TT
OO RUESGU
DE RUESHR Ø107 2901845
ZNY XXXXX
O 171842Z ZFF4 & ZFF1
BT
XXXXX
ANKA ENVOLPE AND PASS TO COS SENSITIVE EYE ONL

S E 6 R F T 171842Z OCT 73			
CITE TEHRAN 107		•	
TO: IMMEDIATE ANKARA CEYES	ONLY		
NIACT IMMEDIATE ANKARA			
FOR FROM TEHRAN			
QUOTED BELOW IS WHITE I	HOUSE MESSAGE (	WH32513) TO AMB	ASSADOR
HELM'S FROM SECRETARY KISSING	SER WHICH CONTA	INS A MESSAGE.	STARTING
PARA THREE, TO BE DELIVERED			
BHUTTO LEFT EHRANS BEFORE TH	HIS MESSAGE REC	EIVED HERE. HE	EXPECTS
TO RECEIVE IT. AMBASSADOR F			
PAKISTAN EMBASSY AND TELL HI			
HAVE MESSAGE FOR HIM FROM AN	BASSADOR HELMS.	. BHUTTO WILL	ARRANGE
TO RECEIVE YOU. PLEASE CABI	E TEHRAN WHEN I	MESSAGE HAS BEE	N DELIVERED
AND REACTION FROM BHUTTO, IF	ANY. IT CLEA!	R THAT SECRETAR	Y
WISHES TO HANDLE ONLY THROUG	CHANNEL.	MANY THANKD.	WHITE
HOUSE MESSAGE FOLLOWS:	<u></u>		•
0 1716142 OCT 73 ZFF-1			
FM THE WHITE HOUSE	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN		•	
ZEM		•	
S E C P E T SENSITIVE EXCLUS	LIVELY EYES ONLY	ΥΥ	
WH32513			
OCTOBER 17, 1973		HR70-14	•

AMBASSADOR HELMS, TEHRAN

HENRY A. KISSINGER

TO:

FR OM:

(U)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: MAR 2008

REF:

TEHR AN

1. THANK YOU FOR REFTEL. BHUTTO IS CORRECT THAT THIS CHANNEL IS BEST FOR THESE MATTERS. MESSAGES SHOULD GO THROUGH YOU IDEALLY AND THROUGH SRF IN ANY CASE. 2. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO RESPOND TO BHUTTO AS INDICATED BELOW. HE HAS DEPARTED TEHRAN, CAN YOU REACH HIM THROUGH DISCREET CHANNELS OF YOUR OWN? OR SHOULD WE REPEAT MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO STATION CHIEFS IN JIDDA OR ANKARA? 3. YOU SHOULD TELL BHUTTO THE FOLLOWING: THE PRESIDENT AND I EXTEND OUR WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS. PRESIDENT DEEPLY APPRECIATES BHUTTO'S ANALYSIS OF SITUATION, HIS DESIRE TO EXERCISE HELPFUL POSITIVE INFLUENCE, AND HIS COURAGEOUS STAND AGAINST PRESSURES. THIS IS IN SPIRIT OF OUR TALKS IN SEPTEMBER AND COMMON US-PAKISTANI INTEREST. BHUTTO CAN ASSUME US IS FOLLOWING STRATEGY WE DISCUSSED IN SEPTEMBER. PRINCIPLE THAT MILITARY ACTION SPONSORED AND SUPPLIEDTLY SOVIET UNION CAN SUCCEED IS OF COURSE EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS, NOT ONLY FOR MIDDLE EAST BUT ALSO FOR SOUTH ASIA AND INDEED GLOBALLY. 4. WHETHER TO GO TO DAMASCUS OR NOT IS DECISION FOR BHUTTO TO

4. WHETHER TO GO TO DAMASCUS OR NOT IS DECISION FOR BHUTTO TO MAKE. ON BALANCE WE DO NOT THINK IT A GOOD IDEA. BUT IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO GO, HE COULD CONVEXKFOLLOWING TO SYRIAN LEADERS:

(A) THE US INTENDS TO USE AFTERMATH OF THIS CRISIS AS OFPORTUNITY TO VIGOROUSLY PROMOTE A RAPID, COMPREHENSIVE, AND JUST SETTLEMENT. THE GUARANTEE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE US SIDE WILL BE FOUND IN THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION AS WELL AS IN THE FORMAL US COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE ITSELF FULLY.

(B) HOWEVER, IF THIS DIPLOMACY IS TO BE GIVEN ITS FULL OPPORTUNITY, A CEASEFIRE MUST PRECEDE IT. CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY UNDERTAKING OF PARTIES TO START TALKS UNDER AEGIS OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION GWRW IN ALL ITS PARTS. NEITHER SIDE CAN EXPECT OR INSIST UPON GUARANTEE OF ITS MAXIMUM OBJECTIVES AS PRECONDITION OF TALK. THE US IS CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT COMMENCEMENT OF PROCESS WILL ESTABLISH MOMENTUM AND PROVIDE US WITH REST CONTEXT OF EXERTING VIGOROUS INFLUENCE.

5. WARM REGARDS.

SECRET

BT Ø107

NNNN