in the tribal areas. The perennial NAP demand that the federally administered tribal areas be integrated into the NWFP is interpreted by the maliks, or tribal headmen, as a direct challenge to their traditional authority. These tribal chiefs also fear that integration would end the subsidies originally established by the British as a bribe for good behavior.

Tribal maliks have benefited from this arrangement, as well as from other economic inputs from the Central Government, ranging from lucrative transportation licenses to a complaisant attitude toward a flourishing trade in smuggled goods. Also, much of the illicit opium produced in Pakistan originates in the tribal areas, where central regulations do not apply and enforcement is difficult.

The Pathans of the NWFP have legitimate grounds for discontent. The long struggle of the NAP there for provincial autonomy is rooted in these inequities. To the extent that they persist -- or are believed to persist -- the party's challenge to central authority will continue.
The return in 1970 to four smaller, more ethnically homogeneous provinces, after some 15 years in which they were governed as a single province, has exacerbated, rather than improved, relations between the Central Government and the Pathan nationalists. NAP attempts to gain political leadership in the two border provinces and its role as leader of the parliamentary opposition in the National Assembly have exposed it to extreme pressures from the Bhutto government.

While the political significance of the Pathans' discontent is unquestionable, their objectives are surprisingly vague and unarticulated. This reflects the political importance of 10 million Pathans in a nation of 65 million, as well as the lack of a consensus among the Pathans themselves.

Nowhere is this more clear than in the conflicting political goals among different segments of Pakistani Pathans. A few extremists in the tribal belt who have Afghan irredentist support have consistently sought the secession of the Pathans from Pakistan. Next along a notional political spectrum (whose opposite extreme is acceptance of the status quo) are the Pathans of the Wali Khan NAP. Close to the NAP is the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), which as a religious populist party has appealed to the fanatically Muslim Pathans.

Although Pakistan under the 1973 constitution is closer to political democracy than ever before, Pathan nationalists in the settled districts of the NWFP remain dissatisfied. They want greater provincial autonomy and local control of resources; they fear that Bhutto will readily use his inherent powers as Prime Minister to subvert democratic freedoms. Indeed, he has already used these powers against the NAP, e.g., in his peremptory dismissal of the NAP governors of the NWFP and Baluchistan and the arrests of more than 100 second-echelon leaders of the Frontier NAP (the party's NWFP branch).

For the time being most Pathans seem resigned to their situation. Barring massive external interference or the perception of a serious threat to their way of life, the majority of Pathans will probably continue to accept the present uneasy truce with the Central Government.

While there is no single spokesman for all the divisive, conflicting Pathan interests, and there are clear limitations
on the political effectiveness of Wali and the NAP, the durability of the unusual NAP-JUI coalition bespeaks more Pathan support for and identification with the NAP than conventional political criteria would indicate. Despite Wali's comparatively limited support, he is the Pathan spokesman on the national political scene and poses sufficient challenge to the authority of the Central Government to have earned its continuing attacks and enmity.

The economic viability of an independent "Pashtunistan" is open to serious question, but such rational considerations would most likely be disregarded if a charismatic leader, such as Wali Khan, were able to persuade his people that either secession or union with Afghanistan was their only means of maintaining Pathan identity and traditions.
PAKISTAN: THE POLITICS OF PATHAN IDENTITY

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BACKGROUND

Pathans, Pashtuns, and Afghans

Prior to 1947 there was little distinction in subcontinental languages between the terms "Afghan" and "Pathan."* The two were so synonymous that the original acronymic explanation for the name Pakistan cited "Afghania" for the first "a," a reference to the Pathan-majority North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The practice has continued to the present, so that Pathans are frequently referred to as "Afghans" in both India and Pakistan. There have even been instances in Afghanistan of non-Pashtun minorities referring to the ruling elite as "those Afghans."

Tribal Origins

The Pathans or Pashtuns are a collection of East Iranian tribal peoples inhabiting a mountainous area on either side of the hill ranges which separate Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although they all speak variants of a common language, Pashto or Pakhto, the average Pathan owes primary allegiance to his particular tribe and only secondarily sees himself as a Pathan. His nationality

*"Pathan," a Hindustani derivation of Pashtana, the Pashto language term by which members of the group refer to themselves, came into general usage in India in the 16th century during the early years of Mughal rule. "Afghan" was a term of obscure origin adopted by foreign chroniclers in the 11th century to refer to the same tribal group. For the purposes of this study the members of the group resident in Pakistan will be called "Pathans," and those in Afghanistan, "Pashtuns." In general, the Pakistani branch also called "Pakhtuns" speaks the more guttural northeastern dialect, Pakhto; the Afghans speak the softer southwestern Pashto version of the group's distinctive language.
comes in a poor sixth or seventh, especially in comparatively more backward Afghanistan. Generally, however, the more educated a Pathan is, the more likely he is to acknowledge the authority of the government of the nation in which he lives.

Although homogeneous in race, religion, customs, and language, these tribes have never been united politically. They acknowledged a loose allegiance to Kabul during the 18th and much of the 19th centuries, but the Afghan authorities never attempted to administer any part of the mountainous tribal area beyond a few easily accessible valleys. As the British advanced their power toward the Pathan lands from the east, they pursued much the same policy.

Tribal Organization. The border tribes have a rudimentary form of self-government built around the tribal council (jirga). Although the tribal headman (malik) was traditionally primus inter pares, many maliks today wield considerable authority because of their intermediary relationships with Central Government representatives and the benefits which accrue from these ties. Pakhtunwali (the way of the Pathans) is the tribal and personal law of the community and governs both personal and intertribal relations. If a quarrel is not settled by the bullet, the tribe meets in open jirga and prescribes the settlement. The authority for enforcing these decisions is the tribal lashkar (war party).

Tribal stability is rooted in the family, and the head of the family is the absolute lawgiver. Often custom, rather than the Muslim canon or shariat, governs family relations. The Pakhtunwali imposes some moral restraints on lawlessness; its main elements are the obligation of asylum and intercession, hospitality, good conduct, and retaliation, with blood debts descending from father to son.

Although it is said that money, women, and land are the major causes of tribal feuds, the hill Pathans also have traditionally resisted outside control. An additional element contributing to the restlessness of the area has been the ambition of religious leaders (mullahs). The students and pledged disciples of the mullahs form a kind of standing army which can challenge the authority of malik and jirga, as well as that of the Central Government.
The most notorious example was the Faqir of Ipi, who successively challenged both the British and Pakistani governments during his lifetime; his nephew, a Pathan extremist, continues the family tradition.

Those Pathans who reside in the "settled" districts of the NWFP have modified their tribal organization. (See map, p. 4.) Unlike their counterparts in the tribal agencies, they are subject to the laws of Pakistan. Jirgas have been eclipsed as judicial bodies by local courts; the way of the Pathans operates only to the extent that it does not conflict with Pakistani criminal law. The more remote the village, however, the more likely it is that even settled Pathans will revert to Pakhtunwali and customary law to settle disputes.

Tribal Areas and Settled Districts. In the fast territorial reshuffle which followed in the aftermath of the First Afghan (1838-42) and Second Sikh (1848-49) Wars, the British emerged with control of the frontier districts comprising the present NWFP. Those districts were annexed to the East India Company's Punjab Province, whose new northwest boundary ran along the foothills of the mountains which presently separate Pakistan and Afghanistan. At first the British made no attempt to advance into the highlands, or even to secure such major corridors as the Khyber Pass. It was at this time that the formal distinction between the "settled districts" and the "ghairilaza" (unadministered) tribal territory was first made.

The tribal belt remained a buffer zone, a no-man's land between British India and Afghanistan, until the establishment of the Durand Line border in 1893. Throughout that period the Amirs of Kabul claimed the nominal allegiance of the Pathan tribes. The British, however, used the first 20 years of their rule in the frontier to negotiate signed agreements with every "independent" tribe on the border. These agreements were approved by tribal jirgas and provided for the payment of regular allowances. In most cases the agreements were arranged through Pathan khans, or notables of lowland border villages who had traditionally been middlemen for the Afghans and Sikhs as well. These local power brokers were used until 1878, the end of the "close border" policy. Each British district officer tended to deal with the particular tribes on his border.
legislative act or Supreme Court ruling will apply to these areas unless specifically ordered by the President.

Pathan life in the settled districts, the product of more than 100 years of central rule, is considerably different. The settled Pathans are politically, administratively, and economically better integrated into Pakistani society -- although even here one finds, for example, GOP reluctance to take the political risks involved in eliminating opium cultivation. Pathan nationalism has been the focal point for oppositionist politics in the NWFP, but the people of the Province have participated in local and National Assembly activities since legislative institutions were introduced in the subcontinent in the late 19th century.

Although the arrangement was not popular, the settled districts of the NWFP were ruled from Lahore between 1955 and 1970, the period of the "One Unit," when all four provinces of the west wing were incorporated into the single Province of West Pakistan. Pathan politicians have participated in provincial and national government and administration since Pakistan's independence, despite their dissatisfaction with their share of the benefits. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, a settled Pathan, is now leader of the opposition in the National Assembly.

Settled Pathans are also primarily agriculturalists, living in the more arable lowland districts, especially the Peshawar Valley and Mardan. Their existence contrasts markedly with the harshness of life in the hills, where a migratory seminomadic life based on sheep and goat herding predominates, although there is some farming as well. In addition, lowland Pathans are closer to achieving economic self-sufficiency, whereas the tribals derive more significant support from remittances sent to home villages by Pathan soldiers, policemen, and laborers throughout Pakistan.

Pathan Distinctiveness

Unlike the two largest ethnic components of present Pakistan, the Punjabis and the Sindhis, the Pathans are neither an Indo-Aryan people nor an integral part of the
The distinction established by the British between the tribal areas and the settled districts of the NWFP has been maintained to the present day. The tribal belt between the western borders of the settled districts and the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier has been divided into five tribal agencies loosely administered by the Central Government through political agents. The system of allowances continues, although certain tribes now derive more significant benefits from the government trucking licenses and busline permits which they operate in the border region.

