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ORIGIN NODS-00

RELEASED IN FULL

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY PM/NPP:ALOCKE/T:WSALMON/NEA/PAB:JACOON:DLS  
APPROVED BY T/D - MR. NYE  
OES/NET:RDEMING  
PM/NPP:MHUMPHREYS  
ACDA/NP:CVAN DOREN  
NEA/PAB:JACOON  
INR/STA:RGALLUCCI  
P:JFORBES  
S/AS:RKELLEY - S/S-O:TRREYNDERS  
EUR/RPE:WBARMON

-----096149 020009Z /70

O R 012321Z NOV 78 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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NODIS **DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS:MNUC, TECH, PK, FR, UK

SUBJECT: PAKISTANI REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: (A) PARIS 31540; (B) PARIS 31663; (C) NEW DELHI 15633;  
(D) LONDON 16951 (E) VIENNA 8200

1. REPORTS THAT THE PAKS ARE MOVING AHEAD TO ACQUIRE  
SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, INCLUDING REPROCESSING AND  
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ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY, AND THAT WORK ON HIGH EXPLOSIVES  
CONTINUES, IS RAISING SERIOUS CONCERN HERE REGARDING  
PAKISTAN AS A MAJOR PROLIFERATION RISK. THE USG INTENDS  
TO BRING OUR CONCERN TO THE ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS OF  
POTENTIAL SUPPLIER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BELGIUM, ITALY,  
SWITZERLAND, SPAIN, JAPAN, CANADA, WEST GERMANY, THE  
NETHERLANDS, AND THE UK ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING  
TALKING POINTS AND NON-PAPER.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER  
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE/CASE ID: 21 DEC 2011 201104016

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2. WE WOULD LIKE TO BRIEF THE FRENCH FIRST ON OUR PLANS TO APPROACH OTHER CAPITALS IN ORDER TO BRING THE GOF UP TO DATE ON OUR LATEST INTELLIGENCE. WE HOPE THIS CONTINUATION OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH ON THE PAKISTAN PROBLEM WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE RECIPROCAL SHARING OF INFORMATION.

3. EMBASSY PARIS IS REQUESTED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE FRENCH OFFICIALS (E.G., JACOMET) AND REVIEW THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AT PARA 5 AND PRESENT THE TALKING POINTS AND TEXT OF NON-PAPER IN PARAS 6 AND 7. PLEASE REPORT ANY FRENCH REACTIONS AND COMMENTS SOONEST, BUT DO NOT SUGGEST THAT WE ARE CLEARING THIS PROPOSED APPROACH WITH THEM.

4. IN INTRODUCING THIS SUBJECT, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE U.S. HAS, FROM ITS OWN SOURCES, RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT COINCIDES WITH THE INFORMATION THE FRENCH HAVE PASSED IN CONFIDENCE TO US (REF A AND B). ADD THAT THE USG HAS DECIDED AT LEAST INITIALLY TO SHARE SOME OF OUR INFORMATION WITH KEY POTENTIAL SUPPLIER COUNTRIES AND ALERT THEM TO OUR CONCERNS REGARDING PAK INTENTIONS AS THE UK HAS RECENTLY DONE REGARDING PAK GAS CENTRIFUGE ACTIVITY. WE EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT PARTICULAR ATTENTION BE PAID TO PAK  
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EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT TO COMPLETE A REPROCESSING PLANT. STRESS THAT WE ARE DRAWING ON U.S. OR PUBLIC INFORMATION ONLY, AND WILL NOT REFER IN ANY WAY TO INFORMATION SHARED WITH US BY THE FRENCH. IN VIEW OF SIMILARITY OF OUR INFORMATION WITH THAT PROVIDED BY FRENCH, HOWEVER, WE WISH TO ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH DO NOT MISINTERPRET OUR ACTIONS AS BASED ON THEIR SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE.

5. AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE GOF, EMBASSY SHOULD RELAY THE FOLLOWING NOTING THAT THIS INTELLIGENCE IS FOR THE GOF AND IS NOT BEING FULLY SHARED WITH OTHER CAPITALS RECEIVING OUR PROPOSED NON-PAPER.

A. IN AUGUST 1977 A DEPARTMENTAL OFFICER BRIEFED QUAI OFFICIALS ON INFORMATION ABOUT THE WORK OF FOUR SUB-DIVISIONS WITHIN THE "TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT DIVISION" OF THE PAEC. THE ACTIVITIES WERE: IMPLOSION HYDRODYNAMICS; NEUTRONICS PROBABLY INCLUDING INITIATORS FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES; HIGH EXPLOSIVE TESTING; METALLURGY INCLUDING PACKAGING OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES. RECENT INTELLIGENCE INDI-

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CATES THAT AT LEAST PART OF THIS AC  
WORK ON AN ELECTRONIC TRIGGERING CIRCUIT FOR REMOTE  
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DETONATION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND EXPERIMENTS ON CONVEN-  
TIONAL EXPLOSIVE SHAPED CHARGES CONTINUE AT AN ESTABLISHED  
ORDINANCE FACILITY.

B. IN ADDITION TO THAT ACTIVITY RECENT INTELLIGENCE  
INDICATES THAT AT THE PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR  
TECHNOLOGY (PINSTECH) A "HOT LABORATORY" IS UNDER  
CONSTRUCTION WHICH INCLUDES A LABORATORY SCALE REPROCES-  
SING OPERATION.

