Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Quest for Power

Dilip Mukerjee
ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO
Acknowledgements

This book would never have been written but for the opportunity Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave me to visit his new Pakistan. Addressing his first public meeting as President on 3 January 1972, at Karachi, he said he wanted to hold a dialogue with the people of India in search of enduring peace. Taking this cue, I proposed to the Times of India that I suggest to Bhutto to begin his dialogue through the newspaper. Both the Editor, Sham Lal, and the Resident Editor in Delhi, Girilal Jain, readily agreed. Off went a cable to Bhutto via London, seeking an interview. I received word some three weeks later that he had agreed in principle. Fixing a date, however, took time with the result that I saw him along with another Indian journalist, B. K. Tiwari, only in mid-March.

The attempt in this book is to let Bhutto speak for himself, and hence the long quotations from his writings and speeches. I have also indicated, as far as possible, the sources of my information in some detail to share with the readers the basis for the judgements offered in the book.

Many journalists and diplomats in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have helped me by providing factual information as well as personal assessments. Pakistan's Information
Department sent me a useful collection of official material in response to my request to Bhutto’s Press Secretary, Khalid Hassan. Werner Adam of Neue Zurcher Zeitung and Far Eastern Economic Review, who was stationed in Islamabad until May, has let me look through his papers. The US AID Mission in Islamabad gave me economic data on new Pakistan worked out by its statisticians, from which I reproduce several tables in an appendix.

The book was written at India International Centre in New Delhi in the pleasant and hospitable environment of its library. I owe thanks to its staff, particularly Hari Krishna Kaul. K. L. Sharma and his colleagues in the Times of India library took a great deal of trouble to locate elusive items of information, while S. Ansari of the Sapru House library made available its clippings files and other material on Pakistan. The staff of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library located for me, after much effort, material on Sir Shahnawaz Khan Bhutto.

I was particularly lucky in securing the enthusiastic cooperation of two colleagues, C. Subba Rau and K. T. R. Menon of the Times of India News Service, for this study. They looked through mass of published material to help me reconstruct the story of Bhutto’s rise to power. Subba Rau also took charge of the manuscript and tidied it up for publication. D. P. Banerji, A. C. Ramaswami, and A. C. Mouli bore the brunt of typing the manuscript in their spare time. Last but not least, my wife, son, and daughter contributed a highly articulate and trenchant scepticism about my theories and assumptions. Needless to say, the responsibility for any mistakes or misstatements lies solely with me.

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D. M.
FOR better or for worse, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto is there to stay as arbiter of Pakistan's destinies. His neighbours in the subcontinent and elsewhere need to know where this shrewd but flamboyant leader wishes to take his country. Even though the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign State has reduced Pakistan's size and resources, it is still a country of 57 million people who can tilt the balance in the region by the choices they make for the future. Their preferences will be largely shaped by Bhutto's predilections, because he is undoubtedly the most forceful leader Pakistan has had since the passing of Jinnah, the father of the nation.

This book presents a portrait of Bhutto, the man and the leader, from the time he embarked on the road to power in 1958 at the age of 30. Major-General Iskander Mirza, then President of Pakistan, picked up Bhutto for a cabinet post in Pakistan's first martial law regime on the strength of his talents and family connections. Mirza was eased out within three weeks by General Ayub Khan, but the latter saw no reason to drop the bright young man who had a useful background in international law and an uncommon gift of the gab.
In return for Ayub Khan's favour, Bhutto gave him devotion and loyalty and became one of the pillars of his regime. Greater preferment followed: Bhutto was rewarded with the foreign affairs portfolio in 1963 on the death of the incumbent, Mohammad Ali Bogra. This is precisely the opportunity Bhutto was looking for, and he made the fullest use of it to build up a reputation for himself at home and abroad. As it happened, there was scarcely any competition; he had little difficulty in emerging as "the most probable heir"—as one perceptive Pakistani journalist wrote in 1964 while analyzing the "problems of leadership".

Even while dutifully mouthing paean in praise of his mentor, Ayub Khan, the heir had enough perception to see that economic development was creating pressures and tensions which the paternalistic system of government was unable to cope. A break with Ayub Khan was thus bound to come, but this was hastened by the India-Pakistan war of 1965. The conflict ended in a stalemate on the battlefield, but it was politically a disaster for Pakistan because it had the effect of shelving the Kashmir dispute instead of reopening it. Bhutto should normally have paid a price for this sorry outcome; he was undoubtedly the strongest and most persuasive advocate of the policy of confrontation. But he succeeded through a masterly manoeuvre in pinning the blame on Ayub Khan.

Pakistan had really no choice but to agree to revert to the status quo ante as suggested by the Soviet Union at Tashkent in January 1966. As Ayub Khan was to say later in private conversation, it was unrealistic to expect a breakthrough on Kashmir at the negotiating table after having failed to make a breakthrough on the battlefield. But Bhutto chose to disagree. It is difficult to be sure whether he really believed that a military solution was
possible, although he has publicly taken the stand after quitting office that Pakistan should have continued fighting instead of accepting a cease-fire after 22 days. Or was it that Bhutto had the cleverness to see that he would benefit enormously in terms of popularity in West Pakistan by affecting an intransigent posture? Five months after Tashkent, Bhutto was out of the cabinet. Thousands poured into railway stations to greet him as he made his way back from the capital to his family estate at Larkana in Sind.

Ayub Khan's sudden illness in January 1968 raised serious doubts about the future because the stability of his system, concentrating all authority in his hands, depended solely on him. This, combined with a steady depreciation of his "saviour" image, made the country increasingly restive. Bhutto was waiting in readiness: he had organized a new political party to do battle with other claimants to the throne. A sudden wave of student unrest towards the end of 1968 gave him the chance he was looking for; he seized upon it to mount a massive assault on the citadel of power. Surprised and shaken, Ayub Khan searched for compromise solutions but Bhutto went on raising the ante. Unlike other Pakistani politicians who were pacified by Ayub Khan's gambit that he would not stand for another term, Bhutto declared that he would accept nothing less than the President's immediate exit. Bhutto's perceptions proved superior—the western wing was with him and not with the compromise-minded elder politicians, while the east indicated through Mujibur Rahman that it wanted to evolve an entirely new concept of nationhood.

Bhutto was willing to accept a martial law interregnum—the Yahya Khan phase—rather than allow Ayub Khan to stage-manage succession. It was obviously Bhutto's hope that power would eventually pass to him. But for a time
events took a different course. From 1956, the rulers of the country had enforced the principle of parity which gave the two wings equal representation in the national legislature. Yahya Khan changed this by introducing the one-man-one-vote principle which tilted the balance in favour of the majority living in the east. If the eastern wing had not voted solidly for Mujibur Rahman, it would still have been possible to create an east-west coalition as under H. S. Suhrawardy in 1956-57. This is what Yahya Khan had evidently banked on, hoping that an uneasy two-wing tandem would leave the President, preferably himself, with effective control as in the pre-1958 period. But these calculations were thrown totally out of gear by Mujibur Rahman's sweeping victory which gave him an absolute majority in the national assembly. If parliamentary norms were observed, the most Bhutto could hope for was to be leader of the opposition. This suited neither Bhutto nor the junta. A discreet bid was made for an arrangement under which the military and Mujibur Rahman could share power. He did not and could not agree, obliging the junta to accept Bhutto as an ally—at least temporarily. They acted in concert to stall the transfer of power, accepting the risk that this might trigger off a revolt. But they were confident of their ability to crush it.

As it happened, Bhutto and the military fell out within weeks of the crackdown. Having dealt with the Awami League, the junta was now trying to cut Bhutto to size with the help of the religious and right-wing parties. He reacted with protests and even threats, but failed to make any impression on the generals. In despair, he said he would be prepared to accept the military's permanent overlordship in return for a share in power. But the military still insisted on a coalition between him and right-wing parties to act as a check against him. This is what Bhutto finally accepted—
agreeing to become Deputy Prime Minister under the aging Bengali leader, Nurul Amin.

As it turned out, the war swept out Yahya Khan and his constitutional scheme. He still made an unsuccessful last-minute bid to hang on to power, but his colleagues had lost their nerve in the face of a rising tide of indignation against the military in the wake of military defeat. The mantle fell on Bhutto in the resultant vacuum.

Bhutto's record in his first six months of office suggests the directions he has in mind for the future. There is no doubt that he would like Pakistan to regain the geopolitical leverage it had before the break-up of the country. Enjoying the "open blessings" of Washington and the unmistakable support of China, he hopes to build up a pivotal role for his country in a new setting. His gaze, he says, is now turned to West Asia because of the shift in Pakistan's interests following the loss of Bangladesh. But this may be mere rhetoric: Pakistan's role in the subcontinent is far too important to Bhutto and his friends to overlook. Although he has said that he wants to turn away from confrontation with India to "consultation" and "negotiation", it is difficult to be certain that this is his final position. The measure of support Pakistan is able to mobilize from its friends could lead to a reversal to familiar militancy vis-a-vis India.
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**Appendix**
1. The End of the Beginning

WHEN Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto returned from Dacca to Karachi on 26 March 1971, the day after the Pakistan army began a massive operation to crush the East Bengali autonomy movement, he said to newsmen waiting at the airport: “By the grace of God, Pakistan has at last been saved”. But even as he said this, he knew that events may take an altogether different turn. As he records in The Great Tragedy his reflections on the crisis set down in early May: “In my heart I hoped and prayed that I was right. The future will tell whether Pakistan has been saved or lost.”

Pakistan lost the eastern wing within nine months. The finale came on 16 December 1971 when Pakistani troops formally surrendered to Indian and Bangladesh forces at a poignant ceremony at Dacca’s race course ground. The previous night Bhutto, then at the United Nations in New York, walked out of a Security Council session after tearing up the draft resolutions presented by several delegations to bring the war in the subcontinent to an end. As he was

leaving, he said: “Under no circumstances will I accept a
document of surrender.” But before many hours had passed,
he was publicly staking a claim to power implicitly accepting
the vivisection of his country. He told the US network,
CBS, “If I have to play a role—my people gave me a more
impressive mandate than to any other leader—I must have
effective authority. I must put my hands to the task fully
and completely, and totally without let or hindrance.”
He was speaking on the strength of the decisive mandate given
to him by the people of West Pakistan. The eastern wing,
constituting the majority of the total population of the two
wings, had voted overwhelmingly for Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and his Awami League in the December 1970
elections, giving this party a clear majority in the national
assembly. But with the east breaking away, Bhutto’s
position was now unassailable. The trauma of the nation’s
defeat and disgrace gave him the opportunity to get to the top.
He had set his heart on this as far back as 1966, when he cut
himself adrift from President Ayub Khan following the
settlement he reached with India at Tashkent.

With the surrender in Dacca, followed a few hours later
by Mrs Indira Gandhi’s offer of a unilateral cease-fire, there
was nothing more for Bhutto to do at the UN. The Security
Council had still to adopt a resolution, but as anyone could
see this was going to be only for the record. Bhutto had
already decided to return home when he received a message
from General Yahya Khan asking him to come back to
participate in a new civilian government. This was not
necessarily an offer to hand over power to him; the first
steps towards constituting a civilian cabinet had, in fact,
been taken even before full-scale fighting began between

\(^2\)TV interview of 16 December, reported in the *Indian Express*, New
Delhi, 17 December 1971.
India and Pakistan on the evening of 3 December. Yahya Khan had got Bhutto to agree to be the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in a coalition to be headed by Nurul Amin, the aging East Bengali leader. A formal announcement to this effect was made on 7 December, followed by newspaper speculation that Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party was to get seven out of 13 cabinet posts.

But this cabinet was to function under the supervision of the military, in terms of the constitution which Yahya Khan had drawn up. This expressly provided that the head of the armed forces, the Supreme Commander a la Field Marshal Ayub Khan, would be President and Head of State. The main features of the constitutional scheme were to be announced in a broadcast by the General scheduled for 17 December but it was cancelled. Instead, he came to the microphone to announce that he had, in the interest of peace, responded to the Indian offer and ordered the armed forces to cease fire.

Yahya Khan’s constitutional scheme never saw the light of day. The text of his broadcast, issued in advance to correspondents in Islamabad, was withdrawn, while the national assembly session, due to be held on 27 December, was cancelled. It appears that the military top brass got together on the night of the surrender at Dacca and decided that Yahya Khan would have to go. According to one version the decision was clinched by Lt.-Gen. Gul Hassan, then Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army, and by Air Marshal Rahim Khan, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force. These two evidently demanded that Yahya Khan should ask Bhutto to return and swear him in as President.

3Despatch filed from New York by the Press Trust of India (PTI), quoting reports circulating there, the *Times of India*, 25 December 1971.
This prompted the summons to Bhutto, but it is still not clear whether Yahya Khan had at that stage reconciled himself to bowing out altogether. His intentions apart, there is also the question whether the military was willing to allow itself to be eclipsed by a civilian political leader, even one as friendly to them as Bhutto had been over the years. While it is clear that the top brass was divided over this and other related issues, it is difficult to be precise about the position that particular members of the junta adopted in the crucial behind-the-scenes bargaining. It is quite possible that it was touch and go. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Bhutto’s friend and now cabinet colleague, later disclosed that Pakistan might have been plunged into a civil war had Bhutto’s return to the country on 20 December been delayed even by a few hours. Although Bhutto does not directly confirm this, he says the full truth will be available only after enquiries, now in progress, are completed—a reference presumably to the judicial enquiry into Pakistan’s performance in the war.4

Pirzada was possibly referring to a last-minute bid Yahya Khan had made to continue in power with the support of his Chief of Staff, General Abdul Hamid Khan. But eventually Hamid Khan disassociated himself with the move. It is said that he changed his mind when he addressed a meeting of Army officers attached to the GHQ on 19 December to explain to them the reasons for accepting India’s cease-fire offer. Held in Rawalpindi, this meeting had barely begun when it broke up in confusion when young hotheads in the audience reacted violently to the apologia and surged towards the dias in anger. Such indiscipline by staff officers shook

4Information obtained in an interview Bhutto gave to the author and another Indian correspondent at his house in Larkana on 14 March 1971. A report of this interview appeared in the Times of India, New Delhi, 16 March 1971.
Hamid Khan, and forced upon him the conclusion that Yahya Khan’s continuance would trigger off a mutiny.\(^6\) In any event, there was no mistaking the public indignation against Yahya Khan and his coterie; demonstrators were out in many Pakistan cities to ventilate their feelings. “In Peshwar, a noisy mob burned the President in effigy, an intolerable insult in Pakistan under normal circumstances.”\(^6\) Again, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, a former Air Chief, held a press conference in Rawalpindi to demand Yahya Khan’s trial, and to urge steps to bar his flight from the country.

With Hamid Khan also turning against him, Yahya Khan threw in the towel: Pakistan Radio interrupted its Urdu bulletin on the evening of 19 December to report his decision to resign “as soon as a representative national government is formed tomorrow.” The point to note is that this report, quoting an official briefing, still talked in terms of a “national” government, a throw-back to the all-party coalition that Yahya Khan had been trying to put together. Nurul Amin, Yahya Khan’s Prime Minister-designate, had, however, already given up his claim to the job in Pakistan’s changed circumstances.\(^7\) Perhaps Yahya Khan was hoping that he could still salvage something of the plan he had devised

\(^5\)Based on information obtained from knowledgeable Pakistani and foreign journalists.


\(^7\)Nurul Amin was elected leader of the United Coalition Party on 15 November. It consisted of 37 members from West Pakistan and 52 from the East who had got in unopposed in the by-elections held to replace outlawed members of the national assembly. The UCP’s constituents were the three Muslim League factions, Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, and Amin’s Pakistan Democratic Party. The combination was without doubt masterminded by the military junta. Bhutto described it as a “bogus coalition”, and declared that the people of Pakistan would never accept the imposition of a rejected leadership. This was on 2 December, but five days later he reconciled himself to sharing power with Amin.
for a civilian regime with built-in checks and balances so that the military might eventually gain the whip-hand for itself. This was, however, not to be.

During the suspense-laden hours before Yahya Khan finally climbed down, it is possible that others were also thinking of staking their claims. The story is told in Pakistan that the right-wing parties, notably the Jamaat-e-Islami and Abdul Qayyum Khan's Pakistan Muslim League, approached Lt.-Gen. Tikka Khan, the senior-most among the commanders in the field, to take over from Yahya Khan. General Tikka Khan, later Bhutto's army chief, had several factors in his favour, not least his reputation as a tough soldier who could be counted upon to hold his own against heavy odds. He had subdued the Baluchis for Ayub Khan in 1963, and masterminded the crackdown in Dacca in 1971. Besides, he had the reputation of being a devoutly religious man, austere in his style of living—in welcome contrast to Yahya Khan's notorious self-indulgence. For the rightists, he made an ideal choice—not least because his lack of political sophistication would have allowed others to wield power in his name.

Tikka Khan, it is said, declined the offer, saying that it was high time that the army returned to the barracks leaving politics to politicians. The fact is that Tikka Khan was not in Rawalpindi but at his corps headquarters during the struggle for power at the GHQ. Judging from this, as well as other evidence, foreign observers discount this story; they suggest that this is what some right-wing leaders might have been thinking of but they had no opportunity to put their ideas into practice. These observers also dismiss the hair-raising account offered by a foreign journal of Air Marshal Rahim Khan's ordering a flight of PAF fighters to "buzz" President's House in Rawalpindi in a bid to force a
decision in Bhutto's favour when the junta assembled there on the night of 16 December.

Whatever was happening in Pakistan's still unfinished capital, Islamabad, or in adjoining Rawalpindi where the Army's GHQ is located, Bhutto was obviously proceeding on the assumption that he would take over the reins—eventually if not immediately. In preparation for this, he hurried from New York to Washington for meetings with President Nixon and Secretary of State, William Rogers. In view of the disastrous turn events had taken, consultations were certainly necessary with a country which had strongly backed Pakistan against India during the 14-day war. But there was perhaps a personal angle as well. After Bhutto left the Ayub cabinet, he chose to affect an anti-American posture in his pronouncements on foreign policy. There were misgivings about him in Washington not only on this score, but also about his flamboyant call for unending confrontation with India. He hastened, therefore, to assure the White House as well as the State Department that he could be counted upon to pursue statesman-like policies in keeping with Pakistan's changed circumstances. He had already had an exchange of views with Chiao Kuan Hua, leader of the Chinese delegation to the UN, on the very night of the surrender in Dacca.

The Washington meetings went off very well. Emerging from these, Bhutto told waiting newsmen that "a new chapter was beginning in Pakistan's relations with the USA". He later claimed that President Nixon had promised him the USA's continued support for the sovereignty and unity of the Pakistan State. Obviously, the White House was still undecided whether Bangladesh had really broken away for good. This is clear from a subsequent press conference of William Rogers in which he said: "We did favour, and do
favour, unity of the two wings of Pakistan on principle be-
cause secession, if it became a way of life, could be very
dangerous to the rest of the world.”

Leaving Washington, Bhutto flew across the Atlantic to
make a brief halt in London on his way home. Talking to
the press at Heathrow airport, he said: “We are going to
build a new country again; it is almost like the first chapter
of Genesis.” But as was to be expected, specially after his
talks with the Americans and the Chinese, his emphasis fell
on retaining the framework of one Pakistan. “What we
must do is to get the people’s consent for a grand reconcilia-
tion between the two wings of Pakistan”. Earlier, he had
said in New York: “There is no Bangladesh. There is
East Pakistan.”

Travelling via Rome and Teheran, Bhutto flew straight
into Islamabad’s Chaklala airport at around 10.30 in the
morning of 20 December. Several thousands of his suppor-
ters were there to welcome him, waiting outside the heavily
guarded perimeter. As The Times (London) reported, “they
waved banners and chanted ‘Long Live Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’. When the aircraft was spotted in the sky, they roared their
applause.” Fobbing off newsmen at the airport with a
brief comment or two, a grim Bhutto walked hurriedly to a
car drawn up alongside the aircraft and headed directly for
President’s House. No aides went with him; he was on his
own in this final encounter with Yahya Khan.

As observers recall it, no one—not even Bhutto’s closest
associates—knew what the outcome of this encounter would
be. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, chief of the People’s Party in
Punjab and now Governor of this province, met Yahya Khan
twice on 19 December, along with Mahmud Ali Kasuri,

8Washington, 23 December, as reported by the Indian Express, New
Delhi, 24 December 1971.
now Bhutto's Law Minister. Although Khar was earlier saying that there would be no coup d'etat, his confidence had visibly ebbed by the time Bhutto returned. In reply to a foreign correspondent's query, he said with a shrug of the shoulders: "Anything can happen."

Everyone waited with bated breath, the more enterprising among newsmen taking up positions outside President's House. As one of them says, the first indication of what had happened came when Bhutto, looking as grim as before, drove out of President's House, with escort cars ahead and behind. Noting the Presidential standard flying from the car carrying him, perceptive watchers knew that the change-over was complete. Yahya Khan had resigned his office and sworn in Bhutto. At 2.30 in the afternoon, an official announcement over Radio Pakistan let the country know this: "The President has appointed Mr. Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto as President and Martial Law Administrator and handed over power to him."

Between the time Bhutto left President's House to take up residence temporarily in the Punjab Government's Guest House and at 9 o'clock in the evening when he drove out to record his inaugural address for TV and radio, he received the two men who were credited with having brought him to power, Lt.-Gen. Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan.

It was settled at these meetings that Gul Hassan would take over as C-in-C, Army, while Rahim Khan would continue as C-in-C of the Air Force. With this decision taken, he sent for Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan to tell him that he as well as all the principal staff officers (barring, of course, Gul Hassan) would have to resign because they were too closely identified with Yahya Khan to be saved.

Foreign policy is Bhutto's forte—and hence his keen interest in making the right impression abroad. This explains
why he found time even during his first hours in office to receive the ambassadors of the USA and China, the two countries closest to him. He was taking office, as the Washington Post commented, "with the open blessings of President Nixon", while greetings from Chou En-Lai were to arrive shortly afterwards promising "full support in Pakistan's just struggle against foreign aggression". Three more envoys were also sent for—those of the USSR, France and Britain—to complete the list of all permanent members of the Security Council.

But even amidst these preoccupations, Bhutto found time to issue instructions terminating the appointment of General Habibullah, chief of the National Press Trust, Z. A. Suleri, Chief Editor of the Pakistan Times, and Ghauri, Resident Editor of the Morning News, Karachi. This brings out Bhutto's sensitivity to criticism, as well as the lack of any inhibitions in settling old scores. In Habibullah's case, Bhutto had in mind the attacks mounted against him by the newspapers run by the State-owned trust. But there were some personal irritants as well. Habibullah belongs to a well known political family of the NWFP which was at one time very close to Ayub Khan and now divides its loyalties between Wali Khan's National Awami Party and the Council Muslim League. Suleri was a leading apologist for Ayub Khan, and later for Yahya Khan. Ghauri did not have strong partisan associations but he was certainly an outspoken critic. In sum, all three paid the penalty for having set themselves at odds against Bhutto—although he was to say in his broadcast later that night that he would "never take a single action

Ayub Khan's son, Gauhar Ayub, is married to Habibullah's daughter. Until Gauhar Ayub quit business to carve out a political career for himself under a paternal umbrella, he was a major shareholder in Gandhara Industries, Habibullah's family firm. The story will come up again later in this book.
out of vindictiveness”.

The broadcast which lasted well over an hour was made off the cuff. As Bhutto put it, he did not speak from a text because he wanted to speak from the heart. It was nevertheless a masterly blend of judiciously worded promises to all important segments of the population—workers, peasants, students, soldiers, and even policemen. At the same time, it struck a note of defiance vis-a-vis India not only to boost popular morale but also to win plaudits from the armed forces smarting under the reverses they had suffered. But there was a glaring omission too. No mention was made of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, although Bhutto must have known that the whole world was waiting for word about the East Bengali leader who had been held totally incommunicado since 25 March.

The world’s press noted the promise made by Bhutto to his soldiers that “we will take revenge”, and that “we shall wipe out the stigma even if it has to be done by our grandchildren”. These revanchist formulations, along with his declaration that East Pakistan is an inseparable part of Pakistan, hit the headlines evoking sharp editorial comments in many leading newspapers. The Daily Telegraph (London) discussed his insistence on Pakistan’s unity as “no more than mere rhetoric”, while the New York Times said that “a dramatic change, long overdue in Pakistan, has to begin with President Bhutto himself”. In a subsequent comment on 23 December, the Daily Telegraph reminded him that to speak of one Pakistan, as if nothing had changed, was “surely out of the question”. It added: “If links of any kind are to be re-established, then surely Mujib is the only bet, however long the odds.” Arguing that the Sheikh’s release “would win for Mr. Bhutto the acclaim of the whole democratic world”, the paper regretfully noted that “so far
Mr. Bhutto has given little promise of statesmanship of this calibre.” The New York Times, commenting on 3 January, recognized that the Shiekh constituted a trump card for Bhutto who would try to make the most of what little he had to bargain with, but also saw a danger that he might overplay his hand.

In the context of Pakistan’s problems with India the Financial Times (London) recalled on 21 December that Bhutto “had the most consistent and emphatic record of hostility towards India of any leader who has achieved prominence in Pakistan”. The Ottawa Citizen, commenting a day later, said that “it is a measure of Pakistan’s desperation that in its darkest hour it has to turn for leadership to the very man who helped bring disaster to the country.” The Djakarta Times reminded Bhutto on 23 December that “the change in the map of South Asia is irreversible”. It was out of the question, the newspaper said, that the people of East Bengal would “forgive and forget the bloody affair” for which “Mr. Bhutto shares responsibility”. Even in distant Buenos Aires, the Herald asked Pakistan’s new President on 21 December “to forget about revenge if he is to keep his promise to create a new Pakistan”.

Reactions in India were predictably sharper, largely because of Bhutto’s role in keeping Pakistan geared to a policy of continuing confrontation. Motherland, a Delhi newspaper closely identified with the Hindu party, Jana Sangh, described Bhutto’s emergence to power as the “new old chapter”. It doubted whether Pakistan under its new leadership would be any different from the old. The left-wing Patriot, a Delhi newspaper, was just as caustic: it said Bhutto had two masters to serve abroad and none at home. “His policies—if it is not a contradiction in terms of talk of policies where Mr.
Bhutto is concerned—will largely be determined in Washington and approved in Peking. Totally undependable and free of any commitment to any ideology or political principle, Mr. Bhutto will rule for Mr. Bhutto's sake. His temperament and habit will incline him to flamboyant gestures, wild talks and loud demands."\(^{11}\) *Frontier*, a Calcutta weekly with a perceptible sympathy for Maoist dogma, thought that the old junta in Pakistan "has been replaced by a new one, possibly consisting of the younger, pro-China elements who look up to Mr. Bhutto as their leader. In a way he has become the most powerful man in Pakistan after the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, for none other enjoyed the combined allegiance of the people and the armed forces."\(^{12}\)

Among the independent national newspapers, the *Times of India* thought Bhutto "cannot possibly hope to come to grips with the challenges facing him so long as he continues to live in a world of make-believe and refuses to come to terms with the facts of life. To start with, he needs to recognise that the break-up of Pakistan into two is final, and that nothing he or his friends can do will help to bring the two parties together. He has been frank enough to say that his country has taken a hell of a bashing, but he is still unwilling to admit that it can no longer function on the basis of old assumptions."\(^{13}\)

Notwithstanding the fact that the broadcast was badly received outside Pakistan, it is a remarkable document for the insight it offers into Bhutto's thinking as head of a shattered state over which he has been called upon to preside after a grave military and political debacle. The first strand to note is the acknowledgement of the tremendous challenges facing

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\(^{11}\) Editorial, 21 December 1971.

\(^{12}\) *Frontier*, 1 January 1971.

\(^{13}\) Editorial "Enter Mr. Bhutto," 21 December 1971.
him and his 57 million people. As he said:

We are facing the worst crisis in our country's life, a deadly crisis. We have to pick the pieces, very small pieces, but will make a new Pakistan. . . . In the whole history of the subcontinent, from the beginning of the time when Muslims set foot in the subcontinent, from the beginning of the time of Mohammed Bin Qasim, Muslims have never faced such a difficult situation as we are facing today. But Muslims have a proud heritage in the subcontinent. . . . We will begin anew with confidence, with the co-operation of the people.14

Secondly, Bhutto was anxious to assert the legitimacy of his regime. He was not just one more martial law administrator, like Ayub Khan, who took over the country in 1958 after a bloodless coup, or like his successor, Yahya Khan, who moved in when the popular upsurge obliged Ayub Khan to quit. As Bhutto explained:

I have been summoned by the nation at this critical hour, when we are at the edge of a precipice, to lead the nation as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. But there is a difference in the arrangement in the sense that I have been elected by the people. I have not been capriciously thrust upon them. I am speaking to you today as the authentic voice of the people of Pakistan, not by virtue of the office I hold but by virtue of the verdict you gave in the national elections.

Thirdly, Bhutto made it a point to salve the wounded pride

14 Excerpts reproduced from the text issued by Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi.
of the armed forces and to assure them that the country would do its best for them so that they do not have to knuckle under to the Indians:

We have not lost a war. We have not failed. We have been failed. Our soldiers have nothing to be ashamed of. . . . The truth is that [the] Pakistani is one of the best soldiers in the world. When I say that, these are not the words of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. These are the words of a distinguished foreign general, a great British general, who said that the world has not seen a better infantry soldier than the Pakistani.

The armed forces should know that I have always admired them. I have always stood by them as Foreign Minister. I have always contributed towards the strengthening of the armed forces. Please, my dear jawans and my dear officers and my dear brothers, you have fought bravely. You have nothing to be ashamed of. You have been victims of a system. We will put this right. I will establish direct contact with you. We will get together. . . . Whatever your grievances are, we will redress them.

I appeal to my young friends in the armed forces; I appeal to the jawans that we will redeem this day. We will take revenge and we will see to it that this temporary humiliation is put right if, of course, India wants to go on the path of revenge, if India does not want co-operation and understanding based on justice and equity.

India's days in East Pakistan are [numbered]; India should not get intoxicated . . . we will fight, and we will continue to fight for our honour, for our self-respect, and for the integrity of Pakistan. India has a choice to either accept the norms of justice and equity or face an implacable enemy for all times.
Today your minds are agitated. Today you are seeking vengeance. Please wait a little. We will work out together a scheme that will vindicate national honour, your honour.

Bhutto kept back till the end the announcement that he was retiring seven of the top-most army officers. He was careful to emphasize that he was acting not on his own but in response to the wishes of the armed forces, specially its younger officers. This was followed by the declaration that Gul Hassan has been made acting Commander-in-Chief.

The armed forces come from the people. It is the people who create the armed forces. So we will bring back harmony and integration between the people and the armed forces. But I need your co-operation, your sympathy and your understanding. In this connection certain measures are necessary. I say with a heavy heart that I have already taken certain measures which will come into force immediately. Immediately, at once, the following generals would have retired. The former President has already retired. Gen. Aga Mohammed Yahya Khan is no longer in the armed forces. He has retired. And so have Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan, Gen. S. G. M. Pirzada, Gen. Omar, Gen. Khudadad Khan, Gen. Kayani and Gen. Mitha.

This is not my personal decision. I do not know most of them. I have not seen most of them. But I have held discussions, consultations, and this appears to be the will of the armed forces and of the people of Pakistan. I am the servant of the people of Pakistan and I must salute their decision and the sentiments of the armed forces.
These generals stand retired, and they cannot perform any further duties. They will retire honourably, gracefully, and arrangements have already been made for their replacement.

Everything is temporary. My own position is temporary. I have asked Gen. Gul Hassan to be the acting C-in-C of the Pakistan army and he will take this position immediately. Straightaway he will go to work and he will have to work night and day. He is a soldier, a professional soldier. I do not think he has dabbled in politics and I think he has the respect and support of the armed forces. These are temporary arrangements and permanent arrangements will be made later on when I have an opportunity to discuss these matters in greater depth.

But he [Gul Hassan] will retain the rank of Lt.-Gen. He should not expect that he will be promoted to the rank of General merely because of this temporary arrangement.

I expect Lt.-Gen. Gul Hassan will get the confidence of the people of Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan. But we must also expect that he will achieve great things. He will remodel, re-set and reorientate the army on new lines, dynamic lines, on the lines of a free people’s army.

Bhutto’s stance on “East Pakistan” brought out his belief that the best way to get across to his countrymen is to speak to them in the name of Islam. At one point he declared:

15Gul Hassan was mentioned as a possible successor to Yahya Khan in some speculations during the war as well as later. Of several such reports, one appeared in the Guardian, London, 1 December 1971, while another was circulated by AFP, the French News Agency. Malcolm Browne reported in the New York Times of 18 December that the names of former President Ayub Khan, Bhutto, and Air Marshal Rahim Khan were being mentioned as likely successors.
"I speak as a Muslim and as a Pakistani." At another point he said: "The past belongs to God, the future belongs to God, but let me tell you I am speaking as a Pakistani believing in a great ideal, in a great concept." In giving a religious leavening to this address, Bhutto was following the style which all Pakistani politicians—starting with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Father of the Nation—have adopted.

Taking the religious tack, Bhutto dwelled on the Muslim character of East Bengal and played upon the fear of Hindu domination over it via India. He admitted mistakes in relations with the eastern wing, and offered to discuss future arrangements without conditions but within the concept of one united Pakistan.

They [the East Bengalis] are the majority of our land and I am fully convinced that they want to remain with us. I appeal to them not to forget us but to forgive us.

Muslim Bengal will always be a part of Pakistan. Muslim Bengal suffered more than any other [part of the subcontinent] under Hindu domination. Muslim Bengal’s character will always remain [Muslim] and we will see to it that Muslim Bengal remains a part of Pakistan.

To rectify and make amends for our mistakes, I seek an opportunity to meet the leaders of Bengal. To arrive at a settlement without foreign occupation. We must be given that opportunity so that we may arrive at a settlement [as] between two brothers who have always lived together and under certain conditions will continue to live together for all times. It can be a very loose arrangement but it must be within the concept of Pakistan.

Finally, Bhutto showed a keen realization that promises to redeem national honour needed to be supplemented by
assurances that he would use his power to secure for the people some measure of social justice. This was after all the platform on which he had swept the polls in West Pakistan in December 1970.

I tell the farmers: you are the backbone of the nation. You will not be ejected by vaderas [landowners in Sind], you will not be ejected by zamindars [landowners in Punjab]. You will have your rights. I intend to have land reforms. In the first instance, I would have land reforms which are absolutely necessary [and] for which we need no debate. . . . In the second instance, when democracy is restored, the people's representatives must determine the extent of land reforms.

I will ensure that the labourers are not maltreated. I will ensure that there are no lock-outs. I will ensure that unemployment does not unnecessarily take place. I will tell the labour community: please be a little patient. We will do everything in our power to put the resources of the nation at your disposal. To all those who work with their hands, all those who toil, [I say] do not fear because your Pakistan has come into being today.

To my students who brought me back into a position of responsibility. . . . I am grateful to you. My students are my children. I have told the student community that we will not interfere in [their] internal politics. We will allow the student community to flourish, to come to its own decisions. They are the elite. They are the masters of tomorrow. I am going to bring about many reforms in educational field. I will make you the masters of your destiny but that destiny is the destiny of Pakistan.

In a more general vein, Bhutto addressed himself to the
problems of corruption and nepotism which have remained lively political issues in Pakistan for most of its existence.

I will move as fast as necessary to see to it that corruption and nepotism and maladministration are handled, and when I say that I mean it. I will come down with a very heavy hand on corruption.

I warn the bureaucracy to do its job, to do its duty. I expect the bureaucracy to work night and day. I am a man who works 24 hours a day. For me there is no question of sleep or rest and I expect the bureaucracy to do the same. The tea parties must come to a stop. . . . And when I talk of the bureaucracy, I do not mean only the Secretariat at Islamabad. I mean each and every bureaucrat wherever he is. I will travel unexpectedly suddenly . . . I might land at Rahimyar Khan. . . in Chitral . . . Mirpur Khas . . . Layallpur. So they may expect me at any time.

The common man, the poor man, the peasant and the labourer have been subjected to humiliation. If the common man had not been humiliated for 24 years, Pakistan as a nation would not have been humiliated today. I want each and every individual to be regarded as important. I do not want him to get his justice through sifarish [recommendation]. Nobody will do sifarish through my relations or through my party. I will never brook that because the people of Pakistan are my family. I have got children and I have got [a] wife. They will be nowhere in the picture, and if my children and my family or my wife think that they can exploit my position, they are sadly mistaken because I will make them accountable as no one else.

This was an attempt to cater to public sentiments—in
elementary terms appropriate to a country in which the advance towards political maturity has been deliberately held back by its rulers. All this notwithstanding, the inaugural address did make known major political decisions to lift the ban on Wali Khan's National Awami Party imposed by Yahya Khan on 26 November, and the cancellation of the bogus by-elections in East Pakistan. The latter decision was only of academic interest since no more than 20 members from the east, whether elected in 1970 or in the by-elections, were physically present in the west. Yet Bhutto chose to act quickly in this regard to give greater validity to his stand that he wanted to settle with the east through negotiations between the genuine leaders of the people.

A clearer indication of his intention was available from the press conference which followed the broadcast. In reply to a question about Sheikh Mujib, he said that he had checked about the East Bengali leader before he went to Washington, and again after coming back, to make sure that he was safe. "I was afraid," Bhutto added, "that Mujib might have been executed." Quite clearly, he was planning to talk to him but he did not spell this out immediately because he was still to ascertain public reaction to such a move.

The press conference marked the end of Bhutto's first day as President. His mood, as those attending it recall, was very relaxed; his aides were unmistakably jubilant. The doubts and forebodings of the morning had obviously given way to a sense of confidence as Bhutto saw that the military needed him more than he needed them. One way or other, he had got where he wanted to—even though Pakistan was now only half the country that it was. But this does not mean that Bhutto has scaled down his ambitions. Those acquainted with his style are convinced that he will never be satisfied until he has built for himself a significant role in interna-
tional affairs. In Pakistan’s quest for a triangular balance in its relationship with the three world powers, the USA, the USSR, and China, Bhutto seeks the key to his own as well as to his country’s future.
2. Formative Phase

Bhutto's installation as President on 20 December 1971, crowned a political career which began in an unexpected conjunction of circumstances in 1958. A general election was due to be held in March 1959, the first country-wide poll since independence in 1947. The country was restive and its ruling elite unsure of the verdict of the ballot box. Not willing to take any chances, the army decided to ask the President, Maj.-Gen. Iskander Mirza, "to act to save the country from disintegration." Mirza was only too willing; he abrogated the 1956 constitution which had taken nine years to prepare, and put the country under martial law on 9 October 1958.

Mirza lasted only three weeks. Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief and Chief Martial Law Administrator, pushed out the President and installed himself in the job in a swift and silent palace revolution on 27 October. Just before this happened, Mirza had worked out with Ayub Khan a list of ten names for the first cabinet. This included Bhutto, a 30-year-old lawyer whose participation in public activity till that date had remained limited to membership of two
UN delegations. Fortunately for him, Ayub Khan saw no reason to change the list after Mirza's exit—thus enabling Bhutto to make his debut in politics.

The reason why Mirza picked up Bhutto in the first place, and Ayub Khan retained him afterwards, was that the young lawyer had not only talent but also the right connections. His father, Sir Shahnawaz Khan Bhutto, was one of the big Sindhi landlords whose country seat at Larkana, some 20 miles from the Mohenjodaro ruins, and the town house in Karachi were places where top people foregathered for pleasure as well as serious business. It appears that the coup d'etat of 1958 was hatched at Larkana, the main actors assembling there ostensibly for a shoot. What could be more natural than a gesture to the host in terms of a cabinet position for his son? In any case, it was necessary to include a Sindhi, and there were not many as bright or as well-qualified as Bhutto. Another factor also needs to be taken into account: Mirza, as a member of the minority sect of Shias, had an added reason for preferring a fellow Shia like Bhutto.

In Sind where politics is even today the preserve of the landed gentry, the Bhutto family was bound to have a place of prominence. Of Rajput Hindu origin, it converted to Islam four centuries ago and moved from Rajputana to Sind shortly thereafter. It owned at one time 250,000 acres spread over Larkana, Sukkur and Jacobabad. Shahnawaz Khan entered the Bombay Legislative Council in 1921 at the age of 33, and continued as a member till 1936 as a representative of the zamindars (landlords) of Sind. He seems to have been in the good books of the British raj, as the honours

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1This is mentioned in Bhutto's profile in the Observer, London, 2 January 1972, based apparently on information supplied by him.

2Ibid.
bestowed on him would suggest. He was given the OBE in 1919 and made a Khan Bahadur in 1921; the CIE followed in 1925 and knighthood in 1930. In 1931, he attended the Round Table Conference on India, held in London to consider future constitutional changes, as the leader of a four-man delegation of Sindhi Muslims.³ The conference divided into several sub-committees on four of which Shahnawaz Khan found a place. But he did not take active part in the proceedings except on the question of separating Sind from the Bombay Presidency.

The few biographical notes on Shahnawaz Khan available in Pakistani papers suggest that he was seeking a separate province for Sindhi Muslims with the same concept in mind that was eventually taken to the logical conclusion by the demand for Pakistan. This is far-fetched; Shahnawaz Khan in his submissions in London underlined that “the demand for the separation of Sind is not so much a Muslim demand as a Sindhi demand”. He pointed out that the idea was first canvassed by a Hindu, Harchandrai, in 1913 in his address as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Karachi session of the Congress. Moreover, the Congress stood committed to the principle of linguistic states since 1927, the relevant resolution being moved (as Shahnawaz Khan reminded the London conference) by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, “the arch-priest of the Hindu Mahasabha”⁴ Contrary to current Pakistani assumptions, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was not particularly enthusiastic at this time about a separate Sind province. As he said at the London conference: “If they [the representatives of Sind] cannot show a practical way of bearing the financial burden, then the province cannot be set up a separate province.”

³Sind’s Role in Freedom Struggle, the Pakistan Times, 25 March 1972.
⁴Proceedings of sub-committees, Part II, pp. 468-70.
Even though Shahnawaz Khan spoke on some occasions as a Sindhi and on others as a representative of the "agriculturists", he was primarily a Muslim politician. At the plenary session of the Round Table Conference, he joined others in echoing the line on the minority problem set by the principal Muslim spokesman, Sir Mohammad Shafi. "If we have failed to arrive at an agreement, the blame lies on the shoulders of those who lightly brush aside safeguards for minorities," Shahnawaz Khan said as a preamble before paying to Ramsay Macdonald, Britain's Prime Minister, an almost fulsome tribute. "If and when a federal India comes into being, he with common consent will be hailed as the architect."

In 1934, Shahnazwaz Khan was appointed a minister in the Bombay government. Following Sind's separation, he became chief adviser to the Governor for an interim period until a provincial ministry was formed after the 1937 election. He and his associates launched a Sind United Party which won 18 seats in a house of 60 to become the largest single party, the Congress taking second place with 14. But Shahnawaz Khan himself failed to get in from his home constituency. This facilitated the formation of a government by Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and his group of Independents. The Muslim League did not contest the election as a party, but nine of its leading lights had got in as Independents. Jinnah was anxious to see a ministry installed in Sind under the League's leadership but he had to wait for this until 1941.

Shahnawaz Khan quit politics and went away to Bombay to become Chairman of the Bombay-Sind Public Service Commission. In early 1947, he moved to Junagadh, a tiny coastal state in south-west Kathiawar, to join the council of ministers of its ruler, Sir Mahabatkhan Rasulkhanji. By
May he had become Dewan, or Prime Minister. It was in this capacity that he counselled the ruler to accede to Pakistan when the choice had to be made in August. As V. P. Menon records in *The Integration of Indian States* on the basis of letters recovered from the Junagadh palace, Shahnawaz Khan was acting under Jinnah’s instructions. The move was unacceptable to the state’s population; the resultant unrest led to some sharp arguments between India and Pakistan. Eventually, Shahnawaz Khan bowed to the realities and asked New Delhi to take over the state, telling Jinnah that the “Muslims of Kathiawar seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan”. Shahnawaz Khan followed the ruler to Karachi in September 1947. There is no record of any further public activity by Shahnawaz Khan, the explanation being that he was in indifferent health and lived in retirement until his death in November 1957.6

Shahnawaz Khan had four wives, as was the custom of the times among such families. One wife was Khursheed who had taken this name on her conversion to Islam to marry Shahnawaz Khan.6 She bore him three children: one son, Zulfiqar, and two daughters. There were five other children by his other wives, a son and four daughters. But this son died, leaving Zulfiqar as the sole heir.

Bhutto, born at Larkana on 5 January 1928, received his early education in Karachi but moved with his father to Bombay at a fairly early age. He joined the Cathedral and John Connon School from which he did his Senior Cambridge at the second attempt. As a fellow student, Piloo Mody


6Based on interview with her brother, Damodar, published in *Dharmyug* (Hindi), Bombay, 26 April 1970. Contrary to some speculations in the yellow press in Pakistan, this was a regular marriage at which Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and other notables were present.
ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO

(now a member of India's Lok Sabha on the Swatantra Party ticket) remarks, Bhutto "did not show much promise" at this stage. After finishing school, he and Mody spent two years together at the J. J. School of Arts in Bombay.⑦

Young Bhutto, as his school friends recall, hero-worshipped Jinnah, who was also resident in Bombay until he moved to Karachi in 1947. Another Bhutto hero was the well-known Indian cricketer, Mushtaq Ali. Apparently, Bhutto was a good opening batsman himself. He had other interests, too. Nargis, one of the best-known stars of the Indian screen, thinks that he had a teenage crush on her. She remembers him as "very charming and likable", but always reeking of gin and perfume. As she recalls: "Bhutto as I knew him was the feudal landlord with princely pleasures—drinks, shikar and dancing with a new girl every night."

In September 1947, some weeks after partition, Bhutto left India to study abroad, and never came back to the country except for brief visits. His father, Shahnawaz Khan, had already gone to Pakistan. The family connection with India was thus at an end, but for several years thereafter Bhutto took the position in legal documents required in connection with the family property in Bombay that he had not made up his mind whether to settle down in India or Pakistan. This was to involve him in an unsavoury political controversy after he fell out with Ayub Khan.

The facts, as documented in Bhutto's petitions to various Indian courts, are readily verified. Some time before partition, Bhutto's father, Shahnawaz Khan, sold a house in Bombay for Rs 140,000 or just over £10,000 at the prevailing rate of exchange. Evidently, this property was in Bhutto's

name, and the sale proceeds were therefore left in the custody of the court as he was a minor. Following partition in 1947 and his departure for the USA, he was declared an evacuee by an order issued on 6 July 1949. This meant that he could get the money back only through an application to a Pakistani court, according to the arrangements made between the two countries.

Whatever the reason, Bhutto challenged the order in a series of applications to the Custodian of Evacuee Property. He pointed out that he had left India on an Indian passport and visited Karachi in 1949 "as an Indian national", and was not therefore an evacuee when the order was made. In his petition of 1949, he said: "Things are so nebulous that I cannot say where I shall settle down when I return after finishing studies." In another statement in 1955, he said he was thinking of settling "permanently" in England. In 1956, he said that "merely because the applicant's parents resided in Karachi and the applicant's marriage took place there . . . it could not be concluded that the applicant's home was also in Karachi at any relevant time." In other words, he disclaimed having become a citizen of Pakistan, as in that event the applications would become immediately untenable. It was only on 3 November 1958, some weeks after he became a minister, that he accepted that he had settled down in Karachi, and begged leave to withdraw his appeal pending before India's Supreme Court.8 At the same time as Bhutto was engaged in this protracted legal battle in India, he was—curiously enough—also seeking to recover the Bombay court deposit through legal processes in Pakistan as a citizen of that country. This was stated in India's Rajya Sabha on 19 November 1965, by the Minister for Rehabilitation in reply

to a call attention notice. The issue came up in the Pakistan national assembly on 30 June 1967. Replying to a question raised by a member of the Treasury benches, Khwaja Shahabuddin, Information Minister, said that it appeared from relevant Indian documents that “till 1958 Mr Bhutto was claiming in Pakistan citizenship of Pakistan and in India he was claiming citizenship of India.” The motivation underlying Shahabuddin’s answer was to undermine Bhutto’s position, but it had no effect at all on the rising tide of his popularity in Pakistan.

To return, however, to the time Bhutto left Bombay in 1947, he made his way to the University of California at Berkeley from where he graduated with honours in Political Science. As Piloo Mody recalls, Bhutto was a very good mimic, and was excellent at take-off of professors and friends. He was also a great admirer of V. K. Krishna Menon because “his performances at the UN did a lot for India”. From Berkeley, Bhutto moved to Christchurch, Oxford, to take a Master’s degree in jurisprudence with distinction in 1952. The following year he was admitted to the Bar from Lincoln’s Inn, London.

His official “life sketch”, issued by the Press Information Department in Rawalpindi after he became President says: “On completion of his legal education in London, Mr Bhutto was appointed Lecturer in International Law, University of Southampton. He was the first Asian to teach at this university”. The secretary of the Southampton University, who was appointed to the job in 1953, denies that Bhutto was on the staff at any time. The secretary speaks from personal knowledge of events since 1953 and on the basis of staff records for the previous ten years. As it happens, Bhutto’s Law tutor at Christchurch, S. N. Grant-Bailey, be-

*Dawn, 1 July 1967.
came Director of Legal Studies at Southampton in 1951. He might have shown some interest in getting Bhutto on the staff, the only explanation Southampton's secretary could offer for the story that Bhutto had taught there in 1952.\(^{10}\)

In 1953, Bhutto returned to Karachi and taught constitutional law at the Sind Muslim Law College, and also set up practice at the High Court. A Pakistani journalist recalls that his ability as a public speaker soon attracted the notice of H. S. Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan from September 1956 to October 1957. He went to Bhutto's father, Shahnawaz Khan, and expressed his readiness to take the son under his political wing. Had this materialized, Bhutto would have made his political debut via the Awami League with which he was to clash head on in 1971.

In 1957, Bhutto was nominated member of Pakistan's delegation to the United Nations on the strength of his knowledge of international law. He participated in committee work, and made a long and well-researched contribution to the work of the sixth committee which was seeking to define aggression, quoting incidentally his professor at California, Hans Kalsen, at some length on the law of the United Nations. On this occasion, Bhutto propounded the thesis that "it is neither possible nor desirable to define aggression" because a definition "may quite conceivably act as a barrier against quick and decisive counter-action."\(^{11}\) It must be a matter of some satisfaction to Bhutto that the definition has eluded the UN till this day. The next year he was sent off to Geneva to attend a UN conference on the law of the seabed in March-April. The main issue in debate was the definition of an agreed territorial limit, with Bhutto taking

\(^{10}\)The author is indebted to a friend in London for making these enquires.

a stand in favour of "the maximum freedom of the high seas and the minimum breadth of territorial sea." Even on this technical issue, he was involved in a clash with India which, along with Mexico, had put forward a proposal for a "flexible" 12-mile limit. He accused India and Mexico of a remarkable "tergiversation"—meaning changing one's principles to suit different occasions. Interestingly, this particular term has continued to recur in Bhutto's writings and pronouncements on India in many different contexts.

Bhutto's personal life today is very different from what it was 15 years ago: the burdens of a political career have weighed him down. But this happened only gradually. In his first years as cabinet minister under Ayub Khan, he continued to have the reputation of being a gay young man with a quick eye for a pretty face. This got him into trouble more than once but does not seem to have done any damage to his political career. Knowledgeable observers believe that Ayub Khan himself took a hand to smoothen the difficulties he ran into at this time with his beautiful, high-born wife, Nusrat (nee Isphani). He married her in 1951 while he was still a student at Oxford. Nusrat spent her early years in Bombay where she went to school. Of Iranian ancestry, her family is one of a group from Iran which settled many years ago in Poona, 120 miles south-east of Bombay. It later shifted to Karachi. In recent years, particularly after Bhutto left the cabinet, Nusrat has occasionally dabbled in politics. On one celebrated occasion, she staged a sit-down strike outside a court in Lahore to secure admission to the proceedings for the family. Although all official biographies refer to Nusrat as the only wife, Bhutto is believed to have another tucked away in his country seat. A Sindhi informant explained to this author that it was quite usual in the big land-

lord families to have a “village wife” from within the clan to help keep inherited properties intact.

Bhutto as a politician has always had a penchant for the dramatic. In July 1963, he was suddenly taken ill with an acute pain in the stomach at three in the morning. The doctors diagnosed it as appendicitis and wanted to move him immediately to hospital. But he insisted that he must wind up a debate on foreign affairs in the national assembly later that morning. With drugs to give him temporary relief, he held forth as scheduled, with his wife and doctor watching from the distinguished visitors gallery. As *Dawn* reported the next day, “a little later he was operated on”.

In politics, Bhutto has never set much store by consistency. He was vehemently opposed to the Awami League’s six-point formula for autonomy in 1966, and again in 1970-71. But in 1969, he was looking for an alliance with Mujibur Rahman who turned down the proposal, forcing Bhutto to cultivate Bhashani and sign a pact with him to work together in certain directions.\(^\text{13}\)

More recently, Bhutto gave the impression, when he took over the presidency, that he wanted an understanding with Wali Khan’s National Awami Party. While talks between the two were still in progress Bhutto evidently went ahead with a quiet effort to suborn NAP members in the NWFP and Baluchistan assemblies. As an exasperated Wali Khan told the *Guardian*, London: “Bhutto is not the sort of person you can do business with.”

The distrust of Bhutto extends also to his basic political beliefs. As Asghar Khan said to this author at the Rawalpindi office of his *Tehrik-e-Istiqal* party: “Bhutto is basically authoritarian in outlook; he talks of democracy but

\(^\text{13}\)Peter Hazellhurst’s despatch from Rawalpindi, *The Times*, London, 10 March 1969.
does not really believe in it.” Incidentally, Bhutto’s house in Karachi is reputed to have one of the finest collections of books on Napoleon put together by his father. Whether Bhutto has looked for political inspiration to this collection is not known, but several Pakistani journalists believe that he did take some interest in studying the political organization adopted in Nazi Germany. As Secretary-General of the Muslim League, the ruling party of the Ayub era, he pleaded at a working committee meeting that government officials should be made to join the party. He argued that “government servants should not remain under any misconception and should know that they have to support the Muslim League.”14 This was quite clearly a bid to push Pakistan, formally and legally, in the direction of one-party state. Memories such as this trouble leaders like Wali Khan, who wonder audibly what the future may have in store.

Bhutto is known to be a loyal and charming friend. This is evident from the way in which he has accommodated in his cabinet and in other prestige positions the people who stood by him in adversity. As briefly noted in Chapter I, he is also a man who does not readily forget an injury, as shown by the sacking of two newspaper editors on the day he took office, and the detention of Yahya Khan’s intelligence chief, Umar, and of three businessmen.

3. Ayub’s Protege

The eight years Bhutto spent as a cabinet minister witnessed a remarkable transformation. From a young lawyer unknown outside Karachi drawing rooms, he became seasoned politician commanding wide popular support in West Pakistan. Hasan Askari, writing in Today in 1964 fancied that “the most probable heir for the mantle of savior, is Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto seems to be idolised by every one.”

Bhutto’s talent, energy and zeal contributed to his success, but Ayub Khan’s support was an important factor as well. Of the ten-member cabinet with which the martial law regime started in October 1958, only Bhutto and Mohammad Soaib, the Finance Minister, were still in office in mid-1966.

Bhutto established himself in Ayub Khan’s favour by volunteering for difficult and unpleasant chores at home. In early 1962 when Ayub Khan’s new constitution was under attack from the intelligentsia, Bhutto went round the country canvassing support in its favour. Students mobbed him in the Punjab University campus but he went on with the

campaign undaunted. In the very tricky months of 1961-62 when Pakistan was reassessing its relationship with the USA in the light of the growing strains between India and China, Bhutto, then holding an economic portfolio, seems to have been given the task of ventilating the government's disappointment with Washington. This rhetoric was galling to Ayub Khan's backers in the USA, who lost no time in conveying their displeasure. But this suited the astute President admirably. It brought Pakistan's views forcefully to the attention of US policy-makers without however personally committing him or his regime; Bhutto's rhetoric could always be disowned as the outpourings of a young and impetuous minister. More important, there was a domestic pay-off as well: the assertion of Pakistan's right to pursue an independent foreign policy, rejecting US pleas for an understanding with India for a common front against China, pleased not only the left-wing elements in the country but also nationalist sentiment in general. The regime gained tangibly greater support at home from precisely those elements of the population which were most hostile to it, such as students and the intelligentsia. Bhutto gained even more: the departure from a pro-Western orientation in foreign policy became associated with him in the public mind, adding immensely to his popularity. He became simultaneously a symbol of resurgent nationalism and anti-Indian chauvinism.

Rapid rewards came to Bhutto as much because of his performances as his effusive affirmations of loyalty to the boss. Writing in Pakistan Annual of 1961, Bhutto said of Ayub Khan:

This man of history is more than a Lincoln to us, for he has bound the nation together by eliminating the fissiparous tendencies without violence; more than a Lenin,
because he has set the country's economy and social objectives on a high and glorious pedestal without coercion. He is our Ataturk, for, like the Great Turkish leader he has restored the nation's dignity and self-respect in the comity of nations, and, above all a Salahuddin, for, like that great Ghazi of Islam, this heir to the noble heritage has regained a hundred million people's pride and confidence, the highest attribute of life, without which a people are soulless.2

After 18 months as Minister for Commerce, he was moved in January 1960 to the portfolio of Information and National Reconstruction, with subsidiary charge of minority affairs. National Reconstruction was an euphemism for propaganda exercises to build the "revolutionary" image Ayub Khan was keen to project for his regime. Three months later, Bhutto was given, in addition, charge of Kashmir Affairs and Fuel, Power and Natural Resources. But his heart was set on becoming Foreign Minister, which involved him in periodic manoeuvres against Manzur Qadir, the man holding the coveted job. The leadership of Pakistan's delegation to the United Nations in 1959 and 1960 whetted Bhutto's appetite. These assignments were given to him because Qadir was too busy to go to the "talking shop", and too important to be spared by Ayub Khan who relied a good deal on the Foreign Minister's counsel. This was clearly brought out when Qadir was chosen to mastermind the new constitution promulgated in 1962.

When the cabinet was reconstituted in June 1962 after elections to the newly revived national and provincial assemblies, Ayub Khan left out Qadir apparently at his own request, and gave the Foreign Ministry to Mohammad Ali

Bogra, a diplomat well in with Washington, and Prime Minister from 1953 to 1955. He was in indifferent health, with the result that his place as the government’s spokesman on foreign policy, and as leader of the House in the national assembly, was often filled by Bhutto. This was the reason why he was chosen to head the Pakistan team for the talks with India on Kashmir which began in Rawalpindi a week before Bogra’s death in January 1963. Ayub Khan assigned the Ministry of External Affairs thereafter to Bhutto in addition to the portfolios he was holding. A year later, when the Cabinet was reconstituted after the 1965 election, Bhutto continued as Foreign Minister.

In the period of a little over four years that Bhutto spent in the government before becoming Foreign Minister, he was associated with two major decisions. As Minister of Commerce in 1969, he introduced a bonus voucher system designed to boost Pakistan’s exports. This entitled an exporter to retain a part of the foreign exchange earnings for himself as bonus. The government’s policy of allowing imports of many scarce items only against these bonus vouchers made the scheme very attractive to the exporter; he could either use his bonus earnings to import on his own account to sell the vouchers at a high premium. The scheme was worked out for the government by a West German expert, Dr Vocke; Bhutto had little to do with either its formulation or implementation both of which fell within the

Ayub had probably promised the job to Bhutto even before Bogra’s death. This is suggested by the tone of Bhutto’s remarks during a debate on foreign policy on 27 November 1962 in which he said: “In my opinion, there are a number of incompetent persons in the foreign service and if it were in my hands, I would have sent them packing a long time ago. Perhaps that day might still come” (italics added). *Important Speeches and Press Conferences of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto*, Karachi, 1966, p. 377.

The bonus scheme was finally abolished by Bhutto on 11 May 1972. See Chapter 9.
purview of the bureaucracy.

The second decision for which Bhutto bore responsibility as Minister of Fuel and National Resources was the acceptance of a Soviet offer to help in exploring mineral resources, particularly oil. The offer was accepted in principle in August 1960; technical talks began in September, and an agreement was signed in March 1961 under which the USSR agreed to provide a loan of $30 million to finance the programme. Bhutto takes credit for this significant departure in Pakistan's foreign policy, marking the first step towards economic co-operation with communist countries. As he put it: "I have always advocated the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. It was in pursuance of this objective that I sponsored the conclusion of the Oil Agreement between Pakistan and the Soviet Union."6

Some qualified observers support Bhutto's claim. Khalid B. Sayeed describes him as "the supreme architect" of an independent foreign policy.6 It is suggested that Bhutto was greatly impressed by India's success in securing aid from the Soviet bloc for key industrial sectors. Keen on diversifying the sources from which Pakistan obtained aid, Bhutto is believed to have persuaded Ayub Khan to consider the Soviet offer. At this time, he was reported to be on personally friendly terms with the Soviet and Chinese embassies. They welcomed the young minister's attentions because everyone kept them at arm's length.7

But other observers of the scene, just as well qualified, are unwilling to accept Bhutto's "sponsorship" of the oil deal. Bhutto was a member of the cabinet's economic affairs com-

6From speech to national assembly, 27 November 1962.
7Information obtained from a diplomat in Karachi.
mittee, and was even otherwise associated with the top policy-making group around Ayub Khan, always ready to offer advice backed up by clever and convincing arguments. It seems that he as well as other policy-maker were groping for a way to reduce Pakistan’s excessive dependence upon the USA, but he was scarcely in a position to be the prime mover at this early stage of his career. Whatever the truth, the fact is that the acceptance of the offer was a major decision of policy in the situation obtaining at the time. In May 1960, Khrushchev had threatened Pakistan with dire consequences following the shooting down in Soviet territory of a US reconnaissance plane which had taken off from Peshawar. According to a report published in *Dawn* of 8 May 1960, “‘Khrushchev even drew a red ring around Peshawar as a bombing target on his strategic map of the world.”8 Pakistan was greatly disturbed; its Ambassador in Washington, Aziz Ahmad, presented an aide-memoire to the State Department asking it to ensure that “all concerned refrain from such activities in the future.”9 Given this context, it would seem highly unlikely that a decision to initiate economic cooperation, barely three months after the Khrushchev ultimatum, could have been “sponsored” by the Minister of Natural Resources. Soviet offers of technical and economic assistance had been gathering dust for months, if not years; Molotov had hinted at Moscow’s readiness to build a steel plant as far back as March 1956.10 But Pakistan had held back for fear of causing offence to its Western allies. With the beginning of a thaw in the cold war, Ayub Khan evidently decided to use the oil deal to test the water. The first reaction in London—as reported by Z. A. Suleri in the *Pakistan Times*—

9The *Pakistan Times*, 19 May 1960.
10Mohammad A. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*
was to raise doubts about Ayub Khan's commitment to the West. "Concern, if not profound anxiety, in American circles" in Karachi was reported by Narayan Swamy in the *Times of India*. These reports confirm that whatever fresh ideas Bhutto may have contributed, their acceptance must have called for a very serious assessment of the pros and cons by those concerned with foreign and defence policy (specially in the context of US military aid).

To turn now to Bhutto's claim to have given a new direction to Pakistan's China policy, the fact is that the first overtures were made in 1959 long before he became foreign minister. Ayub Khan held a press conference on 23 October 1959, at which he said he would approach China for talks on the demarcation of the border, and reiterated this intention in an interview with the *Daily Mail* on 16 November 1959. The motivating factor would seem to have been his concern that Pakistan might, like India, find itself involved in a serious border dispute with China. Two disturbing developments had taken place in October: a serious Sino-Indian skirmish at Kongka La, and Pakistan's discovery of a Peking map showing a large chunk of Pakistan-held Kashmir, including Mintaka and Khunjerab passes, within China. Ayub Khan's fears for the future are clear from the *Daily Mail* interview. He said the Chinese were not immediately ready for any major territorial advance but "tomorrow they would expand".

Pakistan's overture to China produced no response for many months, not least because Ayub Khan was still a very loyal US ally who offered during 1960 to send Pakistani troops to Laos if SEATO decided to intervene. More important, Chou En-lai was still to have a round of talks with Nehru in April 1960, followed by further discussions at the level of officials. When these failed to produce a solution
satisfactory to China, it was time for Peking to consider negotiating with Pakistan without worrying about the irritation which this would cause to India. The Chinese indicated their readiness to discuss border problems in December 1960, and asked for a formal proposal.\textsuperscript{11} This was sent on 28 March 1961.

The opening offered by China gained in importance month by month as Sino-Indian relations deteriorated. The frequent clashes on the border made it clear that a collision was in the offing. Pakistan's policy-makers altered their sights accordingly, taking into account two factors. President Kennedy had expressed a clear interest in backing India against China. Ayub Khan looked upon this as an affront to Pakistan. He told the \textit{New York Times}, he considered it strange that "friends" and "non-friends" should be considered on the same level. Secondly, India's action in Goa in December 1961 caused great disquiet to Pakistan; the failure of NATO to come to Portugal's rescue pointed to the moral that pacts offered no conclusive guarantees of support. \textit{Dawn}, writing two days after India's entry into Goa, urged Pakistan to pull out of SEATO and CENTO and seek closer ties with China.\textsuperscript{12} Speaking in the same strain, Ayub Khan told two American correspondents in July 1961, just before he arrived in the USA on a state visit, that the smaller countries of Asia might turn to China for protection against India if it became overwhelmingly strong.\textsuperscript{13} This was followed by a reversal of Pakistan's posture regarding China's entry into the UN to remove the last hurdle to friendly relations with Peking. Shortly after the vote in favour of admission in December

\textsuperscript{11}The \textit{Hindustan Times}, 1 April 1960, quotes Manzur Qadir as saying this in Bangkok on the previous day.
\textsuperscript{13}Despatch from Girilal Jain, Karachi, in the \textit{Times of India}, 12 July 1961.
1961, the Chinese envoy in Karachi publicly declared that Peking would reciprocate on the border issue.\(^\text{14}\) The long-awaited Chinese reply to Pakistan’s request of March 1961 for negotiations arrived in February 1962.

The climate for a shift of foreign policy in favour of a close understanding with China was building up in Pakistan, with Altak Husain, then editor of *Dawn*, playing a notable part—quite possibly at the instance of the government. An editorial on 14 May 1962 even talked of scrapping the capitalist pattern, “imported along with American dollars”, to seek “different alignments”. Another important advocate was M.A.H. Ispahani, member of a highly influential business family and a former envoy in London and Washington. He made a trip to China in 1960, following which he pseudonymously wrote articles in *Dawn* reminding Pakistan that China was not only an important neighbour but a potential world power.\(^\text{15}\) The stage was thus set for a high-level meeting, at which the whole range of Pakistan’s international relations was discussed. Qadir was certainly present, but the *Pakistan Times* makes no mention of Bhutto being there. A few days later, the President said he would be willing to consider a friendship treaty with China.\(^\text{16}\)

Shortly after Bogra took over as Foreign Minister in June, he sent back to China Maj.-Gen. (Retd.) N. M. Raza, Pakistan’s first Ambassador to Peking.\(^\text{17}\) He was the man who had persuaded Peking to look kindly upon Pakistan’s participation in the SEATO, and arranged talks between Bogra and Chou En-lai at Bandung in 1955. Raza’s efforts yielded quick results; detailed negotiations on the border


\(^{16}\)The *Pakistan Times*, 2 July 1962.

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started in October, just before the Sino-Indian conflict. An agreement on principles was announced on 26 December 1962, one day before Bhutto and Swaran Singh opened the first of their six rounds of talks on Kashmir. The final agreement on the border was signed in March, with Bhutto officiating at the ceremonies in Peking because he had by that time taken over as Foreign Minister.

This brief review of developments shows that changes in the relationship with China flowed directly from the Sino-Indian conflict and indirectly from Pakistan’s disenchantment with the USA. Many men in Pakistan saw the opportunities that friendship with China could offer, but Bhutto was perhaps the first to bring word that China might be willing to consider a request for a border settlement. According to one account, a hint was passed on to him at the United Nations by the Burmese, who had just concluded a border treaty with the Chinese, that “Peking was prepared to reach a reasonable settlement with any of her neighbours”.

As he records in The Myth of Independence, he wrote to Manzur Qadir from the UN to say that “the conflict in Ladakh would give rise to many changes in the sub-continent”.

The subsequent consolidation of relations with Peking owed a great deal to Bhutto’s single-minded efforts. He saw China as the ‘plus factor’ that Pakistan needed to offset India’s size and strength. He tried to disguise this basic motivation behind invocations to Afro-Asian solidarity and anti-imperialism. These sentiments were not necessarily insincere but they were certainly secondary.

Bhutto’s persuasive arguments helped to dispel Ayub

18Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, Bombay, 1970, p. 214-16.
19In Political Situation in Pakistan, a pamphlet Bhutto published in 1968, he wrote: “Pakistan will always need a plus factor for coping with India. Whether the Government likes it or not, it so happens that plus factor is the People’s Republic of China,”
Khan’s misgivings about communist expansionism, and made him and his colleagues realize that China was indeed the plus factor Pakistan had failed to find in SEATO and CENTO. This realization deepened in 1964 and 1965 as events in the subcontinent moved towards a showdown, explaining the firmness with which Ayub Khan stood up to US pressure against cooperation with China.

High-level contacts, evidenced by Chou En-lai’s trip to Pakistan in February 1964 and Ayub Khan’s return visit to China in March 1965, helped to firm up China’s support to Rawalpindi vis-a-vis Kashmir. It was about this time that the idea of staging an Algeria-type insurrection in Kashmir gained acceptance both within the administration and the armed forces. Bhutto is believed to have fathered the idea, either on his own or with inspiration from his Chinese friends. Four factors gave Pakistan an added incentive to put this plan into action. First, Ayub Khan as a soldier was keenly aware that the military build-up on which India had embarked after 1962 would in time alter the balance of forces in the subcontinent. If Pakistan had to opt for a war to get satisfaction on Kashmir, the earlier this took place the better. Secondly, the political situation within Kashmir was still unsettled after the mysterious theft and even more mysterious restoration of the Prophet’s relic from the Hazratbal mosque between 26 December and 3 January 1963. The release of Sheikh Abdullah in April 1964, after almost 11 years of continuous detention, had encouraged many Kashmiris to expect basic political changes. The restiveness was aggravated when the Sheikh embarked in February 1965 on a long tour of Muslim countries to ventilate his views, capped by a meeting with Chou En-lai in Algiers on 31 March. Thirdly, there was a growing feeling in Pakistan—fed by reports from New Delhi describing Lal Bahadur Shastri as “a prisoner of
indecision”—that India’s post-Nehru leadership was divided, weak and vacillating. A meeting with Lal Bahadur Shastri in October seems to have confirmed Ayub Khan’s judgement that the Indian Prime Minister was a “little”, inconsequential fellow who could not be expected to meet the challenge of a crisis. The time was, therefore, opportune for Pakistan to impose a decision, using only just enough force to bring the Kashmir issue to the negotiating table. India’s response, the calculation ran, would be to keep the conflict localized within Kashmir to Pakistan’s advantage; a new and unsure government would not want to run the risk of a wider war. Fourthly, there was a considerable public agitation, partly spontaneous and partly instigated by the government, against the steps taken by New Delhi to integrate Kashmir more closely into India’s political fabric. The extension of articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir in December 1964, which gave the President of India power to take over the administration of the State in an emergency, was seen in Pakistan as violating the understanding Shastri was said to have given to Ayub Khan to maintain the status quo until further negotiations with Pakistan.

Bhutto made an important, and possibly a decisive, contribution in the making of an overall assessment about India. One Western diplomat recalls that he came to a new year party on 1 January 1964 as pleased as Punch about India’s difficulties over the Hazaratbal theft. “The time to act is coming,” he is reported to have said on this occasion. On a more serious plane, unmistakable evidence is offered by an article Bhutto wrote after Nehru’s death that he had convinced himself that India was rapidly losing whatever cohesion it had. As he put it:

The death of Jawaharlal Nehru has been a blow to India
AYUB'S PROTEGE

in more senses than one. It has released in that country centrifugal forces on an unprecedented scale. How long will the memory of a dead Nehru inspire his countrymen to keep alive a polyglot India, the vast land of mysterious and frightening contradictions, darned together by the finest threads... Nehru's magic touch is gone. His spell-binding influence over the masses has disappeared. The key to India's unity and greatness has not been handed over to any individual. It has been burnt away with Nehru's dead body.²⁰

Giving this reading of the Indian situation, a trial of strength was bound to take place sooner or later. This was the reason why a minor and accidental skirmish between border patrols in Kutch in January 1965 was built up into a major confrontation. It all began with an Indian police patrol suddenly finding Pakistan Rangers in control of territory which lay, according to Indian maps, within India. It is possible that the Pakistanis had been there for some time; this was an area to which they laid a claim. When the first clashes took place in January, New Delhi asked the Indian High Commissioner in Karachi to take up the matter at the highest level. Bhutto at first promised that the situation would be sorted out. A settlement seemed to be in the offing when the Pakistan Foreign Office suddenly decided to take a tough line which ruled out a compromise without serious loss of face for Shastri. Was Bhutto stalling for time while the Pakistan army moved tanks and other reinforcements to the area? Or was it that the Foreign Office was genuinely interested in settling this minor dispute, but Bhutto was persuaded to veto the effort when the army found that, militarily, the situation was extremely favourable to Pakistan?

²⁰Z. A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, Karachi, 1966, pp. 61, 75.
The answer is not too clear, but there is not the least doubt that India’s sorry performance in the Kutch fighting gave added weight to Bhutto’s plans vis-a-vis Kashmir. Ayub Khan was later to boast in London that “a full Indian division would have been destroyed in Kutch but for his express orders restraining pursuing Pakistani troops”.

Kutch represented an important gain for Pakistan because the cease-fire agreement of July, concluded through Britain’s good offices, provided for arbitration to settle the boundary dispute. This was a valuable precedent which could be exploited if the planned insurrection in Kashmir put Pakistan in an advantageous bargaining position.

The operation in Kashmir started with the induction of infiltrators from 5 August with the hope that their presence would touch off a massive uprising within the State. Unfortunately for Pakistan, this did not happen. Instead, the fighting gradually widened as India responded with capture of passes and height to block the entry of infiltrators. Pakistan raised the ante by making an armoured assault into the vulnerable Chhumb sector with the aim of cutting off India’s access to Srinagar. India brought air power into play because it could not otherwise hold the rapid Pakistani advance. This set the stage for the next step up the escalation ladder on 6 September when India launched a two-pronged offensive into Punjab to compel Pakistan to ease off pressure on Kashmir. This was something which Ayub Khan had not bargained for. He was, however, confident that the superiority of his weapons—faster American aircraft and more powerful tanks—would decide the issue in his favour. “Our Pattons will stroll into Delhi” was the popular refrain of many conversations in Pakistan at this time. But, as it happened, a run of bad luck stymied the Pakistan offensive into Punjab to which it had committed its reserves. Indian thrusts fared
no better because the punch needed to fight decisive battles was lacking. The result was a stalemate on the battlefield which was soon translated into a cease-fire under UN auspices.

Bhutto played a key role in this inconclusive drama. As S. M. Zafar, then Law Minister, records:

The happenings in the occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir had started in August 1965 and my impression is that amongst the Ministers Mr. Bhutto alone knew what they were and amongst the civil servants the Foreign Secretary, Information Secretary and Defence Secretary were close to him.\(^\text{21}\)

It was because of Bhutto's personal involvement in the operation that Zafar was sent to the UN for the Security Council debates. Bhutto arrived in New York only after the resolution calling for a cease-fire had been adopted to convey Pakistan's acceptance. The inconclusiveness of the war was gravely upsetting to Bhutto who told Zafar that he could not continue to stay in the government. With a superb political perception, Bhutto had realized that the failure to obtain a military decision would cost Ayub Khan dearly because of the high expectations raised by the propaganda effort in the months before the war. It was time, therefore, to disengage from Ayub Khan.

4. Giant Killer

The 1965 India-Pakistan war proved to be a turning point in Ayub Khan’s fortunes. The first manifestations of disenchantment with his leadership were to be seen in the student demonstrations in the west wing that rocked Lahore and Karachi immediately after Ayub Khan’s announcement of 22 September 1965 that Pakistan had agreed to a cease-fire as urged by the UN Security Council. Far more serious unrest followed the Tashkent declaration. In the east, there was on the contrary a widespread sense of relief at the end of the war but also a lively sense of grievance against the central government for having neglected the defences of that wing.

The country-wide indignation had thus several facets. First and foremost, the propaganda build-up during the months preceding the conflict had led the west wing to expect a walk-over. When this did not happen, questions began to be asked why Pakistan had not fared better. It was suspected that Ayub Khan gave into the pressure applied by his western friends when they sensed the danger of China’s intervention in the conflict. The fact that Pakistan’s SEATO
and CENTO alliances failed to yield any material help at a time of trial heightened existing misgivings about the foreign policy pursued by the regime. Even the man in the street could sense the plight in which the country had been placed by the US embargo on arms supplies. With a military machine built up almost entirely around US-gifted equipment, the cut-off threatened to bring it to a grinding halt.

Secondly, the war widened the gulf between the two wings. The east’s vulnerability sharpened the demands for autonomy, leading to the enunciation of the Awami League’s six-point formula by Mujibur Rahman in February 1966. Thirdly, the war intensified economic difficulties, partly because of the suspension of aid by the USA and partly because of shortfalls in agriculture in 1965-66 and 1966-67.

As long as an uneasy ceasefire obtained along the India-West Pakistan border, the regime had little difficulty in keeping its critics in check through patriotic appeals or solidarity. But once the threat of war receded after the settlement worked out at Tashkent under Soviet auspices in January 1966, there was no holding back a restive population. The biggest disturbances took place in Lahore, the city most directly affected by the war. But since the spontaneous upsurge had no organisational underpinning, Ayub Khan succeeded in dampening it down with a mixture of coercion and cajolery. Prominent leaders of opposition parties were arrested, while students were offered several concessions in the academic sphere. The rioting ceased but the disaffection remained.

Bhutto foresaw that the end of the Ayub era would not be long in coming. But he waited to disassociate himself from the President in a manner that would gain him the greatest kudos. The obvious line to take was to voice reservations about the Tashkent declaration. The reputation that he had built up for the military vis-a-vis India made it almost
obligatory to strike an aggrieved posture.

Bhutto says that he offered his resignation on three occasions after Tashkent, but he was told not to desert Pakistan at a time of serious crisis. This is why he held back until mid-June. This claim is upheld by some independent observers,¹ but one Pakistani journalist, Shabbir Hussain, claims that it was Ayub Khan who decided to get rid of Bhutto. According to Hussain’s version, Ayub Khan went to stay with Bhutto at Larkana in the first week of February at the end of a tour of Sind, and told him that he would have to leave the cabinet. Bhutto, it is stated, made a number of efforts to get Ayub Khan to reverse his decision but failed.²

Whoever acted first, it was clearly not possible for the two to work together much longer. Even if Bhutto had decided to wait a while before launching out on an independent political career, Ayub Khan could not. There was a growing divergence between the two over foreign policy. Ayub Khan was as keen as Bhutto to retain China’s support vis-a-vis India. Following the US embargo on arms supplies, he had no choice but to look to China for military hardware. It is claimed by Shabbir Hussain and others that he had despatched Asghar Khan, then the chief of Pakistan’s Air Force, to Peking while the war was still in progress to negotiate for weapons. The story goes that Ayub Khan himself went immediately after the cease-fire, along with Bhutto, on a secret one-day trip to firm up arrangements. These trips figured in the electoral polemics of 1970, as discussed later in this book, but there were several different versions making it difficult to judge what really happened. In any event, Liu Shao-chi, then President of the Chinese Republic, and Chen Yi, Foreign Minister, visited Pakistan in March-April 1966 and

received a tumultuous welcome. Ayub Khan could scarcely wish to alienate the Chinese because the relationship was valuable in both internal and external contexts.

But he evidently did not want to get into a situation where his ties with China would jeopardize his relationship with the USA or with his Muslim friends like Iran and Saudi Arabia. One of the reasons which took him to the USA in December 1965 was to explain to President Johnson “the geopolitical compulsions” which obliged him to cultivate China’s friendship. Johnson evidently accepted this plea, as *Dawn* reported from Washington at the time. Likewise, Ayub Khan was aware that any increase in the Chinese presence in Pakistan would cause disquiet in Teheran and Jeddah; they would be afraid of the communist contagion travelling westward from Pakistan.\(^3\) He wanted, therefore, to hedge his bets, and had the backing of his senior army colleagues and right-wing politicians for a cautious policy. But Bhutto wanted to go full steam ahead to consolidate the friendship. As he was to argue publicly in 1968, neither the USA nor the Soviet Union was really interested in helping Pakistan to secure satisfaction from India. “The People’s Republic of China is the only country which will be sympathetic to Pakistan’s real requirements. This is because that country’s interests in the subcontinent coincide with those of Pakistan.”\(^4\) It was also his calculation that both Washington and Moscow would do more for Pakistan if it was seen to be moving closer to China.

Whatever reservations Bhutto may have had about the outcome of Tashkent, he certainly defended it with great gusto.

\(^3\) The author learned during a visit to Teheran at the end of 1968 that Iran had withdrawn its officer-trainees from Pakistan Army’s staff college at Kakul because of the suspected infiltration of Chinese ideas among Pakistani entrants.

in two statements issued from Larkana on 15 January and 9 February. He declared that it did not “detract one iota” from Pakistan’s resolve to seek a just solution of the Kashmir dispute “under this very declaration or even outside its framework”. He put up an equally strong defence in the national assembly when it met in Dacca in March, analyzing the declaration clause by clause to prove that it “closes no possibilities, blocks no efforts to the achievement of our legitimate aims”.

By the time the assembly session was held, Mujibur Rahman had already put forward his six-point charter of autonomy on behalf of the Awami League. Bhutto sought to answer the complaint that the east had been left to India’s tender mercies by making the claim that India did not dare attempt any mischief because of an ultimatum from Peking conveyed by the Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw to the US Ambassador for transmission to India. “All this will one day come to light; the people of Pakistan will know everything in its fullest detail.” The effect of this revelation was the opposite of what Bhutto had expected. It only underlined the fact that the western wing was incapable of defending the east on its own. To quote Shabbir Hussain, East Pakistanis were heard asking what was the point “in remaining with West Pakistan if we are to be defended by China”. In other words, Bhutto’s rhetoric only gave added weight to the six points instead of demolishing them. As *The Times* recorded a little later, “the disassociation from, if not disagreement with, the policies that took Pakistan to war with India” was inherent in the six-point demand.

Ayub Khan’s response to the six-point formula was to de-

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*From speech in national assembly, 16 March 1966.
Excerpts from a despatch from Dacca reproduced in *Indian Express*, 18 May 1966.
clare that if the "weapon of language" failed to bring the autonomy-seeking East Pakistanis to their senses, he would have no hesitation in using the "language of weapons". Bhutto offered, however, to engage in a public debate with the autonomists. This suggests that even in March, when this offer was made at a meeting of the Muslim League's national council in Dacca, he looked upon himself as a pillar of the regime. But shortly after the council session, he was removed from the office of Secretary-General of the party, ostensibly because of his preoccupations at the Foreign Office. This was the first public indication of his fall from Ayub Khan's favour, but it is noteworthy that he laid down the party office with the comment that he would continue to work as the League's "soldier and a lieutenant of President Mohammad Ayub Khan".  

After the national assembly session, Bhutto went off to Ankara to attend a CENTO council meeting on 20-21 April. He undertook yet another foreign assignment in June which took him to Indonesia, but within a week of his return it was announced by Ayub Khan that he was taking over the foreign affairs portfolio himself as Bhutto was going abroad for medical treatment. The Indonesian visit appears to have precipitated a showdown; the ringing declarations he made in support of Afro-Asian solidarity identified Pakistan too closely with China for Ayub Khan's comfort. But there was no open rift immediately. An editorial in *Dawn* on 20 June, two days after Bhutto's discreet ouster, clearly hinted at the possibility of a rapprochement in future because it described the outgoing Foreign Minister "as an excellent exponent of the brilliant foreign policy of President Ayub Khan". Bhutto, however, was not the one to let the grass grow under his feet. He had a two-hour meeting with Nurul Amin,

*S. M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, Lahore, 1970, p. 56.*
leader of the Opposition in the national assembly, on 21 June following which the latter cryptically remarked: "Who knows how many of the ministers occupying the Treasury benches might join us tomorrow!"\(^8\)

The next day Bhutto passed through Lahore on his way to Larkana. As the Pakistan news agency, APP, reported: "For more than half an hour, the Karachi-bound Khyber Mail was delayed by surging crowds. Students surrounded Mr Bhutto's compartment, kissed his hand and garlanded him profusely. Visibly moved, Mr Bhutto waved back to them while tears trickled down his cheek." The same scenes were repeated in Karachi on 24 June. As the agency described, a large mass of students chanted "Long live Bhutto" and "Bhutto, don't go abroad" as the train bringing him steamed into the station. There were placards bearing slogans "Long live Sino-Pakistan friendship", and "Pakistanis don't want US aid". This was the pay-off Bhutto was looking for; he was well set to acquire the mass support he needed for the coming battle with Ayub Khan.

Bhutto was, however, not the only one sacked by Ayub Khan: he got rid of Mohammad Shoaib, Finance Minister, as well in a neat balancing exercise because the latter was identified in the public mind with pro-Western policies. Theoretically, Shoaib was leaving only because he was taking up a prestige appointment as vice-president of the World Bank in Washington. The third key man to be eased out was Nawab Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh,\(^9\) a big landlord who had been Governor of Punjab from April 1960. By September 1966, within a year of the India-Pakistan war, Ayub Khan had thus considerably altered the top

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\(^9\)Kalabagh was shot dead by his son on account of an unsavoury personal quarrel. This happened within two months of his exit, prompting Bhutto to let fly the charge that the regime was responsible for the murder.
hierarchy. S. M. Zafar, Law Minister at the time, connects the three dismissals directly with the war. As he says: “All three had strong views against each other vis-a-vis the 1965 war. I shall leave them unsaid in the interest of the country and for lack of presentable evidence. There were some significant changes among the secretaries also.”

Soon Bhutto went abroad, quietly and without fuss. When he returned in October, he claims that Ayub Khan made an attempt to strike a deal. In an affidavit filed in the West Pakistan High Court following his arrest in 1968, Bhutto alleged: “The proposal was that as a concession I could remain in active politics provided I avoided one or two sensitive subjects and gave a categorical undertaking that I would not personally contest the presidential election of 1970.” Subsequently, another offer was made that Bhutto might work as “an unofficial adviser to the President”, undertaking important foreign assignments on his behalf. Ayub Khan’s eldest son, Akhtar Ayub; the Governor of Punjab, Mohammad Musa; and several others went to Bhutto at various times with proposals for a rapprochement, but he rejected them all—following which Ayub Khan threatened to “follow him to the grave”. The President in a counter-affidavit denied these allegations, dismissing them as figments of Bhutto’s imagination. But Pakistanis conversant with Ayub Khan’s style of functioning have little reason to doubt that allurements were offered, and threats held out, to neutralize a potential competitor.

Bhutto now engaged in a number of low-key political manoeuvres; he wanted to set up a forward bloc within the ruling party, taking as his precedent a similar move made in undivided India by Subhas Chandra Bose in 1939 follow-

30S. M. Zafar, op. cit., p. 70.
31Excerpts from affidavit in Times of India, 13 February 1969.
ing his differences with Mahatma Gandhi over the direction of the Congress Party’s policies. Later, he visualized the bloc as taking the shape of a united front of opposition parties like the one that Suhrawardy organized in 1962, or another that was created to back Miss Jinnah as a common opposition candidate against Ayub Khan in the presidential election of 1965. Nothing came of either move because although he canvassed the bloc idea with Miss Jinnah and other leading figures in the opposition it would seem that few people, whether in Ayub Khan’s Pakistan Muslim League or outside it, were ready to incur his personal wrath by associating themselves with Bhutto. As a despatch in *The Times* (London) noted: “The former Foreign Minister will have to be patient as well as careful before his day comes again.”

Until late in 1967, Bhutto wandered around the country trying to build up political contacts at the grass-roots level with the aim of launching his own party without however admitting that this is what he was up to. The tone of his speeches changed too; he moved gradually from discreet and indirect criticism of Ayub Khan to harsh and direct attacks. Bhutto’s own pronouncements in support of Ayub Khan’s system were held against him to suggest that loss of office was the only reason why he had turned against the regime. He responded with even sharper invectives, touching off a slanging match from which he emerged a clear winner, as evidenced by his growing following.

By November, Bhutto was ready to form his Pakistan People’s Party. It was formally inaugurated at a convention in Lahore which proclaimed its political credo in the form of four slogans. These were: Islam is our Faith; Democracy is our Polity; Socialism is our Economy; and All Power to the

1214 December 1966.
People. The official reaction, as indicated by press comments, was to deride and mock. *Dawn,* still harping on the contrast between Bhutto in office and out of it, said: “He can shift his ground faster than a fox and, unlike a leopard, can change his spots from year to year.”

Writing again after the convention, the paper made the prophecy that the party “will be a one-man show” because it had failed to draw in any of the established political leaders. This was largely true at that time; persons with any standing, Mahmud Ali Kasuri, for example, were in no hurry to commit themselves to an uncertain new venture.

The year 1968 opened on a sombre note with the discovery of a secessionist conspiracy in East Pakistan. The accused included three officers of the Civil Service of Pakistan, the senior administrative cadre, a lieutenant-commander of the navy, and some 40 others from the defence services and other walks of life. Later, Mujibur Rahman’s name was added to the list although he had already been in prison for 18 months before the conspiracy was unearthed. This invested the affair with considerable political significance. The story, put forward by the government when the trial began before a special tribunal, was that the accused had obtained money from India for securing arms to launch a struggle for an independent Bangladesh. The trial proved totally counter-productive; Law Minister S. M. Zafar later admitted that “there was hardly any one in East Pakistan” who could be convinced of its fairness. In fact, as the case proceeded, it transpired that “confessions” on which the tribunal was asked to rely were extorted by torture. Mujibur Rahman’s defence that the whole thing had been rigged up to discredit him and his autonomy demands came to be accepted as the

1325 November 1967.
truth by almost all East Pakistanis. Ayub Khan, they concluded, was indeed using “the language of weapons”. There is no doubt that the trial, widely publicized throughout the province, aggravated its alienation from the west, bringing nearer the parting of ways that took place in 1971.

The second ominous development was 62-year-old Ayub Khan’s sudden illness. He caught a cold on a shikar trip which worsened into viral pneumonia. He was confined to bed for seven weeks during which he was unable to see even his cabinet ministers. This brought home to many the realization that Pakistan’s stability rested on the health and well-being of one man. As Bhutto said in *The Political Situation of Pakistan*, the illness had brought about “a qualitative and quantitative change in the situation” by throwing up the question of succession. The constitutional provision for the Speaker of the national assembly to fill the gap until new elections were held within three months was unworkable because Ayub Khan’s system was not fashioned for orderly transfer of authority. “It is built on one pillar, the removal of which brings down the whole structure”. This view was widely shared in Pakistan. As S. M. Zafar wrote: “It came to the mind of everyone that if President Ayub Khan were to die, then there would be chaos in the country...the feeling of uncertainty gave birth to the desire that transfer of power must be arranged and settled within his lifetime.”

Ayub Khan recovered within two months but, as one observer put it, “authority was departing the dying king”. Superficially he was in complete control; however, the tenth anniversary of the “revolution” was being celebrated by battering every superlative in the dictionary into a commonplace. In a special issue, the *Pakistan Times* broke all records by printing Ayub Khan’s picture 43 times. But
hardly had the celebrations ended when the storm broke all of a sudden. Some 70 students of Gordon College, Rawalpindi, had gone to Landi Kotal on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and picked up some foreign merchandise in the market there. On the way back they ran into customs officials who confiscated their purchases. The students were sore that they should be punished while bigwigs got away with such infringements of the law every day of the week. Returning to Rawalpindi, they organized a demonstration which soon took on an anti-regime character. Luckily for Bhutto, he arrived in the city that day; he was soon involved in the events because the students had decided to go to him in a procession. The police sought to prevent him from speaking to the processionists at the polytechnic. In the melee, batons, tear gas and eventually guns were used by the police with the result that a 17-year-old first-year student died on the spot. From this small and accidental beginning on 7 November, the whole of West Pakistan was soon plunged in a massive student agitation. Three days later, Ayub Khan was shot at by a young Pathan student, Mohammed Hashim, at a Muslim League meeting in Peshwar.

This incident gave the upsurge an altogether different dimension, specially after the arrest of Bhutto and 11 other political leaders three days later. He was charged with inciting disaffection "to bring into hatred and contempt the

16Hashim made a statement before a magistrate in which he said: "I heard the speech of Mr Bhutto on 5 November and was inspired by it. I had failed in the first year examination and was also excluded from the supplementary. I was frustrated and wanted to commit suicide. As it was against my religion, I decided to shoot the President. I thought it would serve two purposes. I will not have to commit suicide, and Mr Bhutto will have a chance to clinch power." *Hindustan Times*, 1 July 1969.
government established by law”. Bhutto had indeed been making pretty fiery speeches. The prosecution charge sheet quoted him as saying: “The time will come when there will be bloodshed in the country.... It will be said I am spreading sedition. I will spread sedition if need be... we do not fear the bloodshed of revolution. We have burnt our boats.”

In the circumstances of the country, it was clear that he was out to court arrest. This was the final flourish needed to establish his bonafides as a crusader against Ayub Khan. As Neville Maxwell wrote in *The Times*, “Every month in gaol now should erase the stigma of at least six months in the Ayub government”. Whatever the personal angle might have been, the arrest dramatized to the world the political dis­temper that had overtaken Pakistan. As Creighton Burns summed it up in *The Age*, Melbourne, “The long political honeymoon of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan’s controversial autocracy, is now over.”

Bhutto’s arrest prompted 47-year-old Asghar Khan to emerge from retirement to take up an active political career. After completing his tenure as Chief of Air Staff in 1965, he served for a time as Chairman of Pakistan International Airlines. After resigning from this position in early 1967, he seemed to have been waiting for an opportunity to enter politics. A series of articles he published at this time showed that he was ready to cast his lot with the anti-Ayub forces. Many saw him as a far more serious challenge to Ayub Khan than Bhutto. *The Times* said in a despatch from Rawalpindi that “the Air Marshal is undoubtedly made of Presidential timber. He is un tarnished with the blemishes of a past political career. He is the subject of hero worship

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17 *Patriot*, New Delhi, 11 December 1968.
18 14 November 1968.
19 16 November 1968.
as the father of the Pakistan air force.” Z. A. Suleri in his *Pakistan Times* column let fall the hint that Asghar Khan would be welcome as a Presidential candidate in 1975; this was taken to mean that Ayub Khan was willing to accept him as a future successor.

Sensing that a political free-for-all was developing, other men of ambition also jumped into the fray. Among these was another newcomer, Mahboob Murshed, former Chief Justice of the East Pakistan High Court. He must have thought that the choice would fall on him if the opposition decided to field a candidate from the eastern wing. The old-timers who surfaced at this time were Qayyum Khan, President of the Muslim League at the time of Ayub Khan’s *coup d'état*, and Lt.-Gen. Mohammad Azam Khan, popular Governor of East Pakistan from April 1960 to May 1962.

Independently of these leaders, the unrest was proceeding on its own momentum. In East Pakistan, a strike by rickshaw drivers over their demands was made the reason for calling a general strike in Dacca on 7 December, coinciding with a visit by Ayub Khan. Police violence to curb the strike took a heavy toll, leading to a province-wide strike on 19 December. As one observer put it, “the revolt had started in East Pakistan”. The national assembly, which began on session at Dacca on 23 December, could hardly function; the tough Governor of East Pakistan, Abdul Monem Khan, was unable to assure the safety of ruling party members on their way to and from the assembly.

It was in this situation that Ayub Khan finally decided to invite political leaders for talks with him on their demands for constitutional changes. Bhutto was in jail; so was Mujibur Rahman. The National Awami Party declined to attend the talks unless the emergency proclaimed at the time of the 1965 war was lifted, and all political prisoners were released.
But a Democratic Action Committee, an *ad hoc* body set up by old-time politicians, was inclined to be accommodating. Yet there was nothing it could do if the top leaders of the two wings were left out of the negotiations. Bhutto was released in response to the DAC's request, but getting Mujibur Rahman free proved more difficult. Ayub Khan offered to let him out on parole to participate in the talks, but he refused to come except as a free man. Eventually, the whole conspiracy trial was summarily cancelled, making a mockery of the treason charges levelled against the accused.

The more concessions Ayub Khan made, the weaker his position became because the system he had built could work only on the basis of fear. Once this disappeared, the whole thing fell to pieces. On 21 February, he gave his irrevocable promise that he would not be a candidate for the 1970 Presidential election, but Bhutto returned to the attack a few days later with a demand for his immediate exit. The mood of the crowds in Karachi, Lahore, Dacca, and Chittagong was against any compromise with the regime, as he correctly sensed.

The talks between Ayub Khan and political leaders were held eventually from 10 to 13 March, but Bhutto as well as Bhashani stayed away. Both seemed to have been afraid of having to accept a compromise solution under pressure from other participants. At the final meeting, Ayub Khan offered to amend the 1962 constitution to provide for a federal, parliamentary form of government, and for direct elections on the basis of adult franchise. Wali Khan raised the issue of breaking up one-unit, but Ayub Khan took the position that this, along with other unresolved issues, should be settled by the people's representatives after the election. West Pakistani leaders were satisfied, but Mujibur Rahman said he could not agree to a settlement
which did not concede his demand for autonomy. While no decision was taken, Ayub Khan invited the East Bengal leader to formulate his ideas in writing for further discussion.

At the end of these talks, Ayub Khan thought that he had succeeded in stabilizing the situation. But the unrest in the eastern wing continued, gradually building up into a mass upheaval. Meanwhile, Mujibur Rahman sent a draft of the constitutional amendments he wanted in the light of his autonomy demand. As S. M. Zafar says: “The President marked it [the draft] to me and asked if I still thought there was a chance of a democratic solution.” Ayub Khan was obviously afraid that once a sovereign national assembly came into being, Mujibur Rahman might gain control of it and push these amendments through. This was a risk the President was unwilling to take. As he said in his broadcast of 25 March announcing that he was handing over to the army Chief of Staff, Yahya Khan:

I have always told you that Pakistan’s salvation lay in a strong centre. I accepted the parliamentary system because in this way also there was a possibility of preserving a strong centre. But now it is being said that the country be divided into two parts. The centre should be rendered ineffective, and a powerless institution. The defence services should be crippled and the political entity of West Pakistan done away with. . . . It is impossible for me to preside over the destruction of the country.

Thus ended the Ayub Khan era after 10 years in which its founder had built up for himself what seemed an impregnable position. Some of his critics believe that he was so confident of his hold over the people that he was planning on a dynastic succession of power from himself to his son, Gauhar
Ayub. There is some evidence, presented by a well-known Karachi columnist, M. B. Naqvi, that Gauhar was being groomed for a political career.\textsuperscript{20} This was one major cause for Ayub Khan’s undoing: the son had come to symbolize for the people everything that was wrong with the father’s one-man rule. Resigning from the army as a captain, Gauhar had in a few years become a millionaire partner in one of the largest private businesses in the country. He had also started climbing up the political ladder with his appointment as Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee of the Karachi Muslim League. Ayub Khan tried to mend matters too late: he made his son resign his business and political positions but it failed to make any impact.

Bhutto greeted Ayub Khan’s exit and Yahya Khan’s take-over with the blithe comment: “It had to happen, and on the whole it is a good thing. At least we are rid of Ayub Khan and the royal family. Unless the military gets a taste of power—and I do not think this is likely—the prospects for a return to democracy look good.”\textsuperscript{21}

For a while, the prospects did look good. Yahya Khan declared repeatedly that he was only a temporary custodian of power. “I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that I have no ambition other than the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional government,” he said in his first broadcast on 26 March. At his first press conference on 10 April, he declared: it will be for the representatives of the people to give the country a workable constitution. On 29 November, he set a date in October for an election to choose a new constituent assembly which would later convert itself into a sovereign national assembly.

5. 1970 Election

A NATION-WIDE general election, with every adult entitled to vote, was a new experience for Pakistan. No direct elections had been held even at the provincial level since 1954 when the Muslim League was decisively defeated in East Bengal by a United Front of local parties. Elections were held earlier in Punjab and NWFP in 1951, and in Sind in 1953. The fifth province, Baluchistan, had never known any elections other than those under Ayub Khan’s system of basic democracy.

As Yahya Khan had planned it, the elections to constitute the national assembly were to be held first. It was only after it had framed a constitution that polling was to be held for the five provincial assemblies. He later changed his mind, and the provincial elections followed immediately after the national. Bhutto was later to argue that this new schedule was prompted by the calculation that “Mujibur Rahman would be more likely to compromise on the question of autonomy when both the elections were over and the prospect of governing lay ahead”.

The national election was originally scheduled for 5 October but unusually heavy rains in August flooded millions of acres in the eastern wing. Nearly half of the 162 constituencies were affected, persuading Yahya Khan to order a two-month postponement of the poll after consultations with political leaders. But a worse disaster was to follow. On the night of 12-13 November a cyclone hit the coastal districts along a 300-mile belt running from the Sundarbans to Chittagong. In the few hours between midnight and early morning the cyclone and tidal bores which accompanied it washed away at least 500,000 people. Unofficial estimates placed the death-toll at a million. The disaster, the worst that any country has faced in modern times, required the government and the nation to devote all its efforts and resources to the task of relief and rehabilitation. The presumption, therefore, was that the election would be deferred once again. In fact, leaders like Nurul Amin and Ataur Rahman Khan, both former chief ministers of East Bengal, asked for postponement, but Mujibur Rahman argued stubbornly to the contrary. After visiting the cyclone-affected areas, he said: "We are confirmed in our conviction that if we are to save the people of Bangladesh from the ravages of nature, as of their fellowmen, we must attain full regional autonomy." He added that East Bengal owed it to the million who had perished in the cyclone to make the sacrifice of another million, if necessary, so that "we can live as free people and so that Bangladesh can be the master of its destiny".

In the event, the 59.39 million electorate went to the polls to elect a national assembly on 7 December and the provincial assemblies on 17 December. While it was generally expected that the Awami League would sweep the polls in

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the east, not least because of the widespread indignation over the centre’s failure to meet the challenge of the cyclone, few were willing to make any firm predictions about the western wing.\(^3\) This was because of the absence of any benchmarks to evaluate the strength of contending parties. The difficulty was aggravated by two factors: the emergence of new parties like Bhutto’s PPP and the disintegration of the older parties. The Muslim League was now split into three, each claiming to be the true successor of the party of Jinnah which had brought the country into being. The National Awami Party was likewise split into two, while the *ulema* were divided into three warring factions. In this situation, each party entering the fray felt free to make tall claims. This precluded sensible adjustments on the sharing of seats within the framework of electoral arrangements because of the difficulty of reconciling rival ambitions. The result was a surfeit of candidates; there were 1,300 in the field, including some 600 independents, for the 180 seats in the Punjab provincial assembly.

Although the martial law regime had allowed political activity to be resumed from 1 January 1970, the parties found it difficult to build up an effective electoral machine because democratic politics had long remained in abeyance. All of them were, therefore, obliged to leave the running of the campaign to the candidates themselves, an added reason for giving the party ticket to men of wealth and resources rather than to party faithfuls.

With Pakistan having missed the political education that

\(^3\)Gavin Young writing in the *Observer*, London, forecast that the Awami League would bag at least 130 out of 162 seats, while the French News Agency, AFP, suggested that the party’s score would be around 70 per cent. Werner Adam, writing in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong, 5 December 1970, predicted that only 15 to 20 per cent of Bhutto’s 117 candidates would win in the western wing.
successive elections provide, it was hardly surprising to find
the electoral debate conducted at a pretty elementary level.
The arguments centred round personalities rather than poli-
cies. Even top leaders did not hesitate to make vicious per-
sonal attacks against one another. Bhutto was charged with
having pursued a claim to Indian citizenship until his entry
into government in 1958. The insinuation had been made
before and answered, but it came up again. Worse
still, some individuals associated with Islam Pasand parties4
did not hesitate to bring up, sotto voce, questions about his
parentage. Bhutto hit back hard but he left it to his own
mullah, Maulana Kausar Niazi, to dig up scandals about
rival mullahs. Kausar Niazi was at one time a dedicated
member of the Jamaat-e-Islami, but left it following a quarrel
with its leadership.

Commenting on this trading of insults, a Pakistani writer,
Mushtaq Ahmad, says: "Vilification and abuse took the
place of argument and discussion. Incitement and vitupera-
tion were carried beyond the propriety of debate, in which
even loyalties to the State were questioned. It was a
philosophy of hate totally alien to the spirit of democracy."

There was, however, a difference in the tone of politics of
the eastern and western wings. The eastern wing was
largely one homogeneous area, speaking for the most part
the same language. This permitted contending parties to
work for success all over the region but their counterparts
in the west operated within the barriers created by linguistic
and ethnic differences. For instance, the Punjab-based
Council Muslim League made no serious bid to win outside
its home ground. Wali Khan’s National Awami Party

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4Islam Pasand literally means admirers of Islam. In the 1970 election, it
was used pejoratively to signify religion-oriented parties.

stayed out of the contest in Punjab and made only a token appearance in Sind.

Another noteworthy difference between the two wings arises from the prominence of the landed gentry in the politics of the western wing. All the leading figures in the fray in 1970 were landlords, as, for instance, Bhutto, Wali Khan, Mumtaz Daultana, and Abdus Samad Achakzai. The landlords in the eastern wing were mostly Hindu, few of whom stayed in the country after partition. Their estates were divided among Muslims in small parcels, steps being taken through legislation to prevent excessive accumulation of land by any individual. “Partition, therefore, generated a social structure overwhelmingly dominated by a mass of peasant small holders.” The elite in the eastern wing, therefore, had a middle class character, with a strong sprinkling of professionals from the urban areas.

**Political Parties**

Of the 19 parties significantly involved in the electoral battle, the People's Party stood out because of its vigour and the flamboyance of its leader. Having come into existence only three years earlier, it made up for the lack of a grass-root organization by the enthusiasm of its cadres, mostly young men from lower middle class families, and by the charisma Bhutto had acquired as the man who felled the Ayub giant. But the charisma itself was largely the result of contagious hero worship by the youth. Sensing correctly that his advantage lay in cultivating the youth, Bhutto was at one stage agitating for the reduction of the voting age to 18.

As a correspondent wrote in *Holiday* after a visit to West

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Pakistan, “There is no denying that Mr. Bhutto draws large crowds everywhere he goes. There is a natural curiosity among the peasantry, the students, to listen to the only one among the well-known political figures of West Pakistan who talks differently, cutting across the provincial boundaries there.” Another correspondent, Peter Hazelhurst, reported in *The Times*, London, that “Mr. Bhutto is certainly attracting crowds of up to 400,000 at his rallies in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar”.

But Bhutto was not relying on crowds alone. He took good care to enlist the support of religious divines, political notables and local worthies who, for one reason or another, were not interested in joining other parties or were unable to do so on terms satisfactory to themselves. He particularly needed the blessings of the divines because the *Islam Pasands* had, in a bid to damn him, mobilized 133 *ulema* to issue an edict declaring that socialism was anti-Islam. Prominent among those he roped in on his side was Makhdoom Sahib of Hala, a *pir* of some consequence in Hyderabad and Nawabshah districts. This enabled him to counter, in some measure, the hostility of the *Pir* of Pagaro, a better known divine.

Bhutto brought in radicals too from the other end of the political spectrum. Among these were well-known persons like Mahmud Ali Kasuri and Sheikh Mohammad Rashid. Kasuri was associated with Mian Iftikharuddin in the founding of the Azad Pakistan Party in 1951. Along with many others of this party, he joined the National Awami Party on its formation in 1957. He was the President of its Punjab

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8Despatch reproduced in the *Statesman*, New Delhi, 21 April 1970.
9It was at Sangher, a Sind town within this *Pir’s* area of influence, that Bhutto was shot at during the election campaign. Several persons accompanying him were killed.
unit until 1970 when he joined Bhutto. He evidently crossed over too late to get a PPP ticket in the general election, but was later accommodated in a seat vacated by Bhutto. Sheikh Rashid also took the same route—via the Azad Pakistan Party and the NAP to the PPP. Miraj Mohammad Khan was a firebrand student leader of Karachi in the 1950s who later became a trade unionist. Bhutto recruited him for his party with the aim of breaking into the Karachi industrial belt where he faced strong competition from the Jamaat-e-Islami on the one hand and from Bhashani’s lieutenants on the other.

But Bhutto still needed local landlord lieutenants to swing the vote for him in the rural areas. The men in this category included Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, scion of a family of Sind landlords which has dominated the politics of Nawabshah district for three generations. Jatoi was elected to the national assembly in 1962 as well as in 1965 but had remained an obscure backbencher. Much the same was the story of Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Bhutto’s constant companion during the period he was in political wilderness. Khar belongs to a family of large landlords settled in Muzaffargarh, near Multan. Another landlord recruit was Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao. He comes from a wealthy landed family of Peshawar, although it is not in the same league as the big khans who are the traditional leaders of the Pathan community. These recruits served Bhutto well, earning for themselves the rewards Bhutto handed out after taking office.

The presence of these landlords in a party committed to radical economic reforms prompted derisive comments from Bhutto’s critics and rivals. But Bhutto was not put out in the least. Addressing a public meeting in Multan on 24 September, he said: “Some capitalists and feudals have joined my party but it does not at all mean that the PPP has
been converted into a party of jagirdars to suck the blood of the poor people. The capitalists and feudal lords who joined the party have already taken an oath before me to abide by all the conditions laid down in the manifesto.”

The Awami League was originally a grouping of Muslim League dissidents of East Bengal who were in revolt against the domination of Khwaja Nazimuddin and his associates in the parent party. They formed the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League in June 1949 under the presidency of Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, with the blessings of H. S. Suhrawardy. Its character changed in 1955 when it dropped the Muslim label. The motivation was to unite the substantial Hindu minority in the eastern wing with the Muslim majority to be able to battle more effectively on behalf of the region. Through alliances forged with west wing groups—like the Jinnah Awami League started in Punjab by another Muslim League dissident, the Khan of Mamdot—Suhrawardy sought to give the Awami League a national character. But the effort was unsuccessful; the Awami League remained a regional entity.

The party achieved its first major success when it came to power in Dacca as a constituent of the United Front which routed the Muslim League in 1954. But the government was dismissed by the centre within three months, and Chief Minister Fazlul Huq placed under house arrest. After a series of vicissitudes the party assumed office on its own in 1956 following the break-up of the United Front. About the same time Suhrawardy became Prime Minister at the centre in a coalition the Awami League formed with the now defunct Republican Party. In office, Suhrawardy had to make

10Quoted in Mushtaq Ahmad, op. cit., p. 103.
compromises to keep the coalition going with the result that he failed to live up to his party’s pledge with regard to regional autonomy. But what alienated Bhashani even more was the pro-west policy of the Suhrawardy government, specially its unqualified support for Britain and France in the Suez crisis. This eventually led to a parting of ways; Bhashani quit to lead the National Awami Party formed at a convention held in Dacca in July 1957.

Forced out of office within a year, Suhrawardy reverted to his customary role as opposition leader commanding some influence in both wings. But there was little for him to do until 1962 when Ayub Khan permitted political parties to function again. Suhrawardy was invited by Ayub Khan to join his Muslim League, but he refused. Shortly thereafter he found himself in jail under the Security of Pakistan Act. After his release, he took the lead in sponsoring a National Democratic Front in which parties were to merge their identity to work unitedly for taking the country back to democracy. When Suhrawardy died in 1963, his mantle fell on his trusted lieutenant, Mujibur Rahman. Abandoning the idea of operating through a front, Mujibur Rahman revived the Awami League with the aim of consolidating its position in the eastern wing. He was a party to the plan under which opposition parties nominated Miss Jinnah as a common candidate to fight Ayub Khan in the 1965 presidential election. Ayub Khan’s comfortable victory convinced Mujibur Rahman that there was no hope of a change in the character of the central government in the foreseeable future. In 1966 he enunciated his now famous six points, candidly admitting that the question of autonomy “appears to be more important after the [1965] war”.

The six points, as noted earlier, were brought forcefully to West Pakistan’s attention during the round table
conference preceding Ayub Khan’s exit. The reaction in the west to the demand for autonomy was predictably adverse, erasing whatever little support the Awami League had outside its home province. Gradually all western politicians who were associated with the Awami League since Suhrawardy’s time quit the party. They were led by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan.

In sum, by the time the elections were held in 1970, the Awami League was already viewed with suspicion in the western wing. There were increasing doubts about its ultimate goals, as reflected in the insinuation that some Awami League elements were in collusion with India. After all, the charge had been made by the State against Mujibur Rahman himself in the 1967-68 conspiracy trial. Leftist circles had a different theory; they argued that the Awami League was being egged on to take an extremist posture on regional issues by the USA to weaken Pakistan’s central leadership which was moving the country too close to China. Given this context, it came as no surprise when Holiday seized upon a meeting between a US diplomat and Mujibur Rahman on 21 October to read him a lecture on America’s neo-colonialist designs. The weekly said: “Whatever may be their game, the Sheikh can afford to play the role of a Chiang Kai-shek only at his own peril.”

The National Awami Party claims its origin to the merger of the Azad Pakistan Party with such regional groups as Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgars. But it is only after Bhashani joined the party in 1957 that it acquired both regional and national significance. Bhashani with his peasant background and a strongly religious orientation was a very different personality from those he joined hands with in West Pakistan. But since Ayub Khan’s martial law followed soon afterwards, the enforced lull in political activity
kept the differences submerged. These came to the surface when Bhashani accepted, soon after his release from prison, an invitation from Ayub Khan to lead a delegation to China in 1963. This signified the beginning of a rapprochement with the regime to the dismay of his party colleagues.

As Tariq Ali recalls in his *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?*, the leaders in Peking asked Bhashani to desist from opposition to the Ayub government and give them a chance to deepen China’s friendship with Pakistan. Bhashani evidently agreed,12 as borne out by the ambivalent attitude he and his associates subsequently adopted towards the government. Although Bhashani formally joined hands with the opposition alliance which crystallized around Miss Jinnah, he did not campaign actively for her, “possibly because he did not want to upset Ayub’s foreign policy which was veering steadily towards China.”13

These differences culminated in a split in the party. A council meeting held in January 1968 in Dacca removed Bhashani from the presidency, but he claimed that the vote had no validity and continued to operate in the name of the party. Thereafter the two factions were identified as NAP (Bhashani) and NAP (Wali Khan) after their respective leaders. Some observers chose to regard the division as between pro-Peking and pro-Moscow elements, but this exaggerated the commitment of the two factions to the two centres of communist power.

Wali Khan’s faction draws its main support from NWFP, largely because of the leadership of Pathans that Wali Khan has inherited from his father, Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

12See p. 140. Tariq Ali says that Gen. Raza, then Pakistani Ambassador to China, confirmed that Bhashani had agreed to the Chinese suggestion.

Both father and son have maintained a strong commitment to the Pakhtoonistan concept, which at one time was a plea for independence but has come to mean regional autonomy in recent years. This helps the NAP to carry the Pathan masses with it, aided no doubt by the adherence to it of the leading khans—the wealthy landlords who dominate the community. Their support dilutes, in practice, the NAP’s commitment to radical social change.

Outside the province, the faction had from the start the support of some well-known intellectuals and trade unionists in Karachi and Lahore, but it failed to build up a mass base. In the eastern wing, although dwarfed by the other NAP faction, it established a presence in the industrial belt of Dacca and Chittagong and in some rural pockets under the leadership of Muzaffar Ahmad.

The Bhashani faction, or NAP (B), has been traditionally the umbrella organization of the left in the eastern wing. As China’s importance to Pakistan increased, the influence of pro-Peking elements grew within the party—helped, no doubt, by Bhashani’s acquiescence at the instance of Chinese leaders. The party was in two minds about contesting the 1970 election. The East Pakistan Council of the party agreed towards the end of 1969 to enter the fray by a narrow majority. But as the Dacca weekly, Forum, pointed out, this did not reflect the actual division of opinion in the party. This was borne out by the subsequent exit from the party of Mohammad Toha, general secretary, and his associate, Abdul Huq, on this issue. They formed the East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), taking a rigid political line in accordance with the Maoist precept that bourgeois-democratic elections only distract the revolutionary masses from the path of struggle. Incidentally, they were also sceptical about East Bengali nationalism and the demand for autonomy.
flowing from it. Bhashani’s own attitude was also equivocal, to begin with. In early 1970, his position was that autonomy should not be allowed to become an election issue. He wanted it to be settled in advance by Yahya Khan in the same manner that he had put an end to two other major controversies by agreeing to redivide West Pakistan into its constituent provinces and by accepting weightage for the east wing in the national assembly on the basis of its population. Bhashani was also saying that if a socialist programme, covering nationalization of industries, was agreed to in advance, the issue of autonomy would no longer overshadow the political scene.

Early in 1970, it seemed that Bhashani might come to some understanding with Bhutto. His pronouncements, specially during a tour of West Pakistan in March, put the accent on “Islamic” socialism, suggesting that there was common ground between him and Bhutto. The religious overtones did not appeal to the ideological marxists in his party, who joined issue with him on his return to Dacca. But Bhashani stuck to his guns and suggested that those in disagreement with him might leave the party. It was in this phase that Bhashani and Bhutto were reported to be in touch with each other through confidants. According to the Dacca weekly, Holiday, the dialogue “went through many ups and downs”. Eventually, “Bhutto found the Maulana . . . to be lukewarm”.14

When the November cyclone hit the east wing, Bhashani —along with several other politicians—was in favour of a postponement of the poll. But when this did not happen, he asked his party’s candidates to retire from the contest. Even before this, he had done little active campaigning—leaving his candidates to fight on their own. No sooner than

14 Article by N. M. Harun, Holiday, 18 October 1970.
his campaigning itinerary was announced, he fell ill—making
observers wonder whether it was another political illness of
the kind he had feigned on some other occasions as well.18
Was it because he had smelled defeat in the air?

Bhashani's decision to opt out of the election came too
late: his 12 candidates for the national assembly figured on
the ballot because they had not withdrawn in time. In the
landslide in favour of the Awami League, none of the 12 had
any chance. The lesson Bhashani drew from this was re­
lected in a remarkable volte-face on the autonomy issue.
The same day as the final results for the eastern wing came in,
Bhashani called for a referendum on independence for East
Pakistan. "The sooner the Bengalis achieve independence
the better. This is the only solution left for our salvation
and the removal of all bitterness."19 Yet he was saying only
a few weeks earlier that he rejected the idea of confederation
and stood for a united Pakistan. In the same speech, he
had mounted a sharp attack on the Awami League, without
however identifying it by name. He said: "People who have
connection with foreign countries, even enemy-like coun­
tries, can never do anything for the welfare and progress of
Pakistan."

Among other parties, the main reason for the separate
existence of the Pakistan Muslim League is Abdul Qayyum
Khan's inability of get along with Mumtaz Daultana. Failing
to dislodge the latter from the presidency of the Council
Muslim League, Qayyum Khan organized for himself an
independent political platform which he at first called the
Quaid-e-Azam Muslim League. His political associate in
East Pakistan was Abdus Sabur Khan, leader of Ayub Khan's

15Article by N. M. Harun, Holiday, 15 November 1970, despatch by the
weekly's special correspondent.
16Pakistan Observer, 10 December 1970.
parliamentary party and a member of his cabinet.

Qayyum Khan is a veteran politician who resigned from the deputy leadership of the Congress legislature party in the Central Assembly in 1945 to join the Muslim League. His defection, and the effort he put in to promote the League cause, was an important factor in securing a verdict in Pakistan's favour in the referendum held in that province in 1947. Following partition, he was rewarded with the chief ministership after Jinnah dismissed the Congress Ministry of Dr Khan Sahib. He moved to the centre in 1953 to become a minister under Chaudhri Mohammed Ali. Later he became President of the All-Pakistan Muslim League; it was while he was holding this position that Ayub Khan staged his coup d'état. He remained under a cloud all through the Ayub regime, and spent a spell in prison. It was at the height of the anti-Ayub agitation in November 1968 that he announced that he was coming back to politics.

The main base of Qayyum Khan’s party is the southeastern area of NWFP which has a considerable non-Pushtu speaking population. As an outsider himself—his family moved to NWFP from Kashmir at the turn of the century—he understandably has a rapport with the settlers. This, as well as the historical rivalry with Abdul Ghaffar Khan, makes him a bitter opponent of the Pakhtoonistan concept. This also explains the deep antagonism between Qayyum Khan and Wali Khan who now carries the Pakhtoon torch. As a corollary to this conflict, Qayyum Khan took a hard and uncompromising line against Mujibur Rahman’s demand for autonomy.

Qayyum Khan likes to describe himself as a middle-of-the-road politician. But he was in fact taking a position on both economic and political issues which was even more rigid than that of the Jamaat-e-Islami. This was probably one
reason why Qayyum Khan enjoyed the tacit support of the military regime, or so it seemed to his opponents. As Holiday's special correspondent said in a review of the electoral scene: "It is known, notwithstanding the regime's public denials, that some members of the administration would like to see men like Abdul Qayyum Khan returned to the assembly in large numbers." Bhutto, whose supporters often clashed with Qayyum Khan's men, made similar insinations in his campaign speeches.

The Council Muslim League (CML) has maintained a separate existence since 1962 when Daultana and his associates refused to accept Ayub Khan's overlordship in the party. It has its main base in Punjab, where its leader, Mumtaz Daultana, has a network of landlord lieutenants in each district of the province. His ability to hold them together derives from the feuds within the rural gentry on caste or clan lines. If one section sided with Ayub Khan in the past, and with Qayyum Khan later, the rival clan was bound to lend its support to the Daultana faction. Among its few notable leaders outside Punjab, there was Mohammad Ayub Khuro, three times chief minister of Sind before the merger of provinces into one unit of West Pakistan. Another was Khwaja Khairuddin in the eastern wing; his political prominence derived from his kinship with the Dacca nawab family and the old party stalwart, Khwaja Nazimuddin. Daultana showed some interest in getting together with Mujibur Rahman in the early stages of the campaign. This invited from Bhutto the charge that the Punjab leader was willing to compromise the future of Pakistan by agreeing to the Awami League's six points. Daultana denied this vehemently but the charge stuck. Another factor which went against him was the role he had played in promoting the idea of one-unit West Pakistan. The electorate in the
minority provinces of the western wing was constantly reminded of this by his political rivals.

The Convention Muslim League adopted A.K.M. Fazlul Qader Choudhury as its president after Ayub Khan gave up the office following his ouster. Choudhury was Speaker of the national assembly under Ayub Khan, but later fell out with him and was expelled from the party. This gave him a modicum of political acceptability in the post-Ayub period, enabling him to push himself into the party's presidency. He had, however, little to offer to the electorate other than a promise to build an Islamic social order.

The Pakistan Democratic Party was an amalgam of several political groups. They came together originally in the East Pakistan context to meet the challenge of the Awami League on the one hand and of Bhashani's NAP on the other. The moving spirit was Nurul Amin, leader of the opposition in national assembly from 1965 till the end of the Ayub era. He, along with Nasrullah Khan (who quit the Awami League on the six-point issue), took a leading part in the abortive all-party discussions with Ayub Khan in 1969 which preceded his ouster. In the context of the 1970 election, Amin had nothing to distinguish his party from others of its ilk. It thought it had a trump card in Asghar Khan who evoked in the electorate's mind memories of the campaign that he had led against Ayub Khan in 1969 after Bhutto and other political leaders had been put behind bars.

The Jamaat-e-Islami is the best organized of the religion-oriented parties. It is reputed to have some 200,000 dedicated workers who undertake social welfare activities like the running of dispensaries, libraries, and night schools. It has a student wing particularly active in Karachi and Lahore, and also a trade union organization. The Jamaat claims to offer the only authoritative interpretation of Islamic
ideology; it does not hesitate to say that it would, if it had the power, treat other interpreters as enemies of religion. The Jamaat was in trouble with Ayub Khan because of its opposition to his social reforms affecting marriage laws and waqfs (religious endowments). It also led a strong campaign against family planning. One of its slogans this author saw plastered on Lahore walls in 1968 read: Zyadah bacche paida karo, aur sabab kamao (produce more children and earn grace). This was why it joined hands with its arch enemies like the NAP in fielding Miss Jinnah in the 1965 presidential election. Later it figured in the all-party discussions with Ayub Khan in 1969.

Sayed Abu Ala Maududi, the Jamaat’s Amir or chief, has often been criticised for the fact that he and other orthodox ulema were either lukewarm or opposed to the concept of Pakistan. They had argued that it would be foolish to create a Muslim national State because this would only be an obstacle towards a wider Islamic revolution in the sub-continent. This was brought up against the Jamaat again during the 1970 campaign, but Maududi hit back with denunciations of the godless creed espoused by “socialists” like Bhutto.

Apart from the Jamaat, there were three other ulema parties in the field. The Jamaat-e-Ulema-i-Pakistan came into politics in June 1970 under the leadership of Qamarud-din Sialvi, a Sunni divine of Punjab. He and his colleagues are ulema of the Barelvi school (named after the city of Bareilly in U.P., India, where the original seminary was located). This group of ulema was close to Ayub Khan, and obliged him by issuing an edict in 1965 that a woman was ineligible to hold the office of head of State in an Islamic country. The adoption of a political role in 1970 pointed to the concern that these ulema felt about the growing strength of secular and socialist ideas in the country.
The Deoband school of *ulema* (named again after a U.P. town) are divided into two groups. One is called the Hazarvi group after its leader, Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, and the other the Thanvi group after Maulana Etashamul Haq Thanvi. This corresponds to the historical division in the school from well before partition between the *ulema* aligned with the Muslim League and those who supported the Congress. The Hazarvi group has influence, as the outcome of the elections later confirmed, in NWFP and Baluchistan where it controls a large number of rural mosques. The Thanvi group has a scattered influence in Sind and Punjab.

**THE ISSUES**

Basically there were only two issues in the debate during this election. In the eastern wing it was the demand for autonomy raised by the Awami League; Mujibur Rahman’s campaigning had, indeed, turned the election into a referendum on his six points. This predictably had its repercussions in the western wing. Parties with a regional character, like Wali Khan’s NAP or G. M. Syed’s Sind United Party, decided to support the demand for autonomy without specifically endorsing the Mujibur Rahman formula. Two other parties—Bhutto’s PPP and Qayyum Khan’s PML (Q)—were, however, outspokenly in favour of a strong centre, and sharply denounced any west wing party which was thought to be taking a soft line on the six points. As the election drew near, the debate on this issue grew increasingly bitter.

But it is interesting to note that Bhutto did not himself join issue with Mujibur Rahman. He had at one stage tried to secure Mujibur Rahman’s co-operation. As he told *The Times* (London) on 20 April, 1970: “I went to him and
offered to form an alliance. I asked him to abandon some of his six demands on regional autonomy but he refused.” Despite this refusal, Bhutto evidently thought he should keep his options open. As *Holiday* noted:

... significant in the present political context is the Mujib-Bhutto relationship. Whatever they may say in private, neither Mujib nor Bhutto has yet publicly criticised each other... they have been maintaining a correct relationship. Both of them, it seems, now realise that alone they can at best carry a particular region with them but would need each other to decide national issues.¹⁷

The Council Muslim League devoted a good deal of attention to East Pakistan’s aspirations in its manifesto. It envisaged a centre with powers limited to five subjects unless the federating units agreed to delegate more to it. It also promised to remove disparity, ensure parity in appointments to central government services, and to shift the naval headquarters to Chittagong. The Convention Muslim League with an East Bengali president took much the same stand except to demand that north Bengal be made a separate province. The Jamaat-e-Islami wanted to go back to the 1956 constitution but with the change that the national parliament should have a Lower House elected on a population basis, and an Upper House in which all units would have equal representation. This idea found favour also with the Pakistan Democratic Party.

Apart from this constitutional debate, the arguments in the west centred mainly on the demands for social justice which had brought students and workers into the streets in the upsurge against Ayub Khan. All parties sensing the mood of the

¹⁷N.M. Harun in *Holiday*, 18 October 1970.
electorate were ready to tilt their lances against wealth and property. But the voter was not ready to accept at face value the professions of every party. Those who had been closely identified with the Ayub regime were specially suspect. Even among Ayub Khan’s opponents, the voter tended to discriminate on the basis of his understanding of a party’s composition and character.

Not surprisingly, Ayub Khan figured prominently in the debate. An inveterate foe like Qayyum Khan demanded the freezing of Ayub Khan family’s bank accounts, alleging that the resources available to it were being utilized to influence political developments. Asghar Khan alleged that Ayub Khan was trying to get his sychophants into the national assembly. Bhutto introduced the idea that Ayub Khan and his son, Gauhar, should be tried on charges of corruption and embezzlement after the elections put power in the hands of the people. The Council Muslim League also took up the cry in the concluding stages of the campaign. Interestingly, the Convention Muslim League, which could scarcely disown Ayub Khan altogether, came up with the theory that the CIA had plotted his overthrow because of his efforts to disengage Pakistan from western alliances. The party also argued that Ayub Khan had made mistakes because he was not a politician, but this was no reason for the country to forget his success in promoting economic development and in raising Pakistan’s stature in the world.

Most parties advocated some degree of nationalization in the industrial sector. But some did this more reluctantly than others. The People’s Party went farthest in this direction, as discussed in a later chapter. The Awami League was in its own way just as radical in advocating nationalization of banking, insurance, heavy industries, and jute and cotton trades. Both wings of the National Awami Party confined
themselves to general formulations that all basic and heavy industries should be taken over by the State, with Wali Khan’s faction making a demand for the takeover of the jute trade also in consideration, perhaps, of the seats it was contesting in the east. At the other end of the spectrum, Qayyum Khan’s PML (Q) clearly expressed its opposition to nationalization, while the Convention Muslim League said that even though it was opposed to nationalization it would subordinate its views in this matter to the wishes of the people as expressed in the legislature. Much the same stand was taken by the Jamaat-e-Islami; it offered to abide by the will of the legislature provided compensation was paid to the owners of nationalized assets and their management safeguarded from bureaucratic control.

In relation to the rural sector, the PPP was only a few steps ahead of its rivals in pleading for a ceiling of 50 to 150 irrigated acres in West Pakistan. The Council Muslim League was setting the limit at 250 acres of optimum land, adding the proviso that income from any source should not exceed the equivalent of income from this acreage. The Convention Muslim League was prepared to allow cultivators “up to 200 acres only”, while the Jamaat-e-Islami promised to limit holdings to less than 150 acres. The Awami League, concerned only with the situation in the east where the ceiling had already been set at 33 acres, talked of abolishing jagirdari and zamindari all over the country, and exempting holdings up to eight acres from payment of land revenue.

Foreign policy figured in the election campaign, but there was no great controversy except in relation to the posture towards India. Several parties demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO, but this was flogging a dead horse since Pakistan had been entering only a token presence at the meetings of these organisations since 1965.
Their failure to take up cudgels on Pakistan’s behalf at the time of the India-Pakistan war in that year had deepened Pakistan’s alienation from these pacts.

Having taken a stand against pacts, most parties expressed themselves in favour of a neutral foreign policy. The PPP went one better: Bhutto reminded the people that he had been “the uncompromising champion of an independent foreign policy” for years. He offered the assurance that if his party came to power, it would never let Pakistan get inveigled into imperialist clutches. It would also make every effort to safeguard Pakistan’s internal policies from foreign interference. Other parties did not speak quite as stridently. Some declared themselves in favour of non-alignment (a term unpopular in Pakistan because of its association with India), while others preferred to use blander formulations such as “a neutral and independent foreign policy” (as in the case of Wali Khan’s NAP), or “the establishment of good relations with all powers” (as in the case of the Jamaat-e-Islami). Most parties, not excluding the secular NAP, were arguing, however, in favour of closer links with Muslim countries.

China was brought into the campaign by Sarfaraz Khan of the Pakistan Democratic Party, who had formerly been Pakistan’s military delegate at the CENTO headquarters. He claimed that Bhutto was making irresponsible and jingoistic statements at China’s behest, and charged the Chinese with making lavish use of money to influence political developments in Pakistan. There was sharp rebuttal by the Chinese embassy. There were counter-accusations that the US embassy was supplying funds to the Jamaat-e-Islami. The charge became briefly an election issue, with the PPP, the NAP (Wali Khan group), and the Hazarvi group of ulema making a demand for the recall of the U.S. Ambassador.

The discovery of wooden crates in the Karachi docks in
October 1970 containing large quantities of rifles and other weapons touched off another sharp controversy. Bhashani accused unspecified imperialist powers of sending arms to Pakistan to trigger off a civil war. Bhutto took the same line; he said that "arms worth crores of rupees were being imported, not for shooting pigeons, but for killing patriotic Pakistanis". He also saw an imperialist plot behind the tragic incident in November 1970 in which an employee of Pakistan International Airlines shouting "Death to communists" deliberately charged his truck into a VIP reception line, killing Zygfrijd Wolniak, Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister, then on a visit to Pakistan. Incidentally, the PIA trade union at this time was dominated by the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Vis-a-vis India, the issues in dispute were seen in much the same light by all parties. But the nuances needed watching when it came to defining how these disputes should be resolved. Mujibur Rahman in his election broadcast asked for "a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with United Nations resolutions". He also spoke of the great threat posed to the economy of the eastern wing by the barrage India is building to take water out of the Ganges into the Hooghly at Farakka. He demanded that every effort should be made for a just solution of the problem without further delay. But Mujibur Rahman also spoke of his belief in peaceful co-existence "with all States and in particular with our neighbours", indicating his disagreement with the policy of confrontation pursued by Pakistan since 1965, he added: "We believe that normalisation of relations with our neighbours would be to the best advantage of our people." He was later to tell The Times (London) that he would want the popular government taking office after the election to give priority

to the resumption of trade with India. But A.M.H. Kamaruzzaman, Secretary-General of the Awami League, was not in step with his leader; he took the stand that normal commercial relations with India must wait until the solution of disputes over Farakka, Kashmir, and the Berubari border enclave.

Wali Khan declared in his TV broadcast that his party stood by the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir but added the qualification that Pakistan must make itself a democratic State before leaders like Sheikh Abdullah could be tempted to opt for it. More important, he seemed to downgrade the Kashmir issue by adding:

We have many problems with India besides Kashmir; Farakka barrage is one of them, also other rivers flowing into Pakistan with their sources in that country. Most important is the Muslim population there who made sacrifices in order to give us our homeland. To them we have a special responsibility. It is imperative that we solve our problems with India to our mutual satisfaction so that those Muslims could be ensured peace and security in their homes. Both the countries have suffered tremendously for the last 23 years and the sufferers are the common people.

The Bhashani wing of NAP asked for a “peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute” to secure for the people the right of self-determination. But in his public pronouncements, Bhashani was injecting a good deal of rhetoric against India. To make his posture more acceptable to his leftist supporters in the east wing, he often bracketed India with the United States. At one stage of the campaign, he called for a boycott of American goods, accusing Washington of having
taken a partisan attitude in India’s favour during the 1965 war.

Apart from these three parties, all others were explicitly or by implication in favour of a continuing confrontation with India. Mumtaz Daultana argued on behalf of the Council Muslim League that the concept of Pakistan was incomplete without the freedom of Kashmir. He also referred to the dispute over Farakka barrage as an example of India’s perennial hostility. He lent his support to the confrontation policy, arguing that "without the settlement of these issues there can be no fruitful dialogue". Qayyum Khan took a more hawkish position when he declared that his party would “strive for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir by all possible means”. He referred also “to the genocide perpetrated on the Muslim minority in India”, and the responsibility that devolved on Pakistan of protecting them. In comparison the stand taken by Jamaat-e-Islami was relatively bland. It said: “Kashmir, Farakka barrage and the persecution of Indian Muslims are the basic issues which have to be solved with justice and equity before relations between Pakistan and India can be normalised.”

The most strident stance was predictably Bhutto’s and his posture on these disputed issues made the strongest impression on the electorate. The voter knew of his record as a consistent and implacable advocate of the policy of confrontation. He made the 1965 war into an election issue to dramatise his stand. He said he was ready to “own” the charge that he “engineered” the war with India in 1965 after making sure of China’s political support. A Pakistani journalist, Shabbir Hussain, published a book, *The Lengthening Shadows*, in 1970, in which he mentioned a post-war trip by Bhutto to China, along with Ayub Khan, to seek military hardware. But two former military leaders who had
entered politics after retirement, namely Asghar Khan and Nur Khan, disputed both Bhutto’s claim and the journalist’s story. Nur Khan, then with the Council Muslim League, said: “It was we [military leaders] who wanted the war in 1965.” He accused Bhutto of supporting Ayub in his decision to restrain the military when India was locked in battle with China across the Himalayas in 1962. Asghar Khan said that while it was true that he had rushed to China to seek aircraft and equipment, there was no subsequent visit by Ayub and Bhutto.

There were also demands that Pakistan should embark on a nuclear weapons programme. Bhutto and Qayyum Khan made this a campaign issue, while Asghar Khan argued that Pakistan should reach an arrangement with the super powers to secure a nuclear umbrella.

**The Outcome**

When the results came in, it was seen that 63 per cent of the voters had turned out to exercise their franchise in the western wing, compared with 57 per cent in the eastern wing. Within the western wing, Punjab led with a turn-out of 68 per cent and Sind was next with 60 per cent. The figure for NWFP was 48 per cent, and for Baluchistan 48·5 per cent, suggesting a close correlation between voter turn-out and levels of development.

In the east the Awami League achieved a sweeping victory—more total than any recorded in democratic elections anywhere. It won 160 of the eastern wing’s 162 directly elected seats in the national assembly, taking 74·9 per cent of the vote. It went on to take 288 of the 300 seats in the provincial assembly. Following the capture of all the women’s seats—filled by votes of the directly elected
members—the final score was 167 and 298.

Mujibur Rahman won two national assembly seats, one by a margin of 60 to 1. Two members of the minority communities in the eastern wing were elected to the national assembly seats, and nine to the provincial. Among the seven Independents elected to the provincial assembly, several were rebel Awami Leaguers who had been passed over by the party when it awarded nominations. They entered the fray nevertheless, and won on their own strength. After independence, three of the seven were readmitted to the party in consideration of their role in the liberation struggle. The result is that the Bangladesh assembly as now constituted with all the national and provincial assembly members sitting together has hardly an opposition bench.

In the west, the PPP bagged 83 seats (see Table A), or almost three-fifths of the total of the 144 filled by direct elections, but it secured only 37·7 per cent of the aggregate West Pakistan vote (see Table C). It put in its best performance in Sind, where it took 44·9 per cent of the vote and two-thirds of the seats. In Punjab, its share was 41·6 per cent in terms of votes, but the fragmentation of support among its numerous rivals gave it three-fourths of the seats. In NWFP, the PPP got only one of the 18 national assembly seats but it did not do too badly in terms of votes considering that it got 14·2 per cent as compared with 18·3 per cent taken by Wali Khan’s NAP in its home ground (see Table D). In Baluchistan, the PPP hardly made an impression; it got only 2·3 per cent of the vote, too few to win any seat.

These statistics tell only a part of the story. In the eyes of the man-in-the-street the measure of the PPP’s success was the tally of the heads which rolled in the dust. At Larkana, Bhutto’s home town, he humbled Mohammad Ayub Khuro.
<table>
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<th>Name of Party</th>
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<td>Jamait-e-Ulema-Pakistan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Sind 4</td>
<td>Sind 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party (Wali Khan)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Sind 3</td>
<td>Sind 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Sind 1</td>
<td>Sind 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League (Convention)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>Sind 2</td>
<td>Sind 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Democratic Party</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Sind 1</td>
<td>Sind 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Sind 3</td>
<td>Sind 3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>162</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. No.</td>
<td>Name of Party</td>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>All Pakistan Awami League</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>113+6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum Group)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Muslim League (Council)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Muslim League (Convention)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>All Pakistan Central Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and Nizam-e-Islam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Hazarvi Group)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>National Awami Party (Wali Group)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13+2*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Pakistan Democratic Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Markazi Jamaat Ahle-Hadees Pakistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Islami Ganatantri Dal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Sind Karachi, Mohajir Punjabi Muttahida Mahaz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Baluchistan United Front</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indirectly elected women's seats.
TABLE C
PARTY POSITION IN WEST PAKISTAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes polled</th>
<th>Percentage of West Pakistan total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.P.P.</td>
<td>61,48,625</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League (Council)</td>
<td>16,89,109</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumiat-e-Ulema-Pakistan</td>
<td>13,08,578</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)</td>
<td>12,89,455</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi)</td>
<td>11,47,980</td>
<td>7.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami</td>
<td>9,45,275</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League (Convention)</td>
<td>6,19,747</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party (Wali)</td>
<td>4,46,513</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Democratic Party</td>
<td>2,54,389</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>22,939</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>17,39,544</td>
<td>10.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE D
PARTY VOTES BY PROVINCES NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People's Party</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League (Council)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi Group)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League (Convention)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party (Wali)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This was one of the five seats Bhutto won—three from Sind and two from Punjab, losing only in a contest in the Frontier. A PPP lawyer, Khurshid Hasan, defeated Asghar Khan, while another party candidate worsted Rafiq Saigol, a leading industrialist who was seeking election from his home town, Layallpur, on the ticket of the Jamaat-e-Islami-i-Pakistan. In Lyari, a Karachi suburb, Sayeed Haroon, another leading businessman, found that his pocket borough was no longer safe from the PPP’s inroads.

An observer commenting with first-hand knowledge of Pakistani politics, pointed out that Bhutto’s success in Punjab had a distinct regional pattern. “The party did well in the relatively prosperous areas of Lahore division, eastern Multan and along the Grand Trunk Road as far as Rawalpindi, areas where industrial development has taken place and the agriculturists are modern prosperous landowners. Along the Indus river, traditional factors have continued to operate as representatives of the Islam Pasands won many national and provincial seats.”

Bhutto’s success disproved the theory that the votes in the Punjab were in the gift of the landed gentry. He had allies among the landlords, as we noted earlier, but the bigger and more influential of them were tied up with Daultana’s Council Muslim League, or the rival faction led by Qayyum Khan. Bhutto’s success showed, therefore, that it was possible to make a direct appeal to the voter over the heads of the nawabs, maliks and sardars. Only in rare cases did feudal influence bring success; the Mianwali seat remained as always with the Kalabagh family while a scion of the old ruling family of Bahawalpur romped home in a constituency

falling within the former state.

In the provincial elections (see Table B), Bhutto's showing was less impressive than in the national poll. Local factors were bound to pay a larger part in the smaller provincial constituencies, explaining the divergence. In Punjab the PPP bagged 60 per cent of the seats, or 113 out of 180. The runner-up, the Council Muslim League, got only 15. In Sind, Bhutto's party failed to get a majority but came close to it by taking 28 of the 60 seats filled by direct election. With the two women's seats taken by the party later, the PPP's present strength is 30 in a house of 62. But with as many as 14 independents in the assembly, four of them elected with the PPP's support, it should not be difficult for the party to maintain itself in power. The next largest party, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, has, in any case, only seven seats.

The only flaw in Bhutto's success in Sind was his inability to carry the settlers from India. The refugees concentrated in Karachi preferred the religious parties which won four of the city seats in the national assembly while another went to an Independent supported by them. This left the PPP with only two seats from the suburbs. In the provincial elections the party did somewhat better—it took eight out of 15 Karachi seats. But this was possible because it also fielded refugee candidates like its opponents.

In the NWFP assembly, the PPP fared badly. But there was some satisfaction for it in the fact that no other party had got a clear majority. Wali Khan's NAP got 13 out of the 40 seats while its ally, the Hazarvi group of ulama, got four—making a total of 17. Including the two women seats bagged since then by the NAP, the final position was that it and its ally had 19 seats out of 42. Since Qayyum Khan's PML (Q) took 10 and the PPP three seats, these two—
united in their antipathy to Wali Khan—had undoubted potential for making trouble.

In Baluchistan, the NAP combine had only a bare majority to start with—11 (made up of eight from the NAP and three from the Hazarvi group) in a House of 20. The NAP has since won the women's seat, and the total is now 12. But this does not guarantee safety; conflicts stemming from clan feuds tend to divide the NAP, a factor which Bhutto tried to exploit in the election for the women's seat. The voting was 9 to 8, showing that two of NAP's voters had stayed away.

In an overall sense, the PPP has certainly done exceedingly well. But it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that 62 votes out of over 100 cast in West Pakistan went against it. The "first past the post" method of choosing the winner exaggerated its success. The Council Muslim League, the party with the next largest number of votes, did relatively well in Punjab and Baluchistan, while the Qayyum faction proved that it had significant support in NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind. The Convention Muslim League was obviously a non-starter because of the legacy it had inherited from Ayub Khan. But even then it came out ahead of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Punjab which was no mean achievement.

Among the religious parties, the Jamait-ul-ulema-i-Pakistan, or the Sialvi group as it is called after its leader, put in a better performance than its compeers in terms of the aggregate West Pakistan vote. But the Hazarvi group made a far more satisfactory showing in the sense that it gained a pivotal role in the NWFP and Baluchistan assemblies.

It would be tempting to speculate that the rightist parties—the three Leagues and the four religion-oriented groups—would wish to get together to meet the challenge of Bhutto. The separate Leagues, as we noted earlier, are a by-product of personality conflicts while the dissensions among the
ulema derive from abstruse theological disputes. Having learnt to their cost the wastefulness of internecine quarrels, will they now move closer to each other? This seems unlikely because adversity has aggravated mutual bitterness. Again, the ruling PPP can certainly be counted upon to do its best to keep the differences alive. Mutual jealousies can be exacerbated by the way Bhutto distributes the favours that he can bestow. Qayyum Khan has been taken into the cabinet and now ranks as an ally. But the Council Muslim League does not, although Mumtaz Daultana has been offered an ambassadorship to keep him in good humour.

In any case, the Leagues and the ulema groups do not seem to have much of a future. Their failure in 1970 was a clear pointer to their inability to identify themselves with the hankering for change. The setback they suffered might make it more difficult for them to retrieve their position. Many in Pakistan argue, therefore, that Wali Khan’s NAP, with a strong base in its home province, might ultimately become the principal opposition party, specially as he is trying to give the NAP a national personality.

World Reactions

The outcome of the election evoked mixed reactions abroad. While there was satisfaction over a clear-cut verdict, the political polarisation of the two wings caused misgivings. Many asked whether West Pakistan would agree to be ruled by an East Bengali majority. Despatches from the western wing suggested that the prospect was anything but pleasing either to the military or to the political parties.20

The Times (London), commenting editorially on 9 December, congratulated Pakistan "on its orderly first elections" and added: "What is disturbing about this first General Election is that it has dramatized the seemingly unbridgeable differences between the two halves of the country." The Guardian (London) also welcomed the outcome and said: "Foremost, they [the elections] have produced a clear winner in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from East Pakistan, and a clear opposition leader in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Neither will have to manoeuvre with lesser parties to maintain his position." At the same time the paper uttered a word of caution: "The new Prime Minister is faced with awesome tasks... Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will have to show some flexibility in his ideas on the autonomy of the eastern region."

In India, Jagjivan Ram—speaking as President of the ruling party—hailed the results, expressing the hope that the installation of a strong, popularly elected government would help in the process of economic development and promote stability in the whole region. "This might lead ultimately to better relations with various neighbours," he added.21 The same view was taken at a meeting of Parliament's consultative committee for external affairs, held on 11 December. The Communist Party of India saw the election as a defeat of the dark forces of reaction, "an eye-opener to those who cast doubts on the strength and vitality of democratic forces in Pakistan".22

Press comments on the outcome were marked by a cautious optimism, recognizing the problem posed by the conflicting ambitions of Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman but hoping that the two would work out a modus vivendi. The Statesman counselled the Awami League and the People's Party "to

21The Indian Express, New Delhi, 10 December 1970.  
22Ibid., 9 December 1970.
co-operate with each other” since there could otherwise be no progress towards a changeover from military rule to popular government. It asked the two leaders to remember that a failure to produce an acceptable constitution and a viable government would have “consequences far worse than the continuation of martial law”.23 The National Herald cautioned Mujibur Rahman that rash constitutional experiments would not be acceptable to Yahya Khan. “The type of autonomy that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is advocating is unlikely to be appreciated . . . so some adjustments are necessary.”24

Some Indian analysts anticipated, however, the crisis that was due to break out in the next 14 weeks. Girilal Jain, writing on 10 December in the Times of India, said that “the issue now is not just whether Pakistan can at last make the changeover to democracy but whether it can survive as one entity”. He argued:

Mr. Bhutto faces the greatest challenge in the hour of his triumph. He must either compromise with the Sheikh [Mujibur Rahman] and thus risk his popularity in the western wing or confront him and thereby pave the way for an eventual partition of Pakistan.

2310 December 1971.
2421 December 1971.
6. Drift to Disaster

IN the 14 weeks between the general election and the crackdown in Dacca on 25 March Bhutto acted as “the catalyst of separation”.¹ His stand that the rule of majority did not apply to Pakistan blocked the national assembly session and ruled out the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power. But was he acting on his own or as stalking-horse for the military?

There is some evidence that Bhutto’s relations with the junta in power were strained in the pre-election period. He suspected that several powerful generals were quietly helping his opponents in West Pakistan in the hope of seeing him cut down to size. Bhutto’s public statements of the period were particularly critical of Lt.-Gen. Pirzada, Principal Staff Officer to Yahya Khan, and Lt.-Gen. Gul Hassan, Chief of General Staff.² The junta’s attitude may have changed after the election, both in recognition of Bhutto’s success and the danger posed by the steam-roller majority gained by the

¹A phrase used in an article: “The Enigma of a Political Priest,” Holiday, Dacca, 21 February 1971.
²H.K. Burki, the Pakistan Times, 9 January 1972; Ghulam Mohiuddin, Pindir Sharajantra O Bangladesh (in Bengali), Dacca, 1972.
Awami League (AL). But active collusion between the two developed only after an initial bid by the military to come to terms with Mujibur Rahman had failed. In this first phase, Yahya Khan was prepared to accommodate to some extent the AL’s demand for autonomy, embodied in its six-point programme, in return for its agreement to let him continue as head of State so that the military would still retain control. But he soon realized that the AL’s six-point charter was not negotiable. This opened a new phase in which Bhutto had undoubtedly the support of most, if not all, generals at the top. They shared his misgivings about the AL’s ultimate objectives and were glad, therefore, to see Bhutto staking a claim to a share in power. The developments during the 14 crucial weeks thus stemmed as much from Bhutto’s obduracy as from the army’s manoeuvres. In the later stages, the two were certainly acting in concert.

Bhutto defined his position without any ambiguity as early as 20 December. Travelling from his home town, Larkana, to Lahore, Bhutto told a large crowd of admirers at the end of a seven-mile-long victory procession that his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) “was not prepared to occupy the Opposition benches in the national assembly”. He ruled out waiting until the next election on the plea that he could not redeem the pledges his party had made to the people unless “the authority at the centre” was shared between the PPP and the AL in “a grand coalition”. Majority alone, he added, “does not count in national politics”. It was in this speech that he referred to Punjab and Sind as the “bastions” of Pakistan’s power to argue that no government at the centre could be run without the cooperation of the PPP which controlled these two provinces. The rules of the parliamentary game provided no room for an argument of this kind, but Bhutto was not bothered. He knew that his
stance would evoke sympathy, if not explicit support, from the three pillars of Pakistan’s power structure—the military, the bureaucracy, and big business. They all had reason to be afraid of a monolithic Bengali majority.

**Suspicion about Awami League**

Bhutto records a conversation he had with Lt.-Gen. Pirzada a few months before the general election in which the latter asked for an assessment of Mujibur Rahman’s “true intentions”. The one-word answer Bhutto offered “without hesitation” was “separation”. The Awami League’s runaway success at the polls deepened Bhutto’s fears. Even though he conceded the possibility that the six points could be a demand only for provincial autonomy rather than a concealed scheme for secession, he argued that the real danger lay in the “intention” behind the six points. As he said:

> There is a very thin line indeed between maximum autonomy and secession. There is little to distinguish between a loose federation, confederation and near-independence, as can be seen by the different interpretations given to six points. To some, six points may have meant maximum autonomy, and to others secession. The debate can go on endlessly. But it is more than just a question of the meaning and possible effects of six points—it is really the question of the intention behind six points.³

³Z. A. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, pp. 74-5.

His own understanding of the intention was that Mujibur Rahman saw the decisive victory he had gained in the election as an opportunity to move forward to his ultimate goal of
independence. As Bhutto wrote:

Whatever may have been Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s original intentions, there can be no doubt about his intentions after his overwhelming electoral victory. Whether he achieved his goal in two stages or one, whatever his tactics and timing, his goal was an independent, sovereign Bangladesh. He hated West Pakistan and was totally disillusioned with Pakistan. If any further proof was necessary, the events just before the 25th March, and the well and long-planned conspiracy with India that came fully to light after the 25th, are there for all to witness and judge.4

Bhutto seems to have been convinced that India was deeply involved with the AL in a conspiracy to detach the eastern wing from Pakistan. Mrs Gandhi’s decision at the end of December 1970 to seek a fresh mandate was, in his view, a bid “to strengthen her hands so that she could assist a rebellion in East Bengal”. Taking a long view of Indian policy vis-a-vis the eastern wing, he wrote:

The conspiracy is as old as Partition, and since the Agartala Conspiracy Case it has been considera intensified. India always had a covetous eye on East Bengal, as a first step in destroying Pakistan. The late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru personally planned the policy of giving East Bengal different treatment from the rest of Pakistan. The over ten million strong Hindu population of East Bengal and the ethnic affinities of East Bengal to West Bengal were partly responsible for this separate treatment. When, after Partition, India introduced the Evacuee Laws, as a matter of policy she

4Ibid., p. 75.
did not apply them to East Pakistan. India encouraged border trade between East and West Bengal and did not apply between East Bengal and India the stringent rules for visas and permits. From the beginning, India has tried to wean away East Bengal from Pakistan.

Despite his distrust of AL's aims, Bhutto says he was prepared to make every effort to arrive at a political settlement within the context of Pakistan, because the alternative would have been bloodshed and slaughter. But, as he sums up, the gap between them was too wide to bridge:

The differences between Mujibur Rahman and myself arose on principles. It was a struggle of conflicting equities. For Mujibur Rahman equity lay in an independent Bengal; for me in the retention of Pakistan. For him six points was the property of the people—for me, Pakistan was the property of the people. This is how our points of view clashed.

The army's view of the six points was no different from that of Bhutto. In its eyes, the AL was lacking in a proper Pakistani spirit. Its stand on the Kashmir issue was lukewarm, and it wanted normalization of relations with India. In fact, it had become "respectable if not popular in the eastern wing to be pro-India". This did not suit the army; the role, prestige, and size of the armed forces were dependent on militancy against India in general, and a hard line on Kashmir in particular. Besides, as Tariq Ali points out, the army "was ideologically saturated from top to bottom with racist

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6Ibid., pp. 54-5.
6Ibid., p. 74.
7M.B. Naqvi, "West Pakistan's Struggle for Power," South Asia Review, August 1971.
and religious chauvinism against the Bengalis, who had been traditionally regarded as dark, weak and infected with Hinduism.8

It is against this background of deep-rooted suspicion and distrust that the drift to disaster over the 14-week period should be viewed. Even before the dust of the elections had settled, Syed Najiullah, writing for the Pakistan Observer from Rawalpindi, said that Bhutto could not be expected to reconcile himself to the six points because he believed in a "strong, almost unitary centre, with a presidential form of government". The 1962 constitution of Ayub Khan, with its marked authoritarian features, was "after his heart's innermost desires". Najiullah also quoted a private conversation with Bhutto in which he had agreed to advocate the resumption of trade with India to meet East Pakistan's wishes, but the writer suspected that Bhutto would add so many "riders" if pinned down on the issue that the exercise would not be worth it.9

Foreign trade was only one of the issues which made Bhutto object to the six points. It was no consolation to him that defence and foreign affairs were to be central subjects because the resources required by the centre for defence would be within the discretion of the provinces. Point Four of the six points laid down that the units would have the sole authority to levy taxes, but the federal government would be provided with "requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defence and foreign affairs" through an automatic procedure laid down in the constitution. Likewise, it was difficult for Bhutto to think of conducting foreign policy if foreign aid and trade were excluded from the

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9Pakistan Observer, Dacca, 12 December 1970.
centre’s purview. With this “bisection of foreign affairs”, Bhutto feared that “a death blow would have been dealt to Pakistan’s international relations, particularly her outstanding disputes with India”.\textsuperscript{10} He also argued that a common defence policy would be impossible to work out with the two wings of the country looking in separate directions as a result of the virtual severance of all links.

During the negotiations between Mujibur Rahman on the one hand and Yahya Khan and Bhutto on the other, the AL was ready to offer a number of assurances to dispel these misgivings. An offer was made to incorporate a binding arrangement in the constitution to ensure that the centre would have the revenue resources it needed to discharge its responsibilities. It was also agreed to stipulate that the power of provinces to negotiate foreign trade and aid would always be exercised “within the framework of foreign policy” laid down by the centre.\textsuperscript{11} The AL was thus willing to go quite some way to meet Bhutto’s wishes, but he was not prepared to accept any compromise unless it also gave him and his party a place in the central government. “We sought”, as he says in post facto justification, “to share power with the Awami League in the central government because otherwise with their exclusive control of the entire central administration, together with complete authority in East Pakistan, nobody could prevent Mujibur Rahman from taking the final step to secession.”\textsuperscript{12}

Bhutto was also alarmed by the AL’s economic blueprint which envisaged that the western wing would bear 74 per cent of the centre’s expenses. “Moreover, it was intended to

\textsuperscript{10}Bhutto, n. 3, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{11}Cyclostyled memorandum from Malik Ghulam Jilani to Yahya Khan, 7 April 1971. Jilani is one of the four West Pakistani politicians who remained in jail under Bhutto.

\textsuperscript{12}Bhutto, n. 3, pp. 19-20.
set off East Pakistan's contribution against the reparations it claimed from the western wing." In addition, the AL wanted past debts—internal and external—to be apportioned by reference to the use made of the resources. This meant the west accepting 80 per cent or more of the liabilities.

**FOREDOOMED TO FAIL**

The triangular negotiations involving Mujibur Rahman, Yahya Khan, and Bhutto were, thus, bound to fail unless the AL agreed to give way on fundamentals. When the attempts to persuade Mujibur Rahman came to nothing—that was clear by the middle of February—the exigencies of the situation forced both Bhutto and Yahya Khan to keep up a pretence of carrying on further negotiations to give the army time to build up its striking power in the eastern wing. This explains the protracted dialogue that took place before Pakistan was pushed over the precipice.

Yahya Khan made his first visit to Dacca after the election in mid-January for long talks with Mujibur Rahman and his principal colleagues. Yahya Khan left Dacca saying that he was "very satisfied" with his discussions with "the future prime minister of Pakistan". But it is noteworthy that he went from Dacca straight to Al Murtaza, Bhutto's home at Larkana, ostensibly on a duck shooting trip. The Chief of Staff, Abdul Hamid Khan, and Pirzada joined the discussions. This prompted the comment from *Holiday* that "some kind of a consensus on the constitution is being arrived at", with a quid pro quo for Bhutto in terms of a share in power.13 Evidently, the military's expectation at this stage was that it would be able to persuade Mujibur Rahman to work in tandem with Bhutto.

Bhutto took himself to Dacca at the end of January, beginning his stay there with the laying of a wreath at the martyrs column commemorating those killed in the language agitation of 1952. This could not have been easy to do, for the 1952 agitation marked the beginning of serious east-west conflict. But this was a small price to pay for the deal he expected to strike. He was hoping to find Mujibur Rahman softened by the prospect of high office held out by Yahya Khan, but Bhutto was in for disappointment. The mood in Dacca precluded a compromise on the autonomy issue, not least because of the repeated assurances offered by Mujibur Rahman to his people that there would be no departure from the six-point programme. Bhutto returned empty-handed, but it was still too soon for him to throw down a challenge. Public opinion in West Pakistan needed to be prepared for a confrontation, the task to which Bhutto applied himself next.

Hijacking

A helpful development from his viewpoint was the increase in tension between India and Pakistan which followed the hijacking of an Indian aircraft to Lahore on 30 January. Mujibur Rahman saw this as a deliberate attempt to create abnormal conditions with the ulterior purpose of sabotaging the peaceful transfer of power to the people. But Bhutto viewed the incident very differently; he visited the hijackers at the airport and promised them and their organization, the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front, assistance “in whatever manner they want”. When the blowing up of the hijacked plane led to an Indian ban on overflights, and the consequent disruption of air links between the two

\[14\text{The Pakistan Observer, 6 February 1971.}\]
wings, the reaction in the east was one of anger against the centre for permitting the hijacking incident to escalate. Taking the cue from Mujibur Rahman’s sharp comments, the People (Dacca) urged the centre to compensate India for the loss of the aircraft to meet a condition laid down by New Delhi for withdrawing the ban. As the People said, communication difficulties at a time when vital negotiations between the two wings were in progress could only serve the interest of “conspirators against the people”. Bhutto claimed subsequently that the hijacking was “a calculated move to find a pretext for the suspension of inter-wing flights” to disrupt communications between the two wings. In a further bid to inflame passions Bhutto threatened the organizers of a World Hockey Cup tournament, scheduled to be held in Lahore in mid-February, with dire consequences if an Indian team was allowed to participate. “Under the existing conditions”, he said, “an Indian team cannot land on the soil of Pakistan because the Kashmiri people across the cease-fire line are suppressed, gagged, and their leaders externed from the valley.” The organizers of the tournament, a committee headed by a lieutenant general, obligingly gave in.

**Bhutto’s Boycott**

Bhutto held a series of meetings with his party leaders to work out a plan of action to block the AL’s bid to push through a constitution based on the six points. The party was divided on the issue, with one small section in favour of deferring to the wishes of the eastern wing but the majority wholly against it. In his public pronouncements—as at Peshawar on 15 February—Bhutto claimed that he had gone right up to

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15 The Times of India, 12 February 1971.
“the edge of the precipice” to come to an understanding with the Awami League. But the effort did not get him anywhere because Mujibur Rahman was not willing “to budge an inch”. Bhutto indicated that he could conceive of a formula to meet the AL’s wishes regarding separate currencies and foreign exchange accounts for the provinces, but he could not possibly accept any scheme which left the centre wholly dependent for resources on subventions from the provinces, or which left foreign trade and aid in the control of the provinces.

Until these fundamental differences were resolved, Bhutto saw no point in asking PPP members to attend the national assembly. As he put it: “We are expected to go to Dacca not to frame the constitution but to accept what the Awami League had already decided upon. Given this background we will not be there on 3rd March.” He also expressed the fear that PPP legislators were liable to become “double hostages” in Dacca. First, there was India’s hostility to contend with (in the wake of the hijacking incident). Secondly, he was afraid that the crowds in Dacca might harm anyone opposed to a six-point constitution. Dacca did not take kindly to these remarks. As Holiday bitterly commented, only “a diehard secessionist” could talk in these terms.

Bhutto’s decision to stay away from the national assembly called to mind the Muslim League’s refusal to participate in the work of the Indian Constituent Assembly in 1946-47 just before Partition. The reasons in both cases were the same. A strong and determined minority felt that the only way it could safeguard its vital interests was to opt out of the democratic process to seek extra-parliamentary solutions.

Bhutto’s subsequent “reflections” on these events, recorded in *The Great Tragedy*, show that he was afraid that once the national assembly session was held, the initiative would pass entirely into the hands of the AL majority. The
Speaker would have been an AL nominee, acting in accordance with the party’s wishes. Again, the Legal Framework Order had specifically left it to the assembly to decide the voting procedure regarding the constitution. This meant that decisions would be taken by a simple majority, allowing Mujibur Rahman to use his party’s strength to put through a constitution “by brute force”, aided, “if necessary, by terror on the streets”. This was the reason why Bhutto insisted repeatedly on a consensus on the constitution, implying that it should be adopted not merely by a simple majority but also approved by a proportion of members of each province. To this Mujibur Rahman’s reply was that a consensus is “a good thing” but it should not mean “nullifying” the role of the majority party.

Bhutto had other fears too, remarkably similar to those of Jinnah vis-a-vis the Congress Party’s intentions in respect of the Indian Constituent Assembly. Bhutto felt that once the national assembly met under conditions completely within his control, Mujibur Rahman would convert it into a sovereign body and thus make the Legal Framework Order inoperative. “Having given six points constitutional sanctity, with himself as the legally constituted Prime Minister of Pakistan, with control over the armed forces and general administration, and with East Pakistan under his command, the next step would have followed as night follows day.”

Bhutto’s boycott decision evoked, as was to be expected, sharp reaction from Mujibur Rahman. Addressing a joint meeting of members of the national and provincial assemblies on 15 February, he voiced his fear that “a conspiracy was being hatched to delay the transfer of power”. Incidentally, the hall in which the gathering was held had large

17Bhutto, n. 3, pp. 16, 23 and 31.
posters on the wall proclaiming "Independence, not subservience".

Bhashani was equally outspoken. He described Bhutto's moves as a threat to East Pakistan. The reaction of other Bengali leaders was no different. Deploring Bhutto's hasty and unhelpful decision, Nurul Amin feared that this might delay the transfer of power. Ataur Rahman, another former chief minister, accused Bhutto of dividing the country. In the western wing, Maulana Maududi, speaking for Jamaat-e-Islami, deplored Bhutto's action in creating a constitutional deadlock. "The proper course would be for all those who have been elected by the people to take part in the session, giving up extreme attitudes."

Now followed a series of confabulations between Bhutto and the junta. There were rumours at this time that Yahya Khan was planning to hand over to Abdul Hamid Khan because the latter was not bound by the promises to transfer power. In any event, it was Yahya Khan who urgently sent for Bhutto. Emerging from a five-hour session on 19 February, Bhutto told correspondents that his party represented one-half of the country and had, therefore, a right to be heard. Any attempt to frame a constitution without its participation would be "barren, futile, counter-productive and negative". It would, he added, be like "staging Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark".

Another meeting followed the next day, coinciding with Yahya Khan's amendment of the Legal Framework Order by a martial law decree. Under the original order, members were not permitted to resign before taking their seats, but the amendment did away with this restraint. Since Bhutto was at this time collecting resignations from PPP legislators to buttress his boycott threat, it looked as if Yahya Khan had
gone out of his way to facilitate Bhutto’s efforts to build up a crisis situation.

In another two days Yahya Khan dismissed his ministers, originally appointed in August 1969. The outgoing civilians included several Bengalis, and also a West Pakistani member, Mahmood A. Haroon, who was known to be friendly with Mujibur Rahman. Writing with the benefit of hindsight, a Bengali journalist\(^9\) says that the dismissal was intended to keep the entire decision-making process in the junta's own hands to plug any danger of leaks.

The day the ministers were sent packing, Yahya Khan held a conference of all his governors and martial law administrators. A plan was obviously taking shape, as subsequent developments confirmed. The Awami League leaders in Dacca were puzzled and suspicious, but there was no question of their backing down from the position they had taken in their talks with Yahya Khan and Bhutto. In a statement on 24 February, Mujibur Rahman called for a halt "to the kind of political histrionics which the nation has been made to witness during the last week". The commitment to the six-point formula was irrevocable, but the Awami League would be prepared to offer clarifications "in order to dispel any misgivings about the impact of the six-point scheme upon any of the legitimate interests of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan, or on the viability of the central government". This offer of a dialogue was first made on 21 February after Mujibur Rahman had a meeting with Mufti Mehmood and Ghulam Hazarvi, leaders of the NWFP-based Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam. They were told that the AL would welcome discussions on the future constitution with leaders of all parties ahead of the national assembly session.

\(^9\)Ghulam Mohiuddin, n. 2.
While preparations were going on for the inauguration of the national assembly on 3 March, Bhutto had yet another meeting with Yahya Khan on 26 February lasting four hours. This took place in Karachi where Yahya Khan made a brief halt on his way to Dacca for the inauguration. The same day Vice-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, Governor of East Pakistan—he had just returned to Dacca after sessions with Yahya Khan in Rawalpindi—met Mujibur Rahman twice, evidently to convey messages back and forth. Reports in Karachi papers suggested that Ahsan had been asked to arrange another meeting between Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman. The effort ended in a failure, paving the way for a showdown.

Following these meetings in Dacca and Karachi, Bhutto asked on 28 February for a postponement of the national assembly session, and demanded that the stalemate be broken in one of three ways. The national assembly could be dissolved and martial law continued, but he acknowledged that “this would create a dangerous crisis for the nation”. He preferred, therefore, that its inaugural session should be postponed to facilitate further discussion with the AL or, lastly, the time-limit of 120 days set by Yahya Khan for finalizing the constitution should be dropped to allow time for reconciling differences over the future structure of Pakistan. If one of these courses was not adopted and the session held without his party’s participation, he would launch a popular agitation from Khyber to Karachi. He backed up this ultimatum with renewed warnings that any member from West Pakistan trying to attend the assembly would find the people visiting their wrath on his head.²⁰ Bangladesh leader Tajuddin Ahmed later alleged that Bhutto’s threat was

²⁰The Pakistan Times, 1 March 1971.
followed up by personal pressure on West Bengal MNAs by Lt.-Gen. Umar, Yahya Khan’s principal intelligence man.21

Yahya Khan was in Karachi but his principal aides were in session at President’s House in Rawalpindi. They were working out an announcement to be made by Yahya Khan agreeing to postpone the session. Three generals left with the text by the evening flight, but it was too late to put out the announcement that day—not least because of Yahya Khan’s usual preoccupations in the evenings.22

The broadcast was made the next afternoon in which Yahya Khan talked of the regrettable confrontation between the leaders of East and West Pakistan to justify his decision “to postpone the summoning of the national assembly to a later date”. With the major party of West Pakistan declaring its intention to stay away, he feared that the assembly might “disintegrate”. It was, therefore, necessary to give more time to the political leaders to come together but he gave “a solemn promise” that the assembly would be called into session as soon as the environment became “conducive to constitution-making”.

UNARMED REVOLUTION

The reaction in Dacca was predictably sharp. The AL parliamentary party was called together to consider the situation, following which Mujibur Rahman said that the representatives of the majority people could not allow postponement at the behest of a minority party to go unchallenged. He was surprised that Bhutto was being allowed to get away with his threats against West Pakistani legislators despite

22Ghulam Mohiuddin, n. 2, pp. 6, 11, 83.
martial law regulations prohibiting interference with the functioning of the assembly. Sharper comments appeared in Dacca papers; veteran journalist K. S. Mustafa asked in an angry article: “Has Bhutto taken upon himself the task of securing the independence of West Pakistan?” Mustafa alleged that a plan had been hatched by some bureaucrats to jettison Bangladesh by 1974 by when the western wing’s foreign exchange earnings were expected to go up to 73 per cent of the total for Pakistan.

A spontaneous strike had begun in Dacca immediately after Yahya Khan’s announcement. Mujibur Rahman formalized the protest by announcing a six-day programme of strikes and demonstrations. He warned: “You will see history made if the conspirators fail to come to their senses.” The response from the people was electrifying. As Ataus Samad wrote in Holiday:

What is happening now in Bengal is indeed an unarmed revolution. March 1 was the flash point and March 2 was when it erupted. Even without being euphoric about what has happened, it can be said that never before was the entire mass of Bengal so united: . . . The high and mighty bureaucracy in Bengal [has] come out publicly in support of the people, which has never taken place before. The middle class gentry has also publicly professed its loyalty to the people’s cause. The people appear to be psychologically prepared for all consequences. The courage that launched them on the streets of Dacca in 1968 and 1969 is not lost.

The upsurge brought the people into a clash with the army right at the start. The police force in Dacca began to be disarmed by the military. The result was to make the people
even more militant and defiant. There were also some incidents in which Bengalis clashed with non-Bengalis. Mujibur Rahman quickly intervened to plead with his people to protect and honour “everyone living in Bangladesh, no matter where he originates from or the language he speaks”.

Vice-Admiral Ahsan, later described by Bhutto as “a pliable tool in the hands of the Awami League”, was removed from office on 1 March, obviously because he was not considered tough enough to handle the tasks that were to be shortly entrusted to the army and the administration. Lt.-Gen. Tikka Khan came in his place a few days later, with a record of success in “pacification” operations in difficult tribal areas of Baluchistan. He was given joint charge of two offices: Governor and Martial Law Administrator, thus replacing both Ahsan and Lt.-Gen. Sahebzada Muhammad Yaqub Khan who was sent away along with Ahsan. Unfortunately for Yahya Khan, the Chief Justice of East Pakistan refused to swear in Tikka Khan as Governor—serving to dramatize Mujibur Rahman’s total control over the eastern wing. The subcontinent had known non-cooperation movements since the twenties when Mahatma Gandhi introduced the technique to enable an unarmed people to stand up against the might of the British. But never before had non-cooperation achieved such a total sweep. “Even Gandhi would have marvelled,” as Wali Khan is reported to have said.23

Another high point of the non-cooperation movement was the refusal to make any sales to army cantonments. After a few futile attempts the army gave up the effort to secure supplies by force. It had to live for three weeks on emergency

rations, eked out by supplies flown in from the western wing. A vessel carrying troops and ammunition arrived at Chittagong, but dock-workers resisted the unloading. Fighting broke out as a result, in which thousands were involved. The trouble spread from the dockside to the city where clashes took place between Bengalis in revolt against the regime and its non-Bengali supporters. It is incidents of this kind which were later seized upon by Yahya Khan to justify the crackdown. But a press note issued by the military in Dacca on 9 March said that the total of those killed in civil strife during the preceding week was 172, while 358 were injured. The toll in Chittagong was 78 killed; in Khulna 41; and in Rangpur three. In fact, the law and order situation gradually improved as the Bengali administration helped by thousands of student volunteers took charge. As a military announcement said in explanation of an order to withdraw the troops to the barracks: “Following Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s appeal for peace, there has been considerable improvement in the law and order situation”.25

Mujibur Rahman was undoubtedly under pressure to make a unilateral declaration of independence, but he did nothing of the kind. A correspondent had asked him on 1 March whether “independence was his aim”. His cryptic reply was: “You wait”. On 7 March, when he was due to address a public meeting at the end of the first phase of the non-cooperation movement, rumours went round Dacca that he would end with a ringing declaration of independence. Instead he set

24As Tariq Ali writes in New Left Review, July-August, 1971: “Even in army cantonments tension was felt deeply. For instance, all the Bengali cooks, servants and laundrymen left the cantonments. In the food markets vendors refused to sell the soldiers any food. At one stage, the situation became so desperate that special nourishment had to be flown out of West Pakistan.”

25Dawn, Karachi, 6 March 1971,
out a seven-point formula for ending the crisis. His attitude at this point is summed up in the remarks he made to Werner Adam:

If we are left in peace, there will be no civil war. We can have our constitution, and the West Pakistanis can have their own. Then we can, as far as I am concerned, always get together and consult as to whether we should try for a loose federation.²⁸

**Conciliation Efforts**

The course the events took in the east created a sense of alarm in the west. Bhutto’s response was a statement on 2 March in which he tried to assuage Bengali feelings with a statement that he was not rejecting the six points but endeavouring to find a solution as close to the Awami League formula as possible. Yahya Khan also had second thoughts. He announced on 3 March that he was inviting leaders of all parties to meet in Dacca on 10 March, but Mujibur Rahman turned this down—describing it as an invitation issued at gun-point. Nurul Amin (who was later to become the junta’s showboy) also refused to participate. Several west wing leaders, among them Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, endorsed Mujibur Rahman’s decision to reject the overture. Others like Asghar Khan and the Jamaat-e-Islami advocated immediate transfer of power to the AL to resolve the crisis. But it was not these pleas which counted with Yahya Khan; nor could he immediately afford a confrontation because the build up of troops was still incomplete. His next move was therefore to announce on 6 March a new date for the national

assembly meeting. As he said in his broadcast:

For some reason, the postponement of the date of the assembly session has been completely misunderstood. Whether this is deliberate or otherwise I cannot say, but one thing is certain, this misunderstanding has become the rallying cry for the forces of disorder. . . . I, therefore, in my capacity as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of this country, feel duty bound to resolve this unfortunate impasse by taking a decision myself. I cannot wait indefinitely. I have consequently decided that the inaugural session of the national assembly will take place on 25th of March.

Two points made in the broadcast are of interest in the light of subsequent developments. Yahya Khan held out the warning that the armed forces would, no matter what happens, ensure the complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan. “Let there be no doubt or mistake on this point.” He also reminded political parties that the future constitution of Pakistan would have to be drawn up within the framework of the fundamental principles enunciated in the Legal Framework Order of 30 March 1970. This meant that any scheme failing to provide “adequate powers to the centre including legislative, administrative and financial powers to discharge its responsibilities” would attract the veto reserved to himself by Yahya Khan.

This broadcast was intended to convey the message to Mujibur Rahman and the eastern wing that a compromise solution was still possible. A personal communication also went from Yahya Khan to Mujibur Rahman promising to reopen negotiations for an early transfer of power. This was intended, as Bhutto says, to dissuade him from making a
proclamation of independence at his public meeting the next day.\textsuperscript{27}

The gambit worked. Mujibur Rahman, as noted earlier, made a positive response and came up with a formula setting seven conditions for attending the national assembly. These were: (a) immediate withdrawal of Martial Law; (b) transfer of power to elected representatives of the people; (c) return of all military personnel to the barracks; (d) immediate halt to the military build up and the inflow of military personnel to the east from the west; (e) a halt to firing upon civilians, and judicial enquiries into earlier killings; (f) non-interference in the administration functioning in Bangladesh; and (g) transfer of responsibility for law and order to the Bengali police and paramilitary personnel, assisted by Awami League volunteers.

Yahya Khan's broadcast and the answer it evoked from Mujibur Rahman helped to calm down the situation in Dacca. Transport and communication services were resumed, banks began functioning, and factories reopened. But the ban on inter-wing transactions continued, while cable traffic with the outside world was now routed via Manila, instead of Karachi, to avoid western wing censorship. At this stage, several political leaders in the west joined hands to persuade Yahya Khan to come to terms quickly with Mujibur Rahman. A meeting was held in Lahore on 13 March at the initiative of the Hazarvi group of \textit{Ulema} to which came leaders of the Council and Convention Muslim Leagues, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan. Wali Khan's NAP was not represented, but it had agreed in advance to support the efforts of these leaders. The only minority party which held itself aloof was Qayyum Khan's Muslim League, obviously because of its hard line against autonomy.

\textsuperscript{27}Bhutto, n. 3, p. 32.
But Bhutto had different ideas. At a press conference on 15 March, he put forward the demand that power should indeed be transferred to the people, but separately to the majority party of each wing. While reiterating his view that the role of majority did not apply to Pakistan, he added that his proposition did not in any way imply "two Pakistan and two prime ministers". Yet this is what other political figures in the west understood Bhutto's demand to mean. Tufail Ahmed, speaking on behalf of the Jamaat-e-Islami, said that a division of power as suggested by Bhutto would imperil the country's integrity. Asghar Khan described the proposal as "most unfortunate", while Wali Khan pointedly asked for a clarification whether the proposal was within the ambit of a single state. A joint meeting of the political ulema held in Karachi urged Yahya Khan to reject outright Bhutto's "mischievous theory of two Pakistan".

**Final Round**

This was the context in which Yahya Khan began the final round of negotiations with Mujibur Rahman in Dacca on 16 March. But even as these talks were taking place, C 130s were flying in more troops daily via Ceylon. It is estimated by Awami League sources that one division, complete with supporting elements, was brought in between 1 and 25 March. A special commando group was also infiltrated into selected urban areas, and made responsible for rounding up AL leaders immediately as the signal was given. Steps were simultaneously taken to disperse Bengali troops to prevent them from acting together. The Chief of Staff, Abdul Hamid Khan, arrived in Dacca on 20 March to make a final check on these

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preparations. It was at this stage that a Bengali brigadier, then commanding the Chittagong garrison, was suddenly transferred to West Pakistan.

At first, the negotiations seemed to progress satisfactorily. A compromise appeared in sight envisaging transfer of power to the majority parties in the provinces with Yahya Khan retaining control of the centre for an interim period. There was some debate whether a martial law decree would be sufficient to give legal validity to the new dispensation, but this was resolved when A. K. Brohi, a leading constitutional lawyer, gave his opinion that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 provided a precedent for transfer of power by proclamation. 30 (With no constitution in force in Pakistan, it was evidently necessary to fall back on this act.) The package compromise formula provided also for the lifting of Martial Law and for separate sittings of the national assembly members of each wing as sub-committees of the House preparatory to a full session to finalize the constitution. This bifurcation was done at the instance of Yahya Khan to ensure Bhutto’s primacy in the western wing, much against the wishes of political minorities in the west. As Rehman Sobhan wrote later, Wali Khan, Daultana, and Bizengo—leaders of the NWFP, Punjab, and Baluchistan respectively—were “sacrificed at the altar of a Bhutto-Mujib entente”.

But there was never any entente. After renewed threats from Karachi that any compromise worked out without his concurrence would be resisted, Bhutto arrived in Dacca on 21 March and met Yahya Khan the same evening. According to his version of the events, he rejected the scheme worked out with Mujibur Rahman because he could not agree to any settlement, with such significant long-term consequences, behind the back of the national assembly. He, therefore,

wanted the settlement to be approved and authorized at a full session of the assembly which would also determine "the content of the centre's subjects", instead of leaving it to the President to create an interim constitutional arrangement by proclamation to give East Pakistan autonomy on the basis of six points.

As Bhutto later wrote, he could not be a party to the scheme as it inevitably meant two Pakistan.

... This was my main objection to the scheme, but it also contained other serious defects. For one thing, a different measure of autonomy for the provinces of the western wing during the interim period, apart from being unacceptable, would be difficult to work out without the approval of the national assembly. Then again, Martial Law was the source of law then obtaining in Pakistan and the very basis of the President's authority; with the proclamation lifting Martial Law, the President and the central government would have lost their legal authority and sanction. There would thus be a vacuum unless the national assembly was called into being to establish a new source of sovereign power on the national level. If, in the absence of any such national source, powers were transferred as proposed to the provinces, the government of each province could acquire _de facto_ and _de jure_ sovereign status. This was not only a legal but a practical problem. The object of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was to take control of East Pakistan both in fact and in law, and in such a situation nothing could stop the secession of East Pakistan. For that matter, the provinces of the western wing would also be in a position to declare their independence.

A tripartite meeting was held on 22 March at which Yahya
Khan clearly gave Bhutto the right of veto over any constitutional scheme. According to Bhutto, he also had a private conversation with Mujibur Rahman after the tripartite meeting. On this occasion, Bhutto claims that the East Bengal leader told him:

I could do whatever I wanted in West Pakistan and he would support me. In return I should leave East Pakistan alone and assist him in ensuring that the Awami League’s proposal materialised. He suggested that I should become the prime minister of West Pakistan and he would look after East Pakistan. According to him this was the only way out of the impasse. He cautioned me against the military and told me not to trust them: if they destroyed him first they would also destroy me. I replied that I would much rather be destroyed by the military than by history.31

The complacent AL leadership took no note of the veto given to Bhutto, and went on negotiating with Yahya Khan’s aides to settle details of arrangements for transfer of power. This was an exercise in futility. The talks were ostensibly progressing very well when Yahya Khan’s chief negotiator, M. M. Ahmed, suddenly slipped out of Dacca on 25 March. Even though signs multiplied that a showdown was imminent, Mujibur Rahman sat on in his house in Dacca awaiting the worst. His office issued a press release that evening which said: “We have reached agreement on transfer of power and I hope the President will now make an announcement.” Other AL leaders had, however, dispersed following warnings from friendly sources in the army, a precaution which saved them to lead the Bangladesh liberation struggle.

31Bhutto, n. 3, p. 43.
Well before midnight the army had started its operation to “sort out” the Awami League. As Bhutto records:

With the horizon ablaze, my thoughts turned to the past and to the future. I wondered what was in store for us. Here in front of my eyes I saw the death and destruction of our own people. It was difficult to think straight. Many thoughts crossed my mind. Had we reached the point of no return—or would time heal the wounds and open a new chapter in the history of Pakistan? How I wished I knew the answer.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32}Bhutto, n. 3, p. 43.
7. The Gamble that Failed

The terror which the military junta unleashed on 25 March came within an ace of success, although the subsequent change in its fortunes obscures this fact. The battle of the Belonia bulge, lying half way between Comilla and Chittagong, ended on 20 June, marking the end of organized resistance within East Pakistan. Virtually all rebels had been squeezed out of the land into India to lick their wounds. In the western wing, Bhutto had been pushed into a corner, and the domestic political debate stymied by highlighting the danger of war between Pakistan and India. He still had high ambitions for himself, but his self-confidence was clearly ebbing—as brought out in his comment towards the end of May that he would “either be in power or in jail” by November. The international community had, no doubt, expressed its disapproval of the crackdown; there was as a result an embargo on new aid commitments. But Pakistan was able to draw comfort from the fact that it had the support of China and the USA. Many others in the Muslim and the Afro-Asian world had lined up on Pakistan’s side.

1AP despatch from Rawalpindi in *Times of India*, 24 May 1971.
because of their innate fears about secessionist uprisings. India had, however, expressed its support and sympathy for the people of East Bengal, but it was still relying upon world powers to persuade the junta in Pakistan to arrive at a political settlement with the Awami League. What is more, three and a half million unwanted citizens—over 90 per cent of them Hindus—had been driven out of the eastern wing by the end of May, and dumped in India's lap. As more refugees streamed in, at the rate of 40,000 a day during the monsoon months, Pakistan came close to becoming a purely Islamic State—the logical consummation of the two-nation theory.

But the situation changed rapidly in the following months to the disadvantage of Yahya Khan and the junta. The principal factor responsible for this change was the emergence of an increasingly powerful resistance movement in the eastern wing. Very soon it had thrown the Pakistan Army off balance, demonstrating unmistakably to the world that the Bengalis would fight on no matter how heavy the odds. Within West Pakistan, the clash between Bhutto and the junta sharpened as the military leaned towards the right-wing parties for political support. This heightened international misgivings about the junta's ability to stabilize the situation in either wing. More and more observers began to despair of Pakistan's chance of survival as a united country. In a typical comment the Christian Science Monitor on 31 July said: "With the greatest regret we must face the prospect that it is now too late for reconciliation." Even the US Administration and, to a lesser extent, China, shared this disenchantment, as evident from Washington's suspension of new licenses for arms shipments and the low-key Chinese references to Indian "interference" in Pakistan's internal affairs. More important still, the Soviet Union's sympathy for India, and hence for the Bangladesh cause, was becoming increas-
ingly unambiguous: the Indo-Soviet treaty of 9 August made this known unmistakably to the world. India’s mood had changed too: the growing size and strength of the Mukti Bahini, the Bangladesh freedom fighters, left New Delhi in no doubt that any solution falling short of independence would be unacceptable. Even if some Bengali leaders made their peace with Yahya Khan, most of the Mukti Bahini would continue to fight—creating on India’s sensitive eastern border a civil war situation akin to Vietnam. This brought vacillations among India’s policy-makers to an end, paving the way for an increasingly firm commitment to independent Bangladesh, and consequently for greater material and moral support to the Mukti Bahini. Yahya Khan reacted with threats of total war, but this got him nowhere because the continuing exodus from the eastern wing provided irrefutable evidence of his failure to overcome the basic problem. The increasing pressure from the Mukti Bahini, coupled with Pakistan’s growing isolation in the world, forced Yahya Khan to make a last-minute offer through the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad to hold a referendum in the eastern wing on independence in five years’ time. When this was turned down by Mrs Gandhi, he opted finally for a total war which he had been threatening to unleash since 31 July. His aim was not to win but to gain a chunk of territory to create a situation in which India would be compelled to concede a settlement under UN auspices on terms acceptable to Pakistan. The bid failed, with disastrous consequences not only for Pakistan but for the junta as well.

Four strands run through the story of these nine months, all interrelated and inter-dependent. The growth of the freedom movement should, however, be considered first because it set the pace for domestic developments in
Pakistan and for changes in international understanding of the situation.

**STRUGGLE FOR BANGLADESH**

Tikka Khan embarked on operations on the night of 25 March in the belief that the army would be able to crush all resistance in a matter of days. But this calculation went wrong because of two factors he had failed to take into account. First, he could not foresee that the bulk of the Bengalis in the security forces—the police, the para-military East Pakistan Rifles and the regular troops of the Bengal Regiment—would join hands with the rebels. At least three battalions of the Bengal Regiment were stationed in the eastern wing at this time; the Bengali contingent of the EPR was around 12,000; and there were several thousand policemen trained to use arms. Attempts had been made to disarm these men or to isolate them in anticipation of the operation, but several units had successfully taken evasive action. When the crunch came, there was fierce fighting in several cantonments and camps with high casualties on both sides. But enough Bengali officers and soldiers survived to provide valuable leadership to the subsequent freedom struggle. It was a Bengali major, Zia Rahman, who put out on his personal initiative a declaration of independence over Chittagong Radio on the morning of 27 March. This served as a clarion call, drawing in many more soldiers and policemen into the fighting.

The second factor Tikka Khan failed to take into account was the deep revulsion that the massive use of force produced in Bengali minds, leading to total alienation of the population. The Bangladesh flag, visible everywhere until 25 March, disappeared from view and was replaced quickly by the
Pakistani flag and bunting, but the concept of Pakistan was dead. It lay buried, as Tajuddin Ahmad said in his first broadcast over Free Bangladesh Radio, under a mountain of corpses. Not surprisingly, it became increasingly difficult for the army to trust any Bengalis, no matter how highly placed they were in the old Pakistan hierarchy. This led to more indiscriminate and arbitrary actions which served only to widen the gulf. In August, the army tried to gain some Bengali support by installing a civilian regime headed by A. M. Malik as Governor. Although this was done primarily to placate international opinion, the junta also seems to have believed that the right-wing politicians Malik gathered around him as ministers would help to open up a channel of communication with the population. This was a vain hope; ministers had, in fact, little courage to appear in public after one of them was shot at and wounded inside his car by a guerilla in a Dacca street. Yahya Khan followed up with an announcement of general amnesty on 4 September, covering all "offenders" including the AL legislators. But this too evoked no response.

The principal reason for the failure of the junta’s periodic overtures to the people was the brutality of the army from the very start of the operations. The massive killing of students and teachers in Dacca University halls on the night of 25-26 March signified that the tactics of terror were different not only in degree but also in quality from anything East Pakistan, or indeed the subcontinent, had known. The reason for the change which transformed a highly disciplined army into a horde of savages was the indoctrination of men by their officers and the whipping up of national and racial prejudices among the Bengali population. West Pakistanis, as noted earlier, had always looked upon Bengalis as an alien people, separated by Hindu influences from the mainstream of
Islam. In the weeks preceding the crackdown, the AL was pictured to the troops as a party of traitors which was trying to dismember Pakistan under Indian influence. The bloody clashes that took place between Bengali rebels and non-Bengali supporters of the military regime were utilized to give added substance to the allegation. The “White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan”, published by the government of Pakistan in August 1971, gives a gruesome account of this racial conflict, claimed to have taken a toll of 100,000 lives. While this tally cannot be taken at face value, it is apparent that a large number of non-Bengalis perished in an outburst of racial animosity, aggravated by the fact that the two communities were also politically at loggerheads. This meant that the troops went into action with feelings of revenge superimposed on the notion that they were really striking at the Indian enemy by proxy. The theory of an Indian conspiracy undoubtedly helped to smother whatever fellow-feeling a soldier might have felt for a brother Muslim or a compatriot. As Tariq Ali says, the Pakistan Army has always had “a strong ideological orientation to anti-Indian chauvinism”. It was relatively easy, therefore, to sell the line that “Bengali nationalism is Indian inspired, Indian financed and Indian engineered”.

Secondly, senior army officers probably turned their eyes away from looting and rape in the belief that this would bring the Bengali population more quickly to its senses. In an interview after the war, Tikka Khan said that he knew of only four rape cases while Bhutto admitted to 40,000 deaths. Even Pakistanis can scarcely accept these figures in the light of the evidence now available to them from independent foreign sources. The third factor contributing to brutalities

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was a gradual deterioration in the morale of troops as the operation dragged on month after weary month. The toll guerrillas were taking of men and officers made them increasingly revengeful vis-a-vis the local population. This induced attitudes appropriate to an army of occupation operating in hostile territory. This is the only possible explanation for the wanton killing, looting and crimes against women which culminated in the cold-blooded murders of scores of writers, journalists, and professional men just before the surrender.

But to go back to the time it all began, the army’s first reaction when it met with unexpected resistance was to retire to well-guarded cantonments like Comilla, Jessore and Sylhet. Except for Dacca and the vital port of Chittagong, the cities and surrounding countryside were abandoned to the Mukti Bahini. But this was only a prelude to a massive assault following the regrouping of forces. By the middle of April, the counter-offensive had achieved well-nigh total success. This had an impact on the civil administration as well—persons like the Chief Justice of East Pakistan, who had refused to swear in Tikka Khan, now surrendered one by one to the army.

But even as this was happening, the political leadership in exile was organizing itself for a long drawn-out struggle. Picking up the thread from Zia Rahman’s impromptu declaration of independence, a sovereign republic of Bangladesh was formally proclaimed on 17 April at a small town in Kushtia district, about a mile from the Indian border. A war cabinet was named with Mujibur Rahman as President in absentia. Nazrul Islam, Vice-President of the AL, was named acting President, while the General Secretary of the party, Tajuddin Ahmad, was designated Prime Minister. The other three members of the government were ranking
members of the party whose claim to office did not admit of any dispute. Public declarations of support to this govern-
ment in exile soon came from Bhashani on behalf of his wing of the NAP, and from Muzaffar Ahmed on behalf of the other wing. Several communist groups identified themselves with this government with varying degrees of reservation, but all of them explicitly committed themselves to an independent Bangladesh. This represented a line-up of political forces, later consolidated through the creation of an all-party consultative committee, which left only the right wing and religious parties on the other side of the fence.

The naming of a government was at this stage an act of faith. Its only practical implication was that it provided an agency for co-ordinating the activities of different groups fighting against the army under the leadership of young officers like Zia Rahman. It, however, took time for this consolidation to yield tangible results. The Pakistan Army used this respite to make its base more secure by bringing in additional reinforcements and deploying them in mobile formations throughout the land. It used the interval also to start erecting a civilian facade. Men like Fazlul Quader Choudhury and Abdus Sabur Khan,3 pillars of the regime in the Ayub era, were mobilized to organize peace committees. With significant guerilla operations still to start, the disheartened clerks and shopkeepers began slowly to return to Dacca. The general mood of the middle class was summed up in a statement made to a reporter: “We want peace, no matter whether it is Bangladesh or Pakistan.” This report, appearing on 16 June in The Times (London), also said that 25 out of 167 AL members of the national

3 Both are presently in jail in Bangladesh and will be tried for collaborating with the military. Choudhury was caught while attempting to flee the country. Sabur Khan was shot at by guerillas but escaped with minor injuries.
assembly had already indicated their willingness to co-operate with the military, and more were expected to join them.

But what this report from Dacca missed was the quiet build-up of the Mukti Bahini outside Bangladesh. A report in the same paper on 2 June said that “senior officers of the liberation army, assisted by Indian instructors” were training 30,000 voluntary recruits in about 30 camps near the border. This report also mentioned growing evidence of harassment by guerillas on all border fronts. A letter to *The Times* from British residents in the eastern wing published on 11 June said: “It seems certain that guerilla warfare is beginning and will intensify.” From this time onwards, foreign reporters based in Dacca began to see increasing evidence of resistance in Dacca itself, and even more so in areas away from the main garrison towns.

The struggle acquired new dimensions in the weeks to come; frogmen sank two vessels in what a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent described as a brilliantly organized act of sabotage. There were also reprisals against collaborators to discourage co-operation with the military. The most telling action in this category was the assassination of Monem Khan, Ayub Khan’s Governor of East Pakistan. As fighting inside Bangladesh gained momentum, Yahya Khan and his colleagues tragically failed to perceive that the line of action they were pursuing since March was taking Pakistan headlong towards disaster. With a total disregard for international opinion—expressed both privately and publicly to Islamabad—the regime announced on 28 September that Mujibur Rahman was being tried in secret by a special military tribunal. Coming after U Thant’s public warning on 10 August that a trial would “inevitably have repercussions outside Pakistan”, this step showed that it was futile to expect
the junta to reconsider its policies.

Obduracy was not the junta’s only failing; it was guilty of stupid miscalculation as well. Yahya Khan convinced himself that the Indian aim was to seize a slice of territory and install the Bangladesh Government on its own soil. On this reading of Indian intentions, he moved his troops to the border in mid-October—provoking a parallel response from the Indian side. With Pakistan troops thus pinned down at the periphery, the rebels expanded their control over the interior. This outcome made Yahya Khan realize the mistake he had made. He offered to withdraw his troops if India did so too, but Mrs Gandhi had no reason to oblige him.

With forces facing eyeball to eyeball, clashes between them were not long in coming. A major engagement took place on 21 November at Boyra, 80 kilometres north-east of Calcutta, in which both sides used tanks and supporting air cover. The results were disastrous for Pakistan. It lost the best part of a squadron of tanks and three Sabre jet fighters. But even so Maj.-Gen. Farman Ali, the army’s principal spokesman in Dacca, was saying on 26 November that there would be no all-out war because the international community would not “allow” it. But he had not taken into account the fact that Pakistan itself would attempt a first strike in the west. A possible explanation for this serious misreading of the situation was that Lt.-Gen. A. A. K. Niazi, who headed the forces in the east, had advised Yahya Khan against any initiative in the west. Niazi was evidently worried about the eastern wing’s vulnerability to Indian air strikes and naval blockade. Yahya Khan did not heed this...

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{Despatch from Lee Lescaze in Dacca to Washington Post, 26 November 1971.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{From A. H. Quereshi’s long account of the war in Zindagi, Lahore. The writer is among those newspaper editors jailed by Bhutto on 6 April 1972.}\]
advice because he was working on a different set of calculations.

**Political Manoeuvres**

During this nine-month period, the military regime tried to stabilize the political situation in its favour in the east, as well as in the west, in two ways. First, it sought to build, as we noted, a civilian facade in the east for window-dressing purposes. In the west, it made up its mind at a fairly early stage that Bhutto needed to be neutralized if he could not be bypassed when the time came to set up a civilian government at the centre. It is in pursuit of this objective that Yahya Khan started cultivating various political opponents of Bhutto, notably Qayyum Khan, who best answered the military's purposes. He had the reputation of being a strong man who stood for a no-nonsense policy vis-a-vis Bengali and Pathan demands for autonomy. More important still, he was prepared to accept that the military should have a permanent place in the governmental set-up through specific constitutional arrangements for the purpose. Bhutto too was ready to make a deal with the military on much the same lines. As he told this author, he saw no other way out in the conditions then obtaining in Pakistan. He was prepared, therefore, to accept the military's demand for a constitution on the Turkish model to get at least some measure of popular control over the central government. Evidently, the military was not willing to take Bhutto at his word: he had an independent power base by virtue of his electoral success, and also high ambitions for himself. It looked, therefore, for more pliable politicians who would do its bidding without question because they would owe their office to the junta,
As a result, the distance between Bhutto and the junta steadily widened. But to begin with, he was giving unequivocal support to the military's actions in the eastern wing. At a press conference in Karachi on 28 March he accused Mujibur Rahman of wanting to set up "an independent, fascist and racist regime in East Pakistan". He declared that whatever steps had been taken by Yahya Khan "were in the best interests of the country". But very soon he began to ask for transfer of power from the military to civilian governments in the four provinces of West Pakistan, and also at the centre on the basis of an interim constitution. But Qayyum Khan quickly joined issue with Bhutto to argue that transfer of power must wait until civilian governments could be set up in all provinces simultaneously. This implied an indefinite delay until the situation in the east was sorted out. The Jamaat-e-Islami reacted just as sharply: it held Bhutto responsible for the crisis in East Pakistan and hinted that he was up to the same kind of brinkmanship in West Pakistan. Irked by Bhutto's claim to a majority in the national assembly, leaders like Qayyum Khan, Mumtaz Daultana and Maulana Maududi raised at this stage the demand for fresh elections. Nawai Waqt, Lahore, an authentic guide to right-wing opinion, argued that allowing members elected on the six-point manifesto to sit in the assembly would create unmanageable problems—"worse than what we have seen". It was also argued by Tufail Ahmed, acting Amir of the Jamaat-Islami, that new elections should be held on the basis of "fresh census data" to find out whether East Pakistan still had a majority in the total population after the cyclone and the exodus to India. Z. A. Suleri argued in his column in the Pakistan Times that the common roll for voters should be replaced by separate, community-wise electorates in deference to the ideology of Pakistan. Implicit in the suggestion was
the insinuation that the AL victory in December 1970 owed a good deal to the Hindu vote.

This debate over the validity of the 1970 poll continued until Yahya Khan's broadcast of 28 June in which he said there would be no new elections, but only by-elections to fill the seats held by those disqualified by him on charges of treason and anti-State activities. He eventually placed in this category 79 out of 167 AL members of the national assembly and 194 out of its 288 members of the East Pakistan provincial assembly. In each case, the object was to bring in a sufficient number of new men to change the complexion of the legislatures. The national assembly had from the start 146 non-AL members, but their number in the provincial assembly was only 12. This explains the much higher proportion disqualified in the latter case.

Bhutto undoubtedly realized that the regime would use the by-elections to bring in nominees of its own choice to undermine the PPP, but he said nothing immediately on this issue—possibly because he had still not given up hopes of arriving at an accommodation with the junta. He was quoted as saying that there were only two forces of any consequence in Pakistan—the military and the PPP and they should get together. (Earlier he was talking of "three" forces, but the third—the AL—was fortunately for him out of the picture.)

In his broadcast, Yahya Khan disclosed that he was having a constitution drawn up by his experts because of the discouraging history of past efforts to secure agreement in a constituent assembly. Once the document was ready, the national assembly would be called into session to give its approval to it. He indicated that the session would be held in four months' time before which the by-elections would be completed. Qayyum Khan, Daultana and Maududi wel-
comed Yahya Khan’s plan, describing it as “most appropriate” and “heartening”. But Bhutto had grave misgivings. He realized that the constitution framed by the military’s experts would give him, or any other political leader, little elbow room. As he said in a revealing interview to the Teheran weekly, *Kayhan International*: “How can unknown experts draft a constitution when we have elected deputies to do it?” In the same interview he warned against any attempt to conjure up a “puppet majority” in the national assembly. He had obviously decided that it was time to make public his misgivings about the junta’s intentions even though this meant conceding the point made by Indian and other critics that the whole business of by-elections was a farce. Not surprisingly, his comments were deeply resented by the right-wing parties. Five ulema members of the national assembly demanded that he should be tried for conspiring with foreign powers; Qayyum Khan demanded a ban on the PPP; while *Nawai Waqt* called attention to his “clandestine” meetings with the Indian High Commissioner.

Bhutto’s subsequent criticisms of the regime struck an increasingly bitter note. Commenting on the appointment of Malik as Governor of East Bengal, Bhutto warned on 4 September that he would not accept any such “gimmick” for West Pakistan. The American news agency, Associated Press, reported from Lahore on 7 September that a confrontation was developing between him and Yahya Khan on the modalities of constitution-making. Bhutto’s aides were quoted as saying that the intelligence chief, Lt.-Gen. Ghulam Umar, had told friends that the PPP “would not be given power”. Incidentally, a threat against the PPP was implicit in Yahya Khan’s broadcast of 28 June in which he had said that he was weighing the merits of banning parties of a regional character. Since Bhutto had not secured a single
seat from the eastern wing, this loud thinking indicated an attempt at blackmail to make him accept a dispensation decided upon by the army. There were other signs also that the junta had no intention of handing over power to him in a hurry. Z. A. Suleri in an article in the *Pakistan Times* argued on 7 September: “It is about time we make a forthright admission that since we are facing an extraordinary national emergency, we cannot unrestrainedly pursue the ends of democracy... If Mr. Bhutto follows the popular mood which he claims to know he should accept the fact that democracy can be ushered into the country only piecemeal.” A few days later, the *Pakistan Times* argued in an editorial: “The People’s Party’s revolutionary politics is unwelcome [because] it is [the] least suited to the infirm and convalescing State through which the nation is passing.” Pakistan’s principal need, the editorial argued, was a sense of security which could be provided “only under the firm auspices of the armed forces.”8 Bhutto’s response to these suggestions, made no doubt at the promptings of the junta or in anticipation of its wishes, was to declare at a public meeting in Karachi that “West Pakistan would face the same situation as the eastern wing if power was not transferred to his party.”7 This declaration came after nine rounds of talks with Yahya Khan, all on the question of constitutional and political changes in the country. Bhutto’s posture stiffened further: he told a press conference on 22 September that he would have to take recourse to “other processes” if the national assembly was not called into session by January 1972.8 Warning against delays he said: “Time lost is Pakistan lost”. At this stage, Bhutto named Ghulam

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6Excerpts from editorial, as reported by Reuter on 16 September.
7BBC report in *Indian Express*, 14 September 1971.
8AFP report from Karachi, 22 September.
Mustafa Khar as his successor to dramatize his fear that he might be arrested.

It was in this context that Yahya Khan made a broadcast on 12 October in which he set out a time-table envisaging publication of the constitution drawn up by his experts on 20 December. The inaugural session of the national assembly as reconstituted after by-elections was to follow on 27 December. He also laid down that any amendment to the constitution by the national assembly would require not merely a simple majority of the House but also approval by 25 per cent of the members from each province, a major departure from the Legal Framework Order of 1970. The regime also lifted the ban imposed in March on political activity but it retained sweeping powers to punish any one prejudicing the ideology or integrity of Pakistan. The announcement did not enthuse Bhutto. He was now confirmed in his suspicion that a "stooge" government was in the offing. Threatening to topple it within 40 days, he reiterated his demand that, in the absence of the AL, the PPP's majority should be recognized in any transfer of power. But as one visiting commentator noted, "Bhutto may find himself in the same situation as Mujib created for himself in East Pakistan—caught between the attitude shaped by his own inflammatory rhetoric and the inescapable fact that power lies with the army."9

More invectives from Bhutto followed when the results began coming in of the by-elections in the east. As many as 58 of the 79 seats were filled without contest, 52 of them going to seven right-wing parties which had jointly put up candidates and six to Bhutto's PPP. It was clear that the junta was treating the vacant seats as pocket boroughs to put pliable men into the national assembly. Bhutto was given

a sop too, but the end result was that his strength in the national assembly went up from 88 to 94, while the strength of the right-wing parties shot up from a mere 37 to 89. With 21 seats remaining to be filled from the east, it was clear that the regime had decided to confer a majority on the rightists at Bhutto’s expense. The rightists had in the meantime organized themselves formally into a united front (as noted in Chapter 1). Another ominous development was the banning of the National Awami Party by Yahya Khan on 26 November which might have meant disqualification or detention of the seven members elected on its ticket to the national assembly. This foreclosed the possibility of any move by Bhutto to join hands with Wali Khan against the rightists.

Bhutto was in a fix. He could still work with the junta; he had just been to Peking on its behalf. But it had been made clear to him that he would have to share power with its nominees. His disappointment is reflected in his pronouncements describing the United Front as a “bogus coalition”. His party adopted a resolution saying that the transfer of power to such defeated, anti-people elements would be “tantamount to capitulation to India” and would pave the way for “a second and final Tashkent”. This was on 2 December. But Bhutto capitulated the very next day when he sent a letter to Yahya Khan agreeing to accept the office of Deputy Prime Minister in a coalition cabinet on condition that he was given “full powers”. In explanation of this climb-down, he said that he was more concerned about the threat from India than about political arrangements at home. Although war broke out on 3 December, Yahya Khan went ahead with his plan. It was formally notified on 7 December that Nurul Amin, head of the United Front, would be Prime Minister. But this plan went awry, as noted in
Chapter I, following the surrender of the Pakistan Army in Dacca. In this sense it is fair to claim that Bhutto’s ascent to the presidency owed a good deal to India.

As he has himself said: “Did we have to lose a war and suffer humiliation [for] transfer of power to the people’s representatives? Should we thank Mrs Indira Gandhi for this recognition of elected members and transfer of power to the people’s genuine representatives?”

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A crisis of conscience marked the international community’s reaction to the developments in East Pakistan. The human suffering to which military action had exposed the population evoked very wide sympathy, but inhibitions came in the way of official expressions of opinion on the basic conflict between the people and the junta. Several countries and their spokesmen took recourse to equivocation: they expressed agreement with pleas for a political settlement but took good care not to define what this should imply. A good example of this is provided by the statement made by an official US spokesman on 17 June urging “a restoration of peaceful conditions in East Pakistan and a political accommodation”. But a clearer exposition of US views was soon available from the testimony of a State Department official, Christopher Van Hollen, before the Senate Sub-Committee on Refugees. He made it clear that the USA did not plan to use aid as a lever to secure a political solution. Such sanctions, he said, would “undermine our efforts to maintain a productive relationship with the government of Pakistan”. He claimed that Washington had suspended licensing arms shipments “as of early

10Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Information Minister, quotes Bhutto as making this comment to Wali Khan. *Times of India*, 7 March 1972.
April” but deliveries under earlier licences would continue because a total embargo would make Pakistan “rely exclusively on other sources of supply”. This indicated clearly enough to Islamabad that formal pleas for “political accommodation” need not be taken too seriously.

As the months went by, US support for the Pakistan junta deepened because of the interests Washington shared in common with Peking. The USA pumped in a great deal of cash for relief and rehabilitation, 70 per cent of the funds going to Pakistan and 30 per cent to India. The plea was taken that assistance on the spot inside East Pakistan was necessary to dam the flow of refugees into India. The US Congress was, however, in no mood to be content with doling out charity: the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in mid-October (as the House of Representatives had earlier done) to cut off all aid to Pakistan—economic and military, grants as well as loans. This embargo was to operate until President Nixon was able to certify that Yahya Khan was co-operating in bringing peace to the subcontinent.

The disenchantment of the US Congress with Pakistan did not prevent Nixon from throwing his administration’s full weight behind Islamabad during the war. The President’s attitude is best summed up in the comment Kissinger made at a high-level secret meeting in Washington on 3 December. “I am getting hell,” he said, “every half hour from the President that we are not being tough on India. He does not believe that we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favour of Pakistan.” At another meeting of the same high-level group the next day, Kissinger made it clear that the US would make a general plea for political accommodation in East Pakistan when the subject came up in the Security Council, “but it will not certainly imply or suggest any
specifies such as the release of Mujibur Rahman."

The Chinese took much the same position as the USA, but in a more outspoken and forthright fashion. Following a diplomatic note to New Delhi and a People's Daily editorial charging India with interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan, Chou En-lai himself addressed a letter to Yahya Khan on 12 April. The assurance was offered that “should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression”, Peking would “firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard State sovereignty and national independence.” This affirmation of solidarity was widely welcomed in Pakistan, specially because it helped to offset the “insistent appeal” made by the Soviet President, Nikolai Podgorny, on 3 April, for “the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repression”. Bhutto speaking on 15 April described this Soviet plea as “blatant interference” and complimented China on its “just and correct” stand. Going a step further, he offered on 30 April the interpretation that China would intervene in the event of a war between India and Pakistan. Yahya Khan said the same thing by implication in an interview to the Financial Times (London) in mid-July. As he put it, “Pakistan would not be alone” if he was compelled to declare a general war against India.

As the situation deteriorated, Yahya Khan sent Bhutto to Peking early in November at the head of a delegation which included all three Service chiefs. Bhutto's party paper, Musawat, likened the visit to the secret trip Bhutto claims to have made with Ayub Khan to China immediately after the end of the 1965 India-Pakistan war to secure immediate shipments of military supplies. Bhutto came back claiming that he was “more than satisfied” with the results of his talks in Peking. He added: “We are now in full preparedness to

11From Anderson Papers, reproduced in Indian Express.
maintain territorial integrity against foreign aggression." Yahya Khan was even more categorical. Radio Pakistan quoted him on the same day as telling the US network, CBS, that China would intervene in the event of a conflict. But Nawai Waqt made no secret of its disappointment that "the vagueness of China's assurance would unnecessarily embolden warmongers in India." This pessimism about the results of the visit was widely shared. The Daily Telegraph said it looked as if the Pakistani mission to Peking had failed to produce any Chinese undertaking to provide diversionary relief on India's northern frontier. The Guardian commented that China had sent the emissaries home with "the softest of comradely cotton wool, not so much as a scrap of paper—nothing remotely to keep Mrs Gandhi awake."13

In contrast with China's faint-hearted support to Pakistan, the Soviet attitude towards the Bangladesh cause became progressively more outspoken and firm. Moscow made it known, for instance, that it was making no further supplies of arms following the completion of deliveries against earlier contracts. The whole perspective changed with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on 9 August. Although it merely provides for mutual consultations in times of crisis, its timing conveyed to the world the message that the Soviet Union had a strong stake in India's security. Understandably, Pakistan was very upset: Bhutto described the treaty on 12 August as "a pact of aggression" which would embolden New Delhi to embark on an adventurous policy vis-a-vis Pakistan and China. Qayyum Khan said the treaty posed "the gravest threat Pakistan has faced during the last 24 years." Maududi declared that "only through a holy war [jehad] can we avert

12Reuter despatch from Islamabad, 8 November 1971.
13Times of India, 10 November 1971.
the threat to the freedom and integrity of Pakistan which has become extremely serious after 10 August." But a contrary point of view was projected by *Dawn* which suggested that the treaty did not give India more elbow room. In fact, it reduced it because Moscow did not want a war in the subcontinent and would certainly want India to tread carefully. Pakistan’s official posture was one of caution. An official spokesman said the treaty would adversely affect the prospects of peace, and hinted that a revision of policy towards Moscow might be necessary if “vital clarifications” sought about the treaty warranted it. It is noteworthy, however, that Sultan Ahmad Khan, Foreign Secretary, said on 16 August that the government would make “all-out efforts to maintain bilateral relations with the Soviet Union”.

Moscow on its part did not want to alienate Pakistan altogether. The joint communique issued after the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty still talked of “the interests of the entire people of Pakistan”. The Kremlin repeatedly made it clear that it was opposed to an India-Pakistan war because it feared that this would “play into the hands of those internal and external forces which operate to the detriment of both India and Pakistan”. This circumspect attitude was never abandoned; in the joint communique issued after Kosygin’s visit to Algeria in early October, both countries expressed their “respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan”. But sharply worded statements from such unofficial bodies as the Soviet Women’s Committee, the Union of Journalists, and the Central Council of Trade Unions began to appear from early October demanding immediate release of Mujibur Rahman, end of reprisals against the East Pakistani people, and a just solution of the basic

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problem taking into account the rights and aspirations of the people of East Pakistan. This clearly indicated a shift in policy, backed up by practical steps in terms of the Indo-Soviet treaty. The Deputy Foreign Minister, N. P. Firybin, arrived in New Delhi for consultation on 27 October, and was followed shortly afterwards by the Chief of the Soviet Air Staff, Kutaknov. Even more concrete demonstrations of support were to follow at the United Nations during the India-Pakistan war. The Soviet veto was used twice to bar resolutions calling for an end to the conflict on terms unacceptable to India.

The positions taken by the three principal world powers affected no doubt the attitudes of other countries, but it must be said to the credit of West European countries that they did not allow themselves to be influenced by the US stance towards Pakistan. Britain was openly urging by the end of June a solution “acceptable to the people of East Pakistan”, and it asked Yahya Khan “to bring together” the elected representatives of the eastern and western wings. This carried much weight with other countries, particularly with fellow members of the Commonwealth like Canada and Australia because of Britain’s special knowledge of the area. The French, according to the Observer (London), decided as early as July not to enter into any new contract with Pakistan for arms supplies. In September, President Pompidou called for an end to the crisis “not through combat but through a political solution”. The same sentiment was expressed in Bonn by Chancellor Brandt.

The practical benefit of this European line-up was evident in the decision of the Aid-Pakistan consortium to withhold new aid until political conditions conducive to development were re-established in Pakistan. The consortium came to

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this decision at the beginning of May, but it agreed in de-
ference to a request from Pakistan, backed by the USA, to
send an investigatory team headed by I.P.M. Cargill to both
wings of Pakistan. Its report gave the lie to Pakistan’s
claims of normalcy by describing in detail the economic
paralysis brought on by fear and uncertainty. The report
concluded that no “significant movement” in the direction of
normalcy was likely “until there is a drastic reduction in the
visibility—and, preferably, even the presence—of the military
and a re-establishment of normal civilian administration in
East Pakistan.”

DECEMBER WAR

Although Bhutto supported military action in the east, and
bore constructive responsibility for the crackdown, he soon
realized that terror offered no way out of the crisis. As he
put it, “military measures” would be meaningless “unless
they are part of an overall political policy”. By May when
he set down his reflections on the crisis in The Great Tragedy,
he had come to recognize the dangers inherent in the massive
and indiscriminate use of force. He said:

The army will have to act with alacrity but not with bru-
tality. The rebels have to be ferreted out individually.
Mass destruction will not do. It will only aggravate the
problem. Innocent people will get exposed to military
action, thereby making them enemies and further military
action necessary. This in turn will necessitate more troops
and the cycle can become unending.17

16Cited in Bangladesh Documents, Ministry of External Affairs, New
Delhi, 1971, p. 515.
17The Great Tragedy, p. 78.
Bhutto disassociated himself from West Pakistani politicians who were exacerbating East Pakistani susceptibilities by "irresponsible statements" advocating a strong centre or by demands that East Pakistan should be split into three provinces and that the east and west wings should revert to parity of representation in the national legislature accepted in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. In his interview to Kayhan International, quoted earlier, he deplored the line taken by Qayyum Khan who wants to "fix the Bengalis and all that nonsense". In another remark striking the same note, Bhutto added: "The reactionaries seeking the blood of East Pakistanis must be held at bay".

Taking the line that "East Pakistan must be satisfied if it is to be saved", he stressed the need to make the benefits of remaining in Pakistan "apparent and attractive without delay."\(^{18}\) He talked of working towards a true federal structure in which East Pakistan would have genuine provincial autonomy. While the centre would retain foreign aid and trade, currency and some powers of taxation to meet its essential requirements, safeguards would be built into the constitution to ensure that the interests of East Pakistan and other provinces were not violated. In addition, Bhutto offered to take over control of industries from West Pakistani businessmen and place them under public authorities in East Pakistan. He was also ready to agree that the east should utilise its foreign exchange earnings for itself "after meeting an equitable share of the centre's expenditure including defence."

But the point to note is that his political approach to the problems thrown up by the crisis was no different from the one adopted by the junta. Both were hoping to split the Awami League by making a distinction between "hard-core

\(^{18}\)The Great Tragedy, p. 80.
secessionists” like Mujibur Rahman and others. Both were hoping to get the others to disassociate themselves from the banned party by admitting that they had been misled. Bhutto conceded that in some instances the disavowal might amount to “hair splitting”, but he was prepared to take the “risk” because he was clear in his mind that “the success of the regime will to a large extent depend upon the number of AL leaders and workers it can wean away from the secessionist cause.” Neither Bhutto nor the junta was prepared to consider setting Mujibur Rahman free and initiating a fresh dialogue with him—the line of approach recommended by many qualified and independent observers as the only one likely to yield any results. In fact, the justification that Bhutto repeatedly offered for the ban on the AL showed that he was as unwilling as the junta to make a fresh start. In his case there was possibly also a personal angle. Any negotiation with the Awami League qua Awami League would have meant accepting once again a secondary position for the PPP in Pakistan’s political life.

In his interview to Kayhan International, Bhutto dressed up this basic approach in somewhat softer language. He acknowledged the need for “a general reconciliation in which Awami Leaguers must play a part,” barring the “small influential group which wanted secession.” Admitting that most AL Legislators were in hiding, he urged them to avail themselves of Yahya Khan’s offer of amnesty to come forward and play their role in a political settlement. “The problem does not have a military solution.” He also added: “I do not want to comment on the actions of the President, but I can tell you that the military cannot solve Pakistan’s problems.”

Bhutto was put in a dilemma by the junta’s propaganda highlighting the threat from India. He could not challenge it

19The Gread Tragedy, p. 80.
directly without damage to his reputation for militancy vis-a-vis India, but he did tell Kayhan International that he saw no danger of “a general confrontation”. Even after both sides had moved up forces to the border, he told a press conference in Rawalpindi on 19 October that he did not think there would be a war soon. At a public meeting in Karachi on 13 November, he pleaded with Mrs. Gandhi to wait two months to negotiate with a civilian government in Pakistan. “We are coming; you can talk to us.”

Since taking over as President, Bhutto has publicly made the claim\(^\text{20}\) that he had advised Yahya Khan, as well as the Service chiefs, against war because he could see Pakistan was not ready for it. He evidently realized, particularly after his visit to Peking, that Pakistan would have to fight on its own, without even a symbolic gesture of assistance from China. Correctly anticipating the outcome of the war, the hawk turned into a dove.

It is reasonable to assume that Yahya Khan and his general staff realized that a war with India would be a disaster because it would completely isolate the forces in the east. Yet he chose to adopt the tactics of bluff and bluster, holding out frequent threats of “total” war. One purpose of the exercise was to discourage India from providing aid to the Mukti Bahini. The other was to activate international concern for peace in the subcontinent and to present the crisis as another facet of the never-ending quarrel between India and Pakistan. The timing of Yahya Khan’s first threat, made at a press conference in Karachi on 31 July, coincided with a sharp increase in guerrilla activities in the east. Anticipating that India might help the Mukti Bahini to free a part of East Pakistan to give legitimacy to the government in exile, he warned that this would mean “total” war. As he said:

\(^{20}\)At his public meeting in Lahore on 19 March 1972.
"I am not looking for a war. I am trying to avoid it. But I do not believe in turning the other cheek and will hit back." The same theme was repeated on several subsequent occasions—on 1 September in an interview to Le Figaro of Paris, on 19 October to Le Monde and on 1 November to Newsweek. There was no pay-off: India's assistance to the Mukti Bahini was, in fact, progressively stepped up. The world certainly took note of the danger of war; there were a number of statements from the major capitals urging restraint upon both India and Pakistan, but if Yahya Khan had expected that international pressure would oblige India to call off its support to the Mukti Bahini, the results were singularly disappointing. U Thant came forward in early August with a proposal to place observers from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees on both sides of the India-East Pakistan border, but India's refusal scotched the move. It is noteworthy that there was no international outcry against India over this refusal, possibly because of a growing recognition that the freedom movement had an autonomous and independent character. It was in this light that many governments judged the political and moral issues involved in India's help to the movement. In any event, India never acknowledged that it was providing any help or succour until 7 November when Mrs Gandhi acknowledged in a TV interview in New York that her government was assisting the rebels.

The Pakistani general staff was banking heavily on a post-monsoon offensive to get the better of the Mukti Bahini. When this did not happen, Yahya Khan's thoughts turned at last to the idea of a negotiated settlement with AL leaders. He accepted a suggestion, made by the USA, that he should meet representatives of the government in exile to pave

21A story is current in Pakistan that meetings took place between
the way for talks with Mujibur Rahman. As a White House
spokesman disclosed on 8 December, the secret talks would
have been within the framework of one Pakistan, keeping
defence, foreign affairs and currency for the centre. “Yahya
Khan was willing to negotiate with the Bangladesh people;
the only question was about the composition of the Bangla­
desh team.”

It was much too late for talks on the basis of one Pakistan.
The AL Working Committee, at a secret meeting in mid­
October, decided firmly in favour of independence by a large
majority, rejecting the idea of any solution falling short of this
goal. Mrs. Gandhi obliquely referred to this when she wrote to
President Nixon on 15 December that “we have not received
even today the barest framework of a settlement which would
take into account the facts as they are, and not as we imagine
them to be.” In any event, the US officials who canvassed
the proposal with Bangladesh leaders in Calcutta found out
that they were not prepared to make any move whatsoever
until Mujibur Rahman was released. This Yahya Khan
was not prepared to do. The US peace-making effort never,
therefore, got off the ground, although the claim was made
in the Security Council debates during the war that
“fruitful results” were in the offing when hostilities broke
out.

Yahya Khan also made a belated effort to work out a
settlement directly with India. In an Id-day message broad­
cast by Pakistan radio on 20 November, he offered his “hand
of friendship” to India to “begin a new era of good neigh­
bourly relations.” He also called upon all refugees who had

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Pakistan and Bangladesh representatives in Teheran through the good offices
of the Shah of Iran. It is claimed by the Urdu monthly, Zindagi (now
under a ban), that Yahya Khan twice participated in these discussions and
that Bhutto was also involved in these negotiations. No confirmation of
this is available from any source.
left in fear or panic to return to their homes. Privately he sent a message to Mrs Gandhi through J. K. Atal, the newly appointed Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad, outlining a four-fold proposal. He agreed to take back all refugees without quibbling about numbers. This was a major advance over Pakistan’s previous position; it was claiming that just over two million East Bengalis had crossed into India as against the Indian figure of nine million. He reiterated the proposal for talks with the government in exile for an interim settlement within one Pakistan, pending a referendum in five years on the question of independence. There was also an offer to improve bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Accompanying these proposals was a warning that if New Delhi’s refusal precipitated a war, the Chinese would certainly step in on Pakistan’s side. At the two-hour meeting with Atal—this was when he presented his credentials—Yahya painted a frightening picture of Chinese troops streaming into Assam and West Bengal through the Chumbi valley. He also spoke of the common interest Pakistani leaders shared with India in preventing an increase in China’s influence in the subcontinent. Atal rushed to India with the proposals, taking the plea that he had come to meet the Prime Minister because he did not have the opportunity to see her before taking up his new assignment. But Atal need not have bothered; he should have known that India could not possibly accept Yahya Khan’s last-minute package. Both publicly and privately, the government in New Delhi let the Pakistan President know that nothing short of the release of Mujibur Rahman and negotiations with him respecting the mandate won by the AL would be acceptable to India.

When Atal went back on 25 November, Yahya Khan felt very piqued over the rejection of his offer. On 26 November, he told reporters at a banquet held in honour of a visiting
Chinese minister that Mrs Gandhi had spurned his offer of friendship. "If she wants a war, I'll fight." He also let fall the remark that he may not be in Rawalpindi in ten days' time because "I may be off fighting a war."

These remarks proved prophetic; hostilities began on the evening of 3 December. Both sides were preparing for war, at least since mid-October when they moved their forces to battle positions on the borders. There had already been serious skirmishes in the east, one or two at brigade level. Mrs Gandhi had raised India's demands significantly when she made the pull-out of all Pakistani forces from the eastern wing a pre-condition for a settlement. As a fair assessment of the situation puts it, "Pakistan's pre-emptive air attack on India on 3 December was not unprovoked; India's provocation was not unjustified."

Pakistan was in no position to take any offensive action in the east. It attempted, however, to make up for this by launching two offensives in the west—one in the Poonch sector of Kashmir and the other in the Jaisalmer district of Rajasthan. The third important area of operation was Chhamb, located in the neck of Kashmir. It was here that the bitterest fighting of the war took place as Pakistan mounted attack after attack to push its way towards the Jammu-Srinagar road. But this action began really as a defensive move to prevent Indian forces from moving out of this salient towards the canal headworks at Marala which controls the flow of water into the network of irrigation canals in Punjab, some of which also serve as anti-tank moats. Nothing came out of any of these operations. This was partly because of Pakistan's inability to achieve tactical air superiority any-

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22 Mrs Gandhi made this demand in her reply to a three-hour discussion in Rajya Sabha. *Times of India*, 1 December 1971.

where on the western front. Secondly, Pakistan, like India, was unwilling to commit its reserves until the other side showed its hand.

India’s posture was defensive along most of the western front. Limited assaults were launched to eliminate enclaves from which Pakistan might have broken out into Indian territory, or to remove threats to Indian supply lines as in the case of posts around Kargil in Kashmir. Only two offensives were attempted: a thrust towards Sialkot in Punjab and another towards Mirpur Khas in Sind. The second was undoubtedly a diversionary move intended to draw away reserves from the critical Punjab sector. The first started as a minor probe but more punch was put into it as it progressed deeper inside Pakistani territory. The object both here and in Sind was to grab as much real estate as possible in case it proved necessary to trade off gains for losses at the end of the war. The Sind thrust had got bogged down but heavy fighting was taking place in the Sialkot area when the cease-fire came on 17 December.

Pakistan had still plenty of fight left when the war ended in the west, but it chose peace because the balance was unmistakably tilting in India’s favour. India had only a marginal superiority in infantry and larger reserves of armour, but on the whole the contending forces were more or less evenly matched along the western front. But the quick end of the war in the east changed the total picture. It made it possible for India to commit its reserves more freely and bring its superior strength in the air into play by diverting squadrons from the east to the west. This was the reason why Yahya Khan had no choice but to accept the cease-fire.

During the war, Bhutto was pressed into service to head the Pakistan delegation to the UN. The tactics he adopted
volved making an admission that "tragic blunders" had indeed been made in East Pakistan—a bid to disarm criticism of Islamabad's failures. This done, he pitched into India for trying to dismember Pakistan "standing on the shoulders of a big power." The frontal attack he made on Moscow was in keeping with the posture of Pakistan's principal backers, the USA and China, and was also intended to rally support from the entire anti-Soviet lobby in the UN. As Indian forces closed in on Dacca on 13 December, he expressed his confidence that the city would not fall so easily; "Pakistan's valiant soldiers and people would defend Dacca to the end." Two days later when the UN Security Council was told of Niazi's offer of surrender, Bhutto walked out of the council, "struggling to keep back tears and wiping his face constantly with a handkerchief." Before leaving, he said: "For four days the Security Council has procrastinated. The object was to see Dacca fall. So what if Dacca falls? So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? The Pakistanis would still fight a thousand years if they have to."

When the war ended, India was holding a considerable chunk of West Pakistani territory from which at least a million inhabitants had fled. (The figure Pakistan puts out is two million, but this seems exaggerated.) But since the war was not carried to a decisive conclusion, many Pakistanis like to believe that their armed forces were not defeated, the surrender in the east being blamed on the drunken, ineffectual leadership in Rawalpindi. As Asghar Khan said to this author, with all the authority of his long tenure as Air Chief: "The outcome could never be anything else. The whole political aspect was so stupid. You cannot blame the Pakistan Army for what happened." Nur Khan, Asghar Khan's successor, spoke of "the total lack of direction from the top." He lamented that Pakistan had a King Farouk
in Yahya Khan: "You [Indians] were dealing with fools and knaves." Bhutto too takes the same line, as borne ut by his inaugural address and many other pronouncements. But the opposition newspapers, aligned to Jamaat-e-Islami or other right-wing parties, ask uncomfortable questions about China. As Sarfaraz Khan, a retired major-general, now with the Pakistan Democratic Party, wrote: "If China had applied a little pressure at Sikkim, the whole course of the war would have changed. . . . China, alas, did not heed our call for help at the time of our gravest crisis."
BHUTTO started in office with a singular advantage; no one else was in sight to run the country. The military, discredited by defeat, was in no position to nurse political ambitions. This left the field clear for him on the strength of his decisive majority in the national assembly and his established mass base. There was undoubtedly the handicap that his party, the PPP, was not in the picture in NWFP and Baluchistan, but this could hopefully be overcome by alliances at either the local or the central level. This at any rate was the direction he had in mind when he lifted the ban on Wali Khan’s NAP on the day he took over, and sent post-haste for the Pathan leader and his friends of the Jamiatul-ulema-i-Islam (JUI) to start negotiations with them. If nothing came of the efforts, carried on over several months, it was largely because of Bhutto’s predilection for keeping all his options open. At the same time as he negotiated with these potential allies, he was making parallel efforts for an arrangement with their rivals like Qayyum Khan in NWFP and Abdus Samad Achakzai in Baluchistan. In fact, some Karachi newspapers reported that Bhutto plan-
ned to swear in Qayyum Khan as a cabinet minister on 7 March, the day after he came to terms with the NAP and JUI. Wali Khan’s protests evidently persuaded Bhutto to drop the idea at the time. Episodes like this do nothing to erase the reputation he has for unpredictability. He does not attach much importance to consistency—he has said so himself—but it is difficult to envisage how he can discharge the responsibilities of his high office if few around him are willing to trust his word.

Bhutto knows that many hard choices have to be made in the difficult situation facing Pakistan. This makes it necessary to evolve a national consensus on the basic issues before the country to eliminate debilitating conflicts. Only one vote out of every three cast in West Pakistan in the 1970 election went to his party, a pointer to the effort he needs to put in to carry the country with him. In theory, Bhutto’s government at the centre includes representatives of other political parties. This, as he said, is an earnest of his effort “to strengthen national unity”.¹ He has Nurul Amin as Vice-President; the Chittagong tribal leader, Raja Tridib Roy, as Minister of Minority Affairs; and Qayyum Khan as Minister of Interior and Kashmir Affairs. The first two are decorative appointments to maintain the pretence of a link with former East Pakistan. Qayyum Khan alone brings added political weight, but the net effect may be to aggravate Bhutto’s problem with NWFP and Baluchistan. Qayyum Khan, as noted in an earlier chapter, is an implacable enemy of Wali Khan and his NAP. It is also relevant to note that Qayyum Khan has always stood for a strong centre.

The new Pakistan is more compact and homogeneous than the old, but the economic and political preponderance of Punjab is now even greater. Sind has benefited from in-

¹President Bhutto’s Address to the National Assembly, Islamabad, 1972.
dustrial and commercial development in and around Karachi; it has less reason for resentment against a Punjabi-dominated centre than NWFP or Baluchistan. But even Sind has lately been eager to assert its separate identity as reflected in the demands for use of Sindhi as the language of administration in the province. The Jiye Sind (Long Live Sind) movement, sponsored by old-time politicians like G. M. Syed, may have proved a non-starter in the 1970 election, but there are unmistakable signs of disaffection in the present phase of political restiveness. The situation in NWFP can be judged from the periodic outbursts of Wali Khan. He was quoted as saying on one occasion: “We all have guns here. East Pakistan did not have so much as a pen-knife.”

Pakistan needs, therefore, to evolve a federal concept as much as it did before when it was a two-wing country. Given Bhutto’s preference for a strong centre, the differences over centre-state relations may yet prove difficult and divisive. Although he stands committed to a parliamentary form of government, he may want to modify the conventional division of powers to enhance the authority of the federal executive. In other words, what will suit Bhutto is something approximating to the presidential pattern. This is the direction pointed by the interim constitution, as discussed below.

Any assessment of Pakistan’s political future should start really with the role the army sees for itself in the new situation. Nur Khan, speaking with the authority deriving from a long and distinguished Air Force career, told this author: “The political power of the army is totally broken”. A perceptive journalist in Lahore echoed the same sentiment. “The army,” he remarked, “is finished for a long time.

²Peter Preston’s despatch, reproduced in National Herald, Delhi, 8 March 1972.
If it attempts anything against Bhutto, the people will not take it lying down. They will resist as fiercely as the Bengalis in the east after the 1971 crackdown.” These comments suggesting that the military is no longer a threat should be looked at as immediate reactions to the December debacle. But it would be necessary, when judging prospects in a long term perspective, to take into account the tradition of political involvement built up since 1954 when the military and the bureaucracy established a partnership for the country’s governance, leading to Ayub Khan’s induction in Mohammad Ali Boga’s cabinet as Defence Minister. This involvement offered large rewards personally to the military top brass. It also paid dividends to the armed forces as a whole in the shape of lavish expenditure on military preparedness. The military’s ambitions could revive once again if civilian authority faltered for any reason, or centre-state conflicts assumed serious proportions. The institutional checks that inhibit the soldiers in a country like India do not operate in Pakistan, even though both Indian and Pakistani armies were shaped in the same mould. A differentiating factor is the greater homogeneity of the Pakistan Army with 70 per cent of its ranks recruited from just six districts of Punjab. In the officer cadres, however, the Punjabis are only half of the total, while the other half consists mainly of Pathans and Baluchis. Another point of difference with India is that the top personnel of the military and the civil service, as well as the politicians, are all drawn from the same small stock of landed gentry: there are thus many more personal ties and family connections than is the case across the border.

The dangers for the future are highlighted by the circumstances in which Bhutto got rid of Lt.-Gen. Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan in March. The two had evidently started behaving like king-makers because of their role in the transfer of power from Yahya Khan to Bhutto. They were appropriately rewarded: Rahim Khan continued as Air Chief while his army and navy counterparts got the sack. Gul Hassan moved up from Chief of General Staff under Yahya Khan to Acting C-in-C, and was later given the substantive appointment. The disorders that rocked Pakistan in January-February, highlighted by the strike of policemen in Hyderabad, Lahore and Peshawar, prompted these military leaders to indulge in the speculation that the armed forces might soon have to take over the country again. This wishful thinking appears to have alarmed Bhutto, and he decided to push them out before their ideas spread any further. Bhutto hinted at this sequence of events in his interview to this author: “Their behaviour pattern was unfortunately too conditioned by the past. It was unacceptable because I want the Services to be accountable to political authority. I want to emphasize civil control.” He also denied that the two had been specially helpful in getting him into the presidential chair. As he put it, “When I came back from Washington after the surrender in Dacca, I told Yahya Khan that I was not seeking power by anybody’s grace. I was seeking it as leader of a party which had a decisive mandate from the people. Yahya Khan accepted the position; so did Gul Hassan and Rahim Khan. No, these two are not my special friends. When I was having trouble with Yahya Khan last year, they did not help.” Another factor which is believed to have played a part in Bhutto’s decision was Gul Hassan’s reluctance to permit the use of the army in coping with civil disorder. He evidently thought that the army’s
neutral in domestic strife would improve its chances of making a comeback. It has also been suggested that Bhutto found it uncomfortable to have a Pathan as Army Chief because of the problems he was running into in NWFP, but informants in Pakistan do not take this theory seriously.

In place of Gul Hassan, Bhutto brought in 57-year-old Lt.-Gen. Tikka Khan, the seniormost field officer with 32 years of commissioned service. His most important qualification, from Bhutto’s point of view, is his political innocence; he appears to have turned down—as noted in Chapter I—a suggestion from right-wing parties to stake a claim to Yahya Khan’s throne after the surrender in Dacca. His reputation for severity, established in putting down an uprising in Baluchistan in 1962-63 and later in East Pakistan, is probably a factor in his favour. Bhutto may have intended through this appointment to serve notice on potential troublemakers in NWFP and Baluchistan. The replacement of Rahim Khan by 46-year-old Air Marshal Zavar Ahmad Chaudhry is of a more routine character. A quiet, industrious officer, he was managing director of Pakistan International Airlines from July 1971 after 16 months at PAF headquarters at Peshawar as Air Vice-Marshall. Chaudhry is a Qadiani, a minority sect which orthodox Muslims refuse to accept within the Islamic fold, as tragically borne out by anti-Qadiani riots in Punjab in 1953. He might have been passed over for the top job but for Bhutto’s drastic reshuffle.

The new appointments have certainly served to underline Bhutto’s primacy, more so because these were preceded by the dismissal or the retirement of 30 senior officers of the three Services. In the process, a new hierarchy has come to the top which owes its position to him. Even the old hierarchy has little reason to be sore with him; he has, for instance, given diplomatic assignments to both Gul Hassan and Rahim
Khan. There may be jobs for others too in due course. Moreover, he is taking good care to consolidate his relations with the military by making available to it a large slice of the reduced national income. The defence budget for 1972-73 has gone up from Rs 4,150 million to Rs 4,560 million. This represents an increase of 10 per cent but part of this was needed to absorb a pay rise granted on 13 April. More important, the share of defence expenditure in the smaller national income has gone up from about 5 per cent in 1970-71 to around 9 per cent. Efforts are under way not only to recoup equipment losses suffered during the war, but also to give the armed forces more teeth. This is not merely a nervous reaction in the twilight period of cease-fire; it may be part of a long-term design to improve military capability to maintain the role Pakistan has customarily played in the subcontinent in the context of great power rivalries. Bhutto seems to have received weapons from China, Libya, and Jordan, according to an Associated Press message of 29 March from Rawalpindi. In another despatch, the same agency reported that Pakistan “had started its build-up to replace 74,000 regular army men among the prisoners in India.”

**Political Scenario**

Taking power in the trauma of defeat, the first political task facing Bhutto was to head off the popular anger against Yahya Khan and his junta. He needed to do this to salvage what he could of the military’s morale, and to retain its support. Yahya Khan and his Chief of Staff, Abdul Hamid Khan, were placed under house arrest on 8 January. But even before this he ordered an enquiry into the debacle by a three-man judicial commission headed by Pakistan’s Bengali Chief Justice, Hamoodur Rahman. The rightist parties have
been agitating for enlarging the scope of the enquiry to include political aspects, obviously a bid to bring out Bhutto's constructive responsibility for the events of March 1971. These parties have also used the POWs issue to embarrass Bhutto (as discussed in Chapter X), and are taking a militant line against India in a repetition of the tactics employed by Bhutto himself in an earlier period. Since these parties operate mainly in Punjab and Sind, Bhutto need not worry too much about them; he has strength enough in these two provinces to cope with their challenge.

In NWFP, Bhutto's difficulties with the NAP have an economic dimension as well. His party here draws its support from the linguistic minority of non-Pushto speaking people. So does Qayyum Khan's Muslim League. But Bhutto seems to have the youth and the city poor on his side, while the older generation tends to support the Qayyum faction. Wali Khan's NAP is becoming identified with the defence of the established order; it is on the side of Pathan landlords and factory owners against their non-Pathan tenants and workers. "The more its preferences lie revealed, the faster the swing of the interested classes, having a stake in the preservation of the established order, to its side." The party's alliance with JUI poses its own problems because the ulema are uncompromisingly in favour of traditional values, while the NAP claims to be a secular party. For the time being, Bhutto is letting the NAP-JUI combine run this province and Baluchistan, but conflicts could easily arise over political issues like autonomy, or economic questions like tenancy reform. A Peshawar journalist, Askar Ali Shah, foresees the possibility of a clash between the central and provincial governments if and when Bhutto feels he has the

strength to force a showdown. "Almost certainly such a step would be an open invitation to the shapeless upheavals which in the end would bring either a break-up or, maybe, another spell of strong man rule." The showdown could, however, take a less dramatic turn if Bhutto succeeds in dividing the coalition or splitting the NAP itself. The character of the party lends itself to such designs; its provincial satraps like Arbab Sikander Khan, now Governor of NWFP, have on occasions shown themselves to be far more in tune with Bhutto than with Wali Khan.

Wali Khan has, however, one thing in his favour: the fear shared by most, if not all, of Bhutto’s opponents about his authoritarian propensities. They are likely, therefore, to make common cause with Wali Khan against Bhutto in any confrontation between the two. Even otherwise, thought is being given to the idea of a united front of opposition parties to resist Bhutto’s steam-roller majority. It is interesting that Wali Khan suggested the alternative of an all-party government in preference to Bhutto’s proposal for a coalition with the NAP-JUI combine. Equally interesting is Wali Khan’s plea that Bhutto should accept the principle of equality of units in the composition of the central cabinet—a throwback to the arguments Bhutto was advancing to claim a share in power along with the Awami League. As Wali Khan said to the national assembly: “In the absence of a bicameral legislature, some sort of a system must be evolved wherein the federating units feel that they are very much a party to policy-making decisions.”

The political scene in NWFP, as elsewhere in Pakistan, is enlivened by a new phenomenon, the growing exuberance of the volunteer corps set up by different parties. Bhutto’s People’s Guards, headed by his adviser on national security,

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5Text in *Pakistan Economist*, 29 April 1972.
Maj.-Gen. Akbar Khan (retd.), is a cause for anxiety to the PPP’s rivals. Wali Khan says the guards remind him of Hitler’s stormtroopers. But Wali Khan has also his own Zalme Pakhtoon, a group of volunteers descended from the Khudai Khidmatgars of his father, Ghaffar Khan. These two party militias have been freely used to settle local political arguments between the PPP and the NAP in Peshawar and other towns of NWFP. During the period when NWFP had a Bhutto nominee as its governor, the guards touched off a police strike by throwing their weight about. Much the same happened in Hyderabad, highlighting the problem Bhutto has on his hands in keeping his activists in check. Just before a spectacular public meeting, he held in Lahore on 19 March, the guards clashed among themselves using firearms to settle an argument.

The Inauguration

The demand for lifting martial law was made as soon as the dust of war settled, but Bhutto was unwilling to set an early date for return to civilian rule. He advanced several reasons, among them India’s continuing occupation of territories in Punjab and Sind. He also argued that the social and economic changes his party was pledged to make would be facilitated if he retained his martial law powers for some time. Growing resentment, however, forced his hands: he agreed to end martial law by 14 August as part of the still born accord he reached with the NAP and JUI in early March. But when the national assembly held its inaugural session, he sprang upon it a surprise offer to withdraw martial law at once if the assembly accepted the interim constitution he placed before it. The critics were nonplussed; the take-it or leave-it offer meant that they would have to accept the conti-
nuance of martial law if they quibbled about the constitution. Not that quibbling would have done much good because Bhutto had lined up 101 votes, including 10 from Qayyum Khan’s faction of Muslim League and seven from tribal members. With this preponderant majority in a house of 144, he could do what he pleased.

The interim constitution is modelled after the 1935 Government of India Act, providing for a limited degree of provincial autonomy and a host of overriding powers for the centre to meet various emergencies. As one commentator, writing in the Karachi weekly, *Outlook*, pointed out,⁶ the interim-constitution gives Bhutto greater powers than Ayub Khan ever had. In any event, Bhutto has since then given himself more arbitrary powers by suspending the constitutional guarantees for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Not surprisingly, opposition leaders like Wali Khan, Shaukat Hayat Khan of the Council Muslim League, and Hazarvi of JUI have voiced their misgivings about Bhutto’s future intentions. They can scarcely draw any comfort from the fact that this is only an interim dispensation because they take this document as a pointer to the arrangements Bhutto has in mind for the future. But it is noteworthy that he has not publicly taken any stand with regard to centre-state relations, although conceding that this is the most important political issue that the country has to settle. In his address to the national assembly, Bhutto said: “The draft of the interim constitution provides for the measure of autonomy which the provinces enjoyed prior to the imposition of one unit in the western wing.... The house may, in exercise of its year-long constitution-making powers, commencing from 14 August, decide to supplement this measure of autonomy or make any other provisions.” But it has been laid down

⁶29 April 1972.
that the interim constitution will become the permanent one unless the assembly adopts another before 31 August 1973. The first draft of the new constitution is to be placed before the assembly when it meets for the second time in August 1972.

Following the April session at which he received an almost unanimous vote of confidence, Bhutto held a swearing-in ceremony under the new constitution at the Race Cource in Rawalpindi. This public spectacle was, in one sense, certainly called for. It was the first occasion in Pakistan's history when the head of State had been confirmed in office by a truly representative national assembly directly elected on the basis of adult franchise. Bhutto had special trains run to bring in his flock from as far as Quetta, Karachi and Bhawalpur. Fleets of trucks, buses and wagons came from nearby towns of NWFP, Pakistan-held Kashmir and Punjab. Red hoardings extolling the virtues of democracy and the supremacy of the people dominated the arena. And in a fine democratic gesture Bhutto and his ministers shared the dais with leaders of rival political parties. But the arrangements for the ceremony went awry as exuberant Bhutto supporters surged towards the platform. This is illustrative of the problems Bhutto has to cope with in containing the groundswell he has touched off by his heady promises to usher in a brave new future.
SOCIALISM is our economy”: this is one of the four basic slogans of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party. But since becoming President, Bhutto has to no one’s surprise offered repeated assurances to businessmen and industrialists, and to “the creative and humane landowner” that he is not their enemy. He ended his first meeting with businessmen in Karachi on 24 January with the words: “Please go back reassured. Sleep well and give my love to your children.”

Businessmen’s misgivings about Bhutto have not been wholly removed by his “pledge of co-operation”, or by his plea to “get together and bring about a reconciliation.” The wealthy and propertied classes are not worried so much about Bhutto himself—he belongs after all to the same class—but about the forces he and his party have unleashed. The heady rhetoric he used to hasten his climb to power gave the poor in the cities and villages a new awareness of their

1From the text of Bhutto’s address issued by Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan, 24 January 1972.
2Ibid.
misery. With the lid removed by the ouster of the military junta, there was a sudden outburst of pent-up feelings against the "haves"—factory owners as well as landlords—from Karachi to Peshawar. Much the same had happened in the wake of Ayub Khan's exit in 1969, but unrest this time has acquired much larger dimensions. This reflects the expectations Bhutto has aroused.

Bhutto is in no position to meet these expectations. As it is, Pakistan's economy is under grave strain because of the loss of the captive Bangladesh market. His response to the unrest is to offer marginal concessions and improvements. He knows these may not satisfy, but he hopes to gain time and forbearance by a series of demonstrative measures directed against wealth and property. While he is taking care to see that these do not bite too deep, Pakistan's upper crust is asking where these beginnings may lead to. There is a genuine fear that the demands for social and distributive justice will gain added momentum as a result of these initial changes. This may oblige Bhutto to move farther and faster, seriously jeopardizing the interests of the upper crust. But this class in Pakistan realizes that there is for the present no alternative to Bhutto. In fact, the greater his strength, the better placed he would be to contain the pressures from below. Some such calculations explain the increasing support Bhutto is now getting from the business community. But like businessmen everywhere, they are also hedging their bets by offering discreet support to elements in opposition to Bhutto like Wali Khan's National Awami Party. An increment in the power and influence of the opposition would provide, it is hoped, a check on Bhutto, and make him more amenable to persuasion.

Hope for persuasion undoubtedly exists because neither Bhutto nor his principal colleagues have clearly spelt out
their economic ideas. Soon after the People's Party was launched in 1968, Bhutto in a discussion of the *Political Structure of Pakistan* described socialism as "the highest expression of democracy and its logical fulfilment". He was quick to add, however, that socialism can be "progressively realized without violent changes" to make it clear that he was not advocating a sudden restructuring of Pakistani society.

The range of socialism is as wide as conceivable. . . . The socialism applicable to Pakistan would be in conformity with its ideology and remain democratic in nature. If there can be a Scandinavian form of socialism, why cannot there be a Pakistani form suitable to our genius?

Anticipating an attack from right-wing opponents on the score that socialism is an alien ideology which has often been in conflict with religion, Bhutto sought and found support for his advocacy of socialism in what Mohammed Iqbal, the poet, or Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the architect of Pakistan, had said on the subject. Having buttressed his position in this manner, Bhutto concluded:

Islam is our faith, and it is the basis of Pakistan. Pakistan cannot last without the supremacy of Islam. A socialist government does not rival that supremacy. On the contrary, socialism will make the whole population the custodian of Islamic values.

In this document, Bhutto also highlighted the danger to national unity posed by "crass exploitation". Warning that the unity of Pakistan cannot be preserved merely by exhortations or presidential orders, he underlined

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3Reprinted in India by Veshasher Prakashan, Delhi, pp. 10-2.
presumably with the trial of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on a treason charge in mind, that “relations between East and West Pakistan have reached a critical point.” The solution lay in giving the people “their political rights, including economic equality.” He added: “These fine people with a rich and noble heritage will unite again as in the past provided their rights are restored to them.”

The political argument in favour of more balanced regional development was one indication of what Bhutto’s socialism was to mean. The other was a vague formulation that “all enterprises that constitute the infra-structure of the national economy must be in public ownership”. But this was qualified by the assurance:

The control of the essential means of production and of the medium of exchange by the people does not mean the private sector will be eliminated. Private entrepreneurs will be permitted to play their own useful role but will not be able to create monopolistic preserves. The private sector must flourish under conditions appropriate to private enterprise, namely those of competition and not under the shield of State protection such as at present.

It is clear from these observations that Bhutto, still a long way from power, was avoiding making commitments he might later find difficult to wriggle out of. His aim at this time seemed to be to project himself as a radical by Pakistani standards. Even so, he said little about specific economic problems but preferred to denounce the Ayub regime in general terms. He told the Dacca bar that the stability claimed by Ayub Khan was the “stability of a graveyard”. A little later he said in London that “clowns and charlatans” were running the government. “There is shameless plunder
by a handful of people who have government patronage and licences.” These denunciations were necessary to differentiate himself from the Ayub regime of which he had been a leading member for over seven years. But it was too soon to close any doors because the extent and depth of popular disenchantment with Ayub Khan’s regime remained to be tested. When the storm broke towards the end of 1968, there was no mistaking the part played by long-standing economic grievances of industrial workers who had suffered a decline in real incomes during Ayub Khan’s decade of prosperity, or the frustrations of the middle-class students and their families over the shrinking employment opportunities. Bhutto lost no time in deciding that he should adopt a more pronounced radical posture.

**PARTY MANIFESTO**

The next landmark in the evolution of Bhutto’s economic philosophy was the party manifesto issued for the 1970 elections. This declared that the ultimate object of the party was the creation of a classless society, which would ensure true equality of citizens. The aim “follows from the political and social ethics of Islam”; the party was striving only “to put in practice the noble ideals of the Muslim faith.”

The manifesto said that while the party accepted the possibility of a mixed economy, “all the major sources of the production of wealth” would be placed in the public sector. The document then listed 12 sectors of industry which qualified for nationalization under the category of “basic and key industries”.

The 12 identified industries were: iron and steel; non-

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ferrous metals; heavy engineering; machine tools; chemicals; shipbuilding; motor car or tractor assembly or manufacture; equipment for electrical power generation, distribution and use; electronics; production of arms, ammunition, and armaments for defence; cement; and paper.

There was a further commitment to nationalize “all major industries”, including textile and jute mills over a certain production capacity. It was stated that large-scale export trading, such as cotton and jute, would be conducted by state corporations.

In the financial sector, there was an unequivocal commitment to nationalize “forthwith” all banks and insurance companies. The argument was offered that all big industries have been set up entirely with bank loans. “Such loans can be said to have been the misappropriation of public money by the bankers.” It was also contended that the State could not expect to check inflation unless it took control of the banks and converted them into national property. “The State’s financial policy is at present a prisoner of the bankers.”

Vis-a-vis the rural sector, the manifesto committed the party to abolition of feudalism by breaking up the largest estates through legislation and other measures like setting a ceiling on the size of holdings. The ownership of “a maximum of 50 to 150 acres of irrigated land, the maximum varying from tract to tract on the basis of productivity” was set as the norm.

Workers were promised “a system of minimum wages” geared to the cost of living, paid holidays, recreation camps, hospitals, and free medical attention. An assurance was given that primary education would be made compulsory and universal in five years by building the requisite schools and training teachers. Primary and secondary education would be free up to the school-leaving stage.
Did Bhutto have second thoughts about his manifesto? This question arises because when Bhutto took the opportunity offered by the government to all party leaders to make a nationwide TV and radio broadcast just before the election, he slurred over the commitments to social and economic changes incorporated in the manifesto. There was, no doubt, a plea for fundamental changes in the economic structure to stem the rising tide of discontent and disaffection, but little was said about the nature of changes desired. He made no reference, for instance, to ceilings on ownership of land, but only talked of the need for agrarian reforms in general terms. As he put it:

We cannot leave the fate of our peasantry entirely to the anarchy of private possession. There must be a bold and imaginative agrarian programme aimed at reformation. The remaining vestiges of feudalism require to be removed. State lands will be given to landless peasants. Co-operative farms will be introduced on a voluntary basis. The small landowner will be exempted from the payment of land revenue, and self-cultivation will be laid down as a principle of land policy.6

It could be argued that he had no time to get down to the specifics of the agrarian programme in an address in which he had to cover the whole spectrum of the country’s problems within a limited time. But the point to note is that he had no difficulty in elaborating his proposal for agrovilles to include such details as that “each township will have its public square, its civic centre, its recreation grounds, its mosque and schools and hospitals.”

Bhutto said in his broadcast that “heavy industries will be owned by the people.” The second formulation he made was that “we shall bring into the public sector all basic and key industries.” The third stipulated that the infrastructure must come under the control of the State, adding that oil, gas and other natural resources would be nationalized, and transport would come into the hands of the people. But he also entered the caveat:

At the same time we do not propose to nationalize industries that are running competitively and whose control in private hands is not detrimental to the security of the State. Thus we propose to bring about a harmonious equation between the public and private sectors to ensure that the people of the country stand to gain.

Although at present we envisage only the nationalization of heavy industry and other connected industries, and not those that can work efficiently under competitive conditions, nevertheless because we start from the premise that the possession of the means of production in private hands is the cause of exploitation of workers and the masses, a powerful conspiracy of vested interests has been hatched against the Pakistan People’s Party.

Whether a conspiracy of vested interests existed or not, it was useful to talk about one to rake in the votes of the disgruntled and disaffected masses. Bhutto did face, however, a real problem in the sense that most of the ulema, the men of religious learning, had united against him, and were denouncing his socialist professions as anti-Islamic. The results of the elections were to show that the ulema were a
spent force, except in backward NWFP and Baluchistan. But until the verdict brought to light the decline of religion as a factor in West Pakistan politics, each politician—Bhutto not excluded—took good care to underline that he was next to none in upholding Islam. In Bhutto's case, this required him to conjure up the possibility of a fratricidal war of one Islamic sect against another, each claiming to be the only one true to the tenets of the Prophet. As he said:

There are Muslims who are proclaiming that other Muslims who do not accept their political views are not Muslims but kafirs and are to be killed. One million Muslims in Indonesia were killed by Muslims because foreign powers wanted it so.

In the course of Muslim history there have been many tragic periods of sectarian persecution, but since many years, fortunately, most sects have learnt to keep the peace. This peace is now being broken deliberately by persons who are proclaiming that the touchstone of belief lies not in faith but in politics. This is a most dangerous development and can lead to fratricidal carnage, but I can assure you, my countrymen, that we are determined not to allow another Karbala to take place on the soil of Pakistan.

His broadcast had, of course, a good deal to say in criticism of the existing economic and social order to emphasize that he and his party stood for change. As was to be expected, he directed his attack against the "capitalist barons unabashedly plundering national wealth", while the overwhelming majority of the people "are without food, shelter, and clothing."
Our people have been cheated and humiliated; their feelings have been ignored. They have suffered from a massive deception. Shall we call it the lost generation, or the generation that was betrayed? I leave it to you to choose the epitaph. But what about the future? Are the children of this tormented generation to remain in the same squalor and shame?... The dream of Pakistan was not to end in the agony of its people.

There was a time in the history of Islam when the great Umar declared that if along the banks of Euphrates should a dog die of starvation, the Khalifa of Islam would be answerable before the Almighty Allah. Here in Pakistan—in the largest Islamic State—men and women die of starvation by the thousand. Our children sleep on the streets without shelter. Our toiling masses live an appalling life. This has to be changed.

**Yahya’s Legacy**

It is against the background of these policy formulations that Bhutto’s record in office should be judged. But before examining this record, it may be useful to review briefly the problems he inherited from Yahya Khan’s outgoing regime. The economy was on the verge of collapse as a result of the heavy drain on resources involved in the nine months long military operations in the eastern wing. The report of the State Bank of Pakistan for the year ended 30 June 1971 showed that the economy’s growth rate had declined from 6.6 per cent in 1969-70 to a mere 1.4 per cent in 1970-71, the lowest recorded in a whole decade. Industrial production increased during the year by only 2.3 per cent compared to the rise of 11.2 per cent in 1969-70. Agriculture had suffered a decline as a result of the vagaries of the weather. Food output had
fallen by 2 per cent, while cash crops had fared even worse.

Foreign exchange reserves had come down sharply because economic dislocation reduced the contribution that the east made to Pakistan's total earnings. The Yahya regime had given itself a temporary reprieve by declaring a unilateral moratorium on debt service. Payments of interest and principal to foreign governments was put in abeyance from 1 May, less than five weeks after the crackdown. But the saving on this account was more than offset by the Aid-Pakistan Consortium's decision to commit no new aid until the country regained political stability. In a bid to tide over the crisis, the regime obtained short-term loans from some US banks and from friends like Saudi Arabia and possibly Abu Dhabi, the Persian Gulf emirate. When repayments on this fell due in January 1972, the effect was to push foreign reserves down by 40 per cent to the lowest level on record. Considering that reserves, even before this drop, covered just over two months' imports from all sources, this sudden outgo put the country in a precarious position.

Pakistan industry was already in a low key when the crisis broke in the east. As Bhutto said to businessmen on 5 March 1972 the level of investment had been stagnant "over the last couple of years", partly because of the climate of political uncertainty and partly because of a decline in public investment. Many existing plants were already facing a serious

5Associated Press despatch from Rawalpindi, appearing in Indian Express, 1 February 1972.

7Pakistan's imports in 1970-71 from foreign countries were valued at Rs 3,602.4 million. But in considering the situation in January 1972, it would be necessary to include the imports, formerly made from the eastern wing, valued at Rs 803 million in 1970-1971. At the end of December, Pakistan's foreign reserves came to $169 million, or Rs 811 million at the official rate of exchange.
problem of underutilized capacity\(^8\) when the flow of exports to the eastern wing was cut back sharply by the civil war. By November, *Dawn* was reporting that several industrial units faced the threat of closure because of declining sales, the pile-up of stocks, and the paucity of financial resources.

But this recession notwithstanding, prices were rising because of massive monetary expansion to meet a widening budgetary deficit. As the *Pakistan Economist* put it, the new government inherited in December 1971 an explosive price situation.\(^9\) Apart from the inflation stemming from too much money chasing too few goods, West Pakistan had been affected—as mentioned earlier—by drought conditions in '1971, resulting in a decline in wheat output. In normal circumstances, the shortfall should have caused no serious problem because imports had been arranged to tide over the lean months. But in the unsettled conditions of the country after the war, hoarding aggravated the shortfall. Suddenly the price of wheat shot up in Punjab’s cities, to the embarrassment of Bhutto’s new regime.

In addition, there were the special problems arising from the cutting off of supplies from the eastern wing. What affected day-to-day life most was the shortage of safety matches, tea and *pan* (betel leaf). Eventually, supplies of safety matches and tea were arranged from elsewhere but *pan* of the kind liked in Pakistan is not available outside the subcontinent. Smuggling from India, despite the armies arrayed against each other at the border, has mitigated the hardship. In the industrial sector, factories processing hides and skins

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\(^8\) Mubashir Hasan, Bhutto’s Finance Minister, gave the following figures (in percentage terms) of capacity actually utilized in 1969-70: tubewell and pumping equipment 57, bicycles 33, steel and non-ferrous castings 30, electrical motors 21, diesel engines 19 and machine tools 11. The *Morning News*, Karachi, 13 May 1972.

or finished leather obtained from the eastern wing found themselves suddenly without raw materials. Again, the interrupted supply of jute goods, the most widely used packaging material, put trade and industry to considerable inconvenience.¹⁰

Accumulating economic difficulties were to result soon after Bhutto took over in a series of gheraos, meaning a siege of a factory or business premises to keep owners or managers confined until they agreed to a settlement of the workers' demands. This affected many large enterprises, including Pakistan Tobacco Company, the local affiliate of the well-known international combine, British-American Tobacco. Some 20,000 workers of the textile industry were out on strike demanding the reinstatement of workers laid off by managements following the loss of the eastern market, and the resultant piling up of stocks. Bhutto was seriously worried about the spreading unrest, but he was not immediately ready to restrain the workers. It was their votes in Karachi that had helped his party win a city constituency which the wealthy Haroon family had come to look upon as its pocket borough.

**First Steps**

Sensing the problems that lay ahead of him—the post-Ayub outburst of early 1969 provided an immediate parallel—Bhutto put the rich in the dock by demanding in his inaugural address the return of funds taken out of Pakistan by them. "My armed forces need weapons, my armed forces need tanks—therefore this money must come back." If it did not, he threatened to take measures against the families of those

¹⁰Syed Najiullah, broadcasting a commentary from Radio Pakistan on 19 January, dwelt on these shortages to conclude: "We still do not know how much it would really affect us."
ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO

guilty of “having taken Pakistan’s blood out of this poor country.” Passports of some 200 persons—belonging mostly to the richest 22 families—were impounded to convey the message to the country that the government intended to back up its threats with action. Some arrests were also made, both of businessmen and of top officials in key economic assignments. These included Gen. Habibullah, Ahmed Dawood, and Fakhruddin Valika—all of them from the roster of the 22 families. The two officials sent to jail were S. U. Durrani, Managing Director of the State Bank of Pakistan, and Rear Admiral U. A. Sayeed, Chairman of the National Shipping Corporation.

The reason why the three businessmen were packed off to jail is still obscure. The only explanation Bhutto offered was in an address to businessmen on 24 January in which he said: “Some of you are unfortunately talking too loosely. I had to take some action.” The same day he released all three “as a token of his goodwill towards the business community”, to quote the report put out by Radio Pakistan. The officials continued, however, in jail, with Bhutto accusing them of violating both service rules as well as laws applicable to ordinary citizens. Although Durrani successfully obtained a writ from the High Court requiring the government to release him, Bhutto’s response was to re-arrest the official at the jail gate under a different law.

But despite the seizure of passports and the arrests, the response to the call for bringing back funds was quite disappointing. The government estimated that something like $3,000 million, equal to Rs 1,440 crores at the official rate of exchange, had been taken out of the country over the years. It set 15 January as the deadline for repatriation, undertaking

11 From the text of Bhutto’s remarks to businessmen on 24 January 1972 issued by Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan.
not to ask awkward questions about the accumulations and also offering the incentive that 45 per cent of the foreign exchange brought back could be re-sold on the free market at home under the bonus voucher scheme. The effect of this concession was that anyone bringing back funds would receive about Rs 9 for each dollar, instead of the official value of Rs 4.76 per dollar. These inducements notwithstanding, few transferred their holdings back to the country. The government at first extended the 15 January deadline by a month, and later it decided to let the matter drop. In any case, the impounded passports were returned by 5 March. The ban on foreign travel was also rescinded: businessmen, like others, were free to travel again. The whole exercise ended rather tamely, with only Rs 12 crores (S 25 million) returned to the country. But it had given Bhutto a chance to strike the right radical note by making a show of force against the tycoons. This had never happened before, which enhanced its impact on the people.

**TAKEOVER OF INDUSTRY**

Of greater long-term consequence was Bhutto's decision to take over the management of a number of large firms, but leaving their ownership untouched. This was done by an Economic Reforms Order, promulgated on 2 January 1972, which permitted the government to dislodge the existing managements and put its own nominees in their place. The order specified that no compensation is payable to the outgoing managements for loss of office, and bars the courts from intervening in any manner.

The taken-over industries fell into ten categories, among them iron and steel, heavy engineering, heavy electricals, assembly and manufacture of motor vehicles and tractors,
petrochemicals, cement, and public utilities. Twenty units were taken over in the first instance, but this gave rise to charges of discrimination. There were cases where one enterprise in the iron and steel sector was taken over, but another was not, as mentioned in an angry comment by the Karachi afternoon daily, *Star*.\textsuperscript{12} It was probably this criticism that prompted the takeover of another 11 firms on 16 January. Mubashir Hasan, explaining the decision to the press in Lahore, said that the programme of securing control and command over the ten basic industries was now complete. But a few days later one more electricity generating and distributing company was added to the list.

Twenty of the 32 taken-over units were public companies with shares quoted on the stock exchange. An analysis of these 20 units, made by the *Pakistan Economist*, showed that 18 were operating enterprises while two were still in the “organization stage”. The value of assets ranged from Rs one crore to Rs 23.37 crores. Only two of the operating companies had accumulated losses, while the others carried reserves. “Briefly, the units taken over were in a good phase of performance and earnings.”\textsuperscript{13} The companies taken over represent, however, only a small segment of the industrial structure. It is, in fact, claimed that there are 48 more units operating in the same areas of industry, but the government has allowed them to continue under private management.\textsuperscript{14}

Bhutto’s takeover of these units was heralded by a TV and radio broadcast in which he explained that the industries were picked for State control because they “bear on the life of every citizen and form the base without which no industrial development can take place.” But he also had some

\textsuperscript{12}Mentioned in an *Associated Press* report from Karachi, 4 January 1972.
\textsuperscript{13}*Pakistan Economist*, Karachi, 1 April 1972.
\textsuperscript{14}*Ibid.*, 29 April 1972.
assurances to offer to private enterprises:

It is not the intention of the government to extend control over other categories of industries. It is also necessary to make it clear that the new arrangements will not affect foreign investment or foreign capital. We expect that, after these clear assurances, industries in other categories will maintain the norms of production and performance that government will prescribe. It is our firm intention to have a happy blend of the public and the private sector. I am confident that the private sector will cooperate fully.  

Bhutto's next move came on 16 January, coinciding with the takeover of the second batch of 11 firms. He abolished the managing agency system, a relic of the British raj. In its origins, the agency system was intended to provide local management services to British-owned companies. This made for economies of scale because the same agency looked after a large number of enterprises. Gradually, the agencies became holding companies having long-term contracts for managing subsidiaries—a device which was useful in maintaining control without necessarily having a majority of the equity. In a period when few were willing to sink their capital in industrial ventures, the well-established agencies—British as well as Indian—were able to mobilize capital on the strength of their reputation. But the fact is that the system also led to increased economic concentration, as well as to many abuses. Agencies often milked the managed companies to the detriment of other shareholders by manipulating selling or buying arrangements. A demand for the reform of the system, if not its termination, has been in the air in Pakistan

From the text issued by Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan.
for a long time, more so after India did away with managing agencies in the mid-sixties.

The abolition affected 148 managing agency companies, which among themselves managed 158 companies of West Pakistan and 28 companies of East Pakistan. The biggest agency, Dawood, lost the management of seven companies, Valikas came next with five, and Saigol with four ranked third.

**Labour Policy**

Having taken these two steps against big business, Bhutto was now ready to deal with the restive industrial workers. He went to Karachi for discussions with businessmen as well as his own party colleagues working in the trade union field. An announcement issued thereafter, proclaimed as the "new labour policy", offered to raise the workers' share in the annual profits of the undertaking from two per cent fixed by Ayub Khan in 1968 to four per cent. If workers improved their productivity, this would entitle them to a share of 10 per cent in the increased profits.

But in a situation where workers were being laid off or retrenched in large numbers, the only remedy Bhutto offered was a stipulation that employers would have to give reasons explicitly in writing while terminating an employee's services. Likewise, he refused to legislate for an increased minimum wage on the plea that this would only worsen inflation. But this did not stop him from claiming:

> We have tried to introduce certain basic reforms which were long overdue but which no previous government dared to introduce... we are determined to make a

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beginning in the highest interest of the workers.17

This beginning provided for workers' participation in management "to the extent of 20 per cent at the factory level". In certain cases workers were to be allowed also to appoint an auditor to inspect accounts and records, but the management of the unit would pay for his services. By another change in labour laws, the role of works councils was enlarged to serve as a forum for discussion of collective disputes. If the discussion led to a deadlock, workers were given the right to call a strike at three days' notice, instead of 21 days' as in the past. But a built-in provision for an appeal to labour courts by either party might in effect mean that few strikes would take place. This appeared to be an attempt to shift the emphasis to State-organized adjudication.

The new policy also enlarged some fringe benefits. Employers were made responsible for providing free education up to the school-leaving stage for one child of each worker. (Subsequently, education was made free for all students up to class VIII, or two years before school-leaving, from October 1972, and fully from October 1974.) A promise was made to provide old-age pensions and compulsory group insurance, while the two per cent of wages contributed by workers towards medical benefits was waived.

These benefits were accompanied by a stern warning against "unruly and rowdy practices which have become the order of the day". The government, Bhutto said, had endured these patiently, hoping that the participants would themselves realize that the anarchist approach would not get them or the country anywhere. But since this had not happened,

17From the text of broadcast made on 10 February 1972, issued by Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan.
he had to make it clear that "the strength of the street will be met by the strength of the State." As he explained:

For long the people have tolerated this intolerable form of threat and thunder. It must stop. I say this as a friend and associate of those who have been innocently misled to indulge in one gherao after another. It is in their interest to put an end to this lawlessness. Scores have been settled. Pent-up energies have been released. So let everyone return to the path of normality. In future the full weight of law will be visited on such forms of illegal demonstration.

**LAND REFORM**

In the agrarian sector, Bhutto came forward with his proposals for land reform on 1 March in which he lowered the maximum limit on individual ownership of land from 500 to 150 irrigated acres, and from 1,000 to 300 non-irrigated acres. Land becoming surplus as a result would accrue to the State without any liability for payment of compensation to owners. The State would in turn distribute the surplus free of charge among the landless or those operating uneconomic holdings.

Bhutto, always his own loudest drum-beater, described the reforms as marking the beginning of "a new saga in the annals of Pakistan." His broadcast added:

This is no prank with history. It adds a golden chapter to its volume on liberty. The hour has struck and we must rejoice on hearing the shackles break. Not tomorrow because it is too late but Friday, the 3rd of March, shall be a public holiday to commemorate the infinite blessings of this day, the beauty and splendour of its promise.
This was Pakistan's second instalment of land reform, the first having been put through by Ayub Khan in January 1959 when ceilings on ownership were first prescribed. The net effect was that 2.22 million acres, less than two per cent of the total cultivated area, were surrendered by 6,000-odd landowners to the State but almost 60 per cent of this acreage fell in the uncultivated category. By June 1964, some 650,000 acres had been sold to tenants and small farmers, benefiting some 59,000 of them. At this time there were some 1.5 million farm holdings operated by tenants, and another 1.5 million small farms in West Pakistan of a size less than the accepted "subsistence" norm of 12.5 acres.

The reason for this sorry outcome was the exemption from the ceiling allowed for orchards up to 150 acres, and for shikargahs (hunting grounds) and livestock farms irrespective of size. That apart, an existing owner was entitled to gift a part of his estate—up to 50 per cent of the ceiling—to reduce his holdings, while every female dependant was entitled to retain up to one-sixth of the ceiling. Although some individuals did have to part with large acreages—the Punjab Governor, Nawab of Kalabagh, losing 22,000 acres,18 and Bhutto 11,000 acres19—there was no great hardship caused to the rural gentry. Indeed, this was only to be expected because Ayub Khan "could not afford to alienate his own army officers."20

Bhutto's reforms allow for no exemptions except for an additional area up to one-fifth of the ceiling for ownership of a tractor or a tubewell farm before 20 December 1971. Institutions like universities, but no others, are exempt from

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19From the transcript of a press conference in Rawalpindi on 4 March by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Bhutto's Minister for Political Affairs.
ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO

the ceiling. Bhutto considered making the family the basis for ceiling legislation, instead of the individual, but decided against it on the plea that "Islam sanctifies the right of the individual". He added: "As Muslims, we cannot conceive of a scheme repugnant to the tenets of Islam."

Since his land reforms came 15 months after the People's Party won the polls in Punjab and Sind, considerable redistribution of land within families must have taken place in the light of the electoral pledge to enforce a ceiling of 50 to 150 irrigated acres. The land reform law calls for the scrutiny of all land transferred after March 1967 "to determine the genuineness of the transaction", adding however that transfers in favour of heirs would be considered valid. There was no knowing, therefore, what would be the actual outcome of this round of reforms although statistics dating from 1964 indicated that there were 14,000 farms of 150 acres and above spread over 4.8 million acres.21

Some critics in Pakistan argued that the new ceilings were still too high. The underlying concept of tying the permissible holding with produce index units—these being a measure of the productivity of land—was judged to be irrational inasmuch as the grading of land was done as far back as 1947 in terms of farming practices which have since been overtaken by the green revolution. Land in Punjab has an average rating of 40 units, while the highest would be 120 units for the best land in a canal-irrigated district like Lyallpur. In Sind, the average drops to 25 units. With the ceiling set at first at 15,000 units, plus an allowance of an extra 3,000 units for investment on a tubewell or a tractor, the critics thought that very little land would become available for redistribution.

21Dr Ashfaq Hussain Qadri, writing in the Pakistan Economist of 22 April, cited one estimate that 5.5 million acres may become available for redistribution. In the light of the 1964 statistics, this is probably too high a figure.
tion, specially because of transfers made in anticipation of the reform. A correspondent writing in the 6 May issue of the Karachi weekly, *Outlook*, commented: "Responsible public leaders are on record as saying that in the Frontier even the biggest landlord is not at all affected." The adverse comments presumably prompted second thoughts, persuading Bhutto to lower on 23 April the upper limit to 14,000 units, inclusive of the allowance. This meant that the maximum permissible holding would now be 240 acres rather than 300 acres.

Along with the ceiling legislation, Bhutto decreed several changes in the landlord-tenant relationship to restrain eviction and prohibit *begar*, or free labour, required by landlords. It was laid down that landlords would henceforth be responsible for providing seed, while the cost of the remaining inputs would be shared equally. Likewise, liability for payment of water rates and other agricultural taxes was shifted from tenants to landlords throughout the country. Although it would take time to assess the actual impact of these changes, there was no doubt that Bhutto had gained a great deal of kudos for having at least made the effort to cut down to size the feudal elements in the countryside. His political rivals, Wali Khan's National Awami Party, for instance, tried to outflank Bhutto by adopting a more radical stance, but this cut little ice in view of the fact that the party was unmistakably on the side of the Pathan landlords of the NWFP in their battle against non-Pathan tenants.

One incidental step taken by Bhutto while formulating his land reform scheme deserves notice for the light it sheds on his relationship with the army. The civil servants, under both Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, undoubtedly abused their authority to grab new lands opened up by various irrigation barrages in Punjab and Sind. Anxious to high-
light his cleansing role, Bhutto announced, along with his land reforms package, that any land acquired by a government servant in excess of 100 acres, whether during his tenure in office or after retirement, would stand “confiscated to the State”. But he was quick to add: “This will not apply to the armed forces as in their case land was given to the defenders of the soil.” When a diplomat later asked him the reason for this preferential treatment, Bhutto is reported to have said without batting an eyelid: “I am afraid of them.”

It is also noteworthy that Bhutto has promised to reserve “substantial areas” for the defence forces out of the land declared surplus.

As part of his land reforms package, Bhutto promised an allocation of Rs 1,000 crores for agricultural and rural development “in the remaining period of the fourth plan.” Since the five-year plan, starting in 1970-71, was thrown totally out of gear by the events of 1971, it was difficult to judge what the target set by Bhutto implied in terms of stepping up of expenditure. As in the case of so many other economic goals, the fulfilment of this promise to the rural sector must depend largely on the quantum of aid Pakistan manages to obtain to put itself back on its feet. Acutely aware of this, Bhutto was trying, from the very start of his regime, to secure the resumption of aid suspended in the wake of the crisis in the eastern wing. He wanted not only the share that West Pakistan was getting in the total aid for the united country, but more.

**FOREIGN AID**

Late in January, discussions took place between Bhutto and a visiting World Bank mission headed by its President,

22As told by this diplomat to the author in Islamabad.
Robert McNamara, in which two issues came to the fore. The bank, speaking on behalf of the aid club as a whole, pressed for an early settlement with Bangladesh to make it possible to negotiate an apportionment of foreign debt liabilities of united Pakistan between the two. McNamara was later to travel to Dacca as well where he repeated the plea to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Secondly, the bank wanted a decision on the outstanding question of a more realistic value for the Pakistani rupee. Yahya Khan had decided on devaluation in principle in June 1970, and had promised to give effect to it in the following October. He stalled on this, but growing difficulties forced him to make a written commitment in February 1971 to the International Monetary Fund that he was ready to introduce a dual exchange rate of Rs 9.50 and Rs 11.00 per dollar. But before this could be finalized the uprising in the eastern wing changed the whole context.

Bhutto agreed to honour Yahya Khan’s commitment, but it took several weeks to settle the details of the assistance to be provided by donor countries to help Pakistan cushion the shock of devaluation. Donors needed in the first place to get Pakistan’s unilateral moratorium on debt service replaced by an agreed arrangement for rescheduling repayments. A meeting of the aid consortium was held on 1 March in Washington. This was a preliminary discussion, which was followed by the visit of a World Bank team to Pakistan to make an assessment of Pakistan’s immediate as well as long-term needs. It was reported to be asking for $350 million in new aid, plus the postponement of a substantial part of debt service. The view taken in Washington was that this

23This was confirmed by Mubashir Hasan, Finance Minister, in a broadcast he made on 11 May 1972 to announce the devaluation of the rupee.
was pitching its needs too high.

Another consortium meeting took place on 27 May in Paris, a fortnight after Bhutto's devaluation announcement, where agreement was reached on the rescheduling of $234 million, representing roughly half of the repayments of interest and principal due since the unilateral moratorium on 1 May 1971 to 30 June 1972. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund had agreed to extend a stand-by credit of $100 million, while the USA—anxious to resume aid as early as possible—had signed two agreements for the sale of wheat and edible oil to relieve immediate shortages.

Given the context of these negotiations with aid agencies, the fact that Pakistan was heading towards devaluation was known long before the decision was finally announced on 11 May, setting the par value at Rs 11 to the dollar. Predictably, the blame for the weakness of the rupee was put on the past regimes. As Mubashir Hasan said in his explanatory broadcast that night, "Like many other things in the country, the value of the rupee is false." He added: "We are determined to wipe out all vestiges of falsehood, and naturally this false value of the rupee takes a central position in the crusade."

Along with devaluation, Pakistan at last got rid of the bonus voucher system allowing exporters to retain a part of their foreign exchange earnings for sale on the free market. The scheme was introduced on the advice of a German expert, Vocke, in 1959 when Bhutto was Minister of Commerce in Ayub Khan's first martial law Cabinet. Over the years, the proportion of earnings allowed to be retained had been increased and the benefit gradually extended to all exports, traditional and non-traditional. At the other end, more and more imports were required to be made against foreign exchange retained by exporters in the shape of bonus
vouchers. This pushed up the premium on vouchers to about 200 per cent at the time of abolition.

The new rate of Rs 11 to the dollar would apply uniformly to all imports and exports, although Pakistan is trying to protect unit values by imposing selective export duties. The situation before devaluation was that Pakistan had seven different rates of exchange, ranging from Rs 4.8 to the dollar for essential consumer items like medicines and key raw materials or intermediates like petroleum and fertilizers. For imports made partly against foreign exchange provided by the government and partly against bonus vouchers, the rate worked out to Rs 9.12 at a bonus premium of 180 per cent. For imports wholly financed by vouchers, the rate came to Rs 13.44 on the export side. The realizations varied from Rs 5.60 to the dollar for primary commodities, Rs 7.81 for semi-manufactures and Rs 8.61 for manufactured products, corresponding to bonus entitlements of 10 to 35 per cent.

Exporters stand to gain from the new rate while consumers will have to pay more for some, and less for other, imported items or domestically made items with an import content. The government has, of course, tried to cushion the impact by reducing import duties to maintain unchanged the prices of essential commodities like sugar and kerosene, but there is bound to be a rise in the general price level in the long run. At the end of March 1972, the wholesale price index was already 17 per cent higher than a year ago—causing a good deal of hardship to people with fixed incomes.

More hardships, giving rise to strikes and other struggles to secure the neutralization of living costs, seem to be in prospect, especially if Bhutto finds himself compelled to resort to inflationary financing to balance the budget. If he chose to maintain the present level of defence spending,
it would account for 70 per cent or more of central expenditure. This compares with 54 per cent in the 1970-71 budget for united Pakistan with its greater revenue resources.

Bhutto has to find funds also for his new welfare schemes, among them free education and old-age benefits to industrial workers. The budgetary arithmetic is going to pose a very difficult problem indeed, even if Pakistan secures a substantial volume of foreign assistance from the consortium and from such friends as China, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

LONG-TERM PROSPECTS

But if Pakistan could cut its military spending to a more realistic level, commensurate with the reduction in its size and resources, it could build a viable economy with a potential for growth sufficient to meet the aspirations of its 57 million people. Mehboobul Haque, formerly Chief Economist in Pakistan's Planning Commission and now with the World Bank in Washington, has said that Pakistan—meaning what is left of the country—has the potential to achieve a growth rate of something like 10 per cent. This may be optimistic, considering that the level of growth achieved in favourable years in the past was no more than six per cent. Yet the fact remains that Pakistan is in many ways better off than its neighbours in south and south-east Asia, with a per capita income estimated at $131 against $110 for India and $100 for Indonesia. It has a population density of 73 per square kilometre, compared to 160 in India, 185 in Ceylon, and 492 in Bangladesh. The average cultivated acreage per farm family is 9.5 acres, higher than in other comparable countries. As much as 65 per cent of the cultivated acreage is irrigated through 10,000 miles of canals and some 88,000 tubewells. This explains the relatively low level of unemployment:
only eight per cent of the labour force was estimated to be jobless, compared to 33 per cent in Bangladesh.24

The new Pakistan, thanks to the concentration of industrial growth in the western wing, has a manufacturing sector which contributes 18.9 per cent of the gross domestic product, compared to 1.32 per cent in India, 15 per cent in Thailand, and 17.4 per cent in the Philippines. An analysis of the import bill shows that consumer goods account for about ten per cent of the total, evidence of the advance made by import substituting industries.

The balance of payments position would certainly be difficult, to begin with. In 1969-70, the adverse balance (after taking into account both imports from and exports to what is now Bangladesh) was Rs 91.7 crores. Since it will take time to find alternative outlets for the exports made to the eastern wing, the deficit would tend to widen. But the gap should narrow over the years because of the high rate of export growth to be expected on the basis of the western wing's past performance—an annual increase of 8.5 per cent a year over the ten years ended 1969-70.

Some success has already been achieved in selling abroad goods which went to the eastern wing, but it is realized that quality will have to be upgraded and costs lowered to make real headway. Since quite a number of import-substituting industries were set up without any thought for comparative international costs, it is likely that these will have to carry a burden of unutilized capacity for a long time until the rise in domestic demand takes up the slack. Alternatively, exports will have to be sustained through heavy subsidies.

Another problem arising from the break-up of the country is that the new Pakistan offers for the present too small a

24These figures are taken from Moin Baqai, *Economic Potential of West Pakistan*, a paper circulated by Press Information Department of Pakistan.
market for many capital and intermediate goods industries. This is the only area where there is still scope for import substitution. This accounts for the renewed interest in tying up with neighbours like Iran. Since 1964, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey have been members of a mutual assistance arrangement called RCD, or Regional Co-operation for Development. But RCD's achievements over the years warrant no great hopes. But it suits Bhutto to say that his country's focus has now shifted towards the uninterrupted belt of Muslim nations culminating on the shores of the Atlantic. Only the future can tell whether this new perspective will bring a better economic pay-off than RCD.

25From his inaugural address to the national assembly, 14 April 1972.
10. Climate for Negotiations

Bhutto’s past rhetoric against compromise solutions is his greatest handicap in negotiating for peace in the subcontinent. This makes it difficult for Indians to accept at face value his present plea for a *detente*, while in his own country he has a considerable problem in persuading public opinion to accept a settlement which must, in the nature of things, fall far short of the aims he earlier advocated. Mrs Gandhi has a problem with her people too; a decisive military victory has raised expectations that India can at last settle to its satisfaction all disputes with Pakistan.

Both leaders have tried to guide public opinion towards greater realism. Although some success has, no doubt, been achieved, popular attitudes have so hardened over years of political confrontation that it is impossible to damp down mutual hostility in the short run. This is evident from the stand of revanchists like Sarfaraz Khan of the Pakistan Democratic Party; he argues that Hindu India is out to settle scores with Pakistan. It is, he says, India’s great ambition to strike at the heartland of Islam; it will want, therefore, to devour a part of West Pakistan to be able to
exert direct pressure on Islam’s bastions in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{1} India also has its quota of hawks. Madhu Limaye of the Socialist Party takes the view that New Delhi should have continued the war until the military might of Pakistan was smashed, and Pakhtoonistan, Baluchistan, and Sind liberated.\textsuperscript{2}

These strong sentiments should not be lightly dismissed merely because the persons voicing them carry no political weight in their respective countries. Underlying them is a mutual distrust and suspicion which is widely shared. Bhutto himself is on record as saying: “India’s principal objective is the obliteration of Pakistan.” He added: “It is clear that Indian leaders have come to tolerate Pakistan because they do not have the power to destroy her. If they could forge this power, as they are endeavouring to do by the augmentation of their military forces, they would end partition and reabsorb Pakistan into the India of their dreams.”\textsuperscript{3}

There are equally serious misgivings about Pakistan’s intentions on the Indian side. As Swaran Singh, Foreign Minister, told Parliament on 20 July 1971: “The hostility Pakistan has always entertained for India is the result of the basis upon which India was partitioned. And subsequently Pakistan was fed by several outside powers in the belief that it was in Pakistan’s interest to continue the policy of confrontation. We have therefore to frame our attitude and policy knowing this background.”

**PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS**

It is in this context that current perceptions in the two

\textsuperscript{1}From a series of articles in *Mashriq*, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{2}From a speech in Bombay, reported in the *Times of India*, 13 December 1971.

countries should be assessed. To consider Pakistan first, Bhutto has said that when he assumed the responsibility of government and viewed the debris, he resolved in his mind that "the only sane course to follow was to seek an accommodation with India on the basis of a just and honourable settlement." But he has evidently very considerable reservations about Indian intentions. He has told two western journalists that India "is giddily threatening new aggression", and that New Delhi's aims in the last war included the break-up of West Pakistan.

At Lahore, the nerve centre of Pakistan's political life, he went through the motions of obtaining approval to his plea for peace with India from the 400,000 people assembled to hear him. But in the same speech, he promised: "A strong Pakistan will emerge. Our nation has not been defeated. I shall not forget the words of Tipu Sultan that one day of a lion's existence is worth hundred of a jackal." This is just one example out of many which brings out the contradictions in Bhutto's stance. There is no doubt that his ambivalence gives sustenance to revanchist arguments in the press as well as from public platforms. For instance, H. K. Burki, diplomatic correspondent of the Pakistan Times, warns his readers: "If we want peace and security, we had better be prepared for war—a bloody, long, all-out war which we shall have to fight by ourselves."

But the interesting change in Pakistan is that at least some voices are being raised in favour of a detente. Mazhar Ali Khan, Dawn's new editor, pleaded in a signed article for

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4Address to national assembly, 14 April 1972.
5International Herald Tribune, 14 February 1972; interview with the BBC, 18 February 1972.
6From the text issued by Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan.
7From the column headed: "Give us Guns, Free the Army," 14 January 1972.
normalization of relations with India so that "the grim past can be forgotten and we can learn to live together on the basis of mutual help and trust." M. B. Naqvi in his column in *Dawn* counselled the government to give up its militaristic stance vis-a-vis India. "Our undoubted differences with India shall have to be tackled vigorously. Only the means must be peaceful. It is no use being blinded by passion." Yet another columnist, S. R. Ghauri, argued that even if the idea of confederation was unacceptable, India and Pakistan could co-operate in the economic and political fields.

*Outlook* (Karachi), commenting editorially on 6 May, said that Pakistan can no longer afford a policy of confrontation. It added:

> A normalisation of relations with India and a recognition of the realities of the situation in Bangladesh is to be welcomed *per se*. Mr Bhutto's efforts in this direction should be supported without reservation provided, as he put it, the *detente* stops short of a humiliating imposition.

Political leaders, mostly those belonging to the National Awami Party, have also spoken in favour of peace and *detente*. But they have predictably asked India to take the initiative because victory, they say, puts it in a position to set the pace. Wali Khan, arguing that India has a significant role to play in the subcontinent, suggests that it should make a magnanimous and generous contribution towards peace. In his view, Pakistan stands defeated and humiliated; it cannot afford another war. Mahmoodul Haq Usmani, NAP's general secretary, has urged India as the victor to take

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8Excerpts reproduced in *the Times of India*, 15 March 1972.
9Ibid., 6 February 1972.
10Ibid., 12 February 1972.
unilateral action again (as in the case of the cease-fire) to re­duce tensions in the subcontinent. Another NAP leader, Ghaus Baksh Bizengo, now Governor of Baluchistan, takes the view that India and Pakistan should change their antagonistic attitude towards each other and settle problems by peaceful means.

Even the idea of a confederation of the countries of the subcontinent is no longer taboo, although Pakistani opinion in the past often saw this as a sinister design to undo partition. Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti, NAP leader from Baluchistan, has said that Pakistan can save itself from the danger of disintegration by taking the bitter pill of confed­eration. Bhutto is, of course, totally opposed to the idea; he argues that “the very mention of it puts the backs up of lots of people in Pakistan.” But he is prepared to “let the factors of geography and history assert themselves in the natural course of things. Let us start modestly. Let us do our bit and the future leaders can build on it.”

He had earlier said that if Pakistan wanted a confederation, the obvious move for it would be to seek this with India, for it was once a part of India.

The concept of Pakistan and India entering into a pact to outlaw the use of force in the settlement of disputes has always been opposed in Pakistan. This was one reason for the hostility to the Tashkent declaration of 1966 which incorporated the concept in general terms. In today’s situation, it is no more acceptable than in the past, but it is discussed all the same in recognition perhaps of Pakistan’s increased vulnerability. Outlook, for instance, has said:

12 In an interview with the author and another Indian journalist, the Times of India, 16 March 1972.
13 UPI report in the Times of India, 14 January 1972.
Now, it is possible to argue that a no-war pact is what this situation really needs. In a way, this is what the much maligned Tashkent declaration provided. Obviously in seeking a new no-war pact, India is seeking guarantees of a more specific nature. Do they involve a limitation on the size and composition of our armed forces?\textsuperscript{14}

Bhutto does not agree. He has rejected quite categorically the idea of a no-war pact. In an interview with Kuldip Nayar, Resident Editor, the \textit{Statesman} (New Delhi), Bhutto said: “In Pakistan, a no-war pact means surrender.”\textsuperscript{15} His Foreign Office subsequently clarified his position to mean that a pact could be considered if it contained a clause providing for the arbitration of disputes which remained unresolved in bilateral negotiations.

The future size of armed forces is a subject now being debated in Pakistan in the context of a \textit{detente}. \textit{Dawn} has expressed the view that a large army was maintained in the past not merely for defence but as the political wing of a regime manned by a self-appointed marshal or general. “The unhappy chapter in the history of our land must be brought to an end.”

But Bhutto has no intention of alienating the armed forces by committing himself to a reduction in their size. He takes the public position: “We are not going to disarm. We have too many problems.” This means that Indian suggestions for a mutual reduction of the forces facing each other are not acceptable.

\textsuperscript{14}Editorial, 6 May 1972.
\textsuperscript{15}The \textit{Statesman}, New Delhi, 26 March 1972.
On the basic issue of Kashmir, Bhutto’s position is difficult to pin down because he has made several different formulations. In his inaugural address to the national assembly on 14 April, while discussing prospective negotiations with India, he said:

We are prepared to resolve all our bilateral differences. But we cannot bargain state principles for human flesh. The right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir has not been bestowed on them either by India or Pakistan. It is their inherent right which no one can take away from them.

At his public meeting in Lahore, referred to earlier, he said: “We have fought three wars on Kashmir. We cannot forget the Kashmir dispute. Even if we forget the Kashmir dispute the people of Kashmir will not forget it.” It is noteworthy, however, that the references on both occasions were brief and cursory: Kashmir was mentioned only once in the 15,000-word inaugural address or the hour-long public speech. As Bhutto has said, he is not dwelling on Kashmir in his public pronouncements since taking over as President—“not in the way I did before.”

In defining his present position on Kashmir, he has told this author and other Indian journalists that he would like to proceed step by step, because any attempt to solve the problem at a go might “blow up in our faces” as Tashkent did. The two countries could agree to a broad framework to define the long-term perspective, but it will have to be left to him to determine the pace and the modalities because he claims he has “to do the selling”. But it is clear from what he
told Kuldip Nayar that he is not prepared for any immediate change in the pre-war status quo:

What I say now is that you maintain your position and we maintain ours. You maintain your position that Kashmir is an integral part of India. Between these two positions, there is enough room to defuse that problem and lower the tension. We can make the cease-fire line a line of peace. Let the people of Kashmir move between the two countries freely. One thing can lead to another. Why should it be ordained on me or Mrs Gandhi that we resolve everything today? We should set things in motion, in the right direction. Others can pick up from there. We cannot clear the decks in one sweep. There can be no grand sweep in the subcontinent.¹⁶

He told the BBC in an interview he gave on 18 February, which was subsequently published in full in Pakistan, that Kashmir still remained a basic dispute but it would have to be settled by consultations and negotiations, not by confrontation. In this interview, he made the interesting formulation that the opportunity to change the status quo in Kashmir having been missed by previous rulers, Pakistan had come to the position where “we finally suffer”. His argument ran:

In 1962 during the Sino-Indian conflict when India had vacated most of her forces from Kashmir, our army could have walked in. This was an opportunity. In 1965, if the war had continued there would have been a better settlement. So I cannot be held responsible if the other governments missed the opportunities. I was only able to

¹⁶The Statesman, New Delhi, 26 March 1972.
tell them that if you do not take [the opportunity], you will finally suffer, and we have come to that position where we finally suffer.

Even more interesting is his current formulation that it is up to the Kashmiris themselves to fight for the right of self-determination if they want a different future. As he said to this author:

The struggle for self-determination cannot be inspired from outside. Like revolution it cannot be exported. It has to be an indigenous struggle. If the people of Kashmir believe that they have been deprived of the right of self-determination, they will rise. Their struggle will be basically theirs. Outside support cannot solve their problems.

This is a far cry from what he was saying in office as Foreign Minister, and afterwards as an Opposition leader. In an election-eve broadcast in October 1970, he promised that he would reactivate foreign policy to give "effective support" to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. He also pledged his party to a "drive" for their "liberation"; he was confident that a strong and vigorous Pakistan would be able to gather "sufficient internal and external strength" to redeem its pledge to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Earlier, he had argued in *The Myth of Independence*:

If a Muslim majority area can remain a part of India, then the *raison d'etre* of Pakistan collapses. . . . Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically. Recovering them, she would recover her head and be made whole, stronger, and more viable. It would be fatal if, in sheer exhaustion or out of intimidation-
tion, Pakistan were to abandon the struggle, and a bad compromise would be tantamount to abandonment, which might, in turn, lead to the collapse of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{17}

The book, written in a period when Soviet and American diplomacy had converged in seeking to reconcile India-Pakistan differences, reflected Bhutto's anxiety that Ayub Khan might be prevailed upon to accept a compromise solution. Warning against this he wrote:

If the worst were to come to the worst, what would be the consequences of Pakistan abandoning Jammu and Kashmir? It is clear that a compromise of this nature would whet but not satisfy India's appetite and, with her growing military power and possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, she would use these territories as a rallying point to integrate the remaining parts of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{18}

In 1963, soon after Bhutto concluded his six rounds of talks with Swaran Singh on Kashmir, he explicitly rejected in a public address the idea of a settlement dividing Kashmir along the 1948 cease-fire line. He took the view that a political settlement of this nature, together with the no-war pact India was insisting upon as part of a package deal, would only cover up India's aggression in Kashmir and denial to its people of the right of self-determination.\textsuperscript{19}

Just as Bhutto is hamstrung by his past declarations, other political figures in Pakistan find it difficult to abandon the positions they took as recently as in the 1970 election. In their manifestoes all of them—not excluding Mujibur Rahman—

\textsuperscript{17}Bhutto, n. 3, p. 180.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 177.
\textsuperscript{19}Reproduced in Z. A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, Karachi, 1966.
reiterated their commitment to self-determination for Kashmir and a settlement in accord with the UN resolution. Some parties like Qayyum Khan’s Pakistan Muslim League went, in fact, a good deal further and hinted at annexation by force. In the present situation, the tone has somewhat softened but the right-wing parties are still raising the Kashmir issue more insistently than others in a bid to embarrass Bhutto.²⁰

At the other end of the spectrum, the NAP leader Bizengo has said that he does not regard Kashmir as a basic problem. More fundamental in his view is the hatred the two countries have developed since partition. But even he quickly added in this interview given to an Indian correspondent that the right of self-determination must be respected so that the Kashmiri people can decide whether they want independence or a merger with India or Pakistan.²¹

The Pakistani intelligentsia accepts, like Bizengo, that the 24-year-old plea for self-determination cannot be lightly set aside. In a perceptive article in Outlook, Khurshid Hyder has interpreted Bhutto’s declaration that Kashmiris must fight their own battles to mean that a “military disengagement” in Kashmir may now be possible. But she added:

This is the maximum any government in Pakistan can concede in the given circumstances. Pakistan cannot agree to the conversion of the cease-fire line into an international frontier or, alternatively, negotiate a final settlement on Kashmir with India. The question of Kashmir is not a bilateral Indo-Pak problem. Nor can the UN involvement be ignored or wished away. Some modus vivendi can be agreed to for the present, which may later become

²⁰For instance, the National Working Committee of the Pakistan Democratic Party reminded Bhutto on 28 May that he has to seek a solution of the Kashmir issue in the light of the Security Council resolution.
²¹Interview with B. K. Tiwari, the Indian Express, 24 March 1972.
the basis of a definitive settlement. Something along the lines of the Soviet-German treaty may be tacitly agreed to. If India tries to impose more than that, it may prove a transient gain.

The reference to the Soviet-German treaty implies that Pakistan will not formally concede New Delhi’s sovereignty over the part of Kashmir under Indian control but it may be persuaded to subscribe to a declaration agreeing not to use force to alter the status quo.

PRISONERS OF WAR

On the issues arising from the last war, the release of 91,498 POWs is undoubtedly the most important to Pakistan. But the spate of demonstrations by relatives which greeted Bhutto as he went round the country after taking over as President have died down. There is little doubt that these were master-minded by his political opponents. His threat to quit unless the agitation stopped has undoubtedly had some effect. But more telling has been the message put across in numerous newspaper editorials and columns that the agitation was weakening Pakistan’s bargaining position. As the Pakistan Times said on 10 February: “Those who are pressing the present regime to secure instant repatriation of POWs and civilians should not shut their eyes to the vital issues at stake. No patriotic Pakistani would want Mr. Bhutto to go cap in hand to New Delhi to secure the release of prisoners.”

There is some reason to doubt whether Bhutto really wants the POWs back in a hurry. First, he seems to be convinced

22There are 56,998 military prisoners, 18,287 para-military prisoners, and 16,213 civilians including 4,616 policemen. This makes up a total of 91,498 as mentioned in the 1971-72 annual report of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
that they are a diminishing asset for India, and he can therefore afford to wait. If repatriation does not take place, he expects “everyone” to jump in—the UN, ICRC, and even the USSR—to bring pressure on India. Secondly, there are signs that he may be planning to demobilize the prisoners in India, the equivalent of four and a half divisions. This is probably the explanation for the raising of two new divisions now under way. One reason for this switch may be disquiet about alleged indoctrination by India. Bhutto has brought this up himself, while Nur Khan, former air chief, has publicly called for the screening of the prisoners prior to their return to active service. Another reason may be that Bhutto is aiming at a smaller but better equipped army to cut down expenditure without a proportionate loss of strength.

**Bangladesh**

Although Pakistan formally takes the line that Bangladesh has no *locus standi* with regard to the POWs, there is growing realization that the problem cannot be settled without Dacca’s concurrence. The Pakistan Foreign Office has itself said that the return of 400,000 East Bengali residents in Pakistan will be “part of a process” by which other issues are sorted out between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Although it is obvious that this process will have to include recognition of the new State, the official posture on this is still non-committal. There is, however, a considerable body of public opinion in favour of immediate recognition. Asghar Khan, speaking on behalf of his Tehrik-e-Ishtiqal, made the demand as early as 11 January. Wali Khan has argued that Bhutto’s assumption of the presidency implies tacit acceptance of Bangladesh as a reality because the popular mandate he claims was given to him only by the western wing. Mahmoodul Haq Usmani,
Secretary-General of NAP, has taken the matter further with a specific plea for "normalization" of relations with Bangladesh. Typical of many newspaper comments on the subject is that of Syed Najiullah, a Dawn columnist. He wrote:

Pakistan is going to recognise Bangladesh sooner or later—perhaps sooner than many of us can imagine. We should not go about thinking that by denying them our friendship and co-operation we will force them into the Bay of Bengal. Let us not be too emotional about the Pakistan which is no more. Let us try to accept the realities with tears of blood, if necessary.

But it is clear from what Bhutto has been saying that he wants two issues to be settled to his satisfaction before he recognizes Bangladesh. The first is the future of the 1.5 million Biharis in the east. As he has said, he would be prepared to take back the same number of Biharis as the Bengalis who go back. But he is opposed to a total exchange of population. As he put it: "If we are suddenly saddled with a million more Biharis, there will be wreckage taking us back to the nightmare of partition: slums, shanty towns, men sleeping in the streets... cholera, smallpox, unemployment."

The second issue on which he wants to press Dacca for accommodation is the trial of war criminals. The decision to put 1,500 men in the dock has generated a great deal of heat in Pakistan, with Bhutto setting the tone by his declaration that he would not be a party to the humiliation of the Pakistan army. According to him, this is India's real motivation for facilitating the trial.

of POWs by Bangladesh. But Bhutto was earlier talking in somewhat different terms. Admitting that excesses had been committed, he said he was prepared to take action against those who had acted beyond their lawful authority. He told Newsweek in an interview that "if Mujib wants to try some of the people who went berserk, we are prepared to oblige." But in talking to audiences at home—at his press conference on 25 March for instance—he said that if New Delhi or Dacca insisted on the trials "the point of no return will be reached and that will be the end of the line". But he indicated shortly thereafter that he had "to say something" in deference to public sentiment, and hoped that it would not queer the pitch for his talks with India. But notwithstanding the public sentiment Bhutto was deferring to, Dawn has said in an editorial that large-scale killing of unarmed civilians, rape and loot, murder and blackmail are crimes under any law. "When the individuals arraigned are proven guilty by an impartial tribunal, they must be suitably punished."

ATTITUDES IN INDIA

To turn now to Indian perceptions regarding the problems of peace-making, the first point to note is the disinclination to deal with them piecemeal. The preference is unmistakably for an overall settlement, covering both the long-standing disputes as well as those arising out of the last war. One reason for this is a general wariness about Pakistan's intentions. This was reflected in Mrs Gandhi's comment to the Times of Ceylon: "There is no room for sentiment in our appraisal of Pakistan's relations with us."24

The Government's stand has the backing of all parties. The Jana Sangh has, in fact, urged that there should be no

24Reproduced in the Hindustan Times, 1 April 1972.
return to the pre-war status quo unless all outstanding issues, including the compensation claimed for properties left behind at the time of partition in either country, are brought within the ambit of this overall settlement. This implies that nothing short of complete and total satisfaction of all Indian grievances against Pakistan would satisfy the party. Other parties do not subscribe to this extreme position. The Communist Party of India and the Communist Party (Marxist) have described the Jana Sangh stand as chauvinistic and bellicose. But both communist groups want a final settlement so that enduring peace can be established in the subcontinent.

Reactions to Cease-fire

It is noteworthy that all parties, barring the Jana Sangh, had welcomed the government’s initiative in offering a unilateral cease-fire to bring the war to an end. Explaining the Jana Sangh’s view that the decision to terminate the hostilities was premature and hasty, Atal Behari Vajpayee told the Lok Sabha on 29 March that he suspected the government was compelled to take this step at the instance of the Soviet Union. This incidentally lent support to the theory put forward by President Nixon that he prevailed upon Moscow to use its influence with New Delhi for an early cease-fire.

It has been claimed that the Organization Congress, the splinter group now in opposition, and the Socialist Party also had reservations about the cease-fire. But this is not borne out by facts; Kamaraj, the tallest among Organization Congress leaders, welcomed the cease-fire in a statement from Madras on 17 December, while N. G. Goray, Socialist Party

25Resolution of the Jana Sangh General Council, the Times of India, 8 May 1972.
leader, explained in the Rajya Sabha on 18 December that his party had only suggested that the implementation of the cease-fire order should wait until Pakistan’s concurrence had been secured.

Newspaper comments on the cease-fire were almost unanimous in welcoming the initiative. The Hindustan Times complimented Mrs Gandhi on her high statesmanship, taking the line that India fought the war for justice in the east and not a victory in the west. The Indian Express raised, however, only “two cheers”; it was worried that Yahya Khan’s acceptance might be only a ploy to gain time to get more hardware from China and the USA. But despite these nagging doubts, it is clear that jingoism had little support in the country even at a time when the guns had been barely silenced.

In discussing the approach to be adopted in negotiations, one section of opinion takes the line that Bhutto is India’s best bet. The Socialist Party’s mouthpiece, Janata, said in an editorial that it would be better to talk to Bhutto than to push him into a corner “leading to his replacement by a less mercurial but more hawkish leader.” It warned that if Bhutto was dislodged, General Tikka Khan was most likely to succeed him “who in his arrogance, will not hesitate to wage a war with India even if it means the ruination of Pakistan.”

Frank Moraes in a signed editorial in the Indian Express thought that Bhutto’s interviews with Indian newsmen indicated that he was emerging “as a more chastened and more sober-minded politician than he was in the old UN days”. Moraes suggested that India would lose nothing by taking Bhutto at his word. But M. C. Chagla, a former Foreign Minister, warned against taking Bhutto on trust, arguing that India should not part with prisoners of war before a durable

26Excerpts from the editorial in the Times of India, 7 April 1972.
peace was in sight. As he put it: "Bhutto is utterly unpredictable and utterly unreliable. I have known him well."27

Avoiding these two extreme positions, the Times of India argued that India has a stake in a stable and democratic Pakistan. It saw some merit in Bhutto’s contention that unless India was generous he might be in trouble with his own army. But the paper added that it would be unrealistic for Bhutto to expect New Delhi to release the prisoners without a peace settlement or ignore the wishes and susceptibilities of Bangladesh in this matter.28

BOUNDARY IN KASHMIR

Of the issues to be resolved with Pakistan, the question of Kashmir predictably commands the greatest attention. The official position has not been defined too precisely, presumably to avoid showing the hand before negotiations get under way. Swaran Singh had told the Security Council on 21 December, immediately after the end of the war, that India would insist on some adjustments to the cease-fire line in Kashmir “to make it more stable, rational and viable”. This was, he said, a matter for discussion between India and Pakistan. Mrs Gandhi endorsed the demand at a press conference on 31 December; she reiterated that it would be necessary to have some readjustments of the cease-fire line.

India is thus taking a position which runs counter to the Security Council resolution of 21 December demanding the return to positions “which fully respect the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir supervised by the UN military observation group in India and Pakistan”. This resolution was

27From a speech to Rotary Club, Bombay, reported in the Times of India, 12 May 1972.
adopted with only two members, the Soviet Union and Poland, abstaining, while all the 13 others voted for it. But the line-up does not greatly bother India because it has obviously decided to treat UN involvement in Kashmir as a closed chapter.

India’s current stand is that the cease-fire line drawn under the Karachi Agreement of 1949 no longer exists and the “United Nations group, which was supervising the line, has no locus standi in this matter any more.” This is what V. C. Shukla, Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence, told the Rajya Sabha on 9 May, while informing the House of India’s refusal to hold flag meetings on truce violations “in the presence of United Nations observers”.

The idea of adjustments to the cease-fire line was subsequently elaborated by Jagjivan Ram, Minister for Defence, to mean that it should be converted into an international frontier separating India and Pakistan. But since official spokesmen have not reiterated this formulation, it is safe to assume that the Defence Minister was flying a kite to test international and Pakistani reactions.

The Jana Sangh, in conformity with its general attitude to India-Pakistan relations, has declared that it would oppose withdrawal of troops from posts in Kargil and elsewhere in Pakistan-held Kashmir because these are as much in Indian territory, as defined in the Constitution, as any other. The party has, in fact, suggested that India should “retain” the territories taken over in Sind and Punjab in exchange for the Pakistan-held part of Kashmir. This stand in respect of captured territories follows from the Jana Sangh argument that it should be India’s aim to take over the whole of Kash-

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30 Press conference by A.B. Vajpayee, the *Times of India*, 29 December 1971.
mir. The party is opposed, therefore, to conversion of the cease-fire line into an international border. It would regard any such move as “an abject surrender and betrayal of India’s interest and Constitution”.31

The Swatantra Party, while sympathizing with the Jana Sangh position, does not want to go quite that far. Its spokesman in Parliament, P. K. Deo, has said that since Pakistan-held Kashmir is *de jure* a part of India, he is not in favour of giving up the fruits of conquest.32 However, the party has never made the demand that India should seek to incorporate the whole of Kashmir.

The position taken by Morarji Desai, Organization Congress leader, is similar to that of the Swatantra; he too wants India to retain possession of areas captured in Kashmir. But in the larger context, his party has come out unequivocally in favour of friendly relations with Pakistan; it does not want temporary misunderstandings or minor clashes of interest to perpetuate hostility.33

The CPI’s position, as defined by the National Executive Committee on 6 January, proposes a settlement in Kashmir along the 1948 cease-fire line “with necessary adjustments”. The CPM politburo took the stand that the war was fought for the liberation of Bangladesh and any territorial ambitions in the west were unacceptable to the party. It urged the government not to give in to the plea made by the Jana Sangh against withdrawal from occupied areas, warning that anything of this kind would lead to perpetual embitterment and hostility.34

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31From resolution adopted by the General Council of the party, n. 25.
32From a speech made in Parliament’s Central Hall on 18 December 1971.
33Resolution of the Working Committee, the *Hindustan Times*, 12 January 1972.
On the question of prisoners of war, Mrs Gandhi has specifically said that it is not possible to delink them from “other issues” arising out of the war for which the two countries have to find negotiated solutions. The government has also made it clear that it regards Bangladesh as an interested party in this matter because the surrender of troops in the east was made to the joint India-Bangladesh command. Most parties—from the CPI at one end to the Jana Sangh at the other—have specifically said that they would oppose any attempt to bypass Bangladesh. They also endorse the right of Bangladesh to try those guilty of war crimes. The government’s own view is no different; Mrs Gandhi told a Hungarian correspondent on 22 April that the POWs could not claim exemption from the due processes of law if they had committed a crime. In the same interview, Mrs Gandhi explained that there would be no difficulty in returning the prisoners to a friendly and peaceful Pakistan, implying that their release would have to form part of an overall settlement. This was probably why she specifically warned the correspondent that it would be wrong to expect “instant solutions”. But to avoid any misunderstanding regarding New Delhi’s approach, she has on several occasions underlined India’s stake in Pakistan’s stability.

But instant solutions is what Bhutto wants in the matter of POWs and the areas occupied by Indian forces in Sind, Punjab, and Kashmir, holding over until an indeterminate future date the resolution of the basic disputes. There is thus a wide gap between the Indian and Pakistani approaches. But

35Talking to newsmen on return from Dacca, the Hindustan Times, 20 March 1972.
36The Statesman, New Delhi, 7 March 1972; the Hindustan Standard, 12 April 1972.
India could still be persuaded to do its bit towards narrowing the gap if it was convinced that Bhutto genuinely wants to turn away from past policies of confrontation. There is a clear indication already that India has lowered its sights regarding the terms of settlement. The plea made at a meeting of the AICC, the ruling party’s national council, to incorporate the demand for a no-war pact in the resolution covering India-Pakistan relations was turned down by the leadership. The speech made on this occasion by the Foreign Minister suggested that a declaration promising non-interference in internal affairs may be acceptable in place of a pact.

Pakistan’s anxiety to secure military hardware in a hurry has been taken in India as an indication that Bhutto may yet return to his former posture of intransigence if he can mobilize the international support, political as well as military, that he needs. With this development in mind Mrs Gandhi has specifically mentioned her fear that foreign influences at work in Pakistan are a factor prejudicing the attempts for a detente. This is probably why she has asked Bhutto to demonstrate “beyond doubt” that he is genuinely interested in peace. But this has only irked him to make the riposte: “Does she want a demonstration of good faith in neon signs?”

Bhutto has made a good debating point, but the fact remains that Pakistan stands committed to changing the territorial status quo in Kashmir. While it may not be possible to disown the commitment immediately, ways can certainly be found to get round it to offer credible assurances that force will not be employed to settle arguments. It is not merely Bhutto’s intentions that need to be taken into account in this context but also those of his friends. It can be argued that they have a vested interest in keeping
India and Pakistan at loggerheads in pursuit of their global search for checks and balances. For a man of vaulting ambitions like him, there is bound to be a strong personal predeliction in favour of a role which gives him and his country a feeling of added importance in the international arena.
### APPENDIX

#### Economic Profile of New Pakistan

**POPULATION**


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<td><strong>42880</strong></td>
<td><strong>57198</strong></td>
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<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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**SOURCE:** U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad.
### NATIONAL INCOME

**Gross National Product Estimated (with Unallowable Portions) at Constant FY 1960 Factor Cost, FY 1960-70**

*(Rupees Million)*

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(r) = revised.  
(p) = provisional.

**SOURCE:** U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad.
AGRICULTURE

ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS, FY 1956-71

('000 Acres and '000 Tons)

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<td>2697</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>2369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>21250</td>
<td>1245</td>
<td>18420</td>
<td>1309</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>4032</td>
<td>2610</td>
<td>4413</td>
<td>2912</td>
<td>4313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapeseed and Mustard</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>1093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = acreage, P = production.

## INDUSTRY

### INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION—SELECTED PRODUCTS, FY 1960-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar ('000 tons)</td>
<td>313.1</td>
<td>267.9</td>
<td>404.7</td>
<td>551.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vegetable Ghee and Products ('000 tons)</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>121.5</td>
<td>129.2</td>
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<td>Cigarettes (millions)</td>
<td>18912</td>
<td>20023</td>
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<td>23089</td>
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<td>Cotton Yarn (million lbs)</td>
<td>456.3</td>
<td>495.1</td>
<td>526.5</td>
<td>602.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton Fabrics (million square yards)</td>
<td>683.6</td>
<td>714.8</td>
<td>710.2</td>
<td>725.4</td>
<td>787.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art Silk and Rayon Cloth (million square yards)</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>73.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paper Board ('00 tons)</td>
<td>261.4</td>
<td>246.2</td>
<td>342.3</td>
<td>373.0</td>
<td>395.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cycle Tyres and Tubes (millions)</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Tyres and Tubes ('000)</td>
<td>131.4</td>
<td>186.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>226.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sulphuric Acid (*) ('000 Tons)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paints and Varnishes ('000 Imp. Gals)</td>
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<td>1325.9</td>
<td>1509.3</td>
<td>1449.3</td>
<td>1664.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soda Ash (*) ('000 tons)</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches (million gross boxes)</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement ('000 tons)</td>
<td>193.4</td>
<td>2128</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>2565</td>
<td>261.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mild Steel ('000 tons)</td>
<td>193.6</td>
<td>176.0</td>
<td>223.8</td>
<td>172.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cycles ('000)</td>
<td>137.6</td>
<td>155.4</td>
<td>169.8</td>
<td>161.3</td>
<td>159.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electric Fans ('000)</td>
<td>208.9</td>
<td>210.8</td>
<td>168.3</td>
<td>161.6</td>
<td>206.1</td>
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</table>

(p) = provisional.

(*) = data for 1962 calendar year basis.

**SOURCE:** U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad.
## FOREIGN TRADE

### FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF VISIBLE TRADE, FYs 1961-71

(Rupees Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rest-of-World Exports</th>
<th>East Bengal Exports</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
<th>Rest-of-World Imports</th>
<th>East Bengal Imports</th>
<th>Total Imports</th>
<th>Balance of Trade</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
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<td>1304.6</td>
<td>2703.3</td>
<td>3625.7</td>
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<td>1967-68</td>
<td>1880.7</td>
<td>1216.6</td>
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<td>1968-69</td>
<td>1805.6</td>
<td>1342.4</td>
<td>3215.1</td>
<td>3046.6</td>
<td>871.2</td>
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<td>1969-70</td>
<td>1681.7</td>
<td>1651.5</td>
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<td>923.4</td>
<td>51.0</td>
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<td>1970-71</td>
<td>2115.2</td>
<td>1373.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3488.4</td>
<td>3602.4</td>
<td>803.8</td>
<td>4406.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes re-exports, both to rest-of-world and to East Bengal.

2 Values estimated from quantities shown in lbs.

3 Includes negligible foreign-originated goods (highest amount Rs 16.8 million in FY 67).

### IMPORTS

**IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES AND COMMODITY GROUPS, FYs 1961-71**

(Rupees Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>FY 67</th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
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<td>Wheat</td>
<td>472.2</td>
<td>489.7</td>
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<td>50.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
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<td>Betel nut</td>
<td>14.0</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>283.9</td>
<td>228.9</td>
<td>257.8</td>
<td>225.4</td>
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<td>Spices</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>39.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wood Lumber and Cork</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>50.6</td>
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<td>Petroleum and Petroleum Products</td>
<td>165.6</td>
<td>231.1</td>
<td>239.6</td>
<td>208.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed Vegetable Oils Soft</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>131.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drugs and Medicines</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Fertilizers Manufactured</td>
<td>135.8</td>
<td>123.1</td>
<td>131.1</td>
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<td>117.6</td>
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<td>Matches</td>
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<td>31.7</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and Paper Board</td>
<td>115.3</td>
<td>116.8</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>122.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jute Manufactures</td>
<td>137.7</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>158.3</td>
<td>159.2</td>
<td>121.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel</td>
<td>358.1</td>
<td>221.5</td>
<td>336.1</td>
<td>304.6</td>
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<td>Manufactures of Metal</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>111.3</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>159.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Agricultural Machinery</td>
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<td>80.4</td>
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<td>95.7</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Construction and Industrial Machinery</td>
<td>546.9</td>
<td>497.5</td>
<td>469.6</td>
<td>526.8</td>
<td>510.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Machinery and Appliances</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>206.3</td>
<td>218.4</td>
<td>218.8</td>
<td>259.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Vehicles</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>118.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road Motor Vehicles</td>
<td>214.2</td>
<td>156.3</td>
<td>152.2</td>
<td>157.1</td>
<td>193.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, Ships and Boats</td>
<td>115.7</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>143.5</td>
<td>167.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
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<td>1122.1</td>
<td>1233.0</td>
<td>1273.8</td>
<td>1273.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4395.6</td>
<td>4164.9</td>
<td>3981.2</td>
<td>4259.5</td>
<td>4406.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes imports from East Bengal (both by sea and air) and imports from the rest of the world. Values of air-borne imports from East Bengal were estimated from quantities shown in lbs.

**SOURCE:** U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fish and Fish Preparations</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
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<td>238.8</td>
<td>253.0</td>
<td>369.2</td>
<td>405.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>121.5</td>
<td>135.1</td>
<td>123.6</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>151.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raw Hides and Skins</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Wool</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raw Cotton (other than linters)</td>
<td>398.9</td>
<td>578.9</td>
<td>503.4</td>
<td>389.8</td>
<td>418.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton Waste not Carded</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs and Chemicals</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>109.5</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and Leather Products</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>107.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and Paper Board</td>
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<td>70.2</td>
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<td>48.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining, Construction and Other Industrial Machinery</td>
<td>72.1</td>
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<td>70.9</td>
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<td>69.7</td>
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<td>Footwear</td>
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<td>18.4</td>
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<td>Toys, Games and Sporting Goods</td>
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<td>27.2</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3381.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3488.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes re-exports, both to rest-of-world and to East Bengal (sea and air). Values of air-borne exports to East Bengal were estimated from quantities shown in lbs.

**Source:** U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad.
PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS

Principal Trading Partners, Imports and Exports, Rank and Percent of Total, FY 1965-71

(Rupees Million and Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category/Country</th>
<th>FY 67 Rank</th>
<th>FY 67 %</th>
<th>FY 68 Rank</th>
<th>FY 68 %</th>
<th>FY 69 Rank</th>
<th>FY 69 %</th>
<th>FY 70 Rank</th>
<th>FY 70 %</th>
<th>FY 71 Rank</th>
<th>FY 71 %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<td>Netherland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal % Total</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>73.2</td>
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### II. Exports

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<td>Principal % Total</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>76.6</td>
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**Source:** U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad.
### CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE

**CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE BY SOURCES, FY 1966-70**

(Rupees Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/Functions</th>
<th>Audited Accounts FY 66</th>
<th>Budget Accounts FY 67</th>
<th>Revised Budget FY 69</th>
<th>Budget FY 70</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 67</td>
<td>FY 68</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Current Revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Tax Revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. International Trade</td>
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<td>2. Income</td>
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<td>3. Excises</td>
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<td>4. Sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Wealth, Gift, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Non-Tax Revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. GOP Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Interest (ex. Inter-government)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Charges &amp; Misc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Extraordinary</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Interest from Provinces</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Capital Receipts</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Domestic Debt (Net)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Other Domestic</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Principal from Provinces</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Surplus on Current Account (Net)</td>
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<td>E. Inter-governmental Surplus</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. External Capital Receipts:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Foreign exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Rupees</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Cash Balance Utilisation</td>
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</table>

*Includes former East Pakistan.

### CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

**Central Government Expenditure by Functions, FY 1966-70**

(Rupees Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/Functions</th>
<th>Audited Accounts FY 66</th>
<th>Budget Accounts FY 67</th>
<th>Revised Budget Accounts FY 69</th>
<th>Budget Accounts FY 70</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Current Expenditures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Revenue Collection</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>53.0</td>
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<td>B. Debt Service (Interest)</td>
<td>460.0</td>
<td>535.3</td>
<td>621.9</td>
<td>769.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Civil Administration</td>
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<td>460.7</td>
<td>523.5</td>
<td>605.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Civil Works</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Defence</td>
<td>2855.3</td>
<td>2293.5</td>
<td>2450.0</td>
<td>2600.0</td>
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<td>F. Current Development Costs</td>
<td>179.3</td>
<td>121.2</td>
<td>192.6</td>
<td>190.7</td>
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<td>24.6</td>
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<td>A. Defence</td>
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<td>(b) Rupees</td>
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<td>304.7</td>
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*Includes former East Pakistan.

**Source:** U.S. Agency for International Development, Islamabad.