On the shadier side of the ledger, good profits are also made in a flourishing smuggling trade, some of which operates with tacit government approval at such bazaar sites as Landi Kotal and Bara. The tribal areas are also the source of much of the illicit opium produced in Pakistan. Until recently the Government of Pakistan (GOP) has not assigned a very high priority to the eradication or control of this activity, both because it was considered only a minor problem and, especially, because of government reluctance to risk antagonizing the tribal Pathans.

The hill tribes have preferred to remain outside the mainstream of Pakistani life, free to pursue their traditional way of life.* Many critics of the tribal system -- notably the National Awami ("People's") Party of Wali Khan (NAP) -- have denounced it as "representation without taxation." They charge that the tribals should also be subject to Pakistani laws and regulations, since they are represented in the National Assembly and participate in the life of the nation in many other ways without paying the price of citizenship. Despite pressures to merge the tribal areas with the settled districts in both the NWFP and Baluchistan, the 1973 Pakistani Constitution follows precedent and specifies that the federally administered tribal areas will remain under central executive authority. In addition, no

*According to Pakistan's 1971 census, there are approximately 2.5 million Pathans in the tribal areas and 6 million in the settled districts of the NWFP. In addition, it is estimated that there are .7 million in Baluchistan, 1 million in Sind, and 1.5 million in Punjab -- or a countrywide total of 11-12 million.
Soon after his release from prison in 1924, Ghaffar Khan inaugurated the first Pakhto-language political monthly, Pakhtun. Within 5 years, in 1929, he decided to launch an even more ambitious undertaking, a group which he called the Khudai Khidmatgars, or "Servants of God." Ostensibly organized to "remove social drawbacks" from the backward Pathan community, the Khudai Khidmatgars, or "Red Shirts" as they soon began to be called, shortly emerged as the NWFP affiliate of Gandhi's Indian National Congress. Although Ghaffar Khan has always denied any political significance to the adoption of the red uniforms which gave the group its name, the group did appeal to the Pathan agricul-tural laboring class. Despite their military command structure, the Red Shirts also asserted their devotion to the Gandhian principles of nonviolence.

The Red Shirts' organizational structure mirrored that of the Congress in the other provinces of British India, beginning at the village level and leading up through the village cluster, subdivisional, and district committees to the provincial committee. Like the Congress, they established almost a parallel government in the rural areas of the NWFP. Because of their active participation in Gandhi's civil disobedience movement, Ghaffar Khan, his brother Dr. Khan Sahib, and other Red Shirt activists were arrested several times and thus spent much of the thirties in prison.

In April 1930 there was serious rioting in Peshawar, and the army had to assume control. The Afridi tribesmen in the nonadministered area were told by nationalist politicians that this unrest signaled the beginning of the end of British rule. They attacked Peshawar in late summer, expecting to be welcomed by the local populace. Instead they were quickly repulsed by British troops who used air as well as ground forces to repel the attack. This was, however, the first time in more than 70 years of British rule that the NWFP frontier capital had been physically attacked. There was also armed conflict between the Indian Army and tribal forces in Tirah and the Mohmand Tribal Agency. The Faqir of Ipi also launched his anti-British activities in Waziristan during this period.

Unsettled conditions prevailed in the tribal hinterland throughout the thirties, encouraged by Red Shirt propaganda against British rule and apprehension raised
traditional, greater Indian culture area. Their language, Pashto/Pakhto, is East Iranian in origin, although strongly influenced by Indic dialects. The NWFP is in many ways a transitional zone between peoples and cultures. Anyone who has driven from the Pakistani Punjab and crossed the Indus River at Attock Bridge to the NWFP immediately notices the different appearance and dress of the people and their pattern of settlement. The Indus is thus in many ways a border between the Indian and Iranian culture areas. Pathan villages on either side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are far more alike than many sites which face each other on opposite sides of the Indus.

By the same token, the Pathans and the Baluch have more in common with each other than with the Punjabis and Sindhis. Baluchi, like Pashto, is an Iranian language descended from the same Saka-Kushan origins. This linguistic kinship, as well as the fact that the Baluch tribes, like the Pathans, were bifurcated when the border was drawn in 1893, has contributed to later Afghan irredentist claims on Pakistani territory.

THE POLITICS OF PATHAN IDENTITY

The Red Shirts vs. the British (1929-47)

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the son of a prosperous Pathan landlord at Utmanzai near Peshawar, born in 1890, became an anti-British political activist in 1914. The young Ghaffar Khan, a onetime student at Aligarh University, a nationalist Muslim breeding ground, early set for himself the goal of educating his backward and illiterate people and building among them a sense of national pride and familiarity with their language, culture, and history. Like many Indian nationalists, he saw the end of British rule as the only chance for his people to improve their lot socially and economically. Since direct political action was impossible, Ghaffar Khan chose a more oblique approach common to other nationalists of the period, and promoted social and educational reform. His attempts to open "independent" nongovernment schools in both the settled districts and the tribal areas in 1921 resulted in his arrest and a 3-year jail sentence.
successfully applied to induce the British to open their clubs to Indian membership.

In 1937 Congress President Jawaharlal Nehru toured the NWFP for the first time, speaking widely and universally praising the Red Shirts and Ghaffar Khan, who by that time had earned the epithet "the Frontier Gandhi." Both Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi visited the NWFP the following year and were accorded warm welcomes by Pathan audiences. British observers could only interpret the unlikely spectacle of virile and bloodthirsty mountain men lauding the half-naked little Hindu apostle of nonviolence as evidence that the Pathans planned to use the Congress as a vehicle to end British rule.

The Congress/Red Shirt attitude toward British tribal area policy was colored by a simplistic Gandhian approach. This view held that the tribal Pathans were restless and bellicose because British imperialism respected neither their homeland nor tradition; its forward policy of "peaceful penetration" was a threat and affront to their honor. Once the Congress had achieved self-government, the tribes would join with their Hindu and non-Pathan Muslim brothers to build a new India. Scores of schools, dispensaries, and cottage industries training centers would be built, and the tribal Pathan would rapidly integrate himself into the new polity and society.

With Britain's entry into World War II, however, the Congress governments in eight Indian provinces resigned in protest at not having been consulted prior to the proclamation of war. During the civil disobedience campaign which followed, all senior Congress leaders, including the two Khan brothers, were arrested and sentenced to prison. At the same time, the movement for Pakistan began to gain momentum among many of the Muslims of India while the Congress and the Muslim League bargained with the British over the future of their country.

Red Shirt Victory in NWFP Election (1946). The next upsurge of political activity in the NWFP coincided with the last months of World War II. Ghaffar Khan and the other Khudai Khidmatgar workers imprisoned during the war were released in March 1945, and a Congress Red Shirt ministry led by Dr. Khan Sahib regained control of the government.
by the British policy of "peaceful penetration." This policy aimed at diminishing the inaccessibility of the more forbidding border areas, such as the strongholds of the Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridi, and Mohmands, through roadbuilding and army recruitment, sweetened with promises of noninterference in internal tribal affairs.

There was close cooperation between the Red Shirts and anti-British elements among Mohmand Pathans on both sides of the Durand Line. In 1932 Ghaffar Khan himself addressed Mohmand tribal jirgas in Afghanistan, and a Khudai Khidmatgar "chapter" was formed. Afghan Mohmands participated in a September 1935 action against British forces in the upper Mohmand Agency, but the result was a standoff.

Red Shirt/Congress Ministry in NWFP (1937). In 1934 both Khan brothers were extermed by the British Indian Government from the NWFP and Punjab. Ghaffar Khan spent his occasional months out of prison with Gandhi at his headquarters in Wardha, Central India. Nevertheless, when the results of the first provincial elections under the 1935 Government of India Act were in, the Congress/Red Shirt candidates had won 15 of the 36 reserved Muslim seats and held a cumulative total of 19 out of a possible 50. Once the Congress had decided to take provincial office wherever possible, they were able to form a ministry in 1937 with Hindu and Sikh support, and Dr. Khan Sahib became the first Prime Minister of the NWFP.

The 1935 Act, a more democratic constitution than India had thus far been granted, gave a new degree of self-government and autonomy to the 11 provinces of British India. The prospect of a Congress ministry in the NWFP was viewed with some misgivings by the British authorities, who had long sought to slow the spread of representative government to the strategically located Province. Ghaffar Khan and his followers were considered "wild fanatics" who had now been given a free hand to destroy the framework of law and order in the NWFP. Many institutions created by the British to reward and strengthen the local aristocracy, such as the honorary magistracy, hereditary stipends, and village headmanships, were abolished by the Congress ministry. In addition, indirect pressures were
By late August 1945 the British had decided to schedule elections to the Central and Provincial Assemblies in order to better gauge Indian opinion on the question of Pakistan. The Muslim League won a majority of the seats reserved for Muslims in India's new Central Assembly, but the provincial results were not so conclusive. Nowhere was this more readily apparent than in the Muslim-majority (94 percent) NWFP. When the votes in the February 1946 Provincial Assembly election were tallied, the Congress/Red Shirts had won more Muslim seats than the League and again were able to form a ministry under Dr. Khan Sahib.

Toward the end of 1946, however, the situation in the NWFP began to change. Against the opposition of the British governor, Sir Olaf Caroe, and the central authorities who tended to favor the less radical Muslim League, Jawaharlal Nehru insisted on paying a visit to the NWFP and the tribal areas. Nehru, as member for external affairs in the inter-Indian Government, was responsible for relations with the Pathan tribes in the unadministered area. The tour began inauspiciously with a large and hostile Muslim League demonstration at the Peshawar Airport. Nehru was given a decidedly unfriendly reception by tribal jirgas in Waziristan. The Afridis refused to meet him at all, and in the Khyber Pass and in Malakand he and his party were stoned and slightly injured. Nehru's only friendly welcome in the Province was at Ghaffar Khan's home village of Utmanzai near Peshawar.

Both Nehru and Ghaffar Khan charged the British governor and the political service* with fomenting opposition to his tour and with favoring the Muslim League over the more radical Congress.

There are those who have alleged -- with some hindsight -- that Nehru's insistence on what turned out to be a confrontation with the tribal maliks helped to turn the tide of popular opinion against the Congress in the NWFP and thereby facilitated the creation of Pakistan. Had the abrasive Kashmiri

* The Indian Political Service was the Viceroy's diplomatic corps. It served in the Indian princely states, the tribal areas along the northwest frontier and Baluchistan, in the Persian Gulf, and in diplomatic and consular posts on the perimeter of the British Indian Empire. By the mid-forties, there were several Indian "politicals," some of them posted in the unadministered tribal areas.
Brahmin not reminded the Pathan elders with his very presence that the Congress was Hindu-dominated, they might have continued their support for Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars rather than accepting Pakistan in 1947. In addition, it is possible that Muslim League President Jinnah might not have pushed so strongly for partition had the NWFP not appeared to reverse itself and support his party over the Red Shirts. West Pakistan without the NWFP would have been far less viable and secure.

Even as the probability of a partition became more certain, Gandhi and Ghaffar Khan alone in the Congress leadership continued to oppose it. Because of broadly conflicting reports from British as well as Indian officials, Viceroy Lord Mountbatten decided to visit the NWFP himself in late April to take the political pulse of the people. A Muslim League deputation assured Mountbatten that, contrary to Congress assertions, they were indeed united under the leadership of Jinnah. The Congress-led provincial ministry, led by Ghaffar's brother Khan Sahib, vehemently opposed the Viceroy's suggestion that a new referendum be held to ascertain whether the people preferred India or Pakistan. The Muslim Leaguers, predictably, demanded it and also urged Mountbatten to dismiss the allegedly partisan Khan Sahib ministry and institute governor's rule immediately.

During his short stay in the NWFP, Mountbatten met Pathan tribal leaders both at Landi Kotal in the Khyber Pass and in Peshawar. They demanded the return of the Khyber and their tribal areas and swore that they would not accept Hindu domination. Rather than submit to the Hindus, they alleged that they would prefer to come to terms with Afghanistan. The Mahsuds and Wazirs voiced strong support for Pakistan and asked the Viceroy to dismiss the Congress ministry in Peshawar.

The communal situation in the NWFP grew ever more heated as the hot weather of 1947 wore on. Mountbatten decided to replace Sir Olaf Caroe as governor of the NWFP well in advance of the transfer of power, "in view of the incessant [Congress] allegations" of his pro-Muslim League bias. The Viceroy, however, took pains to assure Caroe of his high regard, suggesting that he go on leave until August 15, the date of the transfer. He would be replaced for the remaining days of British rule by Lieutenant General Sir Rob Lockhart,
they had not voted, a comparison with the previous year's Provincial Assembly election reveals a dramatic shift in favor of the Muslim League and Pakistan. With the inauguration of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, the NWFP and the adjacent tribal areas up to the Durand Line became part of the new Muslim-majority dominion of Pakistan.

Afghanistan Denies Validity of Previous Pacts with UK (1947)

The Durand Line Controversy. The demarcation of a fixed boundary between Afghanistan and British India was a direct result of British concern that Tsarist Russia would try to continue its drive through Central Asia toward the Arabian Sea unless some kind of barrier were set. Through mutual agreement with the Russians, Afghanistan was confirmed as a buffer state under British tutelage in 1881. Once its northern and eastern frontiers were demarcated in consultation with the Russians, only the boundary with British India remained to be fixed.

a. The Durand Agreement (1893). The line was negotiated in Kabul in 1893 with the Afghan authorities by the Foreign Secretary of British India, Sir Mortimer Durand, and has been known by his name ever since. Through that agreement, not only was the boundary between the tribal belt and Afghanistan clearly defined, but also the Afghan Amir's authority was specifically excluded from the tribal territory across the frontier and a line was demarcated beyond which neither side would "exercise interference."* In addition, all the important passes were included on the British side.

* The British also had been concerned with what they considered to be growing Afghan encroachments on tribal territory within the British sphere of influence.
thus assuring military control of the NWFP referendum which would decide the Province's future affiliation with either India or Pakistan.

In May, Ghaffar Khan's son Ghani founded the Zalme Pakhtun (Pathan Youth), an avowedly militant defense group of "volunteers" pledged to counter anti-Red Shirt Muslim League activities. Ghaffar Khan, pledging his continuing dedication to nonviolence, publicly denied any links between the Zalme and the Red Shirts. Nevertheless, the Zalme became a regular participant in Congress/Red Shirt programs in the NWFP.

Ghaffar Khan Demands "Pakhtunistan" Option. Ghaffar Khan vehemently opposed the British decision to hold a NWFP referendum to determine whether the people preferred union with India or Pakistan. He asserted that the issue had already been settled in the 1946 Provincial Assembly election; which had been fought on the India vs. Pakistan question, and that if any referendum were to be held, it should offer a choice between Pakistan and "Pakhtunistan."* With the exception of Gandhi, however, the Congress high command reluctantly favored holding the referendum, since they had come to the conclusion that only a decisive Red Shirt electoral victory offered any hope for Indian retention of the NWFP. There were also growing doubts about Ghaffar Khan's hold over the people in the face of Muslim League propaganda threatening "Hindu Raj" once the British departed. Lurid stories of communal rioting in other parts of India were reaching the NWFP. In addition, a series of ugly communal incidents occurred in connection with the League's civil disobedience movement in the NWFP aimed at forcing the Red Shirt ministry to resign.

In the end the Red Shirts decided to boycott the referendum held July 6-17, 1947, because it did not offer the alternative of "a free Pathan state." The final tally revealed 289,244 votes for Pakistan and 2,874 for India. Despite the boycott, just over 50 percent of the eligible electorate had opted for Pakistan. Since the tribal areas were not part of the NWFP, no poll was held there; tribal jirgas were consulted later in the year. Although the Red Shirts charged that the results were inconclusive because

*As early as 1932, a "very high" British official was quoted by Bertrand Russell as alleging that Ghaffar Khan's true objective was not Indian self-government, but the creation of a Pathanistan, or Pathan state.
PATHAN POPULATION

- Predominantly Pathan (Pashtun) areas
- Province boundary
- Province capital

MAP OF PATHAN POPULATION

AFGHANISTAN

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

PUNJAB

PAKISTAN

BALUCHISTAN

SIND

KABUL

ISLAMABAD

PESHAWAR

QUETTA

KARACHI

Lahore

Arabian Sea

CHINA
At the same time the British wanted to guarantee the peace of the Afghan border and yet refrain from exercising direct control over the tribes. That policy received a severe jolt when the new Amir Amanullah (1919-29), believing that India -- especially the NWFP -- was ripe for revolution against the British, decided to launch an attack. He declared jihad (holy war) against the "infidels" in May 1919. This third and final Anglo-Afghan War lasted exactly 1 month. Afghan troops occupied positions on the Indian side of the Durand Line inside the Khyber Pass, but were never a really serious challenge even to the war-weary British. The only Afghan success was an advance in the Kurram Valley led by Commander in Chief General Nadir Khan. British control over Waziristan disintegrated when the tribal militia mutinied. The action spilled over into British Baluchistan when Fort Sandeman was attacked.

The war was of limited duration, but its repercussions in the tribal belt were felt for some time afterward. Although the Afghans reaffirmed their acceptance of the Durand Line in the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi, which ended the war, they continued to foment unrest on the Indian side. Later in the same year General Nadir Khan summoned tribesmen from the Indian side of the line to Jalalabad, telling them to prepare for war. The British reacted to this provocative activity with an armed movement into Waziristan in late 1919 and early 1920. A modified forward policy was then announced, emphasizing "peaceful penetration" of the tribal areas and gradual extension of control over the tribes through the improvement of communications, especially the construction of roads into the hitherto inaccessible interior. Such a policy, to be successful, however, required similar activity on the Afghan side of the Durand Line.

The 1921 treaty governing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the newly independent Afghan state and Great Britain provided for prior consultation on major military operations in tribal territory close to either side of the line. In an attachment to the treaty, the British also acknowledged Afghan "interest" in the conditions of the frontier tribes. Thus was established the unfortunate precedent for future Afghan claims to speak for all the Pathan tribes on both sides of the border.
The British, in effect, confirmed to the Amir -- and the rest of the world -- that although they would not directly administer the Pathan tribal areas on their side of the line, they also would not take it kindly if any other power tried to "nonadminister" the area between the border of British India and the Afghan frontier.* Thus the destiny of the Pathan tribes on the "non-Afghan" side of the frontier was decided for them in favor of, first, the British, and after 1947, Pakistan. Or so it seemed, for the line effectively bifurcated the tribal area, leaving more than half of the "Afghans/Pathans" on the British side.


Prior to the Durand agreement, Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) had meddling regularly in the eastern tribal zone among the Wazirs, Kurram Turis, Afridis, and Mohmands. They revered him as their spiritual leader, and he used this authority to extend his influence ever closer to the unadministered -- and as yet undefined -- border of India.

Even after the Durand Line had been established, neither Abdur Rahman nor his successor, Habibullah (1901-19), really respected the noninterference clause of the agreement, which they interpreted for their own purposes to restrict only armed interference.** Both sent Afghan emissaries across the frontier to maintain their own influence with the "independent" tribes and brought tribal jirgas to Kabul as state guests. The tribes, in turn, were receiving allowances from both the British and the Afghans as a hedge against armed insurgency.

* The Durand Agreement of November 12, 1893, specifically referred to the line as the frontier of the Amir's dominions "from Wakhan to the Persian Border" and not as the boundary of India. Nevertheless, the effect in terms of international law was the same, since the Amir had renounced sovereignty beyond the Durand Line.

** Habibullah had reaffirmed his acceptance of the terms of the Durand Agreement when he signed the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905.
return Afghanistan to his family's rule. Although Nadir Khan was received courteously by the British on his arrival in Bombay, he was not given any material support in the organization of his campaign. His efforts to mobilize Afridi and Orakzai Pathans in the tribal areas were, in fact, discouraged by the Government of India, which actually prevented Tirah tribals from crossing the border into Afghanistan.

Taking advantage of his previous experience of tribal leadership during the Third Afghan War, he then turned to the Mahsuds and Wazirs, some of whom also had land on the Afghan side and who had been encouraged in hostility to the British by Amanullah. Nadir Khan successfully enlisted their support, including a tribal lashkar (war party) from Waziristan on the British side. It was this lashkar which led the drive on Kabul and regained the country for the general. Its reward was license to loot much of Kabul before returning home across the Durand Line. Nadir Khan's recompense was the Afghan crown, which he assumed as King Nadir Shah. His capture of Kabul was reputedly celebrated by Pathans in the NWFP no less than in Afghanistan.

Indian tribal Pathans continued to cross the Durand Line at will throughout the thirties. In 1933 a strong lashkar of Mahsuds and Wazirs -- the same two tribes which had turned the tide for Nadir Khan in 1929 -- invaded Afghanistan and seized Matun, the capital of Khost Province some 25 miles across the Afghan side of the frontier. The British attempt to cordon off the movement with troops was unsuccessful, and they were forced to resort to air raids on the home villages of the war party to halt the action. The lashkar was also repulsed by Afghan forces.

Mahsuds and some Wazirs were mobilized in 1938 to march across the border and regain Kabul for the deposed Amir Amanullah. The catalytic agent was a young Syrian religious leader, the Shami Pir, who may have been sent to the region by the Germans with the objective of generating sufficient instability in Afghanistan and the NWFP to force the British to maintain strong forces there. The lashkar that he organized set off for the border in mid-June, but was dispersed by the RAF and the Afghan Army...
The Afghans and the Indian Pathans (1920-39).

Although Afghanistan's extracurricular activities among Pathan tribals on the other side of the Durand Line were viewed with alarm and denounced as meddling by the British, Kabul's motivation should also be taken into account. From Amanullah's vantage point, the "modified forward policy," like the forward policy per se, posed a potential threat to the stability of his government. The British movement up the valleys toward Afghanistan, in territory which the Afghans had never considered to be part of India, was considered provocative. The only response Amanullah could offer was to continue regular payments to anti-British tribesmen on the Indian side and maintain a kind of militia in Waziristan. Following more conventional diplomatic practice, Amanullah also protested the British policy through his own press and his minister in London.*

Ghaffar Khan's nationalist activities in India on behalf of the Pathan cause had a cross-fertilization effect in Afghanistan as well. His political journal Pakhtun was widely circulated among Afghan Pashtuns. In addition, he recorded a conversation with Amanullah during his brief stay in Kabul in 1920, in the course of which he urged the Amir, as well as other Afghan officials and students, to learn the "national language" (Pashto). Whenever he met with tribal jirgas, Amanullah affected Pathan dress and addressed them in memorized Pashto. The "Pashtunization" process was not to receive major attention in Afghanistan, however, until the mid-thirties, and the lingua franca of educated Afghans -- then, as now -- continued to be the distinctive national variant of Persian, Dari.

In 1928 Amanullah was overthrown in Afghanistan by a Tajik bandit who then proclaimed himself Amir. Amanullah's cousin, former Commander in Chief and subsequent Minister to Paris Nadir Khan, took this development as a signal to end his self-exile in the south of France and attempt to

* In 1927, for example, the Afghan Minister sent a note to the Foreign Office alleging that one aspect of forward policy tactics was to rouse the Afghan tribes against the Amir's government.
before it could do much damage. The Shami Pir was persuaded to meet the British frontier authorities and to accept a large bribe as his price for leaving India.

The Afghan Government did not assist the Mohmands and the Wazirs in their military operations against the British during the mid-thirties, reflecting the policy of the new King Nadir Shah (1929-33) and his son, Zahir Shah (1933-73), of maintaining as positive relations as possible with the British. This pattern began to change in 1937, however, as the Afghans became aware of the growing strength in India of the Muslim League and the potential threat to Afghan irredentist aspirations embodied in the Pakistan concept. Thereafter, the Afghan Government returned to the provocative policy of Amanullah and began supporting Ghaffar Khan, after an interregnum of 7 years of official disapproval. This Afghan support was a contributing factor in the Red Shirts' ability to rally popular Pathan support for their Congress-linked party as late as the mid-forties when the League vision of Pakistan had captured the Muslim imagination in most other parts of British India.

Afghan Reaction to the 1947 Partition of India. Afghanistan had adopted an attitude of strict neutrality during the Second World War. In diplomatic discussions with the British early in the war, however, the Afghans raised the issue of their national interests in the event of postwar Indian independence. The British did not respond to Kabul's request either for the return of the territory up to the Indus River or for an assurance that full autonomy would be granted to the region. In subsequent discussions the Afghans placed on record their view that Afghan-British agreements relating to the NWFP would lapse should India become a dominion or otherwise achieve independence.

The Afghan press was quick to react to Ghaffar Khan's 1947 demand for a referendum which offered a possible Pakhtunistan option. Commentators emphasized the need for revising existing border agreements and changing the "temporary" dividing lines which had separated the two "halves of the Afghan nation." Within 10 days of the June 3, 1947, announcement of the imminent transfer of power and partition of the subcontinent, the Afghans sent a note to both the British and Indian Governments, saying that the inhabitants of the region between the Durand Line and the Indus River were Afghans and must decide for themselves
whether to join Afghanistan, Pakistan, or India, or declare their independence.

The British replied on July 3 that they considered the Treaty of 1921, in which both states recognized the boundary, to be binding. They asked Afghanistan to abstain from any act of intervention on the northwest frontier at the time of transfer of power to the Government of India. This prompted a second note from the Afghans reiterating their views on the future of the Pathans.

King Zahir Shah, in his address to the Afghan legislative body in August 1947, had declared that Afghanistan was firmly committed to a policy of "assisting the Pashtuns to the east of the Durand Line," and that they "should be recognized as a separate entity and the deciding of their future should be unconditionally entrusted to themselves." This stand was emphasized for a wider audience in September when Afghanistan became the only member of the United Nations to vote against Pakistan's admission, on the grounds that the Pathans had not had a fair plebiscite. In November an Afghan representative, Prince Najibullah Khan, discussed with Pakistani leaders his government's contention that all former treaties with the British, especially those governing the Durand frontier, had been signed under duress and were hence null and void. Although he received a courteous hearing, his proposals were firmly rejected.

Persistent Afghan Demand for "Pashtunistan." Ever since 1948 Afghanistan has maintained that the Pathans and -- subsequently -- the Baluch of Pakistan are "trans-Durand Afghans." Referring to the NWFP and Baluchistan, respectively, as "Occupied Northern and Southern Pashtunistan," the Kabul authorities have never given up their claim that the Durand Line is no longer a valid international boundary and that the tribal people of Pakistan should be permitted to determine freely their own future.

Confrontation over the issue of Pashtunistan reached its height during the first prime ministership of Mohammad Daud (1953-63). Daud, a member of the Afghan ruling family, and himself a Pashtun, twice brought economic chaos to his country when Pakistan retaliated against his policies by halting the transit shipment of essential imports. The second incident led to Daud's downfall in 1963.
Successive Afghan governments improved relations with Pakistan, but did not waiver in their demands for Pathan and Baluch self-determination and for a revision of the Durand Line boundary. Although the policy of direct confrontation did not again surface until the July 1973 coup which restored Daud to power, Afghanistan continued to maintain close ties with Pathan extremist elements in the Pakistani tribal areas.

Pathan Nationalist Politics in Pakistan (1947-73)

Legitimate Discontent: The Pathan Case

a. Economic. Historically, the meager resources of the Pathans’ homeland were little exploited as long as the Pathans could extract tolls from outside powers that wanted safe passage through their territory. With the great changes of modern times, however, the Pathans can no longer live off their environment.

More than 80 percent of the population is directly dependent on agriculture, yet only 36 percent of the land is cultivable. With the exception of the fertile Peshawar Valley and parts of Mardan district, lack of proper irrigation facilities has hampered the expansion of agricultural production.

Rapid population growth and an increasing population density are fast reaching a critical stage. There is a growing dependency on food imports from other parts of the country, and there are signs of an increasing government reliance on providing subsidized commodities and services in an effort to prevent living standards from declining further.* Yet many Punjabi and Sindhi West Pakistan provincial and GOP officials responsible for the NWFP were genuinely ignorant of conditions there, and did little to bridge the information gap during the One Unit years.

The absorption of the NWFP into the Province of West Pakistan in 1955 was bitterly resented by most Pathans. There

* Items subsidized include pesticides, fertilizers, seeds, tractor and bulldozer services, tubewell construction, and irrigation water.
was widespread feeling that the Lahore government was not responsive to their needs, and that this accounted in large part for the unsatisfactory rate of progress in the frontier region, which, like Baluchistan, has far lower per capita incomes than Punjab or Sind. Industrial growth tended to concentrate around the large urban centers of Karachi and Lahore, as well as the smaller Punjabi cities of Multan and Lyallpur.

The promotion of the industrial development in the NWFP had been one of the objectives of the "Frontier NAP" (the usual designation of the NAP branch in that province). While some pressure could be exerted on the Central Government to support such development projects as hydroelectric schemes and irrigation canals, private investors had to be assured of sufficient guarantees before they would risk their capital. The volatile nature of provincial politics has undoubtedly also discouraged some potential investors from considering the NWFP as a possible site.

Economic discontent looms large in the Pathan consciousness. While it is legitimate, early solutions are unlikely, given the magnitude of the problem and the scarcity of financial and natural resources. The broader issue of political malaise, which has been fueled by economic disparities and underdevelopment, offers even less prospect of resolution.

b. Political. Pathan nationalists, beginning with Ghaffar Khan and the Red Shirts, inherited a political inferiority complex and sense of being discriminated against from the experience of British rule. When other provinces of British India were benefiting from the gradual development of representative government, the NWFP was considered too sensitive and backward to share in the process. Although the Pathans had caught up with the rest of the country by the time of independence, the underdog mentality had been ingrained in their consciousness.

This mentality, combined with fierce independence and deep-seated parochialism, prepared the Pathan well for the role of permanent oppositionist in an independent Pakistan, the very existence of which he had not really supported until the last months of British rule. The new Pakistani authorities, in turn, had inherited from their British predecessors a strong suspicion of Pathan motives. They considered the Red Shirts and the NAP to be Socialists, friends of India, and congenital foes of the movement which had created Pakistan. At the same time, the old assumptions that the NWFP was the
last line of defense against possible Soviet movement toward the warm water have predisposed Pakistan's leadership against any indication of Pathan assertiveness.

Thus, a combination of circumstances growing out of the poverty, backwardness, natural isolationism, and supposed strategic importance of the NWFP served to perpetuate the problems of the area and its difficult relationship with the central authority. The equation which governs the operation of Pathan politics in the post-Bangladesh era is still heavily influenced by the heritage of the past 50-odd years of Pathan political consciousness.

Political Struggle (1947-70)

a. Red Shirts Eclipsed by Muslim League. Within a week of the August 1947 partition, the NWFP Governor, Sir George Cunningham, dismissed Dr. Khan Sahib's Congress/Red Shirt ministry and replaced it with a Muslim League government led by Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, a non-Pathan who had switched his allegiance from the Congress only 2 years earlier. Bowing to political realities, a province-wide meeting of the Red Shirts and associated organizations declared their allegiance to Pakistan in September. At this conference Ghaffar Khan redefined Pakhtunistan as "a unit within Pakistan" consisting of the settled districts and all contiguous Pathan-areas wishing to join the new state. He made it clear, however, that the "state" to which he referred was Pakhtunistan itself and that it would enter into defense, external affairs, and communications agreements with Pakistan.

Between the August partition and the end of November, Pakistan changed the official designation of the "tribal areas" to "frontier regions" and completed a series of agreements with the tribal maliks. Pakistani officials met with each tribal jirga and declared their intention to protect the tribe and respect its autonomy. The jirga then responded with an expression of loyalty. These declarations were accompanied with Pakistani undertakings to continue the British practice of paying subsidies to loyal maliks.

As an expression of good faith, the GOP abandoned the "forward policy" pursued by the British in Waziristan since the tribal uprisings that followed the end of the Third Afghan War in 1919. Pakistani troops were withdrawn in December, and publicity was given to Governor General Jinnah's assurances to the Wazirs that the unpopular military control of their
tribal agency was being disbanded to eliminate all suspicions among brother Muslims. This policy, also prompted by Pakistan's inability to bear the cost of a forward policy and its need to match the Indian Army in Kashmir, contributed to a significant reduction in frontier tensions and made Pakistan's authority even more agreeable to the tribal Pathans.

Tribal support for Pakistan had also been bolstered by the new government's tacit approval -- and some observers believe, encouragement -- of Pathan lashkars entering the state of Kashmir in a jihad against the infidels. Thousands of tribal Pathans from both the Pakistan and Afghanistan sides of the Durand Line looted and massacred their way up the Jhelum River valley toward Srinagar in October 1947 until they were repulsed by Indian Army troops.

At the Constituent Assembly session in Karachi in February 1948, Ghaffar Khan swore an oath of allegiance to Pakistan, but continued to speak ambiguously of Pakhtunistan. Refusing Jinnah's invitation to merge the Khudai Khidmatgars with the Muslim League, Ghaffar Khan instead announced that he would extend the Red Shirt movement throughout Pakistan as a "volunteer" force for the newly formed Pakistan People's Party.* Among the stated objectives of this new party were the stabilization of Pakistan as a "Union of Socialist Republics" and "full and unimpaired autonomy for all." At the same time, Ghaffar Khan denounced Jinnah's Muslim League government as a British puppet and urged the Pathans not to rest content until they had established Pakhtunistan, which he now defined as "rule of, by, and for the Pakhtuns."

Ghaffar Khan, his son Wali, and other Khudai Khidmatgar leaders were arrested June 15, 1948, and charged with sedition. Ghaffar was also accused of planning "collaboration" with the Faqir of Ipi and was sentenced to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment. Although an elected member of the Constituent Assembly, Ghaffar Khan was kept in jail until early 1954. Within 3 months of his arrest the Red Shirts were declared an unlawful organization. Apparently, the independent GOP now considered him as much a threat to internal security as had its British predecessor.

When Ghaffar Khan was finally released from detention at the beginning of 1954, he was enjoined against entering the NWFP. This order, however, was lifted in mid-1955. During his first tour of the NWFP, Ghaffar Khan denounced the GOP's

* A collection of regionalist political groups not to be confused with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's party of the same name formed in 1967.
imminent intention to abolish provincial divisions within the west wing and merge them all into one unit -- the new Province of West Pakistan. He realized that the Red Shirts would be politically emasculated under the new arrangement, which would automatically favor larger parties with a wider appeal.

b. Red Shirts Join Regionalist Opposition To Form NAP. In July 1957, after more than 2 years of fruitless anti-One Unit agitation throughout the country, Ghaffar Khan joined with several other regionalist and/or leftist politicians in Dacca, East Pakistan, to form the National Awami Party (NAP).

The West Pakistan NAP comprised six smaller groups which had united under the leadership of Ghaffar Khan in December 1956 to form the Pakistan National Party.* This group joined forces with the veteran East Pakistani opposition politician, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, and his associates to work for complete provincial autonomy, the end of One Unit, and an independent, nonaligned foreign policy.

While they also aimed at parity between the two wings, the most important aspect of the party program for Ghaffar Khan and the Red Shirts -- which, in effect, became the NWFP branch of the NAP -- was the "restoration" of autonomous provinces in West Pakistan "on the basis of cultural and linguistic homogeneity and geographical contiguity."** In addition, they proposed the merger of the tribal areas and agencies as integral parts of contiguous provinces and the integration of "nomadic, semi-nomadic, and tribal peoples" into "larger settlements so that better civic amenities can be provided to them."

The formation of the NAP coincided with -- and was a typical expression of -- the endemic political fragmentation

* The west wing provincial NAP also included the Quetta Division's proponent of Pakhtunistan, Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, and his Wrore Pashtun party; and the Baluch nationalist group Ustaman Gul, led by Prince Abdul Karim of Kalat.

** Constitution of the Pakistan National Awami Party (1957), Part II, "Aims, Objects and Programme."
which had plagued the country once the euphoria of independence had dissipated. Ghaffar Khan's brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, originally selected as a nonparty chief minister for the new provincial government of West Pakistan in 1955, managed to keep control of the Province until July 1957, during which time he formed the Republican Party. He was, however, dismissed from the post in early July.

As governments fell, one after the other, the military watched and bided their time. In October 1958 they declared martial law, abrogated the constitution, and abolished all political parties. Within 3 weeks of the declaration, the actual leader of the coup, Pakistan Army Commander in Chief General Mohammad Ayub Khan, replaced another general, Iskander Mirza, as President in a bloodless succession. One week after the declaration of martial law, Ghaffar Khan, Bhashani, and several other opposition politicos were arrested as "anti-national" elements. Ghaffar Khan was not released until April 1959. Under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) of August 7, the Red Shirt leader, as well as some 106 other former party politicians charged with contributing to the previous political instability, was disqualified from holding public office until the end of 1966.

Ghaffar Khan's style was a bit cramped by EBDO, but it did not prevent him from touring and speaking throughout the NWFP. Charged with indulging in anti-state activities, the old man was again arrested in April 1961 -- nearly 2 years to the day from his release. This time he was to remain in prison until January 1964. His arrest was followed by the incarceration of scores of other NAP leaders in both wings of the country.

c. Wali Khan Replaces His Father as Pathan Leader. During Ghaffar's imprisonment, leadership of the Frontier NAP passed to his son, Khan Abdul Wali Khan (b. 1915). Wali had been involved in opposition politics since his childhood. This experience, as well as a realistic appreciation of the extent to which the NAP could influence current political developments in the country, led him to relinquish charge of the NWFP branch of the party in mid-1964 after less than a year in office. Shortly thereafter Ghaffar Khan received permission to leave Pakistan on the trip which would end in his decision to take up residence in Afghanistan, and eventually to remain there for 8 years of self-exile. Although Wali
continued to occupy a position of authority within the party and among its Pathan supporters, the functional political role of the Ghaffar Khan family in Pakistan was temporarily eclipsed.

Pathan nationalists, like all their opposition colleagues, suffered disastrous reversals in the January 1965 presidential elections. Under Ayub Khan's misnamed indirect electoral system, "Basic Democracies," the deck was stacked in favor of the government. The basic democracies structure was geared toward maintaining pro-government forces in power and was easily manipulable, with predictable results. The fact that Ayub's Pakistan Muslim League or pro-government independents swept local Pathan-majority constituencies in the NWFP and Baluchistan, however, is not particularly noteworthy. The opposition candidate, Miss Fatima Jinnah, was to carry only the anti-Ayub stronghold of Karachi in all of West Pakistan.

What is noteworthy is the relatively high level of support for Miss Jinnah in the two NAP/Red Shirt centers of Peshawar and Mardan districts and, conversely, the wide margin of Ayub's victory in all the centrally administered Pathan tribal agencies along the Afghan border. The elections to the National Assembly held 2 months later were even more disastrous for the opposition, which was unable to win a single seat. Political observers concluded that the back of the frontier NAP was broken, except for diehard elements in Peshawar and the Ghaffar/Wali stronghold of Charsadda-Mardan.

Despite temptations for Pathan nationalists to take advantage of the unsettled conditions resulting from the September 1965 war with India, the NWFP and the tribal areas remained tranquil. Jirgas in the tribal belt instituted an intertribal truce, and 2,000 to 3,000 tribal "mujahids" ("holy warriors against the infidels") volunteered for service on the Indian border. In a move which subsequently damaged his bona fides among Pathan nationalists — but presumably under heavy government pressure — Wali Khan made several public statements appealing for national unity during the emergency.
The remnant of the Red Shirts left in the NAP identified themselves openly as frontier nationalists, but lacked the ability or determination to galvanize solid political support in Ayub Khan's Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan's self-exile and activities in Afghanistan were criticized regularly in the GOP-controlled press, and his prolonged absence from the local scene weakened the residual effect of his appeal. During this period Wali, the head of the family in Pakistan, was considered little more than a figurehead as Acting President of the frontier NAP during the 3 years (1963-66) when Party President Arbab Sikander Khan was in jail.

There was a revival of extremist activity near the Afghan border in the South Waziristan Tribal Agency during June 1966. Afghan agents were rumored to be offering bribes to tribals to fly Pashtunistan flags along the Waziristan border. At the same time, however, the American Consul in Peshawar reported no substantial support or potential drawing power for the Pakhtunistan movement in the NWFP. Nevertheless, frontier Pathans resented the short shrift which they claimed to be getting from the Provincial Government in Lahore. They were in the forefront of the move to disband the One Unit in the west wing and return to the former provincial arrangements with their own government in Peshawar.

The frontier NAP's emphasis on protesting One Unit was its major point of difference with the national party and reflected the frontier nationalist -- and, by extension, Pathan -- element which gave it its strength in the former NWFP. It is conceivable that it was because of this commitment against One Unit that the Frontier NAP refused to cooperate with other opposition parties, in contradiction of the stated aim of NAP National General Secretary Usmani to form a joint opposition platform.

d. Wali Khan Elected NAP/R President After Party Split. By the end of 1967 the NAP was in its death throes as a united party, deeply divided over domestic priorities and the question of a pro-Peking vs. a pro-Moscow international line. The final break came in July 1968 when the longer moderate branch of the NAP met in Peshawar, refusing any more to accept the leadership of pro-Peking Bengali politician Maulana Bhashani. Wali Khan was elected national president of the new NAP/R (Right), which declared the breakup of One Unit as its primary objective. The party's national council also called for the "reorganization of autonomous provinces on the basis of language and culture" and the "promotion of
regional languages, cultures and traditions. Pathan, Sindhi, Baluch, and Punjabi nationalists congratulated each other, paying self-conscious respect to the various regional sentiments represented at the meeting, including those of East Pakistan. For the first time in several years, the GOP tolerated Pakhtunistan slogans and speeches during this meeting. Pro-Pakistan or other expressions of national sentiment, on the other hand, were not heard.

Wali Khan chose the occasion to question the "anomalous" position of the tribal territories, "deliberately" left out of the mainstream of Pakistani polity although their representatives sat in assemblies and passed judgment on laws to which they were not subject and taxes which they did not have to pay. The general secretary of the Punjab NAP raised a similar point, asking why the tribal areas were separate from the rest of Pakistan if the GOP truly sought national solidarity. While the NAP/R leaders berated the Ayub regime for its tribal policy, however, there was little evidence that the tribal Pathans had any interest in changing the permissive arrangements under which they operated.

Although backward economically, the tribal agencies shared in the Ayub government's rural works program under a formula which actually gave them a slight per capita advantage over the settled districts. They also had first call on all government construction contracts in their territory, including canal and preparatory work for the Warsak and Gomal Dams. They were issued permits for truck and bus lines. This arrangement gave them a major share of the carrying trade on the frontier, allowing them to earn in the settled districts while keeping their vehicles and shops tax-free in the unadministered areas. "Tame" tribal maliks who were members of the national and provincial assemblies from the Khyber Agency and Waziristan also were given textile factory permits. Even the unruly Mahsuds were granted irrigated government land in Sind, ostensibly to encourage them to shift to the settled districts, but in practice creating them absentee landlords with Sindhi tenants.

In September 1968 President Ayub delivered a diatribe against Ghaffar Khan at a meeting of tribal maliks near Mardan, branding him a "traitor." The GOP-controlled Pakistan Times lumped Ghaffar Khan together with the Bengali autonomist Mujibur Rahman and People's Party leader Z. A. Bhutto as "disruptionist" elements. Ayub's attack was
echoed by West Pakistan Governor Mohammad Musa at a Peshawar tribal levee when he denounced not only Ghaffar Khan, but his son Wali as well, urging him to join his father in Afghanistan, where he was "plotting the dissolution of Pakistan." Distorting a recent Ghaffar Khan statement on his criteria for friendship, Musa told the Pathan maliks:

As if his past activities and utterances were not enough to condemn him, he has now chosen to insult the Pakhtuns by saying that the Hindus of India are better friends for them than their own people in Pakistan.

Musa also called untrue Ghaffar Khan's claims that he only conceived of Pakhtunistan within Pakistan.

The fact that both the President and the West Pakistan provincial governor would lavish such vituperation on an octogenarian regional politician indicated some awareness -- or at least anticipation -- of the political ferment which was growing throughout the country. Within a week of the Musa statement, the spark which signaled the beginning of the end of the Ayub "system" was struck in Rawalpindi. The arrival there of Bhutto on November 7, coinciding with a student demonstration and clashes with the police, resulted in outbreaks of violence which were to sweep Pakistan in the weeks ahead. Three days after the Rawalpindi incident, a youth attempted to assassinate President Ayub at a mass meeting in Peshawar.

Within days the GOP responded by arresting under the Defense of Pakistan Rules the men they called the "preachers of violence" -- Wali Khan, Bhutto, and leading members of their parties. Although they were to remain under detention until mid-February 1969, the NAP/R Provincial President in West Pakistan, M. A. Qasuri, continued to defend the party against GOP charges that it aimed at weakening the country. At a mass meeting in Peshawar, Qasuri acknowledged the party's desire for friendship with Afghanistan, but asserted that this did not extend to permitting the Afghan Government to cast an "evil eye" on Pakistani territory.

The Wali Khan NAP and several other opposition parties joined in early 1969 to form the Democratic Action Committee (DAC). Its goals, simply stated, were a return to parliamentary democracy and the restoration of civil rights denied under the state of emergency. Although pledged to nonviolence and discipline, the protests organized by the DAC beginning
January 17, 1969, soon degenerated into a countrywide wave of violence resulting in death and the destruction of public and private property.

The Ayub government, recognizing the depth of feeling expressed in the political upsurge, began to make concessions in February. Wali Khan and other opposition leaders were released from prison, the emergency was ended, and a broad spectrum of political parties was invited to a conference. Soon after his release, Wali told a group of US correspondents that his Pakhtunistan goal was simply the reestablishment of the NWFP within Pakistan and that there was no disagreement between him and his father, Ghaffar Khan, on that point. Wali admitted that the status of the tribal areas posed a "quandary" for the NAP/R since their population was almost equal to that of the settled districts. While they had representation (via the basic democracies system) in the provincial and national assemblies, they were not subject to Pakistan taxes or legal restraints; the arrangement also permitted the GOP political agents to control their voting and assure pro-Ayub results. This theme of merging the tribal areas with the NWFP dates back to the pre-Independence Congress/Red Shirt platform of Ghaffar Khan; it became a canon for the NAP/R.

Although Ayub conceded the major constitutional demands of the DAC and agreed not to be a candidate in the next presidential election, forces had been set in motion which he could no longer control. The opposition, reverting to type, began squabbling among themselves, unable to agree on ultimate goals once their broad objectives had been granted. The first flush of success encouraged regionalist and other opposition forces throughout the country to develop more extreme demands. Law and order threatened to break down completely as police grew increasingly unable to quell student violence, and mobs vented their anger on such establishment targets as ministerial residences and even cars and buses.

e. Proclamation of Martial Law Following Ayub Ouster.
The result was Ayub's resignation and the proclamation of martial law on March 25. Political parties were not abolished, but it is significant that one of the early martial law regulations (MLR 19) forbade the dissemination of "reports on provincial, sectarian and linguistic basis calculated toward territorial
or administrative dismemberment of Pakistan" on penalty of 14 years' imprisonment. The Pathans voiced disappointment with this setback to their hopes for a rapid dissolution of One Unit and the restoration of the NWFP. The new President, former Army Commander in Chief General A. M. Yahya Khan, did, however, make a point of including Wali Khan among a group of politicians invited to meet him during his first post-martial law declaration visit to Peshawar in May.

Apparently anticipating little chance for rapid political change in Pakistan, Wali departed for medical treatment of a chronic eye condition in London soon after his meeting with Yahya. En route to Europe, he stopped in Kabul to visit his father. This visit gave rise to accusations that Wali not only had conferred on strategy with Ghaffar Khan, but also met with Indira Gandhi while there.

Shortly after his return to Pakistan from Europe, again via Afghanistan, Wali Khan somewhat ambiguously defined his goal as "an independent province within Pakistan, but not an independent country." The NAP/R also began suggesting that the NWFP be renamed "Pakhtunistan." While Wali asserted that national integration in the larger sense was Pakistan's most serious problem, he warned also that delay in the "disintegration" of One Unit was "fraught with dangerous consequences."

Soon thereafter, the Qaiyum Khan faction of the Muslim League, hoping to steal some NAP/R thunder, also proposed the renaming of the Province. The two differed, however, in their constitutional formulae. Qaiyum, the longtime enemy of Ghaffar Khan, Wali, and the Pathan nationalists, proposed a strong Central Government, while the NAP/R persisted in its demand for considerable provincial autonomy. Qaiyum chose the occasion to denounce Ghaffar Khan's acceptance of an Indian Government invitation to participate prominently in the Gandhi centenary. Pakistani suspicion of Wali was not allayed when he visited Kabul, ostensibly for eye treatment, after his father's departure for India. Wali's attendance at the King's birthday celebration, where he was personally and publicly greeted by Zahir Shah and "royally treated" by Afghan officials, added to his unsavory aura in GOP eyes.
By December, after Yahya's announcement of the imminent end of One Unit, Qaiyum had reversed himself on the "Pakhtunistan" name, claiming it had been chosen by Gandhi at a time when the Red Shirts opposed the very creation of Pakistan. Qaiyum charged that Wali and Ghaffar Khan had not given up their dream of leading the NWFP to independence. In response, Wali scoffed at these charges, calling the idea of an independent Pakhtunistan "completely unrealistic," and denying that provincial autonomy would mean economic separatism. He speculated that only if the Punjab attempted to apply pressure on the other provinces would the Pathans, Sindhis, and Baluch "go our own way alone."

Although the GOP had been apprehensive about Ghaffar Khan's extended stay in India, a Foreign Office official told an American Embassy officer in late December 1969 that the old man's moderate statements had helped to improve the atmosphere. Pakistanis also approved of Ghaffar's accusations that the Indian Government and its leadership had failed to protect the Muslin minority, and of his protest fast against communal rioting then in progress in India. The Pakistanis felt that he had "cut the ground out" from under the case for an independent Pakhtunistan by expressing a willingness to accept full provincial status for the NWFP within Pakistan. They had no illusions, however, about his motives, which they saw in terms of an effort to boost NAP/R electoral prospects in the yet unscheduled contest for the National Assembly.

When President Yahya issued his Legal Framework Order at the end of March 1970, specifying the regulations and principles governing the election of a National Assembly in October and the drafting of a new constitution by that body, certain crucial provisions provoked immediate controversy. The opposition in general, but especially the regional autonomists in East Pakistan and the NWFP, denounced the subordination of the assembly to the final authority of Yahya and the slighting of provincial autonomy. While article 20 established the principle of "maximum" autonomy for the provinces, it also required that the Central Government have "adequate" powers in relation to external and internal affairs.

f. Rebirth of the NWFP. There was universal rejoicing in Peshawar when the North-West Frontier Province was reborn with the end of One Unit on July 1, 1970. The fact that the tribal areas were maintained as centrally administered territories pleased both the Afghan Government (RGA) and many
tribal maliks. The RGA approved of the arrangement because it sustained the separate status of the tribal agencies, rather than integrating them into West Pakistan proper and removing them one step further from the legal fiction of RGA sovereignty. The maliks, on the other hand, preferred the continuation of the system because it protected their traditional status, their freedom from Pakistani regulations and laws, and the lucrative economic arrangements from which they benefited. At the same time some maliks feared that the appointment of "political" governors allied with majority parties, following the convening of provincial assemblies, would encroach on their "rights."

The National Assembly elections, originally scheduled for October, had to be postponed until December because of the August floods and November cyclone in East Pakistan. Although representatives were directly elected throughout Pakistan, the tribal area contests were decided on the basis of participation by only the few thousand tribal maliks. Each of the five tribal agencies, plus two tribal pockets in the Peshawar and Malakand divisions, elected one delegate to the National Assembly.

Since the party politicians assumed that the maliks would vote as the GOP political agents directed, few bothered to devote much campaign time to the tribal areas. Qaiyum Khan did venture into the Khyber Agency and Wali Khan to a tribal pocket of Kohat district south of Peshawar, but they lavished the better part of their time and energy on the settled districts where representation would be on a one-man, one-vote basis.

When the votes were counted, embarrassment and gloom prevailed in the NAP/R camp. The Wali Khan forces were barely able to muster six of the NWFP's 18 seats in the National Assembly. A left-leaning religious party, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), did far better than expected (eight) through appeals to the illiterate, fanatically Muslim Pathans to vote against the "Godless" Wali, threatening "God's wrath" if they hesitated. The NAP debacle was also seen as a demonstration of Wali Khan's inability to inject a new sense of purpose into the old Red Shirt movement.

Perhaps anticipating renewed NAP pressures for merger of the tribal areas with the NWFP, a representative group of tribal maliks, including former legislators and newly elected MNAs (Members of the National Assembly), held a
press conference in Peshawar in mid-January 1971. They declared that if the new constitution did not provide for a strong Central Government, "the seven million [sic] tribesmen would be constrained to demand a separate province under the name of Qabailistan [Land of Tribes]." This new province would include the five tribal agencies plus the Malakand Division. The maliks concluded with the assertion that they would oppose "unequivocally" any attempt to bring the tribal areas under NWFP jurisdiction. This demand may have also reflected their fear that a weak center would no longer be in a position to continue tribal subsidies amounting to nearly 170,000,000 rupees (ca. US$17 million at the present rate of exchange) per year in allowances and development inputs. It was their position that if the center were weak, they could better survive with their own provincial government than as an appendage of an impoverished NWFP.

Once the civil war had begun in East Pakistan, on March 26, 1971, the Pakhtunistan extremists in the tribal areas hoped to benefit from the disturbances to further their plans for a Pathan "war of liberation." Their leaders were Niaz Ali, nephew of and successor to the late Faqir of Ipi, and Khalifa Abdul Latif. Despite their eagerness, Ghaffar Khan was said to be firmly opposed to an armed rising in the tribal belt. He issued a public statement in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, 2 months after the outbreak of the violence, disclosing his earlier offer to go to East Pakistan and mediate between the Awami League and the GOP. When the offer was not accepted because of GOP conditions to which Ghaffar Khan could not agree, he observed, "If Mujib's majority cannot achieve majority rights, what hope is there for us Pakhtuns?" The old man returned to the theme of suppression of Bengali rights when he spoke at the August 31 Pashtunistan Day observance in Kabul, reflecting his own concern as well as that of the RGA.

The Pathan extremists, undaunted by Ghaffar Khan's advice, established the Azad (Independent) Pakhtun Union under the presidency of Niaz Ali in early August during a meeting of "independent" tribal representatives at Razmak in the North Waziristan Agency on the Pakistan side of the border.

Progress on constitutional matters in the tribal majority provinces (the NWFP and Baluchistan) was also stymied by the effects of the war on the national consciousness and the emergency regulations in effect. While the Pathans, as the
major spokesmen for provincial autonomy in the west wing, sympathized with the Bengali plight, there was little they could do under the circumstances. Wali Khan speculated during a conversation in May with the American Consul in Peshawar that if the generals tried to suppress the people of West Pakistan in the same way that they "killed democracy" in the East, they would end up with three independent provinces and a Punjab "forced to eat crow by India." Shortly afterward he resigned the presidency of the NAP, citing the end of his 2-year term and his need to return to London for an eye operation. Party sources indicated that an additional reason was his disappointment with the post-March 26 turn of events which had frustrated NAP efforts to play a leading role in the NWFP and Baluchistan, where they had also received a plurality in the Provincial Assembly elections.

The party's fortunes took a turn for the worse in late November, shortly after the declaration of a national emergency, when President Yahya banned "all groups and factions" of the NAP, permitting, however, elected MNAs and MPAs to retain their seats. He denounced the NAP as a party which had fought against the creation of Pakistan, and some of whose leaders were then acting against the interests and security of the country at a time when it was fighting subversion and Indian "aggression" in East Pakistan. Yahya also branded Ghaffar Khan "the most inveterate of all opponents of Pakistan," "never relenting in his hostility to the country," and "now in open alliance with its enemies." The action was designed to placate Qaiyum Khan, GOP supporter and traditional foe of the NAP, and also was intended as a warning to Bhutto's Peoples Party (PPP).

g. NAP Replaces PPP as Opposition Leader. Within less than a month Pakistan had been decisively defeated and reduced to its west wing, Bangladesh was a reality, and former "disruptionist" Bhutto was the country's new President. The NAP, and however, refused to cooperate with Bhutto unless he met three major conditions: immediate withdrawal of martial law, promulgation of a new constitution under which each province received a degree of autonomy consonant with the Awami League's Six Points, and authorization for the NAP to appoint and form governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Within weeks, the NAP became the focal point for opposition to Bhutto, not only in the tribal provinces, but elsewhere as well.
In February 1972 the NAP reactivated the Pakhtun Zalme, the militant Pathan volunteers originally formed in 1947 by Wali's brother Ghani as a counterpoise to Muslim League toughs who were agitating against the Red Shirts during the last days of British rule. Wali contended that they were unarmed youths whose only function was to police NAP meetings, but the move was interpreted as a response to the PPP "People's Guards" and to the consideration then being given to arming them. By the end of the month the Zalme were 6,000 strong in the NWFP.

As part of his campaign to establish the NAP as the principal national opposition party, Wali organized a speaking tour in late March through the Punjab, the heart of Bhutto country. In an attempt to dispel the separatist image of the NAP which successive Pakistani governments had encouraged in the public consciousness, Wali in Lyallpur declared flatly that Pakhtunistan was no longer an issue for the NAP and somewhat disingenuously challenged anyone to prove that he had uttered a "single word" on the subject in over 3 years. He also charged that regionalism was being played up as an issue by "vested interests" conspiring to divide the country.

The NAP and the GOP, as personified by Bhutto and the PPP, have carried on a running battle of backbiting and harassment ever since then, the former portraying itself as a champion of democratic freedoms under the gun of a Fascist demagogue in republican clothing.

Pathan nationalism per se remained relatively quiescent during the remainder of 1972. Political maneuvering involving threat and counterthreat culminated in the GOP's agreement in March to convene the National Assembly to prepare an interim constitution. In addition, the Provincial Assemblies were scheduled to meet in April, forestalling Wali Khan's earlier threat to call them into session himself in the NWFP and Baluchistan, where the NAP had formed an unlikely parliamentary alliance with their election competitors, the JUI. The GOP also agreed to permit the NAP-JUI coalition to form governments and fill the governorships in those two provinces.* Shortly

* The two parties together received 44 percent of the 1970 Provincial Assembly vote -- 25.5 percent for JUI and 18.5 for NAP.
afterward NAP leaders Arbab Sikander Khan Khalil, a Pathan, and Sardar Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, a Baluch, were named to the governorships of the NWFP and Baluchistan, respectively. The country's four Provincial Assemblies actually met for the first time in 12 years on May 2.

The high point of the year for the Pathan nationalists came in December with the return to Pakistan of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan after 8 years of self-exile in Kabul and Jalalabad. Welcome by throngs of cheering Pathans at the Torkham border point on the western edge of the Khyber Pass, the 82-year-old "Frontier Gandhi" offered full cooperation with President Bhutto to help build "a new progressive and prosperous society in Pakistan." He also took the occasion to declare publicly that he had never opposed Pakistan as such, but only those who wanted to create a foothold for the British in the name of Islam. Shortly thereafter, in early January 1973, Ghaffar Khan announced plans to launch a "peace movement" and preach nonviolence in the NWFP, move on to Baluchistan, and then extend his movement to Afghanistan, Iran, and India.

Bhutto immediately took exception to Ghaffar Khan's formula, denouncing his "audacity" in grouping together Pakistan's four individual provinces with neighboring countries, but not mentioning Pakistan itself. Accusing the Red Shirt leader of using the "language of violence and disruption," Bhutto said he could not accept Ghaffar Khan's offer of cooperation because he had equated the Provinces of Pakistan with the sovereign independent States of Iran and Afghanistan.

In the year since the return of Ghaffar Khan to Pakistan, provincial autonomy and the alleged threat to democratic freedoms posed by the pressure tactics of the Bhutto government have emerged as the rallying cry of the opposition. The government, in an effort to keep the NAP off-balance and on the defensive, has seldom let up the pressure.

The dismissal in February 1973 of the NAP governors in Baluchistan and the NWFP ultimately resulted in the installation of PPP-led coalition governments in both provinces. This was followed in August with the arrest of three major NAP leaders in Baluchistan, whom Bhutto damned with the faint disclaimer that while he did not consider them traitors, "it was difficult to determine where provincial autonomy ended and secession began." Similarly, in the midst of Wali Khan's vituperative political barnstorming tour of the NWFP during
October, Bhutto ordered the arrest of scores of second-echelon Pathan NAP leaders in the Province.

CURRENT ASSESSMENT

Strength of Pathan Nationalist Sentiment

With the exception of the few extremists in the tribal belt, such as Niaz Ali’s Azad Pakhtun Union, not many Pakistani Pathans seem to be actively interested at the present time in working for the secession of the NWFP and/or Baluchistan. Having made that observation, however, there appears to be a further dichotomy between maliks in the nonadministered tribal areas and the party politicians in the settled districts. Even the party politicians differ in their strategies for galvanizing the support of the people, ranging from Wali Khan’s Pathan NAP nationalists to Qaiyum Khan’s Muslim League supporters of the Bhutto regime.

Tribal Areas. According to observers on the scene during the 1970 political campaign, most tribal Pathans showed little interest in the national issues debated by Pakistani political leaders. They continue to be more concerned with the preservation of their semi-independent status, the maintenance of a smooth working relationship with GOP Political Agents, and the assurance of traditional subsidies. Tribal maliks have consistently opposed the idea of an independent Pakhtunistan, fearing that it might not be able to keep them in the style to which they had become accustomed. They are not unhappy, however, with the new wave of Pashtunistan fever which has developed as a result of the Daud coup in Kabul. The practical dividends for the maliks have been increased attention from Islamabad and new allowances from Kabul.

Many of the older tribal Pathans are suspicious of the motives of Ghaffar Khan and his son, Wali. While this is partially a reflection of the traditional wariness of the highlander toward his more sophisticated lowland cousin, it also derives from the consistent NAP appeal for the merger of the tribal areas into the NWFP. This appeal, in turn, can be traced back to the original program of Ghaffar Khan’s pre-partition Red Shirt movement.
Pakhtunwali and its emphasis on the legitimacy of retribution and blood feuds as a way of life. The freewheeling economic system operating in the tribal belt also could be adversely affected if the large-scale smuggling now tacitly permitted were halted. Presumably the introduction of the Pakistan writ could also affect the traditional social structure and weaken the power of the maliks who still wield considerable power over the tribal masses.

Recent reports from Peshawar indicate a growing generational difference over the issue of integration. While the maliks firmly oppose the idea, saying that they would prefer a separate tribal province rather than merger with the NWFP, younger tribal elements and students have organized a group which they call the Anjuman-i-Ittehad-i-Qabail (Society for Tribal Unity). The society reportedly has called for "the establishment of democracy" in tribal areas and supports Wali Khan and the NAP. They gave Wali a warm reception at Landi Kotal during his stop there en route to Kabul in January 1971.

Settled Districts. There are no indications that the "settled" Pathans are any more unanimous in their attitudes toward Pakhtunistan than their country cousins in the tribal belt. While Wali Khan has recently employed secessionist rhetoric to advance his political objectives, his party does not necessarily represent a majority of the people of the NWFP. He has undoubtedly increased the NAP's share of political support in his struggle with Bhutto, but it would be extremely difficult to gauge accurately the degree to which his efforts have altered the previous political balance in the NWFP.

Although the NAP and the religious/populist Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) were bitter opponents during the 1970 political campaigns, their subsequent experience as NWFP Provincial Government coalition partners has had the effect of drawing many former NAP supporters back to the Wali Khan fold. Rural Pathans in the "settled" districts who had traditionally been NAP -- and earlier, Red Shirt -- adherents, but had switched to the JUI in 1970, are again favoring the NAP. The extent to which Wali's activities in the NWFP in favor of Pathan "rights" have influenced this reversion is unclear.
The settled Pathans most closely identified with the preservation of the status quo and the Bhutto government are the NWFP supporters of the Qaiyum Muslim League. The party, led by the Federal Interior and Frontier Regions Minister Qaiyum Khan (the ancient enemy of Ghaffar and Wali), is the rump of the old Ayub Khan political machine. There are also a small number of PPP members representing shopkeepers and petty landholders. Those two elements, in coalition with a group of independents (who are also for the most part former Ayub men) called the United Front, comprise the present provincial government in Peshawar. They, too, claim to be legitimate representatives of Pathan interests.

**Ultimate Pathan Objectives**

In discussing Pathan objectives, it would be useful to recall Pathan discontents. A fairer share of the admittedly limited economic resources of Pakistan would undoubtedly be high on the list of most Pathans. There is actually some evidence that efforts are already underway to correct the imbalance in distribution of Federal development funds. The most noteworthy example is the section of the new constitution which provides for payment to the provincial authorities by the Federal Government of any hydroelectric profits earned by federally administered power projects within the boundaries of a province. It is far easier, however, to allocate resources on paper than to implement development plans in the form of projects which benefit the people.

The completion of the massive Tarbela Dam across the Indus, projected for 1975, should contribute to some economic improvement in the lives of the people of the NWFP, as well as other parts of Pakistan. Seeing to it that the well-being of the average Pathan, rather than that of the elite, is served by the additional energy and water resources created by the project will be the responsibility of the political managers of the NWFP, as well as the Federal Government. Pathan nationalists demand a larger role in determining such allocations than they have had in the past.

Pathan political objectives are more difficult to isolate and pinpoint. They grow out of a background of suspicion and distrust which has its roots in the nationalist struggle and promises which the attainment of independence has not fulfilled.
Provincial autonomy has been the dominant theme which Pathans have emphasized throughout the past 26 years of Pakistani nationhood. Their definition of autonomy, however, has fluctuated in tandem with that of "Pakhtunistan." Over the years, Pakhtunistan has varied from the simple expedient of renaming the NWFP, to "greater" provincial autonomy, to "complete" autonomy including "regaining control of all resources" within provincial boundaries, to secession and independence.

It is difficult to assess how much of Wali Khan's nationalist rhetoric is aimed at baiting the GOP and how much represents a real determination to follow the Bengalee example and break away from Pakistan. The Province, with or without Baluchistan, is not self-sufficient economically, and Wali knows this. Significant numbers of Pathans from all walks of life earn their livelihood in the business, industrial, and educational centers of Karachi and Lahore.* Pathan men from both the tribal areas and the settled districts of the NWFP who are otherwise unable to support their families find their way to urban centers outside the Province to work as unskilled or factory labor, or to enlist in military or paramilitary forces in order to send regular remittances back to the home village.

Prospects

Pathan nationalism in Pakistan has become the focal point of confrontations between Prime Minister Bhutto and Wali Khan, and between the GOP and Afghan President Daud. The Pathans of Pakistan, while fighting their own battle with the Bhutto regime, have become pawns in a contest between Kabul and Islamabad. Wali may see each new "incident" as an opportunity to advance the cause of Pathan autonomy, not to mention his own more limited objectives. But the interrelated contests involve a serious risk to the internal stability of Pakistan, as well as a larger and even more serious threat of regional conflict.

There is no evidence that Wali Khan and his NAP -- or for that matter Bhutto and Daud -- have any intention of

* There are, for example, between 500,000 and 1 million Pathan workers in Karachi alone.
backing off from the fray. Until recently, however, Wali Khan had distinguished between his brand of Pathan nationalism and that of Kabul, asserting that his major objective was greater autonomy within Pakistan. The escalation of the confrontation, both domestic and bilateral, has not yet influenced any of the players to modify substantially their positions in the direction of compromise.

The appeal of Wali Khan, despite certain significant weaknesses in his strategy to date, is his ability to pursue Pathan objectives on the national scene. Although he cannot convincingly prove that he speaks for all the Pathans, he remains the only Pathan leader to project their demands in confrontation with the GOP. He can point also to a record of achievements in the area of greater provincial autonomy and restraints on central authority as a result of his constitutional struggle with Bhutto over the past 2 years; the struggle continues.

This uneasy atmosphere, in turn, exacerbates, feeds, and is fed upon by political dissidence in the NWFP and Baluchistan. It is unlikely that Wali Khan or other Pathan NAP leaders still in Pakistan would prefer secession, but continued pressure from the GOP in the form of wholesale arrests of party lieutenants, increased surveillance, and periodic allegations of conspiratorial intent have the effect of raising the desperation factor. While Wali and the NAP have until now used Pathan nationalism as a political lever to extract constitutional concessions from Bhutto, there is always a very real danger that sentiment for autonomy might reach the proportions of a groundswell. This would be more likely, particularly if Wali and his fellow NAP leaders were to conclude and convince the people of the NWFP that continued GOP intransigence and hostility offered no alternative to armed resistance.