C. IN ADDITION, RECENT NEWS INDICATES THAT THE GOP IS  
PURSUING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT  
FACILITY. A LARGE ORDER OF INVERTERS IS BEING SOUGHT FROM  
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A UK FIRM. THIS TOPIC RECENTLY WAS COVERED IN INDIAN AND  
BRITISH PRESS REPORTS (REFTELS C & D). THE BRITISH HAVE  
TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT THE PROPOSED EXPORT OF THE  
INVERTERS, AND TO ALERT OTHER POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS TO  
THESE ACTIVITIES. (SEE SEPTTEL)

PLEASE STRESS FOR THE FRENCH THAT THIS INFORMATION IS  
HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND CLOSELY HELD WITH THE USG; WE ASK  
SIMILAR PROTECTION WITHIN THE GOF. REMIND JACOMET THAT  
DURING THEIR SEPTEMBER MEETING IN PARIS, SMITH WELCOMED  
RECEIPT OF GOF INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT (REF E PARA 9).

6. OUR ANTICIPATED APPROACH TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS COM-  
PRISES THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS AND TEXT OF A NON-  
PAPER AT PARA 7. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

--I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO RAISE WITH YOU A MATTER OF DEEP  
CONCERN AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG. YOU ARE AWARE  
THAT FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS OR MORE WE AND OTHERS HAVE  
BEEN TROUBLED BY PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR  
REPROCESSING FACILITY WHICH WE BELIEVE COULD BE AN  
IMPORTANT STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE  
CAPABILITY.

-- IN ADDITION WE ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE  
GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA, AS A RESULT OF THE  
AFGHAN REVOLUTION AND GROWING INSTABILITY IN IRAN. WE  
BELIEVE IT IS CRITICAL TO STABILITY IN THE REGION AND TO  
OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES TO INHIBIT PAKISTAN FROM  
MOVING CLOSER TO THE THRESHOLD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE  
CAPABILITY.

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-- THERE ARE NEWS REPORTS THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER  
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BHUTTO RECENTLY CLAIMED THAT BEFORE HE WAS DEPOSED, PAKISTAN WAS ON THE VERGE OF "FULL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY". HE POINTED OUT IN THIS CONTEXT THAT ONLY THE MUSLIM WORLD WAS WITHOUT NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND SAID PAKISTAN WOULD SHARE THE TECHNOLOGY WITH ISLAMIC STATES. WE DO NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT MR. BHUTTO'S CLAIMS OF IMMINENT SUCCESS IN THIS FIELD, BUT WE DO FIND THIS STATEMENT OF INTENTIONS TO BE DISQUIETING.

-- WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT PAKISTAN'S MOTIVATIONS OR INTENTIONS HAVE CHANGED WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPTION. WE BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN IS EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY OF COMPLETING CONSTRUCTION OF

A NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT AS A NATIONAL PROJECT. TO DO SO, PAKISTAN MAY ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, MATERIALS, AND EQUIPMENT FROM INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS IN VARIOUS FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING YOURS.

-- ALSO THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RECENTLY ADVISED THAT IT HAS FIRM INFORMATION THAT THE PAKS ARE PURSUING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY. THE U.K. HAS STOPPED EXPORT OF INVERTERS FOR SUCH USE AND HAS ASKED OTHER POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION.

-- WE HAVE, IN ADDITION, HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT WORK IS UNDERWAY IN PAKISTAN.

-- ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY WOULD, AND WE BELIEVE IS INTENDED TO, COMPLEMENT THESE ACTIVITIES. IF PAKISTAN WERE TO SUCCEED IN ITS EFFORTS, WE BELIEVE A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS RISK OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WOULD ARISE IN PAKISTAN, WITH PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS THE  
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SUBCONTINENT. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT BE MADE AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION ON A HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS ON THIS

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7. BEGIN NON-PAPER: THE USG HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN IS SEEKING TO COMPLETE THE CHASMA REPROCESSING PLANT -- AND PERHAPS BUILD AN ADDITIONAL FACILITY AT PINSTECH THAT MAY BE CAPABLE OF REPROCESSING -- NEITHER OF WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY BE SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. IF COMPLETED, EITHER OF THESE REPROCESSING FACILITIES MIGHT PRODUCE SUFFICIENT PLUTONIUM ANNUALLY FOR SEVERAL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. WE BELIEVE PAKISTAN IS SEEKING MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE FACILITIES FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN. THE PAKISTANIS MAY TRY TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH RELEVANT FIRMS PERHAPS RESORTING TO THE USE OF INDIRECT REPRESENTATIVES AND "DUMMY" PURCHASING AGENTS TO CIRCUMVENT POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT CONTROLS.

THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE IN POSSESSION OF THESE FACTS IN ORDER THAT IT MAY EXERCISE VIGILANCE AND APPROPRIATE CONTROL TO DETER PAKISTAN FROM ACQUIRING SENSITIVE FACILITIES WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, THE US WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER WHICH MAY COME TO THE ATTENTION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. THE U.S., FOR ITS PART, INTENDS TO PERMIT NO EXPORTS OF MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, OR TECHNOLOGY FROM THE U.S. WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO COMPLETION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR

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FACILITIES IN PAKISTAN. END TEXT OF NON-PAPER.

8. PLEASE REPORT GOF REACTIONS ASAP. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED AS WELL IN ANY INDICATIONS AS TO WHETHER THE FRENCH INTEND TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT PROPOSE PRESSING THEM TO DO SO.

9. FOR ISLAMABAD: THE INFORMATION IN PARA 3 ABOVE IS IN LINE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION CONTAINED PARA 2 AND 3 OF ISLAMABAD 9753.

10. FOR LONDON: ADVISE MOBERLY THAT WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH ABOVE APPROACH OF TALKING POINTS AND NON-PAPERS TO CAPITALS OF COUNTRIES LISTED AND NOTE THAT WE ARE PASSING US-ORIGIN INFORMATION IN PARA 3 ABOVE TO JACOMET. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT UK HAS NO OBJECTION TO FIFTH TALKING POINT IN PARA SIX ABOVE TAKING INTO PARTICULAR ACCOUNT